Land Titles and Deeds Page |1

G.R. No. 111141. March 6, 1998.* states that “x x x (o)rdinary acquisitive prescription of things requires
possession in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.” Hence, a
MARIO Z. TITONG, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
prescriptive title to real estate is not acquired by mere possession thereof
APPEALS (4th Division), VICTORICO LAURIO and ANGELES LAURIO,
under claim of ownership for a period of ten years unless such possession
respondents.
was acquired con justo titulo y buena fe (with color of title and good faith).
Civil Law; Property; Quieting of Title; The ground or reason for filing a The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the
complaint for quieting of title must be “an instrument, record, claim, person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could
encumbrance or proceeding.”—At the outset, we hold that the instant petition transmit his ownership. For purposes of prescription, there is just title when
must be denied for the reason that the lower court should have outrightly the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the
dismissed the complaint for quieting of title. The remedy of quieting of title modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights
may be availed of under the circumstances enumerated in the Civil Code: but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.
“ART. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest
Same; Same; Same; Petitioners have not satisfactorily met the requirements
therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
of good faith and just title.—Petitioners have not satisfactorily met the
proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact
requirements of good faith and just title. As aptly observed by the trial court,
invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said
the plaintiff’s admitted acts of converting the boundary line (Bugsayon River)
title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. An
into a ricefield and thereafter claiming ownership thereof were acts
action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to
constituting deprivation of the rights of others and therefore “tantamount to
real property or any interest therein.” Under this provision, a claimant must
bad faith.” To allow petitioner to benefit from his own wrong would run
show that there is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
counter to the maxim ex dolo malo non oritur actio (no man can be allowed to
which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the
found a claim upon his own wrongdoing). Extraordinary acquisitive
owner’s title to or interest in real property. The ground or reason for filing a
prescription cannot similarly vest ownership over the property upon
complaint for quieting of title must therefore be “an instrument, record, claim,
petitioner. Art. 1137 of the Civil Code states that “(o)wnership and other real
encumbrance or proceeding.” Under the maxim expresio unius est exclusio
rights over immovables prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession
alterius, these grounds are exclusive so that other reasons outside of the
thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.” Petitioner’s
purview of these reasons may not be considered valid for the same action.
alleged possession in 1962 up to September 1983 when private respondents
Same; Same; Same; The acts alleged may be considered grounds for an entered the property in question spanned twenty-one (21) years. This period
action for forcible entry but definitely not one for quieting of title.—He prayed of time is short of the thirty-year requirement mandated by Art. 1137.
that, aside from issuing a writ or preliminary injunction enjoining private
Same; Same; Same; A survey, not being a conveyance, is not a mode of
respondents and their hired laborers from intruding into the land, the court
acquiring ownership.—A survey is the act by which the quantity of a parcel of
should declare him “the true and absolute owner” thereof. Hence, through his
land is ascertained and also a paper containing a statement of courses,
allegations, what petitioner imagined as clouds cast on his title to the
distances, and quantity of land. A survey under a proprietary title is not a
property were private respondents’ alleged acts of physical intrusion into his
conveyance. It is an instrument sui generis in the nature of a partition; a
purported property. Clearly, the acts alleged may be considered grounds for
customary mode in which a proprietor has set off to himself in severalty a
an action for forcible entry but definitely not one for quieting of title.
part of the common estate. Therefore, a survey, not being a conveyance, is
Same; Same; Prescription; A prescription title to real estate is not acquired not a mode of acquiring ownership. A fortiori, petitioner cannot found his
by mere possession thereof under claim of ownership for a period of ten claim on the survey plan reflecting a subdivision of land because it is not
years unless such possession was acquired con justo titulo y buena fe (with conclusive as to ownership as it may refer only to a delineation of
color of title and good faith).—Petitioner’s claim that he acquired ownership possession.
over the disputed land through possession for more than twenty (20) years is
Same; Same; Same; A survey plan not verified and approved by the Bureau
likewise unmeritorious. While Art. 1134 of the Civil Code provides that
of Lands is nothing more than a private writing, the due execution and
“(o)wnership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by
authenticity of which must be proven in accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule 132
ordinary prescription through possession of ten years,” this provision of law
of the Rules of Court.—Furthermore, the plan was not verified and approved
must be read in conjunction with Art. 1117 of the same Code. This article
by the Bureau of Lands in accordance with Sec. 28, paragraph 5 of Act No.

2259, the Cadastral Act, as amended by Sec. 1862 of Act No. 2711. Said law
ordains that private surveyors send their original field notes, computations,
reports, surveys, maps and plots regarding a piece of property to the Bureau
of Lands for verification and approval. A survey plan not verified and
approved by said Bureau is nothing more than a private writing, the due
execution and authenticity of which must be proven in accordance with Sec.
20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The circumstance that the plan was
admitted in evidence without any objection as to its due execution and
authenticity does not signify that the courts shall give probative value
therefor. To admit evidence and not to believe it subsequently are not
contradictory to each other. This Court cannot alter the conclusions of the
Court of Appeals on the credibility accorded to evidence presented by the
parties.
Same; Same; Ownership; A tax declaration, by itself, is not considered
conclusive evidence of ownership.—Similarly, petitioner’s tax declaration
issued under his name is not even persuasive evidence of his claimed
ownership over the land in dispute. A tax declaration, by itself, is not
considered conclusive evidence of ownership. It is merely an indicium of a
claim of ownership. Because it does not by itself give title, it is of little value in
proving one’s ownership.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Rodolfo A. Manlapaz for petitioner.
     Regino B. Tambago for private respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Like a priceless treasure coveted by many, but capable of ownership by only
one, this 20,592 square-meter parcel of land located at Barrio Titong,
Masbate, Masbate is claimed by two contestants in this petition for review on
certiorari. Unfortunately, legal title over the property can be vested in only
one of them.
The case originated from an action for quieting of title filed by petitioner Mario
Titong. The Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate, Branch 441 ruled in
favor of private respondents, Victorico Laurio and Angeles Laurio, adjudging
them as the true and lawful owners of the disputed land. Affirmed on appeal
to the Court of Appeals, petitioner comes to us for a favorable reversal.
Petitioner alleges that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel of land with
an area of 3.2800 hectares, more or less, surveyed as Lot No. 3918, and
declared for taxation purposes in his name. He claims that on three separate
occasions in September 1983, private respondents, with their hired laborers,
forcibly entered a portion of the land containing an area of approximately two
Land Titles and Deeds Page |2
(2) hectares, and began plowing the same under pretext of ownership.
Private respondents denied this allegation, and averred that the disputed
property formed part of the 5.5-hectare agricultural land which they had
purchased from their predecessor-in-interest,2 Pablo Espinosa on August 10,
1981.
In his testimony, petitioner identified Espinosa as his adjoining owner,3
asserting that no controversy had sprouted between them for twenty years
until the latter sold Lot No. 3479 to private respondent Victorico Laurio.4 This
was corroborated by Ignacio Villamor, who had worked on the land even
before its sale to Espinosa in 1962. The boundary between the land sold to
Espinosa and what remained of petitioner’s property was the old Bugsayon
river. When petitioner employed Bienvenido Lerit as his tenant in 1962, he
instructed Lerit to change the course of the old river and direct the flow of
water to the lowland at the southern portion of petitioner’s property, thus
converting the old river into a riceland.5
For his part, private respondent anchors his defense on the following facts:
He denied petitioner’s claim of ownership, recounting that the area and
boundaries of the disputed land remained unaltered during the series of
conveyances prior to its coming into his hands. According to him, petitioner
first declared the land for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No.
2916,6 which showed that the land had an area of 5.5 hectares and was
bounded on the North by the Bugsayon River; on the East by property under
the ownership of Lucio Lerit; on the South by property owner by Potenciano
Zaragoza; and on the West by property owned by Agapito de la Cruz.7
Private Respondent then alleges that, on December 21, 1960, petitioner sold
this property to Concepcion Verano vda. de Cabug, after which Tax
Declaration No. 53398 was issued in her favor. In compliance with their
mutual agreement to repurchase the same, petitioner reacquired the property
by way of sale9 on August 24, 1962 and then declared it for taxation
purposes in his name under Tax Declaration No. 5720.10 However, the
property remained in petitioner’s hands for only four (4) days because, on
August 28, 1962, he sold it to Espinosa11 who then declared it in his name
under Tax Declaration No. 12311.12 Consequently, the property became a
part of the estate of Pablo Espinosa’s wife, the late Segundina Liao
Espinosa. On August 10, 1981, her heirs executed an instrument
denominated as “Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Simultaneous Sale”
whereby the 5.5-hectare property under Tax Declaration No. 12311 was sold
to private respondent13 in consideration of the amount of P5,000.00.
Thereafter, Tax Declaration No. 12738 was issued in the name of private
respondent. In all these conveyances, the area and boundaries of the
property remained exactly the same as those appearing in Tax Declaration
No. 2916 under petitioner’s name.

It was proved at the proceedings in the court a quo that two (2) surveys were
made of the disputed property. The first survey14 was made for petitioner,
while the second was the relocation survey ordered by the lower court. As
anticipated, certain discrepancies between the two surveys surfaced. Thus,
contrary to petitioner’s allegation in his complaint that he is the owner of only
3.2800 hectares, he was actually claiming 5.9789 hectares, the total areas of
Lot Nos. 3918, 3918-A and 3606. On the other hand, Lot No. 3479 pertaining
to Espinosa, was left with only an area of 4.1841 hectares instead of the 5.5
hectares sold by petitioner to him. Apprised of the discrepancy, private
respondent filed a protest15 before the Bureau of Lands against the first
survey, likewise filing a case for alteration of boundaries before the municipal
trial court, the proceedings of which, however, were suspended because of
the instant case.16
Private respondent testified that petitioner is one of the four heirs of his
mother, Leonida Zaragoza. In the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale of Estate
of the deceased Leonida Zaragoza,17 the heirs adjudicated unto themselves
the 3.6hectare property of the deceased. The property involved is described
in the instrument as having been declared under Tax Declaration No. 330118
and as bounded on the North by Victor Verano, on the East by Benigno
Titong, on the South by the Bugsayon River and on the West by Benigno
Titong. On September 9, 1969, Tax Declaration No. 8723 was issued to
petitioner for his corresponding share in the estate.
However, instead of reflecting only .9000 hectare as his rightful share in the
extrajudicial settlement19 petitioner’s share was bloated to 2.4 hectares. It
therefore appeared to private respondent that petitioner encroached upon his
(Laurio’s) property and declared it a part of his inheritance.20
The boundaries were likewise altered so that it was bounded on the North by
Victor Verano, on the East by Benigno Titong, on the South by property
owner Espinosa, and on the West by property owner Adolfo Titong.21 Private
respondent accordingly denied that petitioner had diverted the course of the
Bugsayon River after he had repurchased the land from Concepcion Verano
vda. de Cabug22 because the land was immediately sold to Espinosa shortly
thereafter.23
The lower court rendered a decision in favor of private respondents,
declaring him as the true and absolute owner of the litigated property and
ordering petitioner to respect private respondents’ title and ownership over
the property and to pay attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, costs and moral
damages.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision. On
motion for reconsideration, the same was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari.
Land Titles and Deeds Page |3
At the outset, we hold that the instant petition must be denied for the reason
that the lower court should have outrightly dismissed the complaint for
quieting of title. The remedy of quieting of title may be availed of under the
circumstances enumerated in the Civil Code:
“ART. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest
therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact
invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said
title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title
to real property or any interest therein.”
Under this provision, a claimant must show that there is an instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud,
doubt, question or shadow upon the owner’s title to or interest in real
property.24 The ground or reason for filing a complaint for quieting of title
must therefore be “an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding.” Under the maxim expresio unius est exclusio alterius, these
grounds are exclusive so that other reasons outside of the purview of these
reasons may not be considered valid for the same action.25
Had the lower court thoroughly considered the complaint filed, it would have
had no other course of action under the law but to dismiss it. The complaint
failed to allege that an “instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding” beclouded the plaintiff’s title over the property involved.
Petitioner merely alleged that the defendants (respondents herein), together
with their hired laborers and without legal justification, forcibly entered the
southern portion of the land of the plaintiff and plowed the same.
He then proceeded to claim damages and attorney’s fees. He prayed that,
aside from issuing a writ or preliminary injunction enjoining private
respondents and their hired laborers from intruding into the land, the court
should declare him “the true and absolute owner” thereof. Hence, through his
allegations, what petitioner imagined as clouds cast on his title to the
property were private respondents’ alleged acts of physical intrusion into his
purported property. Clearly, the acts alleged may be considered grounds for
an action for forcible entry but definitely not one for quieting of title.
When the issues were joined by the filing of the answer to the complaint, it
would have become apparent to the court that the case was a boundary
dispute. The answer alleged, among other matters, that petitioner, “in bad
faith, surreptitiously, maliciously and fraudulently had the land in question
included in the survey of his land which extends to the south only as far as
the Bugsayon River which is the visible and natural and common boundary
between the properties.”26 Moreover, during the hearing of the case,

petitioner proved that it was actually a boundary dispute by evidence showing
what he considered as the boundary of his property which private
respondents perceived as actually encroaching on their property. In this
regard, the following pronouncements of the Court are apropos:
“x x x (T)he trial court (and likewise the respondent Court) cannot, in an
action for quieting of title, order the determination of the boundaries of the
claimed property, as that would be tantamount to awarding to one or some of
the parties the disputed property in an action where the sole issue is limited
to whether the instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
involved constitutes a cloud upon the petitioners’ interest or title in and to
said property. Such determination of boundaries is appropriate in adversarial
proceedings where possession or ownership may properly be considered
and where evidence aliunde, other than the ‘instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding’ itself, may be introduced. An action for forcible
entry, whenever warranted by the period prescribed in Rule 70, or for
recovery of possession de facto, also within the prescribed period, may be
availed of by the petitioners, in which proceeding the boundary dispute may
be fully threshed out.”27
Nonetheless, even if the complaint below were to be considered as a valid
one for quieting of title, still, the instant petition for review on certiorari must
fail.
As a general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and
conclusive upon this Court. Such factual findings shall not be disturbed
normally unless the same are palpably unsupported by the evidence on
record or the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts.28 Upon
an examination of the records, the Court finds no evident reason to depart
from the general rule.
The courts below correctly held that when petitioner “sold, ceded, transferred
and conveyed” the 5.5-hectare land in favor of Pablo Espinosa, his rights of
ownership and possession pertaining thereto ceased and these were
transferred to the latter. In the same manner, Espinosa’s rights of ownership
over the land ceased and were transferred to private respondent upon its
sale to the latter. This finds justification in the Civil Code, as follows:
“ART. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates
himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and
the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.
A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional.”
In other words, a sale is a contract transferring dominion and other real rights
in the thing sold.29 In the case at bar, petitioner’s claim of ownership must of
necessity fail because he has long abdicated his rights over the land when he
sold it to private respondent’s predecessor-in-interest.
Land Titles and Deeds Page |4
Petitioner’s claim that he acquired ownership over the disputed land through
possession for more than twenty (20) years is likewise unmeritorious. While
Art. 1134 of the Civil Code provides that “(o)wnership and other real rights
over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through
possession of ten years,” this provision of law must be read in conjunction
with Art. 1117 of the same Code. This article states that “x x x (o)rdinary
acquisitive prescription of things requires possession in good faith and with
just title for the time fixed by law.” Hence, a prescriptive title to real estate is
not acquired by mere possession thereof under claim of ownership for a
period of ten years unless such possession was acquired con justo titulo y
buena fe (with color of title and good faith).30 The good faith of the
possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he
received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his
ownership.31 For purposes of prescription, there is just title when the
adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the
modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights
but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.32
Petitioners have not satisfactorily met the requirements of good faith and just
title. As aptly observed by the trial court, the plaintiff’s admitted acts of
converting the boundary line (Bugsayon River) into a ricefield and thereafter
claiming ownership thereof were acts constituting deprivation of the rights of
others and therefore “tantamount to bad faith.”33 To allow petitioner to
benefit from his own wrong would run counter to the maxim ex dolo malo non
oritur actio (no man can be allowed to found a claim upon his own
wrongdoing). Extraordinary acquisitive prescription cannot similarly vest
ownership over the property upon petitioner. Art. 1137 of the Civil Code
states that “(o)wnership and other real rights over immovables prescribe
through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without
need of title or of good faith.” Petitioner’s alleged possession in 1962 up to
September 1983 when private respondents entered the property in question
spanned twenty-one (21) years. This period of time is short of the thirty-year
requirement mandated by Art. 1137.
Petitioner basically anchors his claim over the property on the survey plan
prepared upon his request,34 the tax declaration in his name,35 the
commissioner’s report on the relocation survey,36 and the survey plan.37
Respondent court correctly held that these documents do not conclusively
demonstrate petitioner’s title over Lot Nos. 3918-A and 3606.
A survey is the act by which the quantity of a parcel of land is ascertained
and also a paper containing a statement of courses, distances, and quantity
of land.38 A survey under a proprietary title is not a conveyance. It is an
instrument sui generis in the nature of a partition; a customary mode in which
a proprietor has set off to himself in severalty a part of the common estate.39
Therefore, a survey, not being a conveyance, is not a mode of acquiring
 Land Titles and Deeds Page |5

ownership. A fortiori, petitioner cannot found his claim on the survey plan misapprehended the lower court’s decision or he is trying to contumaciously
reflecting a subdivision of land because it is not conclusive as to ownership mislead or worse, deceive this Court.
as it may refer only to a delineation of possession.40 With respect to the awards of moral damages of P10,000.00 and attorney’s
Furthermore, the plan was not verified and approved by the Bureau of Lands fees of P2,000.00, the Court finds no cogent reason to delete the same.
in accordance with Sec. 28, paragraph 5 of Act No. 2259, the Cadastral Act, Jurisprudence is replete with rulings to the effect that where fraud and bad
as amended by Sec. 1862 of Act No. 2711. Said law ordains that private faith have been established, the award of moral damages is in order.48 This
surveyors send their original field notes, computations, reports, surveys, pronouncement finds support in Art. 2219 (10) of the Civil Code allowing the
maps and plots regarding a piece of property to the Bureau of Lands for recovery of moral damages for acts enumerated in Art. 21 of the same Code.
verification and approval.41 A survey plan not verified and approved by said This article states that “(a)ny person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
Bureau is nothing more than a private writing, the due execution and another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
authenticity of which must be proven in accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 shall compensate the latter for the damage.” The moral damages are hereby
of the Rules of Court. The circumstance that the plan was admitted in increased to P30,000.00. We agree with the respondent court in holding that
evidence without any objection as to its due execution and authenticity does the award of attorney’s fees is justified because petitioner filed a clearly
not signify that the courts shall give probative value therefor. To admit unfounded civil action.49
evidence and not to believe it subsequently are not contradictory to each WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby
other. This Court cannot alter the conclusions of the Court of Appeals on the DENIED and the questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
credibility accorded to evidence presented by the parties.42 This Decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.
Similarly, petitioner’s tax declaration issued under his name is not even SO ORDERED.
persuasive evidence of his claimed ownership over the land in dispute. A tax
declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive evidence of ownership.43      Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Kapunan and Purisima, JJ., concur.
It is merely an indicium of a claim of ownership.44 Because it does not by Petition denied; Questioned decision affirmed.
itself give title, it is of little value in proving one’s ownership.45 Moreover, the
incompatibility in petitioner’s tax declaration and the commissioner’s report as Note.—Tax receipts and declaration of ownership for taxation when
regards the area of his claimed property is much too glaring to be ignored. coupled with proof of actual possession of the property can be the basis of
Tax Declaration No. 8717 states that petitioner’s property has an area of claim of ownership through prescription. (Heirs of Placido Miranda vs. Court
3.2800 hectares while the totality of his claim according to the commissioned of Appeals, 255 SCRA 368 [1996])
geodetic engineer’s survey amounts to 4.1385 hectares. There is therefore a ——o0o——
notable discrepancy of 8,585 square meters. On the other hand, private
respondent’s claimed property, as borne out by Tax Declaration No. 12738,
totals 5.5 hectares, a more proximate equivalent of the 5.2433hectare
property as shown by the commissioner’s report.
There is also nothing in the commissioner’s report that substantiates
petitioner’s claim that the disputed land was inside his property. Petitioner
capitalizes on the lower court’s statement in its decision46 that “as reflected
in the commissioner’s report dated May 23, 1984 (Exhibit 3-3-A), the area
claimed is inside lot 3918 of the defendants (Exhibit 2)”47 or the private
respondents. A careful reading of the decision would show that this
statement is found in the summary of defendants’ (herein private
respondents) evidence. Reference to Lot No. 3918 may, therefore, be
attributed to mere oversight as the lower court even continues to state the
defendants’ assertion that the 2-hectare land is part of their 5.5hectare
property. Hence, it is not amiss to conclude that either petitioner

[No. 40177. March 15, 1934]
Li SENG GIAP & Co., applicant and appellant, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, oppositor and appellee.
1.REGISTRATION OF LAND; AGRICULTURAL LANDS; REVERSION OF
LAND TO THE STATE.—By virtue of the provisions of article 80 of the
regulations for the carrying out of the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, the
three parcels of land in question reverted to the State as property of the
public domain upon the expiration of the period specified therein, by reason
of the negligence of the possessors thereof.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; GRATUITOUS
TITLE TO PROPERTY.—A gratuitous title to property may be issued only to
natives of the Philippine Islands who are in possession of the necessary
qualifications specified in the Organic Law of the Philippine Islands. Act No.
926 could not have had a different scope from that given it by the aforecited
Act of Congress and, therefore, the phrase "all persons" employed in
paragraph 6 of section 54 of the former Act should be understood to mean
only "citizens of the Philippine Islands" or "citizens of the United States or of
any insular possession thereof".
3.ID. ; ID.; ID.—By virtue of the Maura Law, the parcels of land under
consideration reverted to the State after April 17, 1895, on the ground that
they were not property held in private ownership. Neither were they prior to
nor after the aforesaid date. The applicant herein did not show any title
thereto either by possessory proceedings or otherwise, which may be
considered as having been issued by the Government, in support of its claim.
4.ID. ; ID. PUBLIC LANDS ; PRESCRIPTION.—The law expressly provides
that no public land is susceptible to acquisition by prescription. Neither does
such mode of acquisition hold as against the Government, in accordance
with the express provisions of paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926
invoked by the applicant.
5.ID. ; ID. ; ALIENS.—The provisions of section 54 of Act No. 926 as well as
those of section 45, paragraph (b), of Act No. 2874 should necessarily be so
construed as not to permit aliens to obtain title to lands in their favor. It
should not be understood, however, that the constitutional guaranty that no
person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is violated thereby.
6.ID.; ID.; ID.; SUPREME AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF THE STATE.—
Superior to the law which protects personal liberty, and the agreements
which exist between nations for their own interest and for the benefit of their
respective subjects is the supreme and fundamental right of each State to
self-preservation and the integrity of its dominion and its sovereignty.
7.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; REASONS OF PUBLIC POLICY.—It is upon grounds of
public policy that the rights of individuals, particularly of aliens, cannot prevail
Land Titles and Deeds Page |6
against the aforesaid right of the Government of the Philippine Islands, and
more particularly when, as in this case, far from violating any constitutional
law, it deals precisely with the enforcement of the provisions of the first
organic law of the country and of the Jones Law (section
9), to the effect that lands of the public domain should not be disposed of or
alienated to persons who are not inhabitants or citizens of the Philippine
Islands.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur.
Villareal, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Manly & Reyes for appellant.
Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
DlAZ, J.:
On August 16, 1932, Li Seng Giap & Co., a partnership composed of
individuals who are not citizens of the Philippine Islands nor of the United
States, but aliens, instituted these proceedings in the Court of First Instance
of Camarines Sur, for the registration in its name in the registry of deeds, of
the three parcels of land described in the plans Exhibits A and B, and
technical descriptions attached to its application, in accordance with the
provisions of Act No. 496 and of Chapter VIII or Title II of Act No. 2874.
The Director of Lands filed an opposition to the said application alleging as
his grounds that the three parcels of land in question were public lands
belonging to the Government of the United States under the administration
and control of the Government of the Philippine Islands, and that, being an
alien, the applicant partnership cannot invoke the benefits of the provisions of
section 45 of the said Act No. 2874. The aforecited section is contained in
Chapter VIII of Title II of the said Act invoked by the applicant. The Director of
Lands has made no reference to Act No. 496 in his opposition for the reason
that the Act in question merely prescribes, in general terms, the manner or
procedure to be followed by an applicant in the obtainment of the certificate
of title applied for, or in the denial or issuance thereof, as the case may be,
by the court or by the Government agencies therein mentioned.  
After the trial, the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur rendered
judgment therein denying the application of the applicant partnership on the
ground that it is an alien, and holding, at the same time, that the parcels of
land it sought to register in its name are a portion of the public domain. The
said applicant took exception to and appealed from such judgment, claiming
that the trial court committed the following alleged errors, to wit:

I. The trial court erred in holding that the applicant, Li Seng Giap & Co. being
a partnership made up of individuals who are neither citizens of the
Philippine Islands nor of the United States, is not entitled, for this reason, to
register the land described in its application under the provisions of the Land
Registration Act.   State deems wise to reserve for reasons of public utility.
II. The lower court also erred in declaring the land described in the
application a part of the public domain.  
III. The lower court also erred in denying the applicant's motion for
reconsideration as well as its motion for new trial.
It is unnecessary to discuss the nature of the three parcels of land in
question. The record shows that they are agricultural lands which at present
contain coconut trees, abaca and cacao with which they have been planted
for over forty years. The coconut trees there on range from one to forty years
in age. The said three parcels had likewise been cultivated and had actually
been occupied for many years during the Spanish regime by several natives
of the Province of Camarines Sur, named Inocencio Salon, Lazaro Ceron,
Margarita Labordes, Doroteo Quitales and Cornelio Vargas. The occupation
or possession thereof by the above-named persons was under claim of
ownership but neither the exact date when such possession began nor the
circumstances under which they acquired the property in question has been
determined. However, it seems certain that such occupation began some
fifty-five years ago and continued without interruption from that time until said
persons decide to sell them to Sebastian Palanca who is also an alien like
the herein applicant. Neither is there anything of record to show when the
sale was made but it also seems certain that it took place during the Spanish
regime. Sebastian Palanca continued in possession of the aforesaid three
parcels of land from the time he acquired them in the manner hereinbefore
stated until July 22, 1930, when he sold them to the herein applicant-
appellant. However, before selling them and while he was in possession
thereof under claim of ownership, as alleged, he failed to obtain a gratuitous
title or even a mere possessory information therefor, which would serve to
protect his claim of ownership, by taking advantage of the benefits afforded
by the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, which was promulgated in the
Philippines and published in the Gaceta de Manila, No. 106, of April 17th of
the same year.   of April, 1895.
The pertinent parts of said decree, which are also articles 1, 19 and 21 of the
Maura Law, and which had been in force in the Philippines during the last
years of the Spanish regime and continued to be so until the enactment of
the Public Land Act and the amendments thereto, read as follows:
Land Titles and Deeds Page |7
ARTICLE 1. All uncultivated lands, soil, earth, and mountains not included in
the following exceptions shall be considered alienable public lands: First,
those which have become subjected to private ownership and have a
legitimate owner. Second, those which belong to the forest zones which the
xxx     xxx     xxx
ART. 19. Possessors of alienable public lands under cultivation who have not
obtained nor applied for composition on the date this decree shall be
published in the Gaceta de Manila, may obtain a gratuitous title of property,
by means of a possessory information in conformity with the law of civil
procedure and the mortgage law whenever they establish any of the following
conditions:
First. Having, or having had, them under cultivation without interruption
during the preceding six years.  
Second. Having had possession of them for twelve consecutive years, and
having had them under cultivation until the date of the information, and for
three years before that date.  
Third. Having had them in possession ostensibly and without interruption, for
thirty or more years, although the land is not under cultivation.
xxx     xxx     xxx
ART. 21. A term of one year, without grace, is granted order to perfect the
informations referred to in articles 19 and 20.
Article 80 of the regulations for the carrying out of the Royal Decree above-
mentioned provided as follows:
ART. 80. By virtue of the provision of article 21 of the Royal Decree of
February 13, 1894, the inextensible period for carrying out the informations
referred to in the two preceding articles, shall be counted as on the 17th day
 
Upon the expiration of this period the right of cultivator and possessors to the
obtainment of free title shall lapse, and the full property right in the land shall
revert to the State or, in a proper case, to the public domain.

Therefore, there can be no doubt but that under the last aforecited article the
three parcels of land in question reverted to the State as property of the
public domain upon the expiration of the period specified therein, by reason
of negligence on the part of the possessors thereof.   eighteen hundred and ninety-four, but who failed to receive title therefor
The applicant-appellant contends that under the provisions of section 54,
paragraph 6, of Act No. 926, it has necessarily acquired the right to have the
corresponding certificate of title issued to it upon registration of the said
parcels of land in its name in the registry of deeds, inasmuch as it had
actually been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
thereof, under claim of ownership, not only by itself but also through
Sebastian Palanca from whom it had purchased them, for more than ten
years prior to July 26, 1904, the date on which the aforesaid Act went into
effect, in accordance with the proclamation of the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands of the same date.   in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
The section invoked by the applicant-appellant reads as follows:
SEC. 54. The following-described persons or their legal successors in right,
occupying public lands in the Philippine Islands, or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles to such lands have not been
perfected, may apply to the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine
Islands for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor to wit:
1. All persons who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the
United States had fulfilled all the conditions required by the Spanish laws and
royal decrees of the Kingdom of Spain for the purchase of public lands,
including the payment of the purchase price, but who failed to secure formal
conveyance of title;
2. All persons who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the
United States, having applied for the purchase of public lands and having
secured a survey, auction, and an award, or a right to an award, of such
lands, did not receive title therefor through no default upon their part;
3. All persons who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the
United States, having applied for the purchase of public lands and having
secured a survey and award of same, did not, through negligence upon their
part, comply with the conditions of full or any payment therefor, but who after
such survey and award shall have occupied the land adversely, except as
prevented by war or force majeure  until the taking effect of this Act;
Land Titles and Deeds Page |8
4. All persons who were entitled to apply and did apply for adjustment or
composition of title to lands against the Government under the Spanish laws
and royal decrees in force prior to the royal decree of February thirteenth,
through no default upon their part;
5. All persons who were entitled to a gratuitous title to public lands by
"possessory proceedings" under the provisions of articles nineteen and
twenty of the royal decree of the King of Spain issued February thirteenth,
eighteen hundred and ninety-four, and who, having complied with all the
conditions therein required, failed to receive the title therefor through no
default upon their part; and
6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been
of agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act of Congress of July first,
nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as
against the Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the taking
effect of this Act, except when prevented by war or force majeure, shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title to such land under the provisions of this chapter.  
All applicants for lands under paragraphs one, two, three, four and five of this
section must establish by proper official records or documents that such
proceedings as are therein required were taken and the necessary conditions
complied with: Provided, however, That such requirements shall not apply to
the fact of adverse possession.
It may be noted that the case of the applicant does not come under
paragraph 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 of the aforecited section, which, by the way,
conclusively shows that prior to the enactment of Act No. 926, the said Maura
Law was the last law which regulated the acquisition of alienable public lands
and the issuance of the corresponding title to those who could establish their
claim that they were entitled thereto. Being aware of this fact, the applicant
has never invoked said paragraphs. He merely confines himself to invoking
the provisions of paragraph 6 thereof, in support of which he cites the rulings
of this court in the cases of Tan Yungquip vs. Director of Lands (42 Phil.,
128) and of Central Capiz vs. Ramirez  (40 Phil., 883).  
In the former case, it was held that inasmuch as the applicant Tan Yungquip,
who was a Chinaman, had proven: That he had acquired the parcels of land
which he sought to register in his name, some by purchase and others by

inheritance; that he and his predecessors in interest had been in the open,
peaceful, continuous and notorious possession of the same for at least thirty
years, and that such parcels of land were agricultural lands, therefore, he
was entitled to have them registered in his name under the provisions of the
aforecited section 54 of Act No. 926, for the reason that he filed his
application to that effect more than one year prior to the enactment and
enforcement of Act No. 2874. It was likewise held therein that the matter
should be decided in favor of said Tan Yungquip on the ground that no valid
law could be found, at least on that occasion, which prohibited the
registration in his name in the registry of deeds, of the parcels of land of
which he claimed to be the owner.   The very title of Act No. 926 above referred to shows that one of the
In the latter case above cited, that is, the case of Central Capiz vs. Ramirez,
it was likewise held that lands held in private ownership constitute no part of
the public domain and cannot, therefore, come within the purview of said Act
No. 2874 on the ground that said subject (lands held in private ownership) is
not embraced in any manner in the title of the Act, and that the intent of the
Legislature in enacting the same was to limit the application thereof
exclusively to lands of the public domain.   Islands, as authorized by sections thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, and sixty-two of
Although nothing has been said in the decision rendered in the aforecited
case of Tan Yungquip vs. Director of Lands to the effect that the application
of the therein applicant should be granted on the ground that the provisions
of section 54 of Act No. 926, which were therein under consideration and
interpretation, do not distinguish between citizens of the Philippine Islands or
of the United States and aliens, however, the appellant contends that the
aforecited section has such scope and that the question raised in this case
should be decided under the latter interpretation.   and empowered to enact rules and regulations and to prescribe terms and
We do not believe that the rulings it the aforecited two cases and that in the
case of Agari vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (42 Phil., 143), are
decisive and applicable to the case under consideration, on the ground that
although it is true that Agari, who was the applicant in the last case, was an
alien, it was likewise true that the persons, from whom he had acquired the
land which he sought to register in his name in the registry of deeds during
the time Act No. 926 was still in force, were natives of the Philippine Islands,
who, in turn, had acquired it through their father, who was likewise a native of
the Islands, by composition with the State in accordance with the laws then in
force; nor that, under the provisions of the aforecited section 54 of Act No.
926, the applicant-appellant Li Seng Giap & Co. could have succeeded in
securing the certificate of title which it now seeks; in the first place, because
the three aforecited decisions refer to cases which are different from the one
now under consideration; in the second place, because said decisions were
Land Titles and Deeds Page |9
based on the supposition that the parcels of land in question therein were of
private ownership and at that time no law was known to be in existence,
which prohibited the registration of said parcels of land in the registry of
deeds, in the name of the aforesaid applicants Tan Yungquip, Central Capiz
and Agari, and in the third place because while Act No. 926 was still in force
(it is no longer in force, having been expressly repealed by section 128 of Act
No. 2874, on December 28, 1919), it should have been interpreted in the light
of the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, commonly known as
the Organic Law of the Philippine Islands, inasmuch as the former had been
approved under the authority of sections 13, 14, 15 and 62 of the latter Act.
purposes for which it was approved was to carry out the provisions of
sections, 13, 14, 15 and 62 of the aforecited Act of Congress, which title
reads in part:
An Act . . . providing for the determination by the Philippines Court of Land
Registration of all proceedings for completion of imperfect titles and for the
cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in said
the Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, entitled "An Act
temporarily to provide for the administration of the affairs of civil government
in the Philippine Islands, and for other purposes".
Sections 14 and 15 of the aforesaid Act of Congress, which bear relation to
the question under consideration, provide as follows:
SEC. 14. That the government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized
conditions to enable persons to perfect their title to public lands in said
Islands, who, prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United
States, had fulfilled all or some of the conditions required by the Spanish
laws and royal decrees of the Kingdom of Spain for the acquisition of legal
title thereto, yet failed to secure conveyance of title; and the Philippine
Commission is authorized to issue patents, without compensation, to any
native of said Islands, conveying the title to any tract of land not more than
sixteen hectares in extent, which were public lands and had been actually
occupied by such native or his ancestors prior to and on the thirteenth of
August, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.  
s. SEC. 15. That the Government of the Philippine Islands in hereby
authorized and empowered, on such terms as it may prescribe, by general
legislation, to provide for the granting or sale and conveyance to actual
occupants and settlers and other citizens of said Islands such parts and

portions of the public domain, other than timber and mineral lands, of the
United States in said Islands as it may deem wise, not exceeding sixteen
hectares to any one person and for the sale and conveyance of not more
than one thousand and twenty-four hectares to any corporation or
association of persons: Provided, that the grant or sale of such lands,
whether the purchase price be paid at once or in partial payments, shall be
conditioned upon actual and continued occupancy, improvement, and
cultivation of the premises sold for a period of not less than five years, during
which time the purchaser or grantee cannot alienate or encumber said land
or the title thereto; but such restriction shall not apply to transfers of rights
and title of inheritance under the laws for the distribution of the estates of
decedents.
It may be noted that both of the above-cited sections provide that gratuitous
title to property may be issued only to natives of the Philippine Islands who
are in possession of the necessary qualifications specified therein. It may
therefore be inferred from the foregoing that Act No. 926 could not have a
different scope from that given it by the aforecited Act of Congress and,
therefore, the phrase "all persons" employed in paragraph 6 of section 54 of
the former Act should be understood to mean only citizens of the Philippine
Islands or citizens of the United States or of any insular possession thereof.   equal protection of the laws, is violated thereby, because, as this court has
The parcels of land involved in this case, which as hereinbefore stated, have
reverted to the State after April 17, 1895, by virtue of the Maura Law, not of
private ownership. Neither were they so on or after the aforesaid date. The
applicant herein did not show any title thereto either by possessory
proceedings or otherwise, which may be considered as having been issued
by the Government. The only basis on which it now claims the right to have
them registered in its name is its alleged possession thereof together with
that of Sebastian Palanca and of the former possessors, as if to say, that it is
entitled to the registration thereof in its name, inasmuch as the parcels of
land in question already belong to it, having acquired them by prescription
through the continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession thereof,
under claim of ownership, at least since the Spanish regime in the Philippine
Islands. However, the truth is that the law expressly provides that no public
land may be acquired by prescription, and that such mode of acquisition does
not hold as against the Government. This provision is contained precisely in
the very law invoked by the applicant, that is section 54, paragraph 6, of Act
No. 926. In the case of Ongsiaco vs. Magsilang (50 Phil., 380, 386), this
court said:
". . . in a controversy between private individuals, where the Government has
not intervened, and where it appears that the land has ceased to be of public
L a n d T i t l e s a n d D e e d s P a g e | 10
domain and has come to be of private ownership, a petitioner may obtain
registration of land upon a title acquired by adverse possession as against
individual opponents. The same rule does not maintain with respect to land
claimed by the Government and as to which the Government is opposing." In
the case of Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abad  (56 Phil., 75, 80),
this court, deciding a question similar to the one raised herein by the
appellant, said as follows: "Subsection ( b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874 is
not obnoxious to the constitutional provision relied upon by the appellant, as
depriving the appellant of property without due process of law. That provision
has reference to property to which the citizen has acquired a vested right. It
does not extend to privileges and inchoate rights which have never been
asserted or perfected. The contention of the appellant . . . is therefore without
merit." There is no justifiable reason for disturbing the holdings of this court in
the aforecited two cases. On the contrary, it is considered timely to reiterate
them herein inasmuch as they decide the same question.  
The provisions of section 54 of Act No. 926 as well as those of section 45,
paragraph ( b), of Act No. 2874 should necessarily be so construed as not to
permit aliens to obtain title to lands in their favor. It should not be understood,
however, that the constitutional guaranty that no person shall be denied the
said in the case of In re Patterson (1 Phil., 93, 95, 96), "Unquestionably every
State has a fundamental right to its existence and development, as also to
the integrity of its territory and the exclusive and peaceable possession of its
dominions which it may guard and defend by all possible means against any
attack . . . . Superior to the law which protects personal liberty, and the
agreements which exist between nations for their own interest and for the
benefit of their respective subjects is the supreme and fundamental right of
each State to self-preservation and the integrity of its dominion and its
sovereignty." It is upon grounds of public policy that the rights of individuals,
particularly of aliens, cannot prevail against the aforesaid right of the
Government of the Philippine Islands. and more particularly when, as in the
present case, far from violating any constitutional law, it deals precisely with
the enforcement of the provisions of the first organic law of the country and
those of the Jones Law (section 9), to the effect that lands of the public
domain should not be disposed of or alienated to persons who are not
inhabitants or citizens of the Philippine Islands.  
Wherefore, finding that the judgment appealed from is in accordance with the
law, it is hereby affirmed in toto, with the costs against the appellants. So
ordered.
 L a n d T i t l e s a n d D e e d s P a g e | 11

Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, and Butte,  JJ., concur.

Imperial, J., concur in the result.

Separate Opinion

STREET and GODDARD, JJ.,  dissenting:

It is settled by the decision of Central Capiz vs. Ramirez (40 Phil., 883), that
Act No. 2874 is applicable only to land of the public domain; and the
undersigned are of the opinion that the land which has been held in private
character from a date anterior to July 26, 1894, as occurred in the case of the
land which is the subject of this application, should not be considered public
domain. The land covered by this application should therefore have been
registered in the name of the applicants, exactly as was done in Tan
Yungquip vs. Director of Lands (42 Phil., 128). Any other interpretation
makes Act No. 2874, as applied to this land, subject to the objection that it
deprives the applicants of the equal protection of the law.

G.R. No. 92161. March 18, 1991.*
SIMPLICIO BINALAY, PONCIANO GANNABAN, NICANOR MACUTAY,
DOMINGO ROSALES, GREGORIO ARGONZA, EUSTAQUIO BAUA,
FLORENTINO ROSALES, TEODORO MABBORANG, PATRICIO
MABBORANG and FULGENCIO MORA, petitioners, vs. GUILLERMO
MANALO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Property; Ownership; Respondent Manalo did not acquire private ownership
of the bed of the eastern branch of the river even if the same was included in
the deeds of sale executed in his favor, because it constituted property of
public dominion.—Now, then, pursuant to Article 420 of the Civil Code,
respondent Manalo did not acquire private ownership of the bed of the
eastern branch of the river even if it was included in the deeds of absolute
sale executed by Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad in his favor. These
vendors could not have validly sold land that constituted property of public
dominion. x x x Although Article 420 speaks only of rivers and banks, “rivers”
is a composite term which includes: (1) the running waters, (2) the bed, and
(3) the banks.
Same; Same; Same; Accretion; Accretion, as a mode of acquiring ownership,
requires the concurrence of three (3) requisites: (a) that the deposition of soil
be gradual and imperceptible; (b) that it be the result of the action of the
waters of the river; and (c) that the land where accretion takes place is
adjacent to the banks of rivers.—We turn next to the issue of accretion. After
examining the records of the case, the Court considers that there was no
evidence to prove that Lot 821 is an increment to Lot 307 and the bed of the
eastern branch of the river. Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under
Article 457 of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of three (3) requisites:
(a) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (b)
that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (c)
that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers
(or the sea coast). The Court notes that the parcels of land bought by
respondent Manalo border on the eastern branch of the Cagayan River. Any
accretion formed by this eastern branch which respondent Manalo may claim
must be deposited on or attached to Lot 307. As it is, the claimed accretion
(Lot 821) lies on the bank of the river not adjacent to Lot 307 but directly
opposite Lot 307 across the river.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A sudden and forceful action like that of flooding
is not the alluvial process contemplated under Art. 457 of the Civil Code.—
Assuming (arguendo only) that the Cagayan River referred to in the Deeds of
Sale transferring ownership of the land to respondent Manalo is the western
branch, the decision of the Court of Appeals and of the trial court are bare of
factual findings to the effect that the land purchased by respondent Manalo
received alluvium from the action of the river in a slow and gradual manner.
L a n d T i t l e s a n d D e e d s P a g e | 12
On the contrary, the decision of the lower court made mention of several
floods that caused the land to reappear making it susceptible to cultivation. A
sudden and forceful action like that of flooding is hardly the alluvial process
contemplated under Article 457 of the Civil Code. It is the slow and hardly
perceptible accumulation of soil deposits that the law grants to the riparian
owner.
Same; Same; Quieting of Title; Under Art. 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff
in an action for quieting of title must at least have equitable title to or interest
in the real property which is the subject matter of the action.—If respondent
Manalo had proved prior possession, it was limited physically to Lot 307 and
the depressed portion or the eastern river bed. The testimony of Dominga
Malana who was a tenant for Justina Taccad did not indicate that she was
also cultivating Lot 821. In fact, the complaints for forcible entry lodged
before the Municipal Trial Court of Tumauini, Isabela pertained only to Lot
307 and the depressed portion or river bed and not to Lot 821. In the same
manner, the tax declarations presented by petitioners conflict with those of
respondent Manalo. Under Article 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff in an
action for quieting of title must at least have equitable title to or interest in the
real property which is the subject matter of the action. The evidence of record
on this point is less than satisfactory and the Court feels compelled to refrain
from determining the ownership and possession of Lot 821, adjudging neither
petitioners nor respondent Manalo as owner(s) thereof.
PETITION to review the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Josefin De Alban Law Office for petitioners.
FELICIANO, J.:
The late Judge Taccad originally owned a parcel of land situated in Tumauini,
Isabela having an estimated area of twenty (20) hectares. The western
portion of this land bordering on the Cagayan River has an elevation lower
than that of the eastern portion which borders on the national road. Through
the years, the western portion would periodically go under the waters of the
Cagayan River as those waters swelled with the coming of the rains. The
submerged portion, however, would reappear during the dry season from
January to August. It would remain under water for the rest of the year, that
is, from September to December during the rainy season.
The ownership of the landholding eventually moved from one person to
another. On 9 May 1959, respondent Guillermo Manalo acquired 8.65
hectares thereof from Faustina Taccad, daughter of Judge Juan Taccad. The
land sold was described in the Deed of Absolute Sale1 as follows:
“x x x a parcel of agricultural land in Balug, Tumauini, Isabela, containing an
area of 8.6500 hectares, more or less; bounded on the North by Francisco

Forto; on the East by National Road; on South by Julian Tumolva; and on the
West by Cagayan River; declared for taxation under Tax Declaration No.
12681 in the name of Faustina Taccad, and assessed at P750.00. x x x”
Later in 1964, respondent Manalo purchased another 1.80 hectares from
Gregorio Taguba who had earlier acquired the same from Judge Juan
Taccad. The second purchase brought the total acquisition of respondent
Manalo to 10.45 hectares. The second piece of property was more
particularly described as follows:
“x x x a piece of agricultural land consisting of tobacco land, and containing
an area of 18,000 square meters, more or less, bounded on the North by
Balug Creek; on the South, by Faustina Taccad (now Guillermo R. Manalo);
on the East, by a Provincial Road; and on the West, by Cagayan River
assessed at P440.00, as tax Declaration No. 3152. x x x”2
During the cadastral survey conducted at Balug, Tumauini, Isabela on 21
October 1969, the two (2) parcels of land belonging to respondent Manalo
were surveyed and consolidated into one lot, designated as Lot No. 307, Pls-
964. Lot 307 which contains 4.6489 hectares includes: (a) the whole of the
1.80 hectares acquired from Gregorio Taguba; and (b) 2.8489 hectares out of
the 8.65 hectares purchased from Faustina Taccad. As the survey was
conducted on a rainy month, a portion of the land bought from Faustina
Taccad then under water was left unsurveyed and was not included in Lot
307.
The Sketch Plan3 submitted during the trial of this case and which was
identified by respondent Manalo shows that the Cagayan River running from
south to north, forks at a certain point to form two (2) branches—the western
and the eastern branches—and then unites at the other end, further north, to
form a narrow strip of land. The eastern branch of the river cuts through the
land of respondent Manalo and is inundated with water only during the rainy
season. The bed of the eastern branch is the submerged or the unsurveyed
portion of the land belonging to respondent Manalo. For about eight (8)
months of the year when the level of water at the point where the Cagayan
River forks is at its ordinary depth, river water does not flow into the eastern
branch. While this condition persists, the eastern bed is dry and is
susceptible to cultivation.
Considering that water flowed through the eastern branch of the Cagayan
River when the cadastral survey was conducted, the elongated strip of land
formed by the western and the eastern branches of the Cagayan River
looked very much like an island. This strip of land was surveyed on 12
December 1969.4 It was found to have a total area of 22.7209 hectares and
was designated as Lot 821 and Lot 822. The area of Lot 822 is 10.8122
hectares while Lot 821 has an area of 11.9087 hectares. Lot 821 is located
directly opposite Lot 307 and is separated from the latter only by the eastern
L a n d T i t l e s a n d D e e d s P a g e | 13
branch of the Cagayan River during the rainy season and, during the dry
season, by the exposed, dry river bed, being a portion of the land bought
from Faustina Taccad. Respondent Manalo claims that Lot 821 also belongs
to him by way of accretion to the submerged portion of the property to which
it is adjacent.
Petitioners who are in possession of Lot 821, upon the other hand, insist that
they own Lot 821. They occupy the outer edges of Lot 821 along the river
banks, i.e., the fertile portions on which they plant tobacco and other
agricultural products. They also cultivate the western strip of the unsurveyed
portion during summer.5 This situation compelled respondent Manalo to file a
case for forcible entry against petitioners on 20 May 1969. The case was
dismissed by the Municipal Court of Tumauini, Isabela for failure of both
parties to appear. On 15 December 1972, respondent Manalo again filed a
case for forcible entry against petitioners. The latter case was similarly
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the Municipal Court of Tumauini, Isabela.
On 24 July 1974, respondent Manalo filed a complaint6 before the then Court
of First Instance of Isabela, Branch 3 for quieting of title, possession and
damages against petitioners. He alleged ownership of the two (2) parcels of
land he bought separately from Faustina Taccad and Gregorio Taguba for
which reason he prayed that judgment be entered ordering petitioners to
vacate the western strip of the unsurveyed portion. Respondent Manalo
likewise prayed that judgment be entered declaring him as owner of Lot 821
on which he had laid his claim during the survey.
Petitioners filed their answer denying the material allegations of the
complaint. The case was then set for trial for failure of the parties to reach an
amicable agreement or to enter into a stipulation of facts.7 On 10 November
1982, the trial court rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion:
“WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the Court renders
judgment against the defendants and in favor of the plaintiff and orders:
1. 1.
That plaintiff, Guillermo Manalo, is declared the lawful owner of the
land in question, Lot No. 821, Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and
which is more particularly described in paragraph 2-b of the
Complaint;
2. 2.
That the defendants are hereby ordered to vacate the premises of the
land in question, Lot No. 821, Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and
which is more particularly described in paragraph 2-b of the
Complaint;
3. 3.
That the defendants are being restrained from entering the premises

of the land in question, Lot No. 821, Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre,
and which is more particularly described in paragraph 2-b of the
Complaint; and
4. 4.
That there is no pronouncement as to attorney’s fees and costs.
SO ORDERED.”8
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which, however, affirmed the
decision of the trial court. They filed a motion for reconsideration, without
success.
While petitioners insist that Lot 821 is part of an island surrounded by the two
(2) branches of the Cagayan River, the Court of Appeals found otherwise.
The Court of Appeals concurred with the finding of the trial court that Lot 821
cannot be considered separate and distinct from Lot 307 since the eastern
branch of the Cagayan River substantially dries up for the most part of the
year such that when this happens, Lot 821 becomes physically (i.e., by land)
connected with the dried up bed owned by respondent Manalo. Both courts
below in effect rejected the assertion of petitioners that the depression on the
earth’s surface which separates Lot 307 and Lot 821 is, during part of the
year, the bed of the eastern branch of the Cagayan River.
It is a familiar rule that the findings of facts of the trial court are entitled to
great respect, and that they carry even more weight when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.9 This is in recognition of the peculiar advantage on the part
of the trial court of being able to observe first-hand the deportment of the
witnesses while testifying. Jurisprudence is likewise settled that the Court of
Appeals is the final arbiter of questions of fact.10 But whether a conclusion
drawn from such findings of facts is correct, is a question of law cognizable
by this Court.11
In the instant case, the conclusion reached by both courts below apparently
collides with their findings that periodically at the onset of and during the
rainy season, river water flows through the eastern bed of the Cagayan
River. The trial court held:
“The Court believes that the land in controversy is of the nature and
character of alluvion (Accretion), for it appears that during the dry season, the
body of water separating the same land in controversy (Lot No. 821, Pls-964)
and the two (2) parcels of land which the plaintiff purchased from Gregorio
Taguba and Justina Taccad Cayaba becomes a marshy land and is only six
(6) inches deep and twelve (12) meters in width at its widest in the northern
tip (Exhs. ‘W’, ‘W-1’, ‘W-2’, ‘W-3’ and ‘W-4’). It has been held by our Supreme
Court that ‘the owner of the riparian land which receives the gradual deposits
of alluvion, does not have to make an express act of possession. The law
L a n d T i t l e s a n d D e e d s P a g e | 14
does not require it, and the deposit created by the current of the water
becomes manifest’ (Roxas vs. Tuazon, 6 Phil. 408).”12
The Court of Apppeals adhered substantially to the conclusion reached by
the trial court, thus:
“As found by the trial court, the disputed property is not an island in the strict
sense of the word since the eastern portion of the said property claimed by
appellants to be part of the Cagayan River dries up during summer.
Admittedly, it is the action of the heavy rains which comes during rainy
season especially from September to November which increases the water
level of the Cagayan river. As the river becomes swollen due to heavy rains,
the lower portion of the said strip of land located at its southernmost point
would be inundated with water. This is where the water of the Cagayan river
gains its entry. Consequently, if the water level is high the whole strip of land
would be under water.”
In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Colegio de San Jose, it was held
that—
‘According to the foregoing definition of the words “ordinary” and “extra-
ordinary,” the highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry
season is the ordinary one, and the highest depth they attain during the
extra-ordinary one (sic); inasmuch as the former is the one which is regular,
common, natural, which occurs always or most of the time during the year,
while the latter is uncommon, transcends the general rule, order and
measure, and goes beyond that which is the ordinary depth. If according to
the definition given by Article 74 of the Law of Waters quoted above, the
natural bed or basin of the lakes is the ground covered by their waters when
at their highest ordinary depth, the natural bed or basin of Laguna de Bay is
the ground covered by its waters when at their highest depth during the dry
season, that is up to the northeastern boundary of the two parcels of land in
question.’
We find the foregoing ruling to be analogous to the case at bar. The highest
ordinary level of the waters of the Cagayan River is that attained during the
dry season which is confined only on the west side of Lot [821] and Lot [822].
This is the natural Cagayan river itself. The small residual of water between
Lot [821] and 307 is part of the small stream already in existence when the
whole of the late Judge Juan Taccad’s property was still susceptible to
cultivation and uneroded.”13
The Court is unable to agree with the Court of Appeals that Government of
the Philippine Islands vs. Colegio de San Jose14 is applicable to the present
case. That case involved Laguna de Bay; since Laguna de Bay is a lake, the
Court applied the legal provisions governing the ownership and use of lakes
and their beds and shores, in order to determine the character and ownership

of the disputed property. Specifically, the Court applied the definition of the
natural bed or basin of lakes found in Article 74 of the Law of Waters of 3
August 1866. Upon the other hand, what is involved in the instant case is the
eastern bed of the Cagayan River.
We believe and so hold that Article 70 of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866
is the law applicable to the case at bar:
“Art. 70. The natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered
by its waters during the highest floods”. (Italics supplied)
We note that Article 70 defines the natural bed or channel of a creek or river
as the ground covered by its waters during the highest floods. The highest
floods in the eastern branch of the Cagayan River occur with the annual
coming of the rains as the river waters in their onward course cover the entire
depressed portion. Though the eastern bed substantially dries up for the
most part of the year (i.e., from January to August), we cannot ignore the
periodical swelling of the waters (i.e., from September to December) causing
the eastern bed to be covered with flowing river waters.
The conclusion of this Court that the depressed portion is a river bed rests
upon evidence of record. Firstly, respondent Manalo admitted in open court
that the entire area he bought from Gregorio Taguba was included in Lot
307.15 If the 1.80 hectares purchased from Gregorio Taguba was included in
Lot 307, then the Cagayan River referred to as the western boundary in the
Deed of Sale transferring the land from Gregorio Taguba to respondent
Manalo as well as the Deed of Sale signed by Faustina Taccad, must refer to
the dried up bed (during the dry months) or the eastern branch of the river
(during the rainy months). In the Sketch Plan attached to the records of the
case, Lot 307 is separated from the western branch of the Cagayan River by
a large tract of land which includes not only Lot 821 but also what this Court
characterizes as the eastern branch of the Cagayan River.
Secondly, the pictures identified by respondent Manalo during his direct
examination depict the depressed portion as a river bed. The pictures,
marked as Exhibits “W” to “W-4”, were taken in July 1973 or at a time when
the eastern bed becomes visible.16 Thus, Exhibit “W-2” which according to
respondent Manalo was taken facing the east and Exhibit “W-3” which was
taken facing the west both show that the visible, dried up portion has a
markedly lower elevation than Lot 307 and Lot 821. It has dike-like slopes on
both sides connecting it to Lot 307 and Lot 821 that are vertical upward and
very prominent. This topographic feature is compatible with the fact that a
huge volume of water passes through the eastern bed regularly during the
rainy season. In addition, petitioner Ponciano Gannaban testified that one
had to go down what he called a “cliff” from the surveyed portion of the land
of respondent Manalo to the depressed portion. The cliff, as related by
petitioner Gannaban, has a height of eight (8) meters.17
L a n d T i t l e s a n d D e e d s P a g e | 15
The records do not show when the Cagayan River began to carve its eastern
channel on the surface of the earth. However, Exhibit “E”18 for the
prosecution which was the Declaration of Real Property standing in the name
of Faustina Taccad indicates that the eastern bed already existed even
before the sale to respondent Manalo. The words “old bed” enclosed in
parentheses—perhaps written to make legitimate the claim of private
ownership over the submerged portion—is an implied admission of the
existence of the river bed. In the Declaration of Real Property made by
respondent Manalo, the depressed portion assumed the name Rio Muerte de
Cagayan. Indeed, the steep dike-like slopes on either side of the eastern bed
could have been formed only after a prolonged period of time.
Now, then, pursuant to Article 420 of the Civil Code, respondent Manalo did
not acquire private ownership of the bed of the eastern branch of the river
even if it was included in the deeds of absolute sale executed by Gregorio
Taguba and Faustina Taccad in his favor. These vendors could not have
validly sold land that constituted property of public dominion. Article 420 of
the Civil Code states:
“The following things are property of public dominion:
1. (1)
Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents,
ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and others of similar character;
5. (2)
Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and
are intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth.” (Italics supplied)
Although Article 420 speaks only of rivers and banks, “rivers” is a composite
term which includes: (1) the running waters, (2) the bed, and (3) the banks.19
Manresa, in commenting upon Article 339 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889
from which Article 420 of the Philippine Civil Code was taken, stressed the
public ownership of river beds:
“La naturaleza especial de los rios, en punto a su disfrute general, hace que
sea necesario considerar en su relacion de dominio algo mas que sus aguas
corrientes. En efecto, en todo rio es preciso distinguir: 1. esta agua corriente;
2. el alveo o cauce, y 3. las riberas. Ahora bien: son estas dos ultimas cosas
siempre de dominio publico, como las aguas?
“Realmente, no puede imaginarse un rio sin alveo y sin ribera; de suerte
que al decir el Codigo civil que los rios son de dominio publico, parece que
debe ir implicito el dominio publico de aquellos tres elementos que integran
el rio. Por otra parte, en cuanto a los alveos o cauces tenemos la declaracion
del art. 407, num. 1, donde dice: son de dominio publico ... los rios y sus
 L a n d T i t l e s a n d D e e d s P a g e | 16

cauces naturales; declaracion que con lo que dispone el art. 34 de la ley de Besides, it is important to note that Lot 821 has an area of 11.91 hectares.
[Aguas], segun el cual, son de dominio publico: 1. los alveos o cauces de los Lot 821 is the northern portion of the strip of land having a total area of 22.72
arroyos que no se hallen comprendidos en el art. 33, y 2. los alveos o cauces hectares. We find it difficult to suppose that such a sizable area as Lot 821
naturales de los rios en la extension que cubran sus aguas en las mayores resulted from slow accretion to another lot of almost equal size. The total
crecidas ordinarias.”20 (Italics supplied) landholding purchased by respondent Manalo is 10.45 hectares (8.65
hectares from Faustina Taccad and 1.80 hectares from Gregorio Taguba in
The claim of ownership of respondent Manalo over the submerged portion is
1959 and 1964, respectively), in fact even smaller than Lot 821 which he
bereft of basis even if it were alleged and proved that the Cagayan River first
claims by way of accretion. The cadastral survey showing that Lot 821 has
began to encroach on his property after the purchase from Gregorio Taguba
an area of 11.91 hectares was conducted in 1969. If respondent Manalo’s
and Faustina Taccad. Article 462 of the Civil Code would then apply
contention were accepted, it would mean that in a span of only ten (10)
divesting, by operation of law, respondent Manalo of private ownership over
years, he had more than doubled his landholding by what the Court of
the new river bed. The intrusion of the eastern branch of the Cagayan River
Appeals and the trial court considered as accretion. As already noted, there
into his landholding obviously prejudiced respondent Manalo but this is a
are steep vertical dike-like slopes separating the depressed portion or river
common occurrence since estates bordering on rivers are exposed to floods
bed and Lot 821 and Lot 307. This topography of the land, among other
and other evils produced by the destructive force of the waters. That loss is
things, precludes a reasonable conclusion that Lot 821 is an increment to the
compensated by, inter alia, the right of accretion acknowledged by Article
depressed portion by reason of the slow and constant action of the waters of
457 of the Civil Code.21 It so happened that instead of increasing the size of
either the western or the eastern branches of the Cagayan River.
Lot 307, the eastern branch of the Cagayan River had carved a channel on it.
We turn finally to the issue of ownership of Lot 821. Respondent Manalo’s
We turn next to the issue of accretion. After examining the records of the
claim over Lot 821 rests on accretion coupled with alleged prior possession.
case, the Court considers that there was no evidence to prove that Lot 821 is
He alleged that the parcels of land he bought separately from Gregorio
an increment to Lot 307 and the bed of the eastern branch of the river.
Taguba and Faustina Taccad were formerly owned by Judge Juan Taccad
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code
who was in possession thereof through his (Judge Taccad’s) tenants. When
requires the concurrence of three (3) requisites: (a) that the deposition of soil
ownership was transferred to him, respondent Manalo took over the
or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (b) that it be the result of the
cultivation of the property and had it declared for taxation purposes in his
action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (c) that the land where accretion
name. When petitioners forcibly entered into his property, he twice instituted
takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast).22 The Court
the appropriate action before the Municipal Trial Court of Tumauini, Isabela.
notes that the parcels of land bought by respondent Manalo border on the
Against respondent Manalo’s allegation of prior possession, petitioners
eastern branch of the Cagayan River. Any accretion formed by this eastern
presented tax declarations standing in their respective names. They claimed
branch which respondent Manalo may claim must be deposited on or
lawful, peaceful and adverse possession of Lot 821 since 1955.
attached to Lot 307. As it is, the claimed accretion (Lot 821) lies on the bank
of the river not adjacent to Lot 307 but directly opposite Lot 307 across the If respondent Manalo had proved prior possession, it was limited physically to
river. Lot 307 and the depressed portion or the eastern river bed. The testimony of
Dominga Malana who was a tenant for Justina Taccad did not indicate that
Assuming (arguendo only) that the Cagayan River referred to in the Deeds of
she was also cultivating Lot 821. In fact, the complaints for forcible entry
Sale transferring ownership of the land to respondent Manalo is the western
lodged before the Municipal Trial Court of Tumauini, Isabela pertained only to
branch, the decision of the Court of Appeals and of the trial court are bare of
Lot 307 and the depressed portion or river bed and not to Lot 821. In the
factual findings to the effect that the land purchased by respondent Manalo
same manner, the tax declarations presented by petitioners conflict with
received alluvium from the action of the river in a slow and gradual manner.
those of respondent Manalo. Under Article 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff
On the contrary, the decision of the lower court made mention of several
in an action for quieting of title must at least have equitable title to or interest
floods that caused the land to reappear making it susceptible to cultivation. A
in the real property which is the subject matter of the action. The evidence of
sudden and forceful action like that of flooding is hardly the alluvial process
record on this point is less than satisfactory and the Court feels compelled to
contemplated under Article 457 of the Civil Code. It is the slow and hardly
refrain from determining the ownership and possession of Lot 821, adjudging
perceptible accumulation of soil deposits that the law grants to the riparian
neither petitioners nor respondent Manalo as owner(s) thereof.
owner.
 L a n d T i t l e s a n d D e e d s P a g e | 17

WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in

C.A.-G.R. CV No. 04892 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent Manalo is
hereby declared the owner of Lot 307. The regularly submerged portion or
the eastern bed of the Cagayan River is hereby DECLARED to be property of
public dominion. The ownership of Lot 821 shall be determined in an
appropriate action that may be instituted by the interested parties inter se. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
     Fernan (C.J., Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Decision and resolution set aside.
Note.—For accretion or alluvion to form part of registered land of riparian
owner, the gradual alluvial deposits made by human intervention are
excluded. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 132 SCRA 514.)

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-46410. October 30, 1981.]
ERNESTO BALBIN, JOSE ORIÑA, MAURICIO NARAG, ROSA STA.
MARIA SYTAMCO, BASILIO SYTAMCO, LEOCADIO SYTAMCO, AMADO
V. REYES, LYDIA V. REYES and APOLINARIO REYES, Petitioners, v.
PEDRO C. MEDALLA and JOSEFINA MEDALLA and LINO BARBOSA,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro, Respondents.
Romeo M. Mendoza, for Petitioners.
Ernesto P. Pagayayan for Private Respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Private respondents, upon purchase from the heirs of Juan Ladao of a large
parcel of agricultural land situated at Sitios of Bacong, Tambunakan and
Ibunan, Barrio Balansay, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, applied for the
registration and titling of the same in their name. There was opposition on the
ground that there were previously issued Original Certificates of Titles over
the same properties thru either homestead or free patent grants in the names
of petitioners. The Land Registration Court abstained from ruling on the
opposition due to private respondents’ reservation to file a separate action for
the cancellation of the titles issued to petitioners. The court a quo rendered
judgment declaring the lands in controversy as private properties of the
private respondents by virtue of a registered Informacion Pasesoria in the
name of Juan Ladao, from whose heirs they purchased the properties. The
free patents and the corresponding titles over the questioned properties were
declared null and void and ordered cancelled. Petitioners appealed
contending among others, that respondent Judge erred in holding as valid
L a n d T i t l e s a n d D e e d s P a g e | 18
the possessory information titles of private respondents’ predecessor-in-
interest and in declaring the properties in issue as belonging to them and that
respondent Judge likewise erred in holding that private respondents’ cause
of action has not prescribed.
Petitioners contend that as the possessory information title of private
respondents in the name of Juan Ladao was registered after the non-
extendible period of one year from April 17, 1894 as provided in the Maura
Law, the land covered by it reverted back to the State or to the public domain
of the government. Petitioners likewise claim that since an action for
reconveyance can only be instituted within 4 years after the discovery of the
alleged fraud, private respondents’ complaint, filed more than 14 years after
the issuance of petitioners’ respective titles, is no longer actionable.
The Supreme Court held that for the validity of the possessory information
title, only the institution of a possessory information proceeding and not
registration within the one-year period provided in the Maura Law is required.
In the instant case, the registration of the possessory information in the name
of Juan Ladao on January 25, 1895 or 38 days late as claimed by petitioners
followed as the result of a possessory information proceeding instituted within
the period provided by the decree. As to the issue of prescription, it held that
as the latest patent was issued on October 14, 1959, any action for
reconveyance should have been commenced on or before October 14, 1963.
Private respondents’ action having been instituted more than 14 years from
the issuance of the respective titles of petitioners, their action for
reconveyance had already prescribed. The Supreme Court however, held
that petitioners have acquired title to the lots in question by virtue of
possession in concept of owners, the free patents and homestead patents
having been awarded to them by virtue of their actual possession of the lots
in question. The possessory information, basis of private respondents’ claim
of ownership, alone, without a showing of actual, public and adverse
possession of the land for a sufficient period of time, is ineffective as a mode
of acquiring title under Act 496 and although convertible into a title of
absolute ownership may still be lost by prescription. The Torrens titles issued
to petitioners on the basis of the homestead and free patents obtained by
them have become indefeasible and being so, they have acquired a better
right to the land in question.
Judgment reversed.
SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; POSSESSORY INFORMATION
TITLE; REQUIREMENT FOR ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP UNDER THE
ROYAL DECREE OF 1894. — A postessory information referred to in
Section 19 of the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, provides that in order
that an information may be valid for the purpose of the said Royal Decree
and produce the effect of a title of ownership, it is indispensable that it be
instituted within the unextended period of one year fixed in Sections 19 and
20 of the said Royal Decree (Aguinaldo de Romero v. Director of Lends, 39
Phil. 814).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTITUTION OF POSSESSORY INFORMATION
PROCEEDINGS WITHIN THE ONE-YEAR PERIOD AS PROVIDED IN THE
MAURA LAW; PETITIONERS’ CONTENTION THAT REGISTRATION
DURING THE PERIOD PROVIDED IS REQUISITE FOR THE VALIDITY
THEREOF WITHOUT MERIT. — Petitioners contend that inasmuch as the
possessory information title of respondents, in the name of the late Juan
Ladao, was registered only on May 25, 1895 or 38 days from the last day of
the one-year period as provided in the Maura Law, the same was patently
null and void and the land covered by said title has reverted to the State.
Section 21 of the Maura Law invoked by petitioners does not speak of
registration, but merely perfection of information title which may be done by
instituting postessory information proceeding within the said one-year period
possibly ending in the registration of the title, depending on the evidence
presented.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REGISTRATION OF TITLE FOLLOWING SPECIFIED
PROCEEDING; MAY NOT NECESSARILY BE WITHIN THE SAME ONE-
YEAR PERIOD. — Registration of title usually follows a specified proceeding.
The registration is the act of a government official and may not be controlled
by the private party applying for registration of his title. What is under his
control is the commencement or the institution of the prescribed proceeding
for the perfection of his title for which he may be penalized for tardiness of
compliance. The institution of the proper proceeding is clearly what is
required to be done within the one-year period by the party seeking to perfect
his title, not the registration thereof, if found legally warranted. By its nature,
therefore, registration may not necessarily be within the same one-year
period. If the required proceedings are instituted, as they have to be before
the corresponding title may be issued and registered, the registration may be
possible of accomplishment only after the one-year period, considering the
number of proceedings that might have been instituted within the non-
extendible period of one year.
4. ID.; ID.; ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE; PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD. —
An action for reconveyance of real property resulting from fraud may be
L a n d T i t l e s a n d D e e d s P a g e | 19
barred by the statute of limitations, which requires that the action shall be
filed within four (4) years from the discovery of fraud. Such discovery is
deemed to have taken place when the petitioners herein were issued original
certificate of title through either homestead or free patent grants, for the
registration of said patents constitute constructive notice to the whole world.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTANT CASE. — Where private respondents’
complaint for reconveyance and annulment of titles with damages was filed
only on August 30, 1973, or more than 14 years had already elapsed from
the date of the issuance of the respective titles of the defendants, the action
for reconveyance of land titled in the names of defendants (petitioner herein)
had already prescribed.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACTUAL, PUBLIC AND ADVERSE POSSESSION
REQUIRED FOR ACQUISITION OF OWNERSHIP THEREUNDER. — A
possessory information has to be confirmed in a land registration proceeding,
as required in Section 19 of Act No. 496. "A possessory information alone,
without a showing of actual, public and adverse possession of the land under
claim of ownership, for a sufficient period of time, in accordance with the law,
is ineffective as a mode of acquiring title under Act No. 496." Although
converted into a title of absolute ownership, an information posesoria may
still be lost by prescription.
DECISION
DE CASTRO, J.:
Petition for certiorari for the review of the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Occidental Mindoro, Branch I, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
"1. that the lands in controversy be, as they are hereby declared as the
private properties of the plaintiffs with the right of immediate possession;
"2. that the Free Patents Nos. HV-85975, RV-86191, HV-85977, HV-85976,
HV-85978, HV-85974, EV-58432, EV-94632 and EV-58631, and the
corresponding Original Certification of Titles Nos. P-3088, P-3089, P-3087,
P-4010, P-4011, P-3084, P-919, P-4060 and P-920 be, as they are hereby
declared null and void and therefor should be cancelled;

"3. that defendants, ERNESTO BALBIN, the HRS. of MAURICIO NARAG
and JOSE ORIÑA, shall pay the plaintiffs as damages, the sum of TWO
HUNDRED (P200.00) PESOS per hectare possessed and cultivated by them
from the year 1963 until the possession of the property in question has been
duly surrendered to the plaintiffs, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum,
from the date of this decision, and because said defendants must have paid
the corresponding land taxes due them from the said date (1963), whatever
amounts paid by them from said date to the present should correspondingly
be deducted from the total amount of damages herein awarded to plaintiffs;
however, Defendants, ROSA STA. MARIA SYTAMCO, BASILIO SYTAMCO,
LEOCADIO SYTAMCO, AMADO V. REYES, LYDIA REYES and
APOLINARIO REYES, shall not pay any amount to plaintiffs as damages as
they are not in actual possession and cultivation of the area respectively
claimed by them; and
"4. that the defendants shall further pay the amount of P2,000.00 as
attorney’s fees and cost of the suit."
The following facts, quoting from private respondents’ brief, are not disputed:
"Private respondents on June 19, 1962, purchased from the heirs of Juan
Ladao, a large parcel of agricultural land situated at Sitios of Bacong,
Tambunakan and Ibunan, Barrio Balansay, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.
Said respondents on June 14, 1963, filed an application for registration of title
of the said parcel of land. They utilized as evidence of ownership, the Deed
of Sale executed in their favor by the heirs of the late Juan Ladao (Exhibit "F"
thereof) the Informacion Posesoria issued in the name of Juan Ladao (Exhibit
"H" in the LRC Case) together with the tax declaration and tax receipts for
said land covering the period from May 26, 1904, to January 27, 1962
(Exhibits I to I-28 of said LRC Case) the private respondents, after the sale,
declared it for taxation purposes (Exhibits G and G-1 of said LRC Case), and
have continuously been paying the corresponding taxes up to the present;
the application for registration of title aforesaid was opposed by petitioners on
the ground that they were previously issued Original Certificates of title thru
either Homestead or Free Patent grants. Petitioner Rosa Sta. Maria Sytamco
was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-3088 (Exhibit "1" on June 26,
1963, under Homestead Patent No. HV-85975; Basilio Sytamco was issued
Original Certificate of Title No. P-3089 (Exhibit "2" on June 26, 1963, under
Homestead Patent No. HV-86191; Leocadio Sytamco was issued Original
Certificate of Title No. P-3087 (Exhibit "3" on June 26, 1963, under
Homestead Patent No. HV-85977; Lydia Reyes was issued Original
Certificate of Title No. P-4010 (Exhibit "4" on September 30, 1963), under
Homestead Patent No. HV-85978; Amado Reyes was issued Original
L a n d T i t l e s a n d D e e d s P a g e | 20
Certificate of Title No. P-4011 (Exhibit "5" on September 30, 1963), under
Homestead Patent No. V-85976; Apolinario Reyes was issued Original
Certificate of Title No. P-3084 (Exhibit "6") on June 18, 1963, under
Homestead Patent No. V-85974; Ernesto Balbin was issued Original
Certificate of Title No. P-919 (Exhibit "7"), under Free Patent No. V-58633;
Mauricio Narag was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-4060 (Exhibit
"8") on October 14, 1959, under Free Patent No. V-94632; Jose Oriña was
issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-920 (Exhibit "9") on April 3, 1957
under Free Patent No. V-58631." 1
It appears that before the filing of the present action for reconveyance and
annulment of titles on August 30, 1973, land registration proceedings had
been instituted by private respondents covering the same lands involved in
the aforesaid action. Petitioners herein filed opposition to the application, but
because of the reservation of private respondents to file a separate action for
the cancellation of the original certificates of title issued to petitioners herein,
the land registration court abstained from ruling on the petitioners’ opposition.
In the pre-trial of the ordinary action from which the present petition
stemmed, the following stipulation of facts 2 was entered into:
"1. That the parcels of land subject matter of the instant case are identified as
Lot Nos. 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 1013, 1016 and 1006, as shown in
plans Ap-10864 and Ap-10866; that these lots enumerated are embraced in
Pls-21, Mamburao Public Subdivision;
"2. That the herein petitioners were among the oppositors in Land
Registration Case No. N-44, filed before the court (CFI Occidental Mindoro,
Branch I, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro) on June 14, 1963 by spouses
Pedro C. Medalla and Josefina O. Medalla;
"3. That the opposition of petitioners is based on the ground that the
aforesaid lots respectively titled in their names are included in the land
subject matter of the Land Registration Case No. N-44;
"4. That in the Decision rendered by the court in Land Registration Case No.
N-44 dated May 7, 1969 giving due course to the applicants’ petition for
registration of title, the opposition of the petitioners were not resolved in view
of the reservation made by the applicants to file appropriate actions for the
cancellation of petitioners’ homestead or patent titles;
"5. That the land subject matter of the instant case are titled in the name of
petitioners and included in plans Ap-10864 and Ap-10866, which plans were
submitted as evidence in the said Land Registration Case No. N-44, and that

the basis of herein respondents’ claim in the instant case is the possessory
information title of Juan Ladao, registered on May 25, 1895 before the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Occidental Mindoro."
Petitioners made the following assignment of errors: 3
"I. That the respondent judge of the court a quo erred in holding the validity of
the possessory information title of Juan Ladao, consequently, erroneously
holding that the parcels of land covered by certificate of titles of petitioners
are private properties of private respondents.
"II. That respondent judge of the court a quo erred in holding that private
respondents’ cause of action has not prescribed.
"III. The respondent judge of the court a quo erred in holding that private
respondents have personality and capacity to institute the action, considering
that the land in controversy were public lands at the time of issuance of
respective patents and titles of petitioners.
"IV. The respondent judge of the court a quo erred in holding that the lower
court has jurisdiction over the nature and cause of action of private
respondents."
The first question to be resolved relates to the validity of the possessory
information title of Juan Ladao as raised in the first assignment of error
because petitioners’ title to the land based on their respective homestead or
free patents is valid or not, depending on whether the land so disposed of
under the Public Land Act has not yet been segregated from the public
domain and passed into private ownership at the time of the issuance of the
patents. 4
As found uncontroverted by the lower court, there exists an Informacion
Posesoria in the name of Juan Ladao from whom private respondents
Medalla bought the land. It is also an admitted fact, at least impliedly, same
being not denied in petitioners’ answer to the complaint, that the Informacion
Posesoria was registered on May 25, 1895. What petitioners assail is the
validity of the registration which they claim to have been done beyond the
period of one year from April 17, 1894 to April 17, 1895, as allegedly required
by the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894 otherwise known as the Maura
Law. The provision invoked by petitioners is Article 21 of the aforementioned
decree which reads:
"Art. 21. A term of one year, without grace, is granted in order to perfect the
information referred to in Articles 19 and 20.
L a n d T i t l e s a n d D e e d s P a g e | 21
"After the expiration of this period, the right of the cultivators and possessors
to obtain a gratuitous title shall be extinguished; the full ownership of the land
shall be restored to the State, or in a proper case to the community of
neighbors, and the said possessors and cultivators or their predecessors in
interest by a universal title shall only be entitled to the right of redemption, if
the land had been sold within the five years subsequent to the lapse of the
period.
"The possessors not included within the provisions of this Chapter shall only
acquire for some time the ownership of the alienable lands of the royal
patrimony, in accordance with the common law."
It is the petitioners’ contention that pursuant to the aforecited provision, all
grants of Spanish titles to lands including possessory information titles must
be registered within a period of one (1) year to be counted from April 17,
1894 until April 17, 1895, in accordance with Article 80 of the rules and
regulations implementing said Royal Decree of February 13, 1894; that this
requirement of the law finds support in the cases of Baltazar v. Insular
Government, 40 Phil. 267 and Romero v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 814 from
which petitioners quoted the following:
"All such titles covered by possessory information title during the Spanish
Regime and not registered within the non-extendible period of one year as
provided for in the Maura Law or the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, it
reverts to the State or in a proper case to the public domain." (Italics
supplied)
Petitioners further contend that inasmuch as the possessory information title
of respondents, in the name of the late Juan Ladao, was registered only on
May 25, 1895 or 38 days from the last day of the one-year period as provided
in the Maura Law, the same was patently null and void, and the land covered
by said possessory information title reverted to the State or to the public
domain of the government.
Petitioners’ contention is without merit. Examining closely the two cases
invoked by petitioners, nowhere in said cases can be found the aforecited
passages quoted by the petitioners. These cases did not even speak of
registration as a requisite for the validity of possessory information title
obtained for purposes of Royal Decree of February 13, 1894 or the Maura
Law. What was actually stated in the two aforecited cases are the following:
"A possessory information proceeding instituted in accordance with the
provisions of the Mortgage Law in force on July 14, 1893 neither constitutes

nor is clothed with the character of a gratuitous title to property, referred to in
Section 19 of the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, which provides that in
order that an information may be valid for the purpose of the said Royal
Decree and produce the effects of a title of ownership, it is indispensable that
it be instituted within the unextended period of one year fixed in Sections 19
and 20 of the said Royal Decree (Aguinaldo de Romero v. Director of Lands,
39 Phil. 814).
"The time within which advantage could be taken of the Maura Law expired
on April 17, 1895. Almeida obtained dominion over 526 hectares of land on
June 9, 1895. The possessory information for 815 hectares was issued to
Almeida on December 14, 1896. Almeida was thus not in possession until
after the expiration of the period specified by the Maura Law for the issuance
of possessory titles and his possessory information was of even a later date
and made to cover a large excess of land. Under these conditions, the
possessory information could not even furnish, as in other cases, prima facie
evidence of the fact that at the time of the execution the claimant was in
possession, which it would be possible to convert into ownership by
uninterrupted possession for the statutory period (Baltazar v. Insular
Government, 40 Phil. 267)."
From the foregoing, it is made clear that what was required is merely the
institution of a possessory information proceeding within the one-year period
as provided in the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894 or the Maura Law.
This fact is bolstered by the commentaries of Prof. Francisco Ventura in his
book Land Titles and Deeds, a book widely used by law practitioners and in
the law schools. 5 Thus —
"A distinction should be made between the informacion posesoria issued in
accordance with Articles 390, 391 and 392 of the Spanish Mortgage Law in
connection with Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Royal Decree of February 13,
1894 and the informacion posesoria issued in accordance with Articles 390,
391 and 392 of said law without regard to the aforementioned decree. The
former was the basis of a gratuitous title of ownership which was issued upon
application of the grantee and the possessory title provided he complied with
the requisites prescribed by Articles 19 and 21 of the aforesaid decree and
Articles 81 and 82 of the Chapter IV of the Regulations for the execution of
the same decree. The requisites to be fulfilled and steps to be taken are as
follows:
"1. The holder of the land must prove possession or cultivation of the land
under the conditions presented by Article 19 of the said decree.
"2. The holder of the land had to institute the possessory information
L a n d T i t l e s a n d D e e d s P a g e | 22
proceeding within one year from the date (April 17, 1894) of the publication of
the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894 (Article 21, Royal Decree of February
13, 1894) (Italics supplied).
"3. After obtaining the informacion posesoria, the holder of the land had to file
a petition with the General Director of Civil Administration, attaching thereto a
certified copy of the informacion posesoria asking for the issuance in his
name of a gratuitous title of ownership. If the said office was satisfied that the
applicant fulfilled the conditions prescribed by the law, a gratuitous title of
ownership was issued to him. Such title oftentimes called composicion
gratuita was to be registered in the Registry of Property of the province
where the land was located . . . (pp 30-31)."
Even Section 21 of the Maura Law invoked by petitioners themselves does
not speak of registration, but merely perfection of information title, which, as
already discussed, may be done by instituting possessory information
proceedings within the said one-year period fixed by the aforementioned
Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, possibly ending in the registration of the
title, depending on the evidence presented.
In the case at bar, it is admitted and uncontroverted that there exists an
informacion posesoria registered on May 25, 1895 in the name of Juan
Ladao. This registration of the informacion posesoria must have followed as
the result or outcome of a possessory information proceeding instituted by
the late Juan Ladao in accordance with Section 19 of the said Royal Decree
of February 13, 1894, and commenced within the one-year period, pursuant
to Section 21 of the same decree. Otherwise, if this were not so, no
registration of the said informacion posesoria might have been effected in the
Registry of Deeds of the Province of Occidental Mindoro, for if the
registration thereof on May 25, 1895 was violative of the decree, for being
beyond the one-year period from April 17, 1894 to April 17, 1895, the
Register of Deeds would certainly not have performed an illegal act.
Moreover, registration of title usually follows a specified proceeding. The
registration is the act of a government official and may not be controlled by
the private party applying for registration of his title. What is under his control
is the commencement or the institution of the prescribed proceeding for the
perfection of his title for which he may be penalized for tardiness of
compliance. The institution of the proper proceeding is clearly what is
required to be done within the one-year period by the party seeking to perfect
his title, not the registration thereof, if found legally warranted. By its nature,
therefore, registration may not necessarily be within the same one-year
period. If the required proceedings are instituted, as they have to be before
the corresponding title may be issued and registered, the registration may be

possible of accomplishment only after the one-year period, considering the
number of proceedings that might have been instituted within the non-
extendible period of one year. This is what apparently happened in the
instant case with the proceeding to perfect the title commenced within the
one-year period, but the registration of the possessory information title done
thereafter, or on May 25, 1895, after the prescribed proceeding which is
naturally featured with the requisite notice and hearing. 6
The next question relates to the issue of prescription as raised in the second
assignment of error.
It is the contention of petitioners that the present action for reconveyance has
already prescribed. They developed this theory in their Reply to Rejoinder 7
to Motion to Dismiss, as follows:
"Even granting for the sake of argument that plaintiffs’ possessory
information title is valid and effective, the cause of action for reconveyance
had already prescribed because such action can only be instituted within four
(4) years after discovery of the alleged fraud. (Sec. 55, Act 496; Vera v. Vera,
47 O.G. 5060; Tayao v. Robles, 74 Phil. 114) It will be noted from plaintiffs’
complaint that the patent of Ernesto Balbin and Jose Oriña were issued on
December 6, 1956 so that if any action for reconveyance at all could be
instituted against the two defendants, the same should be instituted before or
during the period of four years or up to 6 December, 1960. According to the
complaint, the patents of Rosa Sta. Maria Sytamco, Basilio Sytamco and
Leocadio Sytamco were issued on 17 April, 1959, so that if any action for
reconveyance can lie against them, the same should be instituted within four
years or up to 17 April, 1963. In so far as the free patent of Amado V. Reyes,
Lydia Reyes and Apolinario Reyes, it appears that said patents were issued
on 3 March, 1959, so that if any action for reconveyance should be filed, it
should be on or before March 3, 1963. And lastly, the patent of Mauricio
Narag was issued on 14 October, 1959, so that if any action for
reconveyance should be instituted, the same should be filed on or before
October 14, 1963.
"Plaintiffs’ complaint was filed only on August 30, 1973, or more than 14
years had already elapsed from the date of the issuance of the respective
titles of the defendants. Consequently, the action for reconveyance of land
titled in the names of defendants had already prescribed."
An action for reconveyance of real property resulting from fraud may be
barred by the statute of limitations, which requires that the action shall be
filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is
deemed to have taken place when the petitioners herein were issued original
L a n d T i t l e s a n d D e e d s P a g e | 23
certificate of title through either homestead or free patent grants, for the
registration of said patents constitute constructive notice to the whole world.
8
In the case at bar, the latest patent was issued on October 14, 1959. There
is, therefore, merit in petitioner’s contention that "if any action for
reconveyance should be commenced, the same should be filed on or before
October 14, 1963. But private respondents’ complaint for reconveyance and
annulment of titles with damages was filed only on August 30, 1973, or more
than 14 years had already elapsed from the date of the issuance of the
respective titles of the defendants. Consequently, the action for
reconveyance of land titled in the names of defendants (petitioners herein)
had already prescribed." 
Even from the viewpoint of acquisitive prescription, petitioners have acquired
title to the nine lots in question by virtue of possession in concept of an
owner. Petitioners herein were given either free patent or homestead patent,
and original certificates of title in their names issued to them, the latest on
October 14,1959. Said public land patents must have been issued after the
land authorities had found out, after proper investigation, that petitioners
were in actual possession of the nine lots in question, particularly in the case
of the free patents. If petitioners were in actual possession of the nine lots,
then the heirs of Ladao and the Medalla spouses were never in actual
possession of the said lots. If the Medalla spouses were not in actual
possession of the nine lots, the alleged possessory information would not
justify the registration of the said nine lots in the names of the Medallas.
A possessory information has to be confirmed in a land registration
proceeding, as required in Section 19 of Act No. 496. "A possessory
information alone, without a showing of actual, public and adverse
possession of the land under claim of ownership, for a sufficient period of
time, in accordance with the law, is ineffective as a mode of acquiring title
under Act No. 496." 9 Although converted into a title of absolute ownership,
an informacion posesoria may still be lost by prescription. 10
On the other hand, the Torrens Titles issued to the petitioners on the basis of
the homestead patents and free patents obtained by them had become
indefeasible. 11
It would result from what has been said on the two main assignments of
errors that petitioners herein have a better right to the land in question than
the Medalla spouses.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be reversed and the
 L a n d T i t l e s a n d D e e d s P a g e | 24

complaint of the Medallas should be, as it is hereby dismissed with costs

against appellees.