POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) Reference Manual Fourth Edition Fat ion, February 1995 + Second Edin, February 199 + Tis Eston, Jy 2001, Four Eaton dune 200 Conytgt © 190, € 158, © 2007, © 2008 Crysler LLC, Perd Mair Company, Gonera Mrs CorpratonFOREWORD 4" Edition ‘he FMEA 4 Eton sa reference manual tobe wsdl by supple to Crysler LLC, Ford Motor Compan. end General Motors Corporation a «pide ait them ia te develope of beh Design and Process FMEAs, The man det not define requmens i sine o clarify ‘ussionsconceming the ecnial development of FMEAS. This manal i aligned wit SAE sin, ‘Summary of Changes inthe 4th edition FMEA Reference Manual ‘The DFMEA and PFMEA methods dail in th 4 ton FMEA Reference Maal nla ‘hose seid with designate syst subsystem, interface, ni component level and he proces at manufictaring and assembly operations. General Changes ‘+The formating used inthe eons inended to provide easier ang 0 Aninde incl, © eons are used india key prapraphs and visa ues re used. + Adon exaple sad verbiage ave been povided to improve he wy ofthe ‘anual and to pvide a loser fi it the FMEA proces a develop + Reinforcement of the need fr management oppor iret, sd seview ofthe [EMEA process ang resus + Define and engthe the udertndg of the kage between DFMEA and PIMA as wells defining the inkages to cer ool. + Improvements tothe Severity, Oveurence, Detection ranking bles oat hey re ‘more meaning to real word aly and ge + Alerative methods are nde Yat ae curently Being applied in indy. Sana sppendices which ve example forms and speci ate spicaion of The focus onthe “standard fobs ea replaced with several opons tht repesct te cua! application of FMEA in nd. 1+ Thesggestion tht RPN ote weds the primary meat or assessing. The ‘eed for improvement hs been isd inci a atonal method, and he we ‘ofthesbolds on RPN cared a racic tht is ot commended, Chapter provides genes! FMEA guidelines the need for management support andiavng ‘find roe for devloping and rsintsining FMEA, i the eed Yor coinuous Improvement, Chapter It describes he eeneral aplication of the FMEA methodology, whichis common bernven DFMEA and PFMEA proces Thi lus he planing sate, acto: plas, and ‘he ore for management appt and eons in FMEAS ‘Chapter I (ocuses on DFMEA (Design Fllre Mode Ete and Analy) estbising the {cope of te alsin us of black dugams,vrsous pes of DFMEAS, formation he es, ‘ate procedure fer aay, eto plas, apd follow-ap ternative to RPN, and canton © DPEMEA® and validation plans.{Chapter 1 fous on PFMEA (Process File Mode Eets and Analysis), easing the scope ofthe analysis, use of Now dagrans,fomaton of eas, basic procedure eral, ‘ton pls, the connection o DFMEAS andthe development of conta plans “The Appenes have several examples of forms for DMFEA and PPMEA and dieses . i)» iye eu): Bes] 4a) zee =e = TIdwvs y 3 Af it Design Fllre Mode and Ets Analysis “Table IIL! Sample DFMEA Form with Minimal lnfermaton Elements & Example Hatres(Chapter Desiga Failure Mode and Eis Analysis ‘Severity (S) (d) Severity is the valu asocaed with the mos seriou et fora sven flue mode. Severity ia relative ranking witha he Scope ofthe inddual FMEA. Suggested Evalustion Criteria “The txm sould agree on evaluation cetera and a ranking system and apply the consistently, even if modified. for individual process alysis. (See Table Ca below for eit dalines) Nis not ecomerended to modi rte ranking values of 9 and {o> "asure madonna tak of seventy 1 stodd not Be rayznd tre Effect estat ‘adr egultory Requirements criteria Severity of Effect on Product (Customer Eifct ‘oa tre ode aa fe vee operation ade els ‘mocompane with overmenteguion wine waning. | Rank ‘ot ae ode acs se eile open stories | ‘cmp wi rent oan wth are grin ‘Loss of pinay Retin ide peal does tata hile operation ‘ego primary ce (ei openle, uta eed eel perms) Los of sary fneton ile opera, bt como ‘omerenos into epee, Desriaion of second Futon (tile pele, bl ono ‘cence ne af rede rel of paras). Apps or Aa, vile pele, te doesnt ono ntl y mot te 78). “Apps o Ave Nob, hie opel tem des a ‘foo ted by may some (0). ‘ub mi yoted by Snctating Ceres (2590 Neer ‘Table Crt Suggested DFMEA Severity Evaluation Criteria ”Design Failure Mode nd tts Analysis (Chapter a y Poo] 4) cejee = = a1dWys “Table HL Sample DYMEA Form with Minimal Information ements & Hxanple Entries‘Chapter Design Failure Mode and Ets Analysis Classification (e) This column may be used to biglghthigh-penity fare Innes nd thawte eases, As result ofthis nals, the eam may use this ifort ‘deny special characters Customer specterequrements may idetlyepeil product process racer symbals ana thr usage | choraderise designated in the design eon speci ‘uthout an associated design faire made sertfed in Be DENA ean aton of wontnese nthe design press Potenti Mode () ‘This information can be separted into multiple columns or ‘combined ino singe coum, In the development of the FMEA, te identification of ll Dotti causes of the file mode is key to robequent {nals Although vaned ecique (sich at rsinorming) [outed o determine the potential easel) of the ae mods ierecommended ta the osm should focws on an understanding ofthe fare michaniam foreach lure mode. I Cause(s)/Mechanism(s) of Failure Potential Mechanism(s) of Failure Mode (f1) ‘A faire mechanism is the physi, chemical, ceca, ‘ermal or otber process that rss in the fala ode. Tis inpocat to make the distinton thst fe mode i an "verve oxen” effet 0 ae not comfie fre moe ‘with au mechanism, tbe ara pysial phenomenon bend the fire mode othe pres of depadaon or chan of eves Ieaing oan renting pascal aur ode. ‘To the ene posible, lst every potential mechanism for each flue mode, The mechani shuld be ited a easly and amply as pose For » system, te fhe mechanism isthe process of ear Propapston following # component flue which lads {0 a stm re ‘A prot or proces can have sever ature made which are Corraaiec to each other beeawe of 8 common fale ‘nectar behind them Ensure tht procose fete ae considered a2 pat of te EMEA proves »= = adwys Design Flue Mode nd ets Analysis Chapter t ‘Table IL Sample DFMEA Form with Minimal Information Elements & Example Entriescapt Design Fale Mode and Ets Analysis Potential Cause(s) of Failure Mode (f2) Pots case of flue defined as an indication of how the sign proces could allow the flue to occur, desebed in turns of someting tat canbe coreted or can te eonoled Pott! case of file may be an indication of & design weakness, the consequence of which the fare mde Cus are the cheumstonces that dues or achat fale echanam In ientiping potential causes of faire, ose concise Aesctptent of he pei causes of false sexed alt Pisin allows for byrogen enbitlemet. Ambigsous phrases uch, poor design or improper design, should not > se, Iavesigation of causes sods 10 foes onthe fair mode and ot on he eff) Ia deeming the causes), be tam should [Seume th exiteace of th este under eum wil est te flue mode (Le he fre made doesnt reir mulipie ‘ses oot Typelly, there may be seve causes each of which an rest {athe fire mode, ‘This res in multiple ins (case nce) forthe aire mode ‘To te extent posible, ist every potenti case foreach aire ‘mode mechanism. The ease should e stds concisely fd compe ax posse, Separating the cases wil resi fused anys for ech cause and sy yi ieeat ‘ensrement, conta, spd ction pls ‘Tuble IS, shows simple cates for the ale mds in Table ILS, Athogh not resuired spt ofthe miian FMEA fom ‘ements, the able ces the fue mechanism sbow the ‘eltonhips among lure mode, flue mechassn and cause. In preparing the DFMEA, asume tht the dsgn will be ‘autre ad assembled to he din net. Exception ca ‘re made a the tun’ discretion Whee histrcal dna ingiste ‘eines athe nanfacing proces aChapter Desig Failure Mode an iets Analysis Come Meh age ea etm in rossten vielen | Momma Tap om sk a It gt Vetesupinccen | Retest [Mec tig ans onl ae ae " feefwepeniy | Sn ~ ‘Partial oss of ny drulic ud due wo hydraulics ube es ee ry sewn | Saaremaa Toor igo warp aw Saerenste [naa snes saonstaasat ‘oat min emt | yea pee | ae ne tank ooo i, ‘Table ILLS Example Potential CausesChap Design Felure Moe and Ets Analysis This page intentional eft lank,Chapter mt Design Fllre Mode and Ets Analysis tei |= ke 2 h oe Hit |<] il IE = i i la - teh : ope (Ht | a |i itll ith z % (ltt allt & “Table HL Sample DYMEA Form with Minimal Information Elements & Example Hatres(chapter Design Failure Moe a Ets Analysis Occurrence (0) (g) Occurrence i the lkltood tat specie causemechanism ‘wil ocur esl nthe fue mde Within the design ie ‘The Hketood of occurence tanking mumber bas w relative mening rather than a blue value (See Table C2). ‘A consistent occurence ranking system shoud be wed t ensure entity. The occurence number isa elaive raking within the scope ofthe FMEA and ray not eflet the ats ikelond of occurence ‘Suggested Evaluation Criteria. ‘The team should age on etaluaton erkara an} a ranking system and aply them conssely, even if modes for inidual prov alysis Occurence should fe estimated ‘ing Io 10 sale using Table C2 as a guideline In determining this estate, questions suchas he following should be considered + What the src history and eld expetience with similar component, sbstems or sss? + Iethe tema cayover or similar a presous ee ite? + How signica are chnges rom a revieslevelitn? + te the item adcally diferent fom a previous eve tri? + Tete tes completely new? What is the applinion or what are the caveman! hangs? Has on engineering araysis (ez. lily) been wel to etme the exposed comparable occurence vate ee the Sppietion? + Have prevenive controls ben put in plas? 45(Chapter Design Failure Mode and Eats Analysis i: Occree Leinood| iter: Oecrenca ot cause oruca [ tCaue orneA | (Design eetaiy of kemehice) (ueident per Senor) Nov icy ip iy 0 pr ua ve ma} Seneca epi oto - soos | Sit eaponte _ . Talos novo | | 10 pr tsnd Seep by poy ote — 7 ‘ig ci i Preto | Serna “<- Geatnal iesaasctvinanirdaore || spertmne trae | Spare viene 0 ‘cg lhe = iyetowes | tain nen Serene at ne apeioam | = amor oy mr 1in 109.000 Nesharaitiiwaescacwibaneniios | | £001 per dowead design or indesign simulation and testing. es - m | | etomoe Talon der alec veytow oowspeene | Table Cr? Suggested DEMEA Occurrence Evaluation CriteriaChapter mt Design Failure Mose and Ets Anaya “This page intentional eft blank, a(Chapter Design Piae Mode and ets Analyst faldt ibid | le - F = La fa Gil = , = i - nil ik | Hy li e il T it a litt + { thy 2 8 VU LAST ali 7 = ‘Table IL! Sample DFMEA Form with Minin Information Elements & Example Eatres‘Design Failure Mode and Ect Analysis Current Design Controls (h) Current Design Contos are thse sctvities conduct as part of tas design proce that have been completed or come to and tha wills the design adequacy for he design fetona and ‘bly quirement nde consideration ‘There re wo types of design contol consider Preveation Elite (event) the cause ofthe mechanism of fale oF the flue noe from osurng or rede sata ounce Detection: nti (te) the cxnence of cause, he sesting tmechaism of lure or the fle made, eter by analy ot pyc! methods, before the tem sees for production, ‘The preted approach I6 to frst uso prevention eons, # osu Te bial occurence ronkegs wl bo sifted by he Phen to pod ey rogaine er te Dateton contol shoul inclode identfation of Use aeivites which detect the fare mode aswell a bose ta tet the ‘The team should consider analysis, testing, reviews, and other cvs that wl sete deen adequacy such Prevention Controls “Benchmarking siios Pala designs ‘+ Desig and Material sandards (internal and exter) “+ Documentation — records of est practices, eons ead, ee ‘tom similar esgns + Simulsion ses ~ analyst of concepts to esbish design reqirenenss + Erorproofing Detection controls + rotary toting + Validation esting + Simaton stain ~valiation of design + Design of Eapeinents including eit tesing 4 Mociup using similar pars °cope Desa a need As | = : : i ee : fee |] E AL - peli] Lt I u es Bi ul i . ; ; 21 2 Py) ( eh al 2 dal lielh, tila ~ PEVUHE ihe [i ie li " Ts lu u hat id . HETIL HI ° ml ae ill} Lik = 3 Gand 7 w S aa LN ait E "able Ll Sample DEMEA Form with Minna laformation Elements & Example Entries(Caper Design Fie Mode and Ets Analy ‘Teo example Design FMEA form in tis mansl has t90 Calne forthe design conrols (Ge, separate slay for Prevention Cools snd Detection Controls) wo asi he ea i Slemiydisingshing between these eo lypes of design ono. Thie alow for 8 guick visual dermis tat bat ‘ype of design contol have own const. 1s on-column (For design cots) form is wd, then the flowing press shold be used. For prevention cals place {Pfr each prevention enol ised. For deteton contol, ‘lie a'D ben each detection conta itd. Preventing the cases of the failure mode thyousk a design ‘change or design procs change i th only way eedcton in the occurence ranking can be elected “Teble IL shows example prevention sn dection coal or the ees eno i Table. Failure | Canse Prevention Detection Mode ‘controls controls ‘Vetisie | Mechanica inkage | Designed per | Eavoamental ocr not | treks to inadequate | mater sadand | sess est 03-9963 stop | comoion protection | MSS Mase eylinder viewam | Cary-over dain | Pressure vary look eto seal degn | wih ane duly | tesing~ sytem ‘elerenireents_| level Tras offyaatie find [Designed pr | Vibration sop | from bose drat | ore soe test 181980, fine cto incoreet| | requirements - sonnet wrque toon ‘pectic Tos ofkyrslie aid Daigal pw | Davin oF foe otydralictines | materia standard | Experiments (DOT) tsinpedleampressed, | MS-IITS Stabe resliney Inappropriate ube mail specified ‘Table LS Examples of Prevention and Deletion Design Controls 1captor Design Fire Mode an Ets Ansys. | i # : i il fii |= HETATE PHY LPATE TE ls | Ue | - 1 . an I tii 7 7 it [ade |= nilles lapel © la i wht le fe - ath 7 Hey dit ° ut nl op [It ih 4 |i = aif] z 3 ind [Atal 7s ‘Table HL! Sample DFMEA Form with Minimal Information Elements & Example EntriesChapter Design Filtre Mode and Eis Anti Detection (0) ) Detection the ak stsocited withthe best detection conto} lined ia the Cute Design Control Deecon edumn. When ‘more dat oe con is identi, is recommended that te leacdon ranking of each contl be incodod as part of te ‘serpon ofthe coal. Record tbe fowet ranking value inte Detection clu, A suggested approch o Curent Design Contol Detection x0 ‘Seue the flr bas eecured and then aes the expats ofthe curent design contol to detec this fare ode. Do not automaicly presume thatthe detection making is low case the occurence is Low. Its important ase the capably of the design contls to detect Tow fen faie ‘nodes of reduce the isk of them going farer nthe design release proces. Detection areaiverking within he sope of e indvidual EMEA. In order to achieve lower ranking, general the desi ‘contol enalysisor version seis) ato be sproved Suggested Evaluation Criteria ‘The team should agree on evaluation citria ard a ranking system and apply them consistently, even if moifed for {tdividalpocese analysis Detection should be esmated wins Toble C3 asa guideline ‘The ranking value of ono (1) Is resoved for fae prevention ‘tough poten dcign sluons 3chapter Design Filre Mode an Ets Analysis ‘Opportunity rhe Tieinooa Dalton | Ubetnoed ef Detecton ty Dest Control | | PAK | uot Yetecn | ocmatdniemmscamtsentorimasmnvas |] 10 | Abbi ‘erty | penton nmi ewe econ | SENSU) | Ship lea Geitepsent ees) a > pees ‘soe | ema exced n pin nine Sccrwibauaa tne streenerstenisoe as | |g : sora ete oe Sm seh aio ach es ucenabeetsing chyimreromm woe | | 7 | Yaryten dt enn ig nd CASietaicinse sean || 6 | Low ‘ret ton Getting setae (Ga eotpune: cnet parses Reon ’ win | Prt vation Gy tig. epi ae Tans | tonto conga ee aac ‘ (Cava tn Fla oa) igh re alsin iy ng dtp Tate, eer . be vat | Brn ssn sin dae, | Siatavin wcteretdopaingewatom pea: | | 2 | Yer Seen [Remcreeeuremetcmmueeutossucaiy |) | Ate iii _| Binds ten poses em mee oe) Cerin ‘Table Cr3 Suggested DEMEA/PFMEA Preventon/Detecion Evaluation Criteria rychaper ‘Design Fallure Mode and Ee Analysis “This page intesonaly et blank sschapter Design Failure Moe and Ets Analysis i] : Jt i uv fh i iki th i Ha [ta aha | =| rallies [ape = (ibe HL i, wai ld |, . Hit |E |ite |i eG 1 ~ AHR 24 Ti TE ij ihe = 4 ih - 5 it LAL cas ‘Table LI Sample DFMEA Form with Minimal Information Elements & Example EasesCopter Design Fie Mode nd ass Analysis Determining Action Priorities ‘Once te team bas completed the intl identification of aire ‘modes an ess, cuss and contol, icing songs foe very, oosunence, abd dion, they est dee fer ‘os are nosed 1o rede the ri, Due to the isheest Timations on esourees, tine, technology, and oher filo, they amt hoc ow to bs pin dere elo “Te intl focus ofthe tam shoud be oriented towards failure nes withthe lghes severity rankings, When theseverty 59 tr 1, is pea hat the foam mst entre da the TS ested tvough existing design conals or commended evo (a deuce inthe FMEA), For faite modes with seeros 8 o¢ below the am should Constr causes ving highest oosence or dz aking. It's the tean’s responsibilty to look at the information ete, decide upon an approach, and determine how to best prize” the isk redscton flocs dat best serve ther ‘ganization and customer Risk Evaluatior Risk Priority Number (RPN) () ‘One approtch to ass ston priitzation as bee ose the isk Prost Number RN = Sovety(S) x Osurece (0) x Datetion D) Within te scone ofthe individual FMEA, thi vate can range ‘etwean Fad 100, The use of an RPN threshold ls NOT a recommended practice for determining th ned for actions ‘Aplving tress asumes tht RPNs ar a meas ofeative ‘AE Cache fen fe 20 ad tt comnaousinpovemeat ‘Snot rue obi 8, For example, ifthe ewstomer appli an acivary thesold of 100 toe followin, the pple would be veguied to take ton on te chratrte B wth he PN of 12 [item] Severiy [Gocurrence | Detection | _RPN jean 3 2 5 9 io 7 a oe ”Design Failure Mode and Ets Analysis Chapter nl ih 5 i jt ! = a1dwvs fatale aL i ht 5 a! t fa ‘Table IL. Sample DFMEA Form with Miainal Information Elements & Exanple Entrieschaps Design Flue Mode ad Ess Analysis In his example, the RPN is higher fo caractaiste B, but the ‘ort shouldbe fo work on A with tbe higher sveriy of 9, though the RPN i890 whichis ower an below the esbod Avober concern with sing the tesbold approach is that here ‘sho specie RPN vse that requires mandstory ation. Unforunately, establishing such trasolds may promote the ‘wre behavior easing team members to sped tne ig 1 {sty & lower ccurence or detection ranking value to redoce IPN. This type of beaviravode addressing the rel problem ‘hat unde th eae othe alae moe and merely Kee te [RPN tolow he bresol, eis imporant to rcognive that while dlcrmiing "soepahie” rk ate pariclar progem maiesone (eg, veiele launch) is desimble, it should be bsed on an Analjsis of severity, eosurence and detection aod not trough ‘he application oF RPN creshois. Use of he RPN index in th dacussons of the team can ba = Use lat The imfalone ofthe use of RPN need to be Undertoa However, fh use f RPN theehlds 2 Stemine ‘tion point recermandes Recommended Action(s) (k) In gene, prevention ations (Le, reducing the ooeuence) are pretenble to doctton acon, As example of thsi the ue of Proves design sandard or best pracice rater an product ‘esifconvaldaton ater design fceae. ‘The intent of recommenda sstions is 10 improve the design “esting these aeons should consider redoing rankings in the following order severity, cocumene, end detection "Example approaches oredoce hese oe explained telow ‘To Reduce Severe (9) Ranking Only design revision ean ‘ring abou reetion im the seventy ranking Han seventy rankings can sometimes be reduced by making Gough reson tt compersalo or mipate tho reutant ‘Sovorty of fale. For example: Tho fequroment 2 is 12 $etan spp a proseure under ure" The sever te eet ta fare mete rapid oss ofa presse” woul be ower or rn ft te ‘A design charge, nan of sa, does ol imp tha the seventy ‘nib resueed. oy design change shoud be revewed Dy te {eam to determine tw oes to the podust Keconaly andDesign Flue Mode and ts Analysis chapter b-+-] we 1 » Ty ou ou + pp q ze [te = = saws SSG = aff] i] sc fre mf es “Table HL Sample DFMEA Form with Minimal Information Elements & Hxample Kateeschapter sign Filre Mode and Ect Analysis For maximum effesvenes and efceny of tis appcach, changes to the product and. process design should be ‘plement em inthe development proces For example, ‘emte mitrls may need t9 be considered say ip he ‘evlopnen cyl eliminate comoson seventy. ‘+ To Reduce Occurence (0) Ranking: & cetion In the ‘Scunece making ca be effected by feoving econtling ‘he or more of he cases or mechani of the flue mode Trough a design ronson. Actions such as, bt limited to, "he olowing sould be considered: (Bor proof the design to liniaate he ule mode © Revised design geome and tolerances (Revised design lower the stresses or pce weak (igh fare robabiiy) compacts 2 Adéredandansy (Revised material spesifation To Reduce Detection D) Ranking: Te pene method is the we of erovimisake proofiag. AB increwe in desig ‘aldo verfeation actions should result ina eduction of ‘he detection aking oly In some cass, «design change to specific part may be reqed to increase the Tilihood of ‘Gesctin (ca roduce the eosin ranking). Adil, the folowing sould be consider: (© Design of Experinents (paricualy when multiple ‘rineratve cases of file mode == presen) (0 Revised et plan ube semen lads ono recomended actions fo a pec flute modelcuslconsal combination, indicate his by entering. "None in this column. Ik may be useful to alo inch = ‘atonal if"None" is entered, especialy in as of igh severity. For design actions consider using the falling 4+ Ress of desi DOE or iil esting + Design analysis (etl, strstr or pyc of ue) that woul confnn that desolation sealve ad does not ‘nmedsee new penta are mods + Drawing, scbemais, or model to confion physical change of ‘arg feaue Reals hom design review + Changes toa given Enginouring Standard or Design Guidelines Reishi alsa esls aDesign Filre Mode and Ets Analysis Chapter = | Tdwvs h ‘Table HL Sample DYMEA Form with Minimal Information Elements & Example Eatreschapter Design Fallure Mode and Ets Analysis ‘able IL? below provides an example of the apiaion of sues (Colum 9, contols (Column ) and reommended soa (Colum. ponsibility & Target Completion Date ()) Enter te name ofthe india an organization responsible for ompleting. cach recommended action iplsting the target fompletion dt. The design responsible enpnceria leader i reeponibl for ensuring that ll acon recommenda ave bees tmplemened or deputy adden Action Results (mn) “This scion emis the results ofeny complete actions and ‘seat on SO, D rankings and RPN. Action(s) Taken and Completion Date (m) Air he ation has hee plemented, eter abit descition ‘ofthe eto nen an acl completion date Severity, Occurrence, Detection and RPN (n) ‘Afr the preventivlcomective action has been completed, ‘dsermine and record the Tesuling severity, coerce, and ‘dectonrnkings ‘Calelate and record the resulting sion (sk pity indicator (eFPN, All evsed rankings should be reviewed. Acton lone do pot fzurantee thatthe problem was saved (ie, caus adres, ‘his at appropiate enlyie or txt sould be completed as ‘verification, I urber ston i sonsidered necessary, repeat the magni The foom should sways) be on ‘comiauous ingroveent aChapter Design Fire Mode an Eos Analysis Tem] | Fate | Cae Dan | Reommended Ta] [ai Reaiannn[Reenw —Einarens cr Sige mio poe | | Sep | adeaiecorasin |main| OP poise i feembstaee |deagewin | ing ryemi | oop nation sey Taetipauis | beinespo | Vimar | an camer Taliecie [ome ina [Reese Sisiciean | Seo seco Temata || Daaeasre | DOE ae ee retort is omens seats ‘Table 7 Examples of Causes, Contras and Recommended Actions Maintaining DFMEAs _ The DEMEA it living document and should be reviewed whenever tere is a product design change and update, at ‘oqued Recommendations updses sould be ialude into | fubsequest DPMEA loos withthe fal vests (ht Worked ted what dd nat wok) Azote clement of ogg mintomace of DPMEAS should itclode «periodic review ofthe rankings used inthe DEMEA. Specific focus shouldbe given to Occurence ad Detection ‘ankigs. This i pricuarly imporant where iprovements have been made citer hough prodct changes ornprovements indesign controls. Additonal incaes where elses hve cured the rankings shouldbe revise acornchaps Design Failure Mode snd Efets Ansys Leveraging DFMEAs Linkages _ TE new projet or aplication is inedorlly sear vo te xing product single DFMEA maybe used with easter ‘corarence, Using a findeentlysotad baseline DFMEA the starting point provides the gett opportuni f leverage pat expuince aad knowledge. If hte ae slight diferenes, ‘he team should Menify and foes on the effets of thee diteences “The DFMEA i mot stand sone” document. For example, the Chat of the DEMEA can be sod at input for subsequent roguct develops: proses. tis the summary ofthe teas ‘essoes an anus Figure TILT shows te linkages of ‘ome of the commonly sed docoments. P= Diagram, etc. Boundary (Block) Diagram, ql SLs ‘igare 11.7 DEMEA Information Thy Design Verification Plan & Report (OVP&R’, PFMEA, etc. erelationships Fl «(Chapter Design Fite Mode and Bets Ansys Design Verification Plan & Report (DVP&R) PFMEA EMEA and DVPAR have an important iskage. The DEMEA ienifes tnd docomens the arent sion prevention and Toasitin th determination of faire modes ‘+ Form C: Fons A with Prevestion Contos column tothe let ofthe Oserene corn 2 To beter show the reitionship berweun prevention ceuiols and occurence ranking ‘+ Form D: Form Band C combined ‘+ Form E> Form D with sepante columns for Curent Deteton Design Controls (Cause sd Fire Mods) (© To highligh tbe need to consider causereated cons ‘+ Form F: Form B with separate columns for Responsibly nd ‘Tegel Completion Date and Actions Taken and Completion Date (© Toallow sorting by dates 1. Ths ws pve ne Cr, Foran GO FMEA Mama Eton, ANG 14Sungle FormsSame Forms DFMEA Form B 6Snsle Forms DEMEA Form "7Sample Forms Appendix A DFMEA Form neSample Forms Appendix A DEMEA Form 19EMEA Form F Sang FormsAppend A PFMEA Forms ‘Sample Fors Form A: Bass form (ith minima infomation) ‘© With Preyeaton aod Destin Contos as pate Form 8: Form A with Proust SupiFunctom and Reguienent a sepa columns (© Tosti the detrmiation offre modes ‘arm C: Fon A with Prevention Contos Coli tothe left of he Osctrence eon (© To beter show the rtinship beween prevention nto to cosurence ranking oem D: Form Band € combines Form E: Form D with separate colunns for Curent Detection Press Control (Cause nd Pare Mods) (© To ighlght the need to consider couse related Eoniroie orm Form B with separate columns fr Responsibly td Tegel Completion Date ind Actins Taken aod Completion Dae (© Toallow sorting by dates Fom G: Fom B with ID, Product and Proess within a Twidged Requirements clu (© To provide consistency among thy Process Flow, PEMEA snd Contol Pin Form H Form D and G combined ° Thomas dt ml rove in th Chay, Fer and OM FMEA ama Eon, IAG. ‘pect nmAppend A Sango Fors EMER Form & mSangle Forms Appendix A PFMEA Form eee Se | se |] BES YU | a [om] wn or a 3Appentic A Sane Fos EMEA Form © m4Sule Forms Appendix A nsSane Forms Appentix A PEMEA Form E 16Sample Forms ‘PEMIEA Form aSample Fors AppentixA EMEA Form G 1Semple Fons Appendix A 19‘Append System evel FMEA Appendix B: System Level FMEA. “he proses fora System FMEA ix generally the same athe development of ater FMEA, The major difeecces between System level FMEAS and oer ypes of FMEAS ithe fous on Seton snd relauoasips that ae unique othe sytem as 8 whole (Le, do aot exist at lower levels. ‘Te System level EMEA includes fille modes associated with ierfaces and inuractions i addon wo considering single pont ares which ‘the peimary feu of produ level FMEAS ‘Tolpis th meaning f Syste, Subsyer, and Composeat FMEAS, vo examples have been consti blow ln Figure B1 (for Intertices ue Interactions) and inFigare B.2 (forliem,Funedon, nd Fale Modes) ‘Minor Subsystems Indirect interface with ae other subsystems Major Subsystems, al Taterface with the Minor Environment [Subsystems Figure Bl Intertaes and Interact ‘The FMEA tam is responsible for specifying the sope of is respective PMEAs. The example in Figure Bt sews ht the team fe specified Sabsytoms A, B,C, apd D ales withthe ‘ruadingeovirament ss comprising te Systm that must be ‘onside wile completing the Systm FMEA.Append 8 Interfaces Interactions System Level MEA In Figure B., itraces beeen subsyems are shown where Subsystem A'touces and (cones with) Subsystem B, touches or comes with C, and a cleaee between D and Signed by the dashed line’ The Eaivnment also oocbes each Of the subeystems Ise in Figue B.l, which requies te “Pavioamestl Interfaces” be considered when camping the FMEA Also, the imeraces 10 major and minor subsystems, whether diet indie, soul he nla ‘Te neracee which are enti nthe Systm FMEA should be ince nth eepecbveSuoeysom FMEA, Figue B2 shows a system and its interelatnships in “tarda” ot approach ‘A chang in one subsystem or component may cause a change in ‘uote subst of component ‘In Figure B1, nteracons between subsystems wn components an coir tong any ofthe inercing systems or example, Subsystem A bess up engin Subystem B nd D gaining heat through thes respective interfaces, a wel a Subsystems A ‘ving off heat othe environment Interactions ih alto oesor Song “non-conacting” systems via ansfer trough the ‘envionment For example if the environmen incompond of igh unity snd Subgtoms A and C are dint lr metals Separated by 4 son-mual composing Subsite B, Subsystem A dC can sil ave a elacoalye reaction dt the ose fiom the eavironment. Thus, itrscions anoag mu-conacting, subsystems can be relatively diffe oped bute inporant tnd sould be considered,‘SystemLevel FMEA Appendix aR WRTOTTIOS Tea Jere wrEISKSaNg BROT WRISTS ‘igure B.2 Kem, Functions nd Failure 12Append B Systm Lovel FMEA Relationships Multiple Levels of Design FMEAs ‘More tie than notte focus of & DEMEA isan tem which i a subset ofa larger sjtem. The FMEAS at be dite evel of ‘he design heey (Le, system, subsystem ad eamponer) ae linked toh the nse > fre mode > effec of flare rehtionshpe Thien wo way linkage (ee Figure 3) From Lower Higher Level: Toe eet of» fe ode a ven level Sse mode he next higher lve, For cxampe, the effet ofa prt 2 fue mode would be & flue made of module 3 either dey or indirect by easing other pr to fil The effet of module le mode is flue made of wbnystem 4 Coorequaly, the elle of 3 flue mode at any sublevel may uma became 8 yt fare mode with mom ser reltod eos From Higher Lower level: To kage fom phar level 0 {herent wer lve ested othe pyc of alae eter han 2 pure caus aa fle relations since ia the development of DDFMEA, the cases denied at aay level deal wi he design roast ony fet with he fale ochanams Undentanding these relationships wil provide a cosseney of ‘lysis and an ccooomy of eff i the development of DEMEAS, asAppendix B System evel FMEA Effect onthe end user “ie efector | { suoayam ature dois 2 \\ ‘jam Fore Mose i )\ elms moto oT ele Fate tose 2 Fare Me satay syst ature Mose anetecusemer eee re Mechanisms typically relate tothe next level ee (oie a2 2 part sy Design Process Causes Y4, YZ, Figere B.3 DFMEA Bets Linkages 7Appendix C Altrative Risk Assessments Appendix C: Alternative Risk Assessments Alternatives to RPN ‘The risk proty number is the product of the sever (8), ‘coud (0), and dtction (D) kings. (5) (0)x(0) = RPN Withi the scope of the individual FMEA, tis vale (betwee nd 100) can be wed wo asi the er a ranking the once Inte design ofthe protect and proces. ‘The ble below, however, lasts how diferen Seve (8), cerrence (0) & Detection (D) scenario esl i gual REN values Upon review of each scenario, pros would aot be establish by seta based onthe RPN lone Fifteen Different Situations with an RPN=350, ‘Severity of || Likelnood of ketood of |] Problem ‘Occurrence Datedion a [S| Meseato | 2| Hazardous ji Moderate [6] tow [61 '3|__ Hazardous jf Moderate [4 | Very Renae — [9] | Hazardous _|9| Vary High Mod High | 3 | High [8] Moderate [5 o | Moderate [5 | — Re a 7 [a] Mederata [4] —nposste [ra a 8] High 3| — Moseaio [5 9 8] Moseraio [5] Very Romie |. i (6 Very Har tow [6 i | Moderato [6 | —imposstile 70 He S| High | — Remote [6 f [High 8) Very Remeis [9 fi [4 Vary High Very Force i lah [5] — impcesbie 10 “he eas ofelelton and sorting of his index bas ed many tse ieetlsively and without consideration to what may bea mor appropri means of prietizing. Examples of same such haranes allow " Usd with eso orm Whip! Caption, C205, 2006 bsAppentixC Aerie Risk Assessments Alternative: SO (S x 0) Some egsnizations may choose o primarily fous on Severity snd Occurence. The SO index is the rodet ofthe Sever, and (Occurence rankings. In using this inde, the orgzization may {eas os how to redbe SO by educng he value of" though prevestive actions. Furthermore tht may lad subsonat fection improvement for tose withthe highest SO vale Alternative: SOD, SD Some orgunzutions have ebosea to use SOD or SD as podtzation tel SOD isthe now-artmetic combination ofthe Soveiy, Oosinence and Detection rankings SD fhe n00- srituetc combination of the Sevesy and Detection rankings Example ($00) Severiy, 8 Occurence, 0: Example (6D) Seseriy, S27 Detection, D=5 ‘The esuing SD is 75, ‘The SOD, when soned in oui, descending andr, will rire the seeoaios fist by seve, second by occurence ted sly by detection. Ss ]0 |» | RPN | sop | sp Tila meee toraa erro |e v. Ly. ery rat ees iaae | arora BT mee ies (ners ca 147 | 377 | 37 |” Scenarios ‘Equal RPN Valuer ‘Table C- Contrast among RPN, SOD and SD st 2s wih REN, ute ofthe SODISD inex shoud be used in “oriest of teamdicsion. Daring protiessimaly bases on {he SOO ha Imfatons just as wh the RPN. Far Sram, @ {hue made win a SOO of 711 woudl be ranked ghar ae abe conskorod belt) falure mde wth 30. 136AppentixD ‘tera Analy Teciguas Appendix D: Alternative Analyses Techniques Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) Design Review Based on Failure Modes (DRBFM) Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Failure Mode and Elects Arliss on of many techniques td to evliate and analy design risk Other methods have teen developed for specif ses and can be sas complement the analysis inthe FMEA process Thay say te sod es 2 replicement for an FMEA wilh aurzation By ‘he custome Thots are only afew of th exal. MBCA is sila to FMEA. The Cin FMECA inate ht the cetcally (oe sever) of the vasious flue effects are ‘onsdered and raked. Todsy, FMEA is oflen used as Syoayan for FMECA Design Review aso on Fire Modes isa ease and effect tals of conceros resto to a design change. Its too) ws {0 pide and mange good diction in reltion 0 the change DRBFM focuses on the impact of the change on does, cvlanton procedures, and manuicuring systems with the inten of eating ad preventing problem. A design review by mbjet mater expr to cult the change) ad relat improvement i at itgral pat of DRBEM. (Retenoe Figure BD. [PTA is a tecigu for syst analysis wher sym fats are ‘ualyzed fom a single potential Tare to Went all posible ‘hus FTA cone combintions of itercepeden st well as Fndependent causes, In aditon Yo the stare ofthe Bt re and all of the lope inerdependncis, the FTA aomally incites the flare probable sdeniicaion. Tis allows the ftlelaion of sysem el ven the component reiabiios." (Refrence Figure D2). © Referees IBC 6025, QD (AS20352 roAppend ‘Alteruive Analysis Techniques ‘Acton Statue lure Mode - DRBFM ‘Seventy | [© Team Review ‘ecw | |e R ‘iene = Input Design Review Based on F t B i range so Onsen | Figure D. Example of DRBFM Elements nei GH! ee On OlReferences and Sugessted Readings References and Suggested Readings IEC 63031, Deena engin -Po 31 Ati Ana nfo “nti” Odo mb TEC tonal ma ae nay omy 200 TECS105, on 2 Fane mas an 207 xD (8-22 “Slay hag Fade SAE ARP St, Recommend Fare Moder and Efe ds FMEA). Pace fr No “somo Apieaione (Replace MIL'STD-16294, 1998 (it). 'SAB1739202, ott Fre Mode an fs Anyi in Dain (Dsgn FMEA) an Potent Pale Med nd fc nas in Marfan and nem Proce (Process PE, [Alfio 1S. Angand Wo, H. Tang (1990 "Probably Cons gsr Planing ond Desi olin Deion isk ond Rely” Wily Pots. Bowls, J (205, "An Arie! o REN ration Fal Maes Eficacia Frage Preceding a ely an dant Sympartin,pp 3385 ako Srna of (se BS ins of Enomoto Tee), VOTE, 200 Pp. 5-56 Kins M, (2007). Pac of Faire Apeonch to FMEA", Trial Procodng Rei nd ‘Marat Spot Kins M, 2009. Fal Tice Anica Prd Rly Iprovemen, Trt! Procedinge Pata ond Maan Sopot ‘rConat, 0:7, 0. Pract Rein Eien, eine) ‘Sh Ho Ds si Ming-0 Wang (192), Rally Anais in Engen Apcoro, Van Nast et ‘Woes, D3. 0). The St Sigma Prato Gu to Date Anals SPC Pres, Kove p31 aus, M200), System Rb Thr (oe, Wi, 208,Index [ATOR (Advanced Pode Qatiy Pein), 2, ecanencs, 18,45, 46,49, 58, 17,9.61,63, 4 3,02 88,9598 10, 05,10, 108, ‘Ssaaion 39,91 ‘OFM (GM, Fert, Che, 11,17 27,75 oto provement 6, S63, 103,107, PME (ces Fale Med bd fee fo aba) 1, 66, 6871573 77,85, 91,9, eo pln 613,11 no, 110 trout 29,1762 potas, 12,38 4, 91,92 ume! deco 9,53 Pots ar mode, 11,1648, 3, 61,7071, ‘son inpeovenest, 16 sit ln ten 2,2, 29, 41,49, 68 79 rove sonra 4 esi ite eco se, 777,107 eta, 18, 49,31, 57.668,75,95,99- Reamer actos 613, 18,5758, 6, 103, Tit 35,36 ir Sato sas 966,98, 109 espn egies 17,5, 68,791 107 DDAMEA (Design atre Mode nd Ets OW ik Pty aber) 7,965,103, ans $16 19,2225 299941 066, 0S 109,135 138 ‘nh 884 115133 sop BAC, 1,11, 1,25, 65,0,71,73.75, OE Deseo permet) 107 iy RB (Design Review by ature Made) 17, SD Rane by Seventy and Deteto)136 for eae 73,105 ‘Sever 85, 7,59, 6484 87, 108 109, van ei 37,455, 87,92, 98 135,136 ow digram 70,71 81,107 $0 ang by Sees and Ocurene, 136 AEC (Fare Med Ef an Cote ‘SOD tanking tse on Seventy. Oscurece ‘aabos). 3.157 md Detecten 136 Fallow, 6 PC (Snail Bross Conte 95,107 FTA Em Tee Ana) 197,19 ‘esl hrc 3,31 fared, 161 19,2 2953138, 779,111 spect 1136107 fers egoremaes 6161825 By 8 911817, 121,227, 2, Ieratone 310,130 13 35 ayaa, 8557.59.08, 1,758, fern 128130131 51,95 99105, os ia fem 71S 11, 3 ter eer, 69,670,107 age 11, 30 rea 319,105,108, ise ring 61,107 ‘elon 31, 49,3361