L12 Rasler, Foreign Policy Makers

Foreign Policy Makers, Personality Attributes, and Interviews: A Note on Reliability
Problems
Author(s): Karen A. Rasler, William R. Thompson and Kathleen M. Chester
Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Mar., 1980), pp. 47-66
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association
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Foreign Policy Makers,
Personality Attributes,
and Interviews
A Note on Reliabilit y Problems
KAREN A. RASLER
WILLIAM R. THOMPSON
Departtment of Government
Flotridla State Universit l
KATHLEEN M. CHESTER
Content analytic procedures for operationalizing 6 personality attributes (Hermann,

1974, 1980) are applied to 92 (1950-1978) interviews with 10 heads of state and govern-
ment. Focusing on data reliability, a test of temporal consistency is examined. The out-
come suggests that the trait scores are not sufficiently consistent across time to be con-
sidered highly reliable. Two possible sources of trait score variance (data source and
situation) are considered, and data for one source are investigated through an analysis
of variance. In general, the findings cast some doubt on the utility of analyzing interviews
to obtain measures of foreign policy makers' personality attributes. Further attention
must be devoted to the multiple problems of source bias, situational circumstances, and
temporal inconsistency.
For a number of comparative foreign policy analysts, the

personality attributes of decision makers constitute an important
source for explanatory variables. The basic assumptions are that
decision makers can influence their environment, that their behav-
ior in international affairs is due partly to factors internal to the de-
cision makers, and that consequently these personality variables
AUTHORS' NOTE: We are indebted to the constructive criticism of several anony-

mous reviewers.
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Vol. 24 No. 80 47-66

? 1980 I.S.A.
47
48 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
are important to study because they represent important links

between elites and their behavior. To date, a number of research
strategies have been employed to investigate the role of per-
sonality on foreign policy. Until recently, anecdotal and limited
case studies (e.g., Holsti, 1962; Rogow, 1963; George and George,
1964; Wolfenstein, 1967; De Rivera, 1968; Tucker, 1973) have
tended to predominate. Some empirical inroads, however, have
been made by simulation (e.g., Hermann and Hermann, 1969;
Hermann et al., 1974), but such experimentation still falls short
of what we would like to possess-namely a data bank containing
quantified information on the personality characteristics of
many real leaders, which could be analyzed in conjunction with
the observed foreign policy behavior of the governments they
head. Yet research (e.g., Hermann, 1974, 1977; Friedlander and
Cohen, 1975; Suedfeld and Tetlock, 1977; Walker, 1977; Falkow-
ski, 1978) has begun to appear which suggests that we may be
developing the capability of moving beyond the limitations of
case studies and simulated experimentation. Without doubt,
the most ambitious development in this area has been put for-
ward by M. G. Hermann (1974, this issue, 1980). In her 1980
study, data pertaining to six personality attributes of national
leaders nationalism, the need for power, the belief in one's
ability to exercise control over events, the need for affiliation,
cognitive complexity, and suspiciousness-are linked to form
two basic orientations to foreign policy (the "independent" aVd
the "participative"), which are then used to predict more aggres-
sive/conciliatory behavior as measured by CREON events-
interaction data.
Hermann's personality attribute data were obtained by content
analyzing interviews given by heads of state and government.
Nevertheless, the validity of such an approach rests in large part
on the premise that interviews can and do provide a meaningful
medium for tapping personality attributes. Her argument is that
interviews evoke relatively spontaneous responses from govern-
mental leaders. On the other hand, it can be argued (for a num-
ber of reasons to be discussed more fully in the following pages)
that interviews are not likely to provide adequate material for
typifying personalities.
Rasler et al. / PERSONALITY AND INTERVIEWS 49
The purpose of this article is to test Hermann's assumption

that interviews yield reliable data on personality attributes. One
aspect of these data is their temporal consistency. If interviews
are to be used to make reliable judgments of personality attri-
butes, the adjudged levels of these attributes rated from inter-
views at one point in time should resemble the personality
attributes rated from interviews at another point in time. This
is not to deny that personality attributes may change somewhat
over time or that they may vary slightly as the leader interacts
with his or her perceived international environment. But it can
be assumed that psychological attributes and measures of them
should not fluctuate significantly and in an erratic way. There-
fore, using the same procedures for coding and scoring person-
ality characteristics as those suggested by Hermann (1980), we
propose to examine the interviews of several leaders for temporal
consistency.
A Brief Description of the Hermann Approach
Hermann content analyzed press interviews of 45 heads of

state and government during 1959-1968 to acquire data on the
6 personality characteristics (listed in Table 1). She found that
they were linked to form distinguishable "independent" and
"participative" orientations to foreign policy. By knowing a
leader's orientation, according to Hermann, one may predict his
or her predispositions when faced with a foreign policy-making
task-how he or she will define the situation and the style of
behavior made in response. For instance, "aggressive" leaders
are considered to be high in need for power, suspiciousness,
nationalism, and internal control and low in conceptual com-
plexity. Their foreign policy behavior is in turn characteristically
"independent" in style and content. Such leaders will seek to
maintain their nation's "individuality" and keep their nations
apart from other nations in the international system as much as
possible. They will urge their government to be suspicious of
the motives of leaders in other nations; and if interaction is
necessary, they expect it to be on their nation's terms.
TABLE 1
Hermann's Six Personality Attributes
Attributes Definition
1. Nationalism The extent to which an individual possesses strong

emotional attachments to the nation-state, perceives
his or her own nation as superior to other nations,
and emphasizes the importance of maintaining
national honor and sovereignty.
2. Need for Power The extent to which an individual is concerned with

establishing, maintaining, or restoring his or her
impact, control, or influence over other actors.
3. Belief in Own The extent to which an individual perceives that

Ability to Control what happens to an individual is contingent on his
Events or her own behavior and characteristics.
4. Need for Affiliation The extent to which an individual is concerned

with establishing, maintaining, or restoring warm
and friendly relationships with other actors.
5. Conceptual The extent to which an individual demonstrates

Complexity a degree of differentiation when observing or
contemplating his or her environment.
6. Suspiciousness The extent to which an individual is inclined to

doubt the motives and actions of others.
Source: Based on the discussion in Hermann (1980).
In contrast, "conciliatory" leaders are said to be high in need

for affiliation and conceptual complexity, low in suspiciousness,
nationalism, and internal control. These characteristics are indi-
cative of a "participative" foreign policy. Conciliatory leaders
are likely to promote interaction with other nations, to learn
what other nations value most about their nation, and to seek a
wide range of alternative solutions to problems jointly plaguing
their nation and other nations. These leaders will attempt to
facilitate their nation's participation in the international system.
Hermann then related both the foreign policy orientations
and the individual characteristics to six foreign policy related
behavioral propensities: (1) to propose changes; (2) to take
independent action; (3) to make commitments; (4) to make positive
expressions toward other nations; (5) to receive negative feed-
Raster et al. / PERSONALtTY AND INTERVIEWS 51
back; and (6) to create policies which have an impact on other

governments.
After operationalizing these six behavioral propensities,
Hermann's subsequent analysis indicated that the "independent"
and "participative" orientations were indeed related to the foreign
policy behavior as hypothesized, particularly for those heads of
state and government who had had little previous training in
foreign affairs. This finding led Hermann to suggest that the two
composites or general orientations to foreign affairs appear to
represent important dimensions in explaining foreign policy deci-
sions and should be included in any integrative effort at under-
standing foreign policy behavior.
The Role of Content Analysis and

the Problem with Interviews
As pointed out earlier, Hermann's (1980) study rests on the

fundamental premise that content analyzing interviews is an ap-
propriate method for obtaining information about personality
attributes. Content analysis indeed has become a major tool for
analyzing the association between messages and the character-
istics of their senders. Its use, particularly in studies dealing with
personality and perceptual factors, is based on two fundamental
assumptions (North et al., 1963; Holsti, 1969). First, content
analysis makes the assumption that information of a verbal or
written nature-ranging in form from a diary or intimate letters
to memoranda, autobiographies, and speeches-can have im-
portance. Such information is a source of political content that
can be analyzed in a systematic and rigorous manner. Second, the
symbolic behavior of the individual can provide important
psychological data about the personality, beliefs, perceptions,
and other personal characteristics.
It has been maintained that interviews are an appropriate
source for measuring personality traits, because the link between
personality characteristics and spontaneous material is stronger
than that between personality characteristics and planned mater-
ial (Osgood and Anderson, 1957: 411-420; Hermann, 1980).

Studies have found that the more carefully and deliberately
planned a communication is, the more remote the relationship is
between the subject's attitudes and the content of the communica-
tion (Osgood and Anderson, 1957; Levine, 1966). Therefore,
spontaneous communication is obviously more desirable because
it minimizes the effects of "ghost writing" and deliberate signals.
By content analyzing planned materials, researchers may learn
what the ghost writer is like or something about the image which
the leader would like to reflect. But this is rarely what researchers
are looking for. However, since leaders are expected to provide
relatively quick responses in an interview, they are forced to pro-
vide spontaneous information in their own words. Consequently,
this information is alleged to be a valuable source for tapping
personality factors.
Nevertheless, others contend that interviews do not provide an
adequate source for obtaining personality data, because the con-
tents are more likely to reflect the verbal strategies in which
leaders involve one another (Jervis, 1969). Interviews can be a
form of diplomatic communication capable of conveying mes-
sages and intentions to both allies and enemies. Consequently,
leaders' words do not necessarily "speak for themselves" but
may represent policy positions arrived at through the collective
assessment and/or governmental politics of their government's
decision-making elite. Moreover, interviews can be used as a
means to convey preconstructed signals about vital issues. In this
sense, they may provide platforms for sending signals, projecting
images, and exposing and espousing policy positions and prefer-
ences, rather than acting as simple mirrors of personality. Within
this perspective, it is quite conceivable that the nature of the
messages sent will change in accordance with changes in percep-
tions of the relative hostility or benevolence of the political
environment.
In a broader context, the dilemma posed here is a reflection of
the debates among content analysts between proponents of the
"representational" and "instrumental" models of communication
(Hoisti, 1969: 33). The representational school takes the position
that the important aspects of communication are "what is re-

vealed by the lexical items present in it" (Poole, 1959: 3; Osgood,
1959). Words are assumed to "represent" accurately the author's
inner feelings; thus, there are constant relationships between the
content of communication and the underlying motives of the
authors. The instrumental school argues that it is not the face
meaning of a message, but "what it conveys, given its content and
circumstances" that is important (Poole, 1959: 3). From this point
of view, communication is seen as an instrument of influence; and
hence the content of messages may be shaped by the communica-
tor's intent to manipulate his audience in certain directions, de-
pending upon the circumstances in which communicators find
themselves.
One compromise position taken by Holsti (1969) has been that
inferences as to the intentions or feelings of authors drawn from
content data need corroboration through independent evi-
dence. Because regularities between content data and the inten-
tions and feelings of the authors may be of a limited type (e.g., for
certain classes of communicators, in specified situations, using
certain media of communication), evidence is needed beyond that
provided by content analysis of messages. For instance, links be-
tween communication and personality may be found in certain
cases depending upon the kinds of leaders involved, the situation
in which they are located, and the type of data source used for
content analyzing communication. But this "compromise" posi-
tion does not really address the problem we are facing in this ex-
amination. Troop mobilizations in prewar crises may be able to
corroborate content-derived perceptions of threat, but they do
not serve as well in the case of personality attributes.' Nationalis-
tic acts-for example, the expropriation of foreign-owned oil
industries-do not necessarily confirm a leader's innate nation-
alism or high nationalism scores. Such acts may simply be
politically expedient. Similarly, troop mobilizations need not
support a high "suspiciousness" score. The verbal expressions of
1. For an example of the use of troop mobilizations in prewar crisis as corroborating

evidence, see Holsti (1972).
"suspiciousness" and the mobilization may be communicating a

sense of threat (real or otherwise) or an intention to take action in
the near future. If external validators are not readily available,
then we are forced to focus on checks which are internal to the
personality data. Thus, we intend to examine the temporal con-
sistency of selected leaders' personality attribute scores.
Testing for Temporal Consistency
The specific procedures we have devised to test for temporal

consistency differ from those employed by Hermann in two
fundamental respects. First, it appears that Hermann pooled each
leader's responses for the decade, content analyzed them to ob-
tain an aggregate score for each personality characteristic, and
then correlated the scores with the various foreign policy be-
haviors. By pooling the responses to obtain an aggregate score,
Hermann assumes that personality remains unchanged and that
the response scores are consistent throughout the decade. She did
calculate a trait reliability index for each personality characteris-
tic to check for stability over time and issues. The index was
calculated by dividing the interview responses of each leader on
each characteristic into two groups (odd and even numbered re-
sponses). The bifurcated scores were then intercorrelated across
heads of state for each characteristic. This results in a trait reli-
ability index for each personality attribute. Hermann's six corre-
lations (or indexes) are high, ranging from .71 to .90.
However, the odd versus even approach can be arbitrary be-
cause there are a number of ways of splitting the scores into two
groups, and each procedure can be expected to yield somewhat
different estimates of true reliability (e.g., Magnusson, 1967;
Nunnally, 1967; Bohrnstedt, 1970). Nevertheless, we have opted
to use a trait reliability index that is calculated by dividing the
interview responses of each leader on each characteristic in half
and then correlating the first half of the responses with the second
half. The purpose of this particular split-half method is to obtain
some indication of the relative consistency of the scores over time.
If we start with the assumption that a leader's personality remains

relatively constant over time, then we would expect that the inter-
view responses for a leader in the first half of his or her adminis-
tration would be correlated fairly high with the interview re-
sponse in the second half of his or her administration. We assume
that personality is not static, that people may undergo psycho-
logical development throughout their lifetimes (e.g., Erikson,
1950), and that some amount of instrument error is tolerable and
to be expected. However, we are not willing to assume that per-
sonality changes frequently and drastically. Consequently,
unusually large fluctuations in the scores of the interview re-
sponses would make a low trait reliability index more likely and
imply that we are not tapping personality attributes but some-
thing else-perhaps the various signals that leaders send to other
leaders about their positions on certain issues and/ or perhaps the
intervening effect of varying circumstances.
Second, unlike Hermann, we have avoided any random selec-
tion by verbatim responses and sought complete question-answer
type interviews. By undertaking a sampling procedure of ver-
batim responses for leaders, Hermann is assuming that every fifth
interview question will elicit the kind of response from a leader
that will accurately reflect his or her personality. She also
analyzed excerpts selected for publication from longer interviews.
Interviews tend to cover a variety of issues; some of these issues
will be more salient to leaders than others. Consequently, ques-
tions ranging from one issue area to another may evoke different
kinds of responses from leaders. If the content of an interview is
not particularly homogeneous, valuable information for tapping
personality attributes may be lost in a sampling procedure. There-
fore, in an effort to gain as much information as possible about
leaders, we preferred complete question-answer and ostensibly
unedited interviews for content analyzing.
Sources such as The Foreign Broadcast Information Service
Daily Report (FBIS) and New York Times, relied upon by Her-
mann, offered only a limited supply of these interviews. There-
fore, news magazines such as Time, Newsweek, U.S. News and
World Report, The Nation, and The New Republic were also ex-
amined. Even with the support of these additional sources, the

small number of complete interviews placed constraints on the
number and choice of possible candidates for examination. Con-
sequently, we have chosen to concentrate on the following ten
individuals: Adenauer, Asad, Bourguiba, Hussein, Meir, Nasser,
Pahlavi, Sadat, Smith, and Vorster. Obviously, we are not in a
position to argue that the ten are representative of all heads of
state and government. They probably are not, but then we really
do not know what group of individuals would constitute a repre-
sentative sample. Suffice to say that they and their interview
records satisfied our need for multiple and fairly complete inter-
views to an extent matched by few other current or previous heads
of state and government.
The Results of
the Test for Temporal Consistency
Other than the two fundamental differences previously noted,

the procedure for deriving scores for the 6 personal characteristics
is the same as Hermann's. The results are based on a principle of
proportions.2 Coding manuals were generously provided by Her-
mann, and two coders content analyzed the 92 interviews em-
ployed in this study.3 For the purpose of gaining some indication
of the scores' temporal consistency, a Spearman Rho rank-order
correlation test for reliability was employed. The test requires
that we calculate each person's 6 trait scores for each of our 92
interviews.
The rank-order correlation test then involves splitting each
leader's array of trait scores into two halves and then using the
aggregate score of each half to rank order the ten leaders on each
personality trait. For example, we have eight Adenauer inter-
views for the 1950-1959 period. As shown in Table 3, the aggre-
2. An abridged version of the coding criteria and attribute scoring procedures is pre-
sented in the appendix. For the purpose of this analysis, we are assuming that these pro-
cedures are valid.
3. Overall inter-coding reliability was .94 as calculated by a ratio of coding agreements
to the total number of coding decisions (Holsti, 1969).
TABLE 2
Heads of State and Government Selected for Analysis
Number of Temporal Range

Individual State Interviews of Interviews
1. Adenauer West Germany 8 1950-1959

2. Asad Syria 8 1974-1978
3. Bourguiba Tunisia 8 1956-1968
4. Hussein Jordan 12 1957-1974
5. Meir Israel 8 1971-1974
6. Nasser Egypt 8 1955-1970
7. Pahlavi Iran 8 1959-1974
8. Sadat Egypt 14 1972-1978
9. Smith Rhodesia 10 1965-1977
10. Vorster Union of South 8 1966-1977
Africa
gate nationalism score of his first four interviews ranks him as the
seventh highest. The aggregate nationalism score of his fifth
through eighth interviews, however, places Adenauer as the fifth
highest of the ten leaders. This same procedure is followed for
each of the other nine leaders for each personality trait, per-
mitting us to examine the level of agreement between the two rank
orders for each trait.
The rationale behind this test is that any leader's trait score
does not have a great deal of meaning if considered in isolation
from the relevant trait scores of other leaders. A nationalism score
of .185 for Bourguiba is not very revealing unless we are able to
contrast it with the respective .137 and .409 nationalism scores of
Adenauer and Vorster. Given a hypothetical range between . 137
and .409, we can then say that Adenauer and Bourguiba score
relatively low on the nationalism trait, while Vorster scores rela-
tively high. Thus, vis-a-vis our concern for reliability, we would
expect that the individuals being examined would assume similar
positions across time and that the levels of rank order agreement
per trait should be reasonably high. An examination of Table 3,
however, indicates that this expectation is not realized in our ten
leader data set. The only rank order agreements which are fairly
high are the ones for internal control (.782) and nationalism
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(.770). The power and cognitive complexity rank orders are

moderately high, but they are not high enough to suggest an ade-
quate degree of reliability. More importantly, the low rank order
correlations encountered for suspiciousness (.297) and affiliation
(.345) suggest a serious reliability problem.4
Some Rival Hypotheses
If seems fairly clear that we have uncovered what appears to be

a reliability problem from the ten leaders interview data. Never-
theless, trait unreliability is only one possible conclusion, for
there are several alternative or rival explanations for the observed
fluctuation in the personality attribute scores.
Suedfeld and Tetlock's (1977) recent finding that the com-
plexity of communications exchanged by governmental leaders
was significantly lower in crises that ended in war (as opposed to
crises that did not end in war) reaffirms the possible significance
of situational influences. However, it is one thing to differentiate
between crises that ended in war and those that did not end in war
(e.g., the 1914 crisis versus the Cuban missile crisis) and still
another to determine systematically the perceived nature of
the situations in which our ten leaders found themselves be-
tween 1950 to 1978. Occasionally, dramatic environmental
changes will take place from which it is reasonable to infer that a
perceived situational change has occurred. Two conceivable ex-
amples which are pertinent to the ten leader set are the 1973
October War and the 1977 visit of Sadat to Israel.
Table 4 reports the outcome of twelve differences of means
tests conducted on Sadat's mean personality attribute scores
4. Given the small sample size, one might suggest that a drastic change in the rank
ordering for one leader may be a cause for low correlations. However, the evidence seems
to indicate that it is not a major concern here. For instance, Table 3 reflects a signficant
change in Sadat's rank order scores for nationalism, yet the overall correlation agreement
is .77. In addition, since a good percentage of the original data is located at the tails rather
than the center of the original frequency distribution, the Spearman rho correlation test is
considered ideal since it minimizes the importance of the distance between numbers and
produces a conservative estimate of association. Thus, it tends to be less sensitive to out-
liers than other tests (Blalock, 1972).
TABLE 4
Sadat's Mean Personality Attribute Scores

Before and After the October War and the Visit to Israel
The October War
NAT POW INC AFF COG SUS
3/72-4/73 .348 .442 .633 .162 .366 .420

3/74-2/75 .131 .114 .444 .304 .694 .308
Significant
Difference
at .05 level S S S NS NS S
The Visit to Israel
NAT POW INC AFF COG SUS
11/76-4/77 .072 .069 .458 .418 .774 .237

12/77-2/78 .145 .097 .543 .239 .393 .197
Significant
Difference
at .05 level NS NS NS NS NS NS
NAT = nationalism AFF = affiliation

POW = power COG = cognitive complexity
INC = internal control SUS = suspiciousness
immediately before and after the 1973 October War and the
visit to Israel. Of the 12 changes in mean scores, 4 are statistically
significant, and all of these are associated with the October War.
Table 4 then offers some limited evidence for the possibility of
situational influences. Unfortunately, dramatic events such as the
two associated with Sadat are more difficult to locate for the other
nine leaders within the time spans for which we have interview
data. Consequently, the Sadat tests are certainly less than con-
clusive and should be regarded more as illustrations of the point
than as full-fledged tests of the influence of situation on interview
scores.
Accordingly, we have elected to focus instead on a second and
more manipulable source of heterogeneous scores-the pos-
sible influence of multiple sources. It is quite conceivable that
different news sources are subject to variable biases in relation to
the types of questions asked, as well as the nature of the ques-
tions/ responses actually published. Given the fact that 8 different

sources (FBIS, New York Times, Newsweek, Time, U.S. News
and World Report, New Republic, Business Week, and The
Nation) were utilized to obtain our 92 interviews, we need to
examine the interview data for possible source influences-a test
that can be most efficiently accomplished through an analysis of
variance. However, since 4 of our sources (FBIS, Time, News-
week, and U.S. News and World Report) yielded 86 of the
92 interviews, the ANOVA examination must be restricted to a
source N of 4 and an interview N of 86.
Table 5 reports the outcomes of ANOVA examination of the
six dependent variables. Source makes a statistically significant
difference in three (internal control, cognitive complexity, and
suspiciousness) of the six cases. However, the evident source bias
is not entirely consistent. Time and Newsweek produce similar
means for internal control, while FBIS and Newsweek produce
similar means for cognitive complexity. Overall, it can only be
said that Time appears to provide somewhat higher scores than
do the other three sources. Nevertheless, the point to be stressed is
that the utilization of multiple sources can constitute a significant
source of trait score variance. In this study, multiple sources ac-
count for approximately 10% to 14% of the variance in three of
the six personality attributes. Thus, we may conclude that it is
possible that some limited portion of the temporal consistency
problem discussed earlier may be traceable to the use of different
sources. But it is equally possible that the influence of multiple
sources and situations is an independent problem to be faced in
improving the reliability of interview-based personality attribute
data.
Conclusion
With Hermann's (1980) procedures for coding and measuring

personality characteristics as the basis, the purpose of this study
has been to assess the reliability of the interview as a source for
operationalizing personality attributes. Toward this end, 92
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interviews of 10 heads of state and government in power between

1950 and 1978 were analyzed for 6 personality attributes. A test of
temporal consistency-a variant of the split-halves approach
which examines the possibility of change over time-suggests
that the trait scores are not sufficiently consistent across time to
justify the unqualified application of interview-based personality
attribute scores to the prediction and explanation of foreign
policy behavior. In addition, two additional sources of score
variance were examined empirically. Certain types of situations
may exert some influence, and an analysis of variance
examination suggests that different sources of interviews are
statistically significant sources of variance in different personality
attribute scores.
Although it is true that we cannot dismiss the possibility that
our 10 leaders and their 92 interviews might assume the status of
statistical rarities, our findings cast doubt on the utility of tapping
interviews for the personality attributes of foreign policy tnakers.
At the very least, our findings indicate that some further attention
must be devoted to the confounding influences of temporal
inconsistency, data source, and the situation of the interviewee.
More generally, while it is quite conceivable that interviews do
reveal the personality attributes of the interviewees, the nature of
our test outcomes do not give us grounds for feeling confident
that the present state of the art is capable of accurately measuring
these personality attributes using such interview analysis
methods.
Finally, the results reported in this article should not be
interpreted as an indictment of the general utility of content
analysis techniques. Our aims and conclusions have been much
more modest. Our findings suggest that a given approach to the
content analysis of interviews given by heads of state and
government does not seem to generate highly reliable indicators
of personality attributes. Content analysis certainly has a number
of other useful applications as may interviews, for that matter.
What we have attempted is to delineate one area in which the
conjunction of specific content analysis procedures and
interviews does not yet achieve the desired results.
APPENDIX
Personality Attribute Coding Criteria and Scoring Procedures
Nationalism
Criteria References to the speaker's nation:

(a) which were preceded by a favorable modifier,
(b) which were preceded by a modifier indicating strength,
(c) which contained within the content mention of the need to maintain
national honor and sovereignty.
References to other nations:
(a) which were preceded by an unfavorable modifier,
(b) which contained within the content mention of the meddlesomeness
of the referent in the affairs of others.
Score: The ratio of the number of references which meet the specified criteria to
the total number of references to own and other nations observed.
Belief in Internal Ability to Control Events
Criteria Verbs indicating that the head of state:

(a) was responsible for initiating or planning the action listed,
(b) assumed that his or her nation would initiate or plan such activity.
Score: The ratio of the number of verbs which meet the specified criteria to the
total number of verbs observed.
Need fbr Power
Criteria Verbs and context which:

(a) indicate strong forceful actions which affect others,
(b) suggest giving help, advice, or assistance to another when not solicited
by the other,
(c) denote an attempt to control other persons or groups by regulating
their behavior or the conditions of their lives or by seeking information
which would affect other people's lives or actions,
(d) indicate an attempt to influence, persuade, convince, bribe, make a
point, or argue with other persons or groups so long as the concern is
not with reaching agreement or avoiding misunderstanding,
(e) suggest an attempt to impress other persons or groups or to create a
public display in order to gain fame and/or notoriety,
(f) denote concern for one's reputation or position.
Score: The ratio of the number of verbs which meet the specified criteria to the
Need for Affiliation
Criteria Verb s and context which:

(a) indicate a positive feeling for other persons or groups,
(b) suggest reaction to a disruption of a relationship,
(c) denote companionate activities such as making visits,
(d) indicate nurturant acts such as helping other persons or groups or
being concerned about the well-being of other persons or groups.
Score. The ratio of the number of verbs which meet the specified criteria to the
APPENDIX (Continued)
Conceptual Complexity
Criteria Words indicating:

(a) low conceptual complexity (e.g., "definitely," "unquestionably"),
(b) high conceptual complexity (e.g., "perhaps," "sometimes").
Score: The ratio of the number of high conceptual complexity words to the
number of low conceptual complexity words observed.
Suspiciousness
Criteria All nouns and pronouns referring to persons, groups, or nations other than
the speaker or the speaker's people, nation, or government if their context
indicates doubt, misgiving, uneasiness, or wariness about what those others
were doing, saying, or planning.
Score: The ratio of nouns and pronouns which meet the specified criteria to the
total number of nouns and pronouns observed.
Source: Based on Hermann (1980). Space does not permit more specific examples
which may be found in the original source.
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Foreign Policy Makers, Personality Attributes, and Interviews: A Note on Reliability

Content analytic procedures for operationalizing 6 personality attributes (Hermann,

For a number of comparative foreign policy analysts, the

AUTHORS' NOTE: We are indebted to the constructive criticism of several anony-

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Vol. 24 No. 80 47-66

are important to study because they represent important links

The purpose of this article is to test Hermann's assumption

A Brief Description of the Hermann Approach

Hermann content analyzed press interviews of 45 heads of

Hermann's Six Personality Attributes

1. Nationalism The extent to which an individual possesses strong

2. Need for Power The extent to which an individual is concerned with

3. Belief in Own The extent to which an individual perceives that

4. Need for Affiliation The extent to which an individual is concerned

5. Conceptual The extent to which an individual demonstrates

6. Suspiciousness The extent to which an individual is inclined to

Source: Based on the discussion in Hermann (1980).

In contrast, "conciliatory" leaders are said to be high in need

back; and (6) to create policies which have an impact on other

The Role of Content Analysis and

As pointed out earlier, Hermann's (1980) study rests on the

ial (Osgood and Anderson, 1957: 411-420; Hermann, 1980).

that the important aspects of communication are "what is re-

1. For an example of the use of troop mobilizations in prewar crisis as corroborating

"suspiciousness" and the mobilization may be communicating a

Testing for Temporal Consistency

The specific procedures we have devised to test for temporal

If we start with the assumption that a leader's personality remains

amined. Even with the support of these additional sources, the

Other than the two fundamental differences previously noted,

Heads of State and Government Selected for Analysis

Number of Temporal Range

1. Adenauer West Germany 8 1950-1959

cx:l~ ~ O,0 t10 n "C ON q C) r0

(.770). The power and cognitive complexity rank orders are

Some Rival Hypotheses

If seems fairly clear that we have uncovered what appears to be

Sadat's Mean Personality Attribute Scores

The October War

NAT POW INC AFF COG SUS

3/72-4/73 .348 .442 .633 .162 .366 .420

The Visit to Israel

NAT POW INC AFF COG SUS

11/76-4/77 .072 .069 .458 .418 .774 .237

NAT = nationalism AFF = affiliation

tions/ responses actually published. Given the fact that 8 different

With Hermann's (1980) procedures for coding and measuring

;~~ ~~~ C, C, M -o -z _I y)m

interviews of 10 heads of state and government in power between

Personality Attribute Coding Criteria and Scoring Procedures

Criteria References to the speaker's nation:

Belief in Internal Ability to Control Events

Criteria Verbs indicating that the head of state:

Need fbr Power

Criteria Verbs and context which:

Need for Affiliation

Criteria Verb s and context which:

Criteria Words indicating:

BLALOCK, H. M. (1972) Social Statistics. New York: McGraw-Hill.

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; ~ C, C, M -o -z _I y)m