Policy Sciences 4 (1973), pp.

49t-508
O Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, Amsterdam--Printed in Scotland

Foreign Policy-Making in Small

States: Some Theoretic
Observations Based on a Study
of the Uganda Ministry of
Foreign Affairs*
M A U R I C E A. EAST
Department of Pofitical Science, University of Kentucky

The focus of this article is on the capacity of smaller states to act in the foreign policy
arena in the contemporary world. The past few years have produced a rather sizable
number of books and articles which deal with small states as a particular type of
actor in world politics [1]. The present effort builds upon this research and attempts
to explore in a preliminary fashion some of the ways in which world politics may be
affected by the capacity (or incapacity) of small states to act in foreign affairs.
In a previous article, I outlined two models of small state foreign policy behavior [2].
One was a conventional model based on what the traditional writings of international
politics said or implied about small states. Basic to most of the traditional literature
is the assumption that small states are fundamentally similar to large states--Small
Powers are Great Powers writ small, to paraphrase Rothstein [3]. The alternative
model, the one which we will be focusing on here, is grounded in the opposite
assumption--that there is a fundamental difference between the foreign policy-
making processes of small and large states. This assumption had to remain largely
untested in my previous article, because the differences found between large and smaU
states were based exclusively on the analysis of foreign policy events data aggregated
over 35 nations over a ten year time period. However, the outcome of the earlier

* The research for this article was carried out while at Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda
under the sponsorship of the Rockefeller Foundation University Development Program. An early
draft of this article was discussed in a faculty seminar at the Department of Political Science at
Makerere, and I acknowledge their most helpful comments and criticisms.

491
study supported the alternative explanatory model and provides the basis for further
theorizing about other ways in which small and large states may differ in terms of
their foreign policy behavior and, more importantly, why. they tend to differ as they do.
In Singer's terms, we want to construct a "scenario" of the "combinations and events,
as well as the sequence in which they unfold, such as to produce a credible narrative
of the p r o c e s s e s . . . " to be explained [4]. This article elaborates upon such a "scenario"
and presents some findings from a study of the Uganda Ministry of Foreign AfFairs as
preliminary data relevant to the explanatory model.
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to sketch out briefly the explanatory
model which underlies this research. Beginning with the characteristics which dis-
tinguish small from large states, it is assumed that small states are likely to have a much
smaller total amount of resources to be allocated by the political system than will
larger states. This means that smaller states will most likely allocate a smaller total
amount of resources to foreign affairs and the general international sector [5]. This
will in turn be reflected in the size and capacity of the foreign policy-making machinery.
The foreign ministries and foreign services of small states are likely to be small in
size and have a smaller capacity to act than their counterparts in large states. With
fewer people involved in the business of monitoring foreign affairs and international
developments, the small state will be severely limited in the number and scope of
issues which it can monitor. Even with regard to those issues which it chooses to
monitor closely and carefully, the small state may face a mind-boggling inequality of
resources if a comparison is made with a great power operating in the same issue area.
In behavioral terms, this limited capacity to monitor issues and to analyze and evaluate
the data which are collected means that small states often are unable to perceive the
many opportunities for action that occur during various stages in the development of
international issues. It is likely, for example, that small states may not even be aware
of the early developments in certain issues which may be of great potential signiticance
to them. These issues may be perceived by the small states at a later stage of develop-
ment when many of the major options have already been (explicitly or implicitly)
foreclosed, i.e., many of the early opportunities for a small state to influence the
direction in which an issue develops have been lost. The small state may then be forced
to exhibit a style of foreign policy behavior characterized by highly conflictful actions,
high risk-taking, and activity involving relatively high levels of commitment and
inflexibility. David Vital summarizes this argument well:
The chief significance of these differences of scope and quality between the small and
great powers' diplomatic machinery.., lies in the sphere of information and intelligence,
in knowledge of affairs, in the availability of data on matters as they arise and, if possible,
before they arise, which is to say, in the capacity to prepare one's moves and execute
them with the least risk of failure and with the highest probability of having chosen the
correct alternative.[6]
There are several other consequences which arise from this "limited capacity
to act" assumption. Small states are likely to avoid those styles of statecraft and
modes of foreign policy behavior which are costly, either in economic terms or man-
power. Therefore, bilateral diplomacy is eschewed in favor of multilateral diplomacy,
and foreign policy actions are more frequently undertaken jointly by smaller states.

492
 Also, the role of international organizations is more crucial in the foreign policies of
small states than in large states.
In addition, the salience of various foreign policy issues may differ between large
and small states, with small states placing greater importance on those international
issues which are most likely to effect their domestic political systems. For most small
states, economic issues--trade, aid, and development--assume a higher importance
than in larger states [7].
There are many theoretical assumptions and empirical propositions embedded
in this explanatory model--assumptions about the way foreign ministries operate,
how and when issues are perceived, and the relative importance attached to various
issues by foreign policy decisionmakers. Much more detailed and rigorous work needs
to be undertaken by way of elaborating this model for further testing. However, the
thrust of such elaboration seems to be in the direction of more rigorous and empirically
based cross-national organizational research on foreign policy-making machinery.
We need to determine to what extent there are significant differences in the organiza-
tion and operation of foreign policy-making institutions in the international system.
If there are differences, along what dimensions can they be most usefully described ?
And what are the consequences and policy implications of such differences ?
It was with these questions in mind, along with others, that I undertook a study of
the Uganda Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), attempting to find out how the
Ministry organizes itself to carry out its tasks, whatever they may be. But before
turning to a more detailed report of the Uganda MFA study, it is necessary to discuss
some of its limitations.
First, the explanatory model outlined here deals with states which have a small
capacity to act in foreign affairs. However, such a conceptualization does little to
clarify the inter-relationships of national size and level of development, both factors
which can and do affect capacity to act [8]. This study focuses on a foreign affairs
ministry in a developing African state, and it is only with great trepidation that one can
generalize to a ministry in a small but highly developed state. Nevertheless, certain
generalizations will be offered, with the clear expectation that these can and should be
empirically tested. They are put forth as a stimulus to further research rather than as
definitive statements about how the world is.
Second, even after noting the dangers of generalizing from developing to developed
states, there are still problems of comparative analysis when looking only at developing
states. It has been virtually impossible to find any research which has focused on
the process of decision-making in foreign affairs in developing states. What one does
find is a plethora of studies of various foreign policies undertaken by developing states,
with no emphasis on the institutions or processess from which the policies emerged.
Because of this lack of information on other developing states, it is impossible to
compare the situation in Uganda with situations elsewhere in the developing world.
But, again the tendency here will be to offer generalizations for the entire developing
world. Fools rush in . . . . !
There is also very little research which has been carried out on decision-making
or policy-making in Uganda regardless of what ministry or governmental agency
you are dealing with. Therefore, it is impossible to determine whether the situation

493
found in the M F A is different from that in other ministries in Uganda, or whether it
is similar in important aspects to the situation in other ministries and throughout
the civil service generally.
Finally, because of the limited time and resources available for this study, it is
time-bound in a very serious way. The research is on the organization and activities
of the Uganda MFA in mid-1972, and it is difficult to ascertain to what degree this
situation at this time period is representative of a longer trend of organization and
activity in the Ministry or whether the present situation is reflective of more recent
factors, such as the January 1971, change in government, recent political unrest, or
perhaps even the more recent change in permanent secretary at the Ministry [9].

A Brief Description of the Research Project

The primary objective of the research was to find out how the Uganda MFA operates
and how it is organized. In addition to searching the small amount of available
literature, the principle method of investigation was personal interviews with persons
working in the MFA. The majority of the persons interviewed were Uganda foreign
services officers (FSOs), while the others were individuals working in the Ministry
who were not FSOs but whose duties were felt to be important to an understanding
of the Ministry as a whole. A total of 27 interviews were conducted, with 19 being
conducted in Kampala and 8 being conducted at Uganda missions abroad. The
breakdown of interviews by rank is shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1

Rank of Foreign Service

Officers Interviewed

FSO I and above 1

FSO III 2
FSO IV 3
FSO V 5
FSO VI ti

Total 22

The five non-FSO officers included four from the executive class dealing with finance
and information and one from the clerical class. Of the 22 FSOs interviewed, 14 of
them were posted at the Headquarters in Kampala, and they represent 17 ~ of the
total number of 18 FSOs in the Headquarters during the period of research.[10]
The interviews were conducted as systematic, structured, open-ended exercises.
This means that the interviewer followed the same general questioning strategy, order
of items, and topics in all interviews, but the interviewee was free to respond as he
saw fit. Probing occurred at the discretion of the interviewer. Notes were taken at the
time and supplemented by annotations by the interviewer after the completion of the
session.

494
 All respondents were assured of the confidential and anonymous nature of the
interviews, and they were told that the information would be used for academic
purposes only. They were also told that the interviewer was only interested in admini-
strative and organizational aspects of the Ministry, and that he was n o t interested
in matters concerning specific policies of the Government or other security matters.
Because of the small number of interviews, no attempt will be made to present
elaborate statistical analysis of the data. However, it is anticipated that future publica-
tions from this research will include more rigorous analysis of the data in addition
to more focused analysis on such areas as the organization of the Ministry, recruitment
and training of FSOs, patterns of career development, relations between Headquarters
and missions, etc.

Major Findings
The principle finding of this study is that the Uganda MFA provides very little
substantive input into the foreign policy-making process. It serves primarily as the
executor of foreign policy decisions and as a body carrying out a large number of
essentially "non-policy" or "non-substantive" activities. Using the communications
framework, one can say that the flow of communications to and from the MFA is
dominated by the downward flow of decisions and directives to be implemented with
very little upward flow of policy relevant information, advice, or recommendations
into the decision-making process.
In one sense, it might be argued that this same trend towards a lesser role for
foreign ministries can be found throughout the world. There is ample evidence among
the developed states that foreign policy-making processes are being increasingly
dominated by the political power and influence of the national political executives
and their staffs. The influence of the U.S. President and the National Security Council
under Kissinger is just the most obvious current example of this trend [11]. Among the
developing states, foreign policy decision-making is said to be dominated by the
personal stature and idiosyncratic factors of the individual national leaders [12].
Although the explanations for these two phenomena may be very different, neverthe-
less, the consequence of both is a reduced role for foreign ministries in the decision-
making process.
Although I do not argue in any way with the above observation about the dominance
of executive influence over that of foreign ministries, the central point made here is
a different, although complementary, one. What was most striking about the MFA
was the absence of activities which could be classified as relevant to the foreign
policy-making process. In the case of the U.S. State Department and the foreign
ministries of other large and developed states, the problem is different. Many in-
dividuals are at work in the State Department on position papers, briefings, intelligence
analyses, policy reviews, etc., all of which are substantively concerned with foreign
policy matters and which potentially could become inputs into the policy-making
process. In other words, the State Department generates potentially useful and relevant
input; their problem is primarily one of getting the attention of the executive leader-
ship and having them give appropriate consideration to departmental inputs. In the

495
Uganda ministry, there is little substantively relevant input being generated at all,
and consequently, there is hardly ever a question about how the MFA input should
be evaluated in the policy-making process.
Precisely what kinds of evidence can one point to in support of the main thesis
advanced here ? On what basis is it valid to say that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
is primarily involved in non-substantive tasks with little or no relevance to foreign
policy decision-making ?
First, there seemed to be little activity by the FSOs interviewed which one could
consider as being policy-relevant. Although almost all FSOs mentioned as part of their
formal job descriptions that they prepared briefs, loose memoranda, and reports for
their superordinates, when probed few were able to mention specific instances in
which they had in fact prepared such reports.
Second, there was little response to a question asking the FSOs to talk about
instances in which they may have personally played a part in influencing a foreign
policy decision. The very wording of the question would seem to urge the respondent
to answer in detail or even to exaggerate their own roles in some area the "halo
effect." But this was decidedly not the case. Respondents frequently exhibited signs
of being ill-at-ease, and in several instances showed slight irritation when attempts
at probing in this area were made.
Third, the over-all impression one got from the job descriptions given by the FSOs
was not one of participating in any significant way in the policy-making process.
Respondents were asked "Tell me what you do, what is your job in the Ministry?"
The response to this question was invariably a more-or-less formal statement of one's
duties and functions as they might be found in the job description statement in an
organization manual. Then the respondent was asked to be a bit more specific and
tell what sorts of things he had been doing during the past two weeks or so. To this
question there were two different sorts of responses. One was that the individual
resisted the question and would repeat the more formal job description. At this point,
the standard procedure was to point out briefly that one of the interests of the research
was to determine the degree to which the formal job descriptions accurately described
a person's activities. The second sort of response was the expected one, where the
individual would begin to tell about what sorts of tasks or duties he had been engaged
in recently.
Both types of responses can be considered evidence in support of the main thesis.
In the case of the first type of response, a reiteration of the formal job description,
it seemed that upon probing the respondent in most cases was acutely aware of the
discrepancy between the formal description and the actual tasks performed. His
reaction was to repeat the formal description rather than describe his less demanding
and non-substantive activities. When the respondents did talk about their specific
activities, these tasks were very frequently concerned with non-substantive, non-
policy relevant sorts of activities, e.g., processing various forms submitted by the local
diplomatic corps, making arrangements for a meeting at the International Conference
Centre, escorting a visiting foreign delegation on a tour, assisting in the collection
of funds for the OAU Liberation appeal, etc.
Finally, over half of the respondents spontaneously indicated in various ways that

496
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not playing as large a role in foreign policy-
making as they thought it should be. These responses took many different forms.
Some were statements to the effect that an individual felt that he was not being used
to the fullest extent of his capabilities. Others felt that the Ministry as a whole was not
being consulted frequently enough by the government. Still others argued that there
was too little coordination in the area of foreign policy, implying a lack of influence
for the Ministry.
What are the factors that may be used to provide an explanation for these findings ?
There are three general categories of factors which will be discussed: (t) Historical
factors relevant to Uganda, (2) Factors related to general trends and developments in
world politics, and (3) Organizational factors operative in the Uganda MFA. The
first two of these will be dealt with briefly, with more emphasis being placed on the
third because of its direct relevance to our concerns here.

Historical Factors
When confronted with these findings, many Ugandan FSOs and other analysts
immediately argue that the MFA is only ten years old and cannot be expected to have
completed its shake-down cruise and be operating at the maximum level of efficiency.
Another form of this same general argument is that in the colonial heritage, it is true
that the ministries of foreign affairs were among the last to be established; there was
no counter-part to the M F A in the Colonial Government. Consequently, the Ministry
is not only ten years young, but it is also younger in years than many of the other
ministries and agencies in the Ugandan government.
As persuasive as these arguments sound at first, it is interesting to note that a
significant number of persons interviewed indicated that the influence of the M F A
had declined relative to its position in the previous Government of Milton Obote.
Also, several argued that even in the Obote regime, the MFA was declining in in-
fluence during the last several years.
Another factor has to do with the style of leadership of the current Head of State.
As has already been mentioned, the phenomenon of the strong, dominant African
head of state is not an unusual one. But in the Second Republic, this tendency is
enforced by the military style of President Idi Amin. President Amin shares with
many other past and present heads of state a strong aversion to the rather slow,
diffused, decemralized, cumbersome style of ministries [13]. Thus, decisions tend to
be made in a manner that limits the opportunities of these ministries to be effective.
This does not necessarily mean that the ministry is shut out of the decision-process.
It is more likely that the style, the speed, and the rules for participating in decisions
all develop in a manner which is not compatible with the normal operating procedures
of the ministry. And there is a snow-ball effect that may begin to operate in time--the
ministry fails to produce effective inputs on its first, second, or even third opportunity,
and the result is that it has reduced access to the decision process in the future. By
default, the role is assumed by some other agency or perhaps even an individual.
A final historical factor has to do with the complex of political forces extant in
Uganda presently. It can be argued that the absence of a multitude of alternative foci
of power and of competing ideas on policy has reduced the influence of the Ministry

497
of Foreign Affairs. When there is a relatively open and free market place of ideas on
foreign policy, then there is a premium put upon the skills of those who are expert
in the field of foreign affairs. When there is a viable and respected alternative perspec-
tive to the Government's ideas on foreign policy, there is a need for the Government to
justify its policies, to give rationales, to search for ways of improving the policy, etc.
This discussion often takes place in the context of parliamentary debates, electoral con-
tests, or even within the competition between various government bodies for influence
in foreign affairs. When there is no such discussion, there is no need for the Govern-
ment to prepare policy statements and justifications, to defend budgetary requests,
etc., and the need for the special skills of the foreign policy experts (and hence the
MFA) decreases [14].

International Factors
Another set of factors has been offered to explain the phenomenon discussed
above. These are called international factors because they represent forces which are
generally external to Uganda but impinge upon the activities of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.
The first factor is the emergence of the "new diplomacy." The objectives, techniques,
style, and duties of diplomats (and hence, foreign ministries) have changed drastically
since the Second World War. Diplomacy has emerged from being basically a politically
oriented activity focusing on the art of negotiation between states into a multi-faceted
complex of activities involving, not only (or even primarily) the political, but also the
military, economic, educational, cultural, scientific, propagandistic, public relations,
intelligence and even athletic aspects of inter-nations relations.
One of the best summary statements about the "new diplomacy" is found in the
Herter Committee report, a study of foreign affairs personnel problems in the U.S.
Department of State carried out under the Kennedy Administration in 1962:
One striking characteristic of the new diplomacy is the diversity of activities it encompasses
and, therefore, the diversity of skills and knowledge it requires. It is no longer useful to
think of foreign affairs as a single professional field.!Rather, it is a broad spectrum into
which a number of professions, some of the orthodox domestic variety and others peculiar
to foreign affairs, must be fitted and modified [15].
The increased scope of activities undertaken in the name of foreign affairs, along
with the increased specialization of skills, has overwhelmed the limited resources of
the foreign ministries of smaller states and has posed a serious challenge to the
dominant "generalist" attitude which most FSOs hold. It is often the case that the
most important relations between two states, particularly between a developing
state and a more developed one, are carried out between a specialized team of experts
from the developed state and, for example, the ministry of education or agriculture
in the developing state. In this situation, the role of the foreign ministry becomes one
of a "clearing house" [16] at best, often being involved in these activities on a purely
formal and non-substantive basis, e.g., providing the protocol support when the
project is formally begun or finished (when the developed state's ambassador may
attend the function), or in formally signing the agreement for assistance (which has

498
been negotiated previously by specialists from both sides and with little or no participa-
tion by the foreign ministry).
One crucial aspect of this problem, namely the limitations placed on the effectiveness
of the Ministry due to its small size, will be discussed below under the heading of
organizational factors. But at this juncture, we must note that one of the consequences
of the small size of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the inability to employ or utilize
specialists as would be the case in a larger organization. Thus, the dominant norm
among the FSOs is that of the "generalist" [17].
For the "generalist," the ideal career pattern in the Foreign Service is one in which
the officer is able to serve in many different capacities in many different countries,
developing a set of general skills and capabilities which can be utilized wherever he
may be assigned. The officer would serve in all the sections of the Ministry--protocol,
political, economic, consular, administration, etc.--and be posted abroad in various
regions of the world. On the basis of this broad, general background, he would be
ideally suited for positions of higher responsibility within the service.
Such a pattern has much to commend it from the perspeetive of the foreign ministries
of small states. With their limited manpower, it is impossible for them to "specialize"
to any great degree and at the same time be able to meet the demands and problems
of staffing at a m i n i m a l level a number of missions abroad.
Thus, in the increasingly specialized field of foreign affairs, the understaffed
generalist foreign ministry finds itself at a distinct disadvantage. Many of the functions
which it traditionally has been called on to perform are now performed elsewhere in
the government [18].
The second international or "external" factor is in a sense a corollary of the first.
There has been a move throughout the world towards more "Summitry" in inter-
national relations [19]. This trend has been prevalent in African international relations,
most likely because African heads of state tend to play a dominant role in decision-
making and policy-formulation. However, recent advances in modes of travel and
communications have made it possible for heads of state all over the world to engage
in summitry more and more frequently.
This development affects foreign ministries directly, in that it reduces the dependence
of the government, particularly the head of state and the foreign minister, on the
ministry. It is true that the foreign ministry is in most instances active in preparing
for such trips, but there is evidence that the role of the personal advisors and staff
members of the head of state is likely to be much more influential than that of the
foreign ministry [20].
Finally, there is a third factor operating to reduce the importance and effectiveness
of ministries of foreign affairs in smaller states. The rise of "parliamentary diplomacy"
and the attendant emphasis placed upon universal and regional organizations by small
states has eroded the policy formulating role of ministries of foreign affairs [21].
Many aspects of the foreign policy of a small or developing state are determined, in
a very real sense, by the actions taken in an international organization. A country's
position on an issue may simply be that they support resolution XXX of the OAU on
this issue, or that they are in full agreement with the Security Council resolution YYY
on that issue.

499
 Granted in some cases, the action taken by the international organization may
represent very accurately the views of a government. But in many other cases, such
a statement attempts to hide the fact that the issue in question has never been fully
discussed or considered by the government, and in lieu of such a policy-making process,
the government opts to support the stand of the OAU or the UN or some other
international body.
To the extent that this process of "policy of proxy" occurs, the policy-formulation
role of the ministry of foreign affairs is reduced. It may be argued that the negotiations
and decision-making that take place within the international organization context
are carried out by FSOs who are government representatives. This is true in most
cases. But the role played by an FSO on behalf of his government in an international
organization is frequently not based on guidelines from Headquarters. A decision
made by an FSO in an international organization may well become government policy,
but such decisions do not emanate from the Ministry and, in fact, may not even
reflect the position of the Ministry or the Government if the issue were given fuller
consideration.

Organizational Factors
Perhaps the single most important factor accounting for the low level of involvement
by the Ministry in the foreign policy-making process is the lack of sufficient manpower.
This factor has been noted briefly above and will be elaborated upon here. Early in
1972, the MFA consisted of 74 FSOs, according to the 1971 Uganda Staff List and
a more recent organizational chart of FSOs by grade and post. Although comparable
figures are not readily available for other small states, analyses of the budgets of the
three East African states--Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania--indicate that the size of
the Uganda MFA budget and its personnel is comparable to that of its immediate
East African neighbors.
We now turn to the examination of the argument relating size of the MFA to its
effectiveness. First, the MFA is too small to staff adequately its various departments,
and thus these departments are unable to function properly as sources of inputs into
the decision-making process. Because they are understaffed, the departments are
unable to produce the information, the analyses, the research, or the policy advice
to be fed into the process. A look at the level of staffing of the various departments
in the MFA in mid-1972 will demonstrate this (see Table 2).
As shown in Table 2, the manpower in the Ministry is spread very thin. For example,
only two men are responsible for the entire African Affairs department. This depart-
ment is responsible for all activities of the OAU, the Economic Commission for Africa
(ECA), East African Community Affairs, refugees, and bilateral relations with all
African states. At the present time, the work generated by the OAU alone is more
than enough for two persons if this were to be done effectively.
In addition, four of Uganda's eleven diplomatic missions are in Africa--Accra,
Addis Ababa, Cairo, and Kinshasa. The African Affairs department is primarily
responsible for servicing the needs of these embassies and for coordinating their
activities. Relations with bordering states and the East African Community (EAC)
are also monitored here. Under such conditions, it is not surprising that the Ministry

500
is unable to monitor and coordinate African activities to the extent that it would like.
Under such conditions, it is also not surprising to discover that most of the activities
taking place between the Uganda government and the EAC occur in other government
agencies than the MFA. This is also true with regard to the interactions with the ECA,
which are frequently of a technical or specialized nature and are handled by the
appropriate specialized agency.

TABLE 2

Number of Persons by Department, in Uganda Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Administration/Finance 4
Protocol 4a
Research and Information 2
African Affairs 2
Economic and Legal 2
UN and Other IOs 1
Passport Division 1
Personal Asst. to Min. 1
Special Assignment 1
Total 18

a During the course of research one officer in Protocol was dismissed from the service.

One point must be made clear at this juncture. We are not arguing against such
delegation of specialized activities to other government ministries. In fact, this would
seem to be a most rational decision, one leading to a greater degree of specialization and
efficiency in conducting these affairs. But it is argued that the M F A should maintain
its role as the principal agency responsible for all of Uganda's relations with other
states and the external world in general. In order to carry out this function at even
a minimal level of effectiveness, the Ministry should be able to act as the central
clearing house and coordinator for those activities being carried out elsewhere in the
government. There is little evidence that this is presently the case, and in fact this
development in the direction of increased delegation of responsibility for foreign
affairs outside of the M F A seems to be more a case of inability to cope rather than
the consequence of a rational decision process. Again, the primary problem seems
to be an acute shortage of manpower.
Similar arguments can be made with regard to other departments. The U N depart-
ment, currently operating with a single person, cannot hope to coordinate the mass of
activities initiated by the U N organization as well as service the very important U N
mission in New York. Similarly, the Research and Information department, with
only two people, carries out very little research for the Ministry, and its informational
activities have been the source of many complaints from missions abroad in recent
years.
Another aspect of the problem can be seen when one compares the size of the
Headquarters staff to the combined size of the missions abroad. In the U.S. Depart-

501
ment of State, with a total of 3,507 FSOs, 2,043 are stationed in Washington [22].
This represents 58 ~ of the total FSOs at Headquarters, servicing the other 42 % who
are dispersed in missions all over the world. The figures are considerably different
for Uganda where 18 FSOs are stationed in K a m p a l a out of a total of 74 officers.
This means that 24 To of the Ministry is in K a m p a l a servicing the 76 % of officers who
are stationed abroad [23].
To summarize, the first organizational factor that appears to affect the Ministry
in its foreign policy-making role is sheer size. Although the Uganda M F A is not
significantly different in size from its two East African neighbors, its size is too small
to allow adequate staffing of the various departments within the Ministry. Thus,
these departments are not able to carry out their intended functions, and they are not
able to generate inputs for the policy-making process. In addition, the size of the
Headquarters staff is quite small in relation to the total number of officers in the
Ministry. This makes it virtually impossible for the Headquarters to handle the
demands and requests from its own missions abroad, nor is it capable of coping effec-
tively with the demands upon it from the diplomatic corps in Kampala.
A second organizational factor is the general distribution of officers by rank in the
Ministry as a whole and particularly in the Headquarters. An examination of the ranks
of the FSOs in the Headquarters demonstrates the degree to which the officers of the
lowest rank (FSO VI or Assistant Secretary) dominate the staffing pattern. Table 3
shows the rank of all officers at the Headquarters as well as the breakdown for the
entire service.

TABLE 3
Officers in Headquarters and in the Total Service, by Rank

Rank Headquarters Total FSOs

N Pct. N Pct.

FSO i (Amb, P.S.) 2 11 13a 18

FSO III (Counsellor, Under-secy) 1 6 5 7
FSO IV (Ist Secy, P.A.S.) 2 1I 11 15
FSO V (2rid Secy, S.A.S.) 3 17 9 12
FSO VI (3rd Secy, Asst. Secy) 10 56 36 48
Total 18 100b 74 100

a Of the t3 FSO I rank officers, 9 are non-career ambassadorial appointments.

b E~xor due to rounding.

Note that 5 6 ~ of all officers at Headquarters are of the lowest grade, FSO VI.
These men are for the most part 30 years old or under, and they have been in the
service for less than three years. However, when comparing the staffing pattern of the
Headquarters with that of the entire service (see Table 3), there are no statistically

502
 significant differences at any rank [24]. Similarly, when comparing the average age
of the Headquarters officers with the average age for the entire service, the difference,
although in the predicted direction, is n o t statistically significant at the predicted
direction, is n o t statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The average age of the Head-
quarters staffis 31.9 years, while that for the entire service is 33.6 years [25].
In spite of the lack of statistically significant differences in the age and ranks of
officers at the Headquarters compared to the total Foreign Service, the crucial factor
still seems to be the high concentration of low ranking officers at Headquarters.
With over half of the officers at Headquarters being of the most inexperienced and
youngest group, it is not as likely that important policy-relevant tasks will be delegated
to them. They, in turn, frequently do not possess the experience or the skills necessary
to produce useful inputs for the policy-making process [26].
The final organizational factor to be examined is the intra-governmental interaction
between the MFA and other ministries and governmental agencies. As is frequently
pointed out in the literature, foreign policy often depends on the outcome of the intra-
governmental competition for influence and scarce resources [27]. A foreign ministry
which is either unaware of this crucial competition or is ineffective at it is likely to
suffer. This seems to be the case with the Uganda MFA.
To begin with, foreign ministries are often looked upon with something less than
favor by the financial watch-dogs of the government. The Ministry is considered to be
a "non-productive" ministry, in that it generates no revenues for the government,
nor is its "product" easily identified or evaluated [28]. In addition, the allowances
alloted to FSOs when serving abroad are considered extremely lavish by civil servants
in other ministries. The FSOs themselves do not help the situation when they return
from a tour abroad, having acquired some of the amenities of life to which their
colleagues in other ministries have no access, e.g., expensive cars, high quality appli-
ances and electronic equipment, foreign clothes, and more luxurious household
goods. The combination of these factors acts against the interests of the Ministry
when it comes before the budget cutters at appropriations time.
The foreign ministries in small developing states face another disadvantage in the
competition with other ministries for influence in policy-making. Because of the high
priority given to state-building and economic development in these types of states,
the ministries primarily responsible for these areas are likely to be the most influential
in the Government. The MFA will be considered important to the extent that it aids
in achieving these objectives. In the case of economic development particularly, the
Ministry's lack of specialized skills in economics, education, trade, agriculture, etc.,
means that even the clearly international aspects of development (e.g., foreign aid
and loan agreements) are often dominated by other agencies and ministries.
Even more serious is the isolation that seems to surround the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. The degree to which the lack of manpower and the specialized nature of various
international interactions have isolated the Ministry has already been mentioned. In
addition, there is a noticeable lack of inter-ministerial contact by the Ministry [29].
One can detect a similar attitude of isolationism on the part of the other ministries.
They consider problems or demands emanating from the missions abroad to be the
sole concern of the MFA. Theoretically, the Uganda mission abroad represents the

503
35
entire Uganda Government; in reality, when a demand comes in from a mission
abroad for information or cooperation from another ministry, the response is fre-
quently slow in coming if it comes at all. This is one of the major complaints heard
from the missions--the lack of supporting services from other ministries and agencies
at home.
The blame for this situation clearly cannot be laid entirely upon the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, and any solution to the problem must certainly come from sources
outside of the Ministry. But there is need for a greater awareness and a greater effort
on the part of the Ministry to integrate itself more closely with the rest of the
governmental structure. In doing so, it may be possible to regain some of the respon-
sibilities and some of the influence in foreign affairs that seem to have slipped from
its domain.

Conclusions
At this point, I want to again turn to a more theoretical level ~br a moment and try
to summarize the argument which has undergirded my study of the Uganda Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. Small states, particularly small developing states, are handicapped
in their pursuit of foreign policy objectives because of their low capacity to act in
foreign affairs. Without denying the importance of the unequal balance of material
force between large and small states, the focus here is on the lack of organizational
capacity to act by the foreign ministries of small states. The limited manpower
available to the foreign affairs area is a major factor to be considered.
Because of this lack of manpower, foreign ministries are losing control over and
responsibility for many areas of international activity. These functions are increasingly
being taken over by other agencies within the government. A major consequence of
this devolution is that there is no single locus of authority in foreign affairs which
can serve as the focal point for the activities and expectations of external actors.
In other words, there is no clear set of guidelines as to how or where an international
actor carries on his business with a small state. It has been argued in some quarters,
most recently in the U.S. Department of State [30], that a proper role for foreign
ministries in the future is one of management and serving as a clearing house and
coordinator for a wide range of foreign affairs activities taking place in numerous
governmental agencies, While this may in fact be a wise direction to take, it is a most
unlikely one for the foreign ministries of these small states who cannot even now
carry out effectively the tasks assigned them, let alone develop a new managerial
function for themselves.
What are some of the likely consequences of this state of affairs, assuming that the
situation found in Uganda is not grossly inaccurate a representation of other small
states? In general, the small states with their lack of capacity to act effectively in
world affairs are a weak link in the global system. Their limited ability to monitor
international affairs carefully may mean that these states are also more likely to
make mistakes and cause unnecessary conflict and tension in the system. Their
inability to identify and assess developments effectively in areas which have high
salience for them is likely to result in much more volatile and conflictual behavior

504
on their part. This is one means by which they can attempt to recapture the initiative
in areas of great importance to them.
Even more serious may be the fact that small states are unable now to take advantage
of the services and opportunities offered to them, e.g., through the United Nations
system and various regional organizations. This is because these services are often
channeled through the foreign ministries, where the information about the oppor-
tunities frequently gets lost and never reaches the appropriate individuals or agencies
in the government.
Finally, I want to argue that in many instances, the foreign ministries of small states
are unable to meet the demands of the diplomatic corps resident in their capital cities.
The various protocol demands and activities of a diplomatic nature are often ignored
by the over-worked foreign ministry. These activities, although often appearing
frivolous and inconsequential, serve a system maintenance function, keeping the
channels well oiled and operative for the inevitable times when crises arise. Quoting
McCMland, these are " . . . a kind of 'overhead' expenditure to help keep the system
in motion" [3t].
I want to end with two closing comments. First, it should be clear that the thrust
of my argument is n o t to criticize any particular set of policies chosen or pursued by
small states today or in the future. My attention has been focused on the manner
in which small states make their policies, and my fear is not that these states will
necessarily choose the wrong policy alternative, but that they will not be capable of
choosing at all in many areas of foreign affairs, due to their limited capacity to act.
Second, many will see my argument as a naive structural-functionalism, where one
seeks to find the traditional functions of diplomacy and foreign affairs in the traditional
structures such as foreign ministries. When this simple relationship does not material-
ize, then the criticism begins. In this gross form, I reject the imputation.
Yet, on another level, there is a sense in which I am accepting some of the structural-
functionalist's argument. I am prepared to argue that in order to maintain a global
political network with minimal levels of violent inter-state conflict and with effective
methods of conflict management, it is necessary to be able to identify those viable,
legitimate, and effective operating units which can act authoritatively on behalf of
the actors in world politics.
The very small and the very underdeveloped nation-states may not be appropriate
actors for the world politics of the future--I am willing to entertain this idea. In fact,
one possible solution might be to transfer many of the international affairs functions
o f smaller states to larger, probably regional groupings. There are some smaU but
significant movements in this direction already. But whatever the units--nation-states,
regional organizations, multinational corporations--the locus of authority within
the actor must be easily identified and must be organized in such a way as to be capable
of effective action in the international domain.
There is one final policy recommendation that seems warranted, assuming the
validity of these preliminary findings from Uganda. Large states ought to become more
aware of and sensitive to the limitations on the capacity of small states to act in
international affairs. They should not look upon this situation as a sign of weakness
of the part of small states to be exploited by the large. The systemic consequences

505
of such behavior by large states are likely to be severe and quite destabilizing for all
actors in the system [32]. The large states collectively ought to take the lead in assisting
smaller states by increasing their capacity to act internationally. This could be done
through the implementation of training programs designed to provide foreign service
officers and other persons in international affairs with needed skills and specializations
to offset the predominantly generalist nature of their current programs. The large
states might also begin to experiment with various types of organizations designed
to provide support services to small states on various types of international issues.
Finally, large states might begin to explore alternative ways o f conducting inter-
national affairs business. In the vast majority of instances, current methods of handling
issues differ only slightly from the basic bilateral diplomacy of the 18th and 19th
centuries. While these policy recommendations might reduce the large powers'
advantage over the small ever so slightly, the benefits might include a slight improve-
ment in the overall atmosphere of world affairs.

Notes
1 Among the more noteworthy books are the following: two by David Vital, The Survival
of Small States (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1971) and The Inequality of States
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967); Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers
(New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1968); and Marshall R. Singer, Weak States in a
Worm of Powers (New York: Free Press, 1972).
2 Maurice A. East, "Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models," Worm
Politics (forthcoming, July, 1973).
3 Rothstein, op. cit., p. 1.
4 J. David Singer, The Scientific Study of Politics: An Approach to Foreign Policy Analysis
(Morristown, N.J. : General Learning Press, 1972), p. 19.
5 It can also be argued that due to diseconomies of small scale and the increased costs of
meeting internal demands, the small states will allocate to foreign affairs an even smaller
proportion of an already small resource base compared to large states. See East, op. cit.
6 Vital, The Inequality of States, p. 22.
7 For a good discussion of the linkage between domestic and international issues among
developing states, see Michael O'Leary, "Linkages Between Domestic and International
Politics in Underdeveloped Nations," in James N. Rosenau (ed.), Linkage Politics
(New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 324-346.
8 This problem of isolating the effects of size and development on the capacity of states
to act in foreign affairs is a very complex one. For some work on the problem, see Vital,
The Inequality of States, pp. 3-9 and 39-57; Stephen A. Salmore and Charles F. Hermann,
"The Effects of Size, Development, and Accountability on Foreign Policy," Peace
Research Society Papers, XIV (1969), pp. 15-30.
9 It is my personal opinion that the majority of interviews went extremely well in terms of
rapport between interviewer and respondent. The bulk of the interviews took place in the
Spring of 1972 before the increasing levels of tension in Uganda which started with the
expulsion of the Asians and the conflict with Britain over this issue. However, most
respondents were reluctant to make any comparisons whatsoever between present and
former situations in the Ministry.
10 It should be noted that the total of 18 FSOs at Headquarters represents those officers
who were available and working in the Ministry during the time of nay research. In
addition to these eighteen, there were four officers on long leave (two of which were
maternity leaves), one officer who was dismissed from the Service before he could be
interviewed, and four officers who arrived in Kampala on rotation from missions abroad.

506
 These latter four arrived late in the research period and were unable to be interviewed.
Ignoring the rotation of officers, the total size of the Ministry at full strength can be
estimated to be approximately 23 officers.
11 See I. M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organiza-
tional Reform (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1972); and John Franklin
Campbell, The Foreign AlTairs Fudge Factory (New York: Basic Books, 1971). Also of
interest is the Department of State's own study, Diplomacy for the 70's: A Program of
Management ReJbrmfor the Department of State, December 1970.
12 One of the earliest discussions of this is found in G. M. Kahin, G. J. Pauker, and L. W.
Pye, "Comparative Politics of Non-Western Countries," American Political Science
Review, XLIX, 4 (December 1955). In the area of foreign policy, see also Henry Kissinger,
American Foreign Policy: Three Essays (New York: Norton, 1969) where he talks about
the charismatic-revolutionary type of leadership in foreign policy.
13 President Kennedy was another Iecent head of state who " . . . viewed the formalized
procedures of the Security C o u n c i l . . . as posing unwarranted delays. . . . " See Michael H.
Armacost, The Foreign Relations of the United States (CA: Dickenson, Belmont, 1969),
p. 99, as well as other chroniclers of the Kennedy era.
14 This point was most clearly pointed out to me by a senior FSO who offered a cogent
analysis of these factors, and who had obviously given great thought to these problems.
15 The quotation is from J. E. Harr, The Professional Diplomat (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
Univ. Press, 1969), pp. 41-42.
16 The conceptualization of the M F A as a clearing house was explicitly recognized by
several of the officers interviewed. They did not seem to recognize the basically non-
policy orientation of such a role, especially as they described it.
17 F o r a more detailed discussion of the "generalist-specialist" issue in the U.S. Department
of State, see Hart, especially Chapters 1, 6, and 7; and J. L. McCamy, Conduct of the
New Diplomacy (New York: Harper and Row, 1964).
18 This transfer of functions was impressed upon me even more clearly during informal
conversations which I held with various members of the diplomatic corps in Kampala,
discussing their experiences working with the foreign ministries of developing states.
19 F o r an interesting study of summitly between the leaders of the East and West blocs,
see Johan Galtung, "Summit Meetings and International Relations," Journal of Peace
Research, I (1964), pp. 36-54.
20 A recent case in point involved U.S. Secretary of State Rogers and his role in President
Nixon's visit to Peking. There was much comment in the press about the subordinate role
played by Rogers, especially in comparison to Kissinger.
21 See the chapter by C. T. Thorne, Jr., "External Political Pressures," in Vernon M c K a y
(ed.), African Diplomacy (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 168-175; and two articles in
the Annals, Vol. 362 (November 1965), one by Babaa and Crabb, "Nonalignment as a
Diplomatic and Ideological Credo," and one by Babaa, "The 'Third Force' and the
United Nations."
22 These figures for the U.S. State Department are taken from Hart, pp. 166-167. They are
for 1966.
23 A comparison between the size of the Headquarters staff of the M F A and several of the
diplomatic missions in Kampala makes the same point. According to the 1971 Diplo-
matic List, the United Kingdom had 13 persons in its mission in Kampala, the U.S.A.
had 10, the U.S.S.R. 9, and the Israelis 7. It is not surprising to discover that many of the
demands of the local diplomatic corps for routine services and privileges often go un-
answered for long periods of time.
24 Using a difference of percentages test at the P = 0.05 level, there are no statistically
significant differences in the table.
25 In this instance, the statistic used was a one-tailed t test for a single sample at the P = 0.05
level.
26 One reason for this high number of low ranking FSOs at Headquarters is the more

507
 urgent need for higher ranking officials in the missions abroad. F o r diplomatic and
practical reasons, it is desirable to have a minimum of two and hopefully three officers
of second secretary rank or above in a mission. This means that there will be one or at
most two third secretaries at each mission. Thus, senior officers are not available for
duty at Headquarteis as often as lower ranking personnel.
27 G o o d discussions of this perspective are found in Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual
Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," American Political Science Review, 58 (September
1969), pp. 689-718; and Morton H. Halperin and Arnold Kanter (eds.), Readings" in
American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973).
28 The phrase "non-productive" is one used by several FSOs in describing the attitude of
other agencies in the Uganda government toward the M F A . It was used in the sense
I employ it here.
29 The evidence for this conclusion includes (I) lack of many scheduled meetings between
FSOs and representatives of other agencies, (2) responses to the question "Are there any
other government agencies with whom you are in close contact in your j o b ? " (3) little
mention of any committees or other structures where FSOs meet with other civil servants
to discuss mutual problems, and (4) a general attitude of aloofness on the part of FSOs
toward other ministries and a minimizing of the impact of other agencies on the M F A .
30 The thrust of the above quoted Department of State report is heavily in the direction
of the State Department performing more of a managerial function in the future. See
Diplomacy for the 70's, especially pp. 1-30.
31 Charles A. McClelland and Gary D. Hoggard, "Conflict Patterns in the Interactions
Among Nations," in James N. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy,
revised edition (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 715.
32 Kissinger clearly recognizes the destabilizing nature of the asymmetry of organizational
characteristics in small and large states. "Where large bureaucracies operate in alternating
spurts of rigidity and c a t a s t r o p h i c . . , upheaval, the new states tend to make decisions
on the basis of almost random pressures. The excessive institutionalization of one and the
inadequate structure of the other inhibit international astability." See Kissinger, op. cit.,
p. 26.

508