XXIX.1 Raymundo V Lunaria

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Adela Raymundo, et al v Ernesto Lunaria et al

October 17, 2008


Quisumbing, J.
Topic: Preponderance of Evidence
Digested by: Quiambao

May 1996: petitioners approached Lunaria to help them find a buyer for their property in Marilao, Bulacan (12,126sqm;
P60,630,000) and promised him 5% agents commission. Respondents found a buyer (Cecilio Hipolito) and an Exclusive
Authority to Sell was executed. Once the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property was registered in the Registry of Deeds, a
copy of the same was given to Far East Bank and Trust Co (which held in escrow P50M to be paid against the total price of
the property).

Ceferino Raymundo (one of the co-owners) advised respondents to go to the bank, receive P1,196,000 as partial payment
for their total commission, and to return after 7 days to get the balance. When respondents went back, they were told the
check was already given to Lourdes Raymundo (representative of petitioners). They tried to get the check but were told that
the balance of the commissions was already distributed among their nephews and nieces. Petitioners say that there’s a
subseq verbal agreement1 after the execution of the written agreement.

Respondents were unable to collect the balance so they filed an action for the collection of a sum of money before RTC
Valenzuela Br 172.

RTC: petitioners to solidarily pay: P1,834,900 (unpaid commission) + interest (legal rate) til fully paid, P200k as moral
damages, 100k as exemplary damages, P150k as attys fees, costs of suit. Petitioners appealed.

CA: affirmed but reduced moral damages (P50k) and exemplary damages (P25k). MR denied.

Issues
Did CA err in:
(a) applying the parol evidence rule – YES
(b) requiring petitioners to establish their case by more than a preponderance of evidence – NO
(c) holding petitioners jointly and severally liable for the payment of the entire brokers fee – NO

Ratio
(1) [TOPIC]: The CA didn’t ask them to prove their case by more than a preponderance of evidence.
Petitioners: There’s no rule requiring that the existence of the subseq. verbal agreement be proved by more than a mere
preponderance of evidence! Lourdes testified that she was given 2/5 share for taking care of the payment of the CGT etc
Respondents: CA didn't’ say that! What it said was that petitioners failed to prove and establish the alleged subseq verbal
agreement even by mere preponderance of evidence

SC: Preponderance of evidence: evidence as a whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. It refers to the
weight, credit and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term
greater weight of evidence or greater weight of the credible evidence. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court
as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.

Here: SC agreed with both RTC and CA when they ruled that there was insufficient evidence to support the existence of the
subseq verbal agreement. They correctly observed that if Lourdes was really offered 2/5 share, why did petitioners not
present any written court order on her authority to assist in the documentation requirement? Even the commission sharing
worksheet was unilaterally prepared by Lourdes. Additionally, the 1/5 commission to buyer is not credible cos payment of
realty taxes is the obligation of the owners and not the buyers and the said buyer wasn’t presented as a witness to
corroborate petitioners’ claims.

1
The 5% agents commission shall be divided as ff: 2/5 for agents, 2/5 for Lourdes, and 1/5 to buyer Hipolito.
Lourdes’ share is to be given to those who helped in processing the docs of sale of the property, the payment of CGT to BIR and in securing an order from the court
Hipolito’s share is for the payment of realty taxes.
(2) The parol evidence rule is not applicable in this case.
Petitioners: application of parol evidence rule is erroneous cos the verbal agreement was entered into subsequent to the
written agreement. There’s no rule that reqs an agreement modifying an earlier agreement to be the same form as the
earlier agreement in order for such modification/amdt to be valid.
Respondents: CA didn’t apply parol evidence rule here even if it emphasized the general legal principle and rule on the
same

SC: The Parol evidence rule (PER) is n/a here. Why? The said rule:
(a) forbids any addition to or contradiction of the terms of a written instrument by testimony or other evidence purporting
to show that, at or before the execution of the parties written agreement, other or different terms were agreed upon
by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract.
 Here, the claimed verbal agreement was agreed upon subsequent to the written agreement.
(b) would question the validity of the written agreement.
 Here, what’s questioned is the validity of the claim that a subsequent verbal agreement was agreed upon by the
parties after the execution of the written agreement which substantially modified their earlier written agreement.
BUT even if PER is applied here, the evidence is insufficient to prove the existence of the subsequent verbal agreement.

(3) No error in ruling for the petitioners’ solidary liability.


Petitioners: We should only be held liable to the extent of our pro-indiviso share in the property sold
Respondents: No error in the solidary liability. Even if there was, it wasn’t raised before the CA nor included in their
statement of issues in their brief.

SC: GR: once an issue’s been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, it can no longer be controverted
anew and should be finally raised to rest. Here, they failed to raise this issue before the CA hence they are estopped.

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