Czarina Louise H.

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Sea Power

Sea power is an essential element to a nation’s military dominance, and a powerful

machinery for a nation’s trade, economic and influential interests. Nations have always
regarded sea power as important. From the very beginning of history, peoples and nations
have strived to gain maritime power. Sea power is important because the of the following
attributes of the sea: the sea as a resource, medium transportation, medium of
information and medium for dominion (Till, 2013). The sea is a source of food and other
materials, and has been so since tens of thousands of years ago. The sea is also a
medium of transportation, and a large trading system. Movement of people and goods
across countries through the sea is vital to a nation’s economy, as majority of trades are
conducted at sea. With the movement of people and goods come the movement of
information and culture. Trading partners on different countries were able to share
information because of sea transportation. Lastly, the sea is a medium for dominion. It is
a strategic highroad, a medium by which a group can conquer another. One example of
this are the British, who used boats and ships for their colonial expeditions.

Two great figures in the history of strategic studies, Alfred Thayer Mahan and
Julian Corbett, have studied sea power in better detail and claimed of its cost-
effectiveness. While Mahan and Corbett have different ideologies regarding sea power
and its role in world domination, both emphasized the benefits of having a strong maritime
force.

According to Mahan, having a strong control of the sea by naval supremacy and
maritime commerce means predominant influence in the world. He used the British era
of the Napoleonic Wars to prove his point. During the Napoleonic Wars, Britain’s cost of
war was spiraling from 29 million pounds per annum in 1804 to 70 million pounds per
annum in 1813. But, Britain was able to sustain such large amount of expenditure
because The Royal Navy has allowed the nation’s trade operations to flourish. The
nation’s trade interests were protected by the Royal Navy, and the imperial system was
stabilized. With the nation’s trade routes and merchant shipments secured and land-
forces well-supported, Britain had stable operations across their colonies and held the
Empire together, making it one of the wealthiest and most powerful nations in the world.

Mahan and Corbett both stress that “command at sea” is important for asserting
military dominance. However, they have different definitions for the term. For Mahan, a
nation’s maritime success is measured by its ability to win a decisive naval battle with the
enemy fleet in a short period of time. Command at sea, according to Mahan’s theory, is
achievable in the quickest way possible by winning decisive naval battles. Corbett, on the
other hand, theorizes that winning naval battles is just one method of achieving a nation’s
goal of command at sea. Winning naval battles does not guarantee command at sea. For
Corbett, securing sea lines of communications is of higher priority, and is a more effective
approach in achieving the goal of command at sea. The benefits of sea power, for Corbett,
however, is not bound to the sea. Having a strong sea line of communication meant that
logistic sea operations would be protected, and land operations would also then be
supported. Having a strong command of the sea would help achieve a strong command
of the land. Good coordination between land and sea forces, therefore, is essential in
asserting dominance in the maritime and land area.

Mahan’s work was published earlier than Corbett’s, and was widely accepted
during the 20th century, when all the major world powers were engaged in a significant
naval arms race. Britain’s enormous maritime power and world dominance during that
period justified Mahan’s writings and narratives. His work was then followed and
challenged by Corbett, who argued that command at sea is wildly different from command
at land. Corbett stated, "the normal position is that neither side has the command; that
the normal position is not a commanded sea, but an uncommanded sea.” (O'Lavin, 2009)
Land battles are different from naval battles and that it is much easier to avoid a decisive
engagement at sea. However, naval operations are just as expensive and difficult as land
operations. Subscribing to Mahan’s theory, aggressively searching for a decisive naval
battle with an enemy navy that is uninterested in battles would be a waste of resource.

At the beginning of the American Revolution, the Americans did not possess any
Naval power. The British, on the other hand, had superior maritime capability and used
this power to eliminate the Continental Army. The British were successful with the
Mahanian tactics. In 1778, however, the balance of power shifted to the allies, and the
Americans had developed their naval forces. The French Navy defeated the British at the
Battle of the Virginia Capes, and the sea victory translated to land victory, with the Allied
Army having the upper hand. Corbett’s theory fit well into this situation. Command of the
sea translates to support on land operations, and therefore translates to command of the
land.

Another great demonstration of Corbett’s theory is the Battle of the Atlantic in

World War II. In late 1941, the U.S. had limited resources, and were unprepared to combat
German U-boats. The U.S., with their limited resources, went for a Mahanian approach
and decided to take down German submarines. This resulted in a weaker sea line of
communications, and the U.S. – British coastal shipping suffered. The U.S. then shifted
to a Corbettian approach, prioritizing sea lines of communication by implementing a
convoy system on shipments. Shipment losses drastically reduced, and the U.S. turned
the tides to their favor in the Atlantic. In this example, it is clear that securing logistics and
shipments in the maritime space is of equal, if not greater importance. While the U.S.
have achievements in their goal of winning a naval battle, supplies and shipments
suffered from the shift of priority from sea lines of communication. With shipments going
to and from Britain being regularly sunk by the Germans, U.S. – Britain relations
weakened, and The U.S. naval victories were not as relevant in gaining command at sea.

Mahan and Corbett’s theories and their examples have demonstrated that sea
power is a complex and interconnected discipline that branches out and benefits key
factors of a nation’s power and international influence. A nation’s economy, international
trade, security, dominance and impression all effect from sea power. Having a strong
maritime force ensures that sea-based trade flourishes. As Corbett demonstrated, sea
power is not as simple as winning naval wars. It is a ‘right mix’ of effective communication,
proper strategy, naval superiority, protection of assets and land-sea coordination.

References
Till, G. (2013). Seapower, A guide for the twenty-first century.
O'Lavin, B. (2009). Mahan and Corbett on Maritime Strategy.