I.

PRESCRIPTIONS
1. SUNGA v. DE GUZMAN

FACTS:

 Five of the nine legitimate heirs or spouses Juan de Guzman and Lucia Montemayor entered into a Private
contract of sale involving a fishpond in Pampanga.

 Five children sold their respective shares to Feliciano Sibug in consideration.

 Spouses de Guzman died. Hence, by operation of law, the nine children succeeded in the ownership of the
property.

 Demands were made by plaintiffs for the delivery of their respective shares since 1955.

 Since the execution of the deed of sale, defendants were in physical possession of the fishpond, hence an
action was instituted against them in February 1962.

 Defendants claimed that they acquire the property through prescription.

 It must be noted that the deed of sale is not notarized nor registered in the Register of Deeds of Pampanga.
Also, the property was still registered in the name of the father of the plaintiffs appellees up to October 1962.
From the private deed of sale, it is clear that four of the heirs did not sign but only 3 instituted the present
action.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners have acquired ownership over the subject land through acquisitive and extinctive
prescription.

HELD: No. The record proves that respondents were not definitely aware that petitioners’ possession extended over
the whole fishpond, including that which pertained to them as their share. Thus, said possession cannot be said to be
adverse and open as to give rise to title by prescription in favor of petitioners. Moreover, in the case of a fishpond
owned in common, the only way the whole fishpond, including the shares of the other co-owners may be said to have
been held in adverse possession by the vendee, as against the co-owners who did not sell is if he harvests all the fish
in the fishpond, leaving nothing for the other co-owners who did not sell their share.

Also, the fact that the tax declaration has remained up to the present in the name of the deceased parents of
respondents makes the possession of petitioners not completely adverse or open, nor was it truly in the concept of an
owner, which are indispensable elements for prescription to become legally effective as a means of acquiring real
property. Lastly, the promise of petitioners to pay for the share of respondents interrupts the possession as a source
of prescriptive rights.

2. LEDESMA v. CA

FACTS:

 April 1, 1974: petitioners executed a Trust Receipt Agreement with RCBC.

 August 21, 1980: respondent RCBC filed case against petitioner to enforce the terms of Trust Receipt
Agreement which petitioner failed to comply with.

 March 3, 1981: As summons could not be served on the latter, said case was dismissed without prejudice.

 On December 2, 1988: RCBC instituted another civil case against petitioner on the same cause of action
and subject matter.
  Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription. However, the motion was denied and
judgment was rendered in favor of RCBC.

 CA: affirmed. MR was denied.

 Petition for certiorari was likewise denied; hence, its present motion for reconsideration filed on May 5, 1993.

ISSUE: Whether the action to enforce the trust receipt agreement has already prescribed.

HELD: No. Article 1144(1) provides for a 10-year prescriptive period for filing an action based on a written contract.
The same shall be read together with Article 1155 of the Civil Code which provides that the prescription of an action is
interrupted when: (1) an action is filed before the court; (2) through the written extrajudicial demand of the creditor;
and (3) through the written acknowledgement of the debt by the debtor.
In Overseas Bank of Manila vs. Geraldez, et al., it was held that the interruption of the prescriptive period by written
extrajudicial demand means that the said period would commence anew from the receipt of the demand. That is the
correct meaning of interruption as distinguished from mere suspension or tolling of the prescriptive period. Also, in
Florendo vs. Organo, where it was ruled that the interruption of the 10-year prescriptive period through a judicial
demand means that "the full period of prescription commenced to run anew upon the cessation of the suspension."
When prescription is interrupted by a judicial demand, the full time for the prescription must be reckoned from the
cessation of the interruption
Further, the Court concluded that the issue of whether the filing of the action merely tolled or it actually interrupted the
running of the prescriptive period was moot and academic because, in either case, the second action was still filed
within the prescriptive period.