Philosophy of the Social

Sciences
http://pos.sagepub.com/

The End of Luhmann's Social Systems Theory

Gerhard Wagner
Philosophy of the Social Sciences 1997 27: 387
DOI: 10.1177/004839319702700401

The online version of this article can be found at:

http://pos.sagepub.com/content/27/4/387

Published by:

http://www.sagepublications.com

Additional services and information for Philosophy of the Social Sciences can be found
at:

Email Alerts: http://pos.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts

Subscriptions: http://pos.sagepub.com/subscriptions

Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav

Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav

Citations: http://pos.sagepub.com/content/27/4/387.refs.html

>> Version of Record - Dec 1, 1997

What is This?

Downloaded from pos.sagepub.com at UNIV OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ on November 28, 2014
 The End of Luhmann’s
Social Systems Theory

GERHARD WAGNER
University of Bielefeld

By advocating an enlightened method of theorizing committed to thinking in

terms of a system of differences, Luhmann has contributed to the development
of sociology in a manner that cannot be praised enough. Nonetheless, he does
not succeed in giving an account of his own position that satisfies the very logical
preconditions that he himself has formulated for it. Instead, his systems theory
paradigm of sociology is based on metaphysical premises characteristic of the
identity-logical thought of "Old Europe." In fact, the only way to make Luh-
mann’s approach truly comprehensible is to reconstruct it as a new version of
Hegel’s dialectic.

Without doubt, Niklas Luhmann is the most productive theorist of

society writing in Germany today. His publications of the past two
decades are certainly equal to those of the probably most internation-
ally renowned of German sociologists, Jiirgen Habermas. This assess-
ment holds not only for their profundity of thought but also and,
above all, for the comprehensiveness of their perspective. For Luh-
mann’s aim is in fact to develop a corpus that overshadows all
previous efforts in its conceptual differentiating powers and complex-
ity : &dquo;Not since Parsons has anyone attempted to formulate a universal
theory for the discipline&dquo; (Luhmann 1995, xlviii; 1984a, 10). With this
theory, Luhmann raises the claim to nothing less than &dquo;universality for
its grasp of its object&dquo;; in other words, with this theory, it should be
possible to explain more than just aspects of the social world-such
as stratification or mobility, or constellations of class or power-it

Received 16 October 1995

Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 27 No. 4, December 1997 387-409

© 1997 Sage Publications, Inc.
387

Downloaded from pos.sagepub.com at UNIV OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ on November 28, 2014
388

should be possible to explain virtually &dquo;everything social&dquo; (Luhmann

1995, xlvii; 1984a, 9).
Even though Habermas also takes up Talcott Parsons, it is Luh-
mann whom the literature deems &dquo;the German Parsons&dquo; (Alexander
1984, 403). This evaluation is plausible in the sense that Habermas
does not follow the path of development taken by Parsons’s work. In
keeping with the heritage of critical theory, Habermas rejects the
functionalism that Parsons turned to in the 1950s. His interest is
aroused solely by the early Parsons and his theory of action and not
by the late Parsons and his systems theory. In contrast, Luhmann
considers it absurd to retreat from the level of theory formation
achieved by Parsons’s systems theory Luhmann became acquainted
with this systems theory &dquo;firsthand&dquo; while studying under Parsons
at the beginning of the 1960s. From this time on, he has concentrated
his research efforts on the elaboration and development of systems
theory. And from this time onwards, critical theory in general and
Habermas’s work in particular have functioned as the antipode to his
theoretical endeavors.
The debate between Habermas and Luhmann at the beginning of
the 1970s represents the first prominent example of this work by
Luhmann &dquo;upon the shoulders of Parsons&dquo; (Habermas and Luhmann
1971). Luhmann’s contributions to this debate also make clear,
though, that the author was in no way content to simply adopt
Parsons’s theoretical framework (Murphy 1982). Whereas until his
death Parsons basically limited himself to providing increasingly
more sophisticated versions of the AGIL (adaption-goal attainment-

integration-latency) schema, Luhmann made efforts to link systems

theory to the newest theoretical findings in biology, cybernetics, and
informations theory. In addition, he also demonstrated his interest in
the newest theoretical discussions in logic and epistemology as well
as in the postmodern approaches of neostructuralism. On this basis,
he reformulated theoretical thought in systems-theoretical categories:
&dquo;Systems theory itself is no longer the theory of a special type of
object, called systems, but of a special type of distinction, namely, the
distinction between system and environment&dquo; (Luhmann 1990a, 259).
Only a short time after Habermas presented his Theory of Commu-
nicative Action in 1981, Luhmann initiated the series of successive
publications outlining his universal theory of sociology. In 1984, an
almost 700-page work on &dquo;Social Systems&dquo; appeared, which Luh-
mann presented as the prefatory work to his theory of modem society.

Downloaded from pos.sagepub.com at UNIV OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ on November 28, 2014
 389

After having clarified his basic terms here, Luhmann turned his
attention to individual functional systems. In 1988, he published a
monograph on &dquo;The Economy of Society,&dquo; in 1990 on &dquo;The Science of
Society,&dquo; in 1993 on &dquo;The Law of Society,&dquo; and in 1995 on &dquo;The Art of
Society,&dquo; with all of the books running roughly 500 pages in length.
In support, as it were, of these studies, he also worked on historical
and systematic studies: four volumes of essays on &dquo;Social Structure
and Semantics&dquo; and six volumes of essays on &dquo;Sociological Enlight-
enment&dquo; have appeared up until now. In addition, other writings have
been published on topics prompting discussion within sociology,
such as ecology and risk. Unfortunately, little of this vast array of
writings has found its way into book form in English. Aside from
journal publications, only six monographs and two collections of
essays have appeared in English (Luhmann 1979, 1982, 1984b, 1985,
1989a,1990b,1993,1995).
In the midst of all of this, Luhmann has never refrained from
comparing his theory to that of Habermas. In recent times, though,
this critical comparison has taken on harsher forms, for Luhmann is
now convinced that critical theory has reached the end of its useful-

ness. Less than 7 years have passed since Luhmann announced the
end of critical sociology. It was not the &dquo;real events involved in the
breakdown of the socialist political and economic systems,&dquo; but radi-
cal developments in the field of basic scientific theory and research
that led to the demise of critical sociology: &dquo;It was more provocatively
called in question by the end of the ontological conception of the
world than by the end of socialism&dquo; (Luhmann 1991a, 147).
Though Luhmann fails to indicate what ontological means in this
context, a glance at his other writings show nothing more than foun-
dationalist thinking is being referred to. It is common knowledge
that foundationalist thinking is based on a relation that can be under-
stood in the sense of an absolute reduction. Just &dquo;the Latin term

’substantia’... , which means ’lying or standing below’ and thus the

’underlying’ to which something else is related,&dquo; draws attention to
this fact (Gloy 1990, 61). Since this underlying point of reference is
itself not conceived of relatively but rather in the sense of an absolute,
ultimate ground, of which no further account can be given, it is
justifiable to speak of a foundation. Accordingly, every reduction to
an ultimate ground can be qualified as foundationalist thinking.

Thus, when critical sociology-for the purpose, as it were, of

gaining a standpoint from which to issue its critique-makes use of

Downloaded from pos.sagepub.com at UNIV OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ on November 28, 2014
390

the &dquo;guarantee of reality&dquo; (Luhmann 1991a, 149) that such a ground-

ing provides, it commits itself to an ontological conception of the
world that has now proven to be insupportable in the face of decisive
&dquo;scientific innovations&dquo; (Luhmann 1991a, 147). In this sense, Luh-
mann continues, critical sociology fails to keep pace not only with the
level of reflection of semiotics and recursive cybernetics but also with
that of systems theory, which can already provide &dquo;worked-out con-
cepts&dquo; (Luhmann 1991a, 149) for consolidating a postfoundationalist
paradigm.

II

Regardless of how Luhmann’s death knell for critical sociology is

assessed, one can only applaud his call to renounce ontological con-

ceptions of the world. In fact, the majority of the positions taken

within current sociological discourse still do contain ontological
premises in the form of unquestioned theological or metaphysical
foundations that are inexplainable in scientific terms (Wagner 1993).
The very precariousness of the situation that sociology thus finds
itself in guarantees the concepts of Luhmann’s systems theory the
great attention they receive, for Luhmann does seek to develop his
systems-theoretic approach to sociology in such a way as to avoid the
absolute reductionism of foundationalist thinking. For this reason,
drawing major inspiration from semiotics, he lays claim to a way of
thinking based on difference (Descombes 1979).
In his view, the very fact that the &dquo;point from which all further
investigations in systems theory must begin&dquo; is &dquo;not identity but
difference&dquo;-namely, &dquo;the difference between system and environ-
ment&dquo; leads to a &dquo;radical de-ontologizing&dquo; (Luhmann 1995, 177;
1984a, 243). Thus, though in a certain sense the &dquo;environment&dquo; does
&dquo;underlie&dquo; the system, in this context, &dquo;underlie&dquo; only indicates that
there are &dquo;preconditions for the differentiation&dquo; of the system &dquo;that
are not differentiated with the system&dquo; (Luhmann 1995, 178; 1984a,

244). Luhmann rejects reducing the system to the environment in

accordance with foundationalist thinking, but he also gives no valid-
ity to the reduction of environment to the system. Instead, he con-
ceives of the systems-theoretic distinction between system and
environment as a relationship in the sense of a difference &dquo;underlying
everything else,&dquo; for &dquo;both are what they are only in reference to each

Downloaded from pos.sagepub.com at UNIV OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ on November 28, 2014
 391

other&dquo; (Luhmann 1995,177 ; 1984a, 244). On the basis of this difference,

Luhmann claims to be developing a postfoundationalist paradigm.
At first glance, Luhmann’s difference-based thinking really does
appear to be part of a postfoundationalist worldview. However, a
second glance makes it clear that here, too, we are dealing with
foundationalist thinking. As important as it is to acknowledge
Luhmann’s commitment to liberating sociology from the burdens of
old-world foundationalist thinking, it is just as correct to assert that
his systems-theoretic sociology, with its foundational difference be-
tween system and environment, presupposes a grounding in the
sense of an absolute identity. For Luhmann’s foundational difference
is no different and this is my thesis-than what Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich Hegel terms negativity in his dialectical logic.
Now Luhmann has never disputed the &dquo;similarities&dquo; that his own
construct has with the dialectic; nevertheless, in his assessment, there
is one fundamental sense in which systems-theoretic sociology is
distinct from the dialectical tradition (Luhmann 1995, 498;1984a, 26).
Whereas the dialectic is foundationalist insofar as all difference in it
is reduced to an &dquo;ultimate identity&dquo; (Luhmann 1995, 498; 1984a, 26),
his systems theory proceeds from a difference, without relating this
to an underlying identity. Luhmann has good reason for believing that
the dialectic is &dquo;too risky in assuming an identity&dquo; (Luhmann 1995,
448; 1984a, 607). However, he also claims that problems of dialectical
logic are given increasing &dquo;attention in general systems theory&dquo;
(Luhmann 1995,546; 1984a, 285). We will see that Luhmann also is not
able and, indeed, not permitted to divest his systems-theoretic soci-
ology of an underlying postulate of identity.
The fact is that, by the way in which Luhmann understands foun-
dational difference, he practically commits his position to identity. For
this category, which is absolutely central to his whole approach, is not
simply premised on identity in the sense of an otherwise irrelevant
foundation that could be abstracted from without any great loss. It is
the case, instead, that the very making of the foundational difference
is premised on this grounding. Without this grounding, there would
also not be any foundational difference. This creates a real dilemma
for our author. To satisfy the criteria of a postfoundationalist
worldview, he would have to-as semiotics has shown-advocate
difference-based thinking.
By conceiving of difference as foundational difference, though, he
circumvents these criteria, for foundational difference requires a
grounding in the sense of an ultimate, absolute identity Luhmann

Downloaded from pos.sagepub.com at UNIV OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ on November 28, 2014
392

cannot advocate this openly without placing himself among the ranks
of the old-world foundationalist thinkers. If, however, this is actually
the case, then it would be justified to conclude that Luhmann sounds
the death knell for his own systems-theoretic sociology If one applies
the same criterion to his own theory with which he dismisses critical
sociology, then it too must be declared dead for precisely the same
reason. The aim of the following argument is to demonstrate that
Luhmann in no way goes beyond foundationalist thinking with his
systems-theoretic sociology
The first step in proving this thesis involves a discussion of the
peculiar use that Luhmann makes of the existing array of difference
theories in general and of the logic of George Spencer Brown in
particular. It will be seen that Luhmann in no way exploits the calculus
of the latter according to a difference-based logic but instead already
reinterprets its initial operations in the direction of identity (Section III).
As a consequence of this reinterpretation, Luhmann understands
difference solely as polar opposition. This in turn forces him to assume
a unity encompassing the two opposing moments (Section IV). The
fact that this unity has to be conceived as identity is demonstrated by
taking a look at Hegel’s logic of reflection, a logic that serves as the
background for Luhmann’s thinking in the development of his gen-
eral theory of self-referential systems (Section V). On the basis of a
discussion of the concept of self-reference, the affinities can actually
be brought out that link the sociology of systems theory with the work
of the philosopher of identity, Hegel (Section VI). An explication of
these affinities furthermore makes it plausible to assert that in his
systems-theoretic sociology, Luhmann’s preference falls to a trun-
cated form of dialectic. This justifies speaking, in conclusion, of the
end of his systems-theoretic sociology (Section VII).

III

To theorize along the lines of a postfoundationalist worldview,

Luhmann has to show that the difference between system and envi-
ronment that is constitutive for his systems-theoretic sociology can be
conceived without an underlying concept of identity. However, Luh-
mann is not able to satisfy this claim. The extent to which Luhmann
is committed to foundationalist thinking can be seen just by reviewing
his reception of existing theories based on the logic of difference.
Admittedly, he does acknowledge the importance of semiotics, from

Downloaded from pos.sagepub.com at UNIV OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ on November 28, 2014
 393

Ferdinand de Saussure to Jacques Derrida. However, no systematic

consideration is made of their insights. Luhmann may have his rea-
sons for this, especially since similarities between Derrida’s concept
of différance and Hegelian logic have been repeatedly noted in the
literature. The question is, though, does he have an alternative?
Luhmann advocates developing systems-theoretic, difference-
based thinking following the &dquo;logic of George Spencer Brown, which
is largely unknown even among philosophers and logicians&dquo; (Luh-
mann 1988a, 296). For Luhmann, there can be no doubt that Spencer
Brown’s (1971) Laws of Form contains a calculus based on a logic of
difference. As Luhmann puts it, Spencer Brown &dquo;opens research with
the instruction: draw a distinction!&dquo; (Luhmann 1988b, 48). This ex-
plains the great interest that Luhmann shows in this calculus: &dquo;At first
glance, this has little to do with systems theory However, once it is
accepted that systems theory is nothing other than the suggestion to
make a specific distinction, namely, between system and environ-
ment, the interconnections become clear&dquo; (Luhmann 1988a, 296).
However, Luhmann’s recourse to the Laws of Form is odd insofar
as he does not thoroughly appropriate the difference-based logic of

Spencer Brown’s (1971) arguments. Even though he tirelessly empha-

sizes the importance of Spencer Brown for overcoming the ontological
worldview and for founding his own systems-theoretic sociology, he
still does not come close to exhausting the difference-logic potential
of the Laws of Form. To the contrary, he even announces that he does
not follow &dquo;this theory in its own direction&dquo;; although he &dquo;values the
affinity-even if only to take advantage of it occasionally&dquo;-he actu-
ally aims to take a different tack &dquo;after following its first steps&dquo;
(Luhmann 1986a, 181). By proceeding in this way however, Luhmann
lets Spencer Brown’s difference-based thinking disappear. Put more
precisely: he transforms step-by-step the difference-based argument
of the Laws of Form in the direction of identity.
That Spencer Brown (1971) begins his argument with a single
operation, termed drawing a distinction, was already mentioned above:
&dquo;a distinction is drawn by arranging a boundary with separate sides
so that a point on one side cannot reach the other side without crossing
the boundary&dquo; (Spencer Brown 1971, 1). To illustrate this example,
Spencer Brown offers the example of a circle drawn in a plane: &dquo;For
example, in a plane space a circle draws a distinction&dquo; (Spencer Brown
1971, 1). To better understand this &dquo;opening,&dquo; it should be added that,
according to Spencer Brown, this distinction is not made for its own
sake. Instead, it serves as preparation for the designation of one of the

Downloaded from pos.sagepub.com at UNIV OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ on November 28, 2014
394

two parts of the diagram distinguished in this fashion. However, the

designation or naming of this part is not to be understood as involving
an operation separate from that of drawing the distinction. Even

though drawing the distinction is logically prior to the designation

procedure, in Spencer Brown’s view, they only constitute a single
operation. For to draw a distinction without designation is &dquo;incom-
plete, operatively imperfect&dquo; (Luhmann 1988b, 49).
Luhmann puts its well by stating that &dquo;distinction and designation
are thus basically only two aspects of a single operation&dquo; (Luhmann

1986a, 181). Without a distinction, there would also be no designation,

&dquo;which, for its part, only makes sense on the basis of a distinction&dquo;
(Luhmann 1986a, 181). Because distinction and designation are indi-
visibly connected to each other, Spencer Brown requires only a single
sign to symbolize his &dquo;first distinction&dquo; (Spencer Brown 1971, 3):
&dquo;Thus, the only sign that Spencer Brown needs for developing his
calculus is 1&dquo; (Luhmann 1986a, 181). This &dquo;mark 1 of distinction&dquo;
serves to mark one of the two sides that are distinguished from one
another and to name it. The sign stands for what is termed the
&dquo;marked state&dquo; (Spencer Brown 1971,4) and, as such, is distinguished
from the other side. Conversely, the latter, being unmarked, has to be
seen as an &dquo;unmarked state,&dquo; as a &dquo;state not marked with the mark&dquo;

(Spencer Brown 1971,5).

Luhmann takes up this operation with which Spencer Brown
(1971) initiates his calculus, but he does this while making a decisive
modification: &dquo;It should be stated here more clearly than this occurs
in Spencer Brown that distinctions ... are asymmetrical in a funda-
mental way&dquo; (Luhmann 1986a, 181). Distinctions cannot be treated
&dquo;in full disregard of the sides&dquo; they distinguish; rather, they always
have to recognize a &dquo;slight preference for one of the sides&dquo; (Luhmann
1988b, 50). As harmless as the assumption of an asymmetry charac-
terizing distinctions appears at first glance, it has tremendous effects
on Luhmann’s subsequent treatment of Spencer Brown’s logic of
difference. In fact, for the development of Spencer Brown’s calculus,
it is completely immaterial which of the two sides being distinguished
is marked: &dquo;once a distinction is drawn, the spaces, states, or contents
on each side of the boundary, being distinct, can be indicated&dquo;

(Spencer Brown 1971, 1). Thus, there is no mention anywhere in his

argument of such a fundamental asymmetry characterizing distinc-
tions. For instance, in his example of a circle drawn in a plane,
according to Spencer Brown, it is possible to designate either the space
inside or outside of the circle (Spencer Brown 1971, 59, 70-76). If the

Downloaded from pos.sagepub.com at UNIV OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ on November 28, 2014
 395

space inside the boundary line is made the marked state, then the
space outside it becomes the unmarked one, or vice versa.
By contrast, Luhmann insists that in making distinctions, there
always has to be a preferred side. Because, in his view, distinctions
can only &dquo;be divested of their differences in preference and be made

resymmetrical&dquo; with the help of a &dquo;considerable intellectual effort&dquo;

(Luhmann 1986a, 181), Luhmann claims that it is only possible to
designate a very specific side-namely, the preferred one-within the
context of the opening operation. On the basis of the preference for
the one side that has to be reckoned with, only this &dquo;one (and not the
other) side&dquo; can be designated (Luhmann 1988b, 49). Thus, in clear
contrast to Spencer Brown (1971), for whom it is no problem at all not
only to distinguish two sides from each other by means of the opening
operation but also to designate them alternatively, Luhmann insists-
due to the aforementioned asymmetry-that only the preferred side
&dquo;can be used as a starting point for further operations&dquo; (Luhmann
1991b,166).
Naturally, Luhmann does not doubt that by performing a second
operation following the first, the nonpreferred side can be designated
just as well. Admittedly, this does involve a very &dquo;special operation&dquo;
(Luhmann 1991b, 166). However, the explication of this second opera-
tion does not seem to cause any difficulties for Luhmann. He is certain
that &dquo;the first chosen designation ... leaves open the option of cross-
ing over to the other side, for otherwise the distinction qua distinction
would be lost&dquo; (Luhmann 1986a, 181). However, Luhmann radicalizes
this conception, which is certainly in keeping with Spencer Brown’s
&dquo;law of calling&dquo; (Spencer Brown 1971, 1), in a remarkable fashion.
&dquo;The possibility of designating the nondesignated with the next op-
eration&dquo; (Luhmann 1986a, 181) is, in his judgment, only given by the
fact that the side of the distinction preferred and thus designated in
the first operation is able to function as the &dquo;point of departure and
linkage&dquo; (Luhmann 1986a, 181) in a very special sense.
In Luhmann’s view, it &dquo;keeps the other side accessible&dquo;; the fact
&dquo;
that the other side is &dquo;accessible&dquo; at all &dquo;by means of a ’crossing’
holds, &dquo;as can easily be seen, only on the basis of the asymmetry
already established in the initial operation&dquo; (Luhmann 1988b, 49).
Thus, if we follow Luhmann, the asymmetry has a very special
importance. In contrast to Spencer Brown, according to whose calcu-
lus a &dquo;crossing&dquo; (Spencer Brown 1971, 2) can take place without
problems, even though there is no mention anywhere of an asymme-
try Luhmann conceives of asymmetry per se as the condition that

Downloaded from pos.sagepub.com at UNIV OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ on November 28, 2014
396

makes crossing possible. In his view, a crossing can only occur because
the preferred side is a preferred one and thus capable of keeping the
nonpreferred side accessible. In this way, it guarantees the success of
the second operation. In short, Luhmann already deviates from
Spencer Brown’s calculus of difference-based logic after completing
only its first few steps.
It is easy to understand why Luhmann, in contrast to Spencer
Brown, insists on asymmetry at all. To be able to give an account of
&dquo;systems&dquo;-theoretic sociology, Luhmann requires an argument as to
why, after the opening distinction between system and environment,
a bias actually arises toward the systems side and not toward the
environmental side, which would bring an &dquo;environmental&dquo;-
theoretic sociology into being (Bradley Laska 1993). The focus of his
thinking is on the system and not the environment, and the assump-
tion of an asymmetry is supposed to prevent, a priori as it were, the
equal likelihood of differentiation on either the environmental or
systems side. In fact, Spencer Brown (1971) makes it easy for Luh-
mann to advance the thesis of an asymmetry fundamental to drawing
distinctions. Thus, the very example that Spencer Brown provides to
illustrate his first distinction puts Luhmann in the position to con-
vince the readership of the supposed asymmetric character of the
basic operation of the Laws of Form.
As Gaston Bachelard (1975, 242) demonstrates so vividly, the con-
ception of an &dquo;inside and outside&dquo; created by the image of a circle on
a plane implies, namely, a very special &dquo;dialectic of dismemberment.&dquo;
As opposed, for instance, to the image of a plane divided by a line,
which separates the two sides from each other in an indifferent
manner, the image of a circle on a plane has suggestive powers that
always result in a preference for the inside of the circle. Luhmann
without doubt builds on these suggestive powers to advance that
&dquo;asymmetricalization&dquo; (Luhmann 1988b, 49) of Spencer Brown’s
(1971) basic operation, which, admittedly, then predetermines all of
his subsequent steps in the direction of identity.

IV

Thus, Luhmann’s asymmetricalization first necessitates a restric-

tion of what can be understood under a distinction. In clear contrast
to Spencer Brown (1971), it is thus logical that when Luhmann speaks
of distinctions, it involves more than simple dissimilarity, but rather

Downloaded from pos.sagepub.com at UNIV OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ on November 28, 2014
 397

solely and exclusively polar opposition. Only a pair of polar opposites

satisfies the condition of making crossing possible so emphatically
formulated by Luhmann. Only about them can it be claimed that one
side is &dquo;kept accessible&dquo; by the other (Luhmann 1988b, 49). Whereas
in the realm of Spencer Brown’s dissimilarities, a crossing from one
side to the other is possible at anytime, Luhmann subjects distinctions
to a condition that only holds for polar opposites-namely, that each
side only has meaning in reference to the other (Luhmann 1988b, 50).
It is only this circumstance by means of which the other side is kept
accessible that interests Luhmann.
It is true that he does not explicitly say that he is exclusively
interested in polar opposites. However, his discussion of a founda-
tional difference, referred to at the beginning of this article, already
points to the model of polar opposition. If it is to hold for system and
environment that &dquo;both are what they are only in reference to each
other&dquo; (Luhmann 1995, 177; 1984, 244), then the reference cannot be
to mere dissimilarity as is expressed, for instance, between mice and
men or between the Pope and a Japanese off-road motorcycle. No one
would deny that each of these two examples of distinctions drawn
involves two different relata. But it is equally true that no one would
want to seriously claim that each is only what it is in reference to the
other. According to Luhmann, this is exactly what is to hold for the
distinction between system and environment. By conceiving of them
in the sense of a foundational difference, he clearly establishes this
distinction in terms of polar opposition.
Luhmann underscores his opting for polar opposition by class-
ifying the system-environment relation alongside other sufficiently
prominent polar opposites in philosophy: &dquo;subject-object, figure-
ground, sign-signified, text-context, system-environment,
master-slave&dquo; (Luhmann 1988b, 50). Or, in another passage: &dquo;inclination-
disinclination, system-environment, true-untrue, good-bad&dquo; (Luh-
mann 1986a, 181). An especially evident example of opposition is

provided by the distinction between woman and man. Luhmann

gives practically paradigmatic status to this difference in his article
&dquo;Women, Men, and George Spencer Brown&dquo; (Luhmann 1988b) to
explicate the basic extent to which the two sides of the distinctions
that interest him generally refer to each other, as well as how this
occurs specifically in the case of the distinction between system and
environment.
Thus, according to his conception, it is to be actually supposed
possible to derive-on the basis of only one relatum-its counterpart.

Downloaded from pos.sagepub.com at UNIV OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ on November 28, 2014
398

In other words, if, in the context of a distinction, we only have the

piece of information woman, then it has to be unqualifiedly possible,
in accordance with his conception of a foundational difference, to
generate the information man: &dquo;A distinction has to make it possible
to determine what a piece of information excludes, and in the case of
’female existence,’ this is understandably, ’male existence’ &dquo; (Luh-
mann 1988b, 48). However, what Luhmann presents here as so obvi-
ous rests on an array of preconditions and is only possible on the basis
of a further assumption that goes beyond the distinction in question.
For it only holds that male existence is the notion excluded by
female existence, if female existence is discussed in relation to a more
precisely defined premise-namely, in terms of the premise of differ-
ence in sex. Only when this is the case can it be deduced that female
existence excludes male existence rather than &dquo;existence as a child&dquo;
or &dquo;embryonal existence&dquo;: &dquo;man and woman may differ in several

regards. They both distinguish themselves from children and em-

bryos by means of various features, modes of behavior, etc. Seen in
this way, man and woman are only different (not opposing) manifes-
tations of the human species among others. They are only opposing
(i.e., humans of opposite sexes) in one regard: in reference to the
difference in sex&dquo; (Wolff 1981,10~.
An assumption is required in order that the information, female
existence, can exclude the information, male existence. Without an
assumption, man and woman are different from one another, but they
do not stand in opposition to one another. For this reason, it cannot
be claimed that one can be kept accessible by the other. If male
existence is supposed to be accessible through female existence, then
the distinction between man and woman has to be conceived of as a
polar opposition, which, in turn, is only possible in reference to an
assumption. Thus, the foundational difference proves in no way to be
self-foundational. What is actually the case is that this sort of differ-
ence itself presupposes something foundational.
The same holds for the distinction between system and environ-
ment. In order for the information, system, to exclude the information,
environment, this distinction also has to be related to a more closely
defined presupposition. In other words, if in regard to the distinction
between system and environment it should hold that each side only
has meaning in terms of the other, then a definite presupposition,
common to both, is required. Luhmann is naturally aware of this

requirement: &dquo;Every difference indeed provokes the question of the

context of the different&dquo; (Luhmann 1989b, 277). The context that exists

Downloaded from pos.sagepub.com at UNIV OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ on November 28, 2014
 399

in regard to the distinction between system and environment Luh-

mann now names &dquo;world&dquo; (Luhmann 1973, 34;1995, 69;1984a,105).
Here, Luhmann denies neither the presupposed character of world
nor the idea of unity connected to it when he states that the distinction
between system and environment presupposes &dquo;the world as the
unity of difference&dquo; (Luhmann 1995, 71; 1984a, 107).
In contrast to the opinion widely held in the literature that Luh-
mann’s approach does not require unity, Luhmann most certainly
speaks of an assumed &dquo;unity of difference&dquo; (Luhmann 1995, 475;
1984a, 642). Admittedly, Luhmann is much more reluctant to state that
this assumed unity, in the framework of his opposition-based,
systems-theoretic sociology, has to be conceived of as identity. By
pointing out that the world is given &dquo;the function of an ultimate,
undifferentiated concept&dquo; (Luhmann 1992, 310), he does in any case
give expression to an unquestioned, taken-for-granted insight in
philosophy that polar opposition cannot be conceived &dquo;without
something identical&dquo; (Gloy 1990, 67) that is presupposed by the
difference.

No one saw this connection more clearly than Hegel. As much as

Luhmann seeks to distinguish himself from Hegel, it is just as helpful
to take a look at Hegel’s Science of Logic to reconstruct the identity-
logical core of Luhmann’s thinking. Hegel defines polar opposition
as an especially refined form of dissimilarity. Thus, opposition means
more than just the &dquo;different&dquo; since this &dquo;is just the merely posited
distinction, and thus a distinction that actually is not one&dquo; (Hegel
1983a, 52). In the merely different, the &dquo;moments&dquo; or aspects of the
distinction divide up &dquo;indifferently&dquo; to each other (Hegel 1983a, 64).
By contrast, in a relation of polar opposition, the moments of distinc-
tion are strictly interconnected. For here, one moment does not simply
encounter some other moment, but instead its other moment-in
other words, the opposite of itself. Hegel illustrates this connection in
his discussion of the specific relationship between the positive and
the negative (Hegel 1983a, 57).
The moments of this polar opposition relate &dquo;negatively to each
other&dquo; (Hegel 1983a, 57) since one can conceive of the positive as the
nonnegative and the negative as the nonpositive. In fact, the positive
and the negative are even &dquo;defined negatively by one another&dquo; (Wolff

Downloaded from pos.sagepub.com at UNIV OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ on November 28, 2014
400

1981, 106), insofar as the identity of each of the two moments develops
in the relationship to the other. Accordingly, the positive can be
identified with the nonnegative and the negative with the nonposi-
tive, for in Hegel’s view, each moment of a polar opposition is
&dquo; ’identical’ with the unique counterpart of its unique counterpart&dquo;
(Wolff 1981, 107). To give this specific relationship of negative and
mutual determinateness precise formulation, Hegel speaks of &dquo;nega-
tivity&dquo; ; this is &dquo;to be understood as the negation of otherness&dquo; (Hegel
1966, 78). But since this does not involve just any other &dquo;otherness&dquo;
but the &dquo;otherness&dquo; of oneself, the negation of &dquo;otherness&dquo; is, &dquo;as such,
a relationship to oneself&dquo; (Hegel 1966, 78).
Now for Hegel there is no doubt that the negativity manifesting
itself in the relationship of polar opposition requires a premise. For a
polar opposition involves, namely, a &dquo;relationship of special dissimi-
larity,&dquo; for opposed moments cannot be merely &dquo;randomly different&dquo;
(Wolff 1981, 106). There is always only one regard in which one can
speak of a polar opposition (i.e., only in relation to one particular
premise). One moment is only negative vis-a-vis another because it is
the determination of precisely one premise &dquo;in regard to which the
other determination acts as exclusive counterdetermination&dquo; (Wolff
1979, 345). Hegel illustrates this interconnection in terms of an exam-
ple from arithmetic, where he shows that +a and -a can only then be
conceived as &dquo;opposing variables at all,&dquo; if both have at their com-
mand one and only one a as a &dquo;unity in itself upon which both are
based&dquo; (Hegel 1983a, 60).
Since Hegel does not conceive of this presupposed unity, on its part,
as an opposed variable but rather as &dquo;that which is indifferent vis-a-
vis the opposition&dquo; (Hegel 1983a, 60), it is possible for him to conceive
of the opposing moments as &dquo;difference within an identity&dquo; (Hegel
1983a, 55). Seen in this way, the premised unity is not only a unity
vis-A-vis the duality of the opposing moments, but it is also this
duality itself. It maintains itself in the duality &dquo;as identical with itself&dquo;
(Gloy 1990, 63). The unity in itself is given &dquo;the function of identity
vis-A-vis the different determinations, indeed, even of numerical iden-
tity, of the persistence of the sameness through the different determi-
nations&dquo; (Gloy 1990, 65).
Hegel incorporates this entire complex of meaning in the term
&dquo;inner reflection&dquo; or &dquo;reflection in itself&dquo; (Hegel 1983a, 60). In contrast
to an external or subjective reflection of an &dquo;activity of the intellect (an
identifying, distinguishing, opposing activity, etc.)&dquo; (Wolff 1981,105),
reflection in itself refers to an objective process that occurs inde-

Downloaded from pos.sagepub.com at UNIV OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ on November 28, 2014
 401

pendently of any intellectual activity: &dquo;Just the term ’inner reflection’

gives an indication of the immanence of the movement, insofar as
’reflection’ means a bending, curving, or reflecting back and ’in itself’
indicates the fact that the mirroring is directed toward itself, and thus
remains within the object&dquo; (Gloy 1981, 137).
In relation to our example from arithmetic, the elements +a and -a
are, as opposing determinations of a presupposed a, reflected deter-
minations ; put in another way they reflect themselves in each other
as determinations of a (Wolff 1981,114). The reflective determinations
+a and -a create, in conjunction with their reflection-logical substra-
tum a, an indissoluble interrelationship, termed a polar opposition. For
this reason, it can be claimed without dispute that if only the reflective
determination +a is given, finding -a and presupposing a represent
&dquo;one indivisible process of reflection&dquo; (Wolff 1981,113). As is already
discernible in his talk of a unity in itself &dquo;underlying&dquo; the reflective
determinations, Hegel conceives of reflection in itself as a movement.
This movement is called the dialectic. It is to be conceived as a
&dquo;splitting into two of a unity and the reunification of that which is
split into a now completed unity&dquo; (Gloy 1981, 140).
Enough on Hegel for now. It should now have become comprehen-
sible that in Luhmann’s systems theory, the notion of a ground can
also be found. Even though Luhmann claims not to make any use of
a &dquo;concept of movement&dquo; or to complete any &dquo;transitions in the form
of negation&dquo; (Luhmann 1995, 613; 1984a, 640), he still turns out to be
a Hegelian. If he already commits himself to identity by conceiving of
the distinction between system and environment in terms of a polar
opposition, he reinforces this step by developing his theory as a
&dquo;theory of self-referential systems&dquo; (Luhmann 1995, 8;1984a, 24). For the
concept of self-reference in the manner in which Luhmann orients it
toward opposition is completely incompatible with postfoundation-
alist, difference-based thinking. It is only consistent that Luhmann
also reduces the Laws of Form, previously declared the flagship of the
postfoundationalist worldview, to the status of a mere &dquo;protologic&dquo;
(Luhmann 1988b, 48), which only provided him with &dquo;stimuli&dquo; for
thought (Luhmann 1991b, 166).
It is not only that its fully developed calculus is reproached for its
clearly &dquo;truncated self-referential references&dquo; (Luhmann 1988b,
...

48). Much worse, even in those &dquo;initial operations&dquo; originally favored

by Luhmann, it is incapable of allowing for self-reference (Luhmann
1986a, 182). That this is due to the fact that its character is grounded
in the logic of difference is something that Luhmann, admittedly, does

Downloaded from pos.sagepub.com at UNIV OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ on November 28, 2014
402

not state. Instead, he points to the

&dquo;broadening&dquo; (Luhmann 1986a,
182) of Spencer Brown’s (1971) calculus
accomplished through the
logical work of the biologist, J. Varela (Varela 1975). It
Francisco
arouses Luhmann’s interest in two regards. First, self-reference is
discussed without any recourse at all to Hegel. Second, these argu-
ments draw, as it were, an empirical legitimacy from Humberto R.
Maturana’s concept of autopoiesis.
Nevertheless, Varela’s (1975) work proves to be of only limited
suitability in helping Luhmann improve on Spencer Brown’s (1971)
protologic. Once again there are two reasons. First, Varela in no way
succeeds in converting the initial operations of the Laws of Form that
Luhmann makes use of to self-reference. Varela succeeds in taking up
the concept of self-reference only at the end of the Laws of Form, that
is, in its last chapter, titled &dquo;Re-entry into the Form&dquo; (Spencer Brown
1971, 69; see 56-57): &dquo;Self-reference, in this calculus, can be identified
with the notion of re-entry&dquo; (Varela 1975, 6). Thereafter, Varela also
fails in his efforts to conceptualize what Luhmann terms &dquo;original
self-reference&dquo; (Luhmann 1981, 24). For the arguments mustered by
Varela, oriented as they are toward the notion of reentry, only support
a subordinate, &dquo;peculiar form of self-reference: a reoccurence in itself,
an accessibility of the whole via a part of the whole&dquo; (Luhmann 1989b,

278).
There is noquestion that such a notion can only make plausible at
most the internal differentiation of a system in terms of self-reference.
It can never do so, however, for the logically prior distinction between
system and environment basic to systems-theoretic sociology. The
distinction between system and environment, the starting point for
systems-theoretic thinking, is, to wit, absolutely constitutive for the
reentry of the distinction of system and environment into the realm
of the system. In other words, the original self-reference realizing
itself between system and environment is logically prior to the pecu-
liar form of self-reference first inaugurated by reentry
In fact, a second look at Varela’s (1975) logic makes it clear that it
in no way represents a product of postfoundationalist thinking. Any-
thing but original, Varela is actually engaged in ascending to the level
of reflection once reached by German idealism. Thus, it is not a simple
act of homage but the acknowledgment of a basic state of affairs when
Luhmann, on the occasion of the acceptance of the Hegel Prize,
characterizes the Science of Logic as &dquo;a never-again surpassed effort to
process distinctions in regard to that which is identical or different in
them. No one has yet succeeded to do the same thing in a different

Downloaded from pos.sagepub.com at UNIV OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ on November 28, 2014
 403

way&dquo; (Luhmann 1990c, 47). However, the processing of distinctions

in regard to that which is identical or different in them is what Hegel
terms reflection. It may be that the movements of thought presented
in Hegel’s logic are &dquo;thin, too thin air&dquo; for &dquo;a sociologist&dquo; (Luhmann
1990c, 47-48). Nevertheless, as much as Luhmann also demonstrates
his reverence for biosystems research, radical constructivism, and
recursive cybernetics, he primarily orients himself in the develop-
ment of his concept of original self-reference in terms of Hegel.

VI

Thus, it is also no coincidence that Luhmann speaks of &dquo;reflection&dquo;

in regard to the distinction that is constitutive for his systems-
theoretic sociology, that between system and environment, when he
means self-reference (Luhmann 1995, 444; 1984a, 601). There is no

question that the concept of reflection functions in this context as a

name to label one of &dquo;three forms of self-reference&dquo; (Luhmann 1995,

443; 1984a, 600). However, there is just as little doubt that it also
indicates the mechanism that characterizes all forms of self-reference.
If Luhmann already knew to report on such things as &dquo;self-
referentiality&dquo; or &dquo;relation to the relating self&dquo; in his essay on &dquo;Reflex-
ive Mechanisms&dquo; (published in 1966) (Luhmann 1974, 99), then he
clearly conceives of the self-referential mechanism as reflection in the
sense of Hegel in the advance he made in general theory in the 1980s.

Thus, reflection does not just refer to a special form of self-reference.

Rather, self-reference is in all its forms reflection.
In fact, Luhmann conceives of self-reference in terms of a very
specific &dquo;relational operation&dquo; (Luhmann 1995, 33; 1984a, 58). Its
relata cannot be identical, since &dquo;pure self-reference in the sense of
’relating only and exclusively to itself’ is impossible&dquo; (Luhmann 1995,
446; 1984a, 604). Whether there is actually a way that this is possible
need not be discussed here (Lowe 1993). Luhmann clearly rejects such
considerations, namely, by concluding unequivocally on behalf of his
own approach: &dquo;Pure self-reference that does not take the indirect

path via something outside of it amounts to tautology&dquo; (Luhmann &dquo;

1986b, 269). Just as much as reference to the other, ’self-reference’ is
reference in the strict sense, indication according to a distinction&dquo;
(Luhmann 1995, 442; 1984a, 600). For &dquo;difference is the functional
premise of self-referential operations&dquo; (Luhmann 1995, 17; 1984a, 35).
It is thus logical that Luhmann’s interest is in a relationship in which

Downloaded from pos.sagepub.com at UNIV OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ on November 28, 2014
404

each relatum &dquo;relates to the other and in this way to itself&dquo; (Luhmann
1986b,269).
But Luhmann also disallows the other extreme. If the two relata
were conceived of, namely, as completely different from one another,
then the concept of self-reference would lose all meaning, for then it
would really be a case of reference to the other. The other, via which
the indirect course of self-reference is supposed to run, cannot merely
be something different. Thus, if the concept of self-reference is not to
become completely arbitrary, as we find it to be in the writings of
biosystems research and radical constructivism, then the other can
only be the other of the one-in other words, its other or the other of
itself. In keeping with the Hegelian maxim, &dquo;everything relates to
itself only as it relates to its other&dquo; (Hegel 1983a, 57), Luhmann
conceives of the two relata as opposed to each other. In view of the
phenomenon of &dquo;original self-reference,&dquo; he insists that the two relata
have to &dquo;make each other possible&dquo; (Luhmann 1981, 24). And this can
mean nothing but that they are necessarily negatively determined by
each other.
Luhmann, with his polar-opposition-oriented understanding of
self-reference, commits himself to Hegel’s theory of negativity. For-
mulated in precise terms, self-reference in Luhmann’s sense thus has
no other meaning than the negation of the otherness of itself. Only in
the negation of its environment can the system relate to itself. Herein
and only herein lies the meaning of the self-reference-defining state-
ment of Luhmann: &dquo;We will speak of reflection when the basic distinc-
tion is between system and environment&dquo; (Luhmann 1995,444; 1984a,
601). For self-reference &dquo;is an operation by which the system indicates
itself in contrast to its environment&dquo; (Luhmann 1995, 444;1984a, 601).
That it was so easy to present this entire context against the back-
ground of Hegelian logic is apparently connected to the fact that it
really cannot be done otherwise. As early as 1973, Luhmann had, in
the context of self-reference, conceived of the mechanism of &dquo;reflec-
tion as the establishment of a relation&dquo; in a special sense; the &dquo;relation
of the system to its environment&dquo; has to serve as &dquo;context for the
definition&dquo; of the &dquo;relation of the system to itself&dquo;: &dquo;Only because the
system has an environment can it relate to itself&dquo; (Luhmann 1973, 25).
A decade later, he reaffirmed his view. Only in distinction to its
environment can systems orient &dquo;themselves to themselves&dquo; (Luh-
mann 1995,455; 1984a, 617). Indeed, nothing can relate to itself except

by relating to an other: &dquo;Systems are oriented by their environment

Downloaded from pos.sagepub.com at UNIV OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ on November 28, 2014
 405

not just occasionally and adaptively, but structurally, and they cannot
exist without an environment.... Without difference from an envi-
ronment, there would not even be self-reference&dquo; (Luhmann 1995,
16-17; 1984a, 35).
With his commitment to negativity, Luhmann attempts to assimi-
late the concept of self-reference, constitutive as it is for the general
theory of self-referential systems and something that Varela’s (1975)
calculus also failed to provide. In his view, this specific reflective
structure of mutual and negative determinateness characterizes that
foundational difference between system and environment from
which systems-theoretic sociology takes its start. It is important to
emphasize here once again that an internal sort of reflection is in-
volved here, which takes place independently &dquo;of the cut of observa-
tion by others&dquo; (Luhmann 1995, 33; 1984a, 58). When Luhmann
establishes that there are self-referential systems, he is speaking of a
real and objective state of affairs devoid of any subjective constructs:
&dquo;There are self-referential systems in reality. Self-reference is not only
a structure of (subjective) consciousness, much less only a structure
of cognition&dquo;; instead, both &dquo;organic reality&dquo; and &dquo;socially ordered
reality&dquo; are made up of systems that &dquo;relate to themselves&dquo; (Luhmann
1981, 18; see Luhmann 1995, 479;1984a, 648).

VII

If we take stock of our reconstruction of the premises of systems

theory, then it has become sufficiently clear that Luhmann has to be
classified as a modem Hegelian. Both his conceptualization of the
distinction that is constitutive for systems theory between system and
environment as a relation of polar opposition and his concept of
self-reference equally commit him to the paradigm of identity logic
underlying the dialectic tradition. His foundational difference be-
tween system and environment involves a reflective structure of the
reflection of mutual and negative determinateness, which can be
found cognitively prefigured in an as yet unsurpassed manner in
Hegel’s (1983a) Science of Logic. In these terms, one can only agree with
Luhmann when he writes that the environment is the &dquo;presupposition
for the system’s identity, because identity is possible only by differ-
ence&dquo; (Luhmann 1995,177;1984a, 243). For the identity of two oppos-
ing moments is only constituted in the difference to the respective

Downloaded from pos.sagepub.com at UNIV OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ on November 28, 2014
406

other of one’s self. Just as the positive proves to be identical with the
nonnegative and the negative with the nonpositive, the system iden-
tifies itself with the nonenvironment and the environment with the
nonsystem by means of an operation of negation, termed self-reference,
of its respective &dquo;otherness.&dquo;
Thus, Luhmann’s claim that the environment &dquo;underlies&dquo; the sys-
tem is more than just misleading (Luhmann 1995, 178; 1984a, 244).
That Luhmann employs the consequential category of &dquo;ground&dquo; has,
admittedly, a very definite meaning. This puts Luhmann in the posi-
tion to abstract from another, real ground: from the world. Thus, it is
not surprising that one repeatedly finds passages in his writings in
which, without further ado, no distinction is made between the
concepts of environment and world. Camilla Warnke (1974) suc-
cinctly summarizes the consequences of Luhmann’s identification of
environment and world: &dquo;The hypostatization of the environment to
the world ... prevents one from conceiving of system and environ-
ment in terms of their identity&dquo; (87). Luhmann has postfoundational-
ist reasons for doing this.
At the same time, he does not force this hypostatization. The fact
that the systems-theoretic distinction between system and environ-
ment requires a premise simply cannot be denied. For only through
&dquo;that reflection on the unity of difference&dquo; (Luhmann 1995,475; 1984a,
642) of system and environment can it be ensured that each is only
what it is in relation to the other: &dquo;Only a notion of the world that
encompasses the relationship and integrates system and environment
can serve as a context for establishing such a relation between system
and environment (Luhmann 1973, 34). Thus, as much as it is true that
the difference of system and environment is constitutive for the
identity of both, it is also equally true that system and environment
are only in a relation of opposition within an identity, termed world.
The difference between system and environment is &dquo;permeated and
circumvented by a ’reality’ &dquo; that encompasses &dquo;both sides&dquo; and
without which the difference cannot be practiced (Pfutze 1988, 303).
Under these auspices, Luhmann’s estimation of his systems-
theoretic sociology as belonging to the postfoundationalist paradigm
of the &dquo;difference between identity and difference&dquo; is wrong; Luh-
mann’s theory of self-referential systems clearly has to be classified
as part of the old-world dialectical tradition of the identity between

identity and difference (Luhmann 1995, 498;1984a, 26), for the world
is the ultimate &dquo;unity and identity&dquo; (Gloy 1990, 63) on which the

Downloaded from pos.sagepub.com at UNIV OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ on November 28, 2014
 407

distinction between system and environment is premised. Not the

environment but the world functions as the ground-of both the
system and the environment. This is not changed by the fact that
Luhmann does not complete Hegel’s three-step dialectical movement
but remains at the stage of contradiction, without offering any reso-
lution. In other words, Luhmann makes use of the rise of the duality
out of the one ground but not the dissolution of this duality in the
now completed unity
Luhmann calls for tolerance of paradox. In allusion to Hegel’s use
of the well-known ancient motif of the spear that &dquo;opens a wound and
heals it as well&dquo; (Hegel 1983b, 88) to give vivid expression to the
completion of the circular movement of the dialectic, Luhmann un-
derscores that &dquo;the world&dquo; is &dquo;injured&dquo; by distinction (Luhmann 1992,
93). However, he does not hold out any prospects of &dquo;healing.&dquo; If one
wanted to give precise formulation to this truncated dialectical move-
ment, the category of emanation would suggest itself, according to
which difference arises out of original unity (Luhmann 1989b, 13).
It is now, however, high time to bring the argument of this article
to a close. Berhard Lakebrink (1976) put it well when he said that a
&dquo;ground is something that makes you look for ontology&dquo; (327). It only
makes sense to make use of &dquo;grounds&dquo; in the context of foundation-
alist thinking. Since systems-theoretic sociology necessitates such a
ground to complete its opening distinction between system and en-
vironment, the concepts that Luhmann develops cannot offer much
to the consolidation of the postfoundationalist paradigm. After all, the
reason why Luhmann originally had his systems-theoretic sociology

begin with precisely such a distinction that does not need to be based
on an underlying identity was to get beyond the ontological world-
view.
Luhmann has failed to do this. As we have seen, making the
distinction that is constitutive for his systems-theoretic sociology
between system and environment requires the premise of a founda-
tion. Regardless of all the rhetoric, Luhmann does not get beyond the
foundationalist presuppositions of the dialectical tradition. For this
reason, it is also justified, as far as Luhmann’s work is concerned, to
announce the end of systems-theoretic sociology There may be other

systems-theoretic approaches that are constructed in accordance with

the postfoundationalist paradigm. In any case, the path that Luhmann
chose-a theory of self-referential systems--has proven to be a dead end.

Downloaded from pos.sagepub.com at UNIV OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ on November 28, 2014
408

REFERENCES

Alexander, J. C. 1984. The Parsons Revival in German sociology. In Sociological theory,

edited by R Collins, 394-412. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Bachelard, G. 1975. Poetik des Raumes. Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein.
Bradley Laska, S. 1993. Environmental sociology and the state of the discipline. Social
Forces 72:1-17.
Descombes, V 1979. Le Meme et l’Autre. Paris: Minuit.
Gloy, K. . Berlin: de Gruyter.
1981. Einheit und Mannigfaltigkeit
—. 1990. Vermittlungsmodelle von Einheit und Vielfalt. In Einheit und Vielheit,
edited by O. Marquard, 58-71. Hamburg: Meiner.
Habermas, J.1984. The theory of communicative action. Vol. 1. Reason and the rationalization
of society. Boston: Beacon Press.
Habermas, J., and N. Luhmann. 1971. Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie—Was
leistet die Systemforschung? Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Hegel, G.W.F 1966. Wissenschaft der Logik, erster Band, erstes Buch: Das Sein. Faksimile-
druck nach der Erstausgabe von 1812. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
—. 1983a.
Wissenschaftder Logik II. Werke in zwanzig Bänden. Vol. 2. Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp.
—. 1983b.
Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften I. Werke in zwanzig Banden.
Vol. 8. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Lakebrink, B. 1976. Aus Hegels Logik: Sein und Existenz. In Der Idealismus und seine
Gegenwart, edited by U. Guzzoni, B. Rang, and L. Siep, 318-36. Hamburg: Meiner.
Lowe, E. J. 1993. Self, reference and self-reference. Philosophy 68:15-33.
Luhmann, N. 1973. Selbst-Thematisierungen des Gesellschaftssystems. Zeitschrift für
Soziologie 2:21-46.
—. 1974. Reflexive mechanismen. In Soziologische Aufklarung, Vol. 1, 92-112.
Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
—. 1979. Trust and
power. Chichester, UK: Wiley.
—. 1981. Selbstreferenz und
Teleologie in gesellschaftstheoretischer Perspektive.
Neue Hefte für Philosophie 20:1-30.
—. 1982. The differentiation of society. New York: Columbia University Press.
—. 1984a. Soziale
Systeme: Grundriß einer allgemeinen Theorie. Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp.
—. 1984b. Religious dogmatics and the evolution of societies. New York: Mellen.
—. 1985. A sociological theory . of law London: Routledge Kegan Paul.
—. 1986a. Die Lebenswelt—nach
Rücksprache mit Phänomenologen. Archiv für
Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 72:176-94.
—. 1986b. Ökologische Kommunikation. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
—. 1988a. Neuere
Entwicklungen in der Systemtheorie. Merkur 42:292-300.
—. 1988b. Frauen, Männer und
George Spencer Brown. Zeitschrift fur Soziologie
17:47-71.
—. 1989a. Ecological communication. Cambridge, UK: Polity.
—. 1989b. und Semantik. Vol. 3. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Gesellschaftsstruktur
—. 1990a. General
theory and American sociology. In Sociology in America, edited
by H. J. Gans, 253-64. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
—. 1990b. Essays on self-reference. New York: Columbia University Press.
—. 1990c. Paradigm lost: Über die ethische Reflexion der Moral. Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp.

Downloaded from pos.sagepub.com at UNIV OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ on November 28, 2014
 409

—. 1991a. Am Ende der kritischen Soziologie. Zeitschrift fur Soziologie 20:147-52.
—. 1991b. Die Form Person. Soziale Welt 42:166-175.

—. 1992. Die

Wissenschaftder Gesellschaft. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
—. 1993. Sociology of risk. Berlin: de Gruyter.
—. 1995. Social
systems. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Murphy, J. W. 1982. Talcott Parsons and Niklas Luhmann: Two versions of the social
system. International Review of Modern Sociology 12:291-301.
Pfutze, H. 1988. Theorie ohne Bewußtsein. Merkur 42:300-14.
Spencer Brown, G. 1971. Laws of form. London: Allen & Unwin.
Varela, F. J. 1975. A calculus for self-reference. International Journal of General Systems
2:5-24.
Varela, F. J., H. R. Maturana, and R Uribe. 1974. Autopoiesis: The organization of livmg
systems. Its characterization and a model. Biosystems 5:187-196.
Wagner, G. 1993. Gesellschaftstheorie als politische Theologie? Zur Kritik und Uberwindung
der Theorien normativer Integration. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
Warnke, C.1974. Die abstrakte Gesellschaft. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
Wolff, M. 1979. Uber das Verhaltnis zwischen logischem und dialektischem Wider-
spruch. Hegel-Jahrbuch 340-48.
—. 1981. Der Begriff des Widerspruchs. Königstein: Hain.

Gerhard Wagner teaches sociology at the University of Bielefeld, Germany. He has

published articles and books on sociological theory and the history of sociology-for
example, Geltung und normativer Zwang (1987), Gesellschaftstheorie als politische
Theologie? (1993), and Max Webers Wissenschaftslehre (1994). Correspondence
should be addressed to the Faculty of Sociology, University of Bielefeld, P.O. Box 100
131, D-33501 Bielefeld, Germany.

Downloaded from pos.sagepub.com at UNIV OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ on November 28, 2014