University of the Philippines College of Law

3D

Topic Opinion Rule

Case No. GR 187246 / 2011
Case Name Tabao Y Perez vs People
Ponente BRION, J

FACTS
 PROSECUTION: At around 10:00 p.m. of Jan. 21, 1993, the petitioner Tabao was driving his Toyota
Corolla car (PCH-111) along Gov. Forbes corner G. Tuazon St towards Nagtahan when it suddenly
ramped on an island divider, bumping Rochelle Lanete who was crossing the street. As a result of the
impact, Rochelle was thrown into the middle of the road on her back. Thereafter, Leonardo Mendez
speeding blue Toyota Corona car (PES-764) ran over Rochelle’s body. Bystanders — armed with stones
and wooden clubs — followed Mendez’ car until it stopped near the Nagtahan Flyover. Cielo, a
newspaper boy, went inside Mendez’ car, sat beside him, got his driver’s license, and ordered him to
move the car backwards. Mendez followed his order, but his car hit the center island twice while backing
up. Cielo went out of the car and approached the sprawled body of Rochelle; he and the petitioner
brought Rochelle’s body inside Mendez’ car. The three of them (the petitioner, Cielo and Mendez) brought
Rochelle to the UST Hospital, where she died due to septicemia secondary to traumatic injuries.
 DEFENSE: The petitioner was driving along Gov. Forbes corner G. Tuazon St. when his car ramped on
an island at the foot of the Nagtahan Flyover. He tried to move the car backwards, but failed to do so. He
alighted from his car and then saw that its 2 rear wheels had been elevated. He returned inside his car to
turn off its engine; he then noticed that many people were approaching his car. He again alighted from
his vehicle and saw a person lying on the road. He looked at his left side and saw a car that was "running
fast like a wind" pass by. He approached the person lying on the road, and noticed that she was still
breathing and moaning. Afterwards, he saw Mendez’ car backing up; he carried the victim towards that
car. Thereafter, he, Mendez and Cielo brought the victim to the UST Hospital.
 Mendez testified that as he was driving on his way home, he saw a vehicle ramped on an island divider.
Suddenly, another vehicle overtook his car from the right and cut his lane. He slowed down his car when
he saw a rug-like object fall from the car that overtook him, and stopped when he realized that what had
fallen was a person’s body. When he moved his car backwards to help this person, many people
approached his car. He alighted from his car and inquired from them what had happened. The people
replied that someone was run over; some of them pointed to him as the culprit. He denied having run over
the victim when they tried to hurt him. The petitioner carried the victim and placed her inside Mendez’ car.
Thereafter, the two of them brought the victim to the UST Hospital.
 The petitioner and Mendez were charged with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide before the RTC,
Br. 39, Manila. The RTC convicted the 2 accused of the crime charged. It found that the petitioner’s car
first hit the victim, causing her to be thrown into the road on her back, and that Mendez’ car ran over her
as she was lying down.
 The CA agreed with the factual findings of the RTC, and affirmed its decision with the modification on the
penalty.

Issue (OP RULE IN Ratio

ISSUE #1)

WON the CA erred Weight of expert testimony

in disregarding the
witness of the The petitioner likewise claims that the CA violated Sec. 49, Rule 130 when it
accused – NO disregarded the testimony of defense witness Police Senior Inspector Danilo
Cornelio who testified that the petitioner’s car could not have bumped the victim
because the latter’s body was not thrown in line with the car, but on its side. The
petitioner argues that P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio is highly qualified in the field of traffic
accident investigation, and as such, his statements are "backed-up by [the]
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(OPINION RULE) principles of applied physics, engineering, and mathematics.”

Sec. 49, Rule 130 states that the opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience or training, which he is shown to possess, may be
received in evidence. The use of the word "may" signifies that the use of opinion of
an expert witness is permissive and not mandatory on the part of the courts.
Allowing the testimony does not mean, too, that courts are bound by the testimony of
the expert witness. The testimony of an expert witness must be construed to have
been presented not to sway the court in favor of any of the parties, but to assist the
court in the determination of the issue before it, and is for the court to adopt or not to
adopt depending on its appreciation of the attendant facts and the applicable law. It
has been held of expert testimonies:

Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may place
whatever weight they may choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the
facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly
within the province of the trial court to decide, considering the ability and character of
the witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the weight and process of the
reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the
side for whom he testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative
opportunities for study and observation of the matters about which he testifies, and
any other matters which deserve to illuminate his statements. The opinion of the
expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the court in view of all
the facts and circumstances in the case and when common knowledge utterly fails,
the expert opinion may be given controlling effect. The problem of the credibility of
the expert witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of the
trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of abuse of
discretion.

P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio was not an eyewitness to the incident; his testimony was
merely based on the Traffic Accident Report prepared by SPO4 Edgar Reyes who
himself did not witness the incident. At any rate, nowhere in P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio’s
testimony did he conclusively state that the petitioner could not have been involved
in the incident. From P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio’s testimon, it is clear that P/Sr. Insp.
Cornelio did not discount the possibility that the victim could have been thrown on
the side. He likewise admitted that the location of an accident victim in relation to the
vehicle would also depend on the speed of the vehicle and the point of impact.

OTHER ISSUES

WON the Reckless imprudence, generally defined by our penal law, consists in voluntarily, but
conviction of the without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by
accused should be reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to
affirmed - YES perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and
place. Imprudence connotes a deficiency of action. It implies a failure in precaution or a
failure to take the necessary precaution once the danger or peril becomes foreseen.
Thus, in order for conviction to be decreed for reckless imprudence, the material damage
suffered by the victim, the failure in precaution on the part of the accused, and the direct
link between material damage and failure in precaution must be established beyond
reasonable doubt. All three were established in this case in accordance with the required
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level of evidence in criminal cases.

The petitioner failed to exercise precaution in operating his vehicle.

The petitioner repeatedly admitted that as he drove his vehicle on his way home
from work, he did not notice the island divider at the foot of the Nagtahan Flyover.
As a result, his car ramped on the island so that both its rear wheels became
"elevated" from the road and he could no longer maneuver the vehicle. 33 The
petitioner even testified that his car had to be towed. Later, during cross-
examination, he admitted that all four wheels of his car, not just the two rear wheels
mentioned in his earlier testimony, lost contact with the ground. The entire vehicle,
therefore, ended up on top of the island divider. He puts the blame for the ramping
and, essentially, his failure to notice the island on the darkness of nighttime and the
alleged newness of the island.

THE fact that the petitioner’s entire vehicle ended up ramped on the island divider
strongly indicates what actually happened in the unfortunate incident. The vehicle
could not have ended up in that condition had the petitioner been driving at a
reasonable speed. We are not persuaded by the petitioner’s rather simplistic
account that mere darkness, coupled with the traffic island’s alleged newness,
caused his car to veer off the traffic trajectory of Governor Forbes Street and to end
up jumping on top of the traffic island intended to channel vehicular traffic going to
the Nagtahan Flyover.

WON the CA The petitioner was positively identified by an eyewitness.

[ERRED IN
UPHOLDING HIS] An eyewitness account established that the petitioner’s vehicle actually hit Rochelle
CONVICTION [ON Lanete. Eyewitness identification is vital evidence, and, in most cases, decisive of
THE BASIS OF the success or failure of the prosecution. One of the prosecution witnesses, Victor
THE] Soriano, unfortunately for the petitioner’s cause, saw the incident in its entirety;
INCREDIBLE AND Victor thus provided direct evidence as eyewitness to the very act of the commission
UNRELIABLE of the crime.24 In his testimony, Victor positively identified the petitioner as the
TESTIMONY OF person who drove the car that ramped on an island divider along Gov. Forbes cor.
VICTOR G. Tuazon St., and hit Rochelle. The petitioner nonetheless claims that Victor is not
SORIANO - NO a credible witness due to inconsistencies between his affidavit and court testimony.
He harps on the fact that Victor declared in his affidavit that the petitioner’s car first
hit Rochelle before it ramped on an island divider; while he testified in court that the
petitioner’s vehicle ramped on the island divider before hitting the victim.

Discrepancies and/or inconsistencies between a witness’ affidavit and testimony in

open court do not impair credibility as affidavits are taken ex parte and are often
incomplete or inaccurate for lack or absence of searching inquiries by the
investigating officer. At any rate, Victor was able to sufficiently explain the
discrepancies between his affidavit and court statements. Victor reasoned out that
the secretary who typed his affidavit made a mistake.

The general rule – that contradictions and discrepancies between the testimony of a
witness and his statements in an affidavit do not necessarily discredit him – is not
without exception, as when the omission in the affidavit refers to a very important
detail of the incident that one relating the incident as an eyewitness would not be
expected to fail to mention, or when the narration in the sworn statement
substantially contradicts the testimony in court. In the present case, the Court sees
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no substantial contradiction in Victor’s affidavit and in his court statements as he

declared in both that he saw the petitioner’s car ramp on the island divider and bump
Rochelle. As to whether the car ramped on the center island before or after it
bumped the victim does not detract from the fundamental fact that Victor saw and
identified the petitioner as the driver of the car that ramped on the island divider and
hit Rochelle.

Victor, who stood only 7 meters from the incident, clearly and in a
straightforward manner described how the petitioner’s car had bumped the
victim. We thus see no reason to overturn the lower courts’ finding regarding
Victor’s credibility, more so since the petitioner did not impute any ill motive
that could have induced Victor to testify falsely. The fundamental and settled
rule is that the trial court's assessment regarding the credibility of witnesses
is entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal, especially when the assessment is affirmed by the CA.
The positive identification in this case, coupled with the failure of the defense
to impute any ill-motive on the eyewitness, to our mind, works to dispel
reasonable doubt on the fact that the petitioner’s car had in fact hit Rochelle.
The eyewitness account provides the necessary link between the petitioner’s
failure to exercise

RULING
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the guilt of both accused, LEONARDO MENDEZ Y MENDEZ and EDWIN
TABAO Y PEREZ, beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged in the Information which is for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Homicide, they are hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY of arresto mayor as minimum, to TWO (2) YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS of prison correctional
as maximum.

Both accused are ordered to jointly and solidarity [sic] pay the heirs of the victim Rochelle Lanete Y Mataac the amount of
P478,434.12 as actual damages; P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; and P50,000.00 as moral damages, and the costs of suit.