AUSTRALIAN Air Power .

China’s great big, very

capable fighter force

The PLAAF’s 33rd Air Division operates 40 two seat Su-27UBK aircraft for air superiority missions and conversion training.

Peter Layton
China’s rapid economic growth over
the last two decades has allowed the
country to significantly modernise its
defence forces – and none more so
than the People’s Liberation Army Air
Force (PLAAF). Over the last twenty
years, the PLAAF has been transformed
through an extensive but focused
re-equipment program.
As a result of this re-equipment , the
PLAAF’s fighter force has dramatically
changed. In two decades it has gone from
having an obsolete, 1950s era fighter force
to today having a highly capable, up-to-
date fighter force equalled only by the
USAF and the Russian Air Force. For Asia-
Pacific air forces, large and small, the PLAAF
fighter force has become the benchmark to
compare against.
This modernisation program continues
apace with the objective being to make the
PLAAF into a ‘strategic air force’. Indeed in
2014 Chinese President Xi Jinping declared
that the country must “accelerate [its]
construction of a powerful people’s air
force… in order to support the realization
of the China dream and the dream of a
strong military”. In this, the PLAAF fighter
force modernisation program has been
carefully co-ordinated and harmonized with
the development of the Chinese aircraft
industry. While much has been achieved, as
Xi Jinping indicated, this remains a work in
progress.
China’s Strategic Requirements
China’s 2015 defence white paper
revealed that the Chinese government
considers major wars unlikely but localized
conflicts possible given power politics,
ethnic troubles and territorial disputes.
For China, the most worrying local wars
are those that might break out on its
periphery. Accordingly, China’s defence
forces are being developed to be able to
end nearby local conflicts quickly, decisively
and crucially in China’s favour. The later
is considered to depend on being able to
prevent US forces intervening. The highest
priority local war contingency relates to
Taiwan, closely followed by the defence
of China’s territorial claims in the East and
South China Seas.
China’s white paper further sets out that in
such local wars, military operations would
be based on active defence concepts that
integrated defensive and offensive means.
In such wars both sides would generally
use high technology systems and extensive
information warfare over an extended, non-
linear battlefield of considerable depth.

Eight prototypes and two preproduction J-20 stealth

fighter aircraft are currently in flight test at the
Chengdu Aircraft Design Institute.

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Believed based on the Russian Su-33, the Chinese developed J-15 multi-role fighter is undergoing sea trials on the PLA Navy’s new Liaoning carrier.
Accordingly, the PLAAF is being developed
to be able to fight and win short-duration,
high-intensity localized conflicts.
For most of its history, the PLAAF focused
principally on limited area air defence of
China’s cities and key defence sites. With
the new defence guidance, this mission has
morphed into extended air defence across
China’s considerable periphery. Given
modern technology, this now requires
achieving air superiority in these distant
areas so as to prevent these being used by
hostile forces to launch long-range missile
attacks.
Air superiority for the PLAAF has a more
strategic context than Western airpower
thinking normally has. For China, achieving
air superiority can be a strategic objective
in itself. Chinese military thinking considers
that achieving the “Three Superiorities” - air
superiority, information dominance and sea
superiority – might be sufficient for a conflict
Some 110 J-11B fighter aircraft have been manufactured at the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation factory for the PLAAF.
to be favourably terminated. At the least,
such an accomplishment would push US
forces out of nearer regions preventing them
interfering.
The PLAAF has taken a two-phased
approach to building a force structure
for air superiority operations. For several
years the goal has been to have a force
able to potentially achieve local area air
superiority out to about 1000km, a zone
sometimes termed the ‘first island chain’.
This encompasses Taiwan, northern Vietnam,
half of the South China Sea, the northern
Philippines and western Japan. In many
respects, this aspiration has effectively been
achieved. The PLAAF’s big, new fighter force
is suitable to be assigned this task albeit
success might be problematic especially in
terms of how long for.
The PLAAF’s second and most ambitious
goal is to be able to achieve limited (in time
and space) air superiority when conducting
offensive counterair operations out to about
3000km by 2030. This would encompass
all of Indochina and Japan as well as the
big US base on Guam. In this, the PLAAF’s
air superiority concept includes not just
attacking land-based air forces but also
ensuring any hostile naval forces within
this zone cannot launch long-range missile
strikes against Chinese territory. In all such
operations, China’s large new, reclaimed
land, airfield at Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly
islands some 1600km from the Chinese
mainland would be a most useful facility, as
long as it remained operable.
Building a Modern Fighter Force
The development of the modern PLAAF
fighter force reflects these strategic
requirements and operational concepts. Its
development has occurred in concert with
that of the Chinese aircraft industry in five
distinct stages, as discerned by US National
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 AUSTRALIAN Air Power .
The large stealthy J-20 may be intended to seek out
and destroy an adversary’s air refueling tankers
and AEW&C aircraft.
Defence University China experts Phillip
Saunders and Joshua Wiseman.
In the first Soviet-era stage (1949-1960),
the PLAAF was established subordinate to
strike aircraft and has undergone several
upgrades since its 1992 entry into service.
Some 240 are in service with the PLAAF and
the PLA Navy. The latest versions feature
improved engines, new avionics including
glass cockpits, stand-off weapons, helmet
mounted sights and reduced frontal radar
signatures.
The fourth stage (1989-2004) began
with the abrupt halt to Western support
as exports of military equipment were
embargoed following the Tiananmen Square
incident. Shortly after however the USSR
collapsed, allowing China to regain access
to Russian military equipment. In 1990 the
Chinese began purchasing 75 Su-27s with an
initial order for 24. In 1998 Chinese industry
began manufacturing 100 Su-27s (labelled
J-11As) under licence. The Su-27s and
J-11As are large fighters broadly equivalent
to the F-15A/B albeit with longer range and
greater payload carrying capability.
In 1998 China also purchased the
Su-30MKK, a development of the Su-27
family to meet specific Chinese requirements
for a heavy strike fighter. About 75 are in
service with the PLAAF with another 24 MK2
variants with the PLA Navy. The Su-30MKK
is broadly similar to the F-15E Strike Eagle

‘
The PLAAF and the Chinese
aircraft industry have been
developing and testing
two new design stealth
fighters: the twin-engined,
single seat, J-20 long range
fighter optimised for strike
not air defence missions
and the twin-engined J-31,
which appears similar to the
the Army and tasked with the air defence
of Chinese cities. The aircraft industry was
established to begin manufacturing Mig-15s,
Mig-17s and Mig-19s under licence.
The second stage (1960-1977) began with
the Chinese split with the USSR and saw
both the PLAAF and the aircraft industry
stagnating as access to foreign technology
and thinking was cut off. The PLAAF played
no part in the 1962 Sino-Indian or 1979
Vietnam border wars while industry simply
continued making unlicensed copies of
obsolete Soviet aircraft.
In the third stage (1977-89), China gained
increasing access to Western technology,
allowing the development of the JH-7
albeit with longer range. Importantly the
Su-30 was the first PLAAF fighter to have
active radar guided missiles comparable to
the USAF’s AIM-120 AMRAAM series.
In this period the indigenous industry
developed the J-10, a single engine, single
seat fighter that, in looking similar to the
Lavi fighter, some believe was designed with
Israeli help. The J-10 first flew in 1998 but
did not enter service until 2005 by which
time it was fitted with the new Chinese PL-12
active radar guided missiles. The upgraded
J-10B features engine upgrades, an active
phased array radar (AESA), an Infra-Red
Search and Track system, precision guided
missiles and a new intake design to lower

’
which first flew in 1988. This two-seat,
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. fighter-bomber was initially fitted with two
imported Rolls Royce Sprey turbofans, later
replaced by licence built copies. The JH-7
is broadly similar to the European Tornado
its radar cross section. Across its various
versions, the J-10 is broadly equivalent to
the F-16 Block 40/50/60 aircraft. There are
some 250 J-10s in PLAAF service with further
orders underway.

The PLAAF’s new-build H-6K bombers with improved turbofans allow DH-10 cruise missile attacks to be launched at long range.

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 The fifth stage from 2004 to the present
day began when the Russians realised that
China was developing an indigenous version
of the Su-27, the J-11B, without an agreed
licensing arrangement. In retaliation the
Russians ceased considering co-production,
slowed deliveries of contracted aircraft
purchases and abandoned discussions over
China acquiring the Tu-22 bomber.
Since 2004 Russia has been more cautious
in selling advanced military aircraft (but not
surface-to-air missile systems) concerned
about technology leakage and the likelihood
China will build unlicensed, unauthorised
copies. China has in some respects returned
to the 1960-77 second stage where its
aviation industry has little access to outside
sources and must accordingly be much more
self-reliant. This is of particular concern in
the area of engine technology where the
Chinese aircraft industry has experienced
difficulties for many decades. China’s
primary access to the globalised defence
industry now seems to be through cyber
intrusions into defence company computer
systems and industrial espionage.
This formal cut off from Western and
Russian defence technology puts the
Chinese fighter aircraft industry at some
disadvantage. Even the US finds being
able to obtain foreign countries advanced
technology important in the design and
manufacture of new fighters - the F-35 Joint
Strike Fighter being the latest example.
China’s new isolation is however eased
somewhat by still retaining access to global
commercial aviation developments.
Moreover, after delays by both sides, in
November 2015 the Russians finally agreed
to sell 24 Su-35s, the latest development
of the Su-27 family. This latest variant has
advanced thrust-vectoring engines, reduced
radar cross-section and a new AESA radar.
Its manufacturer sees the aircraft as a bridge
between the older Su-27s and the new
Sukhoi PAK FA stealth fighter. In Western
terms the Su-35 seems comparable to the
upgraded F-15C/Ds Boeing is proposing.
In the mean time, Chinese industry
developed and manufactured the
unauthorised Su-27 variant, J-11B. The J-11B
has Chinese engines, improved radar able to
employ the PL-12 active radar guided missile
J-31 stealth fighter prototype flew at the 2014 China International Aviation & Aerospace Exhibition.
J-16 multi-role fighter recently entered PLAAF service with an EW variant comparable to the RAAF’s Growler.
and a new multi-role, precision-guided
munition capability. While potentially
comparable to the F-15C/D, there have been
some real difficulties with the production
of the J-11B. Manufacturing standards and
quality control has been mixed apparently
resulting in poor radar reliability and
significant engine servicing shortcomings.
Some 110 J-11Bs are in service. A new
version, the J-11D, has been recently
ordered and features a new AESA radar, an
in-flight refuelling probe, upgraded engines,
improved avionics and additional radar cross
section reduction measures.
In a further evolution of the family, the
J-11D design has been blended with the
Su-30MKK to produce an advanced strike
fighter, the J-16. Some 24 are now in service
with more being produced but concerns are
being voiced over its engine performance
for what is now a heavy airframe.
Away from the Su-27/Su-30/J-11
evolutionary path, the PLAAF and the
Chinese aircraft industry have been
developing and testing two new design
stealth fighters. The first was the twin-
engined, single seat, J-20 long range fighter
which flew in 2011 and which has been
progressively developed since. While often
compared to USAF’s F-22, the J-20 seems
optimised for strike not air defence missions.
The latest and eighth J-20 prototype flew
in September 2015 and appears to have
new engines, additional rear fuselage
area for electronic warfare equipment and
improvements to side and rear stealth
capabilities. It is believed the J-20 will enter
PLAAF service in 2018 with intentions to
field 24 by 2020.
The second stealth aircraft revealed was
the twin-engined J-31 that first flew in
October 2012 and which appears similar
to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Whether it
will enter PLAAF service is uncertain with
Chinese commentators talking about a
possible carrier variant or it being mainly
designed for export. China developed the
JF-17 tactical fighter specifically for the
export market and the J-31 could be similar.
Such an approach would help ensure
China’s best stealth technology was not
unintentionally compromised – an approach
the US followed with the F-22 in denying its
export to allies.
For future strike missions the PLAAF has
also been considering, developing and
testing armed Unmanned Air Vehicles
(UAVs). Clearly impressed by the USAF’s use
of the Predator/ Reaper UAVs in Afghanistan
and Iraq, China has developed comparable
systems in the Wing Loong, CH-4 and CH-5.
The Wing Loong entered PLAAF service in
2013 while the CH-4 is presently in use in
Iraq employing the AR-1/HJ-10 anti-tank
missile against ISIS forces in Anbar province.
For higher threat environments, trails began
in mid-2013 of the Lijian, a single-engined,
flying wing UCAV test bed, visually similar to
the USN’s X-47 stealth UCAV demonstrator.
The X-47 design offered a long range
capability that seems to fit the Chinese
stress on long range fighters. If the Lijian is
similar, it may therefore be intended to be
a future PLAAF strike platform that works in
conjunction with China’s large fighter force.
Employing China’s Fighter Force
The continuing development of the PLAAF
means that by 2020 it will comprise about
.
1100 modern fighters as follows:
650 4th generation (comparable to the
RAAF’s upgraded Hornets)
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 AUSTRALIAN Air Power .
JF-17 Thunder, a fourth-generation fighter jet co-
developed by China and Pakistan.
. multiple fighter, strike and combat support
.
450 4.5 generation (comparable to the
RAAF’s Super Hornets)
24 5th generation (aspiring to match
USAF’s F-22 and beat the F-35)
Accordingly in 2020, given the F-35 will still
not be fully operational, the PLAAF’s fighters
will be a match for any other fighter in the
Asia-Pacific region and indeed outclass
most. The exception is the USAF’s 180 5th
generation F-22s.
Not surprisingly a 2015 study by the
prestigious RAND Corporation found the
PLAAF and USAF had approximate air parity
in a postulated future air battle over Taiwan.
Crucially, this study assumed the F-22 and
F-35 both participated but not the in-flight
test J-20 or J-31 stealth aircraft. RAND
ominously concluded that: “continuous
improvements to Chinese air capabilities
make it increasingly difficult for the United
States to achieve air superiority within a
politically and operationally effective time
frame, especially in a scenario close to the
Chinese mainland.”
How might the large modern PLAAF fighter
force be employed? The PLAAF considers
airpower as “firepower warfare” were
the greatest impact is achieved by using
coordinated aircraft, missile and information
warfare attacks. The PLAAF may therefore
use its modern fighter force in mass attacks
rather than in small unit operations, perhaps
PLA Naval Aviation Su-30MKK2.
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borrowing from the USAF playbook of
employing force packages comprised of
aircraft. China has some of these assets in
place while building up its capabilities in
some missing or weaker areas.
From a Chinese perspective the nearer
region out to 1000km has priority albeit with
intentions to go out to 3000km. Accordingly,
China has already available ballistic
missiles, cruise missiles and surface-to-air
missile systems to support its fighter force
operations in this nearer zone.
In Chinese thinking ballistic and cruise
missiles are important to helping achieve air
superiority through being used to suppress
enemy air defences by attacking air battle
command centres, air defence radars, SAM
systems and parked fighter aircraft. Such
missiles are considered very hard to defend
against, especially if used in large numbers,
and offering a higher likelihood of success in
the early stages of a campaign then manned
aircraft raids.
For this, China has the world’s largest short-
range ballistic missile force comprising some
1,000-1200 missiles. Many are road mobile
and achieve good accuracies allowing use
of conventional warheads. A growing force
of ground and air launched cruise missiles
now complements this ballistic missile force.
Newer intermediate range ballistic missiles
and the new DH-10 cruise missile when
launched from the PLAAF’s H-6K bomber
aircraft (modernised Tu-16 design) are
potentially able to attack more distant air
defence targets as far away as Guam.
China is also developing further its long
range SAM force that today includes the
indigenous HQ-9 and the Russian SA-10 and
SA-20. In late 2014, China purchased Russia’s
new S-400 system with a range of some
400 km. China is also continuing R&D to
extend the range of the HQ-9 to beyond 200
km. Such ranges will allow engagements
extending well off shore, including across all
of Taiwan. This means that the PLAAF’s land-
based SAMs can be an important part of the
extended air superiority battle, rather than
just for home airbase defence.
An important target set for the long range
SAMs is the combat support aircraft that
USAF air packages rely upon to succeed.
These combat support aircraft include tanker
aircraft without which the USAF’s shorter-
range aircraft could not join the battle. In
this regard, the small force of new J-20 long-
range stealth fighters being built may have
engaging hostile combat support aircraft as
their primary mission. US sources believe
that the PLAAF may have in service an air-
to-air anti-radiation missile optimised for use
against AEW&C aircraft.
This highlights though that the PLAAF
fighter force lacks a meaningful combat
support aircraft force itself. Only
just entering service is the new high-
performance KJ–500 AEW&C aircraft, first
of a planned force of about 15. The air-to-
air refuelling fleet similarly remains small
and immature. Several tankers have been
purchased from the Ukraine and Russia but
delivery has been problematic. Moreover,
most of the PLAAF’s aircraft are not fitted
with air-to-air refuelling probes; few of
its fighters can use tankers today. In both
AEW&C and aerial tanking, the PLAAF still
has some way to go.
In this regard, in early development is a
large AEW&C UAV. The US considers the
Divine Eagle UAV carries seven radars,
including five AESAs, to detect and track
stealth aircraft like USAF’s B–2 bomber and
F–35 fighter. Its purported stealth features
and 25km flight ceiling may make shooting
down difficult.
The PLAAF has an impressive and large
fighter force. Used in conjunction with
massed ballistic and cruise missiles attacks
and long-range SAMs, the fighter force in
many situations would be able to gain air
superiority in accordance with declared
strategic requirements.
This seems true out to about 1000km
from the Chinese coast but going further,
especially as far as Guam some 3000km
away, appears much more difficult. For this,
the PLAAF would need to develop a large
and competent force of combat support
aircraft especially of AEW&C assets and
aerial tanking aircraft. Even so, today, just
twenty years after beginning its fighter
force expansion, the PLAAF has a force few
worldwide can match.
Dr. Peter Layton is a Visiting Fellow at the
Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University.