**peninsula neg**

acp aff
strat
 notes
need terror da links, a counterplan (maybe courts or standing), alt causes to acp, LIE CP, watch out
because they’ll say theyre the nsa
multiplank cp
 1nc – cp
This solves adv 2
Dunn

II. Implementation

The debate over the proper role of a national security lawyer is a contentious one with passionate
advocates on both sides. It is a debate that easily dissolves into the academic and esoteric, but it must
translate into the practical and pragmatic or be resigned to echo in irrelevance. The need for relevance
is daunting whenever a resolution must be firm enough to withstand dual and often opposing pressures,
yet flexible enough to apply to unique challenges. The factors discussed above must be internalized and
applied by the individuals entrusted with national security duties. The following list, however, contains
aspects of the discussion that may be implemented either institutionally or legislatively to assist legal
counsel in the national security context.

• Deliberation. Legal counsel must be allowed and required to deliberate with peers within one’s agency
and with lawyers of other government agencies. In crisis situations that require legal counsel, agencies
should convene non-hierarchical committees of various agency lawyers to deliberate and propose a
consensus-based opinion.186

• Access. Legal counsel must be given the security clearance to access the intelligence reporting,
intelligence sources, and analysis that provide the foundation for assertions of security imperatives.187

• Office of Legal Counsel Memoranda. For an OLC memorandum to have binding legal effect on
Executive employees, it must be reviewed and signed, though not necessarily approved, by lawyers for
all cabinet-level departments.

• Disclosure. A bipartisan Congressional committee should review in closed session all OLC memoranda
issued during the Bush ad- ministration. This committee should make public all memoranda not essential
to current national security needs and issue the equivalent of the 9/11 Commission Report on the
substance and decision-making process that led to regrettable opinions.

• Decriminalization of War. A bipartisan Congressional committee should review all criminal statutes
that cover traditional areas of the laws of war. The committee should propose changes to the laws that
incorporate the elements discussed above.
terror da
 links
Surveillance of attorney-client comms is key to stop terror – and their authors are exaggerating
Fein 1 (Bruce, JD from Harvard Law, specializes in constitutional and international law, “Privilege bows
to danger”, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2001/nov/13/20011113-031103-3101r/?page=all)

That maxim is time-honored in Anglo-American jurisprudence So why are . the American Civil Liberties Union, the criminal defense bar, and Sen. Patrick
Leahy , Vermont Democrat, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, flailing Attorney General John Ashcroft's decision last week to monitor
selectively federal detainee-lawyer communications to forestall terrorist crimes The decision has ?

been hyperbolically denounced as "terrifying ," an "abomination," and the destruction of the Sixth Amendment "

right to have a lawyer." But the polemics seem unpersuasive The monitoring regime is measured It applies to . .

convicted criminals and other federal detainees whom the a ttorney g eneral reasonably suspects may use "

communications with attorneys or their agents to facilitate acts of terrorism ." Inmates and their attorneys will be notified of the government's

attorney-client
listening activities, and a so-called "Chinese Wall" will be erected between monitoring teams and federal prosecutors and investigators. The wall will be unbreachable without a court order. Moreover, privileged

communications that extend to past but not prospective crimes will be discarded. Apart from In sum, "

disclosures necessary to thwart an imminent act of violence or terrorism , any disclosures to investigators or prosecutors must
be approved by a federal judge ." At present, the Justice Department is monitoring approximately 10 inmates. Anemic thunderbolts have been hurled by Mr. Ashcroft's detractors. All law is a matter of degree, as soon as it is civilized.

The attorney-client privilege is no exception. It cannot be exploited to plot or to facilitate future crimes , whether terrorist or

otherwise. For instance, advice given to facilitate client perjury at trial is unprivileged. Ditto when attorney-client communications, as under the Justice Department's monitoring scheme, may promote terrorist crimes. In the latter case, the government's interest in interception as at its

zenith. The lives of thousands may be at stake and thwarting a terrorist crime is invariably preferable , to prosecutions

after the carnage. The monitoring is no covert or sneaky attempt to entrap the innocent or to frighten like the Gestapo. Both the inmate and the attorney are informed of the government's ear. To the

extent such an alert blunts or forestalls terrorist crimes, who can complain? And the authentic attorney-client privilege remains unimpaired. Communications pertinent to defending

against past crimes will be unshared with investigators and prosecutors, and discarded. In other words, the inmate and his attorney can discuss without fear the strengths and weaknesses of the government's case, including defense strategy and tactics. The critics'
"chilling effect" fretting is thus imaginary .

Terrorists will entrap their lawyers into plots – surveillance is necessary

Sales 15 (Nathan, Associate Professor of Law at Syracuse University College of Law, teaches and and
writes in the fields of national security law and counterterrorism law, letter to French surveillance
authorities about their new surveillance bill, http://insct.syr.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/Sales_France_surveillance_legislation_analysis_0715.pdf)

U.S. law also has long regarded the attorney-client privilege as a fundamental element of the legal system .
According to the Supreme Court, “[t]he attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the common law.” Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449
U.S. 383, 389 (1981). The purpose of the privilege is to “encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients,” id., which would not be possible if government officials

or other outsiders were listening in. The privilege “thereby promote[s] broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.” Id. At the same time ,
there is a risk that criminals might abuse the attorney-client privilege by enlisting their lawyers in their
unlawful schemes. In 2000, Omar Abdel Rahman—a cleric who was convicted of masterminding the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing and a number of other terrorist plots — used his lawyer to smuggle messages out of
jail to extremists in Egypt urging them to repudiate a ceasefire agreement and resume a campaign of violence. United States v. Stewart, 686 F.3d 156, 161-63 (2d Cir.
2012).
That surveillance deters terrorism – otherwise attorneys will be used to funnel info to terrorists for
future attacks
DOJ 1 (Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, “National Security; Prevention of Acts of Violence and
Terrorism”, Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 211 / Wednesday, October 31, 2001)

Monitoring of Communications With Attorneys To Deter Acts of Terrorism In general, the Bureau’s existing regulations relating
to special mail (§§ 540.18, 540.19), visits (§ 540.48), and telephone calls (§ 540.103) contemplate that communications between an inmate and his or her attorney are not subject to the usual

rules for monitoring of inmate communications. In specific instances, however, based on information from federal law enforcement or intelligence agencies, the Bureau may
have substantial reason to believe that certain inmates who have been involved in terrorist activities
will pass messages through their attorneys (or the attorney’s legal assistant or an interpreter) to individuals on the outside
for the purpose of continuing terrorist activities .
 at: lawyers will encrypt

Their ev concedes that the NSA can beat encryption, so lawyers don’t want it
1ac HRW 14 – Human Rights Watch, in Association with the American Civil Liberties Union (With Liberty
to Monitor All How Large-Scale US Surveillance is Harming Journalism, Law, and American Democracy,
July 2014, ISSN: 978-1-62313-1814) RMT

Not all of the attorneys we spoke with trust encryption. One noted that it can draw the government’s
attention to one’s communications but may slow down attempts to understand the content.342
Another suggested that before the Snowden leaks, he might have considered technological solutions to
the challenge of protecting communications.343 He has even used encrypted phone calls in the past,
which at the time “seemed over the top.”344 But now he is skeptical that such tools would even
work. “Post-Snowden, I think we have to assume there’s no encryption the NSA can’t beat ,” he
argued, adding, “I don’t want a false sense of security .”345
 at: crime-fraud exception
The crime-fraud exception is way too narrow to allow for prospective counterterror – the whole point
is that we need surveillance BEFORE we have suspicion, and the crime-fraud exception requires
CONCRETE EVIDENCE to be presented to a judge for a warrant – if we can’t surveil them, we don’t
have that evidence!
Court of Appeals of Ohio 11 (EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA, JOURNAL ENTRY
AND OPINION No. 95143, SUTTON ET AL., APPELLEES, v. STEVENS PAINTON CORPORATION ET AL.,
APPELLANTS., https://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/8/2011/2011-ohio-841.pdf)

{¶ 20} “A party invoking the crime-fraud exception must demonstrate that there is a factual basis for a

showing of probable cause to believe that a crime or fraud has been committed and that the communications
were in furtherance of the crime or fraud . * * * The mere fact that communications may be related to
a crime is insufficient to overcome the attorney-client privilege .” State ex rel. Nix at 384.
intel adv
 topline
their dunn ev is about government lawyers and OLC staff – they’re not the ones being targeted and
won’t stop giving advice because it’s their JOB – think about it – if a government lawyer was going to
tell the military NOT TO INVADE, they wouldn’t care whether they were surveilled or not because that
info would be presented inevitably! the card’s also not at all about surveillance

Zero internal link – their ev cites mess-ups in foreign policy like the FBI before 9/11 and the DOJ’s
torture memos but both of those happened before surveillance was revealed
 1nc impact d – law of war
No impact to law of war – only a risk it hurts the US
Brooks ’13 – Prof of Law @ Georgetown University Law Center

Rosa Brooks, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Bernard L. Schwartz Senior Fellow,
New America Foundation, 4/23/13, The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of Targeted
Killing, http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/04-23-13BrooksTestimony.pdf
I have also suggested that we face a problem that is deeper still: we are attempting to apply old law to novel situations. As I noted earlier, the
law of war evolved in response to traditional armed conflicts, and cannot be easily applied to relations between states and geographically
diffuse non - state terrorist organizations. When we try to apply the law of war to modern terrorist threats, we
encounter numerous translation problems. Most disturbingly, it becomes nearly impossible to make a principled
decision about when the law of war is applicable in the first place, and when it is not . As I noted earlier, l
aw is almost always out of date: legal rules are made based on the conditions and technologies existing at the time, and as societies and
technologies change, law increasingly becomes an exercise in jamming square pegs into round holes . Up to a
point, this works, but eventually, that process begins to do damage to existing law : it gets stretched out of
shape, or broken. At that point, we need to update our laws and practices before too much damage is done .
 2nc impact d – law of war
No risk to warfighting impact – cases don’t get brought up
Marguiles ‘12

Peter, Professor of Law, Roger Williams University, “Reforming Lawyers into Irrelevance?: Reconciling
Crisis and Constraint at the Office of Legal Counsel”

Concerns about procedural justice and paralysis would also doom a Bivens lawsuit for damages162 as a
method of accountability . Plaintiffs face multiple obstacles in such lawsuits, including persuading the courts
to recognize such a remedy absent congressional authorization ,163 and dealing with official immunities
that thwart relief.164 Each problem is formidable for plaintiffs hoping to prevail in a lawsuit against OLC lawyers. In some cases
involving national security, courts have declined to permit suits for damages, citing the chilling effect on
officials and the risk of disclosing sensitive information as “factors counseling hesitation.”165 While there are
strong arguments that precluding a lawsuit at this stage bends the law too far in the direction of impunity, courts in national security cases have
often discounted this countervailing factor.166 In addition, official immunity interposes a significant obstacle to recovery. Officials
have
qualified immunity, which courts can breach only if an official acts in disregard of clearly settled law .167
Official immunities protect public servants from the unfairness of being surprised by legal developments
that the officials could not have predicted.168 Viewed from an ex ante perspective, immunities allow officials to make difficult decisions
without paralyzing worries about the effects of hindsight bias.169 The lawsuit by former detainee Jose Padilla170 against Yoo is
vulnerable on each of these counts. While categorical preclusion of Bivens suits can send an unhealthy signal to officials and
encourage official overreaching, an appeals court might view the need for secrecy in the provision of legal advice
as justifying such a step.171 In any case, the Padilla suit will also flounder on the grounds of official
immunity. A district court found that the suit could go forward.172 However, the decision failed to
adequately explain how Padilla overcame Yoo’s qualified immunity, in light of the court’s
acknowledgement that “the legal framework relating to [Padilla’s detention] . . . was developing at the
time of the conduct alleged in the complaint.”173 The combination of questions about the availability of
a cause of action and the scope of immunity dims the prospects for a lawsuit against Yoo.174
 1nc impact d – aggression
no risk of random excessive aggression
Kennedy 13 (Brandon, graduate of the University of Southern California Gould School of Law, 1/25, "The
Hijacking of Foreign Policy Decision Making: Groupthink and Presidential Power in the Post-9/11 World",
Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal,
http://mylaw2.usc.edu/why/students/orgs/ilj/assets/docs/21-3%20Kennedy.pdf)

The Obama team adopted several decision-making practices that helped counter the groupthink that
had plagued the Bush team. These practices produced a moderate level of cohesiveness, greatly limited structural organizational
faults, and reduced threats that could give rise to a provocative situational context. 1. Building Moderate Cohesiveness “Hillary
and I were friends before this started . . . . We had this very vituperative campaign, but, you know, she is smart and we ought to be able to do
something with her.”225 After his election, Obama
sought out people to fill the Cabinet and White House staff positions
based on each member’s experience and the different contributions they could bring to the table. While
political ideology was one factor to consider, it was not elevated above other qualities. Above all, Obama seemed
to want to succeed by considering all possible options, and the only way to do that was by including people who
thought differently from him and who would challenge his thinking.226 Obama thus set about to build a team that would work
well together, but whose members would also engage in critical thinking and evaluate all possible options when making decisions. Obama
sought to strike this balance by including both friends and political allies, such as David Axelrod and Rahm Emanuel, and
also outsiders and even former rivals .227 For example, in a somewhat controversial move, Obama chose to keep Bush’s Secretary of
Defense, Robert Gates, citing the importance of continuity and expertise.228 Obama also wished to heal the wounds inflicted during a bitter
nomination campaign and appoint a strong Secretary of State, so he offered Hillary Clinton the post.229 For the position of CIA Director, Obama
chose Leon Panetta, who, as an outsider, would help improve the Agency’s image, which had been severely tarnished due to controversial pre-
Iraq War intelligence, interrogation techniques, and its domestic spying program.230 Thus, the manner in which Obama built his decision-

making group laid the foundation for avoiding groupthink. 2. Roles of Critical Evaluator Assigned to Each Member Joe, I want
you to say exactly what you think. And I want you to ask the toughest questions you can think of. And the reason is . . . because I think the
American people . . . and our troops are best served by a vigorous debate on these kinds of life-or-death issues.231 Obama used these words to
encourage Vice President Joe Biden to be an aggressive contrarian in national security team meetings regarding strategy for Afghanistan.232
And, at a September 13, 2009, national security meeting, Obama
told his team “We need to come to this with a spirit of
challenging our assumptions . . . . Don’t bite your tongue. Everybody needs to say what’s on their mind .”233 In
statements such as these, Obama sought to ensure that each member of his team contributed independently

and critically to any decision making. 3. Leader’s Impartiality at the Outset When assessing the Afghanistan War, Obama told
his national security team, “We have no good options here,”234 therefore establishing that he would not accept
only a single solution from only an individual high-ranking member. 235 Obama preferred to have a full
range of options comprehensively discussed in order for him to remain impartial.236 In making decisions, Obama critically
questioned all proposals and did not state his preference for a specific policy until the group had fully explored all options.237 4.
Consultation with Trusted Outsiders “Mr. President, I shared the [troop surge] option with the chiefs before I came over.”
General James Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, uttered these words to Obama at a national security meeting on
November 23, 2009.238 Throughout the Afghanistan strategy review of 2009, trusted associates in each member’s unit
of the executive branch consultedeach other and reported back to the primary decision-making national
security team.239 As Janis postulates, this seems to have helped the group avoid groupthink because they were
consistently seeking opinions from outside of the decision-making group. 5. Consultation with Outside Experts “I know you
don’t want to work full-time in government,” Obama told Bruce Riedel, a national security expert at the Brookings Institution, “but here’s a
proposition. Will you come into government for 60 days, work in the [National Security Council], do a strategic review of Afghanistan and
Pakistan?”240 This kind of consultation with non-governmental experts took place as well. For example, just as a
troubled corporation might hire outside consultants, General Stanley McChrystal’s Afghanistan strategy review included
bringing outside experts into a war zone to assess the situation.241 The idea behind this review team came in part from
General David Petraeus’s 2007 playbook for Iraq (when the largely successful troop surge took place).242 The review team consisted
of “an experienced group of analysts who were willing to challenge the assumptions of high-ranking
generals.”243 6. “Second Chance” Meeting for Expression of Doubts “Why are we having another meeting about this? I thought
this was finished Wednesday. Why do we keep having these meetings after we have all agreed?”244 Although expressing slight exasperation,
Obama proceeded with a “last chance” meeting before deciding to send 30,000 additional troops to
Afghanistan.245 This meeting served as a final opportunity for group members (especially Pentagon officials, in this instance)
to share residual doubts and to rethink the entire issue before making a definitive choice.246
 1nc – war powers turn
Clarifying restraints on warmaking eviscerates presidential flex – causes rogue state prolif
Yoo 12 (John Yoo, Emanuel Heller Professor of Law at the University of California-Berkeley, Visiting
Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, former official in the Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S.
Department of Justice, holds a J.D. from Yale Law School, 2012, “War Powers Belong to the President,”
ABA Journal—a publication of the American Bar Association, February 1 st, Available Online at
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/war_powers_belong_to_the_president)

Our Constitution has succeeded because it favors swift presidential action in war, later checked by Congress’ funding
power. If a president continues to wage war without congressional authorization, as in Libya, Kosovo or Korea, it is only because Congress has chosen not to exercise its easy check. We should

not confuse a desire to escape political responsibility for a defect in the Constitution. A radical change in the system for making war might appease critics
of presidential power. But it could also seriously threaten American national security . In order to forestall another
9/11 attack, or to take advantage of a window of opportunity to strike terrorists or rogue nations , the
executive branch needs flexibility . It is not hard to think of situations where congressional consent
cannot be obtained in time to act . Time for congressional deliberation, which leads only to passivity
and isolation and not smarter decisions, will come at the price of speed and secrecy . The Constitution
creates a presidency that can respond forcefully to prevent serious threats to our national security.
Presidents can take the initiative and Congress can use its funding power to check them. Instead of
demanding a legalistic process to begin war, the framers left war to politics. As we confront the new
challenges of terrorism, rogue nations and WMD proliferation , now is not the time to introduce
sweeping, untested changes in the way we make war.

Extinction
Utgoff 2 — Victor A. Utgoff, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the
Institute for Defense Analyses and senior member of the National Security Council Staff, 2002
(“Proliferation, Missile Defence And American Ambitions,” Survival, Volume 44, Number 2, June,
Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via EBSCOhost Electronic Journals Service, p. 87-90)

In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons , and
that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction
possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a
world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing
nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but
every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations .
 at: prolif good
Causes aggression – empirics
Kroenig 12 (Matthew Kroenig, associate professor of government @ Georgetown, Stanton Nuclear
Security Fellow for the Council on Foreign Relations, “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It
Have A Future,” 5-26-12, Prepared for the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center,
http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1182&tid=30)

Regional instability: The spread of nuclear weapons also emboldens nuclear powers contributing to regional
instability. States that lack nuclear weapons need to fear direct military attack from other states, but
states with nuclear weapons can be confident that they can deter an intentional military attack , giving
them an incentive to be more aggressive in the conduct of their foreign policy. In this way, nuclear weapons
provide a shield under which states can feel free to engage in lower-level aggression . Indeed, international
relations theories about the “stability-instability paradox” maintain that stability at the nuclear level contributes to
conventional instability. [64] Historically, we have seen that the spread of nuclear weapons has emboldened their possessors and
contributed to regional instability. Recent scholarly analyses have demonstrated that , after controlling for other relevant
factors, nuclear-weapon states are more likely to engage in conflict than nonnuclear-weapon states and
that this aggressiveness is more pronounced in new nuclear states that have less experience with
nuclear diplomacy. [65] Similarly, research on internal decision-making in Pakistan reveals that Pakistani
foreign policymakers may have been emboldened by the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which encouraged
them to initiate militarized disputes against India. [66] Currently, Iran restrains its foreign policy because it fears a major
military retaliation from the United States or Israel, but with nuclear weapons it could feel free to push
harder. A nuclear-armed Iran would likely step up support to terrorist and proxy groups and engage in more aggressive coercive diplomacy.
With a nuclear-armed Iran increasingly throwing its weight around in the region, we could witness an even more crisis prone Middle East. And
in a poly-nuclear Middle East with Israel, Iran, and, in the future, possibly other states, armed with nuclear weapons, any one of those crises
could result in a catastrophic nuclear exchange. Nuclear proliferation can also lead to regional instability due to preventive strikes against
nuclear programs. States often conduct preventive military strikes to prevent adversaries from acquiring nuclear weapons. Historically, the
United States attacked German nuclear facilities during World War II, Israel bombed a nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981, Iraq bombed Iran’s
Bushehr reactors in the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s and Iran returned the favor against an Iraqi nuclear plant, a U.S.-led international coalition
destroyed Iraq’s nuclear infrastructure in the first Gulf War in 1991, and Israel bombed a Syrian nuclear reactor in 2007. These
strikes
have not led to extensive conflagrations in the past, but we might not be so lucky in the future. At the time
of writing in 2012, the United States and Israel were polishing military plans to attack Iran’s nuclear program and some experts maintain that
such a strike could very well lead to a wider war in the Middle East.
 at: bioweap shift
Bio-prolif happening now
Fraser 08 (Jay Fraser, President of Tracer Detection Technology Corp., keynote speaker at the Fall 2008
meeting of the Federal Laboratory Consortium, “Inevitability of a WMD Attack,” Center for Threat
Awareness, 12-7-08, http://threatswatch.org/rapidrecon/2008/12/inevitability-of-a-wmd-attack/)

Earlier this week Vice President elect Joseph Biden was briefed on thejust released study by the Commission on the
Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism that a WMD attack was likely sooner than later and that
the supposed “margin of safety” was narrowing. The “top line” of the report is that while terrorist groups (with al
Qaeda still being the prime concern and suspect) lacked the technical capabilities to actually make the weapon, the
ability to find cooperating scientists could enable such an attack is increasing . Further, the Commission warned
that all roads lead to Pakistan when it comes to weaponizing a WMD. Specifically, the Mumbai attacks last week, of necessity, raise the
specter of an attack being planned and launched from inside of Pakistan, and more specifically, from the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas. In a sense, the release of this new government report, is new, but it is not necessarily news. The warnings about bio-
terrorism have been a part of a clarion call since November 3, 2003 when an unclassified CIA Report discussed the risks
inherent in the super-accelerated biotechnology sector. The earlier report, “The Darker Bioweapons Future” went just so
far. If told us that the fear was the proliferation of weapons, of labs going research and of the growing number of people engaged in the science
of developing new “bugs” so that countermeasures could be developed. They talked about the development of elixirs of combinations of a mild
pathogen with its antidote (a virulent mixture); or of designer pathogens designed to challenge existing antidotes to force the development of
new ones; or most scary, a stealth virus that could lie dormant until triggered. What “The Darker Bioweapons Future” did not
cover was the possibility of scientists becoming turncoats and offering weapons skills and capabilities to
terrorists, and that the origin of the threat might be in Pakistan. Frankly, it took the passage of a few years and some history to conclude
that the threat might be real, and that the enemy might lie in the guise of a lab coat. In 2003, no one really considered the possibility that a
scientist might “go to the dark side.” Some of the highlights and recommendations of the report to take away from the report were: - Nuclear
and biological weapons are proliferating: Yes, indeed, they are. The question of course relates to their
availability to access of terrorists organizations to them . The statement that as proliferation continues (that more countries
come into possession) the more likely a nefarious end occurs, is obviously true. - I think correctly, although disturbingly, every terrorist act
anywhere in the world brings us closer to the moment that an attack with a WMD occurs is unfortunately true. It is in this case, inevitable.
While tactics do merge and evolve and morph, the reality is that with every incident, the “terrorists” are emboldened by successful attack and
will seek to expand. - The
conclusion that a terrorist organization would obtain a biological as opposed to a
nuclear or radiological capability is likely, especially considering the proliferation of biological research
and testing laboratories worldwide. As a side note, regardless of where the National Bio and Agro Defense Facility is located
(recent announcements were that the NBAF will be located in Kansas, rather than San Antonio with some people concerned that the decision
has more to do with politics than actual capability), the existence of new biological research capabilities logically increase the possibility that a
scientist could be lured by money or other to “cross the line.” As noted by the Report, even
though the Biological Weapons
Conventions Treaty was signed in 1972, a number of countries blatantly violate it, and still there are
countries like Egypt, Israel and Syria that never signed it. Further it is feared the Russia, China, Iran and North Korea may
be secretly pursuing programs. Even though it is acknowledged that terrorist organizations like al Qaeda likely lack the technical skills to
weaponize a biological agent (like anthrax), the fear is real that as more countries violate or circumvent the BWC, or as more companies in the
United States and elsewhere work with such pathogens, that a rogue scientist, for whatever motivation, might lead to combining with a
terrorist organization. "The
United States should be less concerned that terrorists will become biologists and
far more concerned that biologists will become terrorists ," the report states. Thus, as with other scientific skills and
perhaps not unlike the beginning of the proliferation of the nuclear arms race and the race into space, the acquisition of talent can propel a
country or now, a terrorist organization from being a non-player into a power. The potential scenarios are as endless as they are believable. The
question is plausibility. No one should doubt the goal of al Qaeda and its followers to eventually gain the ability to mount a WMD attack on the
West. The question is how it will acquire the capabilities and whether through policy and actions, those countries now in possession of the tools
of a new holocaust will protect the rest of the world. Until now, the nonproliferation efforts have focused on nuclear weapons. One of the shirts
needed it would appear is an increased diligence in the vetting process of hiring scientists at facilities that handles biological toxins. The
question then extends to research universities. Who gets to work at the myriad BSL3 and BSL4 laboratories around the country?
 2nc – li
Key to check multiple existential threats
Li 09 – Zheyao, Candidate, Georgetown University Law Center; B.A., Political Science and History, Yale
University, 2009 (“War Powers for the Fourth Generation: Constitutional Interpretation in the Age of
Asymmetric Warfare,” Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy (Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 373) Available Online
to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)

IV. WAR POWERS IN THE FOURTH GENERATION OF WARFARE A. The Emergence of Non-State Actors Even as the quantity
of nation-states in the world has increased dramatically since the end of World War II, the
institution of the nation-state has
been in decline over the past few decades. Much of this decline is the direct result of the waning of major
interstate war, which primarily resulted from the introduction of nuclear weapons. 122 The proliferation of
nuclear weapons, and their immense capacity for absolute destruction, has ensured that conventional
wars remain limited in scope and duration. Hence, "both the size of the armed forces and the quantity of weapons at their

disposal has declined quite sharply" since 1945.123 At the same time, concurrent with the decline of the nation-state in the
second half of the twentieth century, non-state actors have increasingly been willing and able to use
force to advance their causes. In contrast to nation-states, who adhere to the Clausewitzian distinction between the ends of policy
and the means of war to achieve those ends, non-state actors do not necessarily fight as a mere means of advancing

any coherent policy. Rather, they see their fight as a life-and-death struggle , wherein the ordinary
terminology of war as an instrument of policy breaks down because of this blending of means and
ends. 124 It is the existential nature of this struggle and the disappearance of the Clausewitzian distinction between war
and policy that has given rise to a new generation of warfare. The concept of fourth-generational warfare was first
articulated in an influential article in the Marine Corps Gazette in 1989, which has proven highly prescient. In describing what they saw as the
modem trend toward a new phase of warfighting, the authors argued that: In broad terms, fourth generation warfare seems likely to be widely
dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to
the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The
distinction between "civilian" and "military" may disappear.
Actions will occur concurrently throughout all participants' depth, including their society as a cultural,
not just a physical, entity. Major military facilities, such as airfields, fixed communications sites, and
large headquarters will become rarities because of their vulnerability; the same may be true of civilian
equivalents, such as seats of government, power plants, and industrial sites (including knowledge as well as
manufacturing industries). 125 It is precisely this blurring of peace and war and the demise of traditionally definable battlefields that provides
the impetus for the formulation of a new theory of war powers. As evidenced by Part M, supra, the
constitutional allocation of war
powers, and the Framers' commitment of the war power to two co-equal branches, was not designed to cope with the
current international system, one that is characterized by the persistent machinations of international
terrorist organizations , the rise of multilateral alliances , the emergence of rogue states , and the
potentially wide proliferation of easily deployable weapons of mass destruction , nuclear and
otherwise. B. The Framers' World vs. Today's World The Framers crafted the Constitution, and the people ratified it, in a time when
everyone understood that the state controlled both the raising of armies and their use. Today, however, the threat of terrorism is
bringing an end to the era of the nation-state's legal monopoly on violence, and the kind of war that
existed before-based on a clear division between government, armed forces, and the people-is on the
decline. 126 As states are caught between their decreasing ability to fight each other due to the existence of nuclear weapons and the
increasing threat from non-state actors, it is clear that the Westphalian system of nation-states that informed the
Framers' allocation of war powers is no longer the order of the day. 127 As seen in Part III, supra, the rise of the

modem nation-state occurred as a result of its military effectiveness and ability to defend its citizens. If nation-states such as the
United States are unable to adapt to the changing circumstances of fourth-generational warfare -that is, if
they are unable to adequately defend against low-intensity conflict conducted by non-state actors- "then clearly [the modem state]
does not have a future in front of it.' 128 The challenge in formulating a new theory of war powers for fourth generational
warfare that remains legally justifiable lies in the difficulty of adapting to changed circumstances while remaining faithful to the constitutional
text and the original meaning. 29 To that end, it is crucial to remember that the Framers crafted the Constitution in the context of the
Westphalian system of nation-states. The three centuries following the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 witnessed an international system
characterized by wars, which, "through the efforts of governments, assumed a more regular, interconnected character."' 130 That period saw
the rise of an independent military class and the stabilization of military institutions. Consequently, "warfare became more regular, better
organized, and more attuned to the purpose of war-that is, to its political objective."'1 3 ' That era is now over. Today, the stability of the long-
existing Westphalian international order has been greatly eroded in recent years with the advent of international terrorist organizations, which
care nothing for the traditional norms of the laws of war. This
new global environment exposes the limitations inherent
in the interpretational methods of originalism and textualism and necessitates the adoption of a new
method of constitutional interpretation. While one must always be aware of the text of the Constitution and the original
understanding of that text, that very awareness identifies the extent to which fourth-generational warfare epitomizes a phenomenon
unforeseen by the Framers, a problem the constitutional resolution of which must rely on the good judgment of the present generation. 13
Now, to adapt the constitutional warmarking scheme to the new international order characterized by fourth-generational warfare, one must
understand the threat it is being adapted to confront. C. The Jihadist Threat The erosion of the Westphalian and Clausewitzian model of warfare
and the blurring of the distinction between the means of warfare and the ends of policy, which is one characteristic of fourth-generational
warfare, apply to al-Qaeda and other adherents of jihadist ideology who view the United States as an enemy. An excellent analysis of jihadist
ideology and its implications for the rest of the world are presented by Professor Mary Habeck. 133 Professor Habeck identifies the centrality of
the Qur'an, specifically a particular reading of the Qur'an and hadith (traditions about the life of Muhammad), to the jihadist terrorists. 134 The
jihadis believe that the scope of the Qur'an is universal, and "that their interpretation of Islam is also intended for the entire world, which must
be brought to recognize this fact peacefully if possible and through violence if not."' 135 Along these lines, the jihadis view the
United States and her allies as among the greatest enemies of Islam : they believe "that every element
of modern Western liberalism is flawed, wrong, and evil " because the basis of liberalism is secularism.
136 The jihadis emphasize the superiority of Islam to all other religions, and they believe that "God does
not want differing belief systems to coexist."' 37 For this reason, jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda "recognize
that the West will not submit without a fight and believe in fact that the Christians, Jews, and liberals
have united against Islam in a war that will end in the complete destruction of the unbelievers.' 138 Thus,
the adherents of this jihadist ideology , be it al-Qaeda or other groups, will continue to target the United States
until she is destroyed. Their ideology demands it. 139 To effectively combat terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, it is
necessary to understand not only how they think, but also how they operate. Al-Qaeda is a transnational organization capable of
simultaneously managing multiple operations all over the world."14 It is both centralized and decentralized: al-Qaeda is centralized in the sense
that Osama bin Laden is the unquestioned leader, but it is decentralized in that its operations are carried out locally, by distinct cells."4 AI-
Qaeda benefits immensely from this arrangement because it can exercise direct control over high-probability operations, while maintaining a
distance from low-probability attacks, only taking the credit for those that succeed. The local terrorist cells benefit by gaining access to al-
Qaeda's "worldwide network of assets, people, and expertise."' 42 Post-September 11 events have highlighted al-Qaeda's resilience. Even as
the United States and her allies fought back, inflicting heavy casualties on al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and destroying dozens of cells worldwide,
"al-Qaeda's networked nature allowed it to absorb the damage and remain a threat." 14 3 This is a far cry from earlier generations of warfare,
where the decimation of the enemy's military forces would generally bring an end to the conflict. D. The Need for Rapid Reaction and Expanded
Presidential War Power By now it should be clear just how different this conflict against the extremist terrorists is from the type of warfare that
occupied the minds of the Framers at the time of the Founding. Rather than maintaining the geographical and political isolation desired by the
Framers for the new country, today's United States is an international power targeted by individuals and groups that will not rest until seeing
her demise. The
Global War on Terrorism is not truly a war within the Framers' eighteenth-century
conception of the term, and the normal constitutional provisions regulating the division of war powers
between Congress and the President do not apply . Instead, this "war" is a struggle for survival and dominance against
forces that threaten to destroy the United States and her allies, and the fourth-generational nature of the conflict, highlighted by an
indiscernible distinction between wartime and peacetime, necessitates an evolution of America's traditional
constitutional warmaking scheme. As first illustrated by the military strategist Colonel John Boyd, constitutional decision-making in
the realm of war powers in the fourth generation should consider the implications of the OODA Loop: Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act. 44 In
the era of fourth-generational warfare, quick reactions, proceeding through the OODA Loop rapidly, and disrupting the enemy's OODA loop are

the keys to victory. "In order to win," Colonel Boyd suggested, "we should operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than our
adversaries." 145 In the words of Professor Creveld, "[b]oth organizationally and in terms of the equipment at their disposal, the armed
forces of the world will have to adjust themselves to this situation by changing their doctrine, doing away with much of their heavy equipment
and becoming more like police."1 46 Unfortunately, the existing constitutional understanding, which diffuses war
power between two branches of government, necessarily (by the Framers' design) slows down decision-
making. In circumstances where war is undesirable (which is, admittedly, most of the time, especially against other nation-
states), the deliberativeness of the existing decision-making process is a positive attribute. In America's current
situation, however, in the midst of the conflict with al-Qaeda and other international terrorist organizations, the existing process of

constitutional decision-making in warfare may prove a fatal hindrance to achieving the initiative
necessary for victory. As a slow-acting, deliberative body, Congress does not have the ability to adequately deal
with fast-emerging situations in fourth-generational warfare. Thus, in order to combat transnational
threats such as al-Qaeda, the executive branch must have the ability to operate by taking offensive
military action even without congressional authorization, because only the executive branch is capable
of the swift decision-making and action necessary to prevail in fourth-generational conflicts against
fourth generational opponents.
 1nc – drones turn
They align US policy with global laws of war – that ends TK – extinction
Louis Rene Beres 11, Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue, 2011, “After Osama
bin Laden: Assassination, Terrorism, War, and International Law,” Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law, 44 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 93

Even after the U.S. assassination of Osama bin Laden,we are still left with the problem of demonstrating that assassination can be
construed, at least under certain very limited circumstances, as an appropriate instance of anticipatory self-
defense. Arguably, the enhanced permissibility of anticipatory self-defense that follows generally from the growing
destructiveness of current weapons technologies in rogue hands may be paralleled by the enhanced
permissibility of assassination as a particular strategy of preemption. Indeed, where assassination as anticipatory
self-defense may actually prevent a nuclear or other highly destructive form of warfare , reasonableness
dictates that it could represent distinctly, even especially, law-enforcing behavior. For this to be the case, a number of particular conditions
would need to be satisfied. First, the assassination itself would have to be limited to the greatest extent possible to those authoritative persons in the prospective attacking state. Second, the
assassination would have to conform to all of the settled rules of warfare as they concern discrimination, proportionality, and military
necessity. Third, the assassination would need to follow intelligence assessments that point , beyond a reasonable doubt, to

preparations for unconventional or other forms of highly destructive warfare within the intended victim's state. Fourth, the
assassination would need to be founded upon carefully calculated judgments that it would , in fact, prevent
the intended aggression, and that it would do so with substantially less harm [*114] to civilian populations than would all
of the alternative forms of anticipatory self-defense . Such an argument may appear manipulative and
dangerous; permitting states to engage in what is normally illegal behavior under the convenient pretext
of anticipatory self-defense. Yet, any blanket prohibition of assassination under international law could
produce even greater harm , compelling threatened states to resort to large-scale warfare that could
otherwise be avoided. Although it would surely be the best of all possible worlds if international legal norms could
always be upheld without resort to assassination as anticipatory self-defense, the persisting dynamics of a decentralized
system of international law may sometimes still require extraordinary methods of law-enforcement . n71 Let us
suppose, for example, that a particular state determines that another state is planning a nuclear or chemical surprise attack upon its
population centers. We may suppose, also, that carefully constructed intelligence assessments reveal that the assassination of selected key figures (or, perhaps, just one leadership figure) could prevent such
an attack altogether. Balancing the expected harms of the principal alternative courses of action (assassination/no surprise attack v. no assassination/surprise attack), the selection of preemptive

assassination could prove reasonable, life-saving, and cost-effective . What of another, more common form of anticipatory self-defense?
Might a conventional military strike against the prospective attacker's nuclear, biological or chemical weapons
launchers and/or storage sites prove even more reasonable and cost-effective? A persuasive answer inevitably depends upon
the particular tactical and strategic circumstances of the moment, and on the precise way in which these particular circumstances are configured. But it is
entirely conceivable that conventional military forms of preemption would generate tangibly greater harms
than assassination, and possibly with no greater defensive benefit . This suggests that assassination should not be
dismissed out of hand in all circumstances as a permissible form of anticipatory self-defense under
international law. [*115] What of those circumstances in which the threat to particular states would not involve higher-order (WMD) n72 military attacks? Could assassination also represent a permissible form
of anticipatory self-defense under these circumstances? Subject to the above-stated conditions, the answer might still be "yes." The threat of chemical, biological or nuclear attack may

surely enhance the legality of assassination as preemption , but it is by no means an essential

precondition. A conventional military attack might still , after all, be enormously, even existentially, destructive .
n73 Moreover, it could be followed, in certain circumstances, by unconventional attacks.
regs adv
 1nc neolib turns
The impact is backwards --- neolib’s increased every measure of progress and the world is getting
better
Yevgeniy Feyman 14, Manhattan Institute Fellow, "The Golden Age Is Now", May 23, www.city-
journal.org/2014/bc0523yf.html
Bjørn Lomborg is well-known as a climate “skeptic.” He has frequently voiced concerns that money spent battling climate change could shift scarce resources away
from more urgent global problems, such as malaria and HIV/AIDS. But the most recent book by the self-proclaimed “skeptical environmentalist” does more than just
voice concern; it attempts to evaluate the damage caused by a variety of problems—from climate change to malnutrition to war—and project future costs related

to these same issues. In How Much Have Global Problems Cost the World ?, Lomborg and a group of economists
conclude that , with a few exceptions, the world is richer, freer, healthier, and smarter than it’s ever been .
These gains have coincided with the near-universal rejection of statism and the flourishing of capitalist
principles. At a time when political figures such as New York City mayor Bill de Blasio and religious leaders such as Pope Francis frequently remind us about the
evils of unfettered capitalism, this is a worthwhile message.¶ The doubling of human life expectancy is one of the most

remarkable achievements of the past century. Consider, Lomborg writes, that “the twentieth century saw life
expectancy rise by about 3 months for every calendar year .” The average child in 1900 could expect to live to just 32 years old;
now that same child should make it to 70. This increase came during a century when worldwide economic output, driven by the spread of capitalism and freedom,
grew by more than 4,000 percent. These gains occurred in developed and developing countries alike; among men and women; and even in a sense among children,
as child mortality plummeted.¶ Why are we living so much longer? Massive improvements in public health certainly
played an important role. The World Health Organization’s global vaccination efforts essentially eradicated smallpox. But this would
have been impossible without the innovative methods of vaccine preservation developed in the private sector by British scientist Leslie Collier. Oral rehydration

therapies and antibiotics have also been instrumental in reducing child mortality. Simply put, technological progress is the key to these
gains —and market economies have liberated, and rewarded, technological innovation.¶ People are not
just living longer, but better—sometimes with government’s help, and sometimes despite it. Even people in the developing
countries of Africa and Latin America are better educated and better fed than ever before. Hundreds of
thousands of children who would have died during previous eras due to malnutrition are alive today.
Here, we can thank massive advancements in agricultural production unleashed by the free market . In
the 1960s, privately
funded agricultural researchers bred new, high-yield strains of corn, wheat, and various
other crops thanks to advances in molecular genetics. Globalization helped spread these technologies to
developing countries, which used them not only to feed their people, but also to become export
powerhouses. This so-called “green revolution” reinforced both the educational progress (properly nourished children tend to learn more) and the life-
expectancy gains (better nutrition leads to better health) of the twentieth century. These children live in a world with fewer armed conflicts, netting what the

authors call a “peace dividend.” Globalization and trade liberalization have surely contributed to this more
peaceful world (on aggregate). An interdependent global economy makes war costly.¶ Of course,
problems remain. As Lomborg points out, most foreign aid likely does little to boost economic welfare, yet hundreds of billions of dollars in “development
assistance” continue to flow every year from developed countries to the developing world. Moreover, climate change is widely projected to intensify in the second
half of the twenty-first century, and will carry with it a significant economic cost. But those familiar with the prior work of the “skeptical environmentalist”
understand that ameliorating these effects over time could prove wasteful. Lomborg notes that the latest research on climate change estimates a net cost of 0.2 to
2 percent of GDP from 2055 to 2080. The same report points out that in 2030, mitigation costs may be as high as 4 percent of GDP. Perhaps directing mitigation
funding to other priorities—curing AIDS for instance—would be a better use of the resources. ¶ Lomborg’s main message? Ignore those pining for the
“good old days.” Thanks to the immense gains of the past century, there has never been a better time
to be alive.
neolib solves environment – property rights
Veer 12 (Pierre-Guy, Independent journalist writing for the Von Mises Institute, 5/2, “Cheer for the Environment, Cheer for Capitalism,”
http://www.mises.ca/posts/blog/cheer-for-the-environment-cheer-for-capitalism/)

How can such a negligence have happened? It’s simple: no one was the legitimate owner
No Ownership, No Responsibility

of the resources (water, air, ground). When a property is state-owned – as was the case under communism – government has
generally little incentive to sustainably exploit it. In communist Europe, governments wanted to
industrialize their country in order , they hoped, to catch up with capitalist economies . Objectives were set, and
they had to be met no matter what. This included the use of brown coal, high in sulfur and that creates
heavy smoke when burned[4], and questionable farming methods, which depleted the soil. This lack of vision can also be seen in the public sector of
capitalist countries. In the US, the Department of Defense creates more dangerous waste than the top five chemical product companies put together. In fact, pollution is such that cleanup
costs are estimated at $20 billion. The same goes for agriculture, where Washington encourages overfarming or even farming not adapted for the environment it’s in[5]. Capitalism, the Green

In order to solve most of the pollution problems, there exists a simple solution: laissez-faire
Solution

capitalism, i.e. make sure property rights and profitability can be applied . The latter helped Eastern
Europe; when communism fell, capitalism made the countries seek profitable – and not just cheap – ways to produce, which
greatly reduced pollution[6]. As for the former, it proved its effectiveness, notably with the Love Canal[7]. Property rights are also thought of
in order to protect some resources, be it fish[8] or endangered species[9]. Why such efficiency? Because an
owner’s self-interest is directed towards the maximum profitability of his piece of land. By containing pollution –
as Hooker Chemicals did with its canal – he keeps away from costly lawsuit for property violation . At the same
time, badly managed pollution can diminish the value of the land , and therefore profits. Any entrepreneur

with a long-term vision – and whose property is safe from arbitrary government decisions – thinks about all that in order to protect his
investment. One isn’t foolish enough to sack one’s property! In conclusion, I have to mention that I agree with environmentalists that it is importance to preserve the environment in
order to protect mother nature and humans. However, I strongly disagree with their means, i.e. government intervention. Considering it very seldom has a long-term vision, it is the worst

thing that can happen. In fact, one could says that most environmental disasters are, directly or indirectly, caused by the State, mainly by a lack of
clear property rights. Were they clearer, they would let each and everyone of us, out of self-interest, protect the environment in a better manner. That way, everyone’s a
winner.
 analytic
zero chance of lawsuits i/l – their impact ev says corporations are getting away with a bunch of bad
stuff and it’s pre-Snowden – means it happens with or without surveillance
the example their impact card gives is BP – there WERE lawsuits against BP, but the plantiffs just
chose to settle
 alt causes
DOJ forced waivers are a huge alt cause
Brown 6 (Lonnie, Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. B.A., Emory
University, 1986; J.D., Vanderbilt Law School, 1989,
http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2404&context=hlr)

"[T]he [corporate] attorney-client privilege is under attack today as never before ." 1 "Privileged information used to
belong to the client; now it apparently belongs to the government ."'2 "[T]he extent of the erosion of privilege
protections and the level of concern about that erosion suggest that the system may be nearing a turning point-a point at which the
continued viability of the privilege is at risk.",3 "The sound you hear coming from the corridors of the Department of Justice is a
requiem marking the death of privilege in corporate criminal investigations." 4 These quotes are representative of the
widespread sentiment within the corporate legal community concerning the perceived increased vigilance of certain
government agencies to obtain voluntary waivers of the attorney-client privilege and work product protection in exchange for
possible prosecutorial or regulatory leniency . Most notably, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") has adopted guidelines that seem to
make waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work product protection a prerequisite for being deemed
"cooperative ," a significant designation that carries with it the prospect for more favorable penal treatment.5 In addition, the United States Sentencing
Commission underscored the potential importance of such waivers by approving an amendment to the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines in 2004 that, under certain circumstances, makes privilege waiver a factor in assessing a corporation's "culpability score," which is used
in determining the appropriate sentencing range. In light of such developments, corporations and their counsel understandably feel great
pressure to abandon the time-honored sanctuary of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine when confronted with a government
investigation. Although prosecutors and other agency officials maintain that waiver is never required or compelled 7 and also dispute
there is a growing body of evidence to the contrary. 9 Moreover, even if the corporate legal community is
claims that it is routinely requested,8

collectively exaggerating the zeal and frequency with which waiver is being urged, it is impossible to dispute that the potential for what
amounts to compelled-voluntary waiver represents a legitimate fear. This perceived ever-present
concern has caused many corporate executives and their counsel to question the continued efficacy of the attorney-
client privilege and work product doctrine. In particular, they contend that the escalating pressure to waive these protections is eroding the desired atmosphere of mutual
candor and trust that has traditionally been the hallmark of the attorney-client relationship, which, in turn, is adversely affecting counsel's desire and ability to conduct the thorough factual
investigations' 0 lauded by the Supreme Court in Upjohn Co. v. United States.
 2nc their ev
Alt cause – most lawyers don’t like corporate criminal liability anyway – another reason why they
wouldn’t take on cases – their ev
Pouncy 11 – Charles, Temple University School of Law, 1995; J.D., Cornell Law School, 1979; B.A.,
Fordham University, 1976 (“Reevaluating Corporate Criminal Responsibility: It’s All About Power,”
12/15/2011, Available Online at http://www.stetson.edu/law/lawreview/media/41-1-Pouncy-
PublicationCopy.pdf) RMT

In 2007, the Corporate Crime Reporter surveyed law partners practicing white-collar criminal defense at the nation’s top one hundred law firms.14
The lawyers were asked, “Should corporate criminal liability be eliminated ?”15 Twenty percent of the one
hundred and fifty-seven lawyers responding agreed that it should be totally eliminated ; however, eighty percent disagreed,
although a majority of those disagreeing believed that it should be restricted or narrowed.16
 2nc DOJ waivers alt cause
More ev – their Copeland evidence is literally being written about the DOJ’s waiver policy – we cut the
CONCLUSION, which says that waivers are a massive alt cause
Copeland, their ev, 10 – Katrice Bridges, Assistant Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State University, The
Dickinson School of Law; B.S. 1998, The University of Illinois; J.D. 2001, The University of Michigan Law
School (“Preserving the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege,” 78 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1199, 2010, Available
Online at http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1211&context=fac_works) RMT

V. CONCLUSION

Under the guise of seeking cooperation in criminal investigations, the DOJ permitted its prosecutors to
condition leniency on a corporation's willingness to disclose communications protected by the attorney-
client privilege. This practice enabled prosecutors to obtain more convictions of corporations, their
employees, and agents because prosecutors had access to the results of corporations' attorney-
conducted internal ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE investigations. Thus, corporate attorneys had to
balance zealously representing their clients and accurately reporting their findings to the government.
The end result was that the corporate attorney-client privilege was weakened in criminal
investigations.
 1nc – corporate crim liability bad
Corporate criminal liability crushes the economy and US competitiveness
Bucy 9 (Pamela, Bainbridge-Mims Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law (on law faculty
since 1987); Assistant United States Attorney, American Criminal Law Review 46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1437,
Lexis)

B. Reasons Not To Prosecute Corporations

While the above reasons favor the prosecution of fictional entities, there are reasons not do so , or at least to be very careful doing so. Criminal
prosecution can be extremely disruptive to a business and to its many constituencies, most of whom have no culpability for the wrongdoing.
Employees, shareholders, bondholders, lenders, customers, and the community where the company is located are all
affected when a company is prosecuted. This disruption is particularly worrisome since, as noted infra, the standard for imposing corporate criminal liability is broad and the
prosecutorial discretion for applying the standard is expansive. The second policy concern with prosecuting corporations, again exacerbated by the breadth of the

standard of corporate criminal liability and extent of prosecutorial discretion, is that criminal prosecution, or simply the potential of it , may deter
appropriate and needed entrepreneurial spirit and risk taking . Businesses, fearful of aggressive criminal prosecutions, may
become overly cautious and avoid fully exploring new business models and opportunities. Third, the comparative aggressiveness of
criminal prosecution in the United States and its unpredictability (in light of the broad standard of liability and the large amount of
prosecutorial discretion) may discourage foreign companies from operating in the United States. It may also
render American companies , which are subject to such liability, less competitive in the global economy.

Competitiveness solves great power war – it’s an impact filter

Colby 14 (Elbridge, the Robert M. Gates fellow at the Center for a New American Security; and Paul
Lettow, was senior director for strategic planning on the U.S. National Security Council staff from 2007
to 2009, 7/3/14, “Have We Hit Peak America?,”
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/03/have_we_hit_peak_america)

Many foreign-policy
experts seem to believe that retaining American primacy is largely a matter of will -- of how
America chooses to exert its power abroad. Even President Obama, more often accused of being a prophet of decline than a booster of
America's future, recently asserted that the United States "has rarely been stronger relative to the rest of the world." The question, he continued, is "not whether

America will lead, but how we will lead." But

will is unavailing without strength . If the United States wants the
international system to continue to reflect its interests and values -- a system, for example, in which the
global commons are protected, trade is broad-based and extensive, and armed conflicts among great
nations are curtailed -- it needs to sustain not just resolve, but relative power . That, in turn, will require
acknowledging the uncomfortable truth that global power and wealth are shifting at an unprecedented pace,
with profound implications. Moreover, many of the challenges America faces are exacerbated by vulnerabilities that are largely self-created,
chief among them fiscal policy. Much more quickly and comprehensively than is understood, those vulnerabilities are reducing America's
freedom of action and its ability to influence others. Preserving America's international position will require it to
restore its economic vitality and make policy choices now that pay dividends for decades to come. America has to prioritize and to
act. Fortunately, the United States still enjoys greater freedom to determine its future than any other major
power, in part because many of its problems are within its ability to address . But this process of renewal must
begin with analyzing America's competitive position and understanding the gravity of the situation
Americans face.
 2nc – link
The plan makes it impossible for any corporations to operate – specifically small businesses – kills
econ
Economist 14 (The Economist, they’re legit, “A mammoth guilt trip”,
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21614101-corporate-america-finding-it-ever-harder-stay-
right-side-law-mammoth-guilt)

All this has made the legal environment for companies staggeringly complex . In 1991 John Coffee, a professor at Columbia University,
estimated the number of regulatory statutes carrying criminal penalties at around 300,000; this number continues to be widely cited, although if it was accurate at the time it will certainly be an underestimate today. Under a bill

before Congress, the Justice Department and 35 federal agencies would have to list criminal offences that fall within their jurisdiction, along with the penalties imposed and the use to which the fines have been put. The
costs to companies of complying with all these legal requirements are huge . Large companies have to spend
more than $ 40m a year each on keeping documents merely to respond to potential regulatory
requests, concludes a working paper based on a survey of 128 companies by William Hubbard at the
University of Chicago Law School. Smaller companies cannot afford to keep documents on this scale ,
putting them at risk of breaching statutes even if they have done nothing wrong. On top of that, there are opportunity
costs which are impossible to measure. Enormous amounts of time and money are now being put into
compliance programmes that may placate judges, prosecutors, regulators and monitors but undermine innovation and customer
services . And even the most diligent company may not escape censure . “No matter how gold-plated your corporate compliance efforts, no matter how
upstanding your workforce, no matter how hard one tries, large corporations today are walking targets for criminal liability ,” said Larry Thompson, a
former deputy attorney-general, in a speech delivered to the National Association of Defence Lawyers in 2011.

Small businesses are uniquely key

Clancy 15 (Kaitlyn, government relations intern at the Heartland Institute "Government Regulations
Impact on Small Businesses," Somewhat Reasonable – a blog by the Heartland Institute,
http://blog.heartland.org/2015/06/government-regulations-impact-on-small-businesses/)

According to the U.S. Census Bureau, small businesses in the United States account for over half of the employees in
the working population . They are also responsible for creating 65% of the new net jobs since 1995 and
50% of the nation’s annual GDP.
 2nc – econ impact
Econ decline goes nuclear and escalates
Auslin 9 (Michael, Resident Scholar – American Enterprise Institute, and Desmond Lachman – Resident
Fellow – American Enterprise Institute, “The Global Economy Unravels”, Forbes, 3-6,
http://www.aei.org/article/100187)

What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and global chaos followed hard
on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible,
economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally
worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems.
The threat of instability is a pressing concern . China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20
million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a
year. A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability. The
regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's
neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in
downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that
devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture
toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. Even apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external
conflict. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic
stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's
unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the
specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets.
Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer
Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while
nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not

bode well for the rest of Europe. A prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would dramatically raise
tensions inside these countries. Couple that with possible protectionist legislation in the United States, unresolved
ethnic and territorial disputes in all regions of the globe and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what
they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that coalesce into a big bang .
 no chilling
no chilling effect and circumvention – their ev
HRW 14 – Human Rights Watch, in Association with the American Civil Liberties Union (With Liberty to
Monitor All How Large-Scale US Surveillance is Harming Journalism, Law, and American Democracy, July
2014, ISSN: 978-1-62313-1814)

Some described other lawyers expressing reluctance to take on certain cases that might incur
surveillance, though by and large the attorneys interviewed for this report seemed determined to do
their best to continue representing clients . Like journalists, some felt frustrated, and even offended,
that they were in this situation. “I’ll be damned if I have to start acting like a drug dealer in order to
protect my client’s confidentiality,” said one.¶ The result is the erosion of the right to counsel, a pillar of
procedural justice under human rights law and the US Constitution. ¶ Uncertainty and Secrecy¶
Uncertainty is a significant factor shaping the behavior of both journalists and lawyers. The combination
of the sheer number of surveillance programs, the complexity of the underlying legal regimes, and the
lack of clarity as to their scale and scope renders it practically impossible for any layperson to discern
which forms of communication and data storage are secure and when they may be reasonably
subject to surveillance.
solvency
 other stuff
Safeguards and minimization work – their ev is all hype
Sales 15 (Nathan, Associate Professor of Law at Syracuse University College of Law, teaches and and
writes in the fields of national security law and counterterrorism law, letter to French surveillance
authorities about their new surveillance bill, http://insct.syr.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/Sales_France_surveillance_legislation_analysis_0715.pdf)

U.S. law attempts to strike an appropriate balance between preserving attorney-client confidentiality
and preventing abuse of the privilege, and it limits the government’s ability to monitor certain communications
between attorneys and their clients in national security investigations. For example, FISA expressly provides that “[n]o otherwise privileged
communication obtained in 2 accordance with, or in violation of, [FISA] shall lose its privileged character.” 50 U.S.C. § 1806(a). According to the leading
treatise on U.S. national security law, this statute ensures that “a conversation between a FISA target and his attorney that is otherwise subject to the attorneyclient privilege remains
privileged even though federal agents are monitoring the conversation on a FISA wiretap.” 2 DAVID S. KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS § 28.6, at 221 (2d ed.

2012). Section 702 of FISA further seeks to protect the privilege through so-called “minimization” procedures. 50 U.S.C.
§ 1881a(e) (requiring the Attorney General to adopt minimization procedures and directing a federal court to review the procedures); see also id. § 1801(h) (requiring minimization procedures

When the government conducts surveillance, it is inevitable that it will collect a large
for traditional FISA surveillance).

amount data that is unrelated to the investigation. U.S. law addresses this problem with rules that restrict which
personnel may see information that has been collected inadvertently, the purposes for which the information may and may not be used, how long it may be
retained, and so on. The section 702 minimization procedures generally oblige the government to destroy any

nonpertinent data about an American that has been incidentally acquired during surveillance—a requirement that
applies to privileged information as well as non-privileged information. Id. § 3(b)(1). The rules also bar the government from disseminating any information about an
American—privileged or non-privileged— unless it indicates that he is engaging in terrorism , is evidence of a crime, or similar criteria are met. Id. §
there are special requirements for privileged attorney-client communications : As
6(b). In addition to these general rules,

soon as it becomes apparent that a communication is between a person who is known to be under
criminal indictment in the United States and an attorney who represents that individual in the matter under indictment (or someone acting on behalf of the attorney),
monitoring of that communication will cease and the communication will be identified as an attorney-client
communication in a log maintained for that purpose. The relevant portion of the communication containing that conversation will be
segregated and the National Security Division of the Department of Justice will be notified so that
appropriate procedures may be established to protect such communications from review or use in any criminal prosecution,
while preserving foreign intelligence information contained therein . Additionally, all proposed disseminations of information
constituting United States person attorney-client privileged communications must be reviewed by the NSA Office of General Counsel prior to dissemination.
 circumvention
We’ll just get the data from another country – Australia proves
Rasch 14 (Mark, attorney and author, working in the areas of corporate and government cybersecurity,
privacy and incident response, “Attorney Client Privilege and the NSA”,
http://www.securitycurrent.com/en/analysis/ac_analysis/attorney-client-privilege-and-the-nsa)

Outsourcing Of course, the NSA is not permitted by law to deliberately target U.S. persons for surveillance. The N ew
Y ork T imes shows how easy this is to skirt. The lawyers whose communications were intercepted were clearly U.S. persons. But it wasn’t their communications
that the NSA wanted – it was the communications of their Indonesian clients. So the lawyers’ communications were not deliberately targeted. But what about communications between two

U.S. lawyers about their Indonesian clients? There the NSA would be deliberately targeting U.S. persons . A no-no. No problem .
Just pick up the phone and call ASIS in Canberra. Have our friends down under conduct the
collection and give it up to us. They have no restrictions on targeting U.S. persons. And what they
give us on a “silver platter” is, well dessert. We don’t violate privilege. We outsource it.
 video survey alt cause
Video surveillance will be used to circumvent – it’s empirically proven in the context of ACP
surveillance
Simon 15 (Rachel, J.D., 2014, Seton Hall University School of Law, “THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEY
EXCEPTION TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT”, http://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1530&context=shlr)
II. EVIDENCE OF GOVERNMENT SPYING As of June 2013, it is beyond question that the United States federal government has been spying on its citizens for decades.15 The government publicly
justifies its mass surveillance programs on grounds of national security and counterterrorism.16 Considering that Guantanamo is where the government houses alleged “high-value detainees”
suspected of terrorism,17 it is less than surprising to learn that various federal agencies have been spying on daily activities at Guantanamo since its inception. As detailed infra, what is

perhaps more surprising is that such surveillance is occurring after the federal government has been admonished for
secretly videotaping suspected terrorists’ meetings with their attorneys , on no fewer than four prior occasions. Before suspected
9/11 terrorists were sent to Guantanamo, they were held at the Metropolitan Detention Center (“MDC”) in Brooklyn, New York. In March 2003, the Department of Justice Office of the

Inspector General (“ DOJ OIG”) reported on pervasive breaches of private meetings between attorneys and their
clients detained at the MDC: In total, we found more than 40 examples of staff videotaping detainees’ attorney visits.
On many videotapes, we were able to hear significant portions of what the detainees were telling their attorneys and sometimes what the attorneys were saying as well. It appeared that

detainees’ attorney visits were recorded intentionally . . . . In sum, we conclude[] that audio taping attorney visits violated the law and interfered
with the detainees’ effective access to legal counsel.18 Although the DOJ OIG clearly found that this conduct violated federal law19 and the detainees’ constitutional rights, it is
unclear whether any remedial action was taken . It appears that the government instead attempted to
circumvent statutory and constitutional constraints by having clandestine agencies , rather than municipal
conduct the furtive recording of attorney-detainee meetings . One notorious incident of a
policemen,

clandestine agency’s picking up the baton is the 2002 CIA recording of interrogations of detainee Abu
Zubaydah.20 The recordings comprised ninety-two videotapes.21 One “initial purpose” of recording the interrogations was to create “a record of Abu Zubaydah’s medical condition
and treatment should he succumb to his wounds and questions arise about the medical care provided to him by [the] CIA.”22 That said, “[a]nother purpose was to assist in the preparation of
the debriefing reports.”23 Indeed, the CIA listened to the audio from the videotapes of the interrogations to prepare debriefing reports.24 After public revelation of the tapes’ existence, the
CIA’s Director of Clandestine Operations ordered the destruction of all ninety-two tapes in November 2005.25A second incident surfaced in 2010, when the CIA admitted that it had twice
misinformed the Department of Justice about whether it possessed recorded interrogations of Ramzi Binalshibh.26 The CIA had previously claimed that it destroyed all recordings of Binalshibh
around the same time it destroyed the ninety-two recordings of Abu Zubaydah in 2005.27 In 2010, however, the Agency admitted that it still possessed two videotapes and one audiotape of
Binalshibh’s interrogations. A third notorious incident of the United States’ conducting interrogation recordings involved the worldwide, broadcasted recording of Omar Khadr, a Canadian who
was held at Guantanamo since the age of sixteen.28 In February 2003, Canadian Security Intelligence Service officials interrogated Khadr in Guantanamo. In July 2008, Khadr’s defense
attorneys publicly released recordings of the interrogation made by the recording equipment in the attorneyclient meeting room.29 A Special Agent for the United States Naval Criminal
Investigative Service (“NCIS”) watched and listened to the Khadr recordings one week after they were made and reported on the intelligence gathered during the sessions.30 Ultimately, seven
hours of interrogations of Khadr conducted over four days at Guantanamo appeared in an edited, feature-length documentary film.31 While the MDC recordings were generally of private
attorneyclient meetings, the Guantanamo recordings were limited to interrogations, where a detainee’s attorney may or may not have been present. That all changed in January 2013, when
the discovery that an “external body” was surreptitiously monitoring and censoring the Military Commission hearings at Guantanamo, superseding the presiding judge’s supposed sole
authority to do so, emerged.32 The external body censored Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s Learned Counsel, David Nevin, while he recited the title of a motion that contained mostly unclassified
information pertaining to CIA dark site prisons. The Military Commission’s presiding judge, Army Colonel James Pohl, taken by surprise, stated: [I]f some external body is turning the
commission off under their [sic] own view of what things ought to be, with no reasonable explanation because [there] is no classification on it, then we are going to have a little meeting about
who turns that light on or off.33 Within one week, Judge Pohl seemed to not only accept having an external body eavesdrop on, and censor, the Military Commission hearings, but also even
defend the notion on the government’s behalf. Specifically, Judge Pohl challenged one defense attorney for Abd alRahim al-Nashiri by asking, “[d]oes it surprise you that the United States

defense
government has all sorts of ability to monitor conversations throughout the world?”34 Soon after the government’s display of courtroom eavesdropping capabilities,

counsel for Guantanamo detainees learned that the meeting rooms assigned to them for private conversations with
their clients had been bugged with convincingly disguised microphones for surreptitious audio recording.35 The microphones,
these microphones are “often
made by Louroe, are hidden in realistic smoke detector shells mounted on the meeting rooms’ ceilings.36 According to Louroe,

used in law enforcement interview rooms,” because they are “sensitive enough to capture a suspect’s
comments even when whispered.”37 That said, a public relations manager of Louroe specifically shunned clandestine usage of its products at Guantanamo: “If I’m
monitoring audio covertly or surreptitiously, then it is 100% illegal. Not only have I broken the law, but I can’t use any of that audio as evidence in a court case.”38 Public relations spin
notwithstanding, however, there is no debate that the microphones in the attorney-client meeting rooms at Guantanamo are specifically designed for monitoring conversations that the
speakers wish to keep confidential.
 at: “bulk” covers this stuff!
No – the plan says “bulk” – that means it can’t be targeted at any specific location or group – this is
codified in US law
Lin 16 (Herb, chief scientist (emeritus) at the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board,
National Research Council of the National Academies, Senior Research Scholar for Cyber Policy and
Security at Stanford’s Hoover Institution, “Having a Conversation About Bulk Surveillance”,
http://cacm.acm.org/magazines/2016/2/197418-having-a-conversation-about-bulk-
surveillance/fulltext)

Bulk collection is defined in presidential policy directive (PPD-28) as "the authorized collection of large
quantities of signals intelligence (SIGINT) data which, due to technical or operational considerations, is
acquired without the use of discriminants (e.g., specific identifiers, selection terms, etc.)"b But the
directive does not define "discriminant," and so there is no precise definition of bulk (or targeted)
collection. Under this definition, all signals intelligence associated with communications in, for example,
Syria, would be regarded as "targeted," simply because the selector "Syria" was used to separate Syrian
traffic from other traffic. And signals intelligence associated with a communications channel linking only
two individuals would be regarded as "bulk," simply because all (two) individuals in using that channel
were being monitored. What is the commonsense meaning of the term "bulk" collection? A recent
National Research Council (NRC) study on Presidential Policy Directive 28,c in which I participated as a
staffer, argued that "if a significant portion of the data collected is not associated with current targets, it
is bulk collection; otherwise, it is targeted." The study went on to note "there is no precise definition of
bulk collection, but rather a continuum, with no bright line separating bulk from targeted [collection]."
The report acknowledges the term "significant" is itself imprecise, but in my view "significant" is at least
amenable to quantification, and in principle one could argue as to whether "significant" should mean
10%, 90%, or some number in between.
 planflaw/bulk inev
The plantext makes no sense – you can’t ONLY stop bulk collection of lawyers because the nature of
bulk collection means we only know whose communications we have once we process them – neg on
presumption
Cushing 14 (Tim, TechDirt, “NSA About Attorney-Client Privilege Concerns: We'll Probably Grab Your
Communications But We'll Try Not To 'Listen In'”,
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140312/08541426546/nsa-responds-to-attorney-client-privilege-
concerns-well-probably-grab-your-communications-well-try-not-to-listen.shtml)

Of course, the problem here is that anything not related to someone "under a criminal indictment" is still fair game. And the rest of the letter, while reassuring, also notes that it's
inevitable that attorney-client communications will be swept up , simply because the agency runs a
variety of bulk collection programs . So, the response is more of a "we'll do our best to minimize" rather than a promise it won't intercept attorney-client
communications. That's the problem with bulk, untargeted surveillance . All anyone has left is the hope that the
agency rigorously adheres to its minimization policies , and there's plenty of evidence that suggest the NSA has overstepped its boundaries in the
past. In the end, the ABA is right back where it started -- operating under an "uncertain privilege" which, as it pointed out in its earlier letter (quoting the Supreme Court), "is little better than
no privilege at all."
military mental health aff