1AC

---NSDA
 1AC---Saudi
Advantage 1 is Saudi:

F-35s are completely unnecessary for deterrence, but massively increase the risk of
a regional confrontation---Saudi moral hazard, regional entanglement, and Iranian
provocations
Arad 1/17 – Shimon Arad, 1-17-2020 {Shimon Arad is a Ph.D. student at the School of Political Science at the University
of Haifa. His last position was Head of the Strategic Planning Unit in the Political-Military and Policy Bureau of the Israeli
Ministry of Defense. “THE UNITED STATES SHOULDN’T SELL THE F-35 TO SAUDI ARABIA.”
https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/the-united-states-shouldnt-sell-the-f-35-to-saudi-arabia/}//JM

There are three major disadvantages to releasing the F-35 to Saudi Arabia. It could raise the potential risk of
possible long-term regional entanglement costs for the United States, undermine Israel’s qualitative military edge, and
symbolize U.S. endorsement for Saudi regional and domestic policies. The Saudi military campaign in Yemen has complicated
the U.S.-Saudi military relationship. It has necessitated active intelligence and aerial support, and undermined the premise that the
tens of billions of dollars’ worth of advanced weapon systems sold to Saudi Arabia would rarely be used. They were meant to be “expensive
paperweights” but instead have made the United States complicit in the civilian toll of the war, heightened the dilemma of selling Riyadh
weapons while controlling their use, and increased
public and congressional opposition to the arms relationship. The
fear is that with the F-35, Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman will be further emboldened and inadvertently draw
the United States in to additional regional brawls, entangling it in conflicts with Iran, Qatar, or some other
country. The Saudi campaign in Yemen and the murder of Khashoggi point to bin Salman’s reckless nature. The sale of the F-35s
would do no more to rein in Saudi Arabia than has the sale of 154 advanced F-15s in restraining the Saudi-led
war in Yemen. Trump’s emphasis on the economic utility of arms sales in the “buyer’s market” increases Saudi
Arabia’s bargaining power and reduces the efficacy of U.S. political and military leverage. Instead of
reassuring Riyadh, such a sale may in fact embolden it and increase its self-perception of military prowess. The
actual military utility of this weapon system is far from immediate. It would take years to produce and
transfer the Saudi F-35s and for them to reach operational readiness. The advanced F-15SA that the Saudis are
in the process of absorbing is already the most advanced fighter jet in the region , excluding Israel’s F-35s,
capable of interoperability with American air capabilities and an existing strong indication of Washington’s
commitment to Saudi Arabia’s security. In the meantime, such a decision may trigger Iranian provocations prior
to the supply of the F-35, because of their fear of the stealth fighter jet, increasing the potential for U.S. entanglement.

Worsening the arms race makes escalation linearly more likely---emboldens hawks,
inflames tensions, and decks diplomatic solutions
Thrall 17 – Trevor Thrall is a senior fellow for the Cato’s Institute’s Defense and Foreign Policy Department, with expertise
in international security and the politics of American national security. Thrall is also an associate professor at George Mason
University’s Schar School of Policy and Government where he teaches courses in international security. (“Trump’s No Good
Very Bad Arms Deal” 6/7, Cato, https://www.cato.org/blog/trumps-no-good-very-bad-arms-deal

3. The deal pushes the United States down the slippery slope in the Middle East. Picking sides in the broader struggles between Saudi Arabia and
Iran, between Sunni and Shia, and among the array of other groups seeking power and dominance in the Middle East can only cause trouble. The
idea that through arms sales the United States can “project stability” or dictate geopolitical outcomes in the Middle East is dangerous folly. The
more likely outcomes of the Saudi arms deal are increased tensions with Israel and a costly and dangerous
arms race with Iran. Even worse, picking sides increases the risk that the U.S. will wind up getting dragged
deeper into future conflicts as it seeks to make sure “its side” maintains the advantage. Given that Saudi Arabia lobbied
for Western intervention in Libya and Syria, and has intervened itself to varying degrees in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, Libya, and
Bahrain since 2011, this risk is non-trivial. The reality is that this self-imposed entanglement does nothing to advance American security
or other national interests. Neither vague concerns about regional stability nor the modest risk posed by terrorism warrant such large-scale arms
deals. Though the Trump administration worries about Iran’s influence, it makes no sense to worry more about Iran—who opposes Al Qaeda and
ISIS—than about the other autocratic states in the region. Why, for example, does it make sense for the United States to double down on a
partnership with Saudi Arabia, the very country most responsible for the spread of Wahhabism—the hard line version of Islam embraced by Al
Qaeda and the Islamic State? Why does it make sense to continue pouring weapons into a region already fragile, already tense, already in
conflict? As civil wars across the region should illustrate, external intervention, whether in the form of troops or weapons, simply amplifies
existing conflicts. 4. The Saudi arms deal will privilege military solutions at the expense of diplomacy. When
countries believe they
have the ability to impose their will by military force, their desire to negotiate dwindles. By selling the
Saudis weapons, the United States will embolden Saudi hawks to continue pressing for a military approach,
not only in the short run in Yemen, but in other conflict areas as well. Likewise, when Israel or Iran’s
national security team meets, the U.S. weapons sale to the Saudis will give those hawks the upper hand
in their discussions. This problem will be further multiplied by every other instance where the United States is selling weapons in the Middle
East. The
dynamic will, in turn, encourage arms racing, inflame tensions, will very likely amplify existing
violence, and in short will make it much more difficult for leaders of all nations in the region to work
toward diplomatic solutions.

Goes nuclear and draws in great powers

Goodson 18 – Larry Goodson, Professor of Middle East Studies at the U.S. Army War College. 02-02-18. “Five Enduring
Barriers to Peace in the Middle East.” Army War College. https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/five-enduring-barriers-
to-peace-in-the-middle-east/

More importantly, America’s position has changed in the world, allowing a resurgent Russia, rising China, and
awakening India to challenge each other and American hegemony. The Middle East has become an
important arena of their competition, especially because of oil. Half of China’s oil comes out of the Persian Gulf to fuel
the economic rise of what is now the world’s largest oil importer. India, the world’s third-leading oil importer, gets more than half of its oil from the

region, and India is also the world’s leading recipient of labor remittances from overseas workers, primarily from
laborers employed in the Persian Gulf. The second-leading oil exporter in the world, Russia is interested
in Middle Eastern oil primarily for what its availability and pricing do to the market for Russian oil. Other
Russian interests in the Middle East include arms sales, base access (its only bases outside of the traditional Soviet zone are in Syria),
and the creation and expansion of an anti-access/area-denial zone in the Black Sea region. Meanwhile, this is
happening as the global position of the United States has slipped during an Obama Administration that struggled to “lead from behind” and a
Trump Administration marked by erratic swings from foreign policy adventurism to “America First” neo-isolationism. Powerful nations with competing

interests often find that the collision of those interests leads to war. Having so many great power
interests converge in a part of the world that has historically been an active arena of conflict is worrisome.
Since the late 1970s, the region has had the highest number of fatalities due to war. Three of the world’s
top five countries in military spending per capita are Middle Eastern (Saudi Arabia is first, Israel is third, and Kuwait is fifth).
Middle Eastern countries have also developed or pursued weapons of mass destruction, with Israel widely
known to have nuclear weapons and a robust delivery capability, while seven Middle Eastern countries
have or have had biological or chemical weapons. Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq currently occupy the
bottom three spots on the Global Peace Index. As great power competition resurfaces and now takes place
in a conflict-prone, unstable Middle East, the question seems not to be if great power conflict will
occur, but when.
Extinction
Starr 14 – Steven Starr, the Senior Scientist for Physicians for Social Responsibility and Director of the Clinical Laboratory
Science Program at the University of Missouri. Starr has published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the Strategic
Arms Reduction (STAR) website of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, June 11 th, 2014, “There Can be No
Winners in a Nuclear War”, Truth Out, https://truthout.org/articles/there-can-be-no-winners-in-a-nuclear-war/, EO

Nuclear war has no winner. Beginning in 2006, several of the world’s leading climatologists (at Rutgers, UCLA, John Hopkins University, and
the University of Colorado-Boulder) published a series of studies that evaluated the long-term environmental

consequences of a nuclear war, including baseline scenarios fought with merely 1% of the explosive power in the US and/or Russian launch-
ready nuclear arsenals. They concluded that the consequences of even a “small” nuclear war would include

catastrophic disruptions of global climate and massive destruction of Earth’s protective ozone layer. These
and more recent studies predict that global agriculture would be so negatively affected by such a war, a global famine would result, which would cause up to 2 billion people to starve to death.
These peer-reviewed studies – which were analyzed by the best scientists in the world and found to be without error – also predict that a war fought with less than half of US or Russian strategic

nuclear weapons would destroy the human race. In other words, a US-Russian nuclear war would create such extreme long-term
damage to the global environment that it would leave the Earth uninhabitable for humans and most
animal forms of life. A recent article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “Self-assured destruction: The climate impacts of nuclear war,” begins by stating: “ A
nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter.
Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self-assured destruction .” In 2009, I wrote “Catastrophic
Climatic Consequences of Nuclear Conflicts” for the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament. The article summarizes the findings of these studies. It

explains that nuclear firestorms would produce millions of tons of smoke, which would rise above cloud
level and form a global stratospheric smoke layer that would rapidly encircle the Earth. The smoke layer
would remain for at least a decade, and it would act to destroy the protective ozone layer (vastly increasing
the UV-B reaching Earth) as well as block warming sunlight, thus creating Ice Age weather conditions that
would last 10 years or longer. Following a US-Russian nuclear war, temperatures in the central US and Eurasia would fall below freezing every day for

one to three years; the intense cold would completely eliminate growing seasons for a decade or longer. No crops could be

grown, leading to a famine that would kill most humans and large animal populations. Electromagnetic
pulse from high-altitude nuclear detonations would destroy the integrated circuits in all modern electronic
devices, including those in commercial nuclear power plants. Every nuclear reactor would almost
instantly meltdown; every nuclear spent fuel pool (which contain many times more radioactivity than found in the reactors) would boil off,
releasing vast amounts of long-lived radioactivity. The fallout would make most of the US and Europe uninhabitable. Of course,
the survivors of the nuclear war would be starving to death anyway. Once nuclear weapons were introduced into a US-Russian conflict, there
would be little chance that a nuclear holocaust could be avoided. Theories of “limited nuclear war” and “nuclear de-escalation” are

unrealistic. In 2002 the Bush administration modified US strategic doctrine from a retaliatory role to permit preemptive nuclear attack; in 2010, the Obama administration made only
incremental and miniscule changes to this doctrine, leaving it essentially unchanged. Furthermore, Counterforce doctrine – used by both the US and Russian military – emphasizes the need for
preemptive strikes once nuclear war begins. Both sides would be under immense pressure to launch a preemptive nuclear first-strike once military hostilities had commenced, especially if nuclear
weapons had already been used on the battlefield. Both the US and Russia each have 400 to 500 launch-ready ballistic missiles armed with a total of at least 1800 strategic nuclear warheads,
which can be launched with only a few minutes warning. Both the US and Russian Presidents are accompanied 24/7 by military officers carrying a “nuclear briefcase,” which allows them to
transmit the permission order to launch in a matter of seconds. Yet top political leaders and policymakers of both the US and Russia seem to be unaware that their launch-ready nuclear weapons
represent a self-destruct mechanism for the human race. For example, in 2010, I was able to publicly question the chief negotiators of the New START treaty, Russian Ambassador Anatoly
Antonov and (then) US Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller, during their joint briefing at the UN (during the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference). I asked them if they were
familiar with the recent peer-reviewed studies that predicted the detonation of less than 1% of the explosive power contained in the operational and deployed US and Russian nuclear forces
would cause catastrophic changes in the global climate, and that a nuclear war fought with their strategic nuclear weapons would kill most people on Earth. They both answered “no.” More
recently, on April 20, 2014, I asked the same question and received the same answer from the US officials sent to brief representatives of the NGOS at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory
Committee meeting at the UN. None of the US officials at the briefing were aware of the studies. Those present included top officials of the National Security Council. It is frightening that
President Obama and his administration appear unaware that the world’s leading scientists have for years predicted that a nuclear war fought with the US and/or Russian strategic nuclear arsenal
means the end of human history. Do they not know of the existential threat these arsenals pose to the human race . . . or do they choose to remain silent because this fact doesn’t fit into their
official narratives? We hear only about terrorist threats that could destroy a city with an atomic bomb, while the threat of human extinction from nuclear war is never mentioned – even when the

US foreign policy
US and Russia are each running huge nuclear war games in preparation for a US-Russian war. Even more frightening is the fact that the neocons running

believe that the US has “nuclear primacy” over Russia; that is, the US could successfully launch a nuclear sneak
attack against Russian (and Chinese) nuclear forces and completely destroy them . This theory was articulated in 2006 in “The Rise of U.S.
Nuclear Primacy,” which was published in Foreign Affairs by the Council on Foreign Relations. By concluding that the Russians and Chinese would be unable to retaliate, or if some small part
of their forces remained, would not risk a second US attack by retaliating, the article invites nuclear war. Colonel Valery Yarynich (who was in charge of security of the Soviet/Russian nuclear

Nuclear Primacy is a Fallacy.” Colonel Yarynich, who was on the

command and control systems for 7 years) asked me to help him write a rebuttal, which was titled “

Soviet General Staff and did war planning for the USSR, concluded that the “ Primacy” article used faulty methodology and erroneous

assumptions, thus invalidating its conclusions. My contribution lay in my knowledge of the recently published (in 2006) studies, which predicted even a “successful”
nuclear first-strike, which destroyed 100% of the opposing side’s nuclear weapons, would cause the
citizens of the side that “won” the nuclear war to perish from nuclear famine, just as would the rest of
humanity.

And, F-35s utilize an interconnected ALIS system---that causes Iran to shift to cyber
attacks that take down the whole network
Trevithick 17 – Joseph Trevithick, {Joseph Trevithick is an Fellow at GlobalSecurity.org, specializing in defense and
security research and analysis. 11-13-2017. “Saudis Join UAE in Push to Buy F-35s as Concerns About the Jet's Computer
Network Grow.” https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/16022/saudis-join-uae-in-push-to-buy-f-35s-as-concerns-about-the-
jets-computer-network-grow}//JM

But whether or not the needs and requirements of potential Gulf operations align with those of the United States, or could be expected to remain
in sync for the foreseeable future, is much more of an issue that with previous combat aircraft given the inherently interconnected nature of the F-
35 program as a whole. The ALIS computer system and its associated cloud-based network are central to the
day-to-day operation of the Joint Strike Fighters. Lockheed Martin has designed the system as single
point of access for each aircraft’s digital information. As such, it is constantly gathering data about each plane and
whether it might be in need of certain maintenance. It’s also serves as the load gate for packages of operational data,
containing detailed mission routes, details about potential threats and hazards, and other information. When the F-35’s software needs
a patch, it comes down to individual units through their on-site ALIS terminal. The Maryland-headquartered
defense contractor has been particularly guarded about the ALIS system . In October 2017, the U.S. Government
Accountability Office found that the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps F-35 units still did not have complete manuals and troubleshooting
guides for their Joint Strike Fighters because American officials had not yet reached a final deal about sharing technical data with the plane’s
manufacturer. The most obvious concern, as we at The War Zone have noted many times before, is the threat of a cyber
attack that could quickly hamper or shut down F-35 operations. I have outlined a worst-case scenario in the past: “The
nightmare scenario would involve an opponent causing a disruption during an actual crisis by either actively feeding bad information
into the ALIS system or otherwise disabling some portion of it or its overarching architecture. The interconnected nature of the
arrangement might allow a localized breach to infect larger segments of the F-35 fleet both in the United States or abroad or vice versa.
It’s not hard to imagine the time and energy needed to sort out real inputs and outputs from fake ones hampering or halting operations entirely
under the right circumstances. Given
the jet's low-observable characteristics, advanced defensive systems, and
other sensors, a cyber attack would be an attractive option for any enemy force. Why would an enemy use
a $500,000 air-to-air or surface-to-air and put their personnel and equipment at risk in an attempt to down an F-35
when a simple worm may be able to do the same to a whole fleet of F-35s? It could also do so with plausible deniability,
something kinetic weapons are far less adept to.”

Those escalate
Brunner 15 – Jordan Brunner, {Tower Tomorrow Fellow; Law student, Arizona State University. August 2015. “Iran Has
Built an Army of Cyber-Proxies.” http://www.thetower.org/article/iran-has-built-an-army-of-cyber-proxies/}//JM

There are many different scenarios that could play out. Saudi Arabia or Israel could massively retaliate against an attack
by a private cyber-actor sponsored by Iran, sparking a cyber-war that could result in a regional showdown if tensions get too
high. What started as a cyber-conflict could turn into a very real war. A U.S. company might respond to a
cyber-attack in a similar way, sparking a war between the U.S. and the culprits. As Shane Harris points out in his new book @War:
The Rise of the Military-Internet Complex, companies and institutions are responding to cyber-attacks with “hack-
backs,” attempting to retrieve stolen information or retaliate against an attacker by stealing their data. Hack-backs are becoming a
serious problem even within the U.S., where they are illegal unless explicitly authorized. Harris quotes a former NSA official
saying, “It is illegal. It is going on. … It’s happening with very good legal advice. But I would not advise a client to try it.” Harris concludes that
“A single act of self-defense could quickly escalate into a full-fledged conflict.” It would be even easier for the military to get involved based on
the standards of the new U.S. Army Law of War Manual. Maj. Gen. (ret.) Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., former Deputy Judge Advocate General of the
Air Force, explained in a June blog post for the website Lawfare how an attack in cyberspace might be considered an act of war: The Department
of Defense’s new policy is significant, he said, “because it shows that the U.S. defense establishment is plainly of the opinion that actual violence
in no longer … necessarily required to constitute a legally-sufficient rationale for self-defense, cyber or otherwise.” Attacks
against
critical infrastructure—such as the electrical grid—that cause mass panic or significant damage to the execution of vital functions could
be construed as sufficient to invoke the legal justification of self-defense. In fact, the electrical grid would be a perfect target:
Downing the grid would cause mass panic and looting while shutting down other aspects of critical infrastructure across the United States, from
the New York Stock Exchange to emergency services provided by hospitals. And according Cheryl A. LaFleur, commissioner of the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, these threats are real and definitely possible for a savvy cyber actor to carry out. Adding
to the chaos is
the problem of attribution. Hackers can make an attack appear as if it came from somewhere else, meaning
that a well-intentioned hack-back could end up “hacking back” the wrong country or institution. There is also the possibility of a
proxy taking action against the military capabilities of the United States in order to aid its sponsor.
 1AC---Israel
Advantage 2 is Israel:

Sale of F-35 to Saudi undermines America’s historical commitment to Israel’s

QME, or qualitative military edge
Arad 1/17 – Shimon Arad, 1-17-2020 {Shimon Arad is a Ph.D. student at the School of Political Science at the University
of Haifa. His last position was Head of the Strategic Planning Unit in the Political-Military and Policy Bureau of the Israeli
Ministry of Defense. “THE UNITED STATES SHOULDN’T SELL THE F-35 TO SAUDI ARABIA.”
https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/the-united-states-shouldnt-sell-the-f-35-to-saudi-arabia/}//JM

The release of the F-35 to the Arab countries will also undermine America’s historical commitment to
preserving Israel’s qualitative military edge. Israel’s aerial superiority is key to the preservation of its
qualitative military edge. Given the massive acquisition of advanced fighter planes by the Arab states in recent years, combined with the
improvements made in their air defense systems, Israel’s regional F-35 exclusivity remains the main safeguard for its
overall military superiority. According to U.S. legislation, guaranteeing Israel’s qualitative military edge
means supplying it with superior military means and capabilities, above and beyond the weapon systems
supplied by the United States to the Arab countries. Former Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, refers to this qualitative
preference in his memoirs, writing that among the steps taken “to ensure that Israel’s QME was not diminished by the F-15 sale to Saudi
Arabia… we would sell Israel the same model F-35 Joint Strike Fighter we were going to provide our NATO allies.” Releasing the F-35
to Saudi Arabia would undermine Israel’s aerial advantage and, in the event of a military conflict, could
enable the Saudis to penetrate Israel’s airspace. Even if the Saudi version of the F-35 was downgraded, it
would still provide game-changing fifth-generation stealth, network-centric, and command and control
operational capabilities. This includes interconnectivity between Saudi Arabia’s 5th and 4th generation fighters, making its existing F-
15s even more lethal. The only superior aerial capability that could surpass the F-35 is the F-22, but the United States has thus far refused to
release that capability to any other country.

F-35 exclusivity is the crucial factor for both QME and perception of deterrence---
no alt causes
Arad 19 – Shimon Arad is a Ph.D. student at the School of Political Science at the University of Haifa. His last position was
Head of the Strategic Planning Unit in the Political-Military and Policy Bureau of the Israeli Ministry of Defense, March 5 th,
2019, “Delaying the Release of Fifth-Generation Fighter Planes to the Arab States”, The Institute for National Security Studies,
https://www.inss.org.il/publication/delaying-the-release-of-fifth-generation-fighter-planes-to-the-arab-states/, EO

Israel's aerial superiority remains a key component of its qualitative military edge in the region.
Israel's airpower is central to its image and deterrent ability: it protects the country's airspace, provides
the first and multi-arena response to both immediate and more distant threats, enables retaliation and retribution missions
for attacks on Israel, and plays a central role in managing military operations on various fronts. However, Israel's
aerial superiority has been eroded in recent years, due to a combination of two force buildup processes in
Arab states – the improvement of their air defense systems and the massive acquisition of advanced fighter
planes. For Israel to maintain aerial freedom of action in the next decade, it must have exclusive regional
access to fifth-generation fighter planes, such as the F-35 (known in Israel as the "Adir"). The United States is currently Israel’s principal
address regarding efforts to prevent the transfer of fifth-generation technology to the Gulf states in the form of a possible sale of the F-35. True,
Russia and China are developing fifth-generation fighter planes (SU-57 and J-20, respectively), and Russia has even deployed four SU-57 planes
to Syria, but these planes are still being developed and tested and lack some of the advantages of the American F-35. In addition, the states now
seeking to acquire fifth-generation fighter planes – the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia – will likely prefer the F-35, because
acquiring Russian and/or Chinese planes will deny them one of the F35’s main advantages, namely, its ability to operate in an integrative way
with the existing Western fighter planes at their disposal, made in the United States and Europe. Securing Israel's exclusive access
to fifth-generation fighter planes will grant it a number of significant benefits against the improvements in
the aerial systems of actively hostile countries , such as Iran and Syria, and also enable it to deal with the
impressive aerial systems of pragmatic Arab countries, should they ever renew their hostility toward Israel. Improved ability to
defend the country's airspace: In the existing situation, the Israel Air Force (IAF) has two important advantages in defending the country's
skies. First, the detection systems can effectively identify the approach of fourth-generation fighter planes
towards Israel's air space. Second, the F-35 will provide clear benefits in the efforts to intercept these planes ,
as far from the borders as possible, even in the face of the advanced long range air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles available to them. In contrast,
the presence of fifth-generation fighter planes will complicate the IAF defense system and increase its
vulnerability. Existing radars and sensors will have trouble identifying these planes as they approach
Israel's air space and guiding the Israeli planes to intercept them . If these planes can approach Israel's air space they will
be able to attack Israel's detection system kinetically, enabling fourth-generation fighter planes to integrate into the second wave of attacks on
strategic targets. Long range aerial operational ability, including over transit countries: With its high stealth ability, the F-35 should enable Israel
to operate evasively against distant strategic targets, such as the Iranian nuclear program. This refers to both Iran's aerial detection and air-defense
systems, and the detection systems of countries over which Israeli planes would have to fly. Ability to operate in areas with dense aerial defense
systems: In recent years, countries in the region have improved their air defenses, such as with the S-300 systems supplied to Iran and Egypt, and
the SA-17 supplied to Syria. There are also reports that Saudi Arabia and Qatar are considering purchasing the S-400 from Russia. This trend of
reinforcing defense systems designed to prevent access or penetration, what is known as Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD), creates severe
restrictions for an air force trying to penetrate or attack. The advanced stealth qualities of the F-35 plane should enable the IAF to operate under
protection in areas saturated with advanced anti-aircraft systems. The Trump Administration and Israel's Qualitative Edge Massive
acquisition of advanced planes by Arab countries in recent years is a challenge to the IAF’s future
operational freedom. Assuming the full implementation of deals signed with the United States, Europe, and Russia, Sunni Arab states
(Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Egypt, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman) will soon have access to between 500 and 600 fighter jets that
are more advanced than the IAF array of planes – except for the F-35. About half of these planes, and the most
advanced of them, will be made in the United States. They will be equipped with advanced radar capabilities and some of
the world's best air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, and only the F-35 will afford Israel a qualitative
edge. Israel did not object to these deals, given the assurances of the previous administration that Israel would enjoy a considerable period of
regional monopoly of the F-35. It now appears that the Trump administration is seriously considering selling the F-35 to the UAE. The
administration is under pressure from the UAE and Saudi Arabia, two important regional allies for the promotion of regional American strategy,
particularly against Iran, to supply them with F-35 planes. President Trump’s "business-based" approach and his desire that regional allies
contribute to the United States economy, as well as pressure from Lockheed Martin, the aircraft manufacturer, could tilt the balance in favor of
selling the planes to Arab countries. Tendentious leaks on this subject are meant to test the degree of expected opposition from Congress and
from Israel. Anagreement by Washington to sell the F-35 to the UAE constitutes a dangerous precedent,
which could lead to the supply of these planes to other Arab countries, and spur Russia and China to market their
own products. The F-35's ability to record and send aerial pictures from and to other planes – a feature that
creates integration, the capability for network-enabled warfare, and improved distribution of missions
between planes  also upgrades the attack and survival capabilities of older planes. Thus, releasing even a
small number of F-35 planes to Arab states will facilitate improved operation of their extended range of
fighter planes and pose a serious problem to the IAF, if it is ever called upon to fight against the Arab air forces.

Commitment to Israeli QME is the basis for our security guarantee and gives us the
leverage to restrain aggression---even marginal shifts exacerbate threat perception
Freilich 17 – [Chuck, PhD at Columbia, senior fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, “HOW LONG COULD
ISRAEL SURVIVE WITHOUT AMERICA?,” Newsweek, https://www.newsweek.com/how-long-could-israel-survive-without-
america-636298]

Theimportance of the United States to Israel’s national security cannot be overstated. Washington is usually
the first, and often the sole, port of call for strategic consultation – almost always the foremost one, and inevitably the primary means of addressing the challenges Israel faces.
America is the be-all and end-all of most policy deliberations in Israeli national-security decision-making forums. Some four decades into this “ special relationship ,” the

price of a truly remarkable partnership has been a significant loss of Israeli independence . Indeed, Israel’s dependence on the
US has become so deep that it is questionable whether the country could even survive today without it. For Americans and Israelis alike, these are controversial assertions. Many Americans are critical of what they perceive to be
ongoing Israeli disregard for US policy preferences, and even acts of defiance, despite an entirely asymmetric relationship and vast American aid. This is particularly true at a time when Israel is led by a hardline government. Israelis,
for their part, do not wish to be this dependent on a foreign power, even one as friendly and well meaning towards Israel as the US, and they view Israel’s ongoing freedom of decision and manoeuvre as vital to its national security.
Women soldiers are coated in mud and wear branches in their helmets as their infantry instructors' course learns about camouflage during the field craft week of their training May 19, 2005 at an army base near Beersheva in Israel's
southern desert, photo distributed by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) May 23, 2005. Chuck Freilich writes that as Israel’s international isolation has grown, its dependence on US diplomatic cover has become almost complete. Total
American assistance to Israel, from its establishment in 1949 up to 2016, amounts to approximately $125 billion, a whopping sum, making Israel the largest beneficiary of American aid in the post-Second World War era.1 By the end
of the ten-year military-aid package recently agreed for 2019–28, the total figure will be nearly $170bn. US aid in recent years has accounted for some 3 percent of Israel’s total national budget, and 1 percent of its GDP.2 As such, its
termination would require significant belt-tightening and painful cuts to Israel’s already overstretched budget for domestic needs, such as health and education, which would inflame social tensions. It would not, however, pose an

US aid has constituted approximately 20 percent

insurmountable challenge to Israel’s national economy. The true impact would be on Israel’s defence budget. In recent years,

of Israel’s total defence budget (which includes pensions, and care and compensation for wounded veterans and widows), or 40 percent of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) budget,3 and almost the
entire procurement budget. Termination would thus have a devastating impact on Israel’s defence posture, unless a major reordering of national priorities took place, with profound economic and societal ramifications. Unlike Israel’s
adversaries, who can procure weapons from numerous sources with few political constraints, Israel’s reliance on the US is critical. None of the other major arms producers today – Britain, France, Russia, China – would, or could,

the US is committed by statute to

replace the US. Certainly, none would be willing to provide the funding, and, in any event, there is no qualitative substitute for American arms. Indeed,

preserving Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME: that is, “the ability to counter and defeat any credible
conventional military threat from any individual state, or possible coalition of states, or from non-state actors, while sustaining minimal damage and casualties …
including weapons … superior in capability to those of such other individual or possible coalitions of states and non-

state actors”).4 Israel apparently enjoys a de facto US security guarantee, an important addition to its own
deterrent capabilities at all times, but one which may prove critical in the future, for example, if the nightmarish – but possible – scenario of a Middle
East with multiple nuclear actors emerges. No other country would or could address Iran’s nuclear program, a potentially existential threat for Israel, as the US did, even if there were eventual differences over the means of doing so.
No other country would have helped Israel build a rocket and missile shield, the only one of its kind in the world, or have engaged (reportedly) in joint offensive cyber operations. The US further provides Israel with a link to its global
satellite missile launch surveillance system, which gives it an invaluable extra few minutes of warning time, enabling civilians to take shelter, and the IDF to prepare and take countermeasures. The military relationship also includes
extensive bilateral exercises, allowing the IDF to learn some of the most advanced tactics in the world. Some of the exercises have been multilateral, thereby contributing to the strengthening of Israel’s foreign relations, in some cases

two countries engage in a wide variety

with strategic importance. The US has prepositioned a large store of weapons and munitions in Israel, to which Israel has partial access,5 and the

of counter-terrorism, homeland-security and counter-proliferation measures . Unequivocal American

support for Israel during the 2006 war in Lebanon made it the first military confrontation in the history of the Arab–Israeli
conflict in which Israel did not face constraints of ‘diplomatic time’. The US and Israel conduct unusually close and intensive strategic dialogue and
planning. On the Iranian nuclear program in particular, the two countries engaged in a broad, largely unprecedented strategic conversation for some 20 years. Other issues have included, inter alia, the Iraqi, Syrian and Libyan
programs for weapons of mass destruction, the situation in Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas, the Palestinian issue and much more. Intelligence cooperation – an area in which the US also benefits greatly from the relationship, but which is
critical for Israel – is broad. On the diplomatic level, too, the US is truly the indispensable nation for Israel, with no alternative for the foreseeable future. The US has used its diplomatic clout in a variety of international forums to
protect Israel from an endless array of injurious resolutions regarding the peace process, various Israeli military and diplomatic initiatives and, of particular note, its purported nuclear capabilities.6 No other permanent member of the
Security Council would repeatedly use its veto, as the United States has done, to shield Israel from such resolutions, including possible sanctions, even over policies with which it has sometimes disagreed. Between 1954 and 2011, the
US vetoed a total of some 40 one-sided or clearly anti-Israeli resolutions.7 Nothing better demonstrates Israel’s dependence on the US in international forums, where America is often nearly its sole supporter, than the angst and
distress it experienced when the US merely abstained, for the first time, from a Security Council resolution condemning the settlements in December 2016. As Israel’s international isolation has grown, its dependence on US
diplomatic cover has become almost complete. No other country will work so closely with Israel, as the US has for decades, to promote peace with its neighbours, on terms acceptable to Israel. No other country has so persistently and
emphatically supported Israel’s demand that a final agreement with the Palestinians provide for its security, recognise Israel’s fundamental character as the nation-state of the Jewish people and reject the Palestinian demand for a so-
called “right of return.” Although the US has long been committed to an Israeli withdrawal from most of the territories it acquired in 1967, it has historically backed Israel’s view that UN Security Council Resolution 242, the bedrock
resolution on which all peace negotiations between Israel and its Arab interlocutors have been based, allows for some limited territorial changes, such as inclusion of the “settlement blocs” in Israel. The US exerted considerable efforts
to help build the Israeli–Turkish relationship in its heyday and to revive it in recent years. It has supported Israel’s successful efforts to develop good relations with Azerbaijan, as well as its acceptance in international and regional
forums, such as the OECD and the Western European and Others Working Group (WEOG) in the UN. As part of a policy designed both to build a supporting regional framework for the peace process, and to promote Israel’s regional
and international standing, the US has worked to help Israel improve relations with Jordan and Egypt, as well as the Gulf and North African countries. One effort worthy of particular note was the establishment of Qualifying Industrial
Zones in Jordan and Egypt, which had a major effect on Israeli trade with them. Israel’s vibrant economy is also deeply dependent on the US, its largest trading partner and with whom it enjoys a free-trade agreement, the first the US
signed with any country. Israel’s high-tech sector, of which it is justifiably proud, exists and flourishes largely because of the relationship with the US. Does Israel act independently? From the vantage point of contemporary readers, it
may be surprising to learn that the US–Israeli relationship was actually quite limited and even cool until the late 1960s. It then evolved into a more classic patron-client relationship in the 1970s, and only in the 1980s started to become
the institutionalised, strategic relationship that we know today. For the most part, as a small actor facing numerous and often severe threats, but with limited influence of its own, reliance on the US has become the panacea for virtually
all of Israel’s national-security challenges. Israel can and does appeal to other countries, but this is usually of marginal utility, and what the US cannot achieve, Israel almost certainly cannot, so there has often been limited interest in
even trying. Whether on the peace process, in which there has been competition with the Arab side for American favour, the Iranian nuclear programme, other issues of regional WMD proliferation, terrorism, efforts to delegitimize

the US and Israel long ago reached an unwritten

and impose sanctions on Israel, and just about everything else, turning to Washington has been Israel’s primary recourse. In effect,

understanding. The US provides Israel with massive military assistance, a de facto security guarantee, broad but not total diplomatic
support and (previously) economic assistance. In exchange, Israel is expected to consult with Washington on issues of importance

prior to taking action, demonstrate military restraint and diplomatic moderation , even make some
concessions, and accord the American position overriding importance. Israel certainly does act independently at times, probably more often than one might expect in a totally asymmetric relationship such as this. With a
few exceptions, however, US policy has been the primary determining factor in virtually all major national-security decisions Israel has made ever since the special relationship emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, and in many cases long

On matters pertaining to major military operations, Israel virtually always accords primacy to the
before then.

US position, and it does so on most diplomatic issues as well . In 1967, at a time when US–Israeli relations were still quite limited, the Israelis only went to war
after president Lyndon Johnson informed them that he would not be able to fulfil the earlier US commitment to open the Straits of Tiran, which Egypt had closed to Israeli shipping, and arguably provided an “amber light” for Israeli
action. In 1973, the primary reason Israel refrained from conducting a pre-emptive strike, even once it had become clear that an Egyptian and Syrian attack was imminent, was the fear of the American response. Israel only launched
the 1982 Lebanon war after at least partially convincing the US of the need for a large scale military operation, a process which took the better part of a year. In 1991, Israel refrained from responding to Iraqi missile attacks largely
due to American pressure. The American demand that Israel refrain from attacking Lebanon’s civil infrastructure during the 2006 war left the IDF without a viable military strategy, and was one of the primary reasons for the
difficulties Israel encountered. Concern over a potential lack of support by the incoming Obama administration led Israel to terminate the 2008 operation in Gaza earlier than intended. Israel’s decision to refrain from a strike on the
Iranian nuclear programme, even though it considered it an existential threat, is a particularly important example of the primacy it accords the US position, and especially of the need for American support for major military action.
American opposition was not the only factor in Israel’s calculus, but it was certainly a decisive one. Some also question whether there was any viable military option available and thus believe that the nuclear deal, negotiated by the
US, was actually the least bad outcome for Israel – again demonstrating its dependence on the US, even in the face of existential danger.8 Israel’s reported strike against a covert Syrian nuclear reactor in 2008 was conducted only after
intensive consultations and with considerable US support.9 The Israeli strike on the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak in 1981 is typically cited by critics as the pre-eminent example of independent Israeli military action. The US was not
apprised of Israel’s operational intentions, but the issue had long been on the agenda and was discussed intensively at senior levels. On the peace process, too, the American position has had an enormous impact on Israel’s positions, if
not quite as decisively as on military matters. With the important exception of the initial Oslo Agreement, Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres closely coordinated with the United States on Israel’s positions in the negotiations with the
Palestinians and Syrians in the early 1990s. Ehud Barak met with Bill Clinton just days after assuming office to gain American support for his highly ambitious plan for achieving peace with both the Palestinians and Syrians within a
year. He then spent the following year in extraordinarily close consultation with Clinton, meeting with him on a number of occasions and often speaking with him and other top American officials a number of times a day. Indeed,
Barak’s entire strategy and bargaining posture at the Camp David Summit in 2000, and again prior to the “Clinton Parameters” later that year, was predicated on maximal alignment with the US. In 2005, Ariel Sharon closely
coordinated with the US on Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Gaza. In fact, it was American preferences that led to his decision to fully withdraw from Gaza and dismantle all of the settlements there as well as four in the West Bank.
Ehud Olmert, similarly, closely coordinated with the US on his positions, both at the Annapolis Conference and in regard to his far-reaching proposal to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in 2008. The only areas in which Israeli
governments have truly taken independent positions in recent decades relate to the future of the West Bank, primarily the issues of Jerusalem and the settlements; in the past the Golan Heights; and, under Benjamin Netanyahu, Iran. It
is important to stress that an overwhelming majority of the Israeli electorate is deeply attached to Jerusalem, which it views as the very heart of Judaism and Israel’s renewed statehood. The settlements are of supreme ideological
importance for about one-third of the electorate, a large, highly motivated and very well-organised minority, and almost all Israelis share a deep-seated concern about the security ramifications of a possible future withdrawal from the
West Bank. As for the Golan Heights, there is an overwhelming public consensus in Israel that the territory is critical to its security. Iran, for its part, is viewed by the entire political spectrum as an existential threat, or one that is
potentially so.10 There is a common thread to these cases of Israeli independence – they are all matters either of existential consequence, or of great ideological importance for the Israeli electorate. Unless one expects total Israeli
subservience, it is appropriate for Israel to set its own course on such matters. Even in purely practical political terms, no leader in any democracy could afford to take such deep public sentiment lightly. Furthermore, even the most

Even Netanyahu, who was embattled with the

right-wing premiers have refrained from annexing the West Bank, generally done their best to minimise differences with the US and imposed restraints on settlements.

US like no other premier, agreed to a ten-month settlement freeze at the beginning of his premiership and reigned in
settlement activity thereafter. Most other premiers pursued policies that were closely aligned with those of the US, and Rabin, Barak and Sharon even greatly exceeded American expectations. Israel
can still respond on its own to limited events on its borders, but most military and strategic issues beyond that, and almost all important diplomatic ones, require prior consultation and, in practice, adherence to the American line.

Disagreements on the settlements and the status of Jerusalem have obscured the broader reality: that in most cases Israel does accord clear primacy to American policy .
Could Israel survive without America? Desperate times call for desperate measures and, in extremis, Israel might
The current Israeli government is the exception to the rule.

be able to “tough it out,” virtually alone, in a globalized world. Israel survived, even thrived, without significant US support during its
early decades; the strategic circumstances it faces today, though still severe, are far better; and it is far stronger militarily and economically. Perhaps it could survive. There is no doubt,
however, that this would be, at a bare minimum, an infinitely tougher existence, far less secure and much
poorer – an existence no one in Israel, including the right, wishes to return to. In realistic political terms, it would be almost impossible. Overall support for Israel in the US remains high, but political and demographic trends
already under way are likely to have a deleterious impact on the relationship in the future.11 One of the primary sources of American support for Israel has been its historically bipartisan nature. In recent years, however, even before
the dramatic confrontation over the 2015 Iran nuclear deal greatly accentuated the problem, Republicans and conservatives have become far more supportive of Israel than Democrats and liberals. There is nothing wrong with rising
support for Israel on the right – but the loss of support on the left, and the identification of Israel as a partisan issue, should be of deep concern. A decline in support for Israel has also taken place among young Americans, who are
significantly less likely to sympathise with Israel today than the American public as a whole, primarily due to the Palestinian issue. The medium- to long-term consequences may be significant, as these young people, already important
as voters, gain positions of influence. A similarly problematic process is under way among young Jewish Americans, whose sense of Jewish identity generally, and identification with Israel, is far weaker than that of their elders. Low
birth rates, intermarriage and assimilation undermine the strength and support of the Jewish community, the irreplaceable bedrock of support for Israel in the US. The Hispanic population, already the largest minority group in the US
today, and the religiously unaffiliated, the two groups among whom support for Israel is the lowest, are both growing rapidly.12 Some Jewish-American and Israeli critics believe president Obama to have been less friendly towards
Israel than his predecessors. This is a debatable contention, but to the extent that it was true, the real question is whether Obama was an exception, or heralded a long-term trend, possibly obscured by Trump’s election. Obama was a

The
product of an American generation that came of age with a very different conception of Israel than its predecessors and greater sympathy for the Palestinians. Trump may or may not prove more friendly to Israel.

crucial question is how Israel should position itself for an era, not of actively hostile presidents, but of
ones who may lack the instinctive warmth and support of many of their predecessors. It is important to stress that Israel is unlikely
to ever “lose” the United States. The political and cultural foundations of the relationship are sufficiently strong so that a US abandonment of Israel is virtually unthinkable. Moreover, the US is deeply invested in Israel’s existence and

the degree of
security, and the strategic relationship has become so institutionalised, that it would be difficult for the US to simply walk away. Israel can thus count on long-term American support for its security. But

support may change, and even a marginal change would have profound ramifications for Israeli
national security.

Maintaining Israel’s status as our strong and most vital ally checks a litany of
impacts---Middle East stability, terrorism, and allied credibility
Glick 10 – [Caroline B. Glick is the senior Middle East Fellow at the Center for Security Policy in Washington, DC and the
deputy managing editor of The Jerusalem Post, “The Strategic Foundations of the US-Israel Alliance,” April 23, 2010,
http://www.jewishworldreview.com/0410/glick042310.php3?printer_friendly]

Israel's status as the US's most vital ally in the Middle East has been so widely recognized for so long that
over the years, Israeli and American leaders alike have felt it unnecessary to explain what it is about the alliance that makes it so important for the US. Today, as the Obama administration is
openly distancing the US from Israel while giving the impression that Israel is a strategic impediment to the administration's attempts to strengthen its relations with the Arab world, recalling
why Israel is the US's most important ally in the Middle East has become a matter of some urgency. Much is made of the fact that Israel is a democracy. But we seldom consider why the fact that
Israel is a representative democracy matters. The fact that Israel is a democracy means that its alliance with America reflects the will of the Israeli people. As such, it remains constant regardless

of who is power in Jerusalem. All of the US's other alliances in the Middle East are with authoritarian regimes
whose people do not share the pro-American views of their leaders. The death of leaders or other political developments are liable

to bring about rapid and dramatic changes in their relations with the US. For instance, until 1979, Iran was one of the US's closest strategic allies in the
region. Owing to the gap between the Iranian people and their leadership, the Islamic revolution put an end to the US-Iran alliance. Egypt flipped from a bitter foe to an ally of the US when
Gamal Abdel Nasser died in 1969. Octogenarian President Hosni Mubarak's encroaching death is liable to cause a similar shift in the opposite direction. Instability in the Hashemite kingdom in

.
Jordan and the Saudi regime could transform those countries from allies to adversaries. Only Israel, where the government reflects the will of the people is a reliable, permanent US ally

America reaps the benefits of its alliance with Israel every day. As the US suffers from chronic
intelligence gaps, Israel remains the US's most reliable source for accurate intelligence on the
US's enemies in the region. Israel is the US's only ally in the Middle East that always fights its
own battles. Indeed, Israel has never asked the US for direct military assistance in time of war. Since the US and Israel share the same
regional foes, when Israel is called upon to fight its enemies, its successes redound to the US's
benefit. Here it bears recalling Israel's June 1982 destruction of Syria's Soviet-made anti-aircraft batteries and the Syrian air force. Those stunning Israeli achievements were the first clear
demonstration of the absolute superiority of US military technology over Soviet military technology. Many have argued that it was this Israeli demonstration of Soviet technological inferiority

Israeli technological achievements -

that convinced the Reagan administration it was possible to win the Cold War. In both military and non-military spheres,

often developed with US support - are shared with America. The benefits the US has gained
from Israeli technological advances in everything from medical equipment to microchips to
pilotless aircraft are without peer worldwide. Beyond the daily benefits the US enjoys from its
close ties with Israel, the US has three fundamental, permanent, vital national security interests
in the Middle East. A strong Israel is a prerequisite for securing all of these interests . America's three permanent
strategic interests in the Middle East are as follows: 1 - Ensuring the smooth flow of affordable petroleum products from the

region to global consumers through the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Aden and the Suez Canal. 2 - Preventing the most radical
regimes, sub-state and non-state actors from acquiring the means to cause catastrophic harm. 3 -
Maintaining the US's capacity to project its power to the region. A strong Israel is the best
guarantor of all of these interests. Indeed, the stronger Israel is, the more secure these vital American interests are. Three permanent and unique aspects to Israel's
regional position dictate this state of affairs. 1 - As the first target of the most radical regimes and radical sub-state actors in the region, Israel has a permanent, existential interest in preventing
these regimes and sub-state actors from acquiring the means to cause catastrophic harm. Israel's 1981 airstrike that destroyed Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor prevented Iraq from acquiring nuclear
weapons. Despite US condemnation at the time, the US later acknowledged that the strike was a necessary precondition to the success of Operation Desert Storm ten years later. Richard Cheney -
who served as secretary of defense during Operation Desert Storm - has stated that if Iraq had been a nuclear power in 1991, the US would have been hard pressed to eject Saddam Hussein's Iraqi
army from Kuwait and so block his regime from asserting control over oil supplies in the Persian Gulf. 2 - Israel is a non-expansionist state and its neighbors know it. In its 62 year history, Israel
has only controlled territory vital for its national security and territory that was legally allotted to it in the 1922 League of Nations Mandate which has never been abrogated or superseded. Israel's
strength, which it has used only in self-defense, is inherently non-threatening. Far from destabilizing the region, a strong Israel stabilizes the Middle East by deterring the most radical actors from
attacking. In 1970, Israel blocked Syria's bid to use the PLO to overthrow the Hashemite regime in Jordan. Israel's threat to attack Syria not only saved the Hashemites then, it has deterred Syria
from attempting to overthrow the Jordanian regime ever since. Similarly, Israel's neighbors understand that its purported nuclear arsenal is a weapon of national survival and hence they view it as
non-threatening. This is the reason Israel's alleged nuclear arsenal has never spurred a regional nuclear arms race. In stark contrast, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, a regional nuclear arms race

Although they will never admit it, Israel's non-radical neighbors feel more secure when
will ensue immediately.

Israel is strong. On the other hand, the region's most radical regimes and non-state actors will always seek to emasculate Israel. 3-- Since as the Jewish state Israel is the regional
bogeyman, no Arab state will agree to form a permanent alliance with it. Hence, Israel will never be in a position to join forces with another nation against a third nation. In contrast, the
Egyptian-Syrian United Arab Republic of the 1960s was formed to attack Israel. Today, the Syrian-Iranian alliance is an inherently aggressive alliance against Israel and the non-radical Arab

Recognizing the stabilizing force of a strong Israel, the moderate states of the region
states in the region.

prefer for Israel to remain strong. From the US's perspective, far from impairing its alliance-
making capabilities in the region, by providing military assistance to Israel, America isn't just
strengthening the most stabilizing force in the region. It is showing all states and non-state actors
in the greater Middle East it is trustworthy. On the other hand, every time the US seeks to attenuate its ties
with Israel, it is viewed as an untrustworthy ally by the nations of the Middle East. US hostility towards Israel causes
A strong Israel empowers
Israel's neighbors to hedge their bets by distancing themselves from the US lest America abandon them to their neighboring adversaries.

the relatively moderate actors in the region to stand up to the radical actors in the region because
they trust Israel to keep the radicals in check. Today's regional balance of power in which the
moderates have the upper hand over the radicals is predicated on a strong Israel. On the other
hand, when Israel is weakened the radical forces are emboldened to threaten the status quo.
Regional stability is thrown asunder. Wars become more likely. Attacks on oil resources increase . The
most radical sub-state actors and regimes are emboldened. To the extent that the two-state solution assumes that Israel must contract itself
to within the indefensible 1949 ceasefire lines, and allow a hostile Palestinian state allied with terrorist organizations to take power in the areas it vacates, the two-state solution is predicated on
making Israel weak and empowering radicals. In light of this, the two-state solution as presently constituted is antithetical to America's most vital strategic interests in the Middle East.

When we bear in mind the foundations for the US's alliance with Israel, it is obvious that US
support for Israel over the years has been the most cost-effective national security investment in
post-World War II US history.

ME counter-terror key to prevent CBRNE attacks

Schoeberl 18 – [Richard, Program Chair of Criminology and Homeland Security at Martin Methodist College; over 22
years of security and law enforcement experience, including the FBI and the CIA’s National Counterterrorism Center; acting unit
chief of the International Terrorism Operations Section, “CBRNE Weapons & Islamic State – A Bad Combination,” Domestic
Prepardness, April 25, 2018, https://www.domesticpreparedness.com/resilience/cbrne-weapons-islamic-state-a-bad-combination]

The black market would be a clear path for the Islamic State to obtain materials that could be used in a CBRNE
attack. In 2015, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Moldovan investigators ran a sting operation against a suspected
arms smuggler in Moldovia attempting to sell to what he thought was a representative from the Islamic State high-grade
uranium (Cesium 137). The smuggler was intentionally seeking a Middle Eastern buyer, so the weapon could be
used on “the Americans.” As indicated in the recent 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment Intelligence report,
produced by the Director of National Intelligence, both state and non-state actors have already demonstrated the
development and use of CBRNE weaponry. The report emphasizes that, “chemical materials and technologies –
almost always dual-use – move easily in the globalized economy, as do personnel with the scientific
expertise to design and use them for legitimate and illegitimate purposes.” The Islamic State is the first non-state actor to
combine a projectile delivery system with a banned chemical warfare agent, according to the Combating Terrorism
Center. According to a NATO Review report, there is a “very real – but not yet fully identified risk – of foreign
fighters in the Islamic State’s ranks using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) materials as
weapons of terror against the West.” Like al-Qaida, the Islamic State has also sought the use of chemical and
biological weapons. Although al-Qaida’s efforts were merely aspirational at best, the Islamic State actually achieved the goal
of chemical weapon acquisition. During congressional testimony in 2016, the then Director of National Intelligence James Clapper
stated that the Islamic State’s use of chemical weapons is the first time a terrorist organization has done such since 1995, when the organization
Aum Shinrikyo used sarin gas on the subway in Tokyo. The United Nations has been investigating the use of chemical weapons in Syria and Iraq
and have concluded the Islamic State has acquired and used chemical weapons on many occasions. According to the 2018 Worldwide Threat
Assessment, the Islamic State has been previously linked to sulfur mustard attacks and several chemical weapons attacks within Syria and Iraq.
Experts believe the Islamic State’s arsenal of weapons includes mustard gas and chlorine. Michael Morell, former Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) deputy and acting director, stated that “ISIS
has for some time said that they want to acquire weapons of mass
destruction and to use them and they’ve actually been able to manufacture chemical weapons in Iraq and Syria
and use them on the battlefield.” Following a thwarted attack in Paris, France, in 2015, then French Prime Minister Manuel Valls
discussed before Parliament the possibility of the Islamic State using CBRNE weaponry against the West, saying, “I say it with all the
precautions needed. But we know and bear in mind that there is also a risk of chemical or bacteriological weapons.” The West has reason to be
with the Islamic State’s desire to employ CBRNE attacks. A laptop was recovered in the battlefield in 2014 from an Islamic
State stronghold inside Syria. Information within the laptop, aside from jihadist instructional propaganda on bomb making, was
a 19-page instructional document discussing the development of biological weapons and instructions on
how to weaponize the bubonic plague. The laptop also contained a 26-page fatwa on the use of weapons of
mass destruction and a passage from Saudi jihadi cleric Nasir al-Fahd stating, “If Muslims cannot defeat the kafir (unbelievers) in a different
way, it is permissible to use weapons of mass destruction, even if it kills all of them and wipes them and their descendants off the face of the
Earth.” Officials believe the laptop belongs to a Tunisian national who was studying chemistry and physics and was teaching himself biological
weaponry. According to NATO Review, an unsettling concern is that the Islamic State had previously stolen 90 pounds of
enriched uranium from Mosul University in Iraq. Although it would be extremely difficult for a member or someone
pledging their allegiance to the Islamic State to smuggle a CBRNE weapon into the country, the fear looming is that
someone already in the country who is radicalized is provided instructions on how to build such
weapons.

Declining Israeli assurances cause pre-emptive strikes on Iran

Murdock 9 – Clark A. Murdock, (Senior Advisor at CSIS, November 2009, “Exploring the Nuclear Posture Implications of
Extended Deterrence and Assurance,” http://csis.org/files/publication/091218_nuclear_posture.pdf)

U.S. security assurances to Israel probably have their greatest impact on Israel’s calculus on whether it
should act preventively (as it did in the past against Iraq and Syria) against Iran. Former Israeli Deputy National Security Adviser
Chuck Freilich argues that “Israel’s understanding of American strategy…would affect Israel’s determination to
act unilaterally…[and] Israel’s willingness to discuss options for living with a nuclear Iran would be
affected by a better appreciation of American strategy and of the deterrent options the United States
would be willing to consider.”145 In whatever form they may take, U.S. statements and actions that strengthen
Israel’s confidence in U.S. assurances, both in preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and coping with a nuclear Iran,
will make it less likely that Israel will feel compelled to preemptively attack Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Recent developments – particularly in missile defense cooperation – appear to be helping in this regard. In a stark change of tone, Israeli Defense
Minister Eduh Barak was recently quoted saying, "Israel is strong and I do not see anyone capable of representing a threat to our existence…right
now is the moment for diplomacy.”146 The Washington Post reported that this strength is derived from three parts: “its nuclear capabilities…the
assumption that the United States would stand behind Israel if it came under attack…[and] the calculation that enough of the country’s air bases
and military facilities would survive a first strike to retaliate effectively.”
Arab-Israel interest convergence is unstable and set to decline---only QME can
prevent conflict
Arad 17 – Shimon Arad – {Shimon Arad is a Ph.D. student at the School of Political Science at the University of Haifa. His
last position was Head of the Strategic Planning Unit in the Political-Military and Policy Bureau of the Israeli Ministry of
Defense. 6-1-2017. “Is America Fueling an Arab-Israeli Arms Race?” https://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/america-fueling-
arab-israeli-arms-race-20961?nopaging=1}//JM

The Reversibility of Intentions Paradoxically, the ongoing buildup of advanced Arab aerial capabilities is taking place
at a time when Israel’s relations with Arab states are relatively constructive. The implications of the Iranian nuclear
deal and Tehran’s subversive regional behavior, the fight against the Sunni military extremism of ISIS and others, and
concerns about a resurgence of the Muslim Brotherhood have all created what may be an unprecedented convergence of interests
between Israel and the Sunni Arab states. Subsequently, under present circumstances, it is difficult to imagine the exact contours of a resurgent
hostile Arab Sunni coalition against Israel. However, as the unforeseen regional events since 2011 reaffirm , we need to
be very cautious regarding our ability to assess the directions and swiftness of future developments. Given the
basic hostility towards Israel in Arab public opinion and the absence of people-to-people relations, the
sources of stable nonbelligerence between Israel and the Arab states are weak, and depend upon a temporary
convergence of strategic interests. All the pragmatic Arab states, including Egypt and Jordan, with which Israel has peace treaties,
continue to face significant internal and external challenges. With the Middle East continually demonstrating a propensity
for dramatic changes, the long-term stability of the current accommodative relations between Israel and the Sunni states is far from a
forgone conclusion. A hostile change of intentions towards Israel by these states, possessing large quantities of qualitative
offensive aerial capabilities, could dramatically and rapidly increase the threat to Israel from the air.
Policy Implications The erosion of Israel’s air superiority weakens a traditional military advantage and a prominent
pillar of its deterrent posture. While hostile intentions could develop rapidly, for example, through regime or
leadership change, the time needed for Israel to implement a counterforce buildup would be lengthy. Though
presently assessed as a low-probability scenario, it would come with very high consequences. Therefore, Israel needs a hedging and offset
strategy that would better prepare it for such a contingency. From
a capabilities perspective, Israel needs to remain the
sole recipient of the fifth-generation F-35 in the Middle East well beyond the next decade. This fifth-
generation fighter jet is a qualitative capability that can give Israel relevant advantages if it ever needs to face the impressive array of aerial
capabilities being built by the Arab Sunni countries, and it certainly adds a deterrent value. As time goes by, it will become harder
to retain Israel’s F-35 monopoly. This given the pressures that Lockheed Martin and the Gulf countries will probably bring to bear on the U.S.
administration in the future. Even today, the UAE is signaling its dissatisfaction at the United States’ refusal to sell it the plane, and its recent
outline agreement with Russia to build a next-generation fighter is probably intended to communicate its frustration. Israel
needs to verify
the United States’ commitment that it will remains the sole regional recipient of the F-35 well beyond the
next decade.

Israel would use nukes in each of those scenarios, which escalates---QME disruption
magnifies the risk
Farley 10/7 – (Robert Farley, Assistant Professor, started at the Patterson School in 2005 as a post-doc scholar. He received
his Ph.D. from the University of Washington Department of Political Science in 2004; The National Interest; Unthinkable: Why
Israel Would Fire Nuclear Weapons at Iran; 10/7/19; https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/unthinkable-why-israel-would-fire-
nuclear-weapons-iran-86206) JF

But why might Israel start a nuclear war?

Nuclear Pre-emption

If a hostile power (let’s say Iran, for sake of discussion) appeared to be on the verge of mating nuclear devices with the systems needed to deliver
them, Israel might well consider a preventive nuclear attack. In the case of Iran, we can imagine scenarios in which Israeli
planners would no longer deem a conventional attack sufficiently lethal to destroy or delay the Iranian program.
In such a scenario, and absent direct intervention from the United States, Israel might well decide to undertake a limited nuclear
attack against Iranian facilities. Given that Iran lacks significant ballistic missile defenses, Israel would most likely deliver the nuclear weapons
with its Jericho III intermediate range ballistic missiles. Israel would likely limit its attacks to targets specifically linked with the Iranian nuclear
program, and sufficiently away from civilian areas. Conceivably, since it would be breaking the nuclear taboo anyway, Israel
might target other military facilities and bases for attack, but it is likely that the Israeli government would want to limit the precedent for using
nuclear weapons as much as possible. Would it work? Nuclear weapons would deal more damage than most imaginable conventional attacks, and
would also convey a level of seriousness that might take even the Iranians aback. On the other hand, the active use of nuclear weapons by Israel
would probably heighten the interest of everyone in the region (and potentially across the world) to develop
their own nuclear arsenals Nuclear Transfer One of Israel’s biggest concerns is the idea that a nuclear power (Iran, Pakistan, or North
Korea, presumably) might give or sell a nuclear weapon to a non-governmental organization (NGO). Hamas, Hezbollah, or some other
terrorist group would be harder to deter than a traditional nation-state. Even if a terrorist organization did not
immediately use the weapon against an Israeli target, it could potentially extract concessions that Israel would be unwilling to make. In such a
scenario, Israel might well consider using nuclear weapons in order to forestall a transfer, or destroy the enemy nuclear device after delivery. This
would depend on access to excellent intelligence about the transfer of the device, but it is hardly impossible that the highly professional and
operationally competent Israeli intelligence services could provide such data. Why
go nuclear? The biggest reason would be to
ensure the success of the strike; both the device itself and the people handling the device would be important targets, and a nuclear
attack would ensure their destruction more effectively than even a massive conventional strike (which might well accompany
the nuclear attack). Moreover, committing to the most extreme use forms of the use of force might well deter both the NGO and the originating
state (not to mention any states that facilitated transfer through their borders; hello, Syria!) from attempting another transfer. However, the active
use of nuclear weapons against a non-state actor might look to the world like overkill, and could reaffirm the interest of the source of the nuclear
device in causing more problems for Israel. Conventional Defeat The idea that Israel might lose a conventional war seems ridiculous now, but the
origins of the Israeli nuclear program lay in the fear that the Arab states would develop a decisive military advantage that they could use to inflict
battlefield defeats. This came close to happening during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, as the Egyptian Army seized the Suez Canal and the Syrian
Arab Army advanced into the Golan Heights. Accounts on how seriously Israel debated using nukes during that war remain murky, but there is
no question that Israel could consider using its most powerful weapons if the conventional balance tipped decisively out of its favor. How might
that happen? We can imagine a few scenarios, most of which involve an increase in hostility between Israel and its more tolerant
neighbors. Another revolution in Egypt could easily rewrite the security equation on Israel’s southern border; while the
friendship of Saudi Arabia seems secure, political instability could change that; even Turkish policy might shift in a
negative direction. Israel currently has overwhelming conventional military advantages, but these advantages depend
to some extent on a favorable regional strategic environment. Political shifts could leave Israel diplomatically isolated, and
vulnerable once again to conventional attack. In such a situation, nuclear weapons would remain part of the toolkit for
ensuring the survival of the nation. Conclusion It is unlikely, but hardly impossible, that Israel could decide to use
nuclear weapons first in a future conflict . The best way to prevent this from happening is to limit the reasons why Israel might want to use these
weapons, which is to say preventing the further proliferation of nukes. If Israel ever does use nuclear weapons in anger, it will rewrite the diplomatic and security
architecture of the Middle East, and also the nonproliferation architecture of the world as a whole.
 1AC---Air Supremacy
Advantage 3 is Air Supremacy:

Increasing availability of the F-35 is dangerous---Russia and China can train their
radar to make them effectively useless---undermines deterrence
Gady 19 – Franz-Stefan Gady, {Franz-Stefan Gady is a Senior Editor with The Diplomat. He is interviewing Mauro Gilli,
senior researcher in military technology and international security at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology. 7-3-2019.
“Mauro Gilli: Selling the F-35 to Countries Operating the S-400 Is a Bad Idea.” https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/mauro-gilli-
selling-the-f-35-to-countries-operating-the-s-400-is-a-bad-idea/}//JM

The Diplomat: First of all, what is radar and what is stealth? Gilli: Radar is the acronym for Radio Detection And Ranging: it is a system that
permits the detection of an object, such as an aircraft or a ship. It emits electro-magnetic pulses and captures their echo when they bounce back
from “hitting” the surface of an object. Stealth
technology (also known as “Low Observable”) is a set of features aimed at
reducing an object’s observability to enemy sensors such as radar , infrared, and others. Radar is clearly the most
insidious enemy sensor, given that it permits very long-range detection, and thus provides time for other systems such as surface-to-air missiles or
interceptors to be employed against an incoming aircraft. Accordingly, stealth technology aims at defeating first and foremost enemy radars. By
reducing the observability of an aircraft to enemy sensors, stealth
reduces significantly the range at which such an aircraft
can be detected – an F-35 for instance can be detected by the Russian S-400 only when it is about 40 km
away, too late given that the F-35 carries weapons that can strike both aerial and ground targets at a much
longer range. In very simple terms, how do radar and stealth work? Detection is about distinguishing an object from the background. Stealth
is about accomplishing the very opposite: making an object indistinguishable from the background – camouflaging it. In very simple terms, we
can make an analogy between radar detection and visual detection. If I look up in the sky trying to look for an object, I might not detect anything
because the sky is vast while object of interest is going to be very small, especially at long range. Accordingly, distinguishing the object from sky
will be very difficult, especially when one considers clouds, sunlight, birds, smoke, etc. But my chances of detection increase significantly if I
narrow down the area of the sky I have to look at; if I manage to cancel the background disturbances; or if I know what I am looking
for and I manage to make it stand out in comparison to the background. Can you explain the last two points more in
detail? Over a light blue background, like the sky, a light blue object will not stand out, and hence it will be difficult to detect. But if we manage
to change the light blue background into white, the light blue object will stand out much more, thus raising our chances of detecting it. Similarly,
if we manage to change the color of the object form light blue to black, it will stand out more, both over a light blue background and even more
over a white background, thus raising further our chances of detecting the object. This is essentially what radar systems try to accomplish. Long-
range radars help identify the area of the sky where there might be an incoming aircraft. Then, short-range radars will focus on that area trying to
cancel background disturbances while trying to illuminate the incoming aircraft. Stealth
technology tries to accomplish the very
opposite: concealing an aircraft with the surrounding background . It does so by deflecting away rather than
reflecting incoming radar waves (through their smoothened shape, by shielding the engine duct and nozzle, etc.) and by
absorbing them (through special coating called in fact radar-absorbing material). How is this related to the sale of the F-35 aircraft to countries
such as Turkey or, perhaps less realistically, India? To use the previous analogy, by possessing both the F-35 as well as the S-
400, Turkey or India could figure out how to change the color of the F-35 from light blue to black, and in part how to change the color of the
background from light blue to white. To put it more precisely, stealth technology is aimed at reducing the observability to radars operating at
specific angles and at specific frequencies. Bymodulating the frequencies and angles of operations of multiple S-400
systems, one could find the weak spots of the F-35 and, more important, its unique radar returns. By feeding
such data into signal processing software, the chances of detection increases markedly – one country
would be able to more accurately ignore false positives and more carefully avoid false negative. In other words, if you
know what you are looking for, you can more easily find it. Do you mean that concerns about the sales
of the F-35 to India or Turkey would be justified? In general, yes. We have entered a new era of great power
rivalry, and two main rivalries are emerging: The U.S. and its allies on one side, and Russia, China, and
their (very few) allies on the other. The radar system India and Turkey want to buy, the S-400, is produced by Russia and employed by
both Russia and China. In other words, India and Turkey are buying the very radar system the F-35 is intended to defeat. So access to the F-
35 could help Russia and China. Essentially, this is the concern of the U.S. government. Obviously, in conflict a multitude of
factors play a role – electronic warfare, decoys, counterintelligence, and operation planning are all very
important. But given that stealth creates an element of surprise, the U.S. government does not want to run the risk of
losing such an important advantage. This is important also for conventional deterrence: the concern that the F-
35 can be detected more easily or at much longer ranges would significantly weaken the U.S. vis-à-vis Russia and/or
China from a psychological point of view. What do we know about the capabilities of the S-400? Also, how is modern air defense structured to
mitigate the risk of successful sorties by stealth fighters? The S-400 is one of the most advanced air-defense systems in
the world. In part, this is the product of the massive investments in radar technology that the Soviet Union made in the last phase of the Cold
War. Yet, against U.S. stealth aircraft its very remarkable capabilities might still not be enough. A couple of years ago, Aviation Week & Space
Technology gathered public available data and calculated that the S-400 can allegedly detect an approaching F-22 at only 21 km distance (13 mi)
and an approaching F-35 at 34 km (21 mi). The problem is that both aircraft carry air-to-ground missiles with much longer range (64 km, 40 mi).
A recent report by the Swedish Defense Research Agency has cast doubt on some of the capabilities of the S-400, primarily with regard to its
missile range. Shifting to how integrated air defense systems work, search radars (i.e., long-range, but imprecise) help cue fire-control radars
(short-range, but more precise) over a given area where an aircraft is supposed to be approaching. Fire-control radars need to have the time to
track and engage an incoming aircraft. This is why the range of detection is important. If a fire-control radar detects an incoming aircraft only
very late, it might not have enough time to either track or to engage it.

Russia and China only have limited knowledge now, but recovering a jet would
allow them to reverse engineer it and build their own
Lockie 19 – Alex Lockie, {Writer for BusinessInsider. 4-9-2019. “Japan lost an F-35 in the Pacific, and the US is in trouble
if Russia or China find it first.” https://www.businessinsider.com/japan-lost-an-f-35-in-the-pacific-russia-or-china-may-find-it-
first-2019-4}//JM

Basically, if Russia or China, perhaps using their advanced and stealthy submarines to probe the ocean floor, first found the jet,
they would gain a treasure trove of secrets about the most expensive weapons system in the history of the
world. The F-35 crash in the Pacific represents the first-ever opportunity for Russia and China to hunt for one of these planes in the wild
because the jet has crashed only once before, and that time was on US soil. Reverse engineering the technology could allow
Russia and China to build their own versions of the jet, up to a point. "The general shape of the jet is well-
known, as are its performance characteristics so not much to gain there but parts of radar and other sensors would be prime
targets for recover and testing/even attempts at reverse engineering," he added. Russia specifically operates a fleet of
shadowy submarines meant for very deep dives and research. The US and Japan have advanced maritime capabilities to search for the fallen jet
but mostly rely on two of the US's aging rescue and salvage ships and on large nuclear submarines, which may not be ideal for the rescue
mission. As of now, all anyone knows is where the F-35 was last seen flying. It could have continued on for miles, and currents may have
dragged it miles farther. In short, the entire region has a chance at brushing up against some piece of it. Russia and China know what
an F-35 looks like. There's even some evidence China stole plans for the F-35. But even with an F-35 in its hands,
the two countries still lack the advanced manufacturing know-how held in the US.

Saudi is a unique risk---they have a troubling history of proliferating sensitive

military technology
Elbagir et. Al. 19 – Nima Elbagir, award-winning international television correspondent with two Foreign Press
Association Awards, Salma Abdelaziz, Peabody award winning and Emmy nominated Middle East Editor on CNN's
International desk, Mohamed Abo El Gheit, the Mostafa Al Hosseiny Prize for Best Article in 2013, and the Samir Kassir EU
award for Freedom of the Press in 2014, and Laura Smith-Spark, covers Europe, Middle East and Africa news for CNN Digital in
London, February 5th, 2019, “Sold to an ally, lost to an enemy”, CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2019/02/middleeast/yemen-lost-us-arms/, EO

Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners have transferred American-made weapons to al Qaeda-linked fighters,
hardline Salafi militias, and other factions waging war in Yemen, in violation of their agreements with the United States,
a CNN investigation has found. The weapons have also made their way into the hands of Iranian-backed rebels
battling the coalition for control of the country, exposing some of America's sensitive military technology to Tehran and
potentially endangering the lives of US troops in other conflict zones. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates,
its main partner in the war, have
used the US-manufactured weapons as a form of currency to buy the loyalties of
militias or tribes, bolster chosen armed actors, and influence the complex political landscape , according to
local commanders on the ground and analysts who spoke to CNN. By handing off this military equipment to third parties, the Saudi-led coalition
is breaking the terms of its arms sales with the US, according to the Department of Defense. After CNN presented its findings, a US defense
official confirmed there was an ongoing investigation into the issue. The revelations raise fresh questions
about whether the US
has lost control over a key ally presiding over one of the most horrific wars of the past decade, and whether Saudi Arabia is
responsible enough to be allowed to continue buying the sophisticated arms and fighting hardware . Previous
CNN investigations established that US-made weapons were used in a series of deadly Saudi coalition attacks that killed dozens of civilians,
many of them children. The developments also come as Congress, outraged with Riyadh over the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi last year,
considers whether to force an end to the Trump administration's support for the Saudi coalition, which relies on American weapons to conduct its
war. In 2015, Riyadh launched a coalition to oust Iranian-supported Houthi rebels from the country's capital and reinstate the internationally
recognized government of President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi. The war split the country in two, and with it came the weapons -- not just guns,
but anti-tank missiles, armored vehicles, heat-seeking lasers and artillery -- all flooding into an unruly and complex state. Since then, some of
America's "beautiful military equipment," as US President Donald Trump once called it, has been passed on, sold, stolen
or abandoned in Yemen's state of chaos, where murky alliances and fractured politics mean little hope
for any system of accountability or tracking. Some terror groups have gained from the influx of US arms, with the barrier of
entry to advanced weaponry now lowered by the laws of supply and demand. Militia leaders have had ample opportunity to obtain military
hardware in exchange for the manpower to fight the Houthi militias. Arms dealers have flourished, with traders offering to buy or sell anything,
from a US-manufactured rifle to a tank, to the highest bidder. And Iran's
proxies have captured American weapons they can
exploit for vulnerabilities or reverse-engineer for native production.

Fifth generation capabilities are crucial to deterrence and assurance, which solves
every threat, but decline emboldens rivals and causes miscalc and arms races that
escalate.
Brands 18 – Hal Brands, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University
School of Advanced International Studies, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and the Foreign
Policy Research Institute, Ph.D. in history from Yale University. “Chapter 6: Does America Have Enough Hard Power?”
American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump; pp. 129-133.

Much contemporary commentary favors the first option—reducing commitments—and denounces the third as financially ruinous and perhaps
impossible.5 Yet significantly expanding American capabilities would not be nearly as economically onerous as it
may seem. Compared to the alternatives, in fact, this approach represents the best option for sustaining American
primacy and preventing a slide into strategic bankruptcy that will eventually be punished. Since World War II,
the United States has had a military second to none. Since the Cold War, America has committed to having
overwhelming military primacy. The idea, as George W. Bush declared in 2002, that America must possess
“strengths beyond challenge” has featured in every major U.S. strategy document for a quarter century; it has
also been reflected in concrete terms.6 From the early 1990s, for example, the United States consistently accounted for
around 35 to 45 percent of world defense spending and maintained peerless global power-projection capabilities.7
Perhaps more important, U.S. primacy was also unrivaled in key overseas strategic regions—Europe, East Asia,
the Middle East. From thrashing Saddam Hussein’s million-man Iraqi military during Operation Desert Storm, to
deploying—with impunity—two carrier strike groups off Taiwan during the China-Taiwan crisis of 1995– 96,
Washington has been able to project military power superior to anything a regional rival could employ even on
its own geopolitical doorstep. This military dominance has constituted the hard-power backbone of an ambitious
global strategy. After the Cold War, U.S. policymakers committed to averting a return to the unstable
multipolarity of earlier eras, and to perpetuating the more favorable unipolar order. They committed to building
on the successes of the postwar era by further advancing liberal political values and an open international economy,
and to suppressing international scourges such as rogue states, nuclear proliferation, and catastrophic terrorism.
And because they recognized that military force remained the ultima ratio regum, they understood the centrality of military
preponderance. Washington would need the military power necessary to underwrite worldwide alliance
commitments. It would have to preserve substantial overmatch versus any potential great-power rival. It
must be able to answer the sharpest challenges to the international system , such as Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990
or jihadist extremism after 9/11. Finally, because prevailing global norms generally reflect hard-power realities , America
would need the superiority to assure that its own values remained ascendant. It was impolitic to say that U.S. strategy
and the international order required “strengths beyond challenge,” but it was not at all inaccurate. American primacy, moreover, was
eminently affordable. At the height of the Cold War, the U nited States spent over 12 percent of GDP on defense.
Since the mid-1990s, the number has usually been between 3 and 4 percent.8 In a historically favorable international
environment, Washington could enjoy primacy—and its geopolitical fruits—on the cheap. Yet U.S. strategy also heeded, at least until recently,
the fact that there was a limit to how cheaply that primacy could be had. The American military
did shrink significantly during the
1990s, but U.S. officials understood that if Washington cut back too far, its primacy would erode to a point
where it ceased to deliver its geopolitical benefits. Alliances would lose credibility; the stability of key
regions would be eroded; rivals would be emboldened; international crises would go unaddressed.
American primacy was thus like a reasonably priced insurance policy. It required nontrivial expenditures, but protected against far costlier
outcomes.9 Washington paid its insurance premiums for two decades after the Cold War. But more recently American primacy and strategic
solvency have been imperiled. THE DARKENING HORIZON For most of the post–Cold War era, the international system was— by historical
standards—remarkably benign. Dangers existed, and as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated, they could manifest with
horrific effect. But for two decades after the Soviet collapse, the world was characterized by remarkably low
levels of great-power competition, high levels of security in key theaters such as Europe and East Asia, and the
comparative weakness of those “rogue” actors—Iran, Iraq, North Korea, al-Qaeda—who most aggressively
challenged American power. During the 1990s, some observers even spoke of a “strategic pause,” the idea being that the end of the
Cold War had afforded the United States a respite from normal levels of geopolitical danger and competition. Now,
however, the strategic horizon is darkening, due to four factors. First, great-power military competition is back.
The world’s two leading authoritarian powers—China and Russia—are seeking regional hegemony,
contesting global norms such as nonaggression and freedom of navigation, and developing the military
punch to underwrite these ambitions. Notwithstanding severe economic and demographic problems, Russia has conducted a
major military modernization emphasizing nuclear weapons, high-end conventional capabilities, and rapid-
deployment and special operations forces— and utilized many of these capabilities in conflicts in Ukraine and Syria.10
China, meanwhile, has carried out a buildup of historic proportions, with constant-dollar defense outlays rising from US$26
billion in 1995 to US$226 billion in 2016.11 Ominously, these expenditures have funded development of power-projection and
antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) tools necessary to threaten China’s neighbors and complicate U.S. intervention on
their behalf. Washington has grown accustomed to having a generational military lead; Russian and Chinese modernization efforts
are now creating a far more competitive environment. Second, the international outlaws are no longer so weak.
North Korea’s conventional forces have atrophied, but it has amassed a growing nuclear arsenal and is developing an
intercontinental delivery capability that will soon allow it to threaten not just America’s regional allies but also the
continental United States.12 Iran remains a nuclear threshold state, one that continues to develop ballistic
missiles and A2/AD capabilities while employing sectarian and proxy forces across the Middle East. The Islamic
State, for its part, is headed for defeat, but has displayed military capabilities unprecedented for any terrorist group ,
and shown that counterterrorism will continue to place significant operational demands on U.S. forces whether in
this context or in others. Rogue actors have long preoccupied American planners, but the rogues are now more capable than at any time in
decades. Third, thedemocratization of technology has allowed more actors to contest American superiority in
dangerous ways. The spread of antisatellite and cyberwarfare capabilities; the proliferation of man-portable air
defense systems and ballistic missiles; the increasing availability of key elements of the precision-strike complex—
these phenomena have had a military leveling effect by giving weaker actors capabilities which were formerly
unique to technologically advanced states. As such technologies “proliferate worldwide,” Air Force Chief of Staff General
David Goldfein commented in 2016, “the technology and capability gaps between America and our adversaries are closing
dangerously fast.”13 Indeed, as these capabilities spread, fourth-generation systems (such as F-15s and F-16s) may provide
decreasing utility against even non-great-power competitors, and far more fifth-generation capabilities may be
needed to perpetuate American overmatch. Finally, the number of challenges has multiplied. During the 1990s
and early 2000s, Washington faced rogue states and jihadist extremism—but not intense great-power rivalry. America faced conflicts in the
Middle East—but East Asia and Europe were comparatively secure. Now, the old threats still exist—but the more permissive
conditions have vanished. The United States confronts rogue states, lethal jihadist organizations, and great-
power competition; there are severe challenges in all three Eurasian theaters. “I don’t recall a time when
we have been confronted with a more diverse array of threats, whether it’s the nation state threats posed by
Russia and China and particularly their substantial nuclear capabilities, or non-nation states of the likes of ISIL, Al Qaida, etc.,”
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper commented in 2016. Trends in the strategic landscape constituted a veritable
“litany of doom.”14 The United States thus faces not just more significant, but also more numerous, challenges to its
military dominance than it has for at least a quarter century.

Air supremacy prevents crisis escalation globally

Pfaltzgraff 10 – Robert L, Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies at. The Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy and President of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, et al., Final Report of the IFPA-Fletcher
Conference on National Security Strategy and Policy, “Air, Space, & Cyberspace Power in the 21st-Century”, p. xiii-9

THE UNITED STATES AS AN AEROSPACE NATION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

In his address opening the conference, General Norton A. Schwartz, Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF), pointed out how,
with its inherent characteristics of speed, range, and flexibility, airpower has forever changed warfare. Its
advent rendered land and maritime forces vulnerable from the air, thus adding an important new dimension to warfare. Control
of the air has become indispensable to national security because it allows the United States and friendly
forces to maneuver and operate free from enemy air attack. With control of the air the United States can
leverage the advantages of air and space as well as cyberspace. In these interdependent domains the Air
Force possesses unique capabilities for ensuring global mobility, long-range strike, and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). The benefits of airpower extend beyond the air domain, and
operations among the air, land, maritime, space, and cyber domains are increasingly interdependent.
General Schwartz stated that the Air Force’s challenge is to succeed in a protracted struggle against elements of violent
extremism and irreconcilable actors while confronting peer and near-peer rivals. The Air Force must be able to operate with great
precision and lethality across a broad spectrum of conflict that has high and low ends but that defies an orderly taxonomy.
Warfare in the twenty-first century takes on a hybrid complexity, with regular and irregular elements using myriad tools and
tactics. Technology can be an enabler but can also create weaknesses: adversaries with increased access to space and cyberspace
can use emerging technologies against the United States and/or its allies. In addition, the
United States faces the prospect of
the proliferation of precision weapons, including ballistic and cruise missiles as well as increasingly
accurate mortars, rockets, and artillery, which will put U.S. and allied/coalition forces at risk . In response to mounting irregular
warfare challenges American leaders have to adopt innovative and creative strategies. For its part, the USAF must develop airmen who have the creativity to anticipate and plan for this challenging environment. Leadership, intellectual creativity, capacity, and ingenuity, together with
innovative technology, will be crucial to addressing these challenges in a constrained fiscal environment. System Versatility In meeting the broad range of contingencies – high, low, regular, irregular, and hybrid – the Air Force must maintain and develop systems that are versatile, both
functionally (including strike or ISR) and in terms of various employment modes, such as manned versus remotely piloted, and penetrating versus stand-off systems. General Schwartz emphasized the need to be able to operate in conflict settings where there will be demands for persistent ISR
systems able to gain access to, and then loiter in, contested or denied airspace. The targets to be identified and tracked may be mobile or deeply buried, of high value, and difficult to locate without penetrating systems. General Schwartz also called attention to the need for what he described as
a “family of systems” that could be deployed in multiple ways with maximum versatility depending on requirements. Few systems will remain inherently single purpose. Indeed, he emphasized that the Air Force must purposefully design versatility into its new systems, with the majority of
future systems being able to operate in various threat environments. As part of this effort further joint integration and inter-service cooperation to achieve greater air-land and air-sea interoperability will continue to be a strategic necessity. Space Access and Control Space access, control, and
situational awareness remain essential to U.S. national security. As potential rivals develop their own space programs, the United States faces challenges to its unrestricted access to space. Ensuring continuing access to the four global commons – maritime, air, space, and cyberspace – will be
a major challenge in which the USAF has a key role. The Air Force has long recognized the importance of space and is endeavoring to make certain that U.S. requirements in and for space are met and anticipated. Space situational awareness is vital to America’s ability to help evaluate and
attribute attacks. Attribution, of course, is essential to deterrence. The USAF is exploring options to reduce U.S. dependence on the Global Positioning System (GPS), which could become vulnerable to jamming. Promising new technologies, such as “cold atoms,” pseudolites, and imaging
inertial navigation systems that use laser radar are being investigated as means to reduce our vulnerability. Cyber Capabilities The USAF continues to develop cyber capabilities to address opportunities and challenges. Cyber threats present challenges to homeland security and other national
security interests. Key civilian and military networks are vulnerable to cyber attacks. Preparing for cyber warfare and refining critical infrastructure protection and consequence management will require new capabilities, focused training, and greater interagency, international, and private
sector collaboration. Challenges for the Air Force General Schwartz set forth a series of challenges for the Air Force, which he urged conference participants to address. They included: • How can the Air Force better address the growing demand for real-time ISR from remotely piloted
systems, which are providing unprecedented and unmatched situational awareness? • How can the USAF better guarantee the credibility and viability of the nation’s nuclear forces for the complex and uncertain security environment of this century? • What is the way ahead for the next
generation of long-range strike and ISR platforms? What trade-offs, especially between manned and unmanned platforms, should the USAF consider? How can the USAF improve acquisition of such systems? How can the USAF better exploit the advantage of low-observables? • How can
the Air Force better prepare itself to operate in an opposed network environment in which communications and data links will be challenged, including how to assure command and control (C2) in bandwidth-constrained environments? • In counter-land operations, how can the USAF achieve
improved target discrimination in high collateral damage situations? • How should the USAF posture its overseas forces to ensure access? What basing structure, logistical considerations, andprotection measures are required to mitigate emerging anti-access threats? • How can the Air Force
reduce its reliance on GPS to ensure operations in a GPS-denied environment? • How can the USAF lessen its vulnerability to petroleum shortages, rising energy prices, and resulting logistical and operational challenges? • How can the Air Force enhance partnerships with its sister services
and the interagency community? How can it better collaborate with allies and coalition partners to improve support of national security interests? These issues were addressed in subsequent conference sessions. The opening session focused on the multidimensional and dynamic security
setting in which the Air Force will operate in the years ahead. The session included a discussion of the need to prioritize necessary capabilities and to gauge “acceptable risks.” Previous Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDRs) rested on the basic assumption that the United States would be able
to support operations simultaneously or nearly simultaneously in two major regional contingencies, with the additional capacity to respond to smaller disaster-relief and/or stability operations missions. However, while the 2010 QDR1 maintains the need for U.S. forces to operate in two
nearly simultaneous major wars, it places far greater emphasis on the need to address irregular warfare challenges. Its focus is maintaining and rebalancing U.S. force structure to fight the wars in which the United States is engaged today while looking ahead to the emerging security setting.
The QDR further seeks to develop flexible and tailored capabilities to confront an array of smaller-scale contingencies, including natural disasters, perhaps simultaneously, as was the case with the war in Afghanistan, stability operations in Iraq, and the Haiti relief effort. The 2010 QDR
highlights important trends in the global security environment, especially unconventional threats and asymmetric challenges. It suggests that a conflict with a near-peer competitor such as China, or a conflict with Iran, would involve a mix, or hybrid, of capabilities that would test U.S. forces

in very different ways . Although predicting the future security setting is a very difficult if not an impossible exercise, the 2010 QDR outlines
major challenges for the United States and its allies, including technology proliferation and diffusion; anti-
access threats and the shrinking global basing infrastructure; the possibility of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) use against the U.S. homeland and/or against U.S. forces abroad; critical infrastructure protection and the massed
effects of a cyber or space attack; unconventional warfare and irregular challenges; and the emergence of
new issue areas such as Arctic security, U.S. energy dependence, demographic shifts and urbanization,
the potential for resource wars (particularly over access to water), and the erosion or collapse of
governance in weak or failing states. TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION Technology proliferation is accelerating.
Compounding the problem is the reality that existing multilateral and/or international export regimes and controls have
not kept pace with technology, and efforts to constrain access are complicated by dual-use technologies and
chemical/biological agents. The battlefields of the future are likely to be more lethal as combatants take advantage of
commercially based navigation aids for precision guidance and advanced weapons systems and as global and theater
boundaries disappear with longer-range missile systems becoming more common in enemy arsenals. Non-state entities such as
Hezbollah have already used more advanced missile systems to target state adversaries. The proliferation of precision
technologies and longer-range delivery platforms puts the United States and its partners increasingly at risk. This proliferation
also is likely to affect U.S. operations from forward operating locations, placing additional constraints on American force
deployments within the territories of allies. Moreover, as longer-range ballistic and cruise missiles become more widespread,
U.S. forces will find it increasingly difficult to operate in conflicts ranging from irregular warfare to high-intensity combat. As
highlighted throughout the conference, this will require that the United States develop and field new-generation low-observable
penetration assets and related capabilities to operate in non-permissive environments. PROLIFERATION TRENDS The twenty-
first-century security setting features several proliferation trends that were discussed in the opening session. These trends, six of
which were outlined by Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., President of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, and Shelby Cullom
Davis Professor of International Security Studies, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, framed subsequent discussions. First,
the number of actors–states and armed non-state groups–is growing, together with strategies and
capabilities based on more widely available technologies, including WMD and conventional weapons. This is
leading to a blurring of categories of warfare that may include state and non-state actors and encompass intra-state, trans-state,
and inter-state armed conflict as well as hybrid threats. Second, some of these actors subscribe to ideologies and goals that
welcome martyrdom. This raises many questions about dissuasion and deterrence and the need to think of twenty-first-century
deterrence based on offensive and defensive strategies and capabilities. Third, given the sheer numbers of actors capable of
challenging the United States and their unprecedented capabilities, the opportunity for asymmetric operations against the United
States and its allies will grow. The United States will need to work to reduce key areas of vulnerability, including its financial
systems, transportation, communications, and energy infrastructures, its food and water supply, and its space assets. Fourth, the
twenty-first-century world contains flashpoints for state-to-state conflict. This includes North Korea,
which possesses nuclear weapons, and Iran, which is developing them. In addition, China is developing an
impressive array of weaponry which, as the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command stated in congressional testimony, appears
“designed to challenge U.S. freedom of action in the region and, if necessary, enforce China’s influence over its
neighbors – including our regional allies and partners’ weaponry.”2 These threats include ballistic missiles , aircraft,
naval forces, cyber capabilities, anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, and other power-projection capabilities. The global paradigm of
the twenty-first century is further complicated by state actors who may supply advanced arms to non-state actors and terrorist
organizations. Fifth, the
potential for irregular warfare is rising dramatically with the growth of armed non-
state actors. The proliferation of more lethal capabilities, including WMD, to armed non-state actors is a logical
projection of present trends. Substantial numbers of fractured, unstable, and ungoverned states serve as breeding grounds of
armed non-state actors who will resort to various forms of violence and coercion based on irregular tactics and formations and
who will increasingly have the capabilities to do so. Sixth, the twenty-first-century security setting contains yet another obvious
dimension: the permeability of the frontiers of the nation state, rendering domestic populations highly vulnerable to destruction
not only by states that can launch missiles but also by terrorists and other transnational groups. As we have seen in recent years,
these entities can attack U.S. information systems, creating the possibility of a digital Pearl Harbor. Taken together, these trends
show an unprecedented proliferation of actors and advanced capabilities confronting the United States; the resulting need to
prepare for high-end and low-end conflict; and the requirement to think of a seamless web of threats and other security challenges
extending from overseas to domestic locales. Another way to think about the twenty-first-century security setting, Dr. Pfaltzgraff
pointed out, is to develop scenarios such as the following, which are more illustrative than comprehensive: • A
nuclear
Iran that engages in or supports terrorist operations in a more assertive foreign policy • An unstable
Pakistan that loses control of its nuclear weapons, which fall into the hands of extremists • A Taiwan
Straits crisis that escalates to war • A nuclear North Korea that escalates tensions on the Korean
peninsula What all of these have in common is the indispensable role that airpower would play in U.S.
strategy and crisis management.
 1AC---Plan

Thus, the Plan: The United States federal government should substantially reduce
its Foreign Military Sales of F-35 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia.
 1AC---Solvency
Next is Solvency:

Current F15s sales are more than sufficient to retain deterrence, but preventing the
sale of F-35s is the only way to preserve Israeli QME
Arad 1/17 – Shimon Arad, 1-17-2020 {Shimon Arad is a Ph.D. student at the School of Political Science at the University
of Haifa. His last position was Head of the Strategic Planning Unit in the Political-Military and Policy Bureau of the Israeli
Ministry of Defense. “THE UNITED STATES SHOULDN’T SELL THE F-35 TO SAUDI ARABIA.”
https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/the-united-states-shouldnt-sell-the-f-35-to-saudi-arabia/}//JM

In lieu of any other viable alternative, preventing the sale of the F-35 to Arab countries remains the only genuine
way of preserving Israel’s qualitative military edge. This applies not only to the release of fifth-generation offensive
capabilities to Saudi Arabia, but also to the other Gulf States. At the same time, Saudi Arabia’s advanced F-15s are more than
capable of dealing with Iranian threats and provocations, especially with the United States by its side.
These planes far out-perform the aging Iranian F-14s and their munitions are capable of carrying out
precise, standoff attacks against Iranian ground-to-air radars and air-defense systems, as well as destroying Iranian naval
defenses and capabilities.

No fill-in
Arad 1/17 – Shimon Arad, 1-17-2020 {Shimon Arad is a Ph.D. student at the School of Political Science at the University
of Haifa. His last position was Head of the Strategic Planning Unit in the Political-Military and Policy Bureau of the Israeli
Ministry of Defense. “THE UNITED STATES SHOULDN’T SELL THE F-35 TO SAUDI ARABIA.”
https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/the-united-states-shouldnt-sell-the-f-35-to-saudi-arabia/}//JM

American fears of Saudi Arabia turning to Russia, China, or the Europeans for advanced aerial systems if
the F-35 is not released to it, are exaggerated. Purchasing fifth-generation Russian or Chinese fighters
would require a massive overhaul of Saudi Arabia’s air force, and these would be stand-alone platforms
lacking interconnectivity with its backbone of American and British-made 4th generation fighters. Moreover, Russia
or China will not provide the security guarantees that the United States does, at least not at a price that Riyadh will
be willing to pay. Turkey’s removal from the F-35 program because of its purchase of the Russian S-400 may
also serve to deter Saudi Arabia from turning to Russia or China in fear of possible U.S. reprisals.

But even if, they have limited capabilities and are insufficient to take out solvency
Arad 19 – Shimon Arad, 19 {Shimon Arad is a Ph.D. student at the School of Political Science at the University of Haifa.
His last position was Head of the Strategic Planning Unit in the Political-Military and Policy Bureau of the Israeli Ministry of
Defense. 5-31-2019. “The Real Reason You Should Fear Stealth F-35s.” https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/real-reason-you-
should-fear-stealth-f-35s-60347}//JM

A third fallacy is that the Gulf countries have a viable Russian alternative. Even if the Gulf countries and the
Russians were able to develop a fifth-generation fighter, it would be seriously handicapped in the field of
network-enabled operations in the modern battlefield. The United States would not allow such platforms to
communicate with the fourth-generation American made fighters that make up the backbone of the Gulf states’ air forces. A stand-
alone fifth-generation Russian made fighter would thus go against the grain of the requirements for the
battlespace of the future.
Every disad is thumped---we’ve rebuffed Saudi requests for years
Trevithick 17 – Jospeph Trevithick, 17 {Joseph Trevithick is an Fellow at GlobalSecurity.org, specializing in defense and
security research and analysis. 11-13-2017. “Saudis Join UAE in Push to Buy F-35s as Concerns About the Jet's Computer
Network Grow.” https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/16022/saudis-join-uae-in-push-to-buy-f-35s-as-concerns-about-the-
jets-computer-network-grow}//JM

Whatever specific concerns Shamsi has in mind, it is likely that the Saudis share them, as well, driving their own interest in the F-35.
We at The War Zone have long noted that any serious discussions between the United States and UAE would almost certainly prompt a similar
request from authorities in Riyadh. The overall security situation already prompted the U.S. Air Force to begin rotational deployments of F-22
Raptor stealth fighters to Al Dhafra Air Base in in the UAE. Both the Emiratis and the Saudis may feel that their existing fleets of advanced
fourth generation aircraft simply aren't enough to counter the growing threats. Rebuffed
for years in its attempts to join the F-
35 program, authorities in Abu Dhabi have, in the past, said they considered development of a fifth generation fighter
jet important enough to entertain cooperating with Russia on such project.