Talino vs Sandiganbayan

G.R. Nos. L-75511-14, 16 March 1987

DOCTRINE:
It is settled that if a separate trial is allowed to one of two or more defendants, his testimony
therein imputing guilt to any of the co-accused is not admissible against the latter who was not able to
cross-examine him.

FACTS:
Petitioner, along with several others, were charged in four separate informations with estafa
through falsification of public documents for having allegedly conspired to defraud the government in the
total amount of P26,523.00, representing the cost of repairs claimed to have been undertaken, but
actually not needed and never made, on four government vehicles, through falsification of the supporting
papers to authorize the illegal payments. They were tried jointly until Talino, Macadangdang, and Basilio
asked for separate trials which was allowed. The remaining accused continued defending themselves in
the original proceedings.
During the presentation of evidence in such trials, accused Pio Ulat gave damaging testimony
against petitioner, relating in detail his participation in the questioned transactions. In due time, the
Sandiganbayan rendered its decision in all four cases finding Talino, Basilio, Ulat, Macadangdang, and
Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt while absolving the other defendants due to insufficient evidence.
Petitioner filed the petition assailing the decision for being violative of his constitutionally
enshrined right of confrontation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of Ulat was considered as the sole basis by the Sandiganbayan in
rendering its decision against the petitioner

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent court did not consider the testimony given by
Ulat in convicting petitioner. The part of the decision finding Talino guilty made no mention of Ulat at all
but confined itself to the petitioner's own acts in approving the questioned vouchers as proof of his
complicity in the pilot to swindle the government.
While Talino’s duty to initial or sign the vouchers as regards the adequacy of funds may have
been ministerial, his failure to observe the obvious irregularity is clear evidence of his complicity in the
conspiracy. From petitioner’s own declaration, he signed four vouchers in the morning of May 23, 1980
and three more on the afternoon of the same day. They were substitution for three of the ones he already
signed during the morning which, according to him, were disallowed and cancelled. He also claimed that
he had examined the supporting documents of the last three, which, if true, should have raised his
suspicion that the abstract of bids submitted in the afternoon were dated May 18, 15, and 11 respectively
when it was only in the morning of May 23 that the first abstract was submitted. The fact that he readily
approved the substitute vouchers with the substitute winning bidders is a clear indication that he knew he
was facilitating an irregular transaction.
Furthermore, the portion in which petitioner hinged his allegations on were part of the Solicitor
General’s analysis and not the Sandiganbayan’s decision. As far as the Sandiganbayan was concerned,
the said testimony was inadmissible against the petitioner because he "did not cross examine Ulat," and
was not even required to be present when the latter was testifying. In fact, the respondent court even
expressed the wish that Ulat had been presented as rebuttal witness in the separate trial of the petitioner
as there would then have been "no impediment to the use of his testimony against the other accused". As
this was not done, the trial court could not and did not consider Ulat's testimony in determining the
petitioner's part in the offenses.
 People vs. Seneris
G.R. No. L-48883, 6 August 1980
DOCTRINE:
As a general rule, the testimony of a witness given on direct examination should be stricken
where there is not an adequate opportunity for cross examination, as where the witness by reason of his
death, illness or absence cannot be subjected to cross examination. The direct testimony of a witness
who dies before conclusion of the cross examination CAN be stricken only insofar as not covered by the
cross-examination and absence of a witness is NOT enough to warrant striking his testimony for failure to
appear for further cross examination where the witness has already be sufficiently cross examined or the
matter on which further cross examination is sought is not in controversy.

FACTS:
An information for parricide was charged to private respondent Pilar Angeles as principal by
inducement, Mario Nemenio and Salim Doe as principals by direct participation and Moises Julkanain as
accomplice, in the fatal stabbing of Eduardo Pimentel, the lawful husband of private respondent.
In this case, the accused Nemenio entered on arraignment a plea of guilty. Respondent judge
thereafter rendered a judgment convicting the accused Mario of murder. Immediately after promulgation
of judgment, accused Mario offered to testify against his co-accused, herein private respondent, in her
separate trial. Allowed, he testified as prosecution witness that he and Salim were hired by Angeles to kill
her husband for the consideration of Php 3, 000.
The cross-examination for the prosecution witness was held back numerous times amounting to a
delay of two and a half months. The first delay was due to the counsel of the private respondent
requesting to hold the cross-examination in abeyance until he shall have been furnished with the
transcript of the stenographic notes. The second was due to the failure of the prosecution witness to
appear because he was not served with a subpoena. When finally, the cross-examination commenced, it
was not completed due to lack of material time. However, before the next scheduled cross-examination,
Nemenio was shot dead by law enforcers because he allegedly attempted to escape from prison.
The petitioner filed with the court a motion praying for a ruling on the admissibility of the testimony
of deceased witness Mario. The respondent judge issued an order declaring as inadmissible the entire
testimony of the deceased witness Mario on the principal ground that the defense was not able to
complete its cross examination of said witness relying on the case of Ortigas v. Lufthansa.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring as
inadmissible the entire testimony of the deceased

HELD:
Yes. As a general rule, the testimony of a witness given on direct examination should be stricken
where there is not an adequate opportunity for cross examination, as where the witness by reason of his
death, illness or absence cannot be subjected to cross examination. The direct testimony of a witness
who dies before conclusion of the cross examination can be stricken only insofar as not covered by the
cross-examination and absence of a witness is not enough to warrant striking his testimony for failure to
appear for further cross examination where the witness has already be sufficiently cross examined or the
matter on which further cross examination is sought is not in controversy.
The Lufthansa ruling applies only if there is a finding that the cause for non-completion of the
cross-examination of a witness was attributable to the very party offering the said witness. This cannot be
applied in this case because even though it was indeed agents of the state who killed Nemenio, there was
no finding nor any showing as the same is farfetched or inconceivable that the killing of the witness of
petitioner by its own agents was ill-motivated. The cause of the non-completion of the cross-examination
was beyond the control of the prosecution.
Furthermore, the cross-examination was completed insofar as the essential elements of the crime
charged — parricide, fact of killing — is concerned. What remained was merely the cross-examination
regarding the price or reward, which is not an element of parricide, but only an aggravating circumstance.
Therefore, the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in declaring as entirely
inadmissible the testimony of the state witness who died through no fault of any of the parties before his
cross-examination could be finished.
 Roco vs Contreras
G.R. No. 158275, 28 June 2005
DOCTRINE:
Well-settled is the rule that before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court must first be
satisfied that the following requisites are present: (1) the books, documents or other things requested
must appear prima facie relevant to the issue subject of the controversy (test of relevancy); and (2) such
books must be reasonably described by the parties to be readily identified (test of definiteness).

FACTS:
Petitioner Roco, was engaged in the business of buying and selling dressed chicken. Sometime
in 1993, he purchased his supply of dressed chicken from private respondent Cals Corporation, a
domestic corporation controlled and managed Danilo Yap and Vivian De Ocampo. As payment for his
purchases, Roco drew five checks payable to Cals Corporation against his account with the Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB). Cals Corporation deposited the checks in its account with PCIB
but the bank dishonored them for having been drawn against a closed account.
Thereafter, Cals Corporation filed criminal complaints against petitioner for violation of BP 22.
After preliminary investigation, five informations for violation of BP 22 were filed against Roco before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC). But even before trial could commence, Roco filed with the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR) a denunciation letter against Cals Corporation for the latter’s alleged violation of
Section 258 in relation to Section 223 of the National Internal Revenue Code in that it failed to issue
commercial invoices on its sales of merchandise.
Upon BIR’s investigation, it was found that Cals Corporations sales on account were unavoidable,
hence, the corporation had to defer the issuance of Sales Invoices until the purchases of its customers
were paid in full and the investigation disclosed that the same could not, as yet, be issued by the
corporation precisely because the checks drawn and issued by him in payment of his purchases were
dishonored by PCIB for the reason that the checks were drawn against a closed account. Accordingly, the
BIR found no prima facia evidence of tax evasion against Cals Corporation then trial of the criminal cases
proceeded.
After the prosecution rested, the MTCC declared the cases submitted for decision on account of
Roco failure to adduce evidence in his behalf. Later, the same court rendered a judgment of conviction
against Roco. Petitioner filed with the MTCC a "Request for Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum and
Subpoena Duces Tecum", requiring Vivian Deocampo or Danilo Yap, both of Cal's Corporation or their
duly authorized representatives, to appear and testify in court on May 19, 1999 and to bring with them
certain documents, records and books of accounts for the years 1993-1999. His request was denied by
the MTCC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the three courts committed reversible error in denying petitioner’s request for the
issuance of subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum

HELD:
No. Well-settled is the rule that before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court must first be
satisfied that the following requisites are present: (1) the books, documents or other things requested
must appear prima facie relevant to the issue subject of the controversy (test of relevancy); and (2) such
books must be reasonably described by the parties to be readily identified (test of definiteness).
Admittedly, the books and documents that petitioner requested to be subpoenaed are designated and
described in his request with definiteness and readily identifiable satisfying the test of definiteness. It is,
however, in the matter of relevancy of those books and documents to the pending criminal cases that
petitioner miserably failed to discharge his burden.
In cases falling under BP 22, what the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check not the
purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of
issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum. The books and documents that the petitioner is
requesting in the subpoena are therefore immaterial in the case because the issuing of a bouncing check
is prima facie evidence for BP 22.
Furthermore, the irrelevancy of such books and documents would appear on their very face
thereof, what the fact that the requested Audited Income Statements, Audited Balance Sheets, Income
Tax Returns, etc. pertained to the years 1994 to 1999 which could not have reflected petitioner's alleged
payment because the subject transaction happened in 1993.
Rules of Court
Rule 117, Section 7

Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been convicted
or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for
the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which
necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following
instances:
a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission
constituting the former charge;
b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after a plea was
entered in the former complaint or information; or
c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor and of the
offended party except as provided in section 1 (f) of Rule 116.
In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole or in part the judgment,
he shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction for the graver offense.

NOTES:

Jeopardy – The peril in which a person is put when he is regularly charged with a crime before a tribunal
properly organized and competent to try him (People vs Jabajab).

Double Jeopardy – When a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated wither by
acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the express consent of the accused, the latter
cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense (Villareal vs People).

Requisites in Order to Successfully Invoke the Defense of Double Jeopardy:

1. First jeopardy must have attached;
2. First jeopardy must have been terminated; and
3. The second jeopardy must be for the same offense or the second offense includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information or is an attempt or frustration
thereof.

When does the first jeopardy attach?

1. After a valid indictment;
2. Before competent court;
3. After arraignment;
4. When a valid plea has been entered; and
5. When the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.

Dismissal – does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty
Acquittal – always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does
not show defendant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Dismissal with Express Consent – Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce
or in writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its
meaning (People vs Lacson).
General Rule: A dismissal with the express consent of the accused will not bar the prosecution of the
same offense because such consent is considered a valid waiver of his right against double jeopardy
(People vs Salico).

Exception: When a dismissal, even with express consent of the accused, is tantamount to acquittal such
as:
1. Dismissal based on a demurrer to evidence (insufficiency of evidence given by prosecution) filed
by the accused after the prosecution has rested; or
2. Dismissal due to the denial of accused’s right to speedy trial and disposition of the case
(Condrada vs People; Caes vs IAC).

 If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, even if they are considered as different
offenses, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act. (CONST. Art. III, Sec. 21)
 If a single act is punished by two different provisions of law or statutes, but each provision
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not so require, neither conviction
nor acquittal in one will bar a prosecution for the other (Perez vs CA).

Tests for Determining Whether the Two Offenses are Identical: There is identity between two
offenses when the second offence is:
1. The same offense;
2. An attempt to commit the said offense;
3. A frustration of the said offense;
4. Any offense which necessarily includes the first offense charged; or
5. Any offense which necessarily included the first offense charged.

Exceptions to the 4th Rule upon Conviction for the First Offense Charged:
1. The graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission
constituting the former charge;
2. The facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after a plea was
entered in the former complaint or information; or
3. The plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor and of the
offended part; except when the offended party failed to appear during the arraignment.

Exceptions to the Applicability of the Rule against Double Jeopardy:

1. There has been a deprivation of due process;
2. There is a finding of mistrial;
3. There has been a grave abuse of discretion under exceptional circumstances.

Rules of Court
Rule 117, Section 8

Section 8. Provisional dismissal. — A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express
consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or
a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without
the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6)
years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived.

NOTES:

General Rule: Where the case was dismissed “provisionally” with the consent of the accused, he cannot
invoke double jeopardy in another prosecution therefor or where the case was reinstated on a motion for
reconsideration by the prosecution.
Exceptions: Where the dismissal was actually an acquittal based on:
1. Lack or insufficiency of evidence; or
2. Denial of the right to speedy trial, hence even if the accused gave his express consent to such
dismissal or moved for such dismissal, such consent would be immaterial as such dismissal is
actually an acquittal.

Requisites:
1. Express consent of the accused;
2. Notice to the offended party;
3. Court granted the motion;
4. Order of provisional dismissal is served to the public prosecutor.

Express consent – must be positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to
supplying its meaning. The mere inaction or silence of the accused or his failure to object to a provisional
dismissal does not amount to express consent (People vs Lacson).

When does it become permanent: If a case is provisionally dismissed with the consent of the prosecutor
and the offended party, the failure to reinstate or revive it within the given period will make the dismissal
permanent.

Period for Reinstatement

1. Offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 years – 1 year after issuance of the order.
2. Offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than 6 years – 2 years after issuance of the order.

How to Revive a Case:

1. Re-filing the information; or
2. Filing a new information for the same offense or one necessarily included in the original offense
charged.

 State may revive a criminal case beyond the one or two-year periods, provided there is a
justifiable necessity for the delay (Saldariega vs Panganiban).
 The case may be revived or re-filed beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the
accused to oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy or that such revival or re-filing is
barred by the statute of limitations (People vs Lacson).
 If no revival of the case is made within the prescribed time period, the dismissal shall become
permanent (People vs Lacson).

Conditions Sine Qua Non to the Application of the Time-Bar

1. The prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused or both moves for a
provisional dismissal of the case;
2. The offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
3. The court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and
4. The public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of the provisional dismissal of the case
(Co vs New Prosperity Plastic Products).