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Supreme Court: Filemon Sotto For Appellant. J. H. Junquera For Appellee
Supreme Court: Filemon Sotto For Appellant. J. H. Junquera For Appellee
Supreme Court: Filemon Sotto For Appellant. J. H. Junquera For Appellee
SUPREME COURT
Manila Witnesses:
The defendant not having paid the amount due on said contracts; the
plaintiff, upon the 26th day of June, 1906, commenced the present action in
the Court of First Instance of the Province of Cebu. The complaint filed in
said cause alleged the execution and delivery of the above contracts, the
demand for payment, and the failure to pay on the part of the defendant, and
the prayer for a judgment for the amount due on the said contracts. The
defendant answered by filing a general denial and setting up the special
defense of prescription.
The case was finally brought on to trial in the Court of First Instance, and the
only witness produced during the trial was the plaintiff himself. The defendant
did not offer any proof whatever in the lower court.
After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial, the lower court rendered
a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of
P200 with interest at the rate of 18 3/4 per cent per annum, from the 15th day
of November, 1890, and for the sum of P20 with interest at the rate of 18 3/4
per cent per annum, from the 27th day of October, 1891, until the said sums
were paid. From this judgment the defendant appealed.
The lower court found that P50 of the P70 mentioned in Exhibit B had been
borrowed by the defendant, but by one Evaristo Peñares; therefore the
defendant had no responsibility for the payment of the said P50.
The only questions raised by the appellant were questions of fact. The
appellant alleges that the proof adduced during the trial of the cause was not
sufficient to support the findings of the lower court. It was suggested during
the discussion of the case in this court that, in the acknowledgment above
quoted of the indebtedness made by the defendant, she imposed the
condition that she would pay the obligation if she sold her house. If that
statement found in her acknowledgment of the indebtedness should be
regarded as a condition, it was a condition which depended upon her
exclusive will, and is therefore, void. (Art. 1115, Civil Code.) The
acknowledgment, therefore, was an absolute acknowledgment of the
obligation and was sufficient to prevent the statute of limitation from barring
the action upon the original contract.