Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

Author(s): Richard Nixon and William P. Rogers

Source: The International Lawyer, Vol. 6, No. 2 (April 1972), pp. 428-440
Published by: American Bar Association
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 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

MESSAGE
FROM

THE PRESIDENT OF THE

UNITED STATES
TRANSMITTING

The Vienna Convention on the Law of

Treaties Signed for the United States
on April 24, 1970

Letterof Transmitted

The White House

November22, 1971
To theSenateoftheUnitedStates:
I am transmittingherewith,fortheadvice and consentof the Senate to
theViennaConventionon the Law of Treatiessignedforthe
ratification,
UnitedStateson April24, 1970.The Conventionis theoutcomeof many
yearsof carefulpreparatory Law Commission,
workby the International
followedby a two-sessionconferenceof 110 nationsconvenedunder
UnitedNationsauspicesin 1968 and 1969. The conferencewas the sixth
in a seriescalled by theGeneralAssemblyof the UnitedNationsforthe
purposeof encouraging the progressivedevelopmentand codification of
internationallaw.
The growingimportanceof treatiesin the orderlyconduct of in-
ternational relationshas made increasingly evidentthe need for clear,
well-defined,and readilyascertainable law applicable
rulesof international

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 Vienna Convention 429

to treaties. I believe that the codificationof treaty law formulatedby

representativesof the internationalcommunityand embodied in the Vienna
Conventionmeets thisneed.
The internationalcommunityas a whole will surely benefitfrom the
adoption of uniformrules on such subjects as the conclusion and entryinto
force of treaties,their interpretationand application, and other technical
matters.Even more significant, however,are the orderlyprocedures of the
Convention for dealing with needed adjustmentsand changes in treaties,
along with its strongreaffirmation of the basic principlepacta sunt ser-
-
vanda the rule that treatiesare bindingon the parties and must be per-
formedin good faith.The provisionson judicial settlement,arbitrationand
conciliation,includingthe possibilitythata dispute concerninga perempto-
ry normof internationallaw can be referredto the InternationalCourt of
Justice, should do much to enhance the stabilityof treaty relationships
throughoutthe world.
I am enclosing the report of the Secretary of State, describing the
provisionsof the Conventionin detail.
The Vienna Conventioncan be an importanttool in the developmentof
internationallaw. I am pleased to note that it has been endorsed by the
House of Delegates of the American Bar Association and I urge the Senate
to give its advice and consent to ratification.
Richard Nixon

(Enclosures: (1) Report of the Secretary of State. (2) Copy of the

Convention.)

Letterof Submittal

Department of State,
October18, 1971
Washington,
The President,
The WhiteHouse.
The President: I have the honor to submitto you the Vienna Con-
ventionon the Law of Treaties, adopted on May 23, 1969 by the United
Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, and signed for the United
States on April 24, 1970. I recommendthat you transmitit to the Senate
foradvice and consent to ratification.
The Conventionsets fortha generallyagreed body of rules to govern all
aspects of treatymakingand treatyobservance. It is the product of two
sessions of a 110-nation Conference on the Law of Treaties convened in

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430 INTERNATIONALLAWYER

ViennaunderUnitedNationsauspicesfromMarch 21 to May 24, 1968

andfromApril9 to May 23, 1969.
The TreatiesConferencetook as the basis of its work draftarticles
drawnup by theInternational Law Commissionin thecourseof eighteen
years ofwork. At itsfirstsessionin 1949 theCommissionhad selectedthe
law of treatiesas a priority topicforcodification. Growingsupportfora
writtencode of international treatylaw came not only fromnewlyin-
dependentStatesthatwishedto participate in suchan endeavor,butfrom
and
manyolderStatesthatfavoredclarification modernization ofthelaw of
treaties.As a resulttheGeneralAssemblyof the UnitedNationsin 1966
unanimouslyadopted resolution2166 (XXI) conveningthe Law of
TreatiesConference.
The TreatiesConvention whichemergedfromtheViennaConferenceis
an expertlydesignedformulation of contemporary treatylaw and should
contribute importantly to the of
stability treatyrelationships. Althoughnot
yet in force,the Conventionis alreadygenerallyrecognizedas the au-
thoritativeguideto current treatylaw and practice.
The Conventionsets forthrules on such subjectsas conclusionand
entryintoforceof treaties,theobservance,application, and interpretation
oftreaties,anddepositary procedures.Moreimportantly, itcontainsimpar-
tial proceduresfordealingwithdisputesarisingout of assertionsof in-
validity,termination and suspensionof the operationof treaties,thusre-
alizinga basic UnitedStatesobjective.The Conventionconsistsof eight
parts.Proceduresforhandling mostimportant disputesare containedin an
Annex.The majorprovisions oftheConvention are as follows:

PART I -INTRODUCTION

The Convention appliesto treatiesbetweenStates(Article1) butonlyto

treatiesconcludedaftertheentryintoforceoftheConventionwithregard
to suchStates(Article4).
"Treaty"is definedas an international agreementconcludedbetween
States in writtenformand governedby international law, whetherem-
bodiedin a singleinstrument or in two or morerelatedinstruments and
whateveritsparticulardesignation (Article2). Thus it appliesnot onlyto
formaltreatiesbutto agreements in simplified form,such as exchangesof
notes. Article2 also definesothertermsused in the Convention,but
specifiesthatthe Convention'suse of termsis "withoutprejudiceto the
use of thosetermsor to the meaningswhichmaybe givento themin the
internallaw ofanyState."

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 Vienna Convention 43 1

Althoughthe Conventiondoes not apply to unwrittenagreementsor to

agreementsconcluded by or withinternationalorganizations,it asserts that
the legal force of such otheragreementsor the application to them of any
of the rules of internationallaw to which theyare subject independentlyof
the Conventionis not affected(Article 3).
The non-retroactivity feature (Article 4) is of substantial importance
because it avoids the possibilityof reopening old internationaldisputes.
This is especially truewithregardto long-standingboundarydisputes.

PART II-CONCLUSION AND ENTRY INTO FORCE OF

TREATIES

The rules in this part are primarilytechnical. Section 1 relates to such

mattersas Full Powers or other evidence of authority;adoption and au-
thenticationof texts; and the means of expressingconsent to be bound by a
treaty(Articles7- 17).
Article 18 sets forthrules governingthe obligationof States not to defeat
the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force. That
obligationis limitedto (a) States thathave signed a treatyor exchanged ad
referenduminstrumentsconstitutinga treaty,untilsuch time as theymake
clear their intentionnot to become a party, and (b) States that have
expressed consent to be bound,pendingentryintoforce and provided such
entryinto force is not unduly delayed. This rule is widely recognized in
customaryinternationallaw.
Part 2 of Section II sets forththe rules on reservations to treaties
(Articles 19-23). The articles reflectflexiblecurrenttreatypractice with
regard to multilateraltreaties as generallyfollowed since World War II.
The earlier traditionalrule on reservationshad been that in order for a
State to become partyto a multilateraltreatywitha reservationthe unani-
mous consentof the otherpartieswas required.That rule has given way in
practice to a more flexible approach, particularlyafter the International
Court of Justicein 1951 handed down its Advisory Opinion on Reserva-
tions to the Genocide Convention. The Court's opinion in the case stated,
'The reservingState can be regardedas being a partyto the Convention if
the reservationis compatible with the object and purpose of the Con-
vention."The compatibilityrule has been incorporatedin Article 19 of the
Convention.It applies in those cases where the reservationis not expressly
excluded by the termsof the treaty.
The rightof otherStates to object to a reservationand to refuse treaty
relationswiththe reservingState is maintainedin Article 20. That article

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432 INTERNA TIONAL LA WYER

also provides the practical rule that a reservationis considered to have

been accepted by a State that fails to object either withintwelve months
afterbeing notifiedthereofor by the date on which it expresses its own
consent to be bound, whicheveris later.
Section 3 of Part II governs entryinto force of treatiesand provides for
theirprovisionalapplication,pendingentryinto force, if such application
has been agreed.

PART III - OBSERVANCE, APPLICATION AND

INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES

The articlesin Section 1 relatingto observance of treatiesare of cardinal

importance.The foundationupon which the treatystructureis based is the
principlepacta suntservanda, expressed in Article26 as follows:
Everytreatyin forceis bindingupon the partiesto it and mustbe per-
formed bythemingoodfaith.
The most significant action of the Law of Treaties Conferencewithrespect
to this part was the defeat of an attemptby some States to weaken the
article by use of such expressions as "Every valid treaty" or "Treaties
which have been regularlyconcluded." Phrases such as these mighthave
encouraged States to assert a rightof non-performanceor termination
before any claim of invalidity had been established. The article was
adopted in the twelfthplenarymeetingwithouta dissentingvote.
Article 27 on internal law and observance of treaties restates the
long-standing principleof customaryinternationallaw thata partymay not
invoke the provisions of its internallaw as justificationfor its failure to
performa treaty.The rule is consistent with United States practice over
many years in decliningto accept provisions of internallaw as justifying
nonperformance by a State of its treatyobligationsto the United States. At
the same timethe articledoes not change the way in which the effectof a
treatywithinthe frameworkof domestic law is determined.In explaining
its vote in favorof Article27, the U.S. Delegation observed:
There is a hierarchy legal rules in the internallegislationof
of differing
most States. Constitutional provisionsare very generallygiven primacy.
Statutes,resolutions, and administrative provisions,all of whichmay be
mayhavedifferent
authoritative, weights.Treatyprovisions, whenviewedas
internallaw,necessarily intothathierarchy.
haveto be fitted
Each State is entitledto determine whichlegal formulation has greater
internalauthorityin case ofconflictamonginternal enactments. Article27 in
no wayabridgesthatright. . .
The articles of Section 2 contain rules on the non-retroactivityof

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 ViennaConvention 433

treaties,theirterritorial scope and the difficult problemof applicationof

successivetreatiesdealingwiththe same subjectmatter.Article30 lays
downa set ofprinciples to determine prioritiesamonginconsistent obliga-
tions.In essenceitprovidesthat(a) ifa treatystatesitis subjectto another
treaty,theothertreatygoverns;(b) as betweenpartiesto one treatywho
becomepartiesto a second,the secondgovernson any pointwhereit is
incompatible withthefirst;(c) ifsomepartiesto thefirstare notpartiesto
thesecond,and vice versa,thefirst governsbetweena partyto bothand a
partyonly to the first;the second governsbetweena partyto bothand a
partyonlyto thesecond.
The articlesof Section 3 on interpretation of treatiesemphasizethe
importance of the text in the interpretative process.Article3 1 requiresthat
a treaty"be interpreted in good faithin accordancewiththe ordinary
meaningto be givento thetermsof thetreatyin theircontextand in the
lightofitsobjectandpurpose."Contextis narrowly definedas comprising,
its
"in additionto the text,including preamble and annexes," related
agreements madeby all thepartiesand instruments made by less thanall
thepartiesbutacceptedby all as relatedto thetreaty.Elementsextrinsic
to thetextwhichare to be takenintoaccountare limitedto subsequent
agreementsbetweenthe parties,subsequentpracticeestablishing agree-
ment,and relevantrulesofinternational law.
Article32 allows recourseto "supplementary meansof interpretation,
including thepreparatory workof thetreatyand the circumstances of its
conclusion,in orderto confirm the meaningresulting fromtheapplication
ofArticle3 1, or to determine themeaningwhentheinterpretation accord-
ingto Article3 1: (a) leaves themeaningambiguousor obscure;or (b) leads
to a resultwhichis manifestly absurdor unreasonable."
Five articlesin Section4 deal withtreatiesand thirdStates.Article34
setsforth thetraditional rulethata treatydoes notcreateeitherobligations
or rightsfora thirdStatewithoutits consent.Subsequentarticlesprovide
thata thirdStatemustexpresslyconsentto treatiescreatingobligations for
it,whereas it would be assumed to assent to a it
treatygiving rights, unless
thetreatyotherwiseprovides.Article37 providesforrevocationor modi-
ficationofobligations or rightsof thirdStates,and Article38 preventsthe
preceding articles from barringa ruleset forthin a treatyfrombecoming
binding on a third State as a customary ruleofinternationallaw.

PART IV- AMENDMENT AND MODIFICATION OF TREATIES

Articles39-41 lay down rules for amendingand modifying

treaties.

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434 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

Artide40 providesneededclarification in thecase of multilateraltreaties.

It safeguardstherights in
ofpartiesto participate theamending processby
requiring notificationto all partiesof any proposedamendmentand by
specifying theirrightto participatein the decisionto be takenon the
proposal and in the negotiation and conclusionof any amendment. The
rightto becomepartyto thenewagreement is also extendedto everyState
entitledto becomea partyto thetreaty.

PART V- INVALIDITY, TERMINATION AND SUSPENSION OF

THE OPERATION OF TREATIES

PartV setsforth thegroundson whicha claimmaylegitimately be made

thata treatyis invalidor subjectto termination, denunciation, withdrawal,
or suspension.It deals withsuchgroundsas error,fraud,coercion,breach,
impossibility of performance, fundamental changeof circumstances, and
conflictwitha peremptory normofinternational law (jus cogens).
At the same timeit containsa varietyof safeguardsto protectthe
stabilityof the treatystructure. Article42 subjectsall challengesof the
continuing forceof treatyobligationsto the rulesof the Law of Treaties
Convention. The termination ofa treaty, itsdenunciation or suspension,or
thewithdrawal ofa partymaytakeplace onlyas a resultof theapplication
oftheprovisionsofthattreatyor theConvention.Article43 specifiesthat
a State thatsheds a treatyobligationdoes not escape any obligationto
whichitis subjectunderinternational law independently ofthetreaty.
Article44 deals withseparability of treatyprovisions.It permitssepara-
bilitywithrespectto certaingroundsof invalidity wherethegroundrelates
to
solely particular clauses and where certaincriteria and
as to feasibility
equity are met. Included in such criteria,as a resultof a United States
proposal,is therequirement that"continuedperformance of theremainder
ofthetreatywouldnotbe unjust."
Article45 is a rule of "good faithand fairdealing"thatwill protect
againstill-founded effortsto avoid meetingtreatyobligations. A Statemay
notclaimthata treatyis invalidif,afterbecomingaware of the facts,it
expresslyagreesthatthetreatyis validor is to remainin effector if(and
thiswould be the case arisingmostoften)it is consideredto have ac-
quiesced,by reason of its conduct,in the validityof the treatyor its
maintenance inforceor effect.
In dealingwiththe invalidity articlesin Section2 of Part V (Articles
46-53), the chiefconcern of the UnitedStates Delegationwas to assure
thatthegroundsof invalidity were statedas preciselyand objectivelyas

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 ViennaConvention 435

possibleand thattherewouldbe proceduralor institutional mechanisms to

guardagainstspurious claimsof treatyinvalidity.
The firstofthegroundsforinvalidity, theeffect ofa limitationof internal
law upon competenceto conclude treaties,is stated in Article46. It
providesthata State may not invoke,as invalidating its consentto be
bound,the fact thatits consenthas been expressedin violationof a
provisionof its internallaw regardingcompetenceto conclude treaties
unless:(a) the violationwas manifest, thatis, "objectivelyevidentto any
State conducting itselfin the matterin accordancewithnormalpractice
and ingood faith";and (b) it concernsa ruleof the State's internallaw of
fundamental importance. At theplenarymeetingat whichthe articlewas
adoptedwithoutnegativevote,the UnitedStates Delegationemphasized
thatit had supportedthearticleon the basis thatit deals solelywiththe
conditionsunder which a State may invoke internallaw on the in-
ternationalplaneto invalidateitsconsentto be boundand thatit in no way
impinges on internallaw regarding competenceto concludetreatiesinsofar
as domesticconsequencesare concerned.
Article52 statestheprinciplethata treatyis void ifits conclusionhas
beenprocuredbythethreator use offorcein violationof theprinciples of
internationallaw embodiedin the UnitedNationsCharter.A proposalby
19 Statesthatwouldhave amendedthe rule by defining forceto include
any "economicor politicalpressure"was withdrawn afterstrongopposi-
tionby theUnitedStatesand otherconcernedpowers.Instead,a declara-
tioncondemning thethreator use of pressurein any formby a State to
coerceanyotherStateto concludea treatywas adoptedby theConference
andannexedto theFinalAct.
Article53 deals withtreatiesthatconflictwitha peremptory normof
internationallaw, the jus cogens doctrine.In formulating article,the
this
International Law Commissionstartedfromthe principlethatthereare
rulesof suchfundamental characterthatno Statehas therightto set them
aside by a treaty.This principlehad previouslybeen incorporatedin
Section 116 of theAmericanLaw Institute's Restatement of theForeign
RelationsLaw oftheUnitedStates.Inclusionofthejus cogensprinciple in
the ViennaConventionwas almostuniversally supported,but therewas
considerableconcernwiththetheoretical mannerin whichthe normwas
formulated. Throughefforts by the UnitedStatesand severalothers,the
articlewas revisedto includetwo important limitations.The firstmakes
clearthatin orderfora treatyto be voidunderthearticletheperemptory
normviolatedmusthaveexistedat thetimeoftheconclusionofthetreaty.
The secondclarification requiresa peremptory normto be "a normaccept-

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436 INTERNA TIONAL LA WYER

ed and recognized by the internationalcommunityof states as a whole

. . . ." Inclusion of the latterrequirementresultedin broad acceptabilityof
the article. Many delegations had expressed the view that a norm which
had not achieved recognitionby substantiallyall States ought not to serve
as the basis for claiming a treaty is void. A related article (Article 64)
provides that if a new peremptorynorm emerges, an existing treaty in
conflictwiththe normbecomes void and terminates.
Section 3 of Part V is entitled Termination and Suspension of the
Operation of Treaties. Articles 54, 55, 57, and 58 specify that various
aspects of terminationand suspension must be dealt with in conformity
with the treaty or with the consent of all parties, or, if by agreement
betweencertainof the parties,subject to the same limitationsexpressed in
Article41 on modification.
Paragraph l(b) of Article56 permitsdenunciationof or withdrawalfrom
a treatywhich has no provision on the subject if such right "may be
impliedby the natureof the treaty."At the instance of the United States
Delegation a clear legislativehistorywas established that the procedures
forsettlementof disputes in Section 4 (Articles 65-68) apply to notices of
denunciationgroundedupon Article56.
Article60 recognizesthe long-standingdoctrinethata materialbreach of
a treatyby one partymay be invoked by the other partyto terminatethe
treatyor to suspend the performanceof its own obligations under the
treaty.
Article 61 on superveningimpossibilityof performancecontains the
reasonable rule thata partymay invoke impossibilityof performanceas a
ground for terminatingor withdrawingfrom a treaty if an object in-
dispensable for the execution of the treatypermanentlydisappears or is
destroyed.A State may not, however,invoke impossibilityof performance
ifit is the resultof a breach by thatState of an internationalobligation.
Article 62, on fundamentalchange of circumstances, is a carefully
phrased version of the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus which has been
widely recognized by jurists as a ground which under certain conditions
may be invokedforterminating or withdrawing froma treaty.An important
featureis paragraph 2(a) which precludes invocation of the article as a
groundforterminating or withdrawingfroma treatyestablishinga bound-
ary.
Article 63 makes clear that the severance of diplomats or consular
relations between parties to a treatydoes not affectthe legal relations
established by the treatyexcept to the extentthat the existance of diplo-
maticor consular relationsis indispensableto applyingthe treaty.

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 Vienna Convention 437

Section 4 of Part V contains articles on the procedure for invoking

groundsforinvalidityor terminationof treatiesand forjudicial settlement,
arbitrationand conciliation.During and debates on the preceedingarticles
on invalidity,suspension and terminationone of the major concerns of the
United States and certain other countrieswas the need to formulateade-
quate provisionsfordealing withan assertionof the invalidityof a treatyor
a claim of a rightto unilateralterminationor suspension.
The InternationalLaw Commission had proposed a procedure for deal-
ing with such assertions that would have required a State to notifythe
otherparties of its claim, of the grounds therefor,and of the action to be
taken. If no objection to the proposed action were made within three
months,it could thenbe carriedout. If objection were made, a solutionwas
to be soughtunderthe means indicatedin Article33 of the United Nations
Charter. In the final analysis Article 33 merely provides that disputes
should be settled by peaceful means of the parties' own choice. The
proposed article thus leftundecided the crucial question whethera party
could go ahead and terminatea treatyif it did not agree with the other
partieson a peaceful means of settlementor ifthe means selected failed to
resultin a settlement.
States, such as the United States, that were fightingfor the stabilityof
the treatystructuremade clear thatthe Convention would be unacceptable
unless some form of impartial disputes-settlementprocedure was in-
corporatedinto it. The basic opposition to any meaningfulformof dispute
settlementwas organized by the Communist bloc. The issue became the
overridingone of the Conference. In the closing hours of the second
session, the Conference succeeded in adopting a new article on the set-
tlementof disputes,which should adequately protect United States treaty
relations fromunilateralclaims of invalidityby our treatypartners and
should contributeto the stabilityof treatyobligationsgenerally.
Under the new article- Article 66 of the Convention- any party to a
dispute arisingunder thejus cogens articles may invoke thejurisdictionof
the InternationalCourt of Justice unless the parties agree to submit the
dispute to arbitration.In any other dispute arisingunder Part V - such as
claims of invalidity or terminationbased on error, fraud, breach, or
changed circumstances- any party to the dispute may set in motion a
conciliationprocedure.That procedure,which is set forthin the Annex to
the Convention,includes establishmentin each case of a conciliationcom-
missionand submissionby thatcommissionof a reportto the partiesand to
the Secretary-General of the United States. The report may contain
findingsof fact and conclusions of law, as well as recommendationsto the

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438 INTERNA TIONAL LA WYER

partiesforsettlementof the dispute,althoughit is not bindingupon them.

Paragraph 7 of the Annex provides that the expenses of the commission
will be borne by the United Nations. The General Assembly of the United
Nations on December 8, 1969 adopted Resolution 2534 (XXIV) approving
the provision and requested the Secretary-General to take action ac-
cordingly.
The provisionsfor the settlementof disputes meet the requirementsof
the United States. By contributingto the prompt resolution of disputes
relatingto validityof treatiesthey should go farin helpingto maintainthe
stabilityof treatyrelationshipsthroughoutthe world. The provision for
expenses is a desirable innovationand worthwhileinvestment,since the
concern of many newly independentand small States with the cost of
third-party settlementprocedures had been a very real obstacle to their
generalaccepability.
The SyrianArab Rebublic, in depositingits accession to the Convention
on October 2, 1970, made reservations,the most serious of which was to
reject the Annex on conciliationprocedures. The United States Represen-
tative to the United Nations has notifiedthe Secretary-Generalthat the
United States objects to that reservationand intends,at such time as it
may become a partyto the Convention,to reject treatyrelationswith the
Syrian Arab Republic under all provisionsin Part V with regard to which
that State has rejected the obligatoryconciliation procedures set forthin
the Annex.
The finalsection of Part V, Consequences of the Invalidity,Termina-
tion, or Suspension of the Operation of a Treaty, includes rules for the
unwindingof treaties the invalidityor terminationof which has been
establishedunderthe Convention.

PART VI -MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

Article 73 excludes fromthe applicabilityof the Convention questions

fromState succession, State responsibility,
or the outbreakof hostilities.
Article 74 provides that severance or absence of diplomaticor consular
relations between States does not prevent the conclusion of treaties be-
tween them.The rule accords withmoderntreatypractice.

PART VII -DEPOSITARIES, NOTIFICATIONS,

CORRECTIONS AND REGISTRATION

As the depositaryof more internationaltreatiesthan any other country,

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 ViennaConvention 439

the UnitedStateshad a substantialinterestin thedepositaryarticlesand

was able to achieve severalworthwhile improvements in these technical
articles.Article76 makesclear the internationalcharacterof the depos-
itaryfunctionand theobligationto perform it impartially.
Article77 is a
comprehensive of
catalog depositary functions.Sensiblerulesforcorrec-
tionoferrorsare providedinArticle79.

PART VIII -FINAL PROVISIONS

Includedin Article81-85 are standardprovisionson signature, ratifica-

tion,accession, entryinto force,and authentictexts. Entryinto force
requiresdepositofthirty-five instruments ofratificationsor accession.This
is a largernumberthanrequiredby manyearliertreaties,butwas consid-
eredappropriate becauseofthefundamental importance of theConvention
on theLaw ofTreaties.
The ViennaConventionon theLaw ofTreatiesis a majorachievement
in the development and codification of internationallaw. At the opening
sessionoftheconference in March 1968,theLegal CounseloftheUnited
Nations,Constantin Stavropoulos, describeditas the"mostimportant and
perhaps also the most difficult"of the series of codification confer-
ences called by the United Nations. By agreeingon uniformrules to
governStatepracticeon a hostof technicalmattersrelatedto thenegotia-
tion,adoption,and executionof treaties,theConferenceachievedone of
itsbasicobjectives.ButtheConvention on theLaw ofTreatieshas a much
largersignificance. By codifying thedoctrinesofjus cogensand rebussic
stanibus,itprovidesa framework fornecessarychange.By reasserting the
of
principle pacta sunt as
servanda,long recognized the keystoneof the
treatystructure,it strengthens thefabricof treatyrelationships. By requir-
ingimpartial proceduresforsettlement ofdisputes,itprovidesan essential
elementin minimizing unfounded claimsthattreatiesshouldbe terminated
or suspended.
The United States Delegationto the Vienna Conferencewas led by
RichardD. Kearney,United States Memberof the IntenationalLaw
Commission.Includedon theDelegationat one or bothsessionswereJohn
R. Stevenson,nowLegal Adviserof theDepartment of State,and Charles
I. Bevans,AssistantLegal AdviserforTreatyAffairs; HerbertW. Briggs,
Professorof International Law, Cornell University;Myres McDougal,
Professorof Law, Yale University;JosephM. Sweeney,Dean, Law
School,TulaneUniversity; and FrankWozencraft, former AssistantAttor-
neyGeneral,Department ofJustice.Otherson the UnitedStatesDelega-

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¡nternational

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440 INTERNA TIONAL LA WYER

tion were JaredCarter,Robert E. Dalton, WarrenHewitt,Bruce M.

Lancaster,and HerbertK. Reis fromthe Department of Stateand Ernest
C. GriggIII and RobertB. RosenstockfromtheUnitedStatesMissionto
theUnitedNations.
In preparingfortheConferencetheUnitedStatesGovernment worked
closelywiththe StudyGroup on the Law of Treatiesestablishedby the
AmericanSocietyof International Law in 1965. WithProfessorOliver
Lissitzynof Columbia as
University chairman,thisgroupof eminentin-
ternationallawyersmetregularly withrepresentatives of the Department
ofStateandJustice.
The StudyGroup also joined forceswiththe Special Committeeon
TreatyLaw of the Sectionof International and ComparativeLaw of the
AmericanBar Association,of whichEberhardDeutschis chairman.The
comprehensive knowledge,experience,and wisdomofthemembersof the
academic and legal communitiesservingin these two groups were of
incalculableassistanceto the Delegationin the formulation of United
Statespolicyand planning fortheConference. The House of Delegatesof
theAmericanBar Associationin July1971 approveda resolutionrecom-
mendingthatthe Conventionbe submittedto the Senate and thatthe
without
Senateadviseand consentto itsratification reservations.
I believethattheConventionon the Law of Treatieswillbe an impor-
tantelementin promoting of treatyrelationships.
the stability I hope that
theUnitedStateswillbecomea partyinthenearfuture.
Respectfully submitted.
William P. Rogers

Lawyer,Vol.6, No. 2
International

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