Terrorism 8

Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century
Miryam Lindberg
Análisis nº 7561 February 20, 2010
I. The Definition Issue: What is fining terrorism lies in its subjectiv-

Terrorism? ity. There are clear contrasts in per-
ception for those in authority,
Describing the nature of a particular onlookers, public opinion, victims
topic is commonly the path towards or perpetrators;1 for those who con-
defining it. Attempting to outline demn or condone terrorism. It all
what constitutes terrorism amounts “seems to depend on one’s point of
to landing in the middle of a seman- view,” says terrorism expert Brian
tic minefield where emotions run Jenkins; “if one party can success-
very high and the criteria necessary fully attach the label ‘terrorist’ to its
to describe the term are constantly opponent, then it has inherently
evolving. Terrorism is a polemical persuaded others to adopt its moral
word that has long provoked inter- viewpoint.”2 His formulation sum-
pretation discrepancies in the inter- marizes the rationale behind the
national community. Although controversy surrounding terrorism,
definitions are short formulations which is epitomized in the relativis-
used with the intent of conveying tic saw, “One man’s terrorist is an-
clarity, we may be facing a case of other man’s freedom fighter.” Al-
intended ambiguity, of a lack of though there are different reasons
clarity in order to stifle the need to hindering international consensus,
pronounce moral judgment about subjectivity remains a major obsta-
terrorism. The results to attain a cle in defining the term. The interna-
definition that elicits universal ac- tional community has pragmatically
ceptance have been frustrating so chosen to tackle the issue by skip-
far because the predicament of de- ping to use the word itself and fo-
Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos GEES 1 Análisis nº 7561

cusing instead on the adoption of a of his particular political goals;6 he
series of protocols and treaties that thinks out his objective and then
deal directly with some of terror- carefully plans how best to achieve
ism’s external features. Although it.7 In the taxonomy of violence, ter-
this piecemeal approach may be rorism stands out as a policy tool of
semantically insufficient, it has be- coercive intimidation whose ulti-
come a successful effort in securing mate aim is to change “the system,”
that a vast majority of states sign on through violent acts.8 An important
these binding international agree- objective for those terrorists who
ments for the prosecution or extradi- carry out the coercion strategy is to
tion of the perpetrators of some des- influence the public not so much
ignated acts such as aircraft hijack- through articulate appeal as through
ing, hostage-taking and a variety of intimidation and fear.9 Therefore,
violent attacks against individuals violence applied to achieve a politi-
and property.3 While the interna- cal goal is in essence the fundamen-
tional community has made some tal characteristic that distinguishes
headway classifying some of the terrorism from crime and other
violence considered terrorism to be forms of violence.10
covered by international law, the
euphemistic approach so necessary Since the definition issue remains
to reach international consensus controversial, terrorism experts such
makes only certain the persistence as Walter Laqueur11 and Bruce
of the semantic disarray. Hoffman12 find it useful to list cer-
tain distinctions as a path to defini-
Subjective and heinous, terrorism tion. In addition to its ineluctable
leaves no one indifferent. Invoking political dimension and deliberate
the word “terrorism” stirs strong violence, there are some cardinal
emotions due to its violent nature criteria for describing the ontology
and the misery its bloody actions of contemporary terrorism.
usually entail. Violence or the threat
of violence may be the only feature • It is about power: Terrorists
generally accepted to describe the want power; terrorism is designed
terrorist ethos.4 Unfortunately, to- to create power where there is none
day virtually any especially abhor- or to consolidate it where there is
rent act of violence is often de- very little.13
scribed as terrorism,5 showing the
pervasive misapplication of the • It is systematic: The terrorist
word in everyday life since not all enterprise is a planned, calculated,
violence is terrorism. The word has and indeed systematic act.14 Terror-
become too elastic, a catchall term to ism is a method, rather than a set of
describe violence directed against adversaries or the causes they pur-
society. However, the terrorist is sue.15 It is choreographed with an
fundamentally a rational actor and a audience in mind – a concept
“violent intellectual” ready and epitomized in the celebrated state-
committed to using force in pursuit

ment by terrorism expert Brian Jen- mon with the character of its previ-
kins, “Terrorism is theater.”16 ous versions and a definition of the
• It is designed to have the rip- past would likely not meet the re-
ple effect of fear: Terrorism seeks to quirements of today. The word “ter-
go beyond the immediate target vic- rorism” was first popularized dur-
tims; it seeks to have far-reaching ing the French Revolution to de-
psychological repercussions.17 The scribe the violence practiced by the
purpose of a terrorist attack is to state during the Reign of Terror
instill fear on a wider scale18 in or- (1793-1794) in revolutionary France
der to coerce others into giving in to and in those days, the term had a
their demands. The essence of ter- decidedly positive connotation.24
rorist operations is its indiscriminate Almost one century later, during the
attacks against civilians19 with the days of Karl Marx, the term was
intent of creating havoc and instill- proudly anti-state and acquired
ing fear and insecurity in society. many of the revolutionary connota-
• It is non-state: Terrorism is tions we recognize today.25 And one
more usefully regarded as a most century after that, the same word
serious breach of peace in which has such intrinsic pejorative conno-
non-state entities participate.20 To- tations that not even its practitioners
day it is usually a networked, lead- want the terrorist label to describe
erless adversary, either a subna- their actions.26 This definitional
tional group or non-state entity, metamorphosis taking place during
ideologically motivated.21 In spite the span of centuries is only one
that one of the most accepted crite- part of the story. The fact is that
ria about the terrorist narrative is its pursuing universal acceptance re-
non-state essence, terrorism is also garding certain issues often ends up
developing into a new form of becoming a utopian ideal. The se-
asymmetric warfare carried out by mantics of terrorism seems to be one
states22 in one more demonstration of those lost causes.
of its chameleonic nature.
• It is rational: The terrorist II. Fostering Terrorism: The Root
strives to act optimally in order to Causes
achieve his goal in a clear demon-
stration of an entirely rational Just as with the semantics of terror-
choice, often reluctantly embraced ism, neither is there consensus
after considerable reflection and among academic experts about what
debate,23 weighing costs and bene- generates and fosters terrorism. Al-
fits before undertaking the murder- though scholars such as M.
ous journey. Crenshaw, A. Merari, or W. Reich
have advanced various hypotheses
This short list of criteria is a helpful and arguments about the origins of
account in the quest of understand- terrorism in general, an integrated
ing the ontology of contemporary framework that considers the possi-
terrorism. Our current manifestation ble causes of terrorism in a system-
of terrorism has very little in com- atic manner is still lacking.27 The

underlying, even naïve, assumption The persistent belief that poverty is
is that if society identifies and re- the main, if not the only, cause of
moves the root causes, then terror- terrorism in the contemporary
ism will wither away28 and this pos- world is explained by applying cer-
sibility is depicted as an apparently tain political assumptions such as
plausible effort towards addressing this one: In pure Marxist-Leninist
the terrorist issue.29 terms, the misery of poor countries
is the fault of imperialism and de-
Although the causality issue re- veloped countries exploit them un-
mains as controversial as its other mercifully; therefore, Westerners
aspects, terrorism does have causes; have been told not only that the cur-
ex nihilo nihil fit – nothing comes out rent wealth distribution is unjust,
of nothing.30 Much has been written but that it is all their fault and the
and speculated about the circum- effective cure for the eradication of
stances that make the road to terror- terrorism is the redistribution of that
ist violence seem to be the only way wealth.37 Holding poverty and ine-
out of despair;31 however, more quality as root causes of terrorism is
than anything, terrorism tends to be the wrong approach since the actual
the product of a long process of data does not fit that narrative.38 In
radicalization that prepares a group fact, most research shows that a
of individuals for such extreme ac- higher living standard is positively
tion.32 Notions of causality imply a associated with support for, or par-
sense of predictive value that belies ticipation in, terrorism.39 Yet as long
the complexity of terrorism as well as the root causes of terrorism are
as the factors behind the choosing of analyzed through an interest-based
terrorism as a strategy of violent lens, i.e. dividing the world into
protest.33 Actually, terrorism is a haves and have-nots and linking
problem of what people (or groups, poverty to terrorism, the Marxist
or states) do, rather than who they explanation will remain a compel-
are or what they are trying to ling argument, regardless of its lack
achieve.34 The actor-oriented ap- of accuracy. Discussions that at-
proach may be more useful than the tempt to root terrorism just in pov-
root-cause approach for the analysis erty or civil strife miss one funda-
of these dynamic processes since the mental attribute of terrorism: It is
latter gives the impression that ter- primarily a strategy and tactic open
rorism is driven by fate and its prac- to any group from any background
titioners are passively swayed by and for any politically related rea-
social, economic, and psychological son.40
forces into the terrorist venture.35
This kind of analysis becomes a mis- Nevertheless, society is still told to
representation of reality since terror- believe that the root causes of terror-
ists are undoubtedly rational and ism are poverty, unemployment,
intentional actors who choose to backwardness, and inequality41 and
develop violent strategies in order adding to that picture, other argu-
to achieve their political objectives.36 able factors are adduced for the

spread of terrorism, e.g. the “clash sity, with equally perplexing per-
of civilizations,” the existence of the spectives through which contempo-
State of Israel, or anti- rary terrorism is addressed47 and
Americanism.42 However, factors far with religious and nationalist fanati-
more tangible in the terrorist context cism as its predominant feature.48
are, for example, the correlation be-
tween terrorism and nationalist, The notion of “root causes” is taken
ethnic, religious, and tribal con- more from the realm of politics than
flict;43 ideology, the vengeance mo- from terrorism research and social
tive, and the stark feelings that real theory.49 Politicizing the research of
or perceived wrongs can inspire. It the causes of terrorism or sanitizing
is equally important to consider the the conclusions through the filter of
difficult-to-define and frequently- political correctness has not been
neglected psychological factors such helpful. There is a connection be-
as aggression and fanaticism, which tween terrorism and the economic
involve motives far more elusive and social situation; there is a con-
and hard to control, entailing inves- nection with the political state of
tigations considered repugnant to affairs, and at the present time, there
many as they tend to reduce the im- is a connection with Islam; yet such
portance of the ideological factor in conclusions do not take us very
terrorism and lump together terror- far.50 We need to know more; if we
ists with other types of violent ag- do not ask the right questions, we
gressors.44 In fact, fanaticism is an will not get the necessary answers.
essential part of terrorism; Hitler Terrorism is not a homogeneous
believed that the greatness of each threat; it is a complex process and
movement is rooted in a religious seeing it that way can help us to
fanaticism totally convinced of its prioritize our questions. They must
own rightness, relentless in the pur- put strong emphasis in the link be-
suit of its goal, intolerant against tween perspective and evidence, the
anything else; therefore the enemy role this relationship plays in order
had to be smashed and destroyed – to understand terrorism, and that
and with the resurgence of funda- methodological rigor and evidence
mentalism came a recurrence of fa- are the most important qualities of
naticism.45 While in the terrorism of research.51 Only evidence can settle
earlier eras indiscriminate killings disputes; to understand terrorism
were the exception rather than the one ought to investigate more than
rule, indiscrimination has become just its outward manifestations and,
common practice in our days; this in order to make that happen, the
dehumanization is in large part the research endeavor requires leaving
result of religious fanaticism, espe- behind preconceived notions, study-
cially in the case of Islamism, but it ing the available evidence, and tak-
is also true in the case of radical na- ing into account the old and new
tionalist terrorism.46 Our contempo- features of terrorism.52
rary world presents terrorism in
astonishing complexity and diver-

III. State-Sponsored Terrorism: ments of national power and im-
Violence as a Foreign Policy Tool proving their status in their respec-
tive zones of influence.57 A case in
Just as the character of terrorism has point is Syria’s use of terrorism as
evolved over time, state sponsorship an integral tool of its foreign policy
of terrorism has also undergone a structure.
protracted transformation since the
days of Joseph Stalin to the 1980s This joint venture is usually advan-
when states, in a move of cold ra- tageous for both partners and pre-
tionality, chose to sponsor terrorism sents several incentives: On the one
and turned it into a deliberate in- hand, the sponsoring state can enjoy
strument of foreign policy as a vivid anonymity and avoid international
demonstration of ruthless real- reprisal, it offers a more cost-
politik.53 Although non-state entities effective approach than conven-
are the main actors of the terrorist tional warfare, and makes power
enterprise, states provide the lifeline projection plausible, it also plays a
these entities need to survive and role in bolstering leaders’ domestic
thrive; it is a symbiotic and deadly positions.58 On the other hand, the
relationship with a long and bloody sponsored terrorists can capitalize
history, accounting for several thou- on even larger rewards under the
sand casualties worldwide.54 protection of a state sponsor. In
most cases, the support provided by
Among the strategic, domestic, and the state makes the terrorists far
ideological motivations states have more capable and hinders efforts to
for such an unsavory kind of part- counter them.59 The type and degree
nership, the most important is often of support states give to these
strategic interest: State sponsorship groups varies, but it places a well of
of terrorism is a foreign policy tool resources typical of a established
that can be used to influence nation-state’s entire diplomatic,
neighboring countries, intervene in military, and intelligence apparatus
the affairs of a hostile adversary re- at the disposal of terrorists, such as
gime, or achieve other aims of training, money, logistics, arms, or-
state.55 In reality, one sort of motiva- ganizational assistance, diplomatic
tion does not necessarily exclude the backing, ideological direction, and
rest; sometimes an all-of-the-above sanctuary – with the latter as the
pick in order to advance their own most important sort of assistance.60
agendas leads nations to back ter-
rorist groups.56 The lack of political The other side of the coin has to do
levers and strong allies, feeble with the disincentives to engage in
economies, little international pres- this abominable practice. On the
tige, and weak conventional military terrorists’ side, the high risk of los-
forces push some states to use ter- ing their lives is a serious disincen-
rorism in conjunction with other tive that money surely assuages. Yet
means as a way of augmenting, the main cost for the sponsored
rather than replacing, their instru- group is the loss of identity by hav-

ing to relinquish its original political dealing with sponsors since each
motivations in exchange for hard state has its own peculiarities and
cash – e.g. the case of the Abu Nidal vulnerabilities to be taken into ac-
Organization.61 In the case of states, count.
the disincentives to sponsoring ter-
rorism have mainly to do with the The worst case about the power of
high price of being a pariah – an sanctions is Iran’s continued sup-
aspect still shaping policies.62 Not port to terrorism.67 The capture of
surprisingly, states turn to diplo- the U.S. embassy in Tehran in 1979
macy, economic pressure, or even and the imprisonment of American
conventional war before deliber- diplomats and private citizens for
ately choosing the terrorist venture; 444 days with the explicit acquies-
after all, terrorism is murder.63 In cence of the Iranian government is
1979, the U.S. State Department es- the quintessential example of an act
tablished a list of countries provid- of state-sponsored terrorism and it
ing either direct or indirect support was the pivotal event in the emer-
to terrorist groups. In 2010, the only gence of this type of terrorism as a
states listed are Cuba, Iran, Sudan weapon of the state as well as an
and Syria, though its practitioners instrument of foreign policy.68
do not circumscribe just to that list. Libya, Syria, and Iraq and some
To be formally designated a state governments elsewhere were quick
sponsor automatically entails sanc- to follow this egregious example. In
tions whose effectiveness is impos- spite of international sanctions, Iran
sible to measure accurately; an in- has remained one of the world’s
formal look at the currently de- most active states sponsoring terror-
signed sponsors provides only very ism; it has supported dozens of vio-
modest support for the proposition lent groups over the years, but out
that sanctions have helped to reduce of those terrorist groups, none is
terrorism.64 The best case – maybe more important to Tehran than the
the only case – about the power of Lebanese Hezbollah, which quickly
sanctions was seen in Libya’s policy became a disciplined, skilled and
shift.65 The application of a mix of dedicated movement to become one
military, political, and economic of the world’s premier terrorist or-
measures led to Libya’s pariah-state ganizations.69 Decades-long sanc-
label, economic hardships and tions, though painful, did not affect
growing domestic unrest, with sanc- the political orientation of the re-
tions as the driving force; this in gime, particularly Iranian support to
turn allegedly forced the hand of terrorism.70 Perhaps the lack of con-
Libya’s leadership to abandon ter- sistency in applying the sanctions
rorism.66 The international consen- played a role. Iran has simultane-
sus reached to present a common ously faced both sanctions from the
front against sponsoring Libya United States and engagement by
should count as a really exceptional Europe.71 Sanctions are costly and
case. Furthermore, there is never a this reality cuts both ways, but they
one-solution-for-all approach to can be useful. Their effectiveness

depend on variables such as the de- ism offers a lever of foreign policy
pendence of the target state on for- influence for many leaders with far
eign trade, the responsiveness of its more potential than other means
political system, the breadth of mul- available.79 Since they have few al-
tilateral support, and the impor- ternatives to achieve their ambi-
tance to the targeted regime of the tions,80 they consider that the bene-
behavior the sanctions are intended fits outweigh the costs. That is why
to change.72 it is so difficult to eradicate and it
will remain a challenge for civiliza-
Most instruments of coercion are tion during this new century.
ineffective and at worst counterpro-
ductive.73 Despite different levels of IV. Insurgency or Terrorism?
pressure using diplomacy, military
action, political and economic coer- Insurgency and terrorism are two
cive measures, sponsors have not different phenomena that share
been willing to abandon such an many traits. As it is the case with
important tool for achieving strate- terrorism, “insurgency is part of a
gic ambitions that otherwise they broad category of conflict know as
would not be able to accomplish irregular warfare.”81 And just as
due to their own weakness.74 One with terrorism, political power is the
capital reason why states choose central issue in insurgencies; the aim
terrorism to advance their interests of insurgency is to get the people to
is because it is not treated as an act accept its governance or authority as
of war and such a distinction is vital legitimate.82 Insurgencies are essen-
for sponsors.75 Commissioning or tially a contest for the allegiance of
sponsoring terrorist acts allow for a local populations.83 According to the
degree of deniability; it is a type of CIA’s Guide to the Analysis of Insur-
surrogate warfare to confront more gency, “the common denominator of
powerful enemies without risking most insurgent groups is their de-
retribution.76 States simply respond sire to control a particular area. This
to a calculation of risks and benefits objective differentiates insurgent
in advancing their agenda. Factor- groups from purely terrorist organi-
ing economic sanctions in to see zations, whose objectives do not
how a regime’s interests are better include the creation of an alternative
served may keep it away from en- government capable of controlling a
gaging in terrorism while a more given area or country.”84 With this
ideologically motivated state may determinative geographical compo-
feel that sanctions demonstrate that nent in mind, it becomes clear that
its rivals are determined to sabotage not all terrorist groups are insurgen-
its economy and thus increase its cies, but almost every insurgent
support for terrorists.77 States can be group uses terrorism.85 Since by
coerced into halting their support, definition insurgencies hold an al-
but the process is arduous, ternative vision about polity and
lengthy,78 and it does not guarantee seek to replace it with one fitting
success. State sponsorship of terror- their political, economic, ideological,

or religious vision, they use a vari- Many terrorist groups are state-
ety of political, informational, mili- sponsored precisely because they
tary, and economic instruments to are insurgencies and this state sup-
realize that vision, in addition to the port helps insurgents conduct guer-
irregular military tactics that charac- rilla operations, which ultimately
terize guerrilla operations, combin- enables them to conduct terrorist
ing all these tools with the intent to attacks.93 Israel’s experience with
generate mass political mobilization Hezbollah suggests the many diffi-
to overthrow the existing authority, culties in confronting a skilled ter-
e.g. a national government, imperi- rorist group that is also a popular
alist government, or foreign- insurgent movement.94
occupying force.86 In contrast, ter-
rorism may be fueled by sheer re- The distinction between insurgency
vulsion toward the status quo, with- and terrorism has vital implications
out an alternative in mind.87 because the techniques that could be
used to halt or destroy a terrorist
The terrorist and guerrilla have been group often fail or are incomplete
among the most common ap- against an insurgency that regularly
proaches to warfare throughout his- uses terrorism as a tactic.95 Though
tory; but to succeed against more broad historical trends underlie the
powerful enemies, weaker actors factors motivating insurgents and
have had to adapt.88 Irregular war- most insurgencies follow a similar
fare is the response to an over- course of development, no two in-
whelming power in which state and surgencies are alike; every one is
non-state entities avoid overt mili- different in circumstances, charac-
tary engagement and instead apply ter, and importance to a nation’s
other resources to weaken and de- interests.96 The same can be said
stabilize the powerful adversary. It about terrorism; it has changed over
is a challenge for mighty powers time and so have the terrorists, their
that often end up resembling help- motives and the causes of terror-
less giants on the defensive against ism.97 However, insurgencies ap-
small but ruthless enemies.89 That is pear under different conditions than
why terrorism offers many advan- terrorism – an important considera-
tages for insurgencies and the rea- tion trying to understand how to
son behind why few groups can re- anticipate and counter such vio-
sist its allure completely.90 Isolated lence.98 Insurgency and terrorism
terrorist groups come and go, often require different policy approaches;
abruptly, but the average insur- applying the wrong remedies can
gency lasts more than a decade.91 often exacerbate the problems. Un-
Traditional terrorist groups are derstanding the nature of the enemy
small and have no deep roots must permeate policymaking from
among the population in contrast top to bottom and from capital to
with insurgencies that are usually field.99 In regards to the terrorist
popular and more complex move- undertaking, American planning
ments that often control territory.92 and analysis often tends to react to

an emotive and generic approach to bly intending to use terrorism.106 Yet
terrorism, and/or generalize from Hezbollah has two armed wings,
patterns and incidents that simply one wages guerrilla war and the
do not justify such generaliza- other carries out terrorist attacks.107
tions.100 The word “terrorism” has Attacks on military forces are con-
repeatedly served to imply attacks sidered insurgent operations; how-
by small groups or independent or- ever, the attacks on civilian popula-
ganizations, rather than attacks by tions are more common nowadays
well-organized, non-state actors or and these incidents have served to
asymmetric warfare by states.101 blur the thin line dividing insur-
From a functional perspective, ig- gency and terrorism today.108 The
noring the risk of asymmetric war- CIA’s Guide pinpoints that terrorists
fare does not spell objective plan- do not work in the open as armed
ning, assessment, and analysis, nei- units, for the most part hold no ter-
ther does using definitions of “territory, avoid engaging enemy mili-
rorism” that include virtually any tary forces in overt combat, numeri-
act of violence except formal war, as cally and logistically are constrained
some American agencies do.102 from mobilizing popular support in
While fighting terrorism might a concerted manner, and have no
mean just getting rid of some unsa- direct control or governance over a
vory group, fighting an insurgency populace at any level.109 These are
requires other tactics that include just general guidelines, there are no
e.g. swaying the population against absolute categories regarding insur-
the insurgent group and training gency and terrorism; their tactics
other military forces on how to con- overlap and evolve over time –
duct counterinsurgency opera- more intensively now due to global-
tions. 103 Understanding insurgency ization. For example, in the case of
sets the stage for developing the insurgency, while its traditional
political, material, and psychologi- definition emphasizes armed oppo-
cal tools to win the contest of popu- sition to national governing systems
lar support.104 The military forces and authorities, globalization has
that successfully defeat insurgencies altered this concept since today
are usually those able to overcome there is a growing number of insur-
their institutional inclination to gencies that are multinational in
wage conventional war against in- identity, reach, and aims.110 In the
surgents and instead apply counter- case of terrorism, globalization has
insurgency knowledge.105 enabled terrorism to grow from re-
gional phenomenon into a global
The structure of a group says more threat through the expansion of air
about its primary purpose; it could travel, the wider availability of tele-
be said that, as a rule of thumb, vised news coverage, and broad
groups organized into irregular common political and ideological
military units are more likely to interests.111 The overlap between
pursue guerrilla war; however, insurgency and terrorism has im-
those with cell structures are proba- portant implications for understand-

ing state motivations and for effec- out oil to provide the world’s cur-
tive counterterrorism112 and coun- rent fuel, material needs, and
terinsurgency. Overwhelming con- economies, we would be forced to
ventional military superiority has return to a level of civilization and
pushed enemies to fight unconven- infrastructure of more than a cen-
tionally, mixing modern technology tury ago.116 Oil has become so per-
with ancient techniques of insur- vasive for our modern way of life
gency and terrorism.113 However, by that its importance will remain cru-
focusing on efforts to secure the cial in the coming decades for our
safety and support of the local continued progress. The first quarter
populace, and through a concerted of the twenty-first century will see
effort to truly function as learning our most intensive dependence on
bodies, victory can be achieved114– oil as a fuel and materials source.117
until the next challenge pops up.
The real problem is that, in spite of
V. Oil and Terrorism: That Deadly all those vaunted Western measures
Combination and plans about alternative sources
of energy to cut dependence on for-
Because of its significant role as the eign oil, the West – the United States
fuel – literally and figuratively – for in particular – will become even
modern industrial economies and more reliant on Middle East oil by
for military forces, oil has long been 2025 due to rising demand and de-
a top-priority political issue; coun- pleting reserves elsewhere.118 Since
tries have constantly sought to gain the world’s oil supplies are mostly
control of petroleum resources and concentrated in this region119 and
to manage the use of those resources the oil-rich, authoritarian countries
for their own political, military, and of the Middle East have become the
economic benefit.115 With the devel- birthplace of today’s global jihadist
opment of the petrochemical indus- movement, oil dependence from
try, oil changed our lifestyle. The this region is perceived as a serious
scope of products made from oil vulnerability in terms of national
and by machinery and systems security and energy security – two
powered and transported by oil is issues more intertwined in the 21st
simply breathtaking. Gasoline, air- century than ever before.120 Ensur-
plane fuel, diesel or heating oil are ing unfettered access to Middle East
the obvious products that come to oil may have been a policy that has
mind; however there is a list of less contributed to economic growth, but
obvious applications that nonethe- it has also been a decisive factor in
less play a prominent role in every- other areas rendering less desirable
day life such as tires, all rubber outcomes121 in a region where per-
products, fertilizers, CDs and DVDs, ceptions matter as much as realities.
shoes, eye glasses, computers and Although America imports its oil
accessories, asphalt roads, pharma- mostly from non-Middle East
ceuticals, anesthetics, cosmetics, de- sources, decades of oil extraction in
tergents, and countless more. With- the Middle East have resulted in a

widespread image of the United anti-American sentiment in the
States as a global parasite, feeding Middle East is in part caused by the
off Middle Eastern petroleum reser- perceived hypocrisy between
voirs and propping up malevolent American values and its defense of
and greedy autocratic states.122 This national economic interests to en-
perception has undoubtedly con- sure the unrelenting flow of this
tributed to the challenges of global mineral strategic commodity,130
terrorism.123 In general, Western while turning a blind eye to disturb-
intervention in the cause of oil is ing realities in the Middle East di-
perceived as a factor supporting rectly connected to oil extraction
corrupt, autocratic rulers in the such as political corruption, lack of
Middle East.124 This Western energy political and social development,
dependence definitively shapes critical levels of economic depend-
policies towards other countries. ence on a single national resource,131
These policies have been designed and other structural problems. De-
in large part to assure the abundant spite its abundant oil wealth, the
and uninterrupted flow of oil to the quality of life in the Arab World is
West; for example, the presence of considerably lower than in other
American troops in the world’s developing countries – a condition
largest producer country, Saudi which Osama bin Laden and other
Arabia, which has long enraged Islamist terrorists have noted and
some Muslims and that Osama bin exploited in their continual exhorta-
Laden has masterfully exploited to tions for the Muslin world to take
promote his cause, 125 or European up violence against the West.132
policies toward Iran or Libya since Though there is no proven causal
these countries supply a large per- linkage between poverty and terror-
cent of Europe's imported oil.126 ism, it is the perception of this nexus
what terrorist leaders skillfully ex-
The role of oil in the twenty-first ploit. Poverty combined with youth
century will be shaped by markets, unemployment does create a social
technology and government pol- and psychological climate in which
icy.127 During the Cold War, U.S. Islamism thrive generating the radi-
foreign policies towards the Gulf cals necessary to incite internal con-
were shaped with the bipolar strug- flicts.133
gle against the Soviet Union in mind
and the containment of communism Saudi Arabia, home of an autocratic
provided an overarching strategic kingdom and a strategic American
framework that clearly influenced ally because of oil was also the
many policy decisions between 1945 birthplace of most of the 19 identi-
and 1991.128 During this period, fied hijackers that carried out the
America contracted many marriages 9/11 terrorist attacks. This country
of oil convenience with autocratic is particularly vulnerable to terror-
states such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, or ism and al-Qaeda is well aware that
Egypt, to keep the Soviets at bay.129 a successful attack on one of the
It could be argued that much of the kingdom’s major oil facilities would

send shockwaves to the world.134 ernance in oil-producing countries
Islamist terrorist violence in Africa worldwide.139 Foreign investment,
is also a matter of great distress and particularly in the hydrocarbon sec-
al-Qaeda has already expressed its tor, can play a crucial role in mod-
particular interest in destabilizing ernizing and upgrading economic
the region and attacking its oil infra- infrastructure.140 The fact is that
structure.135 Physical damage to en- these countries could not exploit
ergy infrastructure is a threat to en- their oil without Western technol-
ergy security and to political and ogy. Therefore, the extraction of oil
economic stability. Attacks on pipe- should no longer result in the same
lines are tactically easy and the de- patterns of theft, greed, corruption,
sire among terrorists to attack them and authoritarianism so familiar to
have been well publicized by Osama the Middle East.141 Admittedly the
bin Laden in different statements West has some responsibility in this
calling on his associates to take their area but the exploitation of our col-
holy war directly to the oil industry lective guilt over colonialism, impe-
and to disrupt supplies to the rialism, and other –isms in the po-
United States from the Persian litically correct environment of our
Gulf.136 The specter of burning oil days is a big factor exerting negative
fields by terrorist attacks brings to influence on policy today. In addi-
mind the time in 1990 when Saddam tion to the time-honored tradition in
Hussein ordered the destruction of the Muslim world to put most of the
Kuwait’s oilfields during Iraq’s re- blame of its failures on foreigners
treat. If Saddam had invaded Saudi rather than on their own shortcom-
Arabia instead and applied his ings and lack of self-criticism;142
scorched-earth policy there, Western most Western governments have
economies would have been crip- advisors and experts who offer per-
pled for years.137 A carefully- ception-based and not fact-based
planned terrorist attack could land analysis since they come from the
us in that scenario. Middle East or from universities
where their positions are paid for by
Oil alone cannot explain the horrors oil-producing regimes and produce
of 9/11 or the phenomenon of monothematic advice: Muslim ex-
Islamist terrorism in general, but we tremism is due to wrong Western
cannot completely disregard the foreign policymaking or to the way
connection between the flow of Muslim immigrants are treated in
Western money towards the Middle the West.143 This kind of approach
East and the growth of well-funded has led to many failed policies and
Islamist terrorist groups.138 Long- strategies contributing to the lack of
term energy security and national unity to confront the terrorist en-
security goals will prove elusive emy. The greatest threat to our secu-
unless our energy security interests rity remains problems of mindset
are pursued alongside coordinated and perception since we fail to ap-
efforts contributing to the increase preciate how these phenomena can
of state legitimacy and good gov- impact on terrorist thinking and op-

erations as well as on our own religion. For groups like al-Qaeda,
views and premises, constraining religion is the overriding motive
and distorting our policymaking.144 and, indeed, the religious impera-
There is an enormous need to culti- tive for terrorism is the most impor-
vate a new generation of academics tant defining characteristic of terror-
who can understand this and to in- ist activity today.149 Yet if we can
volve dissidents from the Arab look beyond the fiery and relig-
world who would inform us not iously-fervent rhetoric of terrorist
about the perception, but about the leaders, religion may be used as a
reality of the Middle East – 145 and powerful motivating element for its
Western policymakers who can members, but the ultimate purpose
bravely look at this issue through to use violence is none other than
new eyes. the seizing and remolding of the
controls of a state to establish the
At the turn of the century, non- caliphate,150 an alternative polity
democratic and unstable Middle that Muslims recall as a “golden age
Eastern countries provided thirty of Islam.”151 Thus, in reality, it is
percent of the global supply of oil business as usual; the essence of ji-
with Saudi Arabia alone providing hadism is politically-motivated vio-
ten percent of total supply.146 Al- lence wrapped in an appealing mix
though oil may eventually diminish of religion and fanaticism, but po-
in importance, it will continue to litical after all.
play a significant role in the global
economy for the foreseeable future The postmodern version of the old
and will remain a key subject of in- terrorist scourge, which some au-
ternational politics well into the thors use to explain the underlying
twenty-first century.147 Almost ten rationale of the global jihad, is seen
years after 9/11, too many Western as a reaction to the perceived op-
policymakers are still not capable of pression of Muslims worldwide and
connecting the dots between oil the spiritual bankruptcy of the
revenues and the financing of West.152 Reemergence in the early
Islamist terrorism. 1980s of terrorism motivated by a
religious imperative set in motion
VI. Islamist Terrorism: The Curse profound changes, still unfolding, in
of the Free World the nature, motivations, and capa-
bilities of terrorists.153 Not until 1980
The decade prior to 9/11, a number did the first “modern” religious ter-
of scholars and experts perceived rorist groups appear.154 Much of it
that fundamental changes were tak- could be seen because of the revolu-
ing place in the character of terror- tion in Iran that so dramatically por-
ism since the use of violence for po- trayed the zeal and forcefulness of
litical purposes had allegedly failed: the new Islamic leaders.155 With the
“Postmodern terrorism” was to be resurgence of fundamentalism came
conducted for different reasons al- a recurrence of fanaticism.156 And
together.148 This time the reason was what the world is enduring today

are mostly manifestations of fun- embrace a more open-ended cate-
damentalism; what the public sees is gory of “enemies” – anyone who
not a Muslim majority but a jihadist does not belong to their group, in-
minority.157 cluding other fellow Muslims – and
also to commit suicide or “self-
The Wahhabi religious vision is the martyrdom,” though forbidden by
fundamentalist version of Islam and Islamic law.165 According to their
consists in a strict, puritanical faith interpretation, the enemy is the
that emphasizes literal interpreta- West, the United States in particular,
tion of the Koran and requires to willfully impeding the reinstate-
fight the unbelievers in a holy war ment of the caliphate.166 Jihadists
or “jihad” and to reestablish a true and their followers argue that West-
Islamic state.158 Contemporary ji- ern societies are naturally hostile to
hadists read the Koran and extract Islam167 and exploit the misconcep-
from it the verses referring to vio- tion. On the other side, many West-
lence and then tell Muslims that it is erners hear about Islam and the
their duty to behave accordingly; Muslim world only through explo-
however the problem is whether it sive, negative media reports, failing
was ever meant to be used as a to distinguish between Islam as a
blueprint for action.159 Jihad, that religion and Muslims and the ex-
literally means struggle in the path tremist jihadists who have hijacked
of Allah, basically states that life is Islamic discourse to justify their ter-
hard and one must struggle against rorism.168 It is another case of the
evil in oneself in order to be virtu- clash between perception and real-
ous and moral, trying hard to do ity that needs to be urgently ad-
good and help to reform society; dressed.
from then on, it is open to interpre-
tation that can go all the way to holy In 1996, bin Laden declared war on
war to defend Islam.160 Jihad is a the United States and its allies; his
concept with multiple meanings goal was to drive American forces
that has been used and abused out of the Arabian Peninsula, over-
throughout Islamic history.161 throw the Saudi government, and
liberate Islam’s holy cities of Mecca
Using the jihadist interpretation, and Medina – threats he conveyed
violence is first and foremost a sac- with carefully-staged media ap-
ramental act or divine duty for the pearances.169 Global politics were
religious terrorist.162 The will of Al- indeed for bin Laden a clash of civi-
lah and the doctrine of the Koran lizations between the Muslim world
make their actions legitimate, how- and the West, between Islam and a
ever unrestrained and violent they militant Judeo-Christian conspir-
may be.163 With this justification at acy.170 According to his vision, the
hand, their violence becomes devoid crimes of the West, the exploitation,
of the moral constraints other kinds and the massacres committed by
of terrorists may have.164 Naturally, colonial rule, had to be avenged; the
this also serves as the justification to West, with its demoralizing cultural

influences as much as its economic operandi, as a result, it becomes more
predominance, is still the main ob- difficult to find the appropriate
stacle for the global victory of Is- counterterrorism measures.177
lam.171 Once the holy war was an-
nounced, the fame of bin Laden and Terrorism is an attempt to destabi-
his organization spread through the lize democratic societies and show
Muslim world and al-Qaeda had no their governments are impotent.178
difficulties enlisting new recruits.172 Bin Laden, Hamas and other
Uncontrolled demographic growth spokesmen for the terrorists have
and the incapacity of Arab govern- declared on many occasions that
ments to create jobs for young peo- America and the West in general are
ple have contributed to the terrorist paper tigers whose young people
potential in the Arab world.173 above all want to live, whereas the
However, this potential due to un- young jihadists long to sacrifice
employment does not depict the their lives.179 It is true we celebrate
whole picture of jihadism. Though life, but this generalization misrep-
the support among the poor masses resents the obvious: A small minor-
in Islamic countries is strong due to ity is trying to impose their deadly
its appealing message for social jus- conception and to arrogate the rep-
tice, this kind of terrorism is about resentation of a whole community
privileged boys: The operatives of or religion. Islam is a religion like
international terrorism in Europe others and jihadism is an ideological
and America hail not from the poor, movement fighting and killing to
downtrodden, and unemployed, but impose its purist and radicalized
usually belong to the affluent mid- vision of Islam and the world. In
dle class.174 Even leaving aside mul- order to isolate and marginalize the
timillionaire Osama bin Laden, the jihadists, the Muslim community
9/11 terrorists were all without ex- needs our help.180 We are immersed
ception scions of Middle Eastern in a conflict that is an ideological
privilege; in fact, al-Qaeda has no struggle as much as a security
great use for illiterate recruits be- threat. Globalization may have im-
cause they cannot carry out World proved the technical capacities of
Trade Center-like attacks, unable to terrorists and facilitated the expan-
make themselves inconspicuous in sion of their reach, but terrorism still
the West and lacking the education remains the weakest form of irregu-
and training terrorist operatives lar warfare, representing the ex-
need.175 In other words, such per- treme views of a scarce minority of
sons will have to have the sort of the global population.181 In order to
education that cannot be found deal with the vexing challenge of
among the poor in Pakistan or in global terrorism, the international
Palestinian refugee camps, only community must delegitimize the
among well-off town folk.176 Ji- appeal of the terrorist message that
hadists do not fit the traditional is a product of twisting religion or
stereotype of secular terrorist or- political theory, inspiring recruits to
ganizations, neither does their modi destruction rather than personal

enlightenment.182 It is a tall order in geographical isolation.186 The direct
this new century, but not a hopeless answer to this threat was the
venture. “Global War on Terrorism”
(GWOT). The United States had
VII. Existential Challenge or Plain been trying to stop al-Qaeda’s logis-
Exaggeration? tics networks; U.S. and allied intelli-
gence services disrupted numerous
There is no question that jihadism is plots around the world before the
an old type of conflict in a new 9/11 attacks, but al-Qaeda’s haven
guise. It is also undeniable that al- in Afghanistan enabled the terrorist
Qaeda has declared war on the group to train with little interfer-
United States and Western civiliza- ence.187 Al-Qaeda had dozens of
tion in general, first in 1996 with bin training camps with thousands of
Laden’s widely-dismissed first fatwa volunteers in Afghanistan.188 The
and then in 1998 with his second Taliban regime paid its unflinching
fatwa in which he expounds the ba- commitment to al-Qaeda with the
sic tenets of the jihadist ideology, ultimate price – removal from
the basis of the World Islamic Front power in 2001, just three months
for Jihad against the Crusaders and after 9/11.189 The Afghan operation
the Jews.183 This was specifically a was quick and forced the Taliban to
declaration of war on the United become a guerrilla force once
States and its allies for occupying more.190 With a new government in
the holiest of the territories and Afghanistan, al-Qaeda lost its open
plundering its riches; it became haven but survived the departure of
every Muslim’s personal duty to kill the Taliban regime. It remains an
Americans and their allies, both ci- organization with a dense set of
vilians and military, until they de- links and its presence in dozens of
part from all the lands of Islam, in- countries has allowed them to en-
capable to threaten any Muslim.184 dure.191 The principle of jihad is the
There are so many fringed groups ideological bond that unites this
threatening every moving target amorphous movement transcending
that American counterterrorism ef- structure, diverse membership, and
forts were focused on other sorts of geographical separation.192 After the
threats and it seems to have ignored Afghan campaign, the Bush admini-
the possibility of using an aircraft as stration made Iraq its next target.
a suicide weapon.185 It was a wake-
up call of spectacular proportions. Even before the Second Gulf War in
Never before had so many people March 2003, Iraq had already
been killed in a terrorist attack. Be- emerged as an important rallying
sides the terrible carnage, 9/11 had cry for al-Qaeda and the jihadist
an indisputably powerful psycho- movement; it was al-Qaeda the one
logical impact on the American psy- suggesting its wish to make Iraq the
che and shattered the country’s central battlefield of jihad193 and
sense of invulnerability due to its asked jihadists to descend on Iraq to
superpower standing and relative confront the U.S.-led coalition,

which they did in droves after the have allowed the Taliban to make a
fall of Baghdad.194 Iraq was promi- strong comeback.
nent in al-Qaeda’s plans to invigo-
rate the jihadist cause and perpetu- In the post-Iraq war period and the
ate the image of Islam on the defen- continuation of the war against
sive, having to take up arms against global terrorism, understanding the
the West.195 On the second and third politics of the Muslim world as well
anniversary of 9/11, al-Qaeda's as the sources of radicalism and ex-
deputy leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri tremism is extremely important.198
conveyed the group’s strategy in a Nevertheless, the West has its own
message expressing that Americans demons to fight first, today more
could not handle both wars in Iraq than ever. Jihadists seek to wear
and Afghanistan, landing in a diffi- down the will and resolve of the
cult situation since withdrawal adversary and force a withdrawal.199
meant defeat and staying meant They know the struggle is not easy
bleeding to death.196 The American but that it can be won because they
policy to bridge this gap was to perceive and seek to exploit the
choose containment for Afghanistan weakness of the West, particularly
and to seek stability in Iraq. After a the mortal fear of the spiritual supe-
successful campaign to depose Sad- riority of Islam and the unlimited,
dam Hussein, the post-invasion was unrelenting willingness of its be-
marked by sectarian violence. In lievers to fight and to die for Islam’s
addition, the continuation of the principles.200 Western societies have
violence, the inability of U.S.-led erred in the opposite fashion, going
Coalition forces and Iraqi security for disarmament and appeasement
forces to maintain order in the coun- and playing down the achievements
try and the Abu Ghraib incident of Western civilization; as such they
along other unfavorable develop- have often lost their liberty as a con-
ments surely contributed to the sequence of not being able to pro-
U.S.’s already poor standing among vide security for their own peo-
Muslims.197 Furthermore, the inept ples.201 Western contemporary
use of America’s strategic influence postmodern ideologies such as mul-
only made things worse. In 2007, ticulturalism, utopian pacifism, and
there was an important strategic moral equivalence have heavily in-
shift regarding Iraq, better known as fluenced the psyche of the jihadist
the “Petraeus Doctrine.” The suc- movement. Our multiculturalists
cessful implementation of the contend that the West has neither
“surge” turned the tide and the the moral capital nor the intellectual
situation in Iraq has improved sig- deftness to condemn foreign prac-
nificantly ever since. So much so tices such as suicide bombing, reli-
that our attention has turned once gious intolerance, female circumci-
more to Afghanistan since our con- sion, and honor killings, and so
tainment policy in combination with must accept those practices merely
a disastrous NATO-led operation as different.202 Because of multicul-
turalism, many in the West either do

not think jihadists pose any more Ahmadinejad is saying? In the West,
threat than does their own indus- utopian pacifists have hammered
trial capitalist state – 203 painfully the guilt factor into our consciences
evident in the attitudes of public to such extent that too many people
opinion and in many of our policy- are convinced that radical Islam is
making decisions. Europe, where also our fault.
there is a significant influx of Mus-
lims, is facing daunting integration The third postmodern ideology is
problems. The willingness to be- moral equivalence that seeks to do
come integrated did not exist among away with any notion of calibration
the Muslim immigration of the post- and magnitude, placing impossible
World War II period; they wanted to burdens of perfection upon Western
keep their way of life, which in the societies; for example, Abu Ghraib,
age of multiculturalism was consid- as disgusting as it was, but where
ered perfectly natural.204 Unfortu- no Iraqi detainees perished, is the
nately, the attraction of radical equivalent of either a Nazi Stalag or
Islamism in the Muslim diaspora in Soviet Gulag, where millions were
Europe and other parts of the world starved to death or executed.209 This
continues to be substantial.205 morally wrong, isolated episode
during the Iraq War has quickly
The second ideology, utopian paci- boosted the jihadist narrative and
fism, is innate to Western civiliza- put into question the moral standing
tion, given its propensity both to of all the troops and of our cause.
wage horrific wars and in response Context simply becomes irrelevant;
to put their hopes in world govern- an educated and affluent Western
ment in organizations such as the society must not err, while the
United Nations or the International “other” is apparently always ex-
Court of Justice (ICJ).206 In the West, pected to.210 The aggregate result of
there are people convinced that, multiculturalism, utopian pacifism,
with proper study and counsel, war and moral equivalence can be re-
can be outlawed.207 This premise sumed in the term “political cor-
reveals our failure to understand, or rectness;” leaving the Western pub-
to accept, that conflict is part of the lic philosophically and ethically ill-
human condition. Others delude equipped to condemn Islamist ex-
themselves into thinking that the tremism.211
declared enemy really wishes us no
harm and is just misunderstood, The Soviet Union may have col-
that some good Chamberlain-style lapsed, but the Marxist undercur-
talk could help us out. Although rents of thought still haunt us. We
much of what bin Laden has said are looking at the jihadist challenge
seemed feisty rhetoric for the as an interest-based issue: “If we
masses, not having taken him at his solve the poverty problem, there
word has been at our own peril.208 will be no more terrorism.” Though
Should we maybe be listening more the jihadists exploit the interest-
carefully to what Mahmoud based vision to advance their cause,

they actually see their enterprise as are no better, in principle, than the
a value-laden struggle, and believe infidels, and the battle against them
in the superiority of their ideas; they is still a religious duty.216 It is a
are ready to sacrifice even their lives struggle between barbarism and
dreaming of finally defeating the civilization. And as a good first step,
West and establishing their global the West has to realize of the urgent
caliphate. Contempt for America need to reach out to the Muslim
played a greater role in the large- community to join us in the fight
scale jihadist attacks than any other against jihadism. We are in this to-
motive; however much they may gether.
hate us, terrorists seldom attack
enemies whom they fear.212 West- VIII. How to Respond to This
erners have to believe their cause is Asymmetric Threat
worthy, too. The West is not perfect
but it has a proud heritage that is A good dose of realism would cer-
worth defending: Reason, freedom, tainly do some good. There are no
individualism, science, democracy, easy, quick fixes; there is a great
human rights, pluralism, secularism, deal of wishful thinking and a belief
and more. It does not mean to im- in miracle solutions to the terrorist
pose it on the rest; civilizations un- phenomenon.217 We should also
dergo exchanges and cross- keep in mind terrorism expert Wal-
fertilizations; they overlap and have ter Laqueur’s pertinent observation
differences and similarities,213 but that there is not one but many ter-
the allure of Western civilization is rorisms. It is a daunting task be-
all too powerful and the radicals cause what these many terrorisms
know it. The Islamists violently op- increasingly share is indiscriminate
pose modernism, but large sections violence against civilian popula-
of the Islamic world have been ir- tions. Society is today far more vul-
revocably affected by Western nerable due to urbanization and
ideas214 – even more now with the technological progress; not only
forces of globalization at the helm. It have the arms become far more le-
has endlessly been repeated that the thal, the targets have become so
majority of Muslims want to live in much softer.218
peace with their neighbors, a state-
ment that is as correct as it is irrele- International relations expert Robert
vant because the believers in jihad Keohane suggests that to win the
are a minority, in most countries a battle against transnational terror-
small minority, but they can count ism, it must become widely re-
on a substantial periphery of sym- garded as illegitimate, as are slavery
pathizers, more than sufficient to and piracy today. They have not
sustain long campaigns of terror- been completely eradicated in the
ism.215 The irony of it all is that ji- world, but they have been marginal-
hadism has killed more Muslims ized. The deepening delegitimation
than infidels. All Muslims who do of transnational terrorism is a neces-
not share the jihadists’ convictions sary force in world politics.219 The

problem of the definition of terror- more risky and expensive will only
ism and the subjectivity issue come grow in the near future; using prox-
to mind as big stumbling blocks; ies is too tempting as a formula to
however the international commu- inflict harm on an enemy, based on
nity must continue working on the hope that the sponsorship will
these issues to put pressure on be difficult to prove conclusively.226
states that legitimize political vio- Success may be elusive, but since
lence. We should never disregard the international community cannot
the power of diplomacy and “peer turn a blind eye to the problem, it
pressure” among nations. State- can at least adopt measures to make
sponsored terrorism continues to be coercion more effective.227 For ex-
a challenging issue with passive ample, whatever we are doing re-
support of terrorism often as impor- garding Iran, the main sponsor of
tant as deliberate assistance.220 terrorism in the world, is obviously
Sponsors, enablers and cooperators not working. As a result, the Persian
really constitute one single spec- nuclear bomb is getting ever closer
trum with mixtures of conflict and to becoming a frightful reality. The
cooperation all along it.221 Ending geopolitical consequences of such a
passive support requires reconcep- development will reverberate in the
tualizing what state sponsorship of security and balance of power
terrorism is and reevaluate how it is throughout the Middle East region
fought.222 and far beyond.
Although there are no perfect solu- Another aspect is the specter of

tions, careful policymakers should weapons of mass destruction in the
avoid falling prey to common mis- hands of terrorists or the fear of
takes that could only worsen the chemical, biological, radiological,
challenge presented by state spon- and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism. To
sorship of terrorism.223 Coercing improve counterterrorism policy-
powers often have a poor under- making, we should pay attention to
standing of the full range of state the full range of terrorist threats.
support and concentrate only on Sometimes it is necessary to learn to
some aspects, thus rendering coun- live with complexity and uncer-
terterrorism policies less effective.224 tainty and the reality that CBRN
Therefore, setting priorities, having programs and policies will have to
realistic expectations, understand- keep on changing to deal with
ing the nature of the adversary and threats as they do, or do not, de-
the reasons why a state would sup- velop.228 The threat of a CBRN at-
port terrorism, are just some of sev- tack may be a scary thought for
eral general guidelines that could policymaking, but delivery remains
help curb state sponsorship of ter- a significant technological hurdle for
rorism.225 For states, the use of ter- terrorists229 and this variable should
rorism as substitute warfare pre- be more carefully weighed since it is
cisely because old-fashioned, con- very likely that, in the foreseeable
ventional warfare has become much future, terrorist deeds against the

international community will con- mocracy surrounded by tyrannies,
tinue to be perpetrated in the old- failed states, and state sponsors of
fashioned way. If the new terrorism terrorism. Although it is highly de-
dedicates its resources toward in- sirable to find soon a way out to the
formation warfare or cyberterror- Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such as
ism, it will be exponentially more the two-state solution, it takes two
destructive than any power it to tango and Israel will continue to
wielded in the past – greater even have a very hard time finding the
than it would be with biological and right tango partner in the struggle
chemical weapons: Why indiscrimi- for peace and security. Hamas and
nately kill people when a computer Hezbollah, two terrorists groups
attack can produce far more dra- sponsored by Iran, do not have the
matic and lasting results?230 Those slightest inclination to contribute to
same technological resources and the success of such Western projects.
greater international cooperation On the contrary, their task is to im-
have helped us with the interdiction pose their Islamist vision on the re-
of terrorist finances, showing one of gion and they openly seek the de-
the biggest 9/11 improvements of struction of the State of Israel using
any of the counterterrorist instru- one of their preferred resources all
ments with more than 121 million along – Islamist terrorism. A realis-
dollars in terrorist-related financial tic analysis of the current Israeli-
assets frozen by governments Palestinian situation will have to
worldwide as of the end of 2008.231 conclude that an imminent solution
Governments need to understand is not at hand. After so much time
that cyberterrorism is actually a and money spent, policymakers
global threat and more concerted need to reconceptualize the whole
efforts are needed in this area. The issue.
United States has finally established
a command that will defend mili- Regarding jihadism, today very
tary networks against computer at- small radical groups are not aiming
tacks and develop offensive cyber- at conducting propaganda and
weapons, but the structure will also regular politics to seize power; they
be ready to help safeguard civilian aim at destruction in the hope that
systems.232 These are steps in the out of the ruins of what they have
right direction. destroyed, a better world will
emerge or at least one more in line
It is often heard that a cause of ter- with their ideology.234 In the ideo-
rorism is the State of Israel; for the logical struggle, a distressing feature
Muslim world at large, Israel is a of contemporary Islam is the rapid
symbol and a catalyst of their rage growth of fundamentalism in the
rather than the cause, in reality Is- Middle East since those who belong
rael is just a small Satan compared to this creed are the most intolerant
with the various big Satans on the members of any religion and their
Islamists’ political horizons.233 Israel narrow-mindedness renders them
is a well-established Western de- incapable of any agreement or com-

promise with those who think dif- cal fundamentalism becomes the
ferently.235 In Islamic countries, the norm and not the exception to in-
supervision of education is in the terpret Islam. Moderation and toler-
hands of the Islamists; in addition, ance will go out of the window and
secular entertainment hardly exists the Muslim community will feel
at all, to be a member of a group hard pressed to accept more radical
that does something active is a positions. American General Stanley
powerful motivation and most ter- A. McChrystal, the top U.S. and
rorist groups have little difficulty in NATO commander in Afghanistan
recruiting angry young men and and a real counterinsurgency expert,
women.236 Besides, in these coun- has shifted toward successfully
tries, the religious schools, called proven strategies such as seeking to
madrassas, are often vehicles for protect the population, to reduce
organizing terrorism.237 Islamist ac- civilian casualties, to increase the
tivities will go on since they are size and capacity of Afghan police
convinced that the only way to and military forces, and his planned
achieve their mission on earth is ‘civilian surge’ of governance and
armed struggle, i.e. terrorism and, in development assistance; these are
some circumstances, guerrilla war- moves in the right direction, pro-
fare.238 Insurgents should not con- vided the effort can be resourced
tinue holding an advantage in using and sustained.241 Our defeat would
information and cognition to influ- not only boost the enemy, it will
ence popular attitudes. In the strug- have a domino effect on neighbor-
gle for legitimacy, both performance ing Pakistan because the conflict in
and perceptions matter. For exam- Afghanistan cannot be separated
ple, to recognize that nonviolent from developments in Pakistan. In a
Islam is the key to isolating ji- not so far-fetched scenario, Pakistan
hadism; in Afghanistan and Iraq, could become the first Islamist nu-
that jihadists have no concept, no clear power. To prevent that from
plan, and no ability to govern, much happening will require that militant
less offer Muslims a promising (i.e., Islamists do not take control of that
non-fantasy) future.239 But Western country. Afghanistan and Pakistan
societies also need to be informed; are symbiotically linked and consti-
without magnifying or belittling the tute a single front in the broader
issue, without equating Islam either war against Islamist terrorism. Al-
with only peace or with only war; though NATO’s efforts in Afghani-
there is certainly a connection be- stan, if retooled, could culminate in
tween the religion and the ideology, victory, establishing the metrics of
but it must all be properly ex- what constitutes victory has become
plained.240 an elusive task in itself. For exam-
ple, the Alliance could do every-
The importance of winning the Af- thing right in Afghanistan and still
ghanistan War cannot be overstated. lose the broader regional campaign
Not only is the future of NATO at against terrorism if Pakistan fails to
stake, there is a big chance that radi- contain the radicals in its midst;

could that be considered victory? and far more lethal, than the threat
Thus, apart from being a crucial posed by foreign and domestic ter-
move against the cancerous spread rorist-extremist groups and indi-
of radical fundamentalism in the viduals.246
Islamic world, the fight in Pakistan,
and finding means to help Paki- The relationship between politics
stanis help themselves, is actually and terrorism in the oil-rich coun-
the most important battle in the tries of the Middle East has pro-
world.242 duced a powerful incentive for
America and the Western world to
To that disturbing picture, we must look elsewhere for new partnerships
add the reaction, often the inepti- to meet growing oil needs and for
tude, of governments around the serious moves towards energy in-
world reacting to the spread of dependence.247 It is of the utmost
Islamist terrorism.243 As part of suc- importance to cut the oil umbilical
cessful counterinsurgency measures, cord tying us to the Middle East as
it is all the more crucial to include one more step to hamper the spread
local authorities, groups, and citi- of Islamist terrorism – to put it sim-
zens in new information networks ply, no money, no terrorism. Our
that can help create information so- dealings with countries that export
cieties in which truth, freedom of or finance terrorism have all to do
ideas, and the requirement of gov- with our intense dependence on for-
ernment to listen are the best anti- eign oil since oil is the lifeblood of
dote for insurgency.244 Our military Western economies. This need has
forces are powerful but we need pushed the West to deliberately turn
more legitimate force. Among Mus- a blind eye to the way petrodollars
lim populations already resentful of are used to fund terrorism and other
Western power, U.S. military forces totalitarian activities. Yet in the
are presumptively illegitimate, as countries from which we buy this
reflected in polls showing that a ma- vital commodity, there is a wide-
jority of Iraqi Arabs believe that vio- spread perception of Western ex-
lence against U.S. troops is justifi- ploiters stealing Middle Eastern oil –
able. Counterinsurgency strategies a pathetic image that terrorism ex-
should have as the chief mission to ploits very effectively. Western gov-
improve and support effective and ernments need to take real steps, not
legitimate indigenous forces.245 just posturing, so that we can
Many policymakers find it difficult achieve energy independence and
to accept that asymmetric warfare is stop fearing the “oil weapon,” hang-
only illegal or illegitimate in the ing like the sword of Damocles over
eyes of those who do not need to our prosperity.
use such tactics, or believe this is the
most effective form of attack, and IX. Conclusion
the fact that the future threat posed
by covert or proxy attacks by state Terrorism is the enemy with a thou-
actors may be at least as important, sand faces, multifaceted, and prone

to surprise us with different guises. would be to understand the nature
The countering of its diverse mani- and seriousness of the Islamist
festations has to continue unabat- threat in order to take the normative
edly, always vigilant, while re- approaches towards making life
searching the factors behind it, the more difficult for the terrorists. This
dynamics of its enterprise, the stim- endeavor must also factor in one
uli that triggers it, and the idiosyn- important premise: Although we
crasy of its participants. cannot eradicate terrorism, civilized
societies can work together to actu-
The West needs to join forces with ally turn terrorism into a totally un-
the Islamic community in the fight acceptable tool to attain political
against jihadism. It is a threat to objectives in the twenty-first cen-
both civilizations. Many steps are tury. That would diminish its allure
required to reach that state of affairs as a political weapon and, hope-
in this new century. Nonetheless, fully, its spread in society.
the first step in the right direction
Miryam Lindberg is an advisor to the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, an

American policy institute focusing on terrorism, and a longtime contributor to the Stra-
tegic Studies Group (GEES).
Notes
1 David J. Whittaker, Terrorism: Understanding the Global Threat. (Great Britain: Pearson Educa-
tion Limited, 2007), p. 9-10.
2 As quoted in Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism. (New York: Columbia UP, 2006), p. 23.
3 Gilbert Guillaume, “Terrorism and International Law.” The International and Comparative Law
Quarterly, Vol. 58, Nº 3 (2004), p. 538-39.

4 Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction.
(Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 6.

5 Hoffman, p. 1.
6 Ibid, p. 38.
7 Whittaker, p. 83.
8 Hoffman, p. 37.
9 Whittaker, p. 22.
10 Hoffman, p. 2.
11 Walter Laqueur, “The Terrorism to Come.” Policy Review, Vol. 126 (2004), p. 34.
12 Hoffman, p. 35.
13 Ibid, p. 41.
14 Ibid, p. 3.
15 Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy. (Brookings Institution Press, 2003), p. 18.
16 As quoted in Hoffman, p. 32.
17 Hoffman, p. 32.
18 Ibid, p. 40.
19 Laqueur, “Come”, p. 58.
20 Whittaker, p. 4.
21 Hoffman, p. 38, 40.

22 Anthony H. Cordesman, Terrorism, Asymmetric Warfare, and Weapons of Mass Destruction: De-
fending the U.S. Homeland. (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001), p. 12.

23 Ibid, p. xv.
24 Hoffman, p. 3.
25 Guillaume, p. 538; Hoffman, p. 5.
26 Hoffman, p. 23.
27 Paul R. Ehrlich and Jianquo Liu. “Some Root Causes of Terrorism.” Population and Environ-
ment, Vol. 24 Nº 2 (2002), p. 184.

28 Tore Bjørgo, “Introduction,” Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality, and Ways Forward. Ed.
Tore Bjørgo. (Oxford: Routledge, 2005), p, 2. Also in Walter Laqueur, “Reflections on Terror-
ism.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 1 (1986), p. 91.
29 John Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism. (New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 84.
30 Walter Laqueur, No End To War: Terrorism In The Twenty-first Century. (Continuum Interna-
tional Publishing Group, 2004), p. 22.

31 Whittaker, p. 84.
32 Bjørgo, p. 3.
33 Horgan, “Psychology”, p. 84.
34 Pillar, p. 18.
35 Bjørgo, p. 3.
36 Ibid, p. 3.
37 Ibid, p. 18.
38 Michael Radu, “The Futile Search for ‘Root Causes’ of Terrorism.” Foreign Policy Research Insti-
tute, 23 April 2002. par. 4.

<http://www.fpri.org/enotes/americawar.20020423.radu.futilesearchforrootcauses.html>.
39 Bjørgo, p. 6.
40 Horgan, “Psychology”, p. 84.
42 Laqueur, “No End”, p. 19-21.
44 Laqueur, “No End”, p. 23.
45 Ibid, p. 25, 27.
46 Ibid, p. 24.
49 Bjørgo, p. 2.
51 John Horgan, “The Social and Psychological Characteristics of Terrorism and Terrorists.”
Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality, and Ways Forward. Ed. Tore Bjørgo. (Oxford: Routledge,
2005), p. 47.
52 Horgan, “Psychology”, p. xv. Also in Laqueur, “No End”, p. 11, 29).
53 Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism. (New York: Cambridge UP,
2005), p. 273. Also in Hoffman, p. 258.

54 Byman, p. 1.
55 Ibid, p. 4.
56 Ibid, p. 32.
57 Ibid, p. 21-22.
58 Byman, p. 5, 21; Hoffman, p. 258.
59 Byman, p. 53.
60 Byman, p. 54: Hoffman, p. 259.
61 Hoffman, p. 259.
62 Pillar, p. xiii.
63 Byman, p. 21.
64 Pillar, p. 165.
65 Ibid, p. 167.

66 Ray Takeyh, “The Rogue Who Came in From the Cold.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, Nº 3 (2001), p.
64-65. Also in Gawdat Bahgat, “Oil, Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Libyan
Diplomatic Coup.” The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies, Vol. 29, Nº 4 (2004), p. 392,
394.
67 Pillar, p. 166.
68 Hoffman, p. 258. Also in Gary Sick, “Iran: Confronting Terrorism.” The Washington Quarterly,
Vol. 26, Nº 4 (2003), p. 85.

69 Byman, p. 79-80, 97.
70 Ibid, p. 109.
71 Pillar, p. 166.
72 Ibid, p. 165.
73 Byman, p. 275.
74 Ibid, p. 262, 301.
75 Ibid, p. 263.
76 Hoffman, p. 17.
77 Byman, p. 274.
78 Ibid, p. 297.
79 Ibid, p. 22.
80 Ibid, p. 259.
81 David H. Petraeus and James F. Amos. The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field
Manual 3-24. (Marine Corps Warfighting Publication Nº 3-33.5, 2008), p. 1; ch 1; par. 1-2.
< http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf>.
82 Ibid, p.1; ch. 1; par. 1-3.
83 David C. Gompert et al. “Countering Insurgency in the Muslim World.” (RAND Corporation,
2008), p. 1. <http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/2008/RAND_RB9326.pdf>.
84 As quoted in Byman, p. 34.
85 Ibid, p. 23.
86 David C. Gompert et al, “War by Other Means - Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities
for Counterinsurgency.” (RAND Corporation, 2008), p. 23.

<http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.2.pdf>.
Also in Hoffman, p. 35; see also Petraeus and Amos 1; ch 1; par. 1-1.
87 Gompert et al, “War”, p. xxix.
88 Petraeus and Amos 2; ch 1; par. 1-8.
89 Byman, p. 259.
90 Ibid, p. 25.
91 Gompert et al, “War”, p. xxv.
92 Byman, p. 300.
93 Ibid, p. 25.
94 Ibid, p. 300.
95 Ibid, p. 26.
96 Gompert et al, “War”, p. vi, 23; Petraeus and Amos, p. ix.
98 Byman, p. 300-301.
99 Gompert et al, “War”, p. xxxi.
100 Cordesman, p. 11.
101 Ibid, p. 12.
102 Ibid, p. 13.
103 Byman, p. 300.
104 Gompert et al, “War”, p. xxxiii.
105 Petraeus and Amos, p. ix.
106 Byman, p. 24-25.
107 Ibid, p. 25.
108 Hoffman, p. 36.
109 As quoted in Hoffman, p. 35.
110 Gompert et al, “War”, p. xxix.

111 James Kiras, “Terrorism and Globalization.” The Globalization of World Politics.
Ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith. (New York: Oxford U P, 2006), p. 482.
112 Byman, p. 23.
113 Petraeus and Amos, p. ix.
114 Ibid, p. x.
115 Joan E. Spero and Jeffrey A. Hart, The Politics of International Economic Relations. (Toronto:
Thomson Wadsworth, 2003), p. 299.

116 Neal Adams, Terrorism and Oil. (Tulsa, OK: PennWell 2003), p. 3.
117 James J. Forest and Matthew V. Sousa, Oil and Terrorism in the New Gulf: Framing U.S. Energy
and Security Policies for the Gulf of Guinea. (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), p. 4.
118 Ibid, p. 4.
119 Adams, p. 3.
120 Forest and Sousa, p. 17.
121 Ibid, p. ix.
122 Ibid, p. 18.
123 Ibid, p. 19.
124 Ehrlich and Liu, p. 184.
125 Ibid, p. 183-84.
126 Pillar, p. 191.
127 Spero and Hart, p. 330.
128 Forest and Sousa, p. 134-35.
129 Ibid, p. 136.
130 Ibid, p. 143.
131 Ibid, p. 17.
132 Ibid, p. ix.
135 Ibid, p. 295.
136 Ibid, p. 13.
137 Adams, p. 9.
139 Ibid, p. x.
140 Bahgat, p. 393.
143 Walid Phares, “The European Public Must Learn to Distinguish Between Islam as a Religion
and Jihadism as an Ideology.” Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. (26 July 2008), par. 14.
<http://fdd.typepad.com/fdd/2008/07/europe-must-dis.html>.
144 Peter S. Probst, "Intelligence and Force Protection vs. Terrorism", in James M. Smith and Wil-
liam C. Thomas, eds., The Terrorism Threat and U.S. Government Response: Operational and Organ-
izational Factors, (Colorado Springs, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), p.
4.
145 Phares, par. 14.
146 Spero and Hart, p. 331.
147 Ibid, p. 331-32.
148 Kiras, p. 486.
149 Hoffman, p. 92.
150 Kiras, p. 488,
151 Hoffman, p. 96.
152 Kiras, p. 487.
153 Hoffman, p. 257.
154 Ibid, p. 85.
157 Phares, par. 6.

158 John L. Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam. (New York: Oxford UP, 2003), p. 6.
160 Esposito, p. 28.
161 Ibid, p. 27.
162 Hoffman, p. 88.
164 Hoffman, p. 88.
165 Ibid, p. 89, 91.
166 Ibid, p. 96.
167 Phares, par. 6.
168 Esposito, p. ix.
169 Ibid, p. 20-21.
170 Ibid, p. 21.
172 Ibid, p. 58.
173 Ibid, p. 17.
175 Radu, par. 4.
176 Laqueur, “No End”, p. 16-17.
178 Laqueur, “Reflections”, p. 87.
180 Phares, par. 2.
181 Kiras, p. 495.
182 Ibid, p. 494-95.
183 Hoffman, p. 94-95.
186 Ibid, p. 135.
187 Byman, p. 70.
188 Ibid, p. 206.
189 Ibid, p. 215.
190 Ibid, p. 216.
191 Ibid, p. 217.
193 Ibid, p. 291.
194 Ibid, p. 292.
195 Ibid, p. 293.
196 Ibid, p. 292.
197 Ibid, p. 293.
198 Esposito, p. x.
199 Kiras, p. 482.
201 Victor D. Hanson, “Security and Freedom.” Private Papers (27 June 2008), par. 8.
<http://www.victorhanson.com/articles/hanson062708.html>.
202 Ibid, par. 19, 20.
203 Ibid, par. 22.
205 Ibid, p. 211.
206 Hanson, par. 23, 24.
207 Ibid, par. 25.
209 Hanson, par. 27, 28.
210 Ibid, par. 29, 31.
211 Ibid, par. 32.

213 Esposito, p. 123.
215 Ibid, p. 210.
216 Ibid, p. 212.
218 Laqueur, “No End”, p. 209-10.
219 As quoted in Baylis, p. 321.
220 Byman, p. 219.
221 Pillar, p. 157.
222 Byman, p. 258.
223 Ibid, p. 273.
224 Ibid, p. 260.
225 Ibid, p. 298.
227 Byman, p. 274.
230 Walter Laqueur, “Postmodern Terrorism.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, Nº4 (1996), p. 35.
231 Pillar, p. xxx.
232 Ellen Nakashima, “Gates Creates Cyber-Defense Command.” The Washington Post (24 June
2009).
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/06/23/AR2009062303492.ht
ml>
234 Ibid, p. 209.
236 Laqueur, “No End”, p. 17; Whittaker, p. 85.
237 Pillar, p. 183.
239 Gompert et al, “War”, p. xliv.
241 David Kilcullen, “For Answers to the Afghan-Pakistan Conflict, Ask: What Would Curzon
Do?” The Spectator (18 July 2009), p. 1 <http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/all/5186128/for-

answers-to-the-afghanpakistan-conflict-ask-what-would-curzon-do.thtml>
242 Ibid, p. 5.
244 Gompert, “War”, p. xliv-xlv.
245 Ibid, p. xxxviii.

Terrorism 8

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

You might also like

Terrorism 8

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Terrorism 8

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century

Análisis nº 7561 February 20, 2010

I. The Definition Issue: What is fining terrorism lies in its subjectiv-

Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos GEES 1 Análisis nº 7561

Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos GEES 2 Análisis nº 7561

Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos GEES 3 Análisis nº 7561

Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos GEES 4 Análisis nº 7561

Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos GEES 5 Análisis nº 7561

Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos GEES 6 Análisis nº 7561

Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos GEES 7 Análisis nº 7561

Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos GEES 8 Análisis nº 7561

Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos GEES 9 Análisis nº 7561

Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos GEES 10 Análisis nº 7561

Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos GEES 11 Análisis nº 7561

Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos GEES 12 Análisis nº 7561

Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos GEES 13 Análisis nº 7561

Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos GEES 14 Análisis nº 7561

Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos GEES 15 Análisis nº 7561

Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos GEES 16 Análisis nº 7561

Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos GEES 17 Análisis nº 7561

Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos GEES 18 Análisis nº 7561

Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos GEES 19 Análisis nº 7561

Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos GEES 20 Análisis nº 7561

Although there are no perfect solu- Another aspect is the specter of

Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos GEES 21 Análisis nº 7561

Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos GEES 22 Análisis nº 7561

Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos GEES 23 Análisis nº 7561

Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos GEES 24 Análisis nº 7561

Miryam Lindberg is an advisor to the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, an

Quarterly, Vol. 58, Nº 3 (2004), p. 538-39.

(Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 6.

Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos GEES 25 Análisis nº 7561

fending the U.S. Homeland. (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001), p. 12.

ment, Vol. 24 Nº 2 (2002), p. 184.

tional Publishing Group, 2004), p. 22.

tute, 23 April 2002. par. 4.

2005), p. 273. Also in Hoffman, p. 258.

Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos GEES 26 Análisis nº 7561

Vol. 26, Nº 4 (2003), p. 85.

for Counterinsurgency.” (RAND Corporation, 2008), p. 23.

Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos GEES 27 Análisis nº 7561

Thomson Wadsworth, 2003), p. 299.

Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos GEES 28 Análisis nº 7561

Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos GEES 29 Análisis nº 7561

Do?” The Spectator (18 July 2009), p. 1 <http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/all/5186128/for-

Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos GEES 30 Análisis nº 7561

You might also like