G.R. No.

187226, January 28, 2015

CHERYLL SANTOS LEUS, Petitioner, v. ST. SCHOLASTICA’S COLLEGE WESTGROVE AND/OR

SR. EDNA QUIAMBAO, OSB, Respondents.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Cheryll Santos Leus (petitioner) was hired by St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove (SSCW), a Catholic
educational institution, as a non-teaching personnel, engaged in pre-marital sexual relations, got
pregnant out of wedlock, married the father of her child, and was dismissed by SSCW, in that order.
The question that has to be resolved is whether the petitioner’s conduct constitutes a ground for her
dismissal.

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
annul and set aside the Decision1 dated September 24, 2008 and Resolution2 dated March 2, 2009
issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 100188, which affirmed the Resolutions dated
February 28, 20073 and May 21, 20074 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC
CA No. 049222-06.

The Facts

SSCW is a catholic and sectarian educational institution in Silang, Cavite. In May 2001, SSCW hired
the petitioner as an Assistant to SSCW’s Director of the Lay Apostolate and Community Outreach
Directorate.

Sometime in 2003, the petitioner and her boyfriend conceived a child out of wedlock. When SSCW
learned of the petitioner’s pregnancy, Sr. Edna Quiambao (Sr. Quiambao), SSCW’s Directress,
advised her to file a resignation letter effective June 1, 2003. In response, the petitioner informed Sr.
Quiambao that she would not resign from her employment just because she got pregnant without the
benefit of marriage.5 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On May 28, 2003, Sr. Quiambao formally directed the petitioner to explain in writing why she should
not be dismissed for engaging in pre-marital sexual relations and getting pregnant as a result
thereof, which amounts to serious misconduct and conduct unbecoming of an employee of a Catholic
school.6 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In a letter7 dated May 31, 2003, the petitioner explained that her pregnancy out of wedlock does not
amount to serious misconduct or conduct unbecoming of an employee. She averred that she is
unaware of any school policy stating that being pregnant out of wedlock is considered as a serious
misconduct and, thus, a ground for dismissal. Further, the petitioner requested a copy of SSCW’s
policy and guidelines so that she may better respond to the charge against her.

On June 2, 2003, Sr. Quiambao informed the petitioner that, pending the promulgation of a “Support
Staff Handbook,” SSCW follows the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (1992 MRPS) on
the causes for termination of employments; that Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS cites “disgraceful or
immoral conduct” as a ground for dismissal in addition to the just causes for termination of
employment provided under Article 282 of the Labor Code.8 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On June 4, 2003, the petitioner, through counsel, sent Sr. Quiambao a letter,9 which, in part,
reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

To us, pre-marital sex between two consenting adults without legal impediment to marry each other
who later on married each other does not fall within the contemplation of “disgraceful or immoral
conduct” and “serious misconduct” of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools and the Labor
Code of the Philippines.

Your argument that what happened to our client would set a bad example to the students and other
employees of your school is speculative and is more imaginary than real. To dismiss her on that sole
ground constitutes grave abuse of management prerogatives.

Considering her untarnished service for two years, dismissing her with her present condition would
also mean depriving her to be more secure in terms of financial capacity to sustain maternal needs.10

In a letter11 dated June 6, 2003, SSCW, through counsel, maintained that pre-marital sexual
relations, even if between two consenting adults without legal impediment to marry, is considered a
disgraceful and immoral conduct or a serious misconduct, which are grounds for the termination of
employment under the 1992 MRPS and the Labor Code. That SSCW, as a Catholic institution of
learning, has the right to uphold the teaching of the Catholic Church and expect its employees to
abide by the same. They further asserted that the petitioner’s indiscretion is further aggravated by
the fact that she is the Assistant to the Director of the Lay Apostolate and Community Outreach
Directorate, a position of responsibility that the students look up to as role model. The petitioner was
again directed to submit a written explanation on why she should not be dismissed.

On June 9, 2003, the petitioner informed Sr. Quiambao that she adopts her counsel’s letter dated
June 4, 2003 as her written explanation.12 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Consequently, in her letter13 dated June 11, 2003, Sr. Quiambao informed the petitioner that her
employment with SSCW is terminated on the ground of serious misconduct. She stressed that pre-
marital sexual relations between two consenting adults with no impediment to marry, even if they
subsequently married, amounts to immoral conduct. She further pointed out that SSCW finds
unacceptable the scandal brought about by the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock as it ran
counter to the moral principles that SSCW stands for and teaches its students.

Thereupon, the petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Regional Arbitration Branch
of the NLRC in Quezon City against SSCW and Sr. Quiambao (respondents). In her position
paper,14 the petitioner claimed that SSCW gravely abused its management prerogative as there was
no just cause for her dismissal. She maintained that her pregnancy out of wedlock cannot be
considered as serious misconduct since the same is a purely private affair and not connected in any
way with her duties as an employee of SSCW. Further, the petitioner averred that she and her
boyfriend eventually got married even prior to her dismissal.

For their part, SSCW claimed that there was just cause to terminate the petitioner’s employment with
SSCW and that the same is a valid exercise of SSCW’s management prerogative. They maintained
that engaging in pre-marital sex, and getting pregnant as a result thereof, amounts to a disgraceful
or immoral conduct, which is a ground for the dismissal of an employee under the 1992 MRPS.

They pointed out that SSCW is a Catholic educational institution, which caters exclusively to young
girls; that SSCW would lose its credibility if it would maintain employees who do not live up to the
values and teachings it inculcates to its students. SSCW further asserted that the petitioner, being an
employee of a Catholic educational institution, should have strived to maintain the honor, dignity and
reputation of SSCW as a Catholic school.15 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

On February 28, 2006, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision,16 in NLRC Case No. 6-17657-03-C
which dismissed the complaint filed by the petitioner. The LA found that there was a valid ground for
the petitioner’s dismissal; that her pregnancy out of wedlock is considered as a “disgraceful and
immoral conduct.” The LA pointed out that, as an employee of a Catholic educational institution, the
petitioner is expected to live up to the Catholic values taught by SSCW to its students. Likewise, the
LA opined that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Further, a deep analysis of the facts would lead us to disagree with the complainant that she was
dismissed simply because she violate[d] a Catholic [teaching]. It should not be taken in isolation but
rather it should be analyzed in the light of the surrounding circumstances as a whole. We must also
take into [consideration] the nature of her work and the nature of her employer-school. For us, it is
not just an ordinary violation. It was committed by the complainant in an environment where her
strict adherence to the same is called for and where the reputation of the school is at stake. x x x.17

The LA further held that teachers and school employees, both in their official and personal conduct,
must display exemplary behavior and act in a manner that is beyond reproach.

The petitioner appealed to the NLRC, insisting that there was no valid ground for the termination of
her employment. She maintained that her pregnancy out of wedlock cannot be considered as
“serious misconduct” under Article 282 of the Labor Code since the same was not of such a grave and
aggravated character. She asserted that SSCW did not present any evidence to establish that her
pregnancy out of wedlock indeed eroded the moral principles that it teaches its students.18 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Ruling of the NLRC

On February 28, 2007, the NLRC issued a Resolution,19 which affirmed the LA Decision dated
February 28, 2006. The NLRC pointed out that the termination of the employment of the personnel of
private schools is governed by the 1992 MRPS; that Section 94(e) thereof cites “disgraceful or
immoral conduct” as a just cause for dismissal, in addition to the grounds for termination of
employment provided for under Article 282 of the Labor Code. The NLRC held that the petitioner’s
pregnancy out of wedlock is a “disgraceful or immoral conduct” within the contemplation of Section
94(e) of the 1992 MRPS and, thus, SSCW had a valid reason to terminate her employment.

The petitioner sought reconsideration20 of the Resolution dated February 28, 2007 but it was denied
by the NLRC in its Resolution21 dated May 21, 2007.

Unperturbed, the petitioner filed a petition22 for certiorari with the CA, alleging that the NLRC gravely
abused its discretion in ruling that there was a valid ground for her dismissal. She maintained that
pregnancy out of wedlock cannot be considered as a disgraceful or immoral conduct; that SSCW
failed to prove that its students were indeed gravely scandalized by her pregnancy out of wedlock.
She likewise asserted that the NLRC erred in applying Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS. cralawred

The Ruling of the CA

On September 24, 2008, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision,23 which denied the petition
forcertiorari filed by the petitioner. The CA held that it is the provisions of the 1992 MRPS and not the
Labor Code which governs the termination of employment of teaching and non-teaching personnel of
private schools, explaining that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

It is a principle of statutory construction that where there are two statutes that apply to a particular
case, that which was specially intended for the said case must prevail. Petitioner was employed by
respondent private Catholic institution which undeniably follows the precepts or norms of conduct set
forth by the Catholic Church. Accordingly, the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools followed by it
must prevail over the Labor Code, a general statute. The Manual constitutes the private schools’
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232 or the Education Act of 1982. x x
x.24

The CA further held that the petitioner’s dismissal was a valid exercise of SSCW’s management
prerogative to discipline and impose penalties on erring employees pursuant to its policies, rules and
regulations. The CA upheld the NLRC’s conclusion that the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock is
considered as a “disgraceful and immoral conduct” and, thus, a ground for dismissal under Section
94(e) of the 1992 MRPS. The CA likewise opined that the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock is
scandalous per se given the work environment and social milieu that she was in, viz: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Under Section 94 (e) of the [MRPS], and even under Article 282 (serious misconduct) of the Labor
Code, “disgraceful and immoral conduct” is a basis for termination of employment.

xxxx

Petitioner contends that her pre-marital sexual relations with her boyfriend and her pregnancy prior
to marriage was not disgraceful or immoral conduct sufficient for her dismissal because she was not
a member of the school’s faculty and there is no evidence that her pregnancy scandalized the school
community.

We are not persuaded. Petitioner’s pregnancy prior to marriage is scandalous in itself given the work
environment and social milieu she was in. Respondent school for young ladies precisely seeks to
prevent its students from situations like this, inculcating in them strict moral values and standards.
Being part of the institution, petitioner’s private and public life could not be separated. Her admitted
pre-marital sexual relations was a violation of private respondent’s prescribed standards of conduct
that views pre-marital sex as immoral because sex between a man and a woman must only take
place within the bounds of marriage.

Finally, petitioner’s dismissal is a valid exercise of the employer-school’s management prerogative to

discipline and impose penalties on erring employees pursuant to its policies, rules and regulations. x
x x.25 (Citations omitted)

The petitioner moved for reconsideration26 but it was denied by the CA in its Resolution27 dated March
2, 2009.

Hence, the instant petition.

Issues

Essentially, the issues set forth by the petitioner for this Court’s decision are the
following: first,whether the CA committed reversible error in ruling that it is the 1992 MRPS and not
the Labor Code that governs the termination of employment of teaching and non-teaching personnel
of private schools; and second, whether the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock constitutes a valid
ground to terminate her employment. cralawred

The Ruling of the Court

The Court grants the petition.

First Issue: Applicability of the 1992 MRPS

The petitioner contends that the CA, in ruling that there was a valid ground to dismiss her, erred in
applying Section 94 of the 1992 MRPS. Essentially, she claims that the 1992 MRPS was issued by the
Secretary of Education as the revised implementing rules and regulations of Batas Pambansa Bilang
232 (BP 232) or the “Education Act of 1982.” That there is no provision in BP 232, which provides for
the grounds for the termination of employment of teaching and non-teaching personnel of private
schools. Thus, Section 94 of the 1992 MRPS, which provides for the causes of terminating an
employment, is invalid as it “widened the scope and coverage” of BP 232.

The Court does not agree.

The Court notes that the argument against the validity of the 1992 MRPS, specifically Section 94
thereof, is raised by the petitioner for the first time in the instant petition for review. Nowhere in the
proceedings before the LA, the NLRC or the CA did the petitioner assail the validity of the provisions
of the 1992 MRPS.

“It is well established that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised in the proceedings
in the lower court are barred by estoppel. Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought
to the attention of the trial court ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal. To consider the alleged facts and arguments belatedly raised
would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair play, justice, and due process.”28 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In any case, even if the Court were to disregard the petitioner’s belated claim of the invalidity of the
1992 MRPS, the Court still finds the same untenable.

The 1992 MRPS, the regulation in force at the time of the instant controversy, was issued by the
Secretary of Education pursuant to BP 232. Section 7029 of BP 232 vests the Secretary of Education
with the authority to issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of BP 232.
Concomitantly, Section 5730 specifically empowers the Department of Education to promulgate rules
and regulations necessary for the administration, supervision and regulation of the educational
system in accordance with the declared policy of BP 232.

The qualifications of teaching and non-teaching personnel of private schools, as well as the causes for
the termination of their employment, are an integral aspect of the educational system of private
schools. Indubitably, ensuring that the teaching and non-teaching personnel of private schools are
not only qualified, but competent and efficient as well goes hand in hand with the declared objective
of BP 232 – establishing and maintaining relevant quality education.31 It is thus within the authority
of the Secretary of Education to issue a rule, which provides for the dismissal of teaching and non-
teaching personnel of private schools based on their incompetence, inefficiency, or some other
disqualification.

Moreover, Section 69 of BP 232 specifically authorizes the Secretary of Education to “prescribe and
impose such administrative sanction as he may deem reasonable and appropriate in the
implementing rules and regulations” for the “[g]ross inefficiency of the teaching or non-teaching
personnel” of private schools.32 Accordingly, contrary to the petitioner’s claim, the Court sees no
reason to invalidate the provisions of the 1992 MRPS, specifically Section 94 thereof. cralawred

Second Issue: Validity of the Petitioner’s Dismissal

The validity of the petitioner’s dismissal hinges on the determination of whether pregnancy out of
wedlock by an employee of a catholic educational institution is a cause for the termination of her
employment.

In resolving the foregoing question, the Court will assess the matter from a strictly neutral and
secular point of view – the relationship between SSCW as employer and the petitioner as an
employee, the causes provided for by law in the termination of such relationship, and the evidence
on record. The ground cited for the petitioner’s dismissal, i.e., pre-marital sexual relations and,
consequently, pregnancy out of wedlock, will be assessed as to whether the same constitutes a valid
ground for dismissal pursuant to Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS.
The standard of review in a Rule 45
petition from the CA decision in labor
cases.

In a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, such as the instant petition, where the
CA’s disposition in a labor case is sought to be calibrated, the Court’s review is quite limited. In ruling
for legal correctness, the Court has to view the CA decision in the same context that the petition
forcertiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; the Court has to examine the CA decision from the
prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the
NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was
correct.33
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The phrase “grave abuse of discretion” is well-defined in the Court’s jurisprudence. It exists where an
act of a court or tribunal is performed with a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction.34 The determination of the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion
does not include an inquiry into the correctness of the evaluation of evidence, which was the basis of
the labor agency in reaching its conclusion.35 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Nevertheless, while a certiorari proceeding does not strictly include an inquiry as to the correctness
of the evaluation of evidence (that was the basis of the labor tribunals in determining their
conclusion), the incorrectness of its evidentiary evaluation should not result in negating the
requirement of substantial evidence. Indeed, when there is a showing that the findings or
conclusions, drawn from the same pieces of evidence, were arrived at arbitrarily or in
disregard of the evidence on record, they may be reviewed by the courts. In particular, the
CA can grant the petition for certiorari if it finds that the NLRC, in its assailed decision or resolution,
made a factual finding not supported by substantial evidence. A decision that is not supported by
substantial evidence is definitely a decision tainted with grave abuse of discretion.36 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The labor tribunals’ respective

conclusions that the petitioner’s pregnancy
is a “disgraceful or immoral conduct” 
were arrived at arbitrarily.

The CA and the labor tribunals affirmed the validity of the petitioner’s dismissal pursuant to Section
94(e) of the 1992 MRPS, which provides that: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sec. 94. Causes of Terminating Employment – In addition to the just causes enumerated in the Labor
Code, the employment of school personnel, including faculty, may be terminated for any of the
following causes: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

xxxx

e. Disgraceful or immoral conduct;

xxxx

The labor tribunals concluded that the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock, per se, is “disgraceful
and immoral” considering that she is employed in a Catholic educational institution. In arriving at
such conclusion, the labor tribunals merely assessed the fact of the petitioner’s pregnancy vis-à-
vis the totality of the circumstances surrounding the same.

However, the Court finds no substantial evidence to support the aforementioned conclusion arrived at
by the labor tribunals. The fact of the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock, without more, is not
enough to characterize the petitioner’s conduct as disgraceful or immoral. There must be substantial
evidence to establish that pre-marital sexual relations and, consequently, pregnancy out of wedlock,
are indeed considered disgraceful or immoral.

The totality of the circumstances

surrounding the conduct alleged to be 
disgraceful or immoral must be assessed
against the prevailing norms of conduct.

In Chua-Qua v. Clave,37 the Court stressed that to constitute immorality, the circumstances of each
particular case must be holistically considered and evaluated in light of the prevailing norms of
conduct and applicable laws.38 Otherwise stated, it is not the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the conduct per se that determines whether the same is disgraceful or immoral, but the
conduct that is generally accepted by society as respectable or moral. If the conduct does not
conform to what society generally views as respectable or moral, then the conduct is considered as
disgraceful or immoral. Tersely put, substantial evidence must be presented, which would establish
that a particular conduct, viewed in light of the prevailing norms of conduct, is considered disgraceful
or immoral.

Thus, the determination of whether a conduct is disgraceful or immoral involves a two-step

process:first, a consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct;
and second, an assessment of the said circumstances vis-à-vis  the prevailing norms of
conduct, i.e., what the society generally considers moral and respectable.

That the petitioner was employed by a Catholic educational institution per se does not absolutely
determine whether her pregnancy out of wedlock is disgraceful or immoral. There is still a necessity
to determine whether the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock is considered disgraceful or immoral
in accordance with the prevailing norms of conduct.

Public and secular morality should 

determine the prevailing norms of conduct, 
not religious morality.   

However, determining what the prevailing norms of conduct are considered disgraceful or immoral is
not an easy task. An individual’s perception of what is moral or respectable is a confluence of a
myriad of influences, such as religion, family, social status, and a cacophony of others. In this
regard, the Court’s ratiocination in Estrada v. Escritor39 is instructive.

In Estrada, an administrative case against a court interpreter charged with disgraceful and immoral
conduct, the Court stressed that in determining whether a particular conduct can be considered as
disgraceful and immoral, the distinction between public and secular morality on the one hand, and
religious morality, on the other, should be kept in mind.40 That the distinction between public and
secular morality and religious morality is important because the jurisdiction of the Court extends only
to public and secular morality.41 The Court further explained that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious x x x.
“Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the civil public order but public
moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms.” Otherwise, if
government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and morals, the
resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what some might regard as
religious programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a
standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a “compelled religion,” anathema to
religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly
approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious
views that would not support the policy. As a result, government will not provide full religious
freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are
second-class citizens. Expansive religious freedom therefore requires that government be neutral in
matters of religion; governmental reliance upon religious justification is inconsistent with this policy
of neutrality.

In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in

criminal law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is, the government
proscribes this conduct because it is “detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon
which depend the existence and progress of human society” and not because the conduct
is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments
based on religion might have a compelling influence on those engaged in public deliberations over
what actions would be considered a moral disapprobation punishable by law. After all, they might
also be adherents of a religion and thus have religious opinions and moral codes with a compelling
influence on them; the human mind endeavors to regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of
society in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be
religious or Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an
articulable and discernible secular purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the religion
clauses. x x x.42 (Citations omitted and emphases ours)

Accordingly, when the law speaks of immoral or, necessarily, disgraceful conduct, it pertains to public
and secular morality; it refers to those conducts which are proscribed because they are detrimental
to conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society. Thus,
inAnonymous v. Radam,43 an administrative case involving a court utility worker likewise charged
with disgraceful and immoral conduct, applying the doctrines laid down in Estrada, the Court held
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For a particular conduct to constitute “disgraceful and immoral” behavior
under civil service laws, it must be regulated on account of the concerns of
public and secular morality. It cannot be judged based on personal bias,
specifically those colored by particular mores. Nor should it be grounded on
“cultural” values not convincingly demonstrated to have been recognized in
the realm of public policy expressed in the Constitution and the laws . At the
same time, the constitutionally guaranteed rights (such as the right to privacy) should be observed
to the extent that they protect behavior that may be frowned upon by the majority.

Under these tests, two things may be concluded from the fact that an unmarried woman gives birth
out of wedlock:

(1) if the father of the child is himself unmarried, the woman is not
ordinarily administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral
conduct. It may be a not-so-ideal situation and may cause
complications for both mother and child but it does not give cause for
administrative sanction. There is no law which penalizes an
unmarried mother under those circumstances by reason of her
sexual conduct or proscribes the consensual sexual activity
between two unmarried persons. Neither does the situation
contravene any fundamental state policy as expressed in the
Constitution, a document that accommodates various belief
systems irrespective of dogmatic origins.
(2) if the father of the child born out of wedlock is himself married to
a woman other than the mother, then there is a cause for
administrative sanction against either the father or the mother.
In such a case, the “disgraceful and immoral conduct” consists of
having extramarital relations with a married person. The sanctity
of marriage is constitutionally recognized and likewise affirmed by our
statutes as a special contract of permanent union. Accordingly, judicial
employees have been sanctioned for their dalliances with married
persons or for their own betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity.
In this case, it was not disputed that, like respondent, the father of her child was unmarried.
Therefore, respondent cannot be held liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct simply because she
gave birth to the child Christian Jeon out of wedlock.44(Citations omitted and emphases ours)

Both Estrada and Radam are administrative cases against employees in the civil service. The Court,
however, sees no reason not to apply the doctrines enunciated in Estrada  and Radam in the instant
case. Estrada  and Radam also required the Court to delineate what conducts are considered
disgraceful and/or immoral as would constitute a ground for dismissal. More importantly, as in the
said administrative cases, the instant case involves an employee’s security of tenure; this case
likewise concerns employment, which is not merely a specie of property right, but also the means by
which the employee and those who depend on him live.45 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

It bears stressing that the right of an employee to security of tenure is protected by the Constitution.
Perfunctorily, a regular employee may not be dismissed unless for cause provided under the Labor
Code and other relevant laws, in this case, the 1992 MRPS. As stated above, when the law refers to
morality, it necessarily pertains to public and secular morality and not religious morality. Thus, the
proscription against “disgraceful or immoral conduct” under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS, which is
made as a cause for dismissal, must necessarily refer to public and secular morality. Accordingly, in
order for a conduct to be considered as disgraceful or immoral, it must be “‘detrimental (or
dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society’ and
not because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other.”

Thus, in Santos v. NLRC,46 the Court upheld the dismissal of a teacher who had an extra-marital
affair with his co-teacher, who is likewise married, on the ground of disgraceful and immoral conduct
under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS. The Court pointed out that extra-marital affair is considered
as a disgraceful and immoral conduct is an afront to the sanctity of marriage, which is a basic
institution of society, viz: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

We cannot overemphasize that having an extra-marital affair is an afront to the sanctity of marriage,
which is a basic institution of society. Even our Family Code provides that husband and wife must live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Our laws, in
implementing this constitutional edict on marriage and the family underscore their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.47

The petitioner’s pregnancy out of 

wedlock is not a disgraceful or immoral 
conduct since she and the father of her
child have no impediment to marry each
other.

In stark contrast to Santos, the Court does not find any circumstance in this case which would lead
the Court to conclude that the petitioner committed a disgraceful or immoral conduct. It bears
stressing that the petitioner and her boyfriend, at the time they conceived a child, had no legal
impediment to marry. Indeed, even prior to her dismissal, the petitioner married her boyfriend, the
father of her child. As the Court held in Radam, there is no law which penalizes an unmarried mother
by reason of her sexual conduct or proscribes the consensual sexual activity between two unmarried
persons; that neither does such situation contravene any fundamental state policy enshrined in the
Constitution.

Admittedly, the petitioner is employed in an educational institution where the teachings and doctrines
of the Catholic Church, including that on pre-marital sexual relations, is strictly upheld and taught to
the students. That her indiscretion, which resulted in her pregnancy out of wedlock, is anathema to
the doctrines of the Catholic Church. However, viewed against the prevailing norms of conduct, the
petitioner’s conduct cannot be considered as disgraceful or immoral; such conduct is not denounced
by public and secular morality. It may be an unusual arrangement, but it certainly is not disgraceful
or immoral within the contemplation of the law.

To stress, pre-marital sexual relations between two consenting adults who have no impediment to
marry each other, and, consequently, conceiving a child out of wedlock, gauged from a purely public
and secular view of morality, does not amount to a disgraceful or immoral conduct under Section
94(e) of the 1992 MRPS.

Accordingly, the labor tribunals erred in upholding the validity of the petitioner’s dismissal. The labor
tribunals arbitrarily relied solely on the circumstances surrounding the petitioner’s pregnancy and its
supposed effect on SSCW and its students without evaluating whether the petitioner’s conduct is
indeed considered disgraceful or immoral in view of the prevailing norms of conduct. In this regard,
the labor tribunals’ respective haphazard evaluation of the evidence amounts to grave abuse of
discretion, which the Court will rectify.

The labor tribunals’ finding that the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock despite the absence of
substantial evidence is not only arbitrary, but a grave abuse of discretion, which should have been
set right by the CA.

There is no substantial evidence to

prove that the petitioner’s pregnancy out of
wedlock caused grave scandal to SSCW 
and its students.

SSCW claimed that the petitioner was primarily dismissed because her pregnancy out of wedlock
caused grave scandal to SSCW and its students. That the scandal brought about by the petitioner’s
indiscretion prompted them to dismiss her. The LA upheld the respondents’ claim, stating
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In this particular case, an “objective” and “rational evaluation” of the facts and circumstances
obtaining in this case would lead us to focus our attention x x x on the impact of the act
committed by the complainant. The act of the complainant x x xeroded the moral principles
being taught and project[ed] by the respondent [C]atholic school to their young lady
students.48 (Emphasis in the original)

On the other hand, the NLRC opined that: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the instant case, when the complainant-appellant was already conceiving a child even before she
got married, such is considered a shameful and scandalous behavior, inimical to public welfare and
policy. It eroded the moral doctrines which the respondent Catholic school, an exclusive
school for girls, is teaching the young girls. Thus, when the respondent-appellee school
terminated complainant-appellant’s services, it was a valid exercise of its management
prerogative. Whether or not she was a teacher is of no moment. There is no separate set of rules
for non-teaching personnel. Respondents-appellees uphold the teachings of the Catholic Church on
pre-marital sex and that the complainant-appellant as an employee of the school was expected to
abide by this basic principle and to live up with the standards of their purely Catholic values. Her
subsequent marriage did not take away the fact that she had engaged in pre-marital sex which the
respondent-appellee school denounces as the same is opposed to the teachings and doctrines it
espouses.49(Emphasis ours)

Contrary to the labor tribunals’ declarations, the Court finds that SSCW failed to adduce substantial
evidence to prove that the petitioner’s indiscretion indeed caused grave scandal to SSCW and its
students. Other than the SSCW’s bare allegation, the records are bereft of any evidence that would
convincingly prove that the petitioner’s conduct indeed adversely affected SSCW’s integrity in
teaching the moral doctrines, which it stands for. The petitioner is only a non-teaching personnel; her
interaction with SSCW’s students is very limited. It is thus quite impossible that her pregnancy out of
wedlock caused such a grave scandal, as claimed by SSCW, as to warrant her dismissal.

Settled is the rule that in termination cases, the burden of proving that the dismissal of the
employees was for a valid and authorized cause rests on the employer. It is incumbent upon the
employer to show by substantial evidence that the termination of the employment of the employees
was validly made and failure to discharge that duty would mean that the dismissal is not justified and
therefore illegal.50 “Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if
other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.”51 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Indubitably, bare allegations do not amount to substantial evidence. Considering that the
respondents failed to adduce substantial evidence to prove their asserted cause for the petitioner’s
dismissal, the labor tribunals should not have upheld their allegations hook, line and sinker. The labor
tribunals’ respective findings, which were arrived at sans any substantial evidence, amounts to a
grave abuse of discretion, which the CA should have rectified. “Security of tenure is a right which
may not be denied on mere speculation of any unclear and nebulous basis.”52 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The petitioner’s dismissal is not a 

valid exercise of SSCW’s management 
prerogative.

The CA belabored the management prerogative of SSCW to discipline its employees. The CA opined
that the petitioner’s dismissal is a valid exercise of management prerogative to impose penalties on
erring employees pursuant to its policies, rules and regulations.

The Court does not agree.

The Court has held that “management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion and
judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods, time,
place and manner of work, processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations,
transfer of employees, work supervision, lay off of workers and discipline, dismissal and recall of
workers. The exercise of management prerogative, however, is not absolute as it must be exercised
in good faith and with due regard to the rights of labor.” Management cannot exercise its prerogative
in a cruel, repressive, or despotic manner.53
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SSCW, as employer, undeniably has the right to discipline its employees and, if need be, dismiss
them if there is a valid cause to do so. However, as already explained, there is no cause to dismiss
the petitioner. Her conduct is not considered by law as disgraceful or immoral. Further, the
respondents themselves have admitted that SSCW, at the time of the controversy, does not have any
policy or rule against an employee who engages in pre-marital sexual relations and conceives a child
as a result thereof. There being no valid basis in law or even in SSCW’s policy and rules, SSCW’s
dismissal of the petitioner is despotic and arbitrary and, thus, not a valid exercise of management
prerogative.

In sum, the Court finds that the petitioner was illegally dismissed as there was no just cause for the
termination of her employment. SSCW failed to adduce substantial evidence to establish that the
petitioner’s conduct, i.e., engaging in pre-marital sexual relations and conceiving a child out of
wedlock, assessed in light of the prevailing norms of conduct, is considered disgraceful or immoral.
The labor tribunals gravely abused their discretion in upholding the validity of the petitioner’s
dismissal as the charge against the petitioner lay not on substantial evidence, but on the bare
allegations of SSCW. In turn, the CA committed reversible error in upholding the validity of the
petitioner’s dismissal, failing to recognize that the labor tribunals gravely abused their discretion in
ruling for the respondents.

The petitioner is entitled to 

separation pay, in lieu of actual 
reinstatement, full backwages and 
attorney’s fees, but not to moral 
and exemplary damages.

Having established that the petitioner was illegally dismissed, the Court now determines the reliefs
that she is entitled to and their extent. Under the law and prevailing jurisprudence, “an illegally
dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement as a matter of right.”54 Aside from the instances
provided under Articles 28355 and 28456 of the Labor Code, separation pay is, however, granted when
reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained relations between the employer and the
employee. In cases of illegal dismissal, the accepted doctrine is that separation pay is available in
lieu of reinstatement when the latter recourse is no longer practical or in the best interest of the
parties.57
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In Divine Word High School v. NLRC,58 the Court ordered the employer Catholic school to pay the
illegally dismissed high school teacher separation pay in lieu of actual reinstatement since her
continued presence as a teacher in the school “may well be met with antipathy and antagonism by
some sectors in the school community.”59 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In view of the particular circumstances of this case, it would be more prudent to direct SSCW to pay
the petitioner separation pay in lieu of actual reinstatement. The continued employment of the
petitioner with SSCW would only serve to intensify the atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism
between the parties. Consequently, the Court awards separation pay to the petitioner equivalent to
one (1) month pay for every year of service, with a fraction of at least six (6) months considered as
one (1) whole year, from the time of her illegal dismissal up to the finality of this judgment, as an
alternative to reinstatement.

Also, “employees who are illegally dismissed are entitled to full backwages, inclusive of allowances
and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the time their actual compensation
was withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement but if reinstatement is no longer
possible, the backwages shall be computed from the time of their illegal termination up to the finality
of the decision.”60 Accordingly, the petitioner is entitled to an award of full backwages from the time
she was illegally dismissed up to the finality of this decision.

Nevertheless, the petitioner is not entitled to moral and exemplary damages. “A dismissed employee
is entitled to moral damages when the dismissal is attended by bad faith or fraud or constitutes an
act oppressive to labor, or is done in a manner contrary to good morals, good customs or public
policy. Exemplary damages may be awarded if the dismissal is effected in a wanton, oppressive or
malevolent manner.”61 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

“Bad faith, under the law, does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence. It imports a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, or a breach of a known
duty through some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.”62 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

“It must be noted that the burden of proving bad faith rests on the one alleging it”63 since basic is the
principle that good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the
same.64“Allegations of bad faith and fraud must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence.”65 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The records of this case are bereft of any clear and convincing evidence showing that the
respondents acted in bad faith or in a wanton or fraudulent manner in dismissing the petitioner. That
the petitioner was illegally dismissed is insufficient to prove bad faith. A dismissal may be contrary to
law but by itself alone, it does not establish bad faith to entitle the dismissed employee to moral
damages. The award of moral and exemplary damages cannot be justified solely upon the premise
that the employer dismissed his employee without cause.66 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

However, the petitioner is entitled to attorney’s fees in the amount of 10% of the total monetary
award pursuant to Article 11167 of the Labor Code. “It is settled that where an employee was forced
to litigate and, thus, incur expenses to protect his rights and interest, the award of attorney’s fees is
legally and morally justifiable.”68 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Finally, legal interest shall be imposed on the monetary awards herein granted at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.69 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarychanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision

dated September 24, 2008 and Resolution dated March 2, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 100188 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The respondent, St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove, is hereby declared guilty of illegal dismissal and
is hereby ORDERED to pay the petitioner, Cheryll Santos Leus, the following: (a) separation pay in
lieu of actual reinstatement equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service, with a fraction
of at least six (6) months considered as one (1) whole year from the time of her dismissal up to the
finality of this Decision; (b) full backwages from the time of her illegal dismissal up to the finality of
this Decision; and (c) attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award.
The monetary awards herein granted shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of the finality of this Decision until fully paid. The case is REMANDED to the
Labor Arbiter for the computation of petitioner’s monetary awards.
SERRANO v. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES INC. & MARLOWE NAVIGATION CO., INC.
G.R. No. 167614. March 24, 2009

Facts:

Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd.
(respondents) under a POEA-approved Contract of Employment. On March 19, 1998, the date of
his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the
position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and
representation of respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April. However,
respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence, petitioner
refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May.

Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19, 1998 up to
March 19, 1999, but at the time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2)
months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and
twenty-three (23) days.

Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive
dismissal and for payment of his money claims. LA rendered the dismissal of petitioner illegal
and awarding him monetary benefits. Respondents appealed to the NLRC to question the finding
of the LA. Likewise, petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in
not applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired
portion of their contracts.

Petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not applying
the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission
that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired portion of
their contracts. Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration; he questioned the
constitutionality of the subject clause. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA,
reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject clause. CA affirmed the NLRC ruling
on the reduction of the applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted the constitutional issue
raised by petitioner.

The last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, to wit:

Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just,
valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his
salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.

Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum salary of petitioner
at the monthly rate of US$1,400.00 covering the period of three months out of the unexpired
portion of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract or a total of US$4,200.00.

Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends that, in addition to the
US$4,200.00 awarded by the NLRC and the CA, he is entitled to US$21,182.23 more or a total

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Villarama, Jr., and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

Xx
 JENNY F. PECKSON, Petitioner, v. ROBINSONS SUPERMARKET CORPORATION, JODY GADIA,
ROENA SARTE, AND RUBY ALEX, Respondents.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

For resolution is the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 of the Decision2 dated June 8, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.  109604  affirming  the  Decision3  dated  February  25, 
2009  of  the National Labor  Relations  Commission  (NLRC)  in  NLRC  NCR  Case  No. 00-11-09316-
06/NLRC LAC No. 002020-07, which upheld the dismissal4 by the Labor Arbiter (LA) on May 30, 2007
of Jenny F. Peckson’s (petitioner) complaint for constructive dismissal.

Antecedent Facts and Proceedings

The petitioner first joined the Robinsons Supermarket Corporation (RSC) as a Sales Clerk on
November 3, 1987.  On October 26, 2006, she was holding the position of Category Buyer when
respondent Roena Sarte (Sarte), RSC’s Assistant Vice-President for Merchandising, reassigned her to
the position of Provincial Coordinator, effective November 1, 2006.5  Claiming  that  her  new 
assignment  was  a  demotion  because  it  was  non-supervisory and clerical in nature, the petitioner
refused to turn over her responsibilities to the new Category Buyer, or to accept her new
responsibilities as Provincial Coordinator.  Jody Gadia (Gadia) and Ruby Alex (Alex) were impleaded
because they were corporate officers of the RSC.

In a memorandum to the petitioner dated November 13, 2006,6 the RSC, through Sarte, demanded
an explanation from her within 48 hours for her refusal to accept her new assignment despite written
and verbal demands.  Sarte cited a company rule, Offenses Subject to Disciplinary Action No. 4.07,
which provided that “[d]isobedience, refusal or failure to do assigned task or to obey
superior’s/official’s orders/instructions, or to follow established procedures or practices without valid
reason” would be meted the penalty of suspension.

The petitioner ignored the 48-hour deadline to explain imposed by Sarte.  On November 23, 2006,
Sarte issued her another memorandum,7 reiterating her demand to explain in writing within 48 hours
why she persistently refused to assume her new position, and warning her that this could be her final
chance to present her side or be deemed to have waived her right to be heard.

In her one-paragraph reply submitted on November 27, 2006,8 the petitioner stated that she could
not accept the position of Provincial Coordinator since she saw it as a demotion.  As it turned out,
however, on November 9, 2006, the petitioner had already filed a complaint for constructive
dismissal9 against RSC, Sarte, Gadia and Alex (respondents).

On November 30, 2006, Sarte issued an instruction to the petitioner to report to RSC’s Metroeast
Depot to help prepare all shipping manifests for Cagayan de Oro and Bacolod, but as witnessed by
RSC employees Raquel Torrechua and Alex, she did not obey as instructed.10  Again on December 8,
2006, Sarte issued a similar instruction, citing the need for certain tasks from the petitioner in
preparation for the coming Christmas holidays, but the petitioner again refused to heed.11

As culled from the assailed appellate court decision,12 the petitioner argued before the LA that the
true organizational chart of the RSC showed that the position of Category Buyer was one level above
that of the Provincial Coordinator, and that moreover, the job description of a Provincial Coordinator
was largely clerical and did not require her to analyze stock levels and order points, or source new
local and international suppliers, or monitor stock level per store and recommend items for
replenishment, or negotiate better items and discounts from suppliers, duties which only a Category
Buyer could perform.  She also claimed that she was instructed to file a courtesy resignation in
exchange for a separation pay of one-half salary per year of service.

The respondents in their position paper denied the correctness of the organizational chart presented
by the petitioner.  They maintained that her transfer was not a demotion since the Provincial
Coordinator occupied a “Level 5” position like the Category Buyer, with the same work conditions,
salary and benefits.  But while both positions had no significant disparity in the required skill,
experience and aptitude, the position of Category Buyer demanded the traits of punctuality, diligence
and attentiveness because it is a frontline position in the day-to-day business operations of RSC
which the petitioner, unfortunately, did not possess.

The respondents also raised the petitioner’s record of habitual tardiness as far back as 1999, as well
as poor performance rating in 2005.  In addition to her performance rating of “2.8” out of “4.0” in
2005 equivalent to “below expectation,” the petitioner was found to be tardy in June and July 2005,
13 times, and for the entire 2005, 57 times; that she was suspended twice in 2006 for 20 instances
of tardiness and absences from July to September 2006 alone.13  We also note that the petitioner was
suspended for seven (7) days in September and October 2005 for deliberately violating a company
policy after she was seen having lunch with a company supplier.14

In her affidavit,15 respondent Sarte denied that the reassignment of the petitioner as Provincial
Coordinator was motivated by a desire to besmirch the name of the latter.  She asserted that it was
made in the exercise of management prerogative and sound discretion, in view of the sensitive
position occupied by the Category Buyer in RSC’s daily operations, vis-à-vis the petitioner’s “below
expectation” performance rating and habitual tardiness.

In dismissing the petitioner’s complaint, the LA in its Decision16 dated May 30, 2007 ruled that job
reassignment or classification is a strict prerogative of the employer, and that the petitioner cannot
refuse her transfer from Category Buyer to Provincial Coordinator since both positions commanded
the same salary structure, high degree of responsibility and impeccable honesty and integrity. 
Upholding the employer’s right not to retain an employee in a particular position to prevent losses or
to promote profitability, the LA found no showing of any illegal motive on the part of the respondents
in reassigning the petitioner.  The transfer was dictated by the need for punctuality, diligence and
attentiveness in the position of Category Buyer, which the petitioner clearly lacked.  Moreover, the LA
ruled that her persistent refusal to accept her new position amounted to insubordination, entitling the
RSC to dismiss her from employment.

A month after the above ruling, or on June 22, 2007, the petitioner tendered her written “forced”
resignation,17 wherein she complained that she was being subjected to ridicule by clients and co-
employees alike on account of her floating status since the time she refused to accept her transfer. 
She likewise claimed that she was being compelled to accept the position of Provincial Coordinator
without due process.

On appeal, the NLRC in its Decision18 dated February 25, 2009 sustained the findings of the LA.  It
agreed that the lateral transfer of the petitioner from Category Buyer to Provincial Coordinator was
not a demotion amounting to constructive dismissal, since both positions belonged to Job Level 5 and
between them there is no significant disparity in terms of the requirements of skill, experience and
aptitude.  Contrary to the petitioner’s assertion, the NLRC found that the position of Provincial
Coordinator is not a rank-and-file position but in fact requires the exercise of discretion and
independent judgment, as well as appropriate recommendations to management to ensure the
faithful implementation of its policies and programs; that it even exercises influence over the
Category Buyer in that it includes performing a recommendatory function to guide the Category
Buyer in making decisions on the right assortment, price and quantity of the items, articles or
merchandise to be sold by the store.

The NLRC then reiterated the settled rule that management may transfer an employee from one
office to another within the business establishment, provided there is no demotion in rank or
diminution of salary, benefits, and other privileges, and the action is not motivated by discrimination
or bad faith or effected as a form of punishment without sufficient cause.  It ruled that the
respondents were able to show that the petitioner’s transfer was not unreasonable, inconvenient or
prejudicial, but was prompted by her failure to meet the demands of punctuality, diligence, and
personal attention of the position of Category Buyer; that management wanted to give the petitioner
a chance to improve her work ethic, but her obstinate refusal to assume her new position has
prejudiced respondent RSC, even while she continued to receive her salaries and benefits as
Provincial Coordinator.

On petition for certiorari to the CA, the petitioner insisted that her transfer from Category Buyer to
Provincial Coordinator was a form of demotion without due process, and that the respondents
unjustifiably depicted her as remiss in her duties, flawed in her character, and unduly obstinate in
her refusal to accept her new post.

In its Decision19 dated June 8, 2011, the CA found no basis to deviate from the oft-repeated tenet
that the findings of fact and conclusions of the NLRC when supported by substantial evidence are
generally accorded not only great weight and respect but even finality, and are thus deemed
binding.20

Petition for Review in the Supreme Court

Now on petition for review to this Court, the petitioner maintains that her lateral transfer from
Category Buyer to Provincial Coordinator was a demotion amounting to constructive dismissal
because her reassignment was not a valid exercise of management prerogative, but was done in bad
faith and without due process.  She claims that the respondents manipulated the facts to show that
she was tardy; that they even surreptitiously drew up a new organizational chart of the
Merchandising Department of RSC, soon after she filed her complaint for illegal dismissal, to show
that the position of Provincial Coordinator belonged to Job Level 5 as the Category Buyer, and not
one level below; that the company deliberately embarrassed her when it cut off her email access;
that they sent memoranda to her clients that she was no longer a Category Buyer, and to the various
Robinsons branches that she was now a Provincial Coordinator, while Milo Padilla (Padilla) was taking
over her former position as Category Buyer; that for seven (7) months, they placed her on floating
status and subjected her to mockery and ridicule by the suppliers and her co-employees; that not
only was there no justification for her transfer, but the respondents clearly acted in bad faith and
with  discrimination, insensibility and disdain to make her stay with the company intolerable for her.

Our Ruling

We find no merit in the petition.

This Court has consistently refused to

interfere with the exercise by management 
of its prerogative to regulate the employees’ 
work assignments, the working methods and
the place and manner of work.

As we all know, there are various laws imposing all kinds of burdens and obligations upon the
employer in relation to his employees, and yet as a rule this Court has always upheld the employer’s
prerogative to regulate all aspects of employment relating to the employees’ work assignment, the
working methods and the place and manner of work.  Indeed, labor laws discourage interference with
an employer’s judgment in the conduct of his business.21

In Rural Bank of Cantilan, Inc. v. Julve,22 the Court had occasion to summarize the general
jurisprudential guidelines affecting the right of the employer to regulate employment, including the
transfer of its employees:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Under the doctrine of management prerogative, every employer has the inherent right to regulate,
according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work
assignments, working methods, the time, place and manner of work, work supervision, transfer of
employees, lay-off of workers, and discipline, dismissal, and recall of employees.  The only limitations
to the exercise of this prerogative are those imposed by labor laws and the principles of equity and
substantial justice.

While the law imposes many obligations upon the employer, nonetheless, it also protects the
employer’s right to expect from its employees not only good performance, adequate work, and
diligence, but also good conduct and loyalty.  In fact, the Labor Code does not excuse employees
from complying with valid company policies and reasonable regulations for their governance and
guidance.

Concerning the transfer of employees, these are the following jurisprudential guidelines: (a) a
transfer is a movement from one position to another of equivalent rank, level or salary without break
in the service or a lateral movement from one position to another of equivalent rank or salary; (b)
the employer has the inherent right to transfer or reassign an employee for legitimate business
purposes; (c) a transfer becomes unlawful where it is motivated by discrimination or bad faith or is
effected as a form of punishment or is a demotion without sufficient cause;  (d) the employer must
be able to show that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee.23 
(Citations omitted)

In Philippine Japan Active Carbon Corporation v. NLRC, 24 it was held that the exercise of
management’s prerogative concerning the employees’ work assignments is based on its assessment
of the qualifications, aptitudes and competence of its employees, and by moving them around in the
various areas of its business operations it can ascertain where they will function with maximum
benefit to the company.

It is the employer’s prerogative, based on its assessment and perception of its employees’
qualifications, aptitudes, and competence, to move them around in the various areas of its business
operations in order to ascertain where they will function with maximum benefit to the company.  An
employee’s right to security of tenure does not give him such a vested right in his position as would
deprive the company of its prerogative to change his assignment or transfer him where he will be
most useful.  When his transfer is not unreasonable, nor inconvenient, nor prejudicial to him, and it
does not involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, benefits, and other privileges, the
employee may not complain that it amounts to a constructive dismissal.25

As a privilege inherent in the employer’s right to control and manage its enterprise effectively, its
freedom to conduct its business operations to achieve its purpose cannot be denied.26  We agree with
the appellate court that the respondents are justified in moving the petitioner to another equivalent
position, which presumably would be less affected by her habitual tardiness or inconsistent
attendance than if she continued as a Category Buyer, a “frontline position” in the day-to-day
business operations of a supermarket such as Robinsons.

If the transfer of an employee is not unreasonable, 

or inconvenient, or prejudicial to him, and it does 
not involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his 
salaries, benefits and other privileges, the employee 
may not complain that it amounts to a constructive 
dismissal.

As we have already noted, the respondents had the burden of proof that the transfer of the petitioner
was not tantamount to constructive dismissal, which as defined in Blue Dairy Corporation v. NLRC,27is
a quitting because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, or an
offer involving a demotion in rank and diminution of pay: cralavvonlinelawlibrary

The managerial prerogative to transfer personnel must be exercised without grave abuse of
discretion, bearing in mind the basic elements of justice and fair play.  Having the right should not be
confused with the manner in which that right is exercised.  Thus, it cannot be used as a subterfuge
by the employer to rid himself of an undesirable worker.  In particular, the employer must be able to
show that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient or prejudicial to the employee; nor does it
involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, privileges and other benefits.  Should the
employer fail to overcome this burden of proof, the employee’s transfer shall be tantamount to
constructive dismissal, which has been defined as a quitting because continued employment is
rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; as an offer involving a demotion in rank and
diminution in pay.  Likewise, constructive dismissal exists when an act of clear discrimination,
insensibility or disdain by an employer has become so unbearable to the employee leaving him with
no option but to forego with his continued employment.

Thus, as further held in Philippine Japan Active Carbon Corporation,28 when the transfer of an
employee is not unreasonable, or inconvenient, or prejudicial to him, and it does not involve a
demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, benefits and other privileges, the employee may not
complain that it amounts to a constructive dismissal.29

But like all other rights, there are limits to the exercise of managerial prerogative to transfer
personnel, and on the employer is laid the burden to show that the same is without grave abuse of
discretion, bearing in mind the basic elements of justice and fair play.30  Indeed, management
prerogative may not be used as a subterfuge by the employer to rid himself of an undesirable
worker.31

Interestingly, although the petitioner claims that she was constructively dismissed, yet until the
unfavorable decision of the LA on May 30, 2007, for seven (7) months she continued to collect her
salary while also adamantly refusing to heed the order of Sarte to report to the Metroeast Depot.  It
was only on June 22, 2007, after the LA’s decision, that she filed her “forced” resignation.  Her
deliberate and unjustified refusal to assume her new assignment is a form of neglect of duty, and
according to the LA, an act of insubordination.  We saw how the company sought every chance to
hear her out on her grievances and how she ignored the memoranda of Sarte asking her to explain
her refusal to accept her transfer.  All that the petitioner could say was that it was a demotion and
that her floating status embarrassed her before the suppliers and her co-employees.

The respondents have discharged the burden of 

proof that the transfer of the petitioner was not
tantamount to constructive dismissal.

In Jarcia Machine Shop and Auto Supply, Inc. v. NLRC,32 a machinist who had been employed with
the petitioner company for 16 years was reduced to the service job of transporting filling materials
after he failed to report for work for one (1) day on account of an urgent family matter.  This is one
instance where the employee’s demotion was rightly held to be an unlawful constructive dismissal
because the employer failed to show substantial proof that the employee’s demotion was for a valid
and just cause:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
In case of a constructive dismissal, the employer has the burden of proving that the transfer and
demotion of an employee are for valid and legitimate grounds such as genuine business necessity. 
Particularly, for a transfer not to be considered a constructive dismissal, the employer must be able
to show that such transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee; nor
does it involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, privileges and other benefits. 
Failure of the employer to overcome this burden of proof, the employee’s demotion shall no doubt be
tantamount to unlawful constructive dismissal. x x x.33  (Citation omitted)

In the case at bar, we agree with the appellate court that there is substantial showing that the
transfer of the petitioner from Category Buyer to Provincial Coordinator was not unreasonable,
inconvenient, or prejudicial to her.  The petitioner failed to dispute that the job classifications of
Category Buyer and Provincial Coordinator are similar, or that they command a similar salary
structure and responsibilities.  We agree with the NLRC that the Provincial Coordinator’s position does
not involve mere clerical functions but requires the exercise of discretion from time to time, as well
as independent judgment, since the Provincial Coordinator gives appropriate recommendations to
management and ensures the faithful implementation of policies and programs of the company.  It
even has influence over a Category Buyer because of its recommendatory function that enables the
Category Buyer to make right decisions on assortment, price and quantity of the items to be sold by
the store.34

We also cannot sustain the petitioner’s claim that she was not accorded due process and that the
respondents acted toward her with discrimination, insensibility, or disdain as to force her to forego
her continued employment.  In addition to verbal reminders from Sarte, the petitioner was asked in
writing twice to explain within 48 hours her refusal to accept her transfer.  In the first, she
completely remained silent, and in the second, she took four (4) days to file a mere one-paragraph
reply, wherein she simply said that she saw the Provincial Coordinator position as a demotion, hence
she could not accept it.  Worse, she may even be said to have committed insubordination when she
refused to turn over her responsibilities to the new Category Buyer, Padilla, and to assume her new
responsibilities as Provincial Coordinator and report to the Metroeast Depot as directed.  This was
precisely the reason why the petitioner was kept on floating status.  To her discredit, her defiance
constituted a neglect of duty, or an act of insubordination, per the LA.

Neither can we consider tenable the petitioner’s contention that the respondents deliberately held her
up to mockery and ridicule when they cut off her email access, sent memoranda to her clients that
she was no longer a Category Buyer, and to the various Robinsons branches that she was now a
Provincial Coordinator on floating status and that Padilla was taking over her position as the new
Category Buyer.  It suffices to state that these measures are the logical steps to take for the
petitioner’s unjustified resistance to her transfer, and were not intended to subject her to public
embarrassment.

Judicial review of labor cases does not go beyond 

the evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon
which labor officials’ findings rest.

Finally, as reiterated in Acebedo Optical,35 this Court is not a trier of facts, and only errors of law are
generally reviewed in petitions for review on certiorari criticizing decisions of the CA.  Questions of
fact are not entertained, and in labor cases, this doctrine applies with greater force.  Factual
questions are for labor tribunals to resolve.36  Thus: cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Judicial Review of labor cases does not go beyond the evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence
upon which its labor officials’ findings rest.  As such, the findings of facts and conclusion of the NLRC
are generally accorded not only great weight and respect but even clothed with finality and deemed
binding on this Court as long as they are supported by substantial evidence.  This Court finds no
basis for deviating from said doctrine without any clear showing that the findings of the Labor
Arbiter, as affirmed by the NLRC, are bereft of substantiation. Particularly when passed upon and
upheld by the Court of Appeals, they are binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court and will not
normally be disturbed.

xxxx

As earlier stated, we find no basis for deviating from the oft espoused legal tenet that findings of
facts and conclusion of the labor arbiter are generally accorded not only great weight and respect but
even clothed with finality and deemed binding on this Court as long as they are supported by
substantial evidence, without any clear showing that such findings of fact, as affirmed by the NLRC,
are bereft of substantiation. More so, when passed upon and upheld by the Court of Appeals, they
are binding  and  conclusive  upon  us  and  will  not  normally  be  disturbed; x x x.37  (Citations
omitted)
It is our ruling, that the findings of fact and conclusion of the LA, as affirmed by the NLRC, are
supported by substantial evidence, as found by the CA.

WHEREFORE, the premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 8, 2011 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 109604 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

Xxx

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 167614               March 24, 2009

ANTONIO M. SERRANO, Petitioner, 
vs.
Gallant MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and MARLOW NAVIGATION CO., INC., Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

For decades, the toil of solitary migrants has helped lift entire families and communities out of
poverty. Their earnings have built houses, provided health care, equipped schools and planted
the seeds of businesses. They have woven together the world by transmitting ideas and
knowledge from country to country. They have provided the dynamic human link between
cultures, societies and economies. Yet, only recently have we begun to understand not only how
much international migration impacts development, but how smart public policies can magnify this
effect.

United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon

Global Forum on Migration and Development
Brussels, July 10, 20071

For Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, the last clause in the 5th paragraph of
Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042,2 to wit:

Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid
or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his
salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

does not magnify the contributions of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) to national development,
but exacerbates the hardships borne by them by unduly limiting their entitlement in case of illegal
dismissal to their lump-sum salary either for the unexpired portion of their employment contract
"or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" (subject clause).
Petitioner claims that the last clause violates the OFWs' constitutional rights in that it impairs the
terms of their contract, deprives them of equal protection and denies them due process.
By way of Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner assails the
December 8, 2004 Decision3 and April 1, 2005 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which
applied the subject clause, entreating this Court to declare the subject clause unconstitutional.

Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd.
(respondents) under a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-approved
Contract of Employment with the following terms and conditions:

Duration of contract 12 months

Position Chief Officer
Basic monthly salary US$1,400.00
Hours of work 48.0 hours per week
Overtime US$700.00 per month
Vacation leave with pay 7.00 days per month5

On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded
employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00,
upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by
the end of April 1998.6

Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer. 7 Hence, petitioner
refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998. 8

Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19, 1998 up to
March 19, 1999, but at the time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2)
months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and
twenty-three (23) days.

Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint 9 against respondents for constructive
dismissal and for payment of his money claims in the total amount of US$26,442.73, broken
down as follows:

May US$ 413.90

27/31
,
1998
(5
days)
incl.
Leav
e pay
June 2,590.00
01/30
,
1998
July 2,590.00
01/31
,
1998
Augu 2,590.00
st
01/31
,
1998
Sept. 2,590.00
01/30
,
1998
Oct. 2,590.00
01/31
,
1998
Nov. 2,590.00
01/30
,
1998
Dec. 2,590.00
01/31
,
1998
Jan. 2,590.00
01/31
,
1999
Feb. 2,590.00
01/28
,
1999
Mar. 1,640.00
1/19,
1999
(19
days)
incl.
leave
pay
  ---------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------
  25,382.23
Amou  
nt
adjus
ted to
chief
mate'
s
salar
y
(Marc 1,060.5010
h
19/31
,
1998
to
April
1/30,
1998)
+
  ---------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------
TOT US$ 26,442.7311
AL
CLAI
M

as well as moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

The LA rendered a Decision dated July 15, 1999, declaring the dismissal of petitioner
illegal and awarding him monetary benefits, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the

dismissal of the complainant (petitioner) by the respondents in the above-entitled case was
illegal and the respondents are hereby ordered to pay the complainant [petitioner], jointly
and severally, in Philippine Currency, based on the rate of exchange prevailing at the time
of payment, the amount of EIGHT THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY U.S.
DOLLARS (US $8,770.00), representing the complainant’s salary for three (3) months
of the unexpired portion of the aforesaid contract of employment. 1avvphi1

The respondents are likewise ordered to pay the complainant [petitioner], jointly and
severally, in Philippine Currency, based on the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of
payment, the amount of FORTY FIVE U.S. DOLLARS (US$ 45.00), 12 representing the
complainant’s claim for a salary differential. In addition, the respondents are hereby
ordered to pay the complainant, jointly and severally, in Philippine Currency, at the
exchange rate prevailing at the time of payment, the complainant’s (petitioner's) claim for
attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total amount awarded to the
aforesaid employee under this Decision.

The claims of the complainant for moral and exemplary damages are hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit.

All other claims are hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.13 (Emphasis supplied)

In awarding petitioner a lump-sum salary of US$8,770.00, the LA based his computation

on the salary period of three months only -- rather than the entire unexpired portion of nine
months and 23 days of petitioner's employment contract - applying the subject clause.
However, the LA applied the salary rate of US$2,590.00, consisting of petitioner's "[b]asic
salary, US$1,400.00/month + US$700.00/month, fixed overtime pay, + US$490.00/month,
vacation leave pay = US$2,590.00/compensation per month." 14

Respondents appealed15 to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to question

the finding of the LA that petitioner was illegally dismissed.

Petitioner also appealed16 to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not applying
the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission17 that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the
unexpired portion of their contracts.18

In a Decision dated June 15, 2000, the NLRC modified the LA Decision, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 15 July 1999 is MODIFIED. Respondents are hereby
ordered to pay complainant, jointly and severally, in Philippine currency, at the prevailing
rate of exchange at the time of payment the following:

1. Three (3) months salary

 $1,400 x 3 US$4,200.00
2. Salary differential 45.00
US$4,245.00
3. 10% Attorney’s fees 424.50
TOTAL US$4,669.50

The other findings are affirmed.

SO ORDERED.19

The NLRC corrected the LA's computation of the lump-sum salary awarded to petitioner by
reducing the applicable salary rate from US$2,590.00 to US$1,400.00 because R.A. No. 8042
"does not provide for the award of overtime pay, which should be proven to have been actually
performed, and for vacation leave pay."20

Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the
constitutionality of the subject clause.21 The NLRC denied the motion.22

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari23 with the CA, reiterating the constitutional challenge
against the subject clause.24 After initially dismissing the petition on a technicality, the CA
eventually gave due course to it, as directed by this Court in its Resolution dated August 7, 2003
which granted the petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 151833, filed by petitioner.

In a Decision dated December 8, 2004, the CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the
applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted the constitutional issue raised by petitioner. 25

His Motion for Reconsideration26 having been denied by the CA,27 petitioner brings his cause to
this Court on the following grounds:

The Court of Appeals and the labor tribunals have decided the case in a way not in accord with
applicable decision of the Supreme Court involving similar issue of granting unto the migrant
worker back wages equal to the unexpired portion of his contract of employment instead of
limiting it to three (3) months

II

In the alternative that the Court of Appeals and the Labor Tribunals were merely applying their
interpretation of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, it is submitted that the Court of Appeals
gravely erred in law when it failed to discharge its judicial duty to decide questions of substance
not theretofore determined by the Honorable Supreme Court, particularly, the constitutional
issues raised by the petitioner on the constitutionality of said law, which unreasonably, unfairly
and arbitrarily limits payment of the award for back wages of overseas workers to three (3)
months.

III

Even without considering the constitutional limitations [of] Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, the
Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in excluding from petitioner’s award the overtime pay and
vacation pay provided in his contract since under the contract they form part of his salary. 28

On February 26, 2008, petitioner wrote the Court to withdraw his petition as he is already old and
sickly, and he intends to make use of the monetary award for his medical treatment and
medication.29 Required to comment, counsel for petitioner filed a motion, urging the court to allow
partial execution of the undisputed monetary award and, at the same time, praying that the
constitutional question be resolved.30
Considering that the parties have filed their respective memoranda, the Court now takes up the
full merit of the petition mindful of the extreme importance of the constitutional question raised
therein.

On the first and second issues

The unanimous finding of the LA, NLRC and CA that the dismissal of petitioner was illegal is not
disputed. Likewise not disputed is the salary differential of US$45.00 awarded to petitioner in all
three fora. What remains disputed is only the computation of the lump-sum salary to be awarded
to petitioner by reason of his illegal dismissal.

Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum salary of petitioner at
the monthly rate of US$1,400.00 covering the period of three months out of the unexpired portion
of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract or a total of US$4,200.00.

Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends that, in addition to the
US$4,200.00 awarded by the NLRC and the CA, he is entitled to US$21,182.23 more or a total of
US$25,382.23, equivalent to his salaries for the entire nine months and 23 days left of his
employment contract, computed at the monthly rate of US$2,590.00. 31

The Arguments of Petitioner

Petitioner contends that the subject clause is unconstitutional because it unduly impairs the
freedom of OFWs to negotiate for and stipulate in their overseas employment contracts a
determinate employment period and a fixed salary package. 32 It also impinges on the equal
protection clause, for it treats OFWs differently from local Filipino workers (local workers) by
putting a cap on the amount of lump-sum salary to which OFWs are entitled in case of illegal
dismissal, while setting no limit to the same monetary award for local workers when their
dismissal is declared illegal; that the disparate treatment is not reasonable as there is no
substantial distinction between the two groups;33 and that it defeats Section 18,34 Article II of the
Constitution which guarantees the protection of the rights and welfare of all Filipino workers,
whether deployed locally or overseas.35

Moreover, petitioner argues that the decisions of the CA and the labor tribunals are not in line
with existing jurisprudence on the issue of money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs. Though
there are conflicting rulings on this, petitioner urges the Court to sort them out for the guidance of
affected OFWs.36

Petitioner further underscores that the insertion of the subject clause into R.A. No. 8042 serves
no other purpose but to benefit local placement agencies. He marks the statement made by the
Solicitor General in his Memorandum, viz.:

Often, placement agencies, their liability being solidary, shoulder the payment of money claims in
the event that jurisdiction over the foreign employer is not acquired by the court or if the foreign
employer reneges on its obligation. Hence, placement agencies that are in good faith and which
fulfill their obligations are unnecessarily penalized for the acts of the foreign employer. To protect
them and to promote their continued helpful contribution in deploying Filipino migrant workers,
liability for money claims was reduced under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. 37(Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner argues that in mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies, the subject clause
sacrifices the well-being of OFWs. Not only that, the provision makes foreign employers better off
than local employers because in cases involving the illegal dismissal of employees, foreign
employers are liable for salaries covering a maximum of only three months of the unexpired
employment contract while local employers are liable for the full lump-sum salaries of their
employees. As petitioner puts it:

In terms of practical application, the local employers are not limited to the amount of backwages
they have to give their employees they have illegally dismissed, following well-entrenched and
unequivocal jurisprudence on the matter. On the other hand, foreign employers will only be
limited to giving the illegally dismissed migrant workers the maximum of three (3) months unpaid
salaries notwithstanding the unexpired term of the contract that can be more than three (3)
months.38

Lastly, petitioner claims that the subject clause violates the due process clause, for it deprives
him of the salaries and other emoluments he is entitled to under his fixed-period employment
contract.39

The Arguments of Respondents

In their Comment and Memorandum, respondents contend that the constitutional issue should not
be entertained, for this was belatedly interposed by petitioner in his appeal before the CA, and not
at the earliest opportunity, which was when he filed an appeal before the NLRC. 40

The Arguments of the Solicitor General

The Solicitor General (OSG)41 points out that as R.A. No. 8042 took effect on July 15, 1995, its
provisions could not have impaired petitioner's 1998 employment contract. Rather, R.A. No. 8042
having preceded petitioner's contract, the provisions thereof are deemed part of the minimum
terms of petitioner's employment, especially on the matter of money claims, as this was not
stipulated upon by the parties.42

Moreover, the OSG emphasizes that OFWs and local workers differ in terms of the nature of their
employment, such that their rights to monetary benefits must necessarily be treated differently.
The OSG enumerates the essential elements that distinguish OFWs from local workers: first,
while local workers perform their jobs within Philippine territory, OFWs perform their jobs for
foreign employers, over whom it is difficult for our courts to acquire jurisdiction, or against whom it
is almost impossible to enforce judgment; and second, as held in Coyoca v. National Labor
Relations Commission43 and Millares v. National Labor Relations Commission, 44 OFWs are
contractual employees who can never acquire regular employment status, unlike local workers
who are or can become regular employees. Hence, the OSG posits that there are rights and
privileges exclusive to local workers, but not available to OFWs; that these peculiarities make for
a reasonable and valid basis for the differentiated treatment under the subject clause of the
money claims of OFWs who are illegally dismissed. Thus, the provision does not violate the equal
protection clause nor Section 18, Article II of the Constitution. 45

Lastly, the OSG defends the rationale behind the subject clause as a police power measure
adopted to mitigate the solidary liability of placement agencies for this "redounds to the benefit of
the migrant workers whose welfare the government seeks to promote. The survival of legitimate
placement agencies helps [assure] the government that migrant workers are properly deployed
and are employed under decent and humane conditions." 46

The Court's Ruling

The Court sustains petitioner on the first and second issues.

When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review of the acts of its co-equals,
such as the Congress, it does so only when these conditions obtain: (1) that there is an actual
case or controversy involving a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial determination; 47 (2) that the
constitutional question is raised by a proper party 48 and at the earliest opportunity;49 and (3) that
the constitutional question is the very lis mota of the case, 50otherwise the Court will dismiss the
case or decide the same on some other ground. 51

Without a doubt, there exists in this case an actual controversy directly involving petitioner who is
personally aggrieved that the labor tribunals and the CA computed his monetary award based on
the salary period of three months only as provided under the subject clause.

The constitutional challenge is also timely. It should be borne in mind that the requirement that a
constitutional issue be raised at the earliest opportunity entails the interposition of the issue in the
pleadings before acompetent court, such that, if the issue is not raised in the pleadings before
that competent court, it cannot be considered at the trial and, if not considered in the trial, it
cannot be considered on appeal.52 Records disclose that the issue on the constitutionality of the
subject clause was first raised, not in petitioner's appeal with the NLRC, but in his Motion for
Partial Reconsideration with said labor tribunal, 53 and reiterated in his Petition forCertiorari before
the CA.54 Nonetheless, the issue is deemed seasonably raised because it is not the NLRC but the
CA which has the competence to resolve the constitutional issue. The NLRC is a labor tribunal
that merely performs a quasi-judicial function – its function in the present case is limited to
determining questions of fact to which the legislative policy of R.A. No. 8042 is to be applied and
to resolving such questions in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself; 55 thus, its
foremost function is to administer and enforce R.A. No. 8042, and not to inquire into the validity of
its provisions. The CA, on the other hand, is vested with the power of judicial review or the power
to declare unconstitutional a law or a provision thereof, such as the subject clause. 56Petitioner's
interposition of the constitutional issue before the CA was undoubtedly seasonable. The CA was
therefore remiss in failing to take up the issue in its decision.

The third condition that the constitutional issue be critical to the resolution of the case likewise
obtains because the monetary claim of petitioner to his lump-sum salary for the entire unexpired
portion of his 12-month employment contract, and not just for a period of three months, strikes at
the very core of the subject clause.

Thus, the stage is all set for the determination of the constitutionality of the subject clause.

Does the subject clause violate Section 10,

Article III of the Constitution on non-impairment
of contracts?

The answer is in the negative.

Petitioner's claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the stipulations in his contract on
the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will receive 57 is not tenable.

Section 10, Article III of the Constitution provides:

No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have only a
prospective operation,58and cannot affect acts or contracts already perfected; 59 however, as to
laws already in existence, their provisions are read into contracts and deemed a part
thereof.60 Thus, the non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article II is limited in application to
laws about to be enacted that would in any way derogate from existing acts or contracts by
enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties thereto.

As aptly observed by the OSG, the enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in 1995 preceded the execution
of the employment contract between petitioner and respondents in 1998. Hence, it cannot be
argued that R.A. No. 8042, particularly the subject clause, impaired the employment contract of
the parties. Rather, when the parties executed their 1998 employment contract, they were
deemed to have incorporated into it all the provisions of R.A. No. 8042.

But even if the Court were to disregard the timeline, the subject clause may not be declared
unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the impairment clause, for the law was enacted
in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a business, profession or calling,
particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of ensuring
respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they may be employed. 61 Police power
legislations adopted by the State to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order,
safety, and general welfare of the people are generally applicable not only to future contracts but
even to those already in existence, for all private contracts must yield to the superior and
legitimate measures taken by the State to promote public welfare. 62
Does the subject clause violate Section 1,
Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18,
Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor
as a protected sector?

The answer is in the affirmative.

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the law.

Section 18,63 Article II and Section 3,64 Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without
distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.

To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate
to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of
similar category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none
should be denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed
on, others in like circumstances.65

Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress to incorporate, when it
sees fit, a system of classification into its legislation; however, to be valid, the classification must
comply with these requirements: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions; 2) it is germane to the
purposes of the law; 3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and 4) it applies equally to all
members of the class.66

There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a
classification embodied in a law: a) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the
challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally related to serving a legitimate state
interest;67 b) the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the government must show that the
challenged classification serves an important state interest and that the classification is at least
substantially related to serving that interest; 68 and c) strict judicial scrutiny69 in which a legislative
classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right 70 or operates
to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class 71 is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is
upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state
interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.72

Under American jurisprudence, strict judicial scrutiny is triggered by suspect

classifications73 based on race74 or gender75 but not when the classification is drawn along income
categories.76

It is different in the Philippine setting. In Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas)
Employee Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 77 the constitutionality of a provision in
the charter of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), a government financial institution (GFI), was
challenged for maintaining its rank-and-file employees under the Salary Standardization Law
(SSL), even when the rank-and-file employees of other GFIs had been exempted from the SSL
by their respective charters. Finding that the disputed provision contained a suspect classification
based on salary grade, the Court deliberately employed the standard of strict judicial scrutiny in
its review of the constitutionality of said provision. More significantly, it was in this case that the
Court revealed the broad outlines of its judicial philosophy, to wit:

Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its policies should
be accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except when they run afoul of the
Constitution. The deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental right,
or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution. When these
violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional
guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations.
Rational basis should not suffice.
Admittedly, the view that prejudice to persons accorded special protection by the Constitution
requires a stricter judicial scrutiny finds no support in American or English jurisprudence.
Nevertheless, these foreign decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in this jurisdiction.
At best, they are persuasive and have been used to support many of our decisions. We should
not place undue and fawning reliance upon them and regard them as indispensable mental
crutches without which we cannot come to our own decisions through the employment of our own
endowments. We live in a different ambience and must decide our own problems in the light of
our own interests and needs, and of our qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and
always with our own concept of law and justice. Our laws must be construed in accordance with
the intention of our own lawmakers and such intent may be deduced from the language of each
law and the context of other local legislation related thereto. More importantly, they must be
construed to serve our own public interest which is the be-all and the end-all of all our laws. And it
need not be stressed that our public interest is distinct and different from others.

xxxx

Further, the quest for a better and more "equal" world calls for the use of equal protection as a
tool of effective judicial intervention.

Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the Constitution. The
Preamble proclaims "equality" as an ideal precisely in protest against crushing inequities in
Philippine society. The command to promote social justice in Article II, Section 10, in "all phases
of national development," further explicitated in Article XIII, are clear commands to the State to
take affirmative action in the direction of greater equality. x x x [T]here is thus in the Philippine
Constitution no lack of doctrinal support for a more vigorous state effort towards achieving a
reasonable measure of equality.

Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to
marginalized groups of society, including labor. Under the policy of social justice, the law bends
over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification that
those with less privilege in life should have more in law. And the obligation to afford protection to
labor is incumbent not only on the legislative and executive branches but also on the judiciary to
translate this pledge into a living reality. Social justice calls for the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.

xxxx

Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of
constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative
power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the "rational basis" test, and the legislative discretion
would be given deferential treatment.

But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the
perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special
protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered down view would
call for the abdication of this Court’s solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the
Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the
unconstitutional act is a private person or the government itself or one of its instrumentalities.
Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the character or nature of the actor.

xxxx

In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officer-
employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher
grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP
now receive higher compensation packages that are competitive with the industry, while the
poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications
are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the
SSL while employees higher in rank - possessing higher and better education and opportunities
for career advancement - are given higher compensation packages to entice them to stay.
Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people whose status
and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job marketability, it is they - and not the
officers - who have the real economic and financial need for the adjustment . This is in accord
with the policy of the Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social
services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all." Any
act of Congress that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by
this Court before it can pass muster. (Emphasis supplied)

Imbued with the same sense of "obligation to afford protection to labor," the Court in the present
case also employs the standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it perceives in the subject clause a
suspect classification prejudicial to OFWs.

Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs.
However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against,
and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:

First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-à-vis OFWs with
employment contracts ofone year or more;

Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and

Third, OFWs vis-à-vis local workers with fixed-period employment;

OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-à-vis OFWs with employment
contracts of one year or more

As pointed out by petitioner,78 it was in Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission79 (Second Division, 1999) that the Court laid down the following rules on
the application of the periods prescribed under Section 10(5) of R.A. No. 804, to wit:

A plain reading of Sec. 10 clearly reveals that the choice of which amount to award an
illegally dismissed overseas contract worker, i.e., whether his salaries for the unexpired
portion of his employment contract or three (3) months’ salary for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less, comes into play only when the employment contract
concerned has a term of at least one (1) year or more. This is evident from the words "for
every year of the unexpired term" which follows the words "salaries x x x for three
months."To follow petitioners’ thinking that private respondent is entitled to three (3) months
salary only simply because it is the lesser amount is to completely disregard and overlook some
words used in the statute while giving effect to some. This is contrary to the well-established rule
in legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part or word
thereof be given effect since the law-making body is presumed to know the meaning of the words
employed in the statue and to have used them advisedly. Ut res magis valeat quam
pereat.80 (Emphasis supplied)

In Marsaman, the OFW involved was illegally dismissed two months into his 10-month contract,
but was awarded his salaries for the remaining 8 months and 6 days of his contract.

Prior to Marsaman, however, there were two cases in which the Court made conflicting rulings on
Section 10(5). One was Asian Center for Career and Employment System and Services v.
National Labor Relations Commission(Second Division, October 1998),81 which involved an OFW
who was awarded a two-year employment contract,but was dismissed after working for one year
and two months. The LA declared his dismissal illegal and awarded him SR13,600.00 as lump-
sum salary covering eight months, the unexpired portion of his contract. On appeal, the Court
reduced the award to SR3,600.00 equivalent to his three months’ salary, this being the lesser
value, to wit:

Under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, a worker dismissed from overseas employment without just,
valid or authorized cause is entitled to his salary for the unexpired portion of his employment
contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
In the case at bar, the unexpired portion of private respondent’s employment contract is eight (8)
months. Private respondent should therefore be paid his basic salary corresponding to three (3)
months or a total of SR3,600.82

Another was Triple-Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission (Third

Division, December 1998),83 which involved an OFW (therein respondent Erlinda Osdana) who
was originally granted a 12-month contract, which was deemed renewed for another 12 months.
After serving for one year and seven-and-a-half months, respondent Osdana was illegally
dismissed, and the Court awarded her salaries for the entire unexpired portion of four and one-
half months of her contract.

The Marsaman interpretation of Section 10(5) has since been adopted in the following cases:

Case Title Contract Period of Unexpired Period Applied

Period Service Period in the
Computation
of the
Monetary
Award
Skippers v. 6 months 2 months 4 months 4 months
Maguad84
Bahia 9 months 8 months 4 months 4 months
Shipping v.
Reynaldo
Chua 85
Centennial 9 months 4 months 5 months 5 months
Transmarine
v. dela Cruz
l86
Talidano v. 12 months 3 months 9 months 3 months
Falcon87
Univan v. 12 months 3 months 9 months 3 months
CA88
Oriental v. 12 months more than 10 months 3 months
CA89 2 months
PCL v. 12 months more than more or less 9 3 months
NLRC90 2 months months
Olarte v. 12 months 21 days 11 months and 3 months
Nayona91 9 days
JSS 12 months 16 days 11 months and 3 months
v.Ferrer92 24 days
Pentagon v. 12 months 9 months 2 months and 2 months and
Adelantar93 and 7 days 23 days 23 days
Phil. Employ 12 months 10 months 2 months Unexpired
v. Paramio, portion
et al.94
Flourish 2 years 26 days 23 months and 6 months or 3
Maritime v. 4 days months for each
Almanzor 95 year of contract
Athenna 1 year, 10 1 month 1 year, 9 6 months or 3
Manpower v. months months and 28 months for each
 Villanos 96 and 28 days year of contract
days

As the foregoing matrix readily shows, the subject clause classifies OFWs into two categories.
The first category includes OFWs with fixed-period employment contracts of less than one year;
in case of illegal dismissal, they are entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portion of
their contract. The second category consists of OFWs with fixed-period employment contracts of
one year or more; in case of illegal dismissal, they are entitled to monetary award equivalent to
only 3 months of the unexpired portion of their contracts.

The disparity in the treatment of these two groups cannot be discounted. In Skippers, the
respondent OFW worked for only 2 months out of his 6-month contract, but was awarded his
salaries for the remaining 4 months. In contrast, the respondent OFWs in Oriental and PCL who
had also worked for about 2 months out of their 12-month contracts were awarded their salaries
for only 3 months of the unexpired portion of their contracts. Even the OFWs involved
in Talidano and Univan who had worked for a longer period of 3 months out of their 12-month
contracts before being illegally dismissed were awarded their salaries for only 3 months.

To illustrate the disparity even more vividly, the Court assumes a hypothetical OFW-A with an
employment contract of 10 months at a monthly salary rate of US$1,000.00 and a hypothetical
OFW-B with an employment contract of 15 months with the same monthly salary rate of
US$1,000.00. Both commenced work on the same day and under the same employer, and were
illegally dismissed after one month of work. Under the subject clause, OFW-A will be entitled to
US$9,000.00, equivalent to his salaries for the remaining 9 months of his contract, whereas
OFW-B will be entitled to only US$3,000.00, equivalent to his salaries for 3 months of the
unexpired portion of his contract, instead of US$14,000.00 for the unexpired portion of 14 months
of his contract, as the US$3,000.00 is the lesser amount.

The disparity becomes more aggravating when the Court takes into account jurisprudence
that, prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 8042 on July 14, 1995, 97 illegally dismissed OFWs, no
matter how long the period of their employment contracts, were entitled to their salaries for the
entire unexpired portions of their contracts. The matrix below speaks for itself:

Case Title Contract Period of Unexpired Period Applied in

Period Service Period the Computation
of the Monetary
Award
ATCI v. CA, 2 years 2 months 22 months 22 months
et al.98
Phil. 2 years 7 days 23 months 23 months and 23
Integrated v. and 23 days
NLRC99 days
JGB v. 2 years 9 months 15 months 15 months
NLC100
Agoy v. 2 years 2 months 22 months 22 months
NLRC101
EDI v. 2 years 5 months 19 months 19 months
NLRC, et
al.102
Barros v. 12 months 4 months 8 months 8 months
NLRC, et
al.103
Philippine 12 months 6 months 5 months 5 months and 18
Transmarine and 22 and 18 days
 v. Carilla104 days days

It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract periods or the unexpired
portions thereof, were treated alike in terms of the computation of their monetary benefits in case
of illegal dismissal. Their claims were subjected to a uniform rule of computation: their basic
salaries multiplied by the entire unexpired portion of their employment contracts.

The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a differentiated rule of
computation of the money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs based on their employment
periods, in the process singling out one category whose contracts have an unexpired portion of
one year or more and subjecting them to the peculiar disadvantage of having their monetary
awards limited to their salaries for 3 months or for the unexpired portion thereof, whichever is
less, but all the while sparing the other category from such prejudice, simply because the latter's
unexpired contracts fall short of one year.

Among OFWs With Employment Contracts of More Than One Year

Upon closer examination of the terminology employed in the subject clause, the Court now has
misgivings on the accuracy of the Marsaman interpretation.

The Court notes that the subject clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less" contains the qualifying phrases "every year" and "unexpired term." By its
ordinary meaning, the word "term" means a limited or definite extent of time. 105 Corollarily, that
"every year" is but part of an "unexpired term" is significant in many ways: first, the unexpired
term must be at least one year, for if it were any shorter, there would be no occasion for such
unexpired term to be measured by every year; and second, the original term must be more than
one year, for otherwise, whatever would be the unexpired term thereof will not reach even a year.
Consequently, the more decisive factor in the determination of when the subject clause "for three
(3) months forevery year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" shall apply is not the length of
the original contract period as held in Marsaman,106 but the length of the unexpired portion of the
contract period -- the subject clause applies in cases when the unexpired portion of the contract
period is at least one year, which arithmetically requires that the original contract period be more
than one year.

Viewed in that light, the subject clause creates a sub-layer of discrimination among OFWs whose
contract periods are for more than one year: those who are illegally dismissed with less than one
year left in their contracts shall be entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portion thereof,
while those who are illegally dismissed with one year or more remaining in their contracts shall be
covered by the subject clause, and their monetary benefits limited to their salaries for three
months only.

To concretely illustrate the application of the foregoing interpretation of the subject clause, the
Court assumes hypothetical OFW-C and OFW-D, who each have a 24-month contract at a salary
rate of US$1,000.00 per month. OFW-C is illegally dismissed on the 12th month, and OFW-D, on
the 13th month. Considering that there is at least 12 months remaining in the contract period of
OFW-C, the subject clause applies to the computation of the latter's monetary benefits. Thus,
OFW-C will be entitled, not to US$12,000,00 or the latter's total salaries for the 12 months
unexpired portion of the contract, but to the lesser amount of US$3,000.00 or the latter's salaries
for 3 months out of the 12-month unexpired term of the contract. On the other hand, OFW-D is
spared from the effects of the subject clause, for there are only 11 months left in the latter's
contract period. Thus, OFW-D will be entitled to US$11,000.00, which is equivalent to his/her total
salaries for the entire 11-month unexpired portion.

OFWs vis-à-vis Local Workers
With Fixed-Period Employment

As discussed earlier, prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of the monetary
awards of illegally dismissed OFWs was in place. This uniform system was applicable even to
local workers with fixed-term employment.107
The earliest rule prescribing a uniform system of computation was actually Article 299 of the
Code of Commerce (1888),108 to wit:

Article 299. If the contracts between the merchants and their shop clerks and employees should
have been made of a fixed period, none of the contracting parties, without the consent of the
other, may withdraw from the fulfillment of said contract until the termination of the period agreed
upon.

Persons violating this clause shall be subject to indemnify the loss and damage suffered, with the
exception of the provisions contained in the following articles.

In Reyes v. The Compañia Maritima,109 the Court applied the foregoing provision to determine the
liability of a shipping company for the illegal discharge of its managers prior to the expiration of
their fixed-term employment. The Court therein held the shipping company liable for the salaries
of its managers for the remainder of their fixed-term employment.

There is a more specific rule as far as seafarers are concerned: Article 605 of the Code of
Commerce which provides:

Article 605. If the contracts of the captain and members of the crew with the agent should be for a
definite period or voyage, they cannot be discharged until the fulfillment of their contracts, except
for reasons of insubordination in serious matters, robbery, theft, habitual drunkenness, and
damage caused to the vessel or to its cargo by malice or manifest or proven negligence.

Article 605 was applied to Madrigal Shipping Company, Inc. v. Ogilvie, 110 in

which the Court held the shipping company liable for the salaries and subsistence allowance of its
illegally dismissed employees for the entire unexpired portion of their employment contracts.

While Article 605 has remained good law up to the present, 111 Article 299 of the Code of
Commerce was replaced by Art. 1586 of the Civil Code of 1889, to wit:

Article 1586. Field hands, mechanics, artisans, and other laborers hired for a certain time and for
a certain work cannot leave or be dismissed without sufficient cause, before the fulfillment of the
contract. (Emphasis supplied.)

Citing Manresa, the Court in Lemoine v. Alkan112 read the disjunctive "or" in Article 1586 as a
conjunctive "and" so as to apply the provision to local workers who are employed for a time
certain although for no particular skill. This interpretation of Article 1586 was reiterated in Garcia
Palomar v. Hotel de France Company.113 And in both Lemoine and Palomar, the Court adopted
the general principle that in actions for wrongful discharge founded on Article 1586, local workers
are entitled to recover damages to the extent of the amount stipulated to be paid to them by the
terms of their contract. On the computation of the amount of such damages, the Court in Aldaz v.
Gay114 held:

The doctrine is well-established in American jurisprudence, and nothing has been brought to our
attention to the contrary under Spanish jurisprudence, that when an employee is wrongfully
discharged it is his duty to seek other employment of the same kind in the same community, for
the purpose of reducing the damages resulting from such wrongful discharge. However, while this
is the general rule, the burden of showing that he failed to make an effort to secure other
employment of a like nature, and that other employment of a like nature was obtainable, is upon
the defendant. When an employee is wrongfully discharged under a contract of employment his
prima facie damage is the amount which he would be entitled to had he continued in such
employment until the termination of the period. (Howard vs. Daly, 61 N. Y., 362; Allen vs.
Whitlark, 99 Mich., 492; Farrell vs. School District No. 2, 98 Mich., 43.) 115 (Emphasis supplied)

On August 30, 1950, the New Civil Code took effect with new provisions on fixed-term
employment: Section 2 (Obligations with a Period), Chapter 3, Title I, and Sections 2 (Contract of
Labor) and 3 (Contract for a Piece of Work), Chapter 3, Title VIII, Book IV. 116 Much like Article
1586 of the Civil Code of 1889, the new provisions of the Civil Code do not expressly provide for
the remedies available to a fixed-term worker who is illegally discharged. However, it is noted that
in Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., Inc. v. Rich, 117 the Court carried over the principles on the
payment of damages underlying Article 1586 of the Civil Code of 1889 and applied the same to a
case involving the illegal discharge of a local worker whose fixed-period employment contract
was entered into in 1952, when the new Civil Code was already in effect. 118

More significantly, the same principles were applied to cases involving overseas Filipino workers
whose fixed-term employment contracts were illegally terminated, such as in First Asian Trans &
Shipping Agency, Inc. v. Ople,119involving seafarers who were illegally discharged. In Teknika
Skills and Trade Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 120 an OFW who was
illegally dismissed prior to the expiration of her fixed-period employment contract as a baby sitter,
was awarded salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of her contract. The Court arrived at
the same ruling in Anderson v. National Labor Relations Commission, 121 which involved a
foreman hired in 1988 in Saudi Arabia for a fixed term of two years, but who was illegally
dismissed after only nine months on the job -- the Court awarded him salaries corresponding to
15 months, the unexpired portion of his contract. In Asia World Recruitment, Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission,122 a Filipino working as a security officer in 1989 in Angola was
awarded his salaries for the remaining period of his 12-month contract after he was wrongfully
discharged. Finally, in Vinta Maritime Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 123 an
OFW whose 12-month contract was illegally cut short in the second month was declared entitled
to his salaries for the remaining 10 months of his contract.

In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment who were
illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of the computation of their money claims: they
were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts. But
with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the subject clause, illegally
dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their employment contract
have since been differently treated in that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap,
whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers with fixed-term employment.

The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in
the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally
discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of
one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers
with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs
and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.

There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector protected by the Constitution,
the Court now subjects the classification to a strict judicial scrutiny, and determines whether it
serves a compelling state interest through the least restrictive means.

What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and powers arrayed
in the Constitution and calibrated by history. 124 It is akin to the paramount interest of the state 125 for
which some individual liberties must give way, such as the public interest in safeguarding health
or maintaining medical standards,126 or in maintaining access to information on matters of public
concern.127

In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found no compelling state interest
that the subject clause may possibly serve.

The OSG defends the subject clause as a police power measure "designed to protect the
employment of Filipino seafarers overseas x x x. By limiting the liability to three months [sic],
Filipino seafarers have better chance of getting hired by foreign employers." The limitation also
protects the interest of local placement agencies, which otherwise may be made to shoulder
millions of pesos in "termination pay."128

The OSG explained further:

Often, placement agencies, their liability being solidary, shoulder the payment of money claims in
the event that jurisdiction over the foreign employer is not acquired by the court or if the foreign
employer reneges on its obligation. Hence, placement agencies that are in good faith and which
fulfill their obligations are unnecessarily penalized for the acts of the foreign employer. To protect
them and to promote their continued helpful contribution in deploying Filipino migrant workers,
liability for money are reduced under Section 10 of RA 8042.

This measure redounds to the benefit of the migrant workers whose welfare the government
seeks to promote. The survival of legitimate placement agencies helps [assure] the government
that migrant workers are properly deployed and are employed under decent and humane
conditions.129 (Emphasis supplied)

However, nowhere in the Comment or Memorandum does the OSG cite the source of its
perception of the state interest sought to be served by the subject clause.

The OSG locates the purpose of R.A. No. 8042 in the speech of Rep. Bonifacio Gallego in
sponsorship of House Bill No. 14314 (HB 14314), from which the law originated; 130 but the speech
makes no reference to the underlying reason for the adoption of the subject clause. That is only
natural for none of the 29 provisions in HB 14314 resembles the subject clause.

On the other hand, Senate Bill No. 2077 (SB 2077) contains a provision on money claims, to wit:

Sec. 10. Money Claims. - Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters
of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint,
the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of the complaint, the
claim arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract
involving Filipino workers for overseas employment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary
and other forms of damages.

The liability of the principal and the recruitment/placement agency or any and all claims under this
Section shall be joint and several.

Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement on any money claims exclusive of

damages under this Section shall not be less than fifty percent (50%) of such money
claims: Provided, That any installment payments, if applicable, to satisfy any such compromise or
voluntary settlement shall not be more than two (2) months. Any compromise/voluntary
agreement in violation of this paragraph shall be null and void.

Non-compliance with the mandatory period for resolutions of cases provided under this Section
shall subject the responsible officials to any or all of the following penalties:

(1) The salary of any such official who fails to render his decision or resolution within the
prescribed period shall be, or caused to be, withheld until the said official complies
therewith;

(2) Suspension for not more than ninety (90) days; or

(3) Dismissal from the service with disqualification to hold any appointive public office for
five (5) years.

Provided, however, That the penalties herein provided shall be without prejudice to any liability
which any such official may have incurred under other existing laws or rules and regulations as a
consequence of violating the provisions of this paragraph.

But significantly, Section 10 of SB 2077 does not provide for any rule on the computation of
money claims.

A rule on the computation of money claims containing the subject clause was inserted and
eventually adopted as the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. The Court examined the
rationale of the subject clause in the transcripts of the "Bicameral Conference Committee
(Conference Committee) Meetings on the Magna Carta on OCWs (Disagreeing Provisions of
Senate Bill No. 2077 and House Bill No. 14314)." However, the Court finds no discernible state
interest, let alone a compelling one, that is sought to be protected or advanced by the adoption of
the subject clause.

In fine, the Government has failed to discharge its burden of proving the existence of a
compelling state interest that would justify the perpetuation of the discrimination against OFWs
under the subject clause.

Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of the subject clause is to protect the
employment of OFWs by mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies, such callous and
cavalier rationale will have to be rejected. There can never be a justification for any form of
government action that alleviates the burden of one sector, but imposes the same burden on
another sector, especially when the favored sector is composed of private businesses such as
placement agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is composed of OFWs whose protection no
less than the Constitution commands. The idea that private business interest can be elevated to
the level of a compelling state interest is odious.

Moreover, even if the purpose of the subject clause is to lessen the solidary liability of placement
agencies vis-a-vis their foreign principals, there are mechanisms already in place that can be
employed to achieve that purpose without infringing on the constitutional rights of OFWs.

The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-Based
Overseas Workers, dated February 4, 2002, imposes administrative disciplinary measures on
erring foreign employers who default on their contractual obligations to migrant workers and/or
their Philippine agents. These disciplinary measures range from temporary disqualification to
preventive suspension. The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and
Employment of Seafarers, dated May 23, 2003, contains similar administrative disciplinary
measures against erring foreign employers.

Resort to these administrative measures is undoubtedly the less restrictive means of aiding local
placement agencies in enforcing the solidary liability of their foreign principals.

Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the
right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection. 1avvphi1

Further, there would be certain misgivings if one is to approach the declaration of the
unconstitutionality of the subject clause from the lone perspective that the clause directly violates
state policy on labor under Section 3,131Article XIII of the Constitution.

While all the provisions of the 1987 Constitution are presumed self-executing, 132 there are some
which this Court has declared not judicially enforceable, Article XIII being one,133 particularly
Section 3 thereof, the nature of which, this Court, in Agabon v. National Labor Relations
Commission,134 has described to be not self-actuating:

Thus, the constitutional mandates of protection to labor and security of tenure may be deemed as
self-executing in the sense that these are automatically acknowledged and observed without
need for any enabling legislation. However, to declare that the constitutional provisions are
enough to guarantee the full exercise of the rights embodied therein, and the realization of ideals
therein expressed, would be impractical, if not unrealistic. The espousal of such view presents the
dangerous tendency of being overbroad and exaggerated. The guarantees of "full protection to
labor" and "security of tenure", when examined in isolation, are facially unqualified, and the
broadest interpretation possible suggests a blanket shield in favor of labor against any form of
removal regardless of circumstance. This interpretation implies an unimpeachable right to
continued employment-a utopian notion, doubtless-but still hardly within the contemplation of the
framers. Subsequent legislation is still needed to define the parameters of these guaranteed
rights to ensure the protection and promotion, not only the rights of the labor sector, but of the
employers' as well. Without specific and pertinent legislation, judicial bodies will be at a loss,
formulating their own conclusion to approximate at least the aims of the Constitution.
Ultimately, therefore, Section 3 of Article XIII cannot, on its own, be a source of a positive
enforceable rightto stave off the dismissal of an employee for just cause owing to the failure to
serve proper notice or hearing. As manifested by several framers of the 1987 Constitution, the
provisions on social justice require legislative enactments for their enforceability. 135 (Emphasis
added)

Thus, Section 3, Article XIII cannot be treated as a principal source of direct enforceable rights,
for the violation of which the questioned clause may be declared unconstitutional. It may
unwittingly risk opening the floodgates of litigation to every worker or union over every
conceivable violation of so broad a concept as social justice for labor.

It must be stressed that Section 3, Article XIII does not directly bestow on the working class any
actual enforceable right, but merely clothes it with the status of a sector for whom the Constitution
urges protection through executive or legislative action and judicial recognition. Its utility is best
limited to being an impetus not just for the executive and legislative departments, but for the
judiciary as well, to protect the welfare of the working class. And it was in fact consistent with that
constitutional agenda that the Court in Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employee
Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, penned by then Associate Justice now Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno, formulated the judicial precept that when the challenge to a statute is
premised on the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with
special protection -- such as the working class or a section thereof -- the Court may recognize the
existence of a suspect classification and subject the same to strict judicial scrutiny.

The view that the concepts of suspect classification and strict judicial scrutiny formulated
in Central Bank Employee Association exaggerate the significance of Section 3, Article XIII is a
groundless apprehension. Central Bank applied Article XIII in conjunction with the equal
protection clause. Article XIII, by itself, without the application of the equal protection clause, has
no life or force of its own as elucidated in Agabon.

Along the same line of reasoning, the Court further holds that the subject clause violates
petitioner's right to substantive due process, for it deprives him of property, consisting of
monetary benefits, without any existing valid governmental purpose. 136

The argument of the Solicitor General, that the actual purpose of the subject clause of limiting the
entitlement of OFWs to their three-month salary in case of illegal dismissal, is to give them a
better chance of getting hired by foreign employers. This is plain speculation. As earlier
discussed, there is nothing in the text of the law or the records of the deliberations leading to its
enactment or the pleadings of respondent that would indicate that there is an existing
governmental purpose for the subject clause, or even just a pretext of one.

The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it is for that
precise reason that the clause violates not just petitioner's right to equal protection, but also her
right to substantive due process under Section 1, 137 Article III of the Constitution.

The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the entire
unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract, pursuant to law and
jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.

On the Third Issue

Petitioner contends that his overtime and leave pay should form part of the salary basis in the
computation of his monetary award, because these are fixed benefits that have been stipulated
into his contract.

Petitioner is mistaken.

The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave pay. For seafarers like
petitioner, DOLE Department Order No. 33, series 1996, provides a Standard Employment
Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is understood as the basic wage, exclusive of overtime,
leave pay and other bonuses; whereas overtime pay is compensation for all work "performed" in
excess of the regular eight hours, and holiday pay is compensation for any work "performed" on
designated rest days and holidays.

By the foregoing definition alone, there is no basis for the automatic inclusion of overtime and
holiday pay in the computation of petitioner's monetary award, unless there is evidence that he
performed work during those periods. As the Court held in Centennial Transmarine, Inc. v. Dela
Cruz,138

However, the payment of overtime pay and leave pay should be disallowed in light of our ruling in
Cagampan v. National Labor Relations Commission, to wit:

The rendition of overtime work and the submission of sufficient proof that said was actually
performed are conditions to be satisfied before a seaman could be entitled to overtime pay which
should be computed on the basis of 30% of the basic monthly salary. In short, the contract
provision guarantees the right to overtime pay but the entitlement to such benefit must first be
established.

In the same vein, the claim for the day's leave pay for the unexpired portion of the contract is
unwarranted since the same is given during the actual service of the seamen.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition. The subject clause "or for three months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act
No. 8042 is DECLAREDUNCONSTITUTIONAL; and the December 8, 2004 Decision and April 1,
2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED to the effect that petitioner
is AWARDED his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his employment contract consisting
of nine months and 23 days computed at the rate of US$1,400.00 per month.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

Xxx