PROVIONAL REMEDIES

CASE DIGEST
Receivership

Receivership

1. Abrigo v. Kayanan (G.R. No. L-28601 March 18, 1983)

Facts:

In Civil Case No. 178-G in Court of First Instance of Quezon, plaintiff sought the
partition of seven (7) parcels of land under a claim of co-ownership with the defendants. The
plaintiffs claimed that except for one-half of the fifth parcel, two of the defendants, Leon and
Enrique Abrigo, were in possession of the lands. The defendants put up the defense of
ownership; they claimed ownership by hereditary title by virtue of an alleged duly approved
Amended Project of Partition in the Testate Estate of Nazario Abrigo.

On October 21, 1967, the plaintiffs filed an Urgent Motion for the appointment of a
receiver to administer parcel on the ground that numerous squatters had invaded the property to
the plaintiffs' great damage and prejudice. The trial court respondent Judge Kayanan issued an
Order appointing Atty. Pedro S. Nantes, Acting Clerk of Court, Branch IV, CFI, Quezon City as
receiver of the said parcels of land. One of the defendants who is the petitioner herein, filed a
Motion for the reconsideration, he claimed that there was no legal basis for the appointment of a
receiver under the facts of the case; and alternatively, he offered to post a bond so that the
receiver be discharged. However, the trial court denied his motion.

Hence, petitioner now seeks the annulment and setting aside of the foregoing orders on the
ground that they were issued with grave abuse of discretion.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in appointing a
receiver.

Ruling:

Yes, judge committed grave abuse of discretion in appointing a receiver. Considering that
in actions involving title to real property, the appointment of a receiver cannot be entertained
because its effect would be to take the property out of the possession of the defendant, except in
extreme cases when there is clear proof of its necessity to save the plaintiff from grave and
irremediable loss or damage, it is evident that the action of the respondent judge is unwarranted
and unfair to the defendants.
 In this case, the reason for the appointment of the receiver was the fact that the land had
been entered by numerous squatters. However, a receiver who is also burdened with his duties as
Clerk of Court cannot be in a better position than the actual possessors in dealing with the
squatters. The appointed receiver does not acquire any advantage from the owners and/or
present possessors, nor is he in a better position in order to protect the respective interest of the
herein parties for he has to apply as are the present possessors deprived of their possession, for
the same remedies and relief normally afforded to an aggrieved property owner, under our legal
system. A receiver is not endowed with extra-legal power to take the law in his hands with a
view to quell and disband the squatters short of taking legal action; nor is he conferred with a
magic wand not possessed by herein party-litigants as property owners. On the contrary, the
receivership placed the parties at a disadvantage.

The respondent judge should at least have accepted the bond offered by the petitioner.
Rule 59, Sec. 4 stipulates that "the receiver (may be) discharged when the party opposing the
appointment files a bond executed to the applicant in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the
effect that such party will pay the applicant all damages he may suffer by reason of the acts,
omissions, or other matters specified in the application as ground for such appointment."

2. Acuna v. Calaug

3. Alcantara vs. Abbass, (G.R. No. L-14890 September 30, 1963)

Facts:
In March, 1957, Conrado Alcantara sued Martin Bacaron partly to foreclose the chattel mortgage
executed by the latter on a caterpillar tractor with its accessories. Pursuant to a clause in the
mortgage contract, the Davao court designated Alcantara as receiver of the tractor. With the
court's approval, he leased the machine to Serapio Sablada. Upon the expiration of the lease, and
after Sablada's failure to return the machine and he was declared by the court to be in contempt
of court.
Meanwhile, alleging that Alcantara had neglected his duties as receiver, Bacaron petitioned the
court to relieve such receiver, and to appoint him as the receiver instead. Respondent judge of the
Davao court, issued an order relieving Alcantara and appointed Bacaron as receiver of the
tractor, without bond, with authority to receive the sum of P2,000.00 in Alcantara's hands as
rentals of the tractor, and to the end the same for repairs if necessary.
Alcantara filed his motion for reconsideration, however the court denied. Hence, this instant
petition for special civil action.
Issue:
 (a) Whether or not the court erred in relieving Alcantara as receiver and thereby
replacing him with Bacaron.
(b) Whether or not a receiver may be appointed in the absence of bond.
Ruling:
a. Yes. It appears that acting on the complaint of Alcantara, the court required
Sablada under pain of contempt, to deliver the tractor. It also appears that upon Sablada's failure,
he was declared to be contempt. The order directed Alcantara to take steps to recover possession
of the tractor, with the admonition that "should he fail to take possession of the tractor within
fifteen (15) days after notice thereof, he may relieved as receiver and the defendant who is
willing to be the receiver may be appointed in his place".
It is not clear what steps the court had in mind when it declared that "plaintiff-receiver failed to
take steps to take possession of the tractor leased to Sablada". It could have meant that Alcantara
failed to take the tractor directly from the hands of Sablada from the place where it was, without
resorting to official help. If the court meant — as it must have meant — that Alcantara failed to
exhaust judicial remedies to compel Sablada to comply with the order to place the tractor at the
"junction" previously mentioned, then it fell into error, because Alcantara had in effect,
suggested that Sablada be held in "continuous contempt" i.e., imprisoned until he placed the
tractor at the "junction"; and the court instead of acting accordingly under Rule 64, sec. 7 held
Alcantara to be negligent, and removed him.
In this connection, it should be observed that in his aforesaid pleading of November 26, 1958,
Alcantara even asked for permission to sue Sablada for replevin.
b. Yes. The general rule is that neither to a litigation should be appointed receiver without
the other's consent because "a receiver ought to be an indifferent person between the parties" and
"should be impartial and disinterested". In this case, Bacaron was the defendant of the case and
was appointed, as receiver without bond, over the objection of Alcantara.. Note that Bacaron was
the defendant, and his personal interest would conflict with his duties to the court and the
plaintiff. Furthermore, under the Rules of Court, the receiver must file a bond; and yet Bacaron
was exempted from such obligation. The effect of the whole proceeding was to discharge the
receiver ship at the request of the defendant, without so much a bond is contrary to sec. 4, Rule
61, of the Rules of Court.

4. Central Sawmill vs. Alto Insurance

5. Chavez v. CA (G.R. No. 174356, January 20, 2010)

Facts:

Fidela Y. Vargas (Respondent) owned a five-hectare mixed coconut land and rice fields
in Sorsogon and Evelina G. Chavez (petitioner) had been staying in a remote portion of the land
with her family, planting coconut seedlings on the land and supervising the harvest of coconut
and palay. Fidela and Evelina agreed to divide the gross sales of all products from the land
between themselves. Since Fidela was busy with her law practice, Evelina undertook to hold in
trust for Fidela her half of the profits.

Fidela claimed that Evelina had failed to remit her share of the profits and, despite
demand to turn over the administration of the property to Fidela, she refused to do so.
Consequently, Fidela filed a complaint against Evelina and her daughter, Aida C. Deles, for
recovery of possession, rent, and damages with prayer for the immediate appointment of a
receiver before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulan, Sorsogon. In their answer, Evelina and
Aida claimed that the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case since it
actually involved an agrarian dispute.

RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction based on Fidela’s admission that
Evelina and Aida were tenants who shared in the gross sales of the harvest. Fidela appealed to
the CA and also filed a motion for the appointment of a receiver. CA granted the motion and
ordained receivership of the land on the ground of petitioners’ failure to remit share of the profits
and despite demand to turn over the administration of the property to Fidela.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in granting respondent Fidela’s application for receivership.

Ruling:

Yes. A petition for receivership under Section 1(b), Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure requires that the property or fund subject of the action is in danger of being lost,
removed, or materially injured, necessitating its protection or preservation. Its object is the
prevention of imminent danger to the property. If the action does not require such protection or
preservation, the remedy is not receivership.

In this case, Fidela’s main gripe is that Evelina and Aida deprived her of her share of the
land’s produce. She does not claim that the land or its productive capacity would disappear or be
wasted if not entrusted to a receiver. Nor does Fidela claim that the land has been materially
injured, necessitating its protection and preservation. Because receivership is a harsh remedy that
can be granted only in extreme situations,  Fidela must prove a clear right to its issuance. But she
has not. Indeed, in none of the other cases she filed against Evelina and Aida has that remedy
been granted her.

Besides, the RTC dismissed Fidela’s action for lack of jurisdiction over the case, holding
that the issues it raised properly belong to the DARAB. The case before the CA is but an
offshoot of that RTC case. Given that the RTC has found that it had no jurisdiction over the case,
it would seem more prudent for the CA to first provisionally determine that the RTC had
jurisdiction before granting receivership which is but an incident of the main action.
 6. Commodities Storage & Ice Plant Corp., v. CA, 274 SCRA 439

7. Descallar v. CA (G.R. No. 106473 July 12, 1993)

Facts:

On August 9, 1991, respondent Camilo Borromeo, a realtor, filed against Antonietta O.

Descallar (petitioner) a civil complaint for the recovery of three (3) parcels of land and the house built
thereon in the possession of the petitioner and registered in her name under TCT Nos. 24790,
24791 and 24792 of the Registry of Deeds for the City of Mandaue. Borromeo alleged that he
purchased the property from Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian national and former lover of the
petitioner for many years until he deserted her for the favors of another woman. Borromeo filed an
action to recover the ownership and possession of the house and lots from Descallar and asked for
the issuance of new transfer certificates of title in his name.

In her answer, Descallar alleged that the property belongs to her as the registered owner
thereof; that Borromeo's vendor, Wilhelm Jambrich, is an Austrian, hence, not qualified to acquire or
own real property in the Philippines. Borromeo asked the trial court to appoint a receiver for the
property during the pendency of the case. Despite the petitioner's opposition, Judge Mercedes Golo-
Dadole granted the application for receivership and appointed her clerk of court as receiver with a
bond of P250,000.00.

Petitioner sought relief in the Court of Appeals by a petition for certiorari which the CA. Hence, this
petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:

Whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion in appointing a receiver for real property
registered in the name of the petitioner in order to transfer its possession from the petitioner to the
court-appointed receiver.

Ruling:

Yes. The appointment of a receiver is not proper where the rights of the parties (one of
whom is in possession of the property), are still to be determined by the trial court. Relief by way of
receivership is equitable in nature, and a court of equity will not ordinarily appoint a receiver where
the rights of the parties depend on the determination of adverse claims of legal title to real property
and one party is in possession. Only when the property is in danger of being materially injured or
lost, as by the prospective foreclosure of a mortgage thereon for non-payment of the mortgage loans
despite the considerable income derived from the property, or if portions thereof are being occupied
by third persons claiming adverse title thereto, may the appointment of a receiver be justified.

In this case, there is no showing that grave or irremediable damage may result to respondent
Borromeo unless a receiver is appointed. The property in question is real property, hence, it is
neither perishable or consummable. Even though it is mortgaged to a third person, there is no
evidence that payment of the mortgage obligation is being neglected. In any event, the private
respondent's rights and interests, may be adequately protected during the pendency of the case by
causing his adverse claim to be annotated on the petitioner's certificates of title.

Another flaw in the order of receivership is that the person whom the trial judge appointed as
receiver is her own clerk of court. This practice has been frowned upon by this Court.
 8. Grano v. Hon. Paredes, G.R. L- 27109, March 4, 1927
9. Pacific Merchandisisng Corp., v. Consolacion Insurance & Surety Co., 73 SCRA 564
10. Platon v. Hon. Sandoval, G.R. No. L-49031, August 28, 1944
11. Rivera v. Talavera, G.R. Nos. L-16280 and L-16805, May 30, 1961
12. Tantano v. Espina-Caboverde, G.R. No. 203585, July 29, 2013
13. Traders Royal Bank v. IAC, G.R. No. 11357, June 17, 1997

REPLEVIN

1. Ago v. CA, 16 SCRA 81 (1966)

2. BA Finance v. CA, 258 SCRA 102 (1996)
3. Barach Motors v. Summers, 42 Phil 3 (1921)
4. Chua v. CA, 222 SCRA 85 (1993)
5. La Tondena v. CA
6. Machineries and Engineering Supply Corp., v. CA, 96 Phil 70 (1954)
7. Sebastian v. Valino, 224 SCRA 256 (1993)
8. Servicewide Specialist v. CA, 251 SCRA 70 (1995)

SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE

1. Magoma vs. Macadaeg, 90 Phil 508 (1951)

Magoma v. Macadaeg [G.R. No. L-5153. December 10, 1951.]

Facts:
Candelaria Bautista (respondent) filed an action against Glicerio Mangoma (petitioner)
seeking the separation of the property of the spouses and the consequent dissolution and
liquidation of their conjugal partnership. Prior to the trial on the merits, respondent prayed the
court that pending the determination of the case, she and her daughter Leticia be given support
pendente lite in the amount of P1,000 a month. According to her, while their marriage was still
subsisting, petitioner contracted another marriage with one Luceria Bernardo and abandoned
respondent and two minor daughters and went to live with his second wife. Petitioner refused to
give any support to respondent and her children, thus compelling her to contract monetary
obligations for their maintenance.
Petitioner objected to the motion pendente lite on the following grounds that respondent
abandoned the conjugal home and committed adultery. Respondent judge authorized his deputy
clerk to receive the evidence on the motion for support pendente lite, however, before petitioner
has had a chance to present his evidence on his special defenses, respondent judge issued an
order granting the motion and ordering petitioner to give support pendente lite to his wife and
daughter Leticia in the amount of P750 a month beginning January 15, 1951 up to the
termination of the case, and to pay the accrued payments within five days from notice.
 Hence this petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not respondent judge erred in granting the motion without giving petitioner an
opportunity to present his evidence
Ruling:
Yes, the court erred in not allowing the petitioner to present his evidence for the purpose
of determining whether it is sufficient prima facie to overcome the application. Adultery on the
part of the wife is a valid defense against an action for support. Consequently, as to the child, it
is also a defense that it is the fruit of such adulterous relations, for in that case, it would not be
the child of the defendant and, hence, would not be entitled to support as such. But as this
defense should be established, and not merely alleged, it would be unavailing if proof thereof is
not permitted. It is not of course necessary to go fully into the merits of the case, it being
sufficient that the court ascertain the kind and amount of evidence which it may deem sufficient
to enable it to justly resolve the application, one way or the other, in view of the merely
provisional character of the resolution to be entered."

The facts of this case show that petitioner has not also been given an opportunity to
adduce evidence in support of the defenses he has set up against the motion for support pendente
lite. It appears that the respondent judge, after respondent had presented her evidence and before
the deputy clerk had been able to complete the hearing, issued the order subject of these
proceedings without giving petitioner an opportunity to present his evidence.
The affidavit submitted by counsel for petitioner, which stands uncontradicted, shows
that said counsel asked for postponement of the hearing only once and that he failed to appear on
the date set for the continuation of the hearing due to a misunderstanding. At any rate, the court
is not persuaded from a consideration of the pleadings that there has been a deliberate attempt on
the part of the petitioner, or his counsel, to delay the proceedings, and, therefore, before action is
taken on the matter, an opportunity should be given him to be heard, considering the serious
nature of his special defense. In line with the ruling of this Court in the Sanchez case, supra,
there is no other alternative than to remand this ease to the lower court in order that immediate
steps may be taken relative to the reception of the evidence of petitioner in support of his
opposition.

2. Torres v. Hon. Teodoro, Sr., 101 Phil 422 (1957)