Workmen Of Dimakuchi Tea Estate vs The Management Of Dimakuchi

Tea Estate (1958 AIR 353)

A research submitted in partial fulfilment of the course labour law for the requirement of
Degree of B.A; LL.B. (Hons.) for the Academic Session 2019

SUBMITTED BY:

ANSH PRASAD

Roll No. – 1916

SUBMITED TO:
Ms. PALLAVI SHANKAR

Faculty, LABOUR LAW I

B.A; LL.B

MARCH, 2019

CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, NAYAYA NAGAR,

MITHAPUR, PATNA-800001
 DECLARATION BY THE CANDIDATE
I hereby declare that the work reported in the B.A; LL.B (Hons.) Project Report entitled
“Workmen Of Dimakuchi Tea Estate vs The Management Of Dimakuchi tea Estate (1958
AIR 353)” submitted at Chanakya National Law University; Patna is an authentic record of
my work carried out under the supervision of Ms. Pallavi Shankar. I have not submitted this
work elsewhere for any other degree or diploma. I am fully responsible for the contents of my
Project Report.

(Signature of the Candidate)

Ansh Prasad
Roll no- 1916
Chanakya National Law University, Patna
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I place on my record my sincere thanks to all who helped me in making this project a reality.
This project could not have been completed without the sincere efforts of my kith and kin.
They supported me in every possible way and helped me not only by providing me
information but also in the making of this project. They provided me with all the emotion and
support that I needed and they proved to be a source of my constant extrinsic motivation.
This project would have become a futile effort in their absence. I would like to mention the
name of my teacher of Labour Law, Pallavi Shankar, who provided me not only with
technical know-how of the project but also got me through the struggles of making a project
on such an important topic. The topic has many criticisms associated with it, mostly because
of erroneous interpretation of sources but it was only because of the guidance of a real
teacher that helped me in the completion of this project.

A very special thanks to my friends who were there to support me in every possible way,
ranging from aiding me in finding the relevant materials to helping me in cracking the trick of
formatting. Their help was such that it would always be remembered by me.

At last I would like to thanks each and everyone who were there with me during the making
of this project and who helped me either directly or indirectly. Their immense contribution
means a lot to me and this journey would not have been possible in the absence of their
tireless efforts.

-Ansh Prasad
-4th Semester
-B.A LL.B
 TABLE OF CONTENT

DECLARATION BY THE CANDIDATE 2

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 3
TABLE OF CONTENT 4
INTRODUCTION 5
FACTS OF THE CASE 7
RULES AND REASONING APPLIED BY THE COURT 9
FINAL DECISION OF THE CASE 16
ANALYSIS OF THE CASE 18
CONCLUSION 22
BIBLIOGRAPHY 23
INTRODUCTION
The term “Industrial Dispute” has been defined in Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act
1947 as follows; “Industrial dispute” means any dispute or difference between employers and
employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which
is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with
the conditions of labour, of any person”1

The definition of “industrial dispute” in Industrial Disputes Act 1947 is a modified form of
“trade dispute” u/s 2 (j) of the repealed Trade Disputes Act 1929, and adds to the list of
disputes the one between the employers and employers. Therefore the definition is
comprehensive and wide enough to include all disputes or differences between employers and
employers or employers and workmen or workmen and workmen for employment and non-
employment or terms of employment or conditions of labour of a person. The definition does
not refer to “industry”. But the grammar of the expression indicates that it is a dispute in an
industry. Moreover, the use of the expressions “workmen” and “employers” in the definition
shows the requirement of “industry”.

In the case concerning ‘Workmen Of Dimakuchi Tea Estate V. The Management Of

Dimakuchi Tea Estate’ (AIR 1958 SC 353), the SC observed the principals object of
industrial dispute act 1947. The SC held in this case the principal object of Industrial Dispute
Act 1947. The question for decision in this appeal was whether a dispute raised by the
workmen’ relating to a person who was not a workman could be an industrial dispute as
defined by sec 2(k) of the industrial dispute act, 1947, as it stood before the amendments of
1956. The appellants, who were the workman of Dimakuchi Teas estate, espoused the cause
of one Dr. K. P. Benarjee, Assistant Medical officer, who was dismissed unheard with a one
month salary in advance in lieu of notice but who accepted such payment and left the garden
and the dispute was raised and was ultimately referred by the government for adjudication
under sec 10 of the Act. As Dr. K. P. Banerjee was not a workman within the meaning of the
Act, both the tribunal and the Appellate took view that this issue was not an Industrial
Dispute as defined by sec 2(k) of the Act. This case was lastly settled by the Supreme Court.

I.1 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

The aims and objectives of the study are:

1 Industrial Dispute Act, sec 2(k).

 • To understand the applicability of section 2(k) and sec 10 of the Industrial Dispute
Act.

• To understand the usage of section 2(k) and 10 in the case of Workmen Of Dimakuchi
Tea Estate V. The Management Of Dimakuchi Tea Estate AIR 1958 SC 353

I.2 HYPOTHESIS

In the course of making of this project, the researcher assumed the applicability of section
2(k) of the Industrial Dispute Act and whether or not its usage can hamper the actual outcome
of a case. The primary assumption was to discover the effect of section 2(k) and 10 of the act
on the case and to determine under what circumstance a dispute can be termed as an
industrial dispute.

I.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research methodology adopted in the project is mainly focused on doctrinal way of
research. References in the project have been taken from web journals, articles, newspaper,
websites and books. However every reference has been taken in an unplagiarized manner and
due credit has been given to each source in the bibliography section. Views have been
presented on each topic with no outsourcing of facts. Every view presented is completely
original in form of comments and the facts and other contents are interpretation of authentic
materials.

I.4 SOURCES

For the purpose of making of this project, sources utilised are books, articles, newspapers,
journals, magazines, thesis, and online sources.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The case of Workmen Of Dimakuchi Tea Estate V. The Management Of Dimakuchi Tea
Estate2 is a landmark case from the year 1958. The main or the principle issue or question
involved in this case was whether a dispute in relation to a person who is not a workman falls

2 AIR 1958 SC 353.

within the scope of the definition of industrial dispute contained in Section 2(k) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Details of the case are:

PROSECUTION: Workmen Of Dimakuchi Tea Estate

DEFENDANT: The Management Of Dimakuchi Tea Estate

COURT: Supreme Court of India

BENCH: Chief Justice S.R. Das and Justice S.K. Das

YEAR: 1958

CITATION/S: AIR 1958 SC 353., 1958 SCR 1156.

The appellants are the workmen of the Dimakuchi Tea Estate represented by the Assam Chah
Karmachari Sangha, Dibrugarh and the respondent is the management of the Dimakuchi tea
estate, district Darrang, in Assam. Dr. K. P. Banerjee was appointed assistant medical officer
of the Dimakuchi tea estate. He was appointed subject to a satisfactory medical report and on
probation for three months where his suitability for permanent employment would be
considered. If he was considered unsuitable for employment, he would receive seven days'
notice in writing terminating his appointment and if he was found guilty of misconduct, he
was liable to instant dismissal. If he was found suitable he would be confirmed in the
garden’s services. Dr. Banerjee was given increment of Rs. 5 per mensem but then he
received a letter from one Mr. Booth, manager of the tea estate where it was said that his
services were terminated but he would receive one month’s salary in lieu of notice.

On enquiring about the reasons he was told that the reasons were mainly medical and also
because of the deceitful way in which he added figures to the requirements of the last medical
indent. Dr. Banerjee’s cause was then espoused by the Mangaldai Circle of the Assam Chah
Karmachari Sangha and the secretary of that Sangha wrote to the manager of the Dimakuchi
tea estate, enquiring about the reasons for Dr. Banerjee's discharge. The manager replied that
the Chief Medical Officer, Dr. Cox had found that Dr. Banerjee was incompetent and did not
have sufficient knowledge of simple everyday microscopical and laboratory work which
befalls the lot of every assistant medical officer in tea garden practice and also he
administered a faulty Quinine injection to one of the assistants working there that almost led
to the paralysis of his leg. There were unsuccessful conciliation proceedings over the same
and finally the matter was referred to the tripartite Appellate Board. This Board
recommended that Dr. Banerjee should be reinstated with effect from the date of his
discharge. In the meantime Dr. K. P. Banerjee received a sum of Rs. 30610 from the
respondents and left the tea garden in question. However the government felt that the case
should be referred for adjudication to a Tribunal constituted under Section 7 of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947. The case referred under Section 10(1) (c) gave rise to two main issues:

· Whether the management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate was justified in dismissing Dr. K. P.
Banerjee?
· If not, is he entitled to re-instatement or any other relief in lieu thereof?3

After both parties submitted their written statements the Tribunal held that Dr. Banerjee being
not a “workman”, his case was not one of an "industrial dispute" under the Industrial
Disputes Act and his case was therefore beyond the jurisdiction of this Tribunal and the
Tribunal has therefore no jurisdiction to give any relief to him. There was then an appeal to
the Labor Appellate Tribunal of India, Calcutta which affirmed the decision by the earlier
tribunal. Hence the appellants have moved the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Indian
Constitution for special leave.

RULES AND REASONING APPLIED BY THE COURT

RULES APPLIED
· Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
· Section 2 of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

REASONING APPLIED BY THE COURT

Justice S.K. Das has said that in order to understand the scope of the definition clause of
“industrial dispute” it is firstly most essential to refer to the relevant section and its wordings.

3 Tanya Das, Workmen Of Dimakuchi Tea Estate V. The Management Of Dimakuchi Tea Estate, legal service
India (may. 20, 2020, 12:11 AM), http://www.legalservicesindia.com/article/822/Workmen-Of-Dimakuchi-Tea-
Estate-V.-The-Management-of-Dimakuchi-Tea-Estate.html
Section 2(k) reads as "Industrial dispute" means "any dispute or difference between
employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and
workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of
employment or with the conditions of labor, of any person;” The expression “workman”
which is also relevant for the purpose of this issue is defined under Section 2(s) which reads
as "Workman" means “any person employed (including an apprentice) in any industry to do
any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward and includes, for the
purposes of any proceedings under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, a workman
discharged during that dispute, but does not include any person employed in the naval,
military or air service of the Government."

The appellants have contended that the conditions referred to in the first and second parts of
Section 2(k) are clearly fulfilled in the present case, because there is a dispute or difference
over the termination of service of Dr. K. P. Banerjee and the dispute or difference is between
the employer, namely, the management of the Dimakuchi tea estate on one side, and its
workmen on the other, even taking the expression "workman" in the restricted sense as it is
defined in the Act. The appellants have also submitted that the expression "of any person"
occurring in the third part of the definition clause is expression of very wide import and cant
be restricted to the ambit of merely workmen. However the Justice said that expression “any
person” can’t mean anybody in this whole wide world because the subject matter of dispute
must relate to employment or non-employment or terms of employment or conditions of
labor of any person and these necessarily import a limitation on the term “any person”. Also
the definition clause must be read in the context of the subject matter and scheme of the Act,
and consistently with the objects and other provisions of the Act. If the term “any person” is
given its ordinary meaning, then the definition clause will be so wide as to become
inconsistent not merely with the objects and other provisions of the Act, but also with the
other parts of that very clause.

On hearing these difficulties the appellants themselves conceded that some limitations must
be put on the width of the expression "any person" and hence formulated four limitations:
· The dispute must be a real and substantial one in respect of which one of the parties to the
dispute can give relief to the other.
· The industrial dispute if raised by workmen must relate to the particular establishment or
party of establishment in which the workmen are employed.
· The dispute must relate to the employment, non-employment or the terms of employment or
with the conditions of labor of any person, but such person must be an employee discharged
or in service or a candidate for employment.
· The workmen raising the dispute must have nexus with the dispute either because they are
personally interested or because they have taken up the cause of another person in the general
interest of labor welfare.

Based on this the appellants have again contended that that the dispute in question is an
industrial dispute because the employer could give relief in the matter of the termination of
service of Dr. K. P. Banerjee, Dr. K. P. Banerjee belonged to the same establishment, namely,
the same tea garden, the dispute related to a discharged employee (though not a workman)
and the workmen raising the dispute were vitally interested in it by reason of the fact that Dr.
Banerjee belonged to their trade union and the dismissal of an employee giving him an
opportunity to meet any charge was a matter of general interest to all workmen in the same
establishment or workplace.

Justice S.K. Das reasoned that the first two limitations were obvious and implicit in the
decision itself but the third limitation was too widely stated and was not quite correct. . If the
expression "any person" in the third part of the definition clause were to be strictly equated
with “any workman” then there could be no industrial dispute, prior to 1956, with regard to a
workman who had been discharged earlier than the dispute and had ceased to be workmen,
even though the discharge itself had led to the dispute. This was the same reason why the
Legislature used the expression “any person” in the third part of the definition clause so as to
put it beyond any doubt that the non-employment of such a dismissed workman was also
within the ambit of an industrial dispute. There is a distinction between workmen and non-
workmen or any other employee. However the third limitation as formulated by appellants
ignores the distinction altogether and equates 'any person' with 'any employee' - past, present
or future which is not quite correct or consistent with the other provisions of the Act. The
fourth limitation was also too generally stated as the principle of solidarity of the labor
movement or general welfare of labor must be based on or correlated to the principle of
community of interest. If the workmen have no direct or substantial interest in the
employment or non-employment of a person or in his terms of employment or his conditions
of labor, then an industrial dispute cannot arise with regard to such person. The same
conclusion was also arrived at from a different perspective. Ordinarily, it is only the
aggrieved party who can raise a dispute; but an “industrial dispute” is put a collective basis,
because it is now settled that an individual dispute, not espoused by others of the class to
which the aggrieved party may belong, is not an industrial dispute. Hence if the dispute is a
collective dispute, the party raising the dispute must have either a direct interest in the
subject-matter of dispute or a substantial interest in same therein in the sense that the class to
which the aggrieved party belongs is substantially affected thereby.

The appellants have also drawn attention to the fact that the term “workmen” under the Trade
Unions Act, 1926 means "all persons employed in trade or industry whether or not in the
employment of the employer with whom the trade dispute arises." which clearly signified a
much wider ambit as compared to the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. But it wasn’t accepted
saying that provisions of that Act have different objects in view and can’t help in construing
the definition given under Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Justice S.K. Das has concluded his
reasoning by saying that the crucial test is one community of interest and the person
regarding whom the dispute is raised must be one in whose employment, non-employment,
terms of employment or conditions of labor the parties to the dispute have a direct or
substantial interest. Whether such direct or substantial interest has been established in a
particular case will depend on its facts and circumstances. The expression 'any person' must
be read subject to such limitations and qualifications as arise from the context and the two
crucial considerations are:
· The dispute must be a real dispute between the parties to the dispute so as to be capable of
settlement or adjudication by one party to the dispute giving necessary relief to the other.
· The person regarding whom the dispute is raised must be one in whose employment, non-
employment, terms of employment, or conditions of labor the parties to the dispute have a
direct or substantial interest.

Hence the words “any person” cannot have its widest amplitude, as that would create
incongruity and repugnancy in the provisions of the Act. Chief Justice S.R. Das was in
concurrence with the reasoning given by Justice S.K. Das. Therefore they held that Dr. K. P.
Banerjee was not a 'workman'. He belonged to the medical or technical staff which was a
different category altogether from workmen. The appellants had no direct or substantial
interest in his employment or non-employment, and even assuming that he was a member of
the same Trade Union, it cannot be said, on the tests laid down that the dispute regarding his
termination of service was an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the
Act. However Justice A. K. Sarkar was of a slightly different opinion and hence there is a
divergence seen in the reasoning offered by him. As per him the term “any person” can be
given its plain and wide meaning and it cannot be said to refer only to persons of the
workman class. As discussed earlier the Legislature had used the words "any person" instead
of the word workman because it was intended to include within them persons who had been
dismissed before the dispute arose and who were not within the definition of workmen in the
Act as it stood in 1953. However the Justice is of the view that the legislature could have
used the words "workmen and dismissed workmen”. He said that definition of "workman"
has been amended in 1956 to include workmen discharged in consequence of an industrial
dispute or whose discharge has led to that dispute but the words "any person" have been left
untouched in Section 2(k) and not been replaced by the word workman. This according to
him shows that it was never the intention to confine the words "any person" to workmen in
employment or discharged. Hence it should be given a broad and simple meaning. Section 18
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 talk about the categories of persons on whom the
settlement of the conciliation proceedings shall be binding. However it was said that section
doesn’t assist at all in finding out who were meant to be included in the words "any person"
because the fact that an award is not binding on one doesn’t afford a reason for holding that
there cannot be an industrial dispute concerning him. The idea behind it is that whoever takes
up appointment as a workman in the establishment to which the dispute relates during the
time when the award or settlement is in force, would be bound by it. If it were not so, the
award or settlement would have little effect in setting a dispute, for any newly recruited
workmen could again raise the dispute.

There were mainly three reasons advanced for restricting the general application of the term
“any person”.

· In certain sections of the Act the words "any person" have been used but there the reference
is to workmen, and therefore in Section 2(k) the words "any person" should mean persons of
the workman class.
· The scheme and the purpose of the Act generally and the object of the Act specially being to
benefit workmen, the words "any person" should be confined to people of the workman class.
· The word "dispute" in Section 2(k) itself indicates that the person raising the dispute must
be interested in the dispute and therefore since the dispute must concern the employment,
non-employment, terms of employment or the conditions of labor of a person, that person
must be of the workman class.

While rebutting these reasons, the Justice referring to the first reason said that there was no
cause to infer such an intention whatsoever. Merely because of the fact that in certain sections
like Section 2(i) which defines lockouts and Section 2(q) which defines strike use the words
person as meaning “workmen” there is no reason for concluding that the same word must be
given the same restricted meaning in Section 2(k).

Proceeding to the second reason he said that the Act makes a distinction between employees
who are workmen and all other employees, and that the focus of the Act is on workmen and it
was intended mainly for them. However he reasons that the Act would not cease to be
intended for workmen or displace its focus from workmen or that the distinction between the
workmen and the other employees would not vanish simply by virtue of the fact that a dispute
relating to the dismissal of one who is not a workman is held to be an industrial dispute.

Referring to the last reason he said that the interest that a workmen has is very vague and
difficult to define and so he asked the question that how does it follow that because an
industrial dispute is one in which workmen must be interested so it must be concerning
themselves only? It’s not necessary that an industrial dispute can only be a dispute
concerning workmen. It is not difficult to conceive of a dispute concerning the employment
of a person who is not a workman which at the same time is one which affects the conditions
of labor or terms of employment of the workmen themselves. He ends by saying that even if
an industrial dispute has to be one in which workmen are interested, that would be no reason
for saying that it can only be a dispute concerning workmen and that therefore the words "any
person" in Section 2(k) must mean only workmen.

Referring Section 33 of the Act he said that this section gives protection to workmen who are
parties to the dispute and does not purport to concern it with the person concerning whom the
dispute arises. Such being the position, the section can throw no light on the meaning of the
words "any person" in Section 2(k).
Section 36 of the Act provides how a workman who is a party is represented and how an
employer who is also a party is represented. It does not talk about the representation of any
other person. On this basis it was said that the term “any person” means only workmen.
However A. K. Sarkar reasoned saying that this merely talks about representation of the
parties in a dispute. No one else needs to be represented. Hence it doesn’t concern itself with
the person in regard of whom the dispute has arisen and so it can’t be said the term “any
person” exclusively refers to workmen.
Emphasizing on the issue of interest again, he cited an example saying that if there arose a
dispute against the dismissal of a kind and sympathetic foreman, then the workmen have a
personal and immediate interest of securing their good work conditions and would demand
the foreman’s reinstatement for their own benefit. Such a dispute is also an industrial dispute
and it would make no difference for this purpose that such a foreman is not a workman.

Therefore he held that the dispute concerning the dismissal of Dr. Banerjee would be an
industrial dispute for the workmen having sufficient personal and immediate interest in
seeing that they have a doctor of their liking to look after them. It is indeed the case of the
workmen that by his devotion to duty and good behavior Dr. Banerjee became very popular
with the workmen. He said that the Government must be left to decide in each case whether
the workmen had sufficient interest in the dispute and take necessary steps if they feel it
breaches industrial peace and also decide whether the matter has to be referred for
adjudication or not. He concludes by saying that the dispute concerning a person who is not a
workman may be an industrial dispute within Section 2(k). As it has not been said that the
dispute which is the matter of concern at the moment is for any other reason not an industrial
dispute, he held that the Industrial Tribunal had full jurisdiction to adjudicate that dispute and
should have done so.
 FINAL DECISION OF THE CASE

Chief Justice S.R. Das and Justice S.K. Das gave the majority decision saying that the appeal
of the appellants have failed and is hence dismissed but there shall be no order for costs.

On the other hand Justice A.K. Sarkar gave a minority dissenting judgment saying that the
appeal would be allowed and sent back to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication in
accordance with law.

As per the rule of law, the majority judgment prevails and hence the appeal was dismissed.
However while dealing with this issue the court has also thoroughly examined and scrutinised
the Act to determine its scope and has laid down the following to be the principal objects of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947:
· The promotion of measures for securing and preserving amity and good relations between

the employer and workmen.

· Investigation and settlement of industrial disputes, between employers and employers,

employers and workmen, or workmen and workmen, with a right of representation by a
registered trade union or federation of trade unions or association of employers or a
federation of associations of employers.
· Prevention of illegal strikes and lock-outs.

· Relief to workmen in the matter of lay-off and retrenchment.

· Promotion of collective bargaining.

· Provide machinery or authority for settlement of industrial disputes.

· Relief to workmen in case of transfer and closure of undertaking.

· Improving service conditions of labor.

ANALYSIS OF THE CASE

As we have seen above from the reasoning and decision given by the Honorable Supreme
Court the dispute in the case was not held to be one of an Industrial Dispute as within the
meaning of Section 2(k). Hence the claim of the appellants was not accepted.

However this case is a landmark case mainly for the reason that it went on to analyze and
scrutinize the important provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and has
comprehensively laid down the principal objectives of the Act.

If we look at the preamble of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it reads as “An Act to make
provision for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes, and for certain other
purposes” The scope and extent of these words “certain other purposes” was not given
anywhere, however the judiciary in this case has gone beyond the letter of the law to give it a
vast and encompassing connotation so as to bring within its fold all such issues that affect
that either the employer, employee or the relation amongst them at their workplace.

Industrial Relations are an integral part of social relations arising out of employer-employee
interaction in modern industries which are regulated by the state in varying degrees in
conjunction with the organized social forces and influenced by prevailing institutions. It
involves both individual dialogue and collective interaction. Industrial Relations are like a
coin having two sides- cooperation and conflict. This conflict can affect the economy, lead to
loss of man days, reduce the level of production and in general disrupt the industrial peace.
So to ensure the growth and progress of the industrial society, mechanisms to settle and
resolve the issues pertaining to Industrial Dispute have always been the core concern.

From the point of view of the employer, an industrial dispute resulting in stoppage of work
means a stoppage of production. Apart from the immediate economic effects, loss of prestige
and credit, alienation of the labor force, and other non-economic, psychological and social
consequences may also arise. For the employee, an industrial dispute entails loss of income.
Employees also suffer from personal injury if they indulge into strikes n picketing; and the
psychological and physical consequences of forced idleness. Prolonged stoppages of work
have also an adverse effect on the national productivity and national income as they cause
wastage of national resources. So we see that the legislative intent was to bring within the
folds of the definition all the factors that regulate affairs of industrial society.

However when this definition is looked at from a judicial perspective, it acquires a

polymorphous form. It gets a whole new meaning in every different circumstance. With
regard to the number of workers who actually constitute an industrial dispute in Central
Provinces Transport Services Ltd V. Raghunath Gopal Patwardhan,4 the Supreme Court held
that the dispute between a single employer and an employee doesn’t amount to an industrial
dispute but can take the form of an industrial dispute if the issue or cause is taken up by the
trade union to which the employee belongs or a group of employees of that industry. But
there is no indication as to how many workmen are requires for an industrial dispute. It says
that it has to be raised by a plurality of workmen. In J.K. Cotton Manufacturers Ltd. V. Uttar
Pradesh Govt,5 it was held that if an employee has to fight his cause solitarily without support
of workmen or union it is an individual dispute and not an industrial dispute. However by the
amendment in 1965 Section 2A was inserted which said that issues of an individual workman
can also amount to an industrial dispute. Following this in Tata Chemicals V. Workmen, 6 it
was held that a minority union can also raise an industrial dispute.

The term “any person” has been very much debated in the case. Although in the provision
itself the term hasn’t been given any specific limit and scope, the judiciary has gone ahead to
interpret it in a variety of ways. In Birla Brothers Ltd. v. Modak 7 it was held that the words
"any person" were not meant to refer only to workmen as defined in the Act but were wide
and general and would include others who were not such workmen. However, in Narendra
Kumar Sen v. All India Industrial Disputes (Labor Appellate) Tribunal, 8 it was held that if the
term "any person" were to be read as an expression without any limitation and qualification it
would be open to the workmen not only to raise a dispute any workman or any laborer or any
individual anywhere in the world. It must be realized how entirely untenable it is.

4 Central Provinces Transport Services Ltd V. Raghunath Gopal Patwardhan (1957) 1LLJ 27.
5 J.K. Cotton Manufacturers Ltd. V. Uttar Pradesh Govt AIR 1960 All 734.
6 Tata Chemicals V. Workmen (1978) 2LLJ 22
7 Birla Brothers Ltd. v. Modak, I.L.R. (1948) 2 Cal. 209.
8 Narendra Kumar Sen v. All India Industrial Disputes (Labor Appellate) Tribunal (1953)IILLJ6Bom.
The scope of the term workman has also been dealt in this case at great length. Section 2(s)
defines it as “any person employed (including an apprentice) in any industry to do any skilled
or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward and includes, for the purposes of any
proceedings under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, a workman discharged during
that dispute, but does not include any person employed in the naval, military or air service of
the Government." This definition was amended in 1956 by the legislature and two new
categories of work were added- supervisory and technical.

Looking at it from a judicial perspective in Sunderambal V. Government of Goa, the court

laid down that in order to be a workmen the person should satisfy the following criteria or
conditions- (i) person employed in industry for hire or reward (ii) he should be engaged in
skilled, unskilled, manual, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work (iii) he
shouldn’t be a person falling under the excluded categories of persons mentioned in Section
2(s). In Dargandra Works Chemicals Ltd V. State of Saurashtra, 9 the ambit of the term
“workman” was limited. The essential condition of a person being a workman within terms of
this definition is that he should be employed to do the work in an industry. There should be
the relationship between employer and employee of master and servant. Unless the person is
thus employed there can be no question of his being a workman within this definition.

To sum it up in a nutshell, in S.N. Rai V. Aishwanath Lal, 10 the court held that the
comprehensive purpose of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is to provide machinery for just
and equitable settlement by adjudication and amelioration of the conditions of workmen in
industry. If we take an international perspective countries like United Kingdom operates a
highly liberal labor market with the minimum of legislative intervention and administrative
'red tape'. The UK does not have a written constitution and its court system has grown in a
rather piecemeal way. However, specialist employment tribunals are empowered to hear
almost all individual disputes and they are an integrated element in the civil court structure.
The Employment Rights Act 1996, Employment Rights (Disputes Resolution) Act 1998 and
The Employment Relations Act 1999 govern the issues of industrial disputes over there.

9 Dargandra Works Chemicals Ltd V. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1957 SC 264.

10 S.N. Rai V. Aishwanath Lal AIR 1960 Pat 60.
In George Hudson Ltd. v. Australian Timber Workers' Union, 11 it was held that the very
nature of an 'industrial dispute' is to obtain new industrial conditions, not merely for the
specific individuals then working from the specific individuals then employing them, and not
for the moment only. But for the class of employees from the class of employers.

As far as the International Labor Organization is concerned the subject of disputes was
considered in 1926 by the Third International Conference of Labor Statisticians, which
adopted a resolution defining disputes and laying down detailed principles for determining
the importance of a dispute and for their classification according to the matter in dispute, the
result of the dispute, the method of settlement of the dispute, the industries affected, the
importance of the dispute and the among of wages lost by the dispute.

CONCLUSION

The National Commission on Labor, 2002 by referring to Industrial Disputes Act has said
that each sovereign state has the responsibility to protect the interests of those whom it

11 George Hudson Ltd. v. Australian Timber Workers' Union 32 C.L.R. 413.

represents. So every nation has to acquire and retain certain competitiveness to survive and
prosper in the world. Neither the interest of the poor and unemployed nor neither the interests
of the affluent can be served without competitiveness. Hence it’s become a national necessity
to acquire competitiveness and this competitiveness can’t be acquired without harmonious
relations or at least peaceful relations in the industry. Peaceful industrial relations are
therefore an imperative for the survival and progress of everyone, whether he or she is a
worker or entrepreneur or an employer or employee. Without it the economy will lag behind,
targets will not be attained and there will be general disruption of structures and plans. It has
therefore become a social and national duty to create peaceful relations among those who
constitute the backbone of industry
Hence after a detailed and careful perusal of the case, we can say that this case highlights and
deals with the one of the most indispensable and important labor legislations of the day-
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- its scope, ambit, framework, interpretation and application.
The Supreme Court has extensively dealt with the issue raised in this case. Since the concept
of labor is one of the most crucial in any society, hence after exhaustive discussions,
deliberations, arguments and consensus, the Honorable Court has delivered its judgment
which is not only reasonable and fair, but keeps up with the present labor requirements and
also upholds the principles of justice, equity and good conscience.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS:
1. Taxmann, Labour Laws.
2. S.N. Mishra, Labour industrial Laws.
ONLINE SOURCES:

1. www.indiankanoon.org
2. www.casemine.com
3. www.aironline.com
4. www.legalservicesindia.com 5. www.researchgate.net