G.R. No. L-61744 June 25, 1984 5. ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P3,000.
5. ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P3,000.00 for attomey's fees;
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN MIGUEL, BULACAN, petitioner, 
vs.
HONORABLE OSCAR C. FERNANDEZ, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, Branch IV,
Baliuag, Bulacan, The PROVINCIAL SHERIFF of Bulacan, MARGARITA D. VDA. DE IMPERIO,
ADORACION IMPERIO, RODOLFO IMPERIO, CONRADO IMPERIO, ERNESTO IMPERIO, ALFREDO
IMPERIO, CARLOS IMPERIO, JR., JUAN IMPERIO and SPOUSES MARCELO PINEDA and LUCILA
PONGCO, respondents.
Pascual C. Liatchko for petitioner.
The Solicitor General and Marcelo Pineda for respondents.
RELOVA, J.:
In Civil Case No. 604-B, entitled "Margarita D. Vda. de Imperio, et al. vs. Municipal Government of San
Miguel, Bulacan, et al.", the then Court of First Instance of Bulacan, on April 28, 1978, rendered
judgment holding herein petitioner municipality liable to private respondents, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendant Municipal Government of San Miguel Bulacan,
represented by Mayor Mar Marcelo G. Aure and its Municipal Treasurer:
1. ordering the partial revocation of the Deed of Donation signed by the deceased
Carlos Imperio in favor of the Municipality of San Miguel Bulacan, dated October 27,
1947 insofar as Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, Block 11 of Subdivision Plan Psd-20831
are concerned, with an aggregate total area of 4,646 square meters, which lots are
among those covered and described under TCT No. T-1831 of the Register of Deeds
of Bulacan in the name of the Municipal Government of San Miguel Bulacan,
2. ordering the defendant to execute the corresponding Deed of Reconveyance over
the aforementioned five lots in favor of the plaintiffs in the proportion of the undivided
one-half (½) share in the name of plaintiffs Margarita D. Vda. de Imperio, Adoracion,
Rodolfo, Conrado, Ernesto, Alfredo, Carlos, Jr. and Juan, all surnamed Imperio, and
the remaining undivided one-half (½) share in favor of plaintiffs uses Marcelo E.
Pineda and Lucila Pongco;
3. ordering the defendant municipality to pay to the plaintiffs in the proportion
mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraph the sum of P64,440.00
corresponding to the rentals it has collected from the occupants for their use and
occupation of the premises from 1970 up to and including 1975, plus interest thereon
at the legal rate from January 1970 until fully paid;
4. ordering the restoration of ownership and possession over the five lots in question
in favor of the plaintiffs in the same proportion aforementioned;
and to pay the cost of suit.
The counterclaim of the defendant is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of evidence
presented to substantiate the same.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 11-12, Rollo)
The foregoing judgment became final when herein petitioner's appeal was dismissed due to its failure to
file the record on appeal on time. The dismissal was affirmed by the then Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. SP-12118 and by this Court in G.R. No. 59938. Thereafter, herein private respondents moved for
issuance of a writ of execution for the satisfaction of the judgment. Respondent judge, on July 27, 1982,
issued an order, to wit:
Considering that an entry of judgment had already been made on June 14, 1982 in G.
R. No. L-59938 and;
Considering further that there is no opposition to plaintiffs' motion for execution dated
July 23, 1983;
Let a writ of execution be so issued, as prayed for in the aforestated motion. (p. 10,
Rollo)
Petitioner, on July 30, 1982, filed a Motion to Quash the writ of execution on the ground that the
municipality's property or funds are all public funds exempt from execution. The said motion to quash
was, however, denied by the respondent judge in an order dated August 23, 1982 and the alias writ of
execution stands in full force and effect.
On September 13, 1982, respondent judge issued an order which in part, states:
It is clear and evident from the foregoing that defendant has more than enough funds
to meet its judgment obligation. Municipal Treasurer Miguel C, Roura of San Miguel,
Bulacan and Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan Agustin O. Talavera are therefor hereby
ordered to comply with the money judgment rendered by Judge Agustin C. Bagasao
against said municipality. In like manner, the municipal authorities of San Miguel,
Bulacan are likewise ordered to desist from plaintiffs' legal possession of the property
already returned to plaintiffs by virtue of the alias writ of execution.
Finally, defendants are hereby given an inextendible period of ten (10) days from
receipt of a copy of this order by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan within
which to submit their written compliance, (p. 24, Rollo)
When the treasurers (provincial and municipal) failed to comply with the order of September 13, 1982,
respondent judge issued an order for their arrest and that they will be release only upon compliance
thereof.
Hence, the present petition on the issue whether the funds of the Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan, in The foregoing has not been followed in the case at bar.
the hands of the provincial and municipal treasurers of Bulacan and San Miguel, respectively, are public
funds which are exempt from execution for the satisfaction of the money judgment in Civil Case No. 604- ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted and the order of respondent judge, dated July 27, 1982,
B. granting issuance of a writ of execution; the alias writ of execution, dated July 27, 1982; and the order of
respondent judge, dated September 13, 1982, directing the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan and the
Well settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution. The reason for this was Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, Bulacan to comply with the money judgments, are SET ASIDE; and
explained in the case of Municipality of Paoay vs. Manaois, 86 Phil. 629 "that they are held in trust for respondents are hereby enjoined from implementing the writ of execution.
the people, intended and used for the accomplishment of the purposes for which municipal corporations
are created, and that to subject said properties and public funds to execution would materially impede, SO ORDERED.
even defeat and in some instances destroy said purpose." And, in Tantoco vs. Municipal Council of
Iloilo, 49 Phil. 52, it was held that "it is the settled doctrine of the law that not only the public property but
also the taxes and public revenues of such corporations Cannot be seized under execution against Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Gutierrez, Jr., and De la Fuente, JJ,. concur.
them, either in the treasury or when in transit to it. Judgments rendered for taxes, and the proceeds of
such judgments in the hands of officers of the law, are not subject to execution unless so declared by
statute." Thus, it is clear that all the funds of petitioner municipality in the possession of the Municipal
Treasurer of San Miguel, as well as those in the possession of the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan, are
also public funds and as such they are exempt from execution.

Besides, Presidential Decree No. 477, known as "The Decree on Local Fiscal Administration", Section 2
(a), provides:

SEC. 2. Fundamental Principles. — Local government financial affairs, transactions,

and operations shall be governed by the fundamental principles set forth hereunder:

(a) No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of a lawful
appropriation or other specific statutory authority.

xxx xxx xxx

Otherwise stated, there must be a corresponding appropriation in the form of an ordinance duly passed
by the Sangguniang Bayan before any money of the municipality may be paid out. In the case at bar, it
has not been shown that the Sangguniang Bayan has passed an ordinance to this effect.

Furthermore, Section 15, Rule 39 of the New Rules of Court, outlines the procedure for the enforcement
of money judgment:

(a) By levying on all the property of the debtor, whether real or personal, not otherwise
exempt from execution, or only on such part of the property as is sufficient to satisfy
the judgment and accruing cost, if he has more than sufficient property for the
purpose;

(b) By selling the property levied upon;

(c) By paying the judgment-creditor so much of the proceeds as will satisfy the
judgment and accruing costs; and

(d) By delivering to the judgment-debtor the excess, if any, unless otherwise, directed
by judgment or order of the court.
G.R. Nos. 89898-99 October 1, 1990
MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SALVADOR P. DE GUZMAN, JR., as Judge RTC of Makati,
Branch CXLII ADMIRAL FINANCE CREDITORS CONSORTIUM, INC., and SHERIFF SILVINO R.
PASTRANA, respondents.
Defante & Elegado for petitioner.
Roberto B. Lugue for private respondent Admiral Finance Creditors' Consortium, Inc.
RESOLUTION
CORTÉS, J.:
The present petition for review is an off-shoot of expropriation proceedings initiated by petitioner Municipality of
Makati against private respondent Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc., Home Building System & Realty
Corporation and one Arceli P. Jo, involving a parcel of land and improvements thereon located at Mayapis St., San
Antonio Village, Makati and registered in the name of Arceli P. Jo under TCT No. S-5499.
It appears that the action for eminent domain was filed on May 20, 1986, docketed as Civil Case No. 13699. Attached
to petitioner's complaint was a certification that a bank account (Account No. S/A 265-537154-3) had been opened
with the PNB Buendia Branch under petitioner's name containing the sum of P417,510.00, made pursuant to the
provisions of Pres. Decree No. 42. After due hearing where the parties presented their respective appraisal reports
regarding the value of the property, respondent RTC judge rendered a decision on June 4, 1987, fixing the appraised
value of the property at P5,291,666.00, and ordering petitioner to pay this amount minus the advanced payment of
P338,160.00 which was earlier released to private respondent.
After this decision became final and executory, private respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. This
motion was granted by respondent RTC judge. After issuance of the writ of execution, a Notice of Garnishment dated
January 14, 1988 was served by respondent sheriff Silvino R. Pastrana upon the manager of the PNB Buendia
Branch. However, respondent sheriff was informed that a "hold code" was placed on the account of petitioner. As a
result of this, private respondent filed a motion dated January 27, 1988 praying that an order be issued directing the
bank to deliver to respondent sheriff the amount equivalent to the unpaid balance due under the RTC decision dated
June 4, 1987.
Petitioner filed a motion to lift the garnishment, on the ground that the manner of payment of the expropriation amount
should be done in installments which the respondent RTC judge failed to state in his decision. Private respondent
filed its opposition to the motion.
Pending resolution of the above motions, petitioner filed on July 20, 1988 a "Manifestation" informing the court that
private respondent was no longer the true and lawful owner of the subject property because a new title over the
property had been registered in the name of Philippine Savings Bank, Inc. (PSB) Respondent RTC judge issued an
order requiring PSB to make available the documents pertaining to its transactions over the subject property, and the
PNB Buendia Branch to reveal the amount in petitioner's account which was garnished by respondent sheriff. In
compliance with this order, PSB filed a manifestation informing the court that it had consolidated its ownership over
the property as mortgagee/purchaser at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale held on April 20, 1987. After several
conferences, PSB and private respondent entered into a compromise agreement whereby they agreed to divide
between themselves the compensation due from the expropriation proceedings.
Respondent trial judge subsequently issued an order dated September 8, 1988 which: (1) approved the compromise
agreement; (2) ordered PNB Buendia Branch to immediately release to PSB the sum of P4,953,506.45 which
corresponds to the balance of the appraised value of the subject property under the RTC decision dated June 4,
1987, from the garnished account of petitioner; and, (3) ordered PSB and private respondent to execute the
necessary deed of conveyance over the subject property in favor of petitioner. Petitioner's motion to lift the
garnishment was denied.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was duly opposed by private respondent. On the other hand, for
failure of the manager of the PNB Buendia Branch to comply with the order dated September 8, 1988, private
respondent filed two succeeding motions to require the bank manager to show cause why he should not be held in
contempt of court. During the hearings conducted for the above motions, the general manager of the PNB Buendia
Branch, a Mr. Antonio Bautista, informed the court that he was still waiting for proper authorization from the PNB
head office enabling him to make a disbursement for the amount so ordered. For its part, petitioner contended that its
funds at the PNB Buendia Branch could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in
the disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required under the law, citing the case of Republic
of the Philippines v. Palacio [G.R. No. L-20322, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 899].
Respondent trial judge issued an order dated December 21, 1988 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration on
the ground that the doctrine enunciated in Republic v. Palacio did not apply to the case because petitioner's PNB
Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 was an account specifically opened for the expropriation proceedings of the subject
property pursuant to Pres. Decree No. 42. Respondent RTC judge likewise declared Mr. Antonio Bautista guilty of
contempt of court for his inexcusable refusal to obey the order dated September 8, 1988, and thus ordered his arrest
and detention until his compliance with the said order.
Petitioner and the bank manager of PNB Buendia Branch then filed separate petitions for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, which were eventually consolidated. In a decision promulgated on June 28, 1989, the Court of Appeals
dismissed both petitions for lack of merit, sustained the jurisdiction of respondent RTC judge over the funds contained
in petitioner's PNB Account No. 265-537154-3, and affirmed his authority to levy on such funds.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals, petitioner now files the present petition for
review with prayer for preliminary injunction.
On November 20, 1989, the Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent RTC judge,
respondent sheriff, and their representatives, from enforcing and/or carrying out the RTC order dated December 21,
1988 and the writ of garnishment issued pursuant thereto. Private respondent then filed its comment to the petition,
while petitioner filed its reply.
Petitioner not only reiterates the arguments adduced in its petition before the Court of Appeals, but also alleges for
the first time that it has actually two accounts with the PNB Buendia Branch, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 — exclusively for the expropriation of the subject property,
with an outstanding balance of P99,743.94.
(2) Account No. S/A 263-530850-7 — for statutory obligations and other purposes of the
municipal government, with a balance of P170,098,421.72, as of July 12, 1989.
xxx xxx xxx
[Petition, pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 11-12.]
Because the petitioner has belatedly alleged only in this Court the existence of two bank accounts, it may fairly be full possession and utilizing the property for public purpose, for three (3) years, the Court finds that the municipality
asked whether the second account was opened only for the purpose of undermining the legal basis of the assailed has had more than reasonable time to pay full compensation.
orders of respondent RTC judge and the decision of the Court of Appeals, and strengthening its reliance on the
doctrine that public funds are exempted from garnishment or execution as enunciated in Republic v. Palacio [supra.]
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to ORDER petitioner Municipality of Makati to immediately pay Philippine Savings
At any rate, the Court will give petitioner the benefit of the doubt, and proceed to resolve the principal issues
Bank, Inc. and private respondent the amount of P4,953,506.45. Petitioner is hereby required to submit to this Court
presented based on the factual circumstances thus alleged by petitioner.
a report of its compliance with the foregoing order within a non-extendible period of SIXTY (60) DAYS from the date
of receipt of this resolution.
Admitting that its PNB Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 was specifically opened for expropriation proceedings it had
initiated over the subject property, petitioner poses no objection to the garnishment or the levy under execution of the
The order of respondent RTC judge dated December 21, 1988, which was rendered in Civil Case No. 13699, is SET
funds deposited therein amounting to P99,743.94. However, it is petitioner's main contention that inasmuch as the
ASIDE and the temporary restraining order issued by the Court on November 20, 1989 is MADE PERMANENT.
assailed orders of respondent RTC judge involved the net amount of P4,965,506.45, the funds garnished by
respondent sheriff in excess of P99,743.94, which are public funds earmarked for the municipal government's other
statutory obligations, are exempted from execution without the proper appropriation required under the law. SO ORDERED.

There is merit in this contention. The funds deposited in the second PNB Account No. S/A 263-530850-7 are public
funds of the municipal government. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy
and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute [Republic v. Palacio, supra.; The Commissioner of Public
Highways v. San Diego, G.R. No. L-30098, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 616]. More particularly, the properties of a
municipality, whether real or personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at execution
sale to satisfy a money judgment against the municipality. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and
market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities
and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution [See Viuda De Tan Toco v. The Municipal Council of
Iloilo, 49 Phil. 52 (1926): The Municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Norte v. Manaois, 86 Phil. 629 (1950); Municipality of San
Miguel, Bulacan v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 61744, June 25, 1984, 130 SCRA 56]. The foregoing rule finds application in
the case at bar. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating from
its public funds an amount corresponding to the balance due under the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987, less the
sum of P99,743.94 deposited in Account No. S/A 265-537154-3, no levy under execution may be validly effected on
the public funds of petitioner deposited in Account No. S/A 263-530850-7.
Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left with no legal recourse. Where a municipality
fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the
claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary
appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds therefor [See Viuda De Tan Toco v.
The Municipal Council of Iloilo, supra; Baldivia v. Lota, 107 Phil. 1099 (1960); Yuviengco v. Gonzales, 108 Phil. 247
(1960)].
In the case at bar, the validity of the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987 is not disputed by petitioner. No appeal was
taken therefrom. For three years now, petitioner has enjoyed possession and use of the subject property
notwithstanding its inexcusable failure to comply with its legal obligation to pay just compensation. Petitioner has
benefited from its possession of the property since the same has been the site of Makati West High School since the
school year 1986-1987. This Court will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from
expropriation proceedings it had in fact initiated. It cannot be over-emphasized that, within the context of the State's
inherent power of eminent domain,
. . . [j]ust compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the
owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking.
Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for the property owner is
made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to
wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss
[Cosculluela v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77765, August 15, 1988, 164 SCRA
393, 400. See also Provincial Government of Sorsogon v. Vda. de Villaroya, G.R. No. 64037,
August 27, 1987, 153 SCRA 291].
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Facts: Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private respondents,
Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After proceedings, the RTC of Makati determined the cost
of the said land which the petitioner must pay to the private respondents amounting to P5,291,666.00
minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00. It issued the corresponding writ of execution
accompanied with a writ of garnishment of funds of the petitioner which was deposited in PNB.
However, such order was opposed by petitioner through a motion for reconsideration, contending that
its funds at the PNB could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in
the disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required under the law, citing the
case of Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio.The RTC dismissed such motion, which was appealed to
the Court of Appeals; the latter affirmed said dismissal and petitioner now filed this petition for review.
Issue: Whether or not funds of the Municipality of Makati are exempt from garnishment and levy
upon execution. 
Held: It is petitioner's main contention that the orders of respondent RTC judge involved the net amount of
P4,965,506.45, wherein the funds garnished by respondent sheriff are in excess of P99,743.94, which are public fund
and thereby are exempted from execution without the proper appropriation required under the law. There is merit in
this contention. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution,
unless otherwise provided for by statute. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which
are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the
municipality, are exempt from execution. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an
ordinance appropriating the said amount from its public funds deposited in their PNB account, no levy under
execution may be validly effected. However, this court orders petitioner to pay for the said land which has been in
their use already. This Court will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from
expropriation of land they are already enjoying. The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised within the
bounds of fair play and justice. 
.

The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice. In the case at
bar, considering that valuable property has been taken, the compensation to be paid fixed and the municipality is in
G.R. No. L-31635 August 31, 1971
ANGEL MINISTERIO and ASUNCION SADAYA, petitioners, 
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, Fourth Branch, Presided by the Honorable, Judge JOSE C.
BORROMEO, THE PUBLIC HIGHWAY COMMISSIONER, and THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondents.
Eriberto Seno for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting First Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor
Norberto P. Eduardo for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
What is before this Court for determination in this appeal by certiorari to review a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu is the question of whether or not plaintiffs, now petitioners, seeking the just compensation to which
they are entitled under the Constitution for the expropriation of their property necessary for the widening of a street,
no condemnation proceeding having been filed, could sue defendants Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor
General, in their capacity as public officials without thereby violating the principle of government immunity from suit
without its consent. The lower court, relying on what it considered to be authoritative precedents, held that they could
not and dismissed the suit. The matter was then elevated to us. After a careful consideration and with a view to
avoiding the grave inconvenience, not to say possible injustice contrary to the constitutional mandate, that would be
the result if no such suit were permitted, this Court arrives at a different conclusion, and sustains the right of the
plaintiff to file a suit of this character. Accordingly, we reverse.
Petitioners as plaintiffs in a complaint filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, dated April 13, 1966, sought the
payment of just compensation for a registered lot, containing an area of 1045 square meters, alleging that in 1927 the
National Government through its authorized representatives took physical and material possession of it and used it
for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue, a national road, Cebu City, without paying just compensation and without
any agreement, either written or verbal. There was an allegation of repeated demands for the payment of its price or
return of its possession, but defendants Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General refused to restore its
possession. It was further alleged that on August 25, 1965, the appraisal committee of the City of Cebu approved
Resolution No. 90, appraising the reasonable and just price of Lot No. 647-B at P50.00 per square meter or a total
price of P52,250.00. Thereafter, the complaint was amended on June 30, 1966 in the sense that the remedy prayed
for was in the alternative, either the restoration of possession or the payment of the just compensation.
In the answer filed by defendants, now respondents, through the then Solicitor General, now Associate Justice,
Antonio P. Barredo, the principal defense relied upon was that the suit in reality was one against the government and
therefore should be dismissed, no consent having been shown. Then on July 11, 1969, the parties submitted a
stipulation of facts to this effect: "That the plaintiffs are the registered owners of Lot 647-B of the Banilad estate
described in the Survey plan RS-600 GLRO Record No. 5988 and more particularly described in Transfer Certificate
of Title No. RT-5963 containing an area of 1,045 square meters; That the National Government in 1927 took
possession of Lot 647-B Banilad estate, and used the same for the widening of Gorordo Avenue; That the Appraisal
Committee of Cebu City approved Resolution No. 90, Series of 1965 fixing the price of Lot No. 647-B at P50.00 per
square meter; That Lot No. 647-B is still in the possession of the National Government the same being utilized as part
of the Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City, and that the National Government has not as yet paid the value of the land which
is being utilized for public use."1
The lower court decision now under review was promulgated on January 30, 1969. As is evident from the excerpt to
be cited, the plea that the suit was against the government without its consent having been manifested met with a
favorable response. Thus: "It is uncontroverted that the land in question is used by the National Government for road
purposes. No evidence was presented whether or not there was an agreement or contract between the government
and the original owner and whether payment was paid or not to the original owner of the land. It may be presumed
that when the land was taken by the government the payment of its value was made thereafter and no satisfactory
explanation was given why this case was filed only in 1966. But granting that no compensation was given to the
owner of the land, the case is undoubtedly against the National Government and there is no showing that the
government has consented to be sued in this case. It may be contended that the present case is brought against the
Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General and not against the National Government. Considering that
the herein defendants are sued in their official capacity the action is one against the National Government who should
have been made a party in this case, but, as stated before, with its consent."2
Then came this petition for certiorari to review the above decision. The principal error assigned would impugn the
holding that the case being against the national government which was sued without its consent should be dismissed,
as it was in fact dismissed. As was indicated in the opening paragraph of this opinion, this assignment of error is
justified. The decision of the lower court cannot stand. We shall proceed to explain why.
1. The government is immune from suit without its consent.3 Nor is it indispensable that it be the party proceeded
against. If it appears that the action, would in fact hold it liable, the doctrine calls for application. It follows then that
even if the defendants named were public officials, such a principle could still be an effective bar. This is clearly so
where a litigation would result in a financial responsibility for the government, whether in the disbursements of funds
or loss of property. Under such circumstances, the liability of the official sued is not personal. The party that could be
adversely affected is government. Hence the defense of non-suability may be interposed.4
So it has been categorically set forth in Syquia v. Almeda Lopez:5 "However, and this is important, where the
judgment in such a case would result not only in the recovery of possession of the property in favor of said citizen but
also in a charge against or financial liability to the Government, then the suit should be regarded as one against the
government itself, and, consequently, it cannot prosper or be validly entertained by the courts except with the consent
of said Government."6
2. It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law
and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of
Telecommunications v. Aligean:7 "Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts
of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one
whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State
within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in
equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the
State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an
assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that
the State may not be sued without its consent."8
3. It would follow then that the prayer in the amended complaint of petitioners being in the alternative, the lower court,
instead of dismissing the same, could have passed upon the claim of plaintiffs there, now petitioners, for the recovery
of the possession of the disputed lot, since no proceeding for eminent domain, as required by the then Code of Civil
Procedure, was instituted.9 However, as noted in Alfonso v. Pasay City, 10 this Court speaking through Justice
Montemayor, restoration would be "neither convenient nor feasible because it is now and has been used for road
purposes." 11 The only relief, in the opinion of this Court, would be for the government "to make due
compensation, ..." 12 It was made clear in such decision that compensation should have been made "as far back as
the date of the taking." Does it result, therefore, that petitioners would be absolutely remediless since recovery of
possession is in effect barred by the above decision? If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for
property taken for public use 13 were to be respected, as it should, then a suit of this character should not be
summarily dismissed. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating
an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a
complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after
tender to the party entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon the land
so condemned" to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment." 14 If there were an observance of
procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely
because there was a failure to abide by what the law requires, the government would stand to benefit. It is just as
important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be
maintained. It is not too much to say that when the government takes any property for public use, which is
conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to
the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately
invoked. 15
Accordingly, the lower court decision is reversed so that the court may proceed with the complaint and determine the
compensation to which petitioners are entitled, taking into account the ruling in the above Alfonso case: "As to the
value of the property, although the plaintiff claims the present market value thereof, the rule is that to determine due
compensation for lands appropriated by the Government, the basis should be the price or value at the time that it was
taken from the owner and appropriated by the Government." 16
WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of January 30, 1969 dismissing the complaint is reversed and the case
remanded to the lower court for proceedings in accordance with law.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., and Barredo, J., took no part.
FACTS: Petitioners sought the payment of just compensation for a registered lot alleging that in 1927 the National Government
through its authorized representatives took physical and material possession of it and used it for the widening of a national
road, without paying just compensation and without any agreement, either written or verbal. There was an allegation of
repeated demands for the payment of its price or return of its possession, but defendants Public Highway Commissioner and
the Auditor General refused to restore its possession.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants are immune from suit.
HOLDING: NO. Where the judgment in such a case would result not only in the recovery of possession of the property in favor
of said citizen but also in a charge against or financial liability to the Government, then the suit should be regarded as one
against the government itself, and, consequently, it cannot prosper or be validly entertained by the court except with the
consent of said Government. In as much as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government
officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded
or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State
from suit.
NOTE: When the government takes any property for public use, which is condition upon the payment of just compensation, to
be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. The Court may proceed with the
complaint and determine the compensation to which the petitioner are entitle
(Ministerio vs.CFI, 40 SCRA 464)
G.R. No. 206510               September 16, 2014
MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, Vicar Apostolic of Puerto Princesa D.D.; MOST REV. DEOGRACIAS S.
INIGUEZ, JR., Bishop-Emeritus of Caloocan, FRANCES Q. QUIMPO, CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR.,
Kalikasan-PNE, MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., Bagong Alyansang Makabayan,
HON. NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, Bayan Muna Partylist, ROLAND G. SIMBULAN, PH.D., Junk VF A
Movement, TERESITA R. PEREZ, PH.D., HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, Kabataan Party-list, PETER SJ.
GONZALES, Pamalakaya, GIOVANNI A. TAPANG, PH. D., Agham, ELMER C. LABOG, Kilusang Mayo Uno,
JOAN MAY E. SALVADOR, Gabriela, JOSE ENRIQUE A. AFRICA, THERESA A. CONCEPCION, MARY JOAN A.
GUAN, NESTOR T. BAGUINON, PH.D., A. EDSEL F. TUPAZ, Petitioners,  a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.1âwphi1
vs.
SCOTT H. SWIFT in his capacity as Commander of the US. 7th Fleet, MARK A. RICE in his capacity as
Commanding Officer of the USS Guardian, PRESIDENT BENIGNO S. AQUINO III in his capacity as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, HON. ALBERT F. DEL ROSARIO, Secretary,
pepartment of Foreign Affair.s, HON. PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Executiv~.:Secretary, Office of the President, .
HON. VOLTAIRE T. GAZMIN, Secretary, Department of National Defense, HON. RAMON JESUS P. P AJE,
Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resoz!rces, VICE ADMIRAL JOSE LUIS M. ALANO,
Philippine Navy Flag Officer in Command, Armed Forces of the Philippines, ADMIRAL RODOLFO D. ISO
RENA, Commandant, Philippine Coast Guard, COMMODORE ENRICO EFREN EVANGELISTA, Philippine
Coast Guard Palawan, MAJOR GEN. VIRGILIO 0. DOMINGO, Commandant of Armed Forces of the Philippines
Command and LT. GEN. TERRY G. ROBLING, US Marine Corps Forces. Pacific and Balikatan 2013 Exercise
Co-Director, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR, J.:
Before us is a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) under Rule 7 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, otherwise known as the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases (Rules), involving violations of environmental laws and regulations in relation to
the grounding of the US military ship USS Guardian over the Tubbataha Reefs.
Factual Background
present and future generations." Under the "no-take" policy, entry into the waters of TRNP is strictly regulated and
many human activities are prohibited and penalized or fined, including fishing, gathering, destroying and disturbing
the resources within the TRNP. The law likewise created the Tubbataha Protected Area Management Board
(TPAMB) which shall be the sole policy-making and permit-granting body of the TRNP.
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December 2012, the US
Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel "to enter and exit the territorial waters
of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance,
and crew liberty."4 On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On
January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South
Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No cine was injured in the incident, and
there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
On January 20, 2013, U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott Swift, expressed regret for the incident in a
press statement.5 Likewise, US Ambassador to the Philippines Harry K. Thomas, Jr., in a meeting at the Department
of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on February 4, "reiterated his regrets over the grounding incident and assured Foreign
Affairs Secretazy Albert F. del Rosario that the United States will provide appropriate compensation for damage to
the reef caused by the ship."6 By March 30, 2013, the US Navy-led salvage team had finished removing the last piece
of the grounded ship from the coral reef.
On April 1 7, 2013, the above-named petitioners on their behalf and in representation of their respective
sector/organization and others, including minors or generations yet unborn, filed the present petition agairtst Scott H.
Swift in his capacity as Commander of the US 7th Fleet, Mark A. Rice in his capacity as Commanding Officer of the
USS Guardian and Lt. Gen. Terry G. Robling, US Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and Balikatan 2013 Exercises Co-
Director ("US respondents"); President Benigno S. Aquino III in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), DF A Secretary Albert F. Del Rosario, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr.,
Secretary Voltaire T. Gazmin (Department of National Defense), Secretary Jesus P. Paje (Department of
Environment and Natural Resources), Vice-Admiral Jose Luis M. Alano (Philippine Navy Flag Officer in Command,
AFP), Admiral Rodolfo D. Isorena (Philippine Coast Guard Commandant), Commodore Enrico Efren Evangelista
(Philippine Coast Guard-Palawan), and Major General Virgilio 0. Domingo (AFP Commandant), collectively the
"Philippine respondents."

The name "Tubbataha" came from the Samal (seafaring people of southern Philippines) language which means "long
The Petition
reef exposed at low tide." Tubbataha is composed of two huge coral atolls - the north atoll and the south atoll - and
the Jessie Beazley Reef, a smaller coral structure about 20 kilometers north of the atolls. The reefs of Tubbataha and
Jessie Beazley are considered part of Cagayancillo, a remote island municipality of Palawan.1 Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and
continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan,
Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which
In 1988, Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park by virtue of Proclamation No. 306 issued by President
events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology. They also seek a directive from this
Corazon C. Aquino on August 11, 1988. Located in the middle of Central Sulu Sea, 150 kilometers southeast of
Court for the institution of civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of environmental laws
Puerto Princesa City, Tubbataha lies at the heart of the Coral Triangle, the global center of marine biodiversity.
and regulations in connection with the grounding incident.

In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
Specifically, petitioners cite the following violations committed by US respondents under R.A. No. 10067:
as a World Heritage Site. It was recognized as one of the Philippines' oldest ecosystems, containing excellent
unauthorized entry (Section 19); non-payment of conservation fees (Section 21 ); obstruction of law enforcement
examples of pristine reefs and a high diversity of marine life. The 97,030-hectare protected marine park is also an
officer (Section 30); damages to the reef (Section 20); and destroying and disturbing resources (Section 26[g]).
important habitat for internationally threatened and endangered marine species. UNESCO cited Tubbataha's
Furthermore, petitioners assail certain provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) which they want this Court
outstanding universal value as an important and significant natural habitat for in situ conservation of biological
to nullify for being unconstitutional.
diversity; an example representing significant on-going ecological and biological processes; and an area of
exceptional natural beauty and aesthetic importance.2
The numerous reliefs sought in this case are set forth in the final prayer of the petition, to wit: WHEREFORE, in view
of the foregoing, Petitioners respectfully pray that the Honorable Court: 1. Immediately issue upon the filing of this
On April 6, 2010, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067,3 otherwise known as the "Tubbataha Reefs
petition a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) and/or a Writ of Kalikasan, which shall, in particular,
Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009" "to ensure the protection and conservation of the globally significant economic,
biological, sociocultural, educational and scientific values of the Tubbataha Reefs into perpetuity for the enjoyment of
a. Order Respondents and any person acting on their behalf, to cease and desist all operations over the
Guardian grounding incident;
b. Initially demarcating the metes and bounds of the damaged area as well as an additional buffer zone;
c. Order Respondents to stop all port calls and war games under 'Balikatan' because of the absence of
clear guidelines, duties, and liability schemes for breaches of those duties, and require Respondents to
assume responsibility for prior and future environmental damage in general, and environmental damage
under the Visiting Forces Agreement in particular.
d. Temporarily define and describe allowable activities of ecotourism, diving, recreation, and limited
commercial activities by fisherfolk and indigenous communities near or around the TRNP but away from the
damaged site and an additional buffer zone;
2. After summary hearing, issue a Resolution extending the TEPO until further orders of the Court;
3. After due proceedings, render a Decision which shall include, without limitation:
a. Order Respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, following the dispositive portion of Nicolas v. Romulo,
"to forthwith negotiate with the United States representatives for the appropriate agreement on
[environmental guidelines and environmental accountability] under Philippine authorities as provided in Art.
V[] of the VFA ... "
b. Direct Respondents and appropriate agencies to commence administrative, civil, and criminal
proceedings against erring officers and individuals to the full extent of the law, and to make such
proceedings public;
c. Declare that Philippine authorities may exercise primary and exclusive criminal jurisdiction over erring
U.S. personnel under the circumstances of this case;
d. Require Respondents to pay just and reasonable compensation in the settlement of all meritorious
claims for damages caused to the Tubbataha Reef on terms and conditions no less severe than those
applicable to other States, and damages for personal injury or death, if such had been the case;
e. Direct Respondents to cooperate in providing for the attendance of witnesses and in the collection and
production of evidence, including seizure and delivery of objects connected with the offenses related to the
grounding of the Guardian;
f. Require the authorities of the Philippines and the United States to notify each other of the disposition of
all cases, wherever heard, related to the grounding of the Guardian;
g. Restrain Respondents from proceeding with any purported restoration, repair, salvage or post salvage
plan or plans, including cleanup plans covering the damaged area of the Tubbataha Reef absent a just
settlement approved by the Honorable Court;
h. Require Respondents to engage in stakeholder and LOU consultations in accordance with the Local
Government Code and R.A. 10067;
i. Require Respondent US officials and their representatives to place a deposit to the TRNP Trust Fund
defined under Section 17 of RA 10067 as a bona .fide gesture towards full reparations;
j. Direct Respondents to undertake measures to rehabilitate the areas affected by the grounding of the
Guardian in light of Respondents' experience in the Port Royale grounding in 2009, among other similar
grounding incidents;
k. Require Respondents to regularly publish on a quarterly basis and in the name of transparency and
accountability such environmental damage assessment, valuation, and valuation methods, in all stages of
negotiation;
l. Convene a multisectoral technical working group to provide scientific and technical support to the
TPAMB;
m. Order the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of National Defense, and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to review the Visiting Forces Agreement and the Mutual Defense
Treaty to consider whether their provisions allow for the exercise of erga omnes rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology and for damages which follow from any violation of those rights;
n. Narrowly tailor the provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement for purposes of protecting the damaged
areas of TRNP;
o. Declare the grant of immunity found in Article V ("Criminal Jurisdiction") and Article VI of the Visiting
Forces Agreement unconstitutional for violating equal protection and/or for violating the preemptory norm of
nondiscrimination incorporated as part of the law of the land under Section 2, Article II, of the Philippine
Constitution;
p. Allow for continuing discovery measures;
q. Supervise marine wildlife rehabilitation in the Tubbataha Reefs in all other respects; and
4. Provide just and equitable environmental rehabilitation measures and such other reliefs as are just and
equitable under the premises.7 (Underscoring supplied.)
Since only the Philippine respondents filed their comment8 to the petition, petitioners also filed a motion for early
resolution and motion to proceed ex parte against the US respondents.9
Respondents' Consolidated Comment
In their consolidated comment with opposition to the application for a TEPO and ocular inspection and production
orders, respondents assert that: ( 1) the grounds relied upon for the issuance of a TEPO or writ of Kalikasan have
become fait accompli as the salvage operations on the USS Guardian were already completed; (2) the petition is
defective in form and substance; (3) the petition improperly raises issues involving the VFA between the Republic of
the Philippines and the United States of America; and ( 4) the determination of the extent of responsibility of the US
Government as regards the damage to the Tubbataha Reefs rests exdusively with the executive branch.
The Court's Ruling
As a preliminary matter, there is no dispute on the legal standing of petitioners to file the present petition.
Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."10 Specifically, it is "a party's personal
and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result" of the act being
challenged, and "calls for more than just a generalized grievance."11 However, the rule on standing is a procedural
matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when
the public interest so requires, such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.12
In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,13 we recognized the "public right" of citizens to "a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental
law." We declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is
assumed, like other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and
it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.1âwphi1 Such right carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.14
On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do
ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in
representation of their own and future generations. Thus:
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty
in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class
suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as
hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.
Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present
a:: well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that
rhythm and harmony for the full 1:njoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors'
assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to
ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.15 (Emphasis supplied.)
The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn, is
now enshrined in the Rules which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases. The provision on citizen
suits in the Rules "collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are
stewards of nature."16
Having settled the issue of locus standi, we shall address the more fundamental question of whether this Court has
jurisdiction over the US respondents who did not submit any pleading or manifestation in this case.
The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-suability of the State,17is
expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution which states:
Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.
In United States of America v. Judge Guinto,18 we discussed the principle of state immunity from suit, as follows:
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now · expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987
Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of
our land under Article II, Section 2. x x x.
Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under
the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such principles are deemed
incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of
nations. Upon its admission to such society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its
relations with other states.
As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by Justice Holmes that
''there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends." [Kawanakoa v.
Polybank, 205 U.S. 349] There are other practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the
foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in
parem, non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A
contrary disposition would, in the language of a celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of nations." [De Haber v.
Queen of Portugal, 17 Q. B. 171]
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to
complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The
rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the
same,. such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be
regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. [Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA
120] In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the comp.taint on the ground that it has been filed without its
consent.19 (Emphasis supplied.)
Under the American Constitution, the doctrine is expressed in the Eleventh Amendment which reads:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.
In the case of Minucher v. Court of Appeals,20 we further expounded on the immunity of foreign states from the
jurisdiction of local courts, as follows:
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary
international law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit and, with the
emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of the head of state, or his representative, but
also distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit arc those of a foreign
government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official
capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a
representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the
benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim -par in parem, non habet imperium
-that all states are soverr~ign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication, in broad terms,
is that if the judgment against an official would rec 1uire the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the
award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be
regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded.21 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the same case we also mentioned that in the case of diplomatic immunity, the privilege is not an immunity from the
observance of the law of the territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity from the
exercise of territorial jurisdiction.22
In United States of America v. Judge Guinto,23 one of the consolidated cases therein involved a Filipino employed at
Clark Air Base who was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by two officers of the US Air Force, and
was eventually dismissed from his employment when he was charged in court for violation of R.A. No. 6425. In a
complaint for damages filed by the said employee against the military officers, the latter moved to dismiss the case on
the ground that the suit was against the US Government which had not given its consent. The RTC denied the motion
but on a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed before this Court, we reversed the RTC and dismissed the
complaint. We held that petitioners US military officers were acting in the exercise of their official functions when they
conducted the buy-bust operation against the complainant and thereafter testified against him at his trial. It follows
that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable
to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.
This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without
the former's consent or waiver has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and governmental
acts (Jure imperil") from private, commercial and proprietary acts (Jure gestionis). Under the restrictive rule of State
immunity, State immunity extends only to acts Jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only
when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or
economic affairs.24
In Shauf v. Court of Appeals,25 we discussed the limitations of the State immunity principle, thus:
It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and
injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by JustiGe Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of
Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al. : "Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers,
unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or
officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit
against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action
at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming
to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional
act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the
constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent." The rationale for this ruling is that the
doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
xxxx
The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and
may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.
The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in
their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the
powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope
of his authority or jurisdiction.26 (Emphasis supplied.) In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official
capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its
crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was
committed while they we:re performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against
said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be
one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over
the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the conduct of the US in
this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP
reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). He explained that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their
flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules
and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latter's internal waters and the territorial sea.
According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy
the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the "traditional uses of the oceans" as codified in
UNCLOS, as can be gleaned from previous declarations by former Presidents Reagan and Clinton, and the US
judiciary in the case of United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd.27
The international law of the sea is generally defined as "a body of treaty rules arid customary norms governing the
uses of the sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over maritime regimes. It is a branch
of public international law, regulating the relations of states with respect to the uses of the oceans."28 The UNCLOS is
a multilateral treaty which was opened for signature on December 10, 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. It was ratified
by the Philippines in 1984 but came into force on November 16, 1994 upon the submission of the 60th ratification.
The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks to balance State sovereignty (mare clausum) and
the principle of freedom of the high seas (mare liberum).29 The freedom to use the world's marine waters is one of the
oldest customary principles of international law.30 The UNCLOS gives to the coastal State sovereign rights in varying
degrees over the different zones of the sea which are: 1) internal waters, 2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4)
exclusive economic zone, and 5) the high seas. It also gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction over foreign
vessels depending on where the vessel is located.31
Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the Coastal State exercises sovereignty, subject to the
UNCLOS and other rules of international law. Such sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as
well as to its bed and subsoil.32
In the case of warships,33 as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the
following exceptions:
Article 30
Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the
territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require
it to leave the territorial sea immediately.
Article 31
Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship
or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting from the
non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and
regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this
Convention or other rules of international law.
Article 32
Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes
With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in this Convention affects
the immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes. (Emphasis supplied.)
A foreign warship's unauthorized entry into our internal waters with resulting damage to marine resources is one
situation in which the above provisions may apply. But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS,
as in this case, the US?
An overwhelming majority - over 80% -- of nation states are now members of UNCLOS, but despite this the US, the
world's leading maritime power, has not ratified it.
While the Reagan administration was instrumental in UNCLOS' negotiation and drafting, the U.S. delegation
ultimately voted against and refrained from signing it due to concerns over deep seabed mining technology transfer
provisions contained in Part XI. In a remarkable, multilateral effort to induce U.S. membership, the bulk of UNCLOS
member states cooperated over the succeeding decade to revise the objection.able provisions. The revisions
satisfied the Clinton administration, which signed the revised Part XI implementing agreement in 1994. In the fall of
1994, President Clinton transmitted UNCLOS and the Part XI implementing agreement to the Senate requesting its
advice and consent. Despite consistent support from President Clinton, each of his successors, and an ideologically
diverse array of stakeholders, the Senate has since withheld the consent required for the President to internationally
bind the United States to UNCLOS.
While UNCLOS cleared the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) during the 108th and 110th Congresses, its
progress continues to be hamstrung by significant pockets of political ambivalence over U.S. participation in
international institutions. Most recently, 111 th Congress SFRC Chairman Senator John Kerry included "voting out"
UNCLOS for full Senate consideration among his highest priorities. This did not occur, and no Senate action has
been taken on UNCLOS by the 112th Congress.34
Justice Carpio invited our attention to the policy statement given by President Reagan on March 10, 1983 that the US
will "recognize the rights of the other , states in the waters off their coasts, as reflected in the convention [UNCLOS],
so long as the rights and freedom of the United States and others under international law are recognized by such
coastal states", and President Clinton's reiteration of the US policy "to act in a manner consistent with its [UNCLOS]
provisions relating to traditional uses of the oceans and to encourage other countries to do likewise." Since Article 31
relates to the "traditional uses of the oceans," and "if under its policy, the US 'recognize[s] the rights of the other
states in the waters off their coasts,"' Justice Carpio postulates that "there is more reason to expect it to recognize the
rights of other states in their internal waters, such as the Sulu Sea in this case."
As to the non-ratification by the US, Justice Carpio emphasizes that "the US' refusal to join the UN CLOS was
centered on its disagreement with UN CLOS' regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans
and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind," pointing out that such "has nothing to do with its [the US']
acceptance of customary international rules on navigation."
It may be mentioned that even the US Navy Judge Advocate General's Corps publicly endorses the ratification of the
UNCLOS, as shown by the following statement posted on its official website:
The Convention is in the national interest of the United States because it establishes stable maritime zones, including
a maximum outer limit for territorial seas; codifies innocent passage, transit passage, and archipelagic sea lanes
passage rights; works against "jurisdictiomtl creep" by preventing coastal nations from expanding their own maritime
zones; and reaffirms sovereign immunity of warships, auxiliaries anJ government aircraft.
xxxx
Economically, accession to the Convention would support our national interests by enhancing the ability of the US to
assert its sovereign rights over the resources of one of the largest continental shelves in the world. Further, it is the
Law of the Sea Convention that first established the concept of a maritime Exclusive Economic Zone out to 200
nautical miles, and recognized the rights of coastal states to conserve and manage the natural resources in this
Zone.35
We fully concur with Justice Carpio's view that non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will
disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect
the US to bear "international responsibility" under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which
adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our long-time ally and trading partner,
which has been actively supporting the country's efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its
obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship while transiting our internal waters. Much less can we
comprehend a Government exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS
directive for all nations to cooperate in the global task to protect and preserve the marine environment as provided in
Article 197, viz:
Article 197
Cooperation on a global or regional basis
States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent
international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and recommended practices
and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking
into account characteristic regional features.
In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute. Although the said treaty
upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the.latter's territorial sea, the
flag States shall be required to leave the territorial '::;ea immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the
Coastal State, and they will be liable for damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated
for non-commercial purposes under Article 31.
Petitioners argue that there is a waiver of immunity from suit found in the VFA. Likewise, they invoke federal statutes
in the US under which agencies of the US have statutorily waived their immunity to any action. Even under the
common law tort claims, petitioners asseverate that the US respondents are liable for negligence, trespass and
nuisance.
We are not persuaded.
The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and personnel visiting the Philippines
to promote "common security interests" between the US and the Philippines in the region. It provides for the
guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the United States and the
Philippine government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and
exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.36 The invocation of US federal tort laws and even common law is
thus improper considering that it is the VF A which governs disputes involving US military ships and crew navigating
Philippine waters in pursuance of the objectives of the agreement.
As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil
actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17,
Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be
filed separately:
SEC. 17. Institution of separate actions.-The filing of a petition for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan shall not
preclude the filing of separate civil, criminal or administrative actions.
In any case, it is our considered view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction
provisions of the VF A to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would
be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan. We also find it unnecessary at this point to
determine whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages
which have resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages, including
the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the
criminal action charging the same violation of an environmental law.37
Section 15, Rule 7 enumerates the reliefs which may be granted in a petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan, to
wit:
SEC. 15. Judgment.-Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision, the court shall render
judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from committing acts or neglecting the
performance of a duty in violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental destruction or damage;
(b) Directing the respondent public official, govemment agency, private person or entity to protect,
preserve, rehabilitate or restore the environment;
 (c) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity to monitor strict
compliance with the decision and orders of the court;
(d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or private person or entity to make periodic
reports on the execution of the final judgment; and
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology or to the
protection, preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, except the award of damages to
individual petitioners. (Emphasis supplied.)
We agree with respondents (Philippine officials) in asserting that this petition has become moot in the sense that the
salvage operation sought to be enjoined or restrained had already been accomplished when petitioners sought
recourse from this Court. But insofar as the directives to Philippine respondents to protect and rehabilitate the coral
reef stn icture and marine habitat adversely affected by the grounding incident are concerned, petitioners are entitled
to these reliefs notwithstanding the completion of the removal of the USS Guardian from the coral reef. However, we
are mindful of the fact that the US and Philippine governments both expressed readiness to negotiate and discuss the
matter of compensation for the damage caused by the USS Guardian. The US Embassy has also declared it is
closely coordinating with local scientists and experts in assessing the extent of the damage and appropriate methods
of rehabilitation.
Exploring avenues for settlement of environmental cases is not proscribed by the Rules. As can be gleaned from the
following provisions, mediation and settlement are available for the consideration of the parties, and which dispute
resolution methods are encouraged by the court, to wit:
RULE3
xxxx
SEC. 3. Referral to mediation.-At the start of the pre-trial conference, the court shall inquire from the parties if they
have settled the dispute; otherwise, the court shall immediately refer the parties or their counsel, if authorized by their
clients, to the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) unit for purposes of mediation. If not available, the court shall refer
the case to the clerk of court or legal researcher for mediation.
Mediation must be conducted within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of referral to
mediation.
The mediation report must be submitted within ten (10) days from the expiration of the 30-day period.
SEC. 4. Preliminary conference.-If mediation fails, the court will schedule the continuance of the pre-trial. Before the
scheduled date of continuance, the court may refer the case to the branch clerk of court for a preliminary conference
for the following purposes:
(a) To assist the parties in reaching a settlement;
xxxx
SEC. 5. Pre-trial conference; consent decree.-The judge shall put the parties and their counsels under oath, and they
shall remain under oath in all pre-trial conferences.
The judge shall exert best efforts to persuade the parties to arrive at a settlement of the dispute. The judge may issue
a consent decree approving the agreement between the parties in accordance with law, morals, public order and
public policy to protect the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology.
xxxx
SEC. 10. Efforts to settle.- The court shall endeavor to make the parties to agree to compromise or settle in
accordance with law at any stage of the proceedings before rendition of judgment. (Underscoring supplied.)
The Court takes judicial notice of a similar incident in 2009 when a guided-missile cruiser, the USS Port Royal, ran
aground about half a mile off the Honolulu Airport Reef Runway and remained stuck for four days. After spending
$6.5 million restoring the coral reef, the US government was reported to have paid the State of Hawaii $8.5 million in
settlement over coral reef damage caused by the grounding.38
To underscore that the US government is prepared to pay appropriate compensation for the damage caused by the
USS Guardian grounding, the US Embassy in the Philippines has announced the formation of a US interdisciplinary
scientific team which will "initiate discussions with the Government of the Philippines to review coral reef rehabilitation
options in Tubbataha, based on assessments by Philippine-based marine scientists." The US team intends to "help
assess damage and remediation options, in coordination with the Tubbataha Management Office, appropriate
Philippine government entities, non-governmental organizations, and scientific experts from Philippine universities."39
A rehabilitation or restoration program to be implemented at the cost of the violator is also a major relief that may be
obtained under a judgment rendered in a citizens' suit under the Rules, viz:
RULES
SECTION 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit.-If warranted, the court may grant to the plaintiff proper reliefs which shall include
the protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the environment and the payment of attorney's fees, costs of suit and
other litigation expenses. It may also require the violator to submit a program of rehabilitation or restoration of the
environment, the costs of which shall be borne by the violator, or to contribute to a special trust fund for that purpose
subject to the control of the court.1âwphi1
In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive Branch on the matter of compensation and
rehabilitation measures through diplomatic channels. Resolution of these issues impinges on our relations with
another State in the context of common security interests under the VFA. It is settled that "[t]he conduct of the foreign
relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative-"the political"
--departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not
subject to judicial inquiry or decision."40
On the other hand, we cannot grant the additional reliefs prayed for in the petition to order a review of the VFA and to
nullify certain immunity provisions thereof.
As held in BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Exec. Sec. Zamora,41 the VFA was duly concurred in by the
Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and certified by the duly
authorized representative of the United States government. The VF A being a valid and binding agreement, the
parties are required as a matter of international law to abide by its terms and provisions.42 The present petition under
the Rules is not the proper remedy to assail the constitutionality of its provisions. WHEREFORE, the petition for the
issuance of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan is hereby DENIED.
 FACTS:
                The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December 2012, the
US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel “to enter and exit the territorial
waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment,
maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13,
2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.
                On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia.
On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South
Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and
there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
                Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and
continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan,
Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which
events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.
2. Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS Guardian.
3. Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case.
 
HELD:
First issue: YES.
Petitioners have legal standing
                Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” Specifically, it is “a party’s
personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result” of the act
being challenged, and “calls for more than just a generalized grievance.” However, the rule on standing is a procedural
matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when
the public interest so requires, such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
                In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the “public right” of citizens to “a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental
law.” We declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is
assumed, like other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind
and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
                On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only
do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in
representation of their own and future generations.
Second issue: YES.
 
                The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had
control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate
grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were performing official military duties.
Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation
of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity
therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
                During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the conduct of the
US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the
TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit
as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases
where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage
through the latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea.
                In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy sovereign
immunity subject to the following exceptions:
Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the
territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require
it to leave the territorial sea immediately.
Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other government ship operated for
non-commercial purposes
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting from the
non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and
regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this
Convention or other rules of international law.
Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes
                With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in this Convention
affects the immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes. A foreign
warship’s unauthorized entry into our internal waters with resulting damage to marine resources is
one situation in which the above provisions may apply.
But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?
According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy
the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the “traditional uses of the oceans” as codified in
UNCLOS.
Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that “the US refusal to join the UNCLOS was centered on its disagreement with
UNCLOS” regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by
mankind,” pointing out that such “has nothing to do with its the US’ acceptance of customary international rules on
navigation.”

The Court also fully concurred with Justice Carpio’s view that non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that
the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. We
thus expect the US to bear “international responsibility” under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian
grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our long-time ally and
trading partner, which has been actively supporting the country’s efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would
shirk from its obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship while transiting our internal waters. Much
less can we comprehend a Government exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to comply with the
UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in the global task to protect and preserve the marine environment as
provided in Article 197 of UNCLOS

Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis

States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent
international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and recommended
practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine
environment, taking into account characteristic regional features.

In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute. Although
the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while
navigating the latter’s territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial sea
immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for
damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated for non-commercial
purposes under Article 31.

Third issue: NO.

                The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil
actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule
7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed
separately.

                The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction
provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would
be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.

                The Court also found  unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of State immunity is
indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have resulted from the violation of environmental
laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067,
in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the same violation of an
environmental law.
G.R. No. 74135 May 28, 1992 In response to the complaint, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss anchored on three grounds:

M. H. WYLIE and CAPT. JAMES WILLIAMS, petitioners,  1. Defendants M. H. Wylie and Capt. James Williams acted in the performance of their official
vs. functions as officers of the United States Navy and are, therefore, immune from suit;
AURORA I. RARANG and THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.
2. The United States Naval Base is an instrumentality of the US government which cannot be
sued without its consent; and

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: 3. This Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter as well as the parties in this case.
(Record on Appeal, pp. 133-134)
The pivotal issue in this petition centers on the extent of the "immunity from suit" of the officials of a United States
Naval Base inside Philippine territory. The motion was, however, denied.

In February, 1978, petitioner M. H. Wylie was the assistant administrative officer while petitioner Capt. James
Williams was the commanding officer of the U. S. Naval Base in Subic Bay, Olongapo City. Private respondent
Aurora I. Rarang was an employee in the office of the Provost Marshal assigned as merchandise control guard.
M. H. Wylie, in his capacity as assistant administrative officer of the U.S. Naval Station supervised the publication of
the "Plan of the Day" (POD) which was published daily by the US Naval Base station. The POD featured important
announcements, necessary precautions, and general matters of interest to military personnel. One of the regular
features of the POD was the "action line inquiry." On February 3, 1978, the POD published, under the "NAVSTA
ACTION LINE INQUIRY" the following:
Question: I have observed that Merchandise Control inspector/inspectress are (sic) consuming
for their own benefit things they have confiscated from Base Personnel. The observation is even
more aggravated by consuming such confiscated items as cigarettes and food stuffs PUBLICLY.
This is not to mention "Auring" who is in herself, a disgrace to her division and to the Office of the
Provost Marshal. In lieu of this observation, may I therefore, ask if the head of the Merchandise
Control Division is aware of this malpractice?
In their answer, the defendants reiterated the lack of jurisdiction of the court over the case.
In its decision, the trial court ruled that the acts of defendants M. H. Wylie and Cpt. James Williams were not official
acts of the government of the United States of America in the operation and control of the Base but personal and
tortious acts which are exceptions to the general rule that a sovereign country cannot be sued in the court of another
country without its consent. In short, the trial court ruled that the acts and omissions of the two US officials were not
imputable against the US government but were done in the individual and personal capacities of the said officials.
The trial court dismissed the suit against the US Naval Base. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants
jointly and severally, as follows:
1) Ordering defendants M. H. Wylie and Capt. James Williams to pay the plaintiff Aurora Rarang
the sum of one hundred thousand (P100,000.00) pesos by way of moral and exemplary
damages;

2) Ordering defendants M. H. Wylie and Capt. James Williams to pay the plaintiff the sum of thirty
Answer: Merchandise Control Guards and all other personnel are prohibited from appropriating
thousand (P30,000.00) pesos by way of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and
confiscated items for their own consumption or use. Two locked containers are installed at the
Main Gate area for deposit of confiscated items and the OPM evidence custodian controls
access to these containers. 3) To pay the costs of this suit.

Merchandise Control Guards are permitted to eat their meals at their worksite due to heavy Counterclaims are dismissed.
workload. Complaints regarding merchandise control guards procedure or actions may be made
directly at the Office of the Provost Marshal for immediate and necessary action. Specific dates
Likewise, the suit against the U.S. Naval Base is ordered dismissed. (Record on Appeal, p. 154)
and time along with details of suspected violations would be most appreciated. Telephone 4-
3430/4-3234 for further information or to report noted or suspected irregularities. Exhibits E & E-
1. (Rollo, pp. 11-12) On appeal, the petitioners reiterated their stance that they are immune from suit since the subject publication was
made in their official capacities as officers of the U. S. Navy. They also maintained that they did not intentionally and
maliciously cause the questioned publication.
The private respondent was the only one who was named "Auring" in the Office of the Provost Marshal. That the
private respondent was the same "Auring" referred to in the POD was conclusively proven when on February 7, 1978,
petitioner M. H. Wylie wrote her a letter of apology for the "inadvertent" publication. The private respondent then The private respondent, not satisfied with the amount of damages awarded to her, also appealed the trial court's
commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of Zambales (now Regional Trial Court) against  decision.
M. H. Wylie, Capt. James Williams and the U. S. Naval Base. She alleged that the article constituted false, injurious,
and malicious defamation and libel tending to impeach her honesty, virtue and reputation exposing her to public
hatred, contempt and ridicule; and that the libel was published and circulated in the English language and read by Acting on these appeals, the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, modified the trial court's decision,
almost all the U. S. Naval Base personnel. She prayed that she be awarded P300,000.00 as moral damages; to wit:
exemplary damages which the court may find proper; and P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court below is modified so that the defendants are ordered to
pay the plaintiff, jointly and severally, the sum of P175,000.00 as moral damages and the sum of
 P60,000.00 as exemplary damages. The rest of the judgment appealed from is hereby
affirmed in toto. Costs against the defendants-appellants. (Rollo, p. 44)
The appellate court denied a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners.
Hence, this petition.
In a resolution dated March 9, 1987, we gave due course to the petition.
The petitioners persist that they made the questioned publication in the performance of their official functions as
administrative assistant, in the case of M. H. Wylie, and commanding officer, in the case of Capt. James Williams of
the US Navy assigned to the U. S. Naval Station, Subic Bay, Olongapo City and were, therefore, immune from suit for
their official actions.
In the case of United States of America v. Guinto (182 SCRA 644 [1990]), we discussed the principle of the state
immunity from suit as follows:
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in Article XVI, Section
3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we
have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2.
xxx xxx xxx
Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of
international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the
majority of states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a
condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission to
such society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations
with other states.
As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by
Justice Holmes that "there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on
which the right depends." (Kawanakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349) There are other practical
reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state sought to be
impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem,
non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one
another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of a celebrated case, "unduly vex the
peace of nations." (Da Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 17 Q. B. 171)
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in
the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the
state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the
amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against
the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. (Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA
120) In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has
been filed without its consent.
The doctrine is sometimes derisively called "the royal prerogative of dishonesty" because of the
privilege it grants the state to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-
suability. That is hardly fair, at least in democratic societies, for the state is not an unfeeling
tyrant unmoved by the valid claims of its citizens. In fact, the doctrine is not absolute and does
not say the state may not be sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, the rule says that
the state may not be sued without its consent, which clearly imports that it may be sued if it
consents.
The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or impliedly. Express consent
may be embodied in a general law or a special law. Consent is implied when the state enters into
a contract it itself commences litigation.
xxx xxx xxx
The above rules are subject to qualification. Express consent is effected only by the will of the
legislature through the medium of a duly enacted statute. (Republic v. Purisima, 78 SCRA 470)
We have held that not all contracts entered into by the government will operate as a waiver of its
non-suability; distinction must be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts. (United
States of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487) As for the filing of a complaint by the government,
suability will result only where the government is claiming affirmative relief from the defendant.
(Lim v. Brownell, 107 Phil. 345) (at pp. 652-655)
In the same case we had opportunity to discuss extensively the nature and extent of immunity from suit of United
States personnel who are assigned and stationed in Philippine territory, to wit:
In the case of the United States of America, the customary rule of international law on state
immunity is expressed with more specificity in the RP-US Bases Treaty. Article III thereof
provides as follows:
It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the rights, power and
authority within the bases which are necessary for the establishment, use,
operation and defense thereof or appropriate for the control thereof and all
the rights, power and authority within the limits of the territorial waters and air
space adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, the bases which are necessary to
provide access to them or appropriate for their control.
The petitioners also rely heavily on Baer v. Tizon, (57 SCRA 1) along with several other
decisions, to support their position that they are not suable in the cases below, the United States
not having waived its sovereign immunity from suit. It is emphasized that in Baer, the Court held:
The invocation of the doctrine of immunity from suit of a foreign state without
its consent is appropriate. More specifically, insofar as alien armed forces is
concerned, the starting point is Raquiza v. Bradford, a 1945 decision. In
dismissing a habeas corpus petition for the release of petitioners confined by
American army authorities, Justice Hilado, speaking for the Court,
cited Coleman v. Tennessee, where it was explicitly declared: "It is well
settled that a foreign army, permitted to march through a friendly country or
to be stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt
from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place." Two years later, in Tubb
and Tedrow v. Griess, this Court relied on the ruling in Raquiza
v. Bradford and cited in support thereof excerpts from the works of the
following authoritative writers: Vattel, Wheaton, Hall, Lawrence, Oppenheim,
Westlake, Hyde, and McNair and Lauterpacht. Accuracy demands the
clarification that after the conclusion of the Philippine-American Military
Bases Agreement, the treaty provisions should control on such matter, the
assumption being that there was a manifestation of the submission to
jurisdiction on the part of the foreign power whenever appropriate. More to
the point is Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, where plaintiffs as lessors sued the
 Commanding General of the United States Army in the Philippines, seeking contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its
the restoration to them of the apartment buildings they owned leased to the sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval
United States armed forces station in the Manila area. A motion to dismiss base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the
on the ground of non-suability was filed and upheld by respondent Judge. Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order;
The matter was taken to this Court in a mandamus proceeding. It failed. It they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
was the ruling that respondent Judge acted correctly considering that the
"action must be considered as one against the U.S. Government." The
The other petitioners in the cases before us all aver they have acted in the discharge of their
opinion of Justice Montemayor continued: "It is clear that the courts of the
official functions as officers or agents of the United States. However, this is a matter of evidence.
Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila have no jurisdiction over
The charges against them may not be summarily dismissed on their mere assertion that their
the present case for unlawful detainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction
acts are imputable to the United States of America, which has not given its consent to be sued.
was raised and interposed at the very beginning of the action. The U.S.
In fact, the defendants are sought to be held answerable for personal torts in which the United
Government has not given its consent to the filing of this suit which is
States itself is not involved. If found liable, they and they alone must satisfy the judgment. (At pp.
essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case
655-658)
of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latter's
consent but it is of a citizen filing an action against a foreign government
without said government's consent, which renders more obvious the lack of In the light of these precedents, we proceed to resolve the present case.
jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The principles of law behind this rule
are so elementary and of such general acceptance that we deem it
The POD was published under the direction and authority of the commanding officer, U.S. Naval Station Subic Bay.
unnecessary to cite authorities in support thereof."
The administrative assistant, among his other duties, is tasked to prepare and distribute the POD. On February 3,
1978, when the questioned article was published in the POD, petitioner Capt. James Williams was the commanding
xxx xxx xxx officer while petitioner M.H. Wylie was the administrative assistant of the US Naval Station at Subic bay.

It bears stressing at this point that the above observations do not confer on the United States of
America a blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the
other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely because they
have acted as agents of the United States in the discharge of their official functions.
There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, will be deemed to
have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private
capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no
such waiver may be implied. This was our ruling in United States of America v. Ruiz, (136 SCRA
487) where the transaction in question dealt with the improvement of the wharves in the naval
installation at Subic Bay. As this was a clearly governmental function, we held that the contract
did not operate to divest the United States of its sovereign immunity from suit. In the words of
Justice Vicente Abad Santos:
The NAVSTA ACTION LINE INQUIRY is a regular feature of the POD. It is a telephone answering device in the office
of the Administrative Assistant. The Action Line is intended to provide personnel access to the Commanding Officer
on matters they feel should be brought to his attention for correction or investigation. The matter of inquiry may be
phoned in or mailed to the POD. (TSN, September 9, 1980, pp. 12-13, Jerry Poblon) According to 
M. H. Wylie, the action line naming "Auring" was received about three (3) weeks prior to its being published in the
POD on February 3, 1978. It was forwarded to Rarang's office of employment, the Provost Marshal, for comment.
The Provost Marshal office's response ". . . included a short note stating that if the article was published, to remove
the name." (Exhibit 8-A, p. 5) The Provost Marshal's response was then forwarded to the executive officer and to the
commanding officer for approval. The approval of the Commanding officer was forwarded to the office of the
Administrative Assistant for inclusion in the POD. A certain Mrs. Dologmodin, a clerk typist in the office of the
Administrative Assistant prepared the smooth copy of the POD. Finally, M. H. Wylie, the administrative assistant
signed the smooth copy of the POD but failed to notice the reference to "Auring" in the action line inquiry. (Exh. 8-A,
pp. 4-5, Questions Nos. 14-15).

There is no question, therefore, that the two (2) petitioners actively participated in screening the features and articles
The traditional rule of immunity excepts a State from being sued in the courts
in the POD as part of their official functions. Under the rule that U.S. officials in the performance of their official
of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary
functions are immune from suit, then it should follow that the petitioners may not be held liable for the questioned
consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States.
publication.
However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly
developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have
multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them –– between sovereign It is to be noted, however, that the petitioners were sued in their personal capacities for their alleged tortious acts in
and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary publishing a libelous article.
acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to
acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule
The question, therefore, arises –– are American naval officers who commit a crime or tortious act while discharging
in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in Western
official functions still covered by the principle of state immunity from suit? Pursuing the question further, does the
Europe.
grant of rights, power, and authority to the United States under the RP-US Bases Treaty cover immunity of its officers
from crimes and torts? Our answer is No.
xxx xxx xxx
Killing a person in cold blood while on patrol duty, running over a child while driving with reckless imprudence on an
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the official trip, or slandering a person during office hours could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement. Our
proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its laws and, we presume, those of the United States do not allow the commission of crimes in the name of official duty.
commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be
said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed
The case of Chavez v. Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 282 [1991] gives the law on immunity from suit of public officials:
to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business
 The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to
have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where
there is showing of bad faith.
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, the petitioner's argument that the immunity proviso under Section 4(a) of Executive
Order No. 1 also extends to him is not well-taken. A mere invocation of the immunity clause does
not ipso facto result in the charges being automatically dropped.
It may be argued that Captain James Williams as commanding officer of the naval base is far removed in the chain of
command from the offensive publication and it would be asking too much to hold him responsible for everything which
goes wrong on the base. This may be true as a general rule. In this particular case, however, the records show that
the offensive publication was sent to the commanding officer for approval and he approved it. The factual findings of
the two courts below are based on the records. The petitioners have shown no convincing reasons why our usual
respect for the findings of the trial court and the respondent court should be withheld in this particular case and why
their decisions should be reversed.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code prescribes a civil liability for damages caused by a person's act or omission constituting
fault or negligence, to wit:

In the case of Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Peña (159 SCRA 556 [1988]
then Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, added a clarification of the immunity accorded PCGG
officials under Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1 as follows:
With respect to the qualifications expressed by Mr. Justice Feliciano in his
separate opinion, I just wish to point out two things: First, the main opinion
does not claim absolute immunity for the members of the Commission. The
cited section of Executive Order No. 1 provides the Commission's members
immunity from suit thus: "No civil action shall lie against the Commission or
any member thereof for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task
contemplated by this order." No absolute immunity like that sought by
Mr. Marcos in his Constitution for himself and his subordinates is herein
involved. It is understood that the immunity granted the members of the
Commission by virtue of the unimaginable magnitude of its task to recover
the plundered wealth and the State's exercise of police power was immunity
from liability for damages in the official discharge of the task granted the
members of the Commission much in the same manner that judges are
immune from suit in the official discharge of the functions of their office.
. . . (at pp. 581-582)
xxx xxx xxx
Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a
privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. (id., at page 586)
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission, causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
"Fault" or "negligence" in this Article covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character,
whether intentional or voluntary or negligent." (Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 191 SCRA 195 [1990]).
Moreover, Article 2219(7) of the Civil Code provides that moral damages may be recovered in case of libel, slander or
any other form of defamation. In effect, the offended party in these cases is given the right to receive from the guilty
party moral damages for injury to his feelings and reputation in addition to punitive or exemplary damages. (Occena
v. Icamina, 181 SCRA 328 [1990]). In another case, Heirs of Basilisa Justiva v. Gustilo, 7 SCRA 72 [1963], we ruled
that the allegation of forgery of documents could be a defamation, which in the light of Article 2219(7) of the Civil
Code could by analogy be ground for payment of moral damages, considering the wounded feelings and besmirched
reputation of the defendants.
Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the POD dated February 3, 1978 is a defamation against the character
and reputation of the private respondent. Petitioner Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the Provost Marshal
explicitly recommended the deletion of the name Auring if the article were published. The petitioners, however, were
negligent because under their direction they issued the publication without deleting the name "Auring." Such act or
omission is ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty. It was a tortious act which ridiculed the private respondent.
As a result of the petitioners' act, the private respondent, according to the record, suffered besmirched reputation,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, specially so, since the article was baseless and false. The
petitioners, alone, in their personal capacities are liable for the damages they caused the private respondent.

Where the petitioner exceeds his authority as Solicitor General, acts in bad faith, or, as
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision and resolution of the then Intermediate
contended by the private respondent, "maliciously conspir(es) with the PCGG commissioners in
Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, are AFFIRMED.
persecuting respondent Enrile by filing against him an evidently baseless suit in derogation of the
latter's constitutional rights and liberties" (Rollo, p. 417), there can be no question that a
complaint for damages does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another. The Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.
actions governed by Articles 19, 20, 21, and 32 of the Civil Code on Human Relations may be
taken against public officers or private citizens alike. . . . (pp. 289-291)
Feliciano, J., took no part.

We apply the same ruling to this case.

The subject article in the US Newsletter POD dated February 3, 1978 mentions a certain "Auring" as ". . a disgrace to
her division and to the Office of the Provost Marshal." The same article explicitly implies that Auring was consuming
and appropriating for herself confiscated items like cigarettes and foodstuffs. There is no question that the Auring
alluded to in the Article was the private respondent as she was the only Auring in the Office of the Provost Marshal.
Moreover, as a result of this article, the private respondent was investigated by her supervisor. Before the article
came out, the private respondent had been the recipient of commendations by her superiors for honesty in the
performance of her duties.
G.R. No. 208566               November 19, 2013 direct federal budgets in favor of their districts.5 While the advent of refrigeration has made the actual pork
barrel obsolete, it persists in reference to political bills that "bring home the bacon" to a legislator‘s district
and constituents.6 In a more technical sense, "Pork Barrel" refers to an appropriation of government
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE
spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's
and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners, 
district.7Some scholars on the subject further use it to refer to legislative control of local appropriations.8
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of
PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF Members of the Legislature,9 although, as will be later discussed, its usage would evolve in reference to
REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE certain funds of the Executive.
HOUSE, Respondents.
II. History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
x-----------------------x
A. Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972).
G.R. No. 208493
Act 3044,10 or the Public Works Act of 1922, is considered11 as the earliest form of
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,  "Congressional Pork Barrel" in the Philippines since the utilization of the funds appropriated
vs. therein were subjected to post-enactment legislator approval. Particularly, in the area of fund
HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HONORABLE FELICIANO S. release, Section 312 provides that the sums appropriated for certain public works projects13 "shall
BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents. be distributed x x x subject to the approval of a joint committee elected by the Senate and the
House of Representatives. "The committee from each House may also authorize one of its
members to approve the distribution made by the Secretary of Commerce and
x-----------------------x
Communications."14 Also, in the area of fund realignment, the same section provides that the said
secretary, "with the approval of said joint committee, or of the authorized members thereof, may,
G.R. No. 209251 for the purposes of said distribution, transfer unexpended portions of any item of appropriation
under this Act to any other item hereunder."
PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial Board Member -Province of
Marinduque, Petitioner,  In 1950, it has been documented15 that post-enactment legislator participation broadened from
vs. the areas of fund release and realignment to the area of project identification. During that year,
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT the mechanics of the public works act was modified to the extent that the discretion of choosing
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents. projects was transferred from the Secretary of Commerce and Communications to legislators.
"For the first time, the law carried a list of projects selected by Members of Congress, they ‘being
the representatives of the people, either on their own account or by consultation with local
DECISION officials or civil leaders.‘"16 During this period, the pork barrel process commenced with local
government councils, civil groups, and individuals appealing to Congressmen or Senators for
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: projects. Petitions that were accommodated formed part of a legislator‘s allocation, and the
amount each legislator would eventually get is determined in a caucus convened by the majority.
The amount was then integrated into the administration bill prepared by the Department of Public
"Experience is the oracle of truth."1 Works and Communications. Thereafter, the Senate and the House of Representatives added
their own provisions to the bill until it was signed into law by the President – the Public Works
-James Madison Act.17 In the 1960‘s, however, pork barrel legislation reportedly ceased in view of the stalemate
between the House of Representatives and the Senate.18
Before the Court are consolidated petitions2 taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. Due to the complexity of the subject matter, the Court shall heretofore B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986).
discuss the system‘s conceptual underpinnings before detailing the particulars of the constitutional challenge.
While the previous" Congressional Pork Barrel" was apparently discontinued in 1972 after Martial
The Facts Law was declared, an era when "one man controlled the legislature,"19 the reprieve was only
temporary. By 1982, the Batasang Pambansa had already introduced a new item in the General
Appropriations Act (GAA) called the" Support for Local Development Projects" (SLDP) under the
I. Pork Barrel: General Concept. article on "National Aid to Local Government Units". Based on reports,20 it was under the SLDP
that the practice of giving lump-sum allocations to individual legislators began, with each
"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American -English origin.3 Historically, its usage may be traced to the assemblyman receiving ₱500,000.00. Thereafter, assemblymen would communicate their project
degrading ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed with pork to a multitude of black slaves who would cast their preferences to the Ministry of Budget and Management for approval. Then, the said ministry
famished bodies into the porcine feast to assuage their hunger with morsels coming from the generosity of would release the allocation papers to the Ministry of Local Governments, which would, in turn,
their well-fed master.4 This practice was later compared to the actions of American legislators in trying to issue the checks to the city or municipal treasurers in the assemblyman‘s locality. It has been
further reported that "Congressional Pork Barrel" projects under the SLDP also began to cover
 not only public works projects, or so- called "hard projects", but also "soft projects",21 or non-
public works projects such as those which would fall under the categories of, among others,
education, health and livelihood.22
C. Post-Martial Law Era:
Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (1986-1992).
After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and the restoration of Philippine democracy,
"Congressional Pork Barrel" was revived in the form of the "Mindanao Development Fund" and
the "Visayas Development Fund" which were created with lump-sum appropriations of ₱480
Million and ₱240 Million, respectively, for the funding of development projects in the Mindanao
and Visayas areas in 1989. It has been documented23 that the clamor raised by the Senators and
the Luzon legislators for a similar funding, prompted the creation of the "Countrywide
Development Fund" (CDF) which was integrated into the 1990 GAA24 with an initial funding of
₱2.3 Billion to cover "small local infrastructure and other priority community projects."
Under the GAAs for the years 1991 and 1992,25 CDF funds were, with the approval of the
President, to be released directly to the implementing agencies but "subject to the submission of
the required list of projects and activities."Although the GAAs from 1990 to 1992 were silent as to
the amounts of allocations of the individual legislators, as well as their participation in the
identification of projects, it has been reported26 that by 1992, Representatives were receiving
₱12.5 Million each in CDF funds, while Senators were receiving ₱18 Million each, without any
limitation or qualification, and that they could identify any kind of project, from hard or
infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, and buildings to "soft projects" such as textbooks,
medicines, and scholarships.27
D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (1992-1998).
The following year, or in 1993,28 the GAA explicitly stated that the release of CDF funds was to
be made upon the submission of the list of projects and activities identified by, among others,
individual legislators. For the first time, the 1993 CDF Article included an allocation for the Vice-
President.29 As such, Representatives were allocated ₱12.5 Million each in CDF funds, Senators,
₱18 Million each, and the Vice-President, ₱20 Million.
In 1994,30 1995,31 and 1996,32 the GAAs contained the same provisions on project identification
and fund release as found in the 1993 CDF Article. In addition, however, the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) was directed to submit reports to the Senate Committee on
Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations on the releases made from the funds.33
Under the 199734 CDF Article, Members of Congress and the Vice-President, in consultation with
the implementing agency concerned, were directed to submit to the DBM the list of 50% of
projects to be funded from their respective CDF allocations which shall be duly endorsed by (a)
the Senate President and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, in the case of the Senate,
and (b) the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on
Appropriations, in the case of the House of Representatives; while the list for the remaining 50%
was to be submitted within six (6) months thereafter. The same article also stated that the project
list, which would be published by the DBM,35 "shall be the basis for the release of funds" and that
"no funds appropriated herein shall be disbursed for projects not included in the list herein
required."
The following year, or in 1998,36 the foregoing provisions regarding the required lists and
endorsements were reproduced, except that the publication of the project list was no longer
required as the list itself sufficed for the release of CDF Funds.
The CDF was not, however, the lone form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" at that time. Other
forms of "Congressional Pork Barrel" were reportedly fashioned and inserted into the GAA (called
"Congressional Insertions" or "CIs") in order to perpetuate the ad ministration‘s political
agenda.37 It has been articulated that since CIs "formed part and parcel of the budgets of
executive departments, they were not easily identifiable and were thus harder to monitor."
Nonetheless, the lawmakers themselves as well as the finance and budget officials of the
implementing agencies, as well as the DBM, purportedly knew about the insertions.38 Examples
of these CIs are the Department of Education (DepEd) School Building Fund, the Congressional
Initiative Allocations, the Public Works Fund, the El Niño Fund, and the Poverty Alleviation
Fund.39 The allocations for the School Building Fund, particularly, ―shall be made upon prior
consultation with the representative of the legislative district concerned.”40 Similarly, the
legislators had the power to direct how, where and when these appropriations were to be spent.41
E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (1998-2001).
In 1999,42 the CDF was removed in the GAA and replaced by three (3) separate forms of CIs,
namely, the "Food Security Program Fund,"43 the "Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program
Fund,"44and the "Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program Fund,"45 all of which
contained a special provision requiring "prior consultation" with the Member s of Congress for the
release of the funds.
It was in the year 200046 that the "Priority Development Assistance Fund" (PDAF) appeared in
the GAA. The requirement of "prior consultation with the respective Representative of the
District" before PDAF funds were directly released to the implementing agency concerned was
explicitly stated in the 2000 PDAF Article. Moreover, realignment of funds to any expense
category was expressly allowed, with the sole condition that no amount shall be used to fund
personal services and other personnel benefits.47 The succeeding PDAF provisions remained the
same in view of the re-enactment48 of the 2000 GAA for the year 2001.
F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) Administration (2001-2010).
The 200249 PDAF Article was brief and straightforward as it merely contained a single special
provision ordering the release of the funds directly to the implementing agency or local
government unit concerned, without further qualifications. The following year, 2003,50 the same
single provision was present, with simply an expansion of purpose and express authority to
realign. Nevertheless, the provisions in the 2003 budgets of the Department of Public Works and
Highways51 (DPWH) and the DepEd52 required prior consultation with Members of Congress on
the aspects of implementation delegation and project list submission, respectively. In 2004, the
2003 GAA was re-enacted.53
In 2005,54 the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF shall be used "to fund priority programs and
projects under the ten point agenda of the national government and shall be released directly to
the implementing agencies." It also introduced the program menu concept,55 which is essentially
a list of general programs and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF project may
be subsequently chosen by the identifying authority. The 2005 GAA was re-enacted56 in 2006
and hence, operated on the same bases. In similar regard, the program menu concept was
consistently integrated into the 2007,57 2008,58 2009,59 and 201060 GAAs.
Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were silent with respect to the specific amounts
allocated for the individual legislators, as well as their participation in the proposal and
identification of PDAF projects to be funded. In contrast to the PDAF Articles, however, the
provisions under the DepEd School Building Program and the DPWH budget, similar to its
predecessors, explicitly required prior consultation with the concerned Member of
Congress61anent certain aspects of project implementation.
 Significantly, it was during this era that provisions which allowed formal participation of non-
governmental organizations (NGO) in the implementation of government projects were
introduced. In the Supplemental Budget for 2006, with respect to the appropriation for school
buildings, NGOs were, by law, encouraged to participate. For such purpose, the law stated that
"the amount of at least ₱250 Million of the ₱500 Million allotted for the construction and
completion of school buildings shall be made available to NGOs including the Federation of
Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Inc. for its "Operation Barrio School"
program, with capability and proven track records in the construction of public school buildings x
x x."62 The same allocation was made available to NGOs in the 2007 and 2009 GAAs under the
DepEd Budget.63 Also, it was in 2007 that the Government Procurement Policy Board64 (GPPB)
issued Resolution No. 12-2007 dated June 29, 2007 (GPPB Resolution 12-2007), amending the
implementing rules and regulations65 of RA 9184,66 the Government Procurement Reform Act, to
include, as a form of negotiated procurement,67 the procedure whereby the Procuring Entity68(the
implementing agency) may enter into a memorandum of agreement with an NGO, provided that
"an appropriation law or ordinance earmarks an amount to be specifically contracted out to
NGOs."69
G. Present Administration (2010-Present).
Differing from previous PDAF Articles but similar to the CDF Articles, the 201170 PDAF Article
included an express statement on lump-sum amounts allocated for individual legislators and the
IV. Controversies in the Philippines.
Vice-President: Representatives were given ₱70 Million each, broken down into ₱40 Million for
"hard projects" and ₱30 Million for "soft projects"; while ₱200 Million was given to each Senator
as well as the Vice-President, with a ₱100 Million allocation each for "hard" and "soft projects."
Likewise, a provision on realignment of funds was included, but with the qualification that it may
be allowed only once. The same provision also allowed the Secretaries of Education, Health,
Social Welfare and Development, Interior and Local Government, Environment and Natural
Resources, Energy, and Public Works and Highways to realign PDAF Funds, with the further
conditions that: (a) realignment is within the same implementing unit and same project category
as the original project, for infrastructure projects; (b) allotment released has not yet been
obligated for the original scope of work, and (c) the request for realignment is with the
concurrence of the legislator concerned.71
In the 201272 and 201373 PDAF Articles, it is stated that the "identification of projects and/or
designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared by each
implementing agency (priority list requirement) x x x." However, as practiced, it would still be the
individual legislator who would choose and identify the project from the said priority list.74
Provisions on legislator allocations75 as well as fund realignment76 were included in the 2012 and
2013 PDAF Articles; but the allocation for the Vice-President, which was pegged at ₱200 Million
in the 2011 GAA, had been deleted. In addition, the 2013 PDAF Article now allowed LGUs to be
identified as implementing agencies if they have the technical capability to implement the
projects.77 Legislators were also allowed to identify programs/projects, except for assistance to
indigent patients and scholarships, outside of his legislative district provided that he secures the
written concurrence of the legislator of the intended outside-district, endorsed by the Speaker of
the House.78 Finally, any realignment of PDAF funds, modification and revision of project
identification, as well as requests for release of funds, were all required to be favorably endorsed
by the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case
may be.79
III. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members
of Congress, the present cases and the recent controversies on the matter have, however, shown that the
term‘s usage has expanded to include certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya Funds and
the Presidential Social Fund.
On the one hand, the Malampaya Funds was created as a special fund under Section 880 of Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 910,81 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) on March 22, 1976. In
enacting the said law, Marcos recognized the need to set up a special fund to help intensify, strengthen,
and consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous
energy resources vital to economic growth.82 Due to the energy-related activities of the government in the
Malampaya natural gas field in Palawan, or the "Malampaya Deep Water Gas-to-Power Project",83 the
special fund created under PD 910 has been currently labeled as Malampaya Funds.
On the other hand the Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV84 of PD 1869,85 or
the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). PD 1869 was similarly
issued by Marcos on July 11, 1983. More than two (2) years after, he amended PD 1869 and accordingly
issued PD 1993 on October 31, 1985,86 amending Section 1287 of the former law. As it stands, the
Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed and administered by the
Presidential Management Staff through which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs
and projects not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the
aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.88
Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have increased tremendously,89 owing in no small part to
previous Presidents who reportedly used the "Pork Barrel" in order to gain congressional support.90 It was
in 1996 when the first controversy surrounding the "Pork Barrel" erupted. Former Marikina City
Representative Romeo Candazo (Candazo), then an anonymous source, "blew the lid on the huge sums of
government money that regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks."91 He said
that "the kickbacks were ‘SOP‘ (standard operating procedure) among legislators and ranged from a low 19
percent to a high 52 percent of the cost of each project, which could be anything from dredging, rip rapping,
sphalting, concreting, and construction of school buildings."92 "Other sources of kickbacks that Candazo
identified were public funds intended for medicines and textbooks. A few days later, the tale of the money
trail became the banner story of the Philippine Daily Inquirer issue of August 13, 1996, accompanied by an
illustration of a roasted pig."93 "The publication of the stories, including those about congressional initiative
allocations of certain lawmakers, including ₱3.6 Billion for a Congressman, sparked public outrage."94
Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as enacted in the
2004 GAA for being unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack of "any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal
misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of
Congress," the petition was dismissed.95
Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into
allegations that "the government has been defrauded of some ₱10 Billion over the past 10 years by a
syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of
ghost projects."96 The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who
declared that JLN Corporation – "JLN" standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) – had swindled billions of
pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire
decade. While the NGOs were supposedly the ultimate recipients of PDAF funds, the whistle-blowers
declared that the money was diverted into Napoles‘ private accounts.97 Thus, after its investigation on the
Napoles controversy, criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5)
lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the
lawmakers‘ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing
agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.98
 On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-year audit
investigation99covering the use of legislators' PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3) years of
the Arroyo administration. The purpose of the audit was to determine the propriety of releases of funds
under PDAF and the Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)100 by the DBM, the application
of these funds and the implementation of projects by the appropriate implementing agencies and several
government-owned-and-controlled corporations (GOCCs).101 The total releases covered by the audit
amounted to ₱8.374 Billion in PDAF and ₱32.664 Billion in VILP, representing 58% and 32%, respectively,
of the total PDAF and VILP releases that were found to have been made nationwide during the audit
period.102 Accordingly, the Co A‘s findings contained in its Report No. 2012-03 (CoA Report), entitled
"Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various Infrastructures including Local Projects
(VILP)," were made public, the highlights of which are as follows:103
● Amounts released for projects identified by a considerable number of legislators significantly
exceeded their respective allocations.
● Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts of sponsoring members of
the Lower House.
● Total VILP releases for the period exceeded the total amount appropriated under the 2007 to
2009 GAAs.
● Infrastructure projects were constructed on private lots without these having been turned over
to the government.
● Significant amounts were released to implementing agencies without the latter‘s endorsement
and without considering their mandated functions, administrative and technical capabilities to
implement projects.
● Implementation of most livelihood projects was not undertaken by the implementing agencies
themselves but by NGOs endorsed by the proponent legislators to which the Funds were
transferred.
● The funds were transferred to the NGOs in spite of the absence of any appropriation law or
ordinance.
● Selection of the NGOs were not compliant with law and regulations.
● Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with implementation of seven hundred seventy two (772)
projects amount to ₱6.156 Billion were either found questionable, or submitted
questionable/spurious documents, or failed to liquidate in whole or in part their utilization of the
Funds.
● Procurement by the NGOs, as well as some implementing agencies, of goods and services
reportedly used in the projects were not compliant with law.
As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers alleged that" at least ₱900 Million from royalties in the
operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries
has gone into a dummy NGO."104 According to incumbent CoA Chairperson Maria Gracia Pulido Tan (CoA
Chairperson), the CoA is, as of this writing, in the process of preparing "one consolidated report" on the
Malampaya Funds.105
V. The Procedural Antecedents.
Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, several
petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional. To recount, the relevant procedural antecedents in these cases are as follows:
On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara), President of the Social Justice Society, filed a
Petition for Prohibition of even date under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Alcantara Petition), seeking that the "Pork
Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently restraining respondents
Franklin M. Drilon and Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr., in their respective capacities as the incumbent Senate President
and Speaker of the House of Representatives, from further taking any steps to enact legislation appropriating funds
for the "Pork Barrel System," in whatever form and by whatever name it may be called, and from approving further
releases pursuant thereto.106 The Alcantara Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208493.
On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L. Gonzalez, Reuben M. Abante, Quintin
Paredes San Diego (Belgica, et al.), and Jose M. Villegas, Jr. (Villegas) filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and
Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction dated August 27, 2013 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Belgica Petition), seeking that the
annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013
PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social
Fund,107 be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also,
they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Florencio B. Abad (Secretary Abad)
and Rosalia V. De Leon, in their respective capacities as the incumbent Executive Secretary, Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM), and National Treasurer, or their agents, for them to immediately
cease any expenditure under the aforesaid funds. Further, they pray that the Court order the foregoing respondents
to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF
and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities
or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"; and (b) "the use of the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds,
including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013,
specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto."108 Also,
they pray for the "inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all presently off-budget, lump-sum,
discretionary funds including, but not limited to, proceeds from the Malampaya Funds and remittances from the
PAGCOR."109 The Belgica Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208566.110
Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Pedrito M. Nepomuceno (Nepomuceno), filed a Petition dated August 23,
2012 (Nepomuceno Petition), seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be
issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing
such funds to Members of Congress and, instead, allow their release to fund priority projects identified and approved
by the Local Development Councils in consultation with the executive departments, such as the DPWH, the
Department of Tourism, the Department of Health, the Department of Transportation, and Communication and the
National Economic Development Authority.111 The Nepomuceno Petition was docketed as UDK-14951.112
On September 10, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date (a) consolidating all cases; (b) requiring public
respondents to comment on the consolidated petitions; (c) issuing a TRO (September 10, 2013 TRO) enjoining the
DBM, National Treasurer, the Executive Secretary, or any of the persons acting under their authority from releasing
(1) the remaining PDAF allocated to Members of Congress under the GAA of 2013, and (2) Malampaya Funds under
the phrase "for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910
but not for the purpose of "financing energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government‖ under the same provision; and (d) setting the consolidated cases for Oral Arguments on October 8,
2013.
On September 23, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Consolidated Comment (Comment) of even
date before the Court, seeking the lifting, or in the alternative, the partial lifting with respect to educational and
medical assistance purposes, of the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO, and that the consolidated petitions be
dismissed for lack of merit.113
On September 24, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date directing petitioners to reply to the Comment.
Petitioners, with the exception of Nepomuceno, filed their respective replies to the Comment: (a) on September 30,
2013, Villegas filed a separate Reply dated September 27, 2013 (Villegas Reply); (b) on October 1, 2013, Belgica, et
al. filed a Reply dated September 30, 2013 (Belgica Reply); and (c) on October 2, 2013, Alcantara filed a Reply dated
October 1, 2013.
On October 1, 2013, the Court issued an Advisory providing for the guidelines to be observed by the parties for the
Oral Arguments scheduled on October 8, 2013. In view of the technicality of the issues material to the present cases,
incumbent Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza (Solicitor General) was directed to bring with him during the Oral
Arguments representative/s from the DBM and Congress who would be able to competently and completely answer
questions related to, among others, the budgeting process and its implementation. Further, the CoA Chairperson was
appointed as amicus curiae and thereby requested to appear before the Court during the Oral Arguments.
On October 8 and 10, 2013, the Oral Arguments were conducted. Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit
their respective memoranda within a period of seven (7) days, or until October 17, 2013, which the parties
subsequently did.
The Issues Before the Court
Based on the pleadings, and as refined during the Oral Arguments, the following are the main issues for the Court‘s
resolution:
I. Procedural Issues.
Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy; (b) the
issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy not subject to judicial review; (c) petitioners have legal
standing to sue; and (d) the Court‘s Decision dated August 19, 1994 in G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766, and
113888, entitled "Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez"114 (Philconsa) and Decision dated April 24, 2012 in
G.R. No. 164987, entitled "Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and
Management"115 (LAMP) bar the re-litigatio n of the issue of constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" under the
principles of res judicata and stare decisis.
II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers;
(b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f)
local autonomy.
III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under
Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative
power.
These main issues shall be resolved in the order that they have been stated. In addition, the Court shall also tackle
certain ancillary issues as prompted by the present cases.
The Court’s Ruling
The petitions are partly granted.
I. Procedural Issues.
The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for
judicial inquiry,117 namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b)
the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity ; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case.118 Of these requisites, case law states that the first two are the most important119and,
therefore, shall be discussed forthwith.
A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy.120 This is embodied in
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which pertinently states that "judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable x x x."
Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which "involves a conflict of legal rights, an
assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute.121 In other words, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and
enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence."122 Related to the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already
ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse
effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by
either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate
or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action."123 "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon
constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot
questions."124
Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases.
The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the
constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication
since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD
910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund – are
currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of
the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and
academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.125 Differing from this
description, the Court observes that respondents‘ proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the
controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget,
and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither
will the President‘s declaration that he had already "abolished the PDAF" render the issues on PDAF moot precisely
because the Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By
constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by Congress, through the passage of
a repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality. Instructive on this point is the following
exchange between Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio) and the Solicitor General during the Oral
Arguments:126
Justice Carpio: The President has taken an oath to faithfully execute the law,127 correct? Solicitor General Jardeleza:
Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio: And so the President cannot refuse to implement the General Appropriations Act, correct?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Well, that is our answer, Your Honor. In the case, for example of the PDAF, the
President has a duty to execute the laws but in the face of the outrage over PDAF, the President was saying, "I am
not sure that I will continue the release of the soft projects," and that started, Your Honor. Now, whether or not that …
(interrupted)
Justice Carpio: Yeah. I will grant the President if there are anomalies in the project, he has the power to stop the
releases in the meantime, to investigate, and that is Section 38 of Chapter 5 of Book 6 of the Revised Administrative
Code128 x x x. So at most the President can suspend, now if the President believes that the PDAF is unconstitutional,
can he just refuse to implement it?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor, as we were trying to say in the specific case of the PDAF because of
the CoA Report, because of the reported irregularities and this Court can take judicial notice, even outside, outside of
the COA Report, you have the report of the whistle-blowers, the President was just exercising precisely the duty ….
xxxx
Justice Carpio: Yes, and that is correct. You‘ve seen the CoA Report, there are anomalies, you stop and investigate,
and prosecute, he has done that. But, does that mean that PDAF has been repealed?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor x x x.
xxxx
Justice Carpio: So that PDAF can be legally abolished only in two (2) cases. Congress passes a law to repeal it, or
this Court declares it unconstitutional, correct?
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio: The President has no power to legally abolish PDAF. (Emphases supplied)
Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that "the moot and academic‘ principle is
not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case." The Court will decide cases,
otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation
of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.129
The applicability of the first exception is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners – they essentially allege
grave violations of the Constitution with respect to, inter alia, the principles of separation of powers, non-delegability
of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability and local autonomy.
The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the nature of the interests involved
– the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds have been and continue to
be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount
public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time when the system‘s flaws have never before
been magnified. To the Court‘s mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the accounts of numerous whistle-blowers,
and the government‘s own recognition that reforms are needed "to address the reported abuses of the
PDAF"130 demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only underscores the importance of the matter. It is also
by this finding that the Court finds petitioners‘ claims as not merely theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is
the weight accorded by the Court to the findings made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of
the government. In Delos Santos v. CoA,131 a recent case wherein the Court upheld the CoA‘s disallowance of
irregularly disbursed PDAF funds, it was emphasized that:
The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in
safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately the people's, property. The exercise of its general
audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance system inherent in our
form of government.
It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which is
constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for
their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded
not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that
would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition
questioning its rulings. x x x. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases, the
Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to be sufficient.
The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely due to the practical need for a definitive ruling on the
system‘s constitutionality. As disclosed during the Oral Arguments, the CoA Chairperson estimates that thousands of
notices of disallowances will be issued by her office in connection with the findings made in the CoA Report. In this
relation, Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) pointed out that all of these would
eventually find their way to the courts.132 Accordingly, there is a compelling need to formulate controlling principles
relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious
resolution of the anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the government may be guided on how
public funds should be utilized in accordance with constitutional principles.
Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the recognition that the preparation and passage of the
national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence.133 The relevance of the issues before
the Court does not cease with the passage of a "PDAF -free budget for 2014."134 The evolution of the "Pork Barrel
System," by its multifarious iterations throughout the course of history, lends a semblance of truth to petitioners‘ claim
that "the same dog will just resurface wearing a different collar."135 In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,136 the
government had already backtracked on a previous course of action yet the Court used the "capable of repetition but
evading review" exception in order "to prevent similar questions from re- emerging."137 The situation similarly holds
true to these cases. Indeed, the myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not
resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review.
B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine.
The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies‖ carries the assurance that "the
courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government."138 Essentially, the foregoing
limitation is a restatement of the political question doctrine which, under the classic formulation of Baker v.
Carr,139applies when there is found, among others, "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department," "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it" or
"the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non- judicial discretion." Cast
against this light, respondents submit that the "the political branches are in the best position not only to perform
budget-related reforms but also to do them in response to the specific demands of their constituents" and, as such,
"urge the Court not to impose a solution at this stage."140
The Court must deny respondents‘ submission.
Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions which are within
its province to resolve. A political question refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure."141 The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue
dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution
itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a
task that the political branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial
power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power
but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cannot be any
clearer: "The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law. It includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." In Estrada v.
Desierto,142 the expanded concept of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution and its effect on the political question
doctrine was explained as follows:143
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded
the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the
judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With
the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. x x x (Emphases
supplied)
It must also be borne in mind that ― when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature or
the executive, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution."144 To a great
extent, the Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms undertaken by its co-equal branches of government. But it is by
constitutional force that the Court must faithfully perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the Court‘s avowed intention that a
resolution of these cases would not arrest or in any manner impede the endeavors of the two other branches but, in
fact, help ensure that the pillars of change are erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best interest
of the people that each great branch of government, within its own sphere, contributes its share towards achieving a
holistic and genuine solution to the problems of society. For all these reasons, the Court cannot heed respondents‘
plea for judicial restraint.
C. Locus Standi.
"The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights
by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing."145
Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that
they "dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury."146 Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite
standing to question the validity of the existing "Pork Barrel System" under which the taxes they pay have been and
continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional
usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that
public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public
funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law,147 as in these cases.
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues they have
raised may be classified as matters "of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest."148 The CoA Chairperson‘s statement during the Oral Arguments that the present
controversy involves "not merely a systems failure" but a "complete breakdown of controls"149 amplifies, in addition to
the matters above-discussed, the seriousness of the issues involved herein. Indeed, of greater import than the
damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by
the enforcement of an invalid statute.150 All told, petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases.
D. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis.
Res judicata (which means a "matter adjudged") and stare decisis non quieta et movere (or simply, stare decisis
which means "follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled") are general procedural law principles
which both deal with the effects of previous but factually similar dispositions to subsequent cases. For the cases at
bar, the Court examines the applicability of these principles in relation to its prior rulings in Philconsa and LAMP.
The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second actions,
there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.151 This required identity is not, however,
attendant hereto since Philconsa and LAMP, respectively involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF
Article and 2004 PDAF Article, whereas the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire "Pork
Barrel System." Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality – and, thus,
hardly a judgment on the merits – in that petitioners therein failed to present any "convincing proof x x x showing that,
indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their
sole discretion" or "pertinent evidentiary support to demonstrate the illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks
and has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress." As such, the Court up held, in view of
the presumption of constitutionality accorded to every law, the 2004 PDAF Article, and saw "no need to review or
reverse the standing pronouncements in the said case." Hence, for the foregoing reasons, the res judicata principle,
insofar as the Philconsa and LAMP cases are concerned, cannot apply.
On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The principle, entrenched under Article
8152 of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should
be doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be
different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like
cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward
by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare
decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate the same issue.153
Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork Barrel provision, i.e., the 1994 CDF
Article, was resolved by the Court. To properly understand its context, petitioners‘ posturing was that "the power
given to the Members of Congress to propose and identify projects and activities to be funded by the CDF is an
encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said power in an appropriation act is in implementation of
the law" and that "the proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and
amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution."154 In deference to the foregoing
submissions, the Court reached the following main conclusions: one, under the Constitution, the power of
appropriation, or the "power of the purse," belongs to Congress; two, the power of appropriation carries with it the
power to specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law and it can be detailed and as broad
as Congress wants it to be; and, three, the proposals and identifications made by Members of Congress are merely
recommendatory. At once, it is apparent that the Philconsa resolution was a limited response to a separation of
powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of
Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between the
CDF and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of the entire "Pork Barrel System" as well as (b) the
intra-relation of post-enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those
related to the area of project identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment. The complexity of
the issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as a powerful
countervailing reason against a wholesale application of the stare decisis principle.
In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent constitutional
inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. As may be deduced from the main
conclusions of the case, Philconsa‘s fundamental premise in allowing Members of Congress to propose and identify
of projects would be that the said identification authority is but an aspect of the power of appropriation which has
been constitutionally lodged in Congress. From this premise, the contradictions may be easily seen. If the authority to
identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power of appropriation is a form of legislative power thereby
lodged in Congress, then it follows that: (a) it is Congress which should exercise such authority, and not its individual
Members; (b) such authority must be exercised within the prescribed procedure of law passage and, hence, should
not be exercised after the GAA has already been passed; and (c) such authority, as embodied in the GAA, has the
force of law and, hence, cannot be merely recommendatory. Justice Vitug‘s Concurring Opinion in the same case
sums up the Philconsa quandary in this wise: "Neither would it be objectionable for Congress, by law, to appropriate
funds for such specific projects as it may be minded; to give that authority, however, to the individual members of
Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid, would be constitutionally impermissible." As the Court now largely benefits
from hindsight and current findings on the matter, among others, the CoA Report, the Court must partially abandon its
previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment identification authority of Members of Congress
on the guise that the same was merely recommendatory. This postulate raises serious constitutional inconsistencies
which cannot be simply excused on the ground that such mechanism is "imaginative as it is innovative." Moreover, it
must be pointed out that the recent case of Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima155(Abakada) has effectively
overturned Philconsa‘s allowance of post-enactment legislator participation in view of the separation of powers
principle. These constitutional inconsistencies and the Abakada rule will be discussed in greater detail in the ensuing
section of this Decision.
As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has not
set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these cases. In fine, stare
decisis would not apply.
II. Substantive Issues.
A. Definition of Terms.
Before the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issues of these cases, it must first define the terms "Pork Barrel
System," "Congressional Pork Barrel," and "Presidential Pork Barrel" as they are essential to the ensuing discourse.
Petitioners define the term "Pork Barrel System" as the "collusion between the Legislative and Executive branches of
government to accumulate lump-sum public funds in their offices with unchecked discretionary powers to determine
its distribution as political largesse."156 They assert that the following elements make up the Pork Barrel System: (a)
lump-sum funds are allocated through the appropriations process to an individual officer; (b) the officer is given sole
and broad discretion in determining how the funds will be used or expended; (c) the guidelines on how to spend or
use the funds in the appropriation are either vague, overbroad or inexistent; and (d) projects funded are intended to
benefit a definite constituency in a particular part of the country and to help the political careers of the disbursing
official by yielding rich patronage benefits.157 They further state that the Pork Barrel System is comprised of two (2)
kinds of discretionary public funds: first, the Congressional (or Legislative) Pork Barrel, currently known as the
PDAF;158 and, second, the Presidential (or Executive) Pork Barrel, specifically, the Malampaya Funds under PD 910
and the Presidential Social Fund under PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993.159
Considering petitioners‘ submission and in reference to its local concept and legal history, the Court defines the Pork
Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary
funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective participations of the Legislative and
Executive branches of government, including its members. The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-
sum discretionary funds:
First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund
wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to effectively control certain
aspects of the fund’s utilization through various post-enactment measures and/or practices. In particular, petitioners
consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-
enactment measure that allows individual legislators to wield a collective power;160 and
Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which
allows the President to determine the manner of its utilization. For reasons earlier stated,161 the Court shall delimit the
use of such term to refer only to the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
With these definitions in mind, the Court shall now proceed to discuss the substantive issues of these cases.
B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel.
1. Separation of Powers.
a. Statement of Principle.
The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of
government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission,162 it means that the
"Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative
and the judicial departments of the government."163 To the legislative branch of government, through
Congress,164belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of government, through the
President,165 belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government, through the
Court,166 belongs the power to interpret laws. Because the three great powers have been, by constitutional design,
ordained in this respect, "each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere."167 Thus, "the legislature has no authority to execute or construe
the law, the executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or
execute the law."168 The principle of separation of powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence stem from
the notion that the powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch;
the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other branches or the
citizenry.169 To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of government that are
equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates. Lack of independence would result in
the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or others.170
Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of government unduly
encroaches on the domain of another. US Supreme Court decisions instruct that the principle of separation of powers
may be violated in two (2) ways: firstly, "one branch may interfere impermissibly with the other’s performance of its
constitutionally assigned function";171 and "alternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one branch assumes a
function that more properly is entrusted to another."172 In other words, there is a violation of the principle when there is
impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of another department‘s functions.
The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function both
constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the Executive branch of government. In Guingona, Jr. v. Hon.
Carague173 (Guingona, Jr.), the Court explained that the phase of budget execution "covers the various operational
aspects of budgeting" and accordingly includes "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities,"
the "regulation and release of funds" as well as all "other related activities" that comprise the budget execution
cycle.174 This is rooted in the principle that the allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a
grant of all powers inherent in them.175 Thus, unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive department
should exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives which go into the implementation of the national budget as
provided under the GAA as well as any other appropriation law.
In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members, should not cross over
the field of implementing the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of the
Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that "Congress enters the picture when it deliberates or acts on
the budget proposals of the President. Thereafter, Congress, "in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom,
formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which specifies that
no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by law." Upon approval
and passage of the GAA, Congress‘ law -making role necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executive‘s
role of implementing the national budget begins. So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries between them,
Congress must "not concern it self with details for implementation by the Executive."176
The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where the Court held that "from the
moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any
role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional."177 It must be clarified, however, that since the restriction only pertains to "any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law," Congress may still exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism of
checks and balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress‘ role must be
confined to mere oversight. Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft
of any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive
functions. As the Court ruled in Abakada:178
Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to scrutiny and investigation.1âwphi1 In
particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in
connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its
Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation; and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. (Emphases
supplied)
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork Barrel – among others, the 2013 PDAF Article –
"wrecks the assignment of responsibilities between the political branches" as it is designed to allow individual
legislators to interfere "way past the time it should have ceased" or, particularly, "after the GAA is passed."179 They
state that the findings and recommendations in the CoA Report provide "an illustration of how absolute and definitive
the power of legislators wield over project implementation in complete violation of the constitutional principle of
separation of powers."180 Further, they point out that the Court in the Philconsa case only allowed the CDF to exist on
the condition that individual legislators limited their role to recommending projects and not if they actually dictate their
implementation.181
For their part, respondents counter that the separations of powers principle has not been violated since the President
maintains "ultimate authority to control the execution of the GAA‖ and that he "retains the final discretion to reject" the
legislators‘ proposals.182 They maintain that the Court, in Philconsa, "upheld the constitutionality of the power of
members of Congress to propose and identify projects so long as such proposal and identification are
recommendatory."183 As such, they claim that "everything in the Special Provisions [of the 2013 PDAF Article follows
the Philconsa framework, and hence, remains constitutional."184
The Court rules in favor of petitioners.
As may be observed from its legal history, the defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be the
authority of legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of project implementation.
At its core, legislators – may it be through project lists,185 prior consultations186 or program menus187 – have been
consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various
Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify
projects post-GAA may be construed from the import of Special Provisions 1 to 3 as well as the second paragraph of
Special Provision 4. To elucidate, Special Provision 1 embodies the program menu feature which, as evinced from
past PDAF Articles, allows individual legislators to identify PDAF projects for as long as the identified project falls
under a general program listed in the said menu. Relatedly, Special Provision 2 provides that the implementing
agencies shall, within 90 days from the GAA is passed, submit to Congress a more detailed priority list, standard or
design prepared and submitted by implementing agencies from which the legislator may make his choice. The same
provision further authorizes legislators to identify PDAF projects outside his district for as long as the representative
of the district concerned concurs in writing. Meanwhile, Special Provision 3 clarifies that PDAF projects refer to
"projects to be identified by legislators"188 and thereunder provides the allocation limit for the total amount of projects
identified by each legislator. Finally, paragraph 2 of Special Provision 4 requires that any modification and revision of
the project identification "shall be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be." From the foregoing
special provisions, it cannot be seriously doubted that legislators have been accorded post-enactment authority to
identify PDAF projects.
Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority in the
areas of fund release and realignment. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to
participate in the area of fund release through congressional committees is contained in Special Provision 5 which
explicitly states that "all request for release of funds shall be supported by the documents prescribed under Special
Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
Finance, as the case may be"; while their statutory authority to participate in the area of fund realignment is contained
in: first , paragraph 2, Special Provision 4189 which explicitly state s, among others, that "any realignment of funds
shall be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable
endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be‖ ; and, second , paragraph 1, also of
Special Provision 4 which authorizes the "Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local
Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social Welfare and Development and Trade and
Industry190 x x x to approve realignment from one project/scope to another within the allotment received from this
Fund, subject to among others (iii) the request is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned."
Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund
realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or
assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators
have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in – as Guingona, Jr. puts it – "the various operational
aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities" and the "regulation
and release of funds" in violation of the separation of powers principle. The fundamental rule, as categorically
articulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated – from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates
the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.191 That the said authority is treated as merely
recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to repeat, covers any role in
the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in
Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the guise that the same is merely
recommendatory and, as such, respondents‘ reliance on the same falters altogether.
Besides, it must be pointed out that respondents have nonetheless failed to substantiate their position that the
identification authority of legislators is only of recommendatory import. Quite the contrary, respondents – through the
statements of the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments – have admitted that the identification of the legislator
constitutes a mandatory requirement before his PDAF can be tapped as a funding source, thereby highlighting the
indispensability of the said act to the entire budget execution process:192
Justice Bernabe: Now, without the individual legislator’s identification of the project, can the PDAF of the legislator be
utilized?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor.
Justice Bernabe: It cannot?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: It cannot… (interrupted)
Justice Bernabe: So meaning you should have the identification of the project by the individual legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
Justice Bernabe: In short, the act of identification is mandatory?
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor. In the sense that if it is not done and then there is no identification.
xxxx
Justice Bernabe: Now, would you know of specific instances when a project was implemented without the
identification by the individual legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: I do not know, Your Honor; I do not think so but I have no specific examples. I would
doubt very much, Your Honor, because to implement, there is a need for a SARO and the NCA. And the SARO and
the NCA are triggered by an identification from the legislator.
xxxx
Solictor General Jardeleza: What we mean by mandatory, Your Honor, is we were replying to a question, "How can a
legislator make sure that he is able to get PDAF Funds?" It is mandatory in the sense that he must identify, in that
sense, Your Honor. Otherwise, if he does not identify, he cannot avail of the PDAF Funds and his district would not
be able to have PDAF Funds, only in that sense, Your Honor. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of
law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or
enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle
and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into
the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment. That such informal practices do
exist and have, in fact, been constantly observed throughout the years has not been substantially disputed here. As
pointed out by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno) during the Oral Arguments of these
cases:193
Chief Justice Sereno:
Now, from the responses of the representative of both, the DBM and two (2) Houses of Congress, if we enforces the
initial thought that I have, after I had seen the extent of this research made by my staff, that neither the Executive nor
Congress frontally faced the question of constitutional compatibility of how they were engineering the budget process.
In fact, the words you have been using, as the three lawyers of the DBM, and both Houses of Congress has also
been using is surprise; surprised that all of these things are now surfacing. In fact, I thought that what the 2013 PDAF
provisions did was to codify in one section all the past practice that had been done since 1991. In a certain sense, we
should be thankful that they are all now in the PDAF Special Provisions. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether through formal measures written into
the law or informal practices institutionalized in government agencies, else the Executive department be deprived of
what the Constitution has vested as its own.
2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power.
a. Statement of Principle.
As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle,194 legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the body to
which the Constitution has conferred the same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that
such power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.195 Based
on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of
initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no other. This premise embodies the
principle of non-delegability of legislative power, and the only recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated
legislative power to local governments which, by immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on purely local
matters;196 and (b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law, exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency,197or
fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import
and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.198
Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a restriction to delegate rule-making authority to
implementing agencies for the limited purpose of either filling up the details of the law for its enforcement
(supplementary rule-making) or ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-
making).199The conceptual treatment and limitations of delegated rule-making were explained in the case of People v.
Maceren200 as follows:
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers
and is an exception to the nondelegation of legislative powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation"
calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law."
xxxx
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode
or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or
expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute
cannot be sanctioned. (Emphases supplied)
b. Application.
In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification
authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed
to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress.201 That the
power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law." To understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice
and Insular Auditor202 (Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain
sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual
legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund
would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise
the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes
individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate
which the Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative
power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel
which contain the similar legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.
3. Checks and Balances.
a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power.
The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept separate and distinct does not mean that
they are absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has also provided for an elaborate
system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government.203
A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power to veto an item written into an
appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a process known as "bill
presentment." The President‘s item-veto power is found in Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
reads as follows:
Sec. 27. x x x.
xxxx
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill,
but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein he may exercise his power of item-
veto, forms part of the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" for law-passage as specified
under the Constitution.204 As stated in Abakada, the final step in the law-making process is the "submission of the bill
to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the required publication."205
Elaborating on the President‘s item-veto power and its relevance as a check on the legislature, the Court, in
Bengzon, explained that:206
The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines make the Chief Executive an integral part of
the law-making power. His disapproval of a bill, commonly known as a veto, is essentially a legislative act. The
questions presented to the mind of the Chief Executive are precisely the same as those the legislature must
determine in passing a bill, except that his will be a broader point of view.
The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the government, but in this respect it is
a grant of power to the executive department. The Legislature has the affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief
Executive has the negative power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of the Legislature. It
follows that the Chief Executive must find his authority in the Constitution. But in exercising that authority he may not
be confined to rules of strict construction or hampered by the unwise interference of the judiciary. The courts will
indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto in the same manner as they will presume the
constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the Legislature. (Emphases supplied)
The justification for the President‘s item-veto power rests on a variety of policy goals such as to prevent log-rolling
legislation,207 impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature, as well as to fortify the executive branch‘s role in the
budgetary process.208 In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the US Supreme Court characterized the
President‘s item-power as "a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the
effects of factions, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a
majority of that body"; phrased differently, it is meant to "increase the chances in favor of the community against the
passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design."209
For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item" which may be
the object of the veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details, the
distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill." In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the
Philippine Islands,210 the US Supreme Court characterized an item of appropriation as follows:
An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific appropriation of money, not
some general provision of law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill. (Emphases supplied)
On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the President may be able to exercise
his power of item veto, must contain "specific appropriations of money" and not only "general provisions" which
provide for parameters of appropriation.
Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by singular
correspondence – meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise
known as a "line-item."211 This treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with its definition as a "specific
appropriation of money" but also ensures that the President may discernibly veto the same. Based on the foregoing
formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state
a specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be considered as "line- item" appropriations which are rightfully
subject to item veto. Likewise, it must be observed that an appropriation may be validly apportioned into component
percentages or values; however, it is crucial that each percentage or value must be allocated for its own
corresponding purpose for such component to be considered as a proper line-item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio
correctly pointed out, a valid appropriation may even have several related purposes that are by accounting and
budgeting practice considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating expenses), in which
case the related purposes shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the exercise of the President‘s item veto power.
Finally, special purpose funds and discretionary funds would equally square with the constitutional mechanism of
item-veto for as long as they follow the rule on singular correspondence as herein discussed. Anent special purpose
funds, it must be added that Section 25(4), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that the "special appropriations
bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by
the National Treasurer, or t o be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein." Meanwhile, with respect to
discretionary funds, Section 2 5(6), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that said funds "shall be disbursed
only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be
prescribed by law."
In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-sum
amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates the
further determination of both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which
must still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the appropriation law already
indicates a "specific appropriation of money‖ and hence, without a proper line-item which the President may veto. As
a practical result, the President would then be faced with the predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if
he finds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some
of its legitimate purposes. Finally, it may not be amiss to state that such arrangement also raises non-delegability
issues considering that the implementing authority would still have to determine, again, both the actual amount to be
expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the foregoing determinations constitute the integral
aspects of the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect, be exercising legislative prerogatives
in violation of the principle of non-delegability.
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the
legislator‘s identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that
item later on."212 Accordingly, they submit that the "item veto power of the President mandates that appropriations
bills adopt line-item budgeting" and that "Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the The aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that "public office is a public
constitutionally-given power of the President useless."213 trust," is an overarching reminder that every instrumentality of government should exercise their official functions only
in accordance with the principles of the Constitution which embodies the parameters of the people‘s trust. The notion
of a public trust connotes accountability,221 hence, the various mechanisms in the Constitution which are designed to
On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the Constitution envisions a process which is intended to
exact accountability from public officers.
meet the demands of a modernizing economy and, as such, lump-sum appropriations are essential to financially
address situations which are barely foreseen when a GAA is enacted. They argue that the decision of the Congress
to create some lump-sum appropriations is constitutionally allowed and textually-grounded.214 Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the proper expenditure of public funds may be checked is the
power of congressional oversight. As mentioned in Abakada,222 congressional oversight may be performed either
through: (a) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in
The Court agrees with petitioners.
connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on
any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation;223 or (b) investigation and monitoring of the
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of ₱24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.224
amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations
and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these
The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of Congressional Pork Barrel,
intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it
among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional oversight. The fact that individual legislators are
necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General
given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested
Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative
"observers" when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law. To a certain
identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget" which subverts the prescribed
extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority,
procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out,
would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this
the above-described system forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire ₱24.79 Billion PDAF
very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his
provides that:
national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.215

Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court
Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain
of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly
constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation above-
or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
characterized. In particular, the lump-sum amount of ₱24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
allotted for multiple purposes of spending, i.e., scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation
corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the
of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc. This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves
Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office. (Emphasis
the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily
supplied)
indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the President‘s power of item veto.

Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation – a matter before another
In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays,
office of government – renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
"limited state auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently auditing the
utilization of said Funds."216 Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a "line by line budget or amount per
proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing agency."217 The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the individual
legislator‘s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in office. Indeed, while the
Congressional Pork Barrel and a legislator‘s use thereof may be linked to this area of interest, the use of his PDAF for
Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all Congressional Pork
re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.
Barrel Laws of similar operation, to be unconstitutional. That such budgeting system provides for a greater degree of
flexibility to account for future contingencies cannot be an excuse to defeat what the Constitution requires. Clearly,
the first and essential truth of the matter is that unconstitutional means do not justify even commendable ends.218 Finally, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity between legislators and the
Executive department, through the former‘s post-enactment participation, may affect the process of impeachment,
this matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel System‘s intrinsic
c. Accountability.
constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment.

Petitioners further relate that the system under which various forms of Congressional Pork Barrel operate defies
In sum, insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate Section 14, Article VI of the
public accountability as it renders Congress incapable of checking itself or its Members. In particular, they point out
1987 Constitution, thus impairing public accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article and other forms of Congressional Pork
that the Congressional Pork Barrel "gives each legislator a direct, financial interest in the smooth, speedy passing of
Barrel of similar nature are deemed as unconstitutional.
the yearly budget" which turns them "from fiscalizers" into "financially-interested partners."219 They also claim that the
system has an effect on re- election as "the PDAF excels in self-perpetuation of elective officials." Finally, they add
that the "PDAF impairs the power of impeachment" as such "funds are indeed quite useful, ‘to well, accelerate the 4. Political Dynasties.
decisions of senators.‘"220
One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables politicians who are members of political dynasties
The Court agrees in part. to accumulate funds to perpetuate themselves in power, in contravention of Section 26, Article II of the 1987
Constitution225 which states that:
Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as
may be defined by law. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying
phrase "as may be defined by law." In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies guideline for legislative or executive action.226 Therefore, since
there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court
must defer from ruling on this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative since it has not been
properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.
5. Local Autonomy.
The State‘s policy on local autonomy is principally stated in Section 25, Article II and Sections 2 and 3, Article X of the
1987 Constitution which read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
ARTICLE X
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of
recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities,
and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and
functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.
Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7160,227 otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC),
wherein the policy on local autonomy had been more specifically explicated as follows:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. – (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political
subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals.
Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority,
responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the National Government to the
local government units.
xxxx
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations
with appropriate local government units, nongovernmental and people‘s organizations, and other concerned sectors
of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
The above-quoted provisions of the Constitution and the LGC reveal the policy of the State to empower local
government units (LGUs) to develop and ultimately, become self-sustaining and effective contributors to the national
economy. As explained by the Court in Philippine Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court:228
This is as good an occasion as any to stress the commitment of the Constitution to the policy of local autonomy which
is intended to provide the needed impetus and encouragement to the development of our local political subdivisions
as "self - reliant communities." In the words of Jefferson, "Municipal corporations are the small republics from which
the great one derives its strength." The vitalization of local governments will enable their inhabitants to fully exploit
their resources and more important, imbue them with a deepened sense of involvement in public affairs as members
of the body politic. This objective could be blunted by undue interference by the national government in purely local
affairs which are best resolved by the officials and inhabitants of such political units. The decision we reach today
conforms not only to the letter of the pertinent laws but also to the spirit of the Constitution.229 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional principles
on local autonomy since it allows district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their judgments in
utilizing public funds for local development.230 The Court agrees with petitioners.
Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make equal the unequal" and that "it is also a recognition that
individual members of Congress, far more than the President and their congressional colleagues, are likely to be
knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given each project."231 Drawing
strength from this pronouncement, previous legislators justified its existence by stating that "the relatively small
projects implemented under the Congressional Pork Barrel complement and link the national development goals to
the countryside and grassroots as well as to depressed areas which are overlooked by central agencies which are
preoccupied with mega-projects.232 Similarly, in his August 23, 2013 speech on the "abolition" of PDAF and budgetary
reforms, President Aquino mentioned that the Congressional Pork Barrel was originally established for a worthy goal,
which is to enable the representatives to identify projects for communities that the LGU concerned cannot afford.233
Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies
the avowed intention of "making equal the unequal." In particular, the Court observes that the gauge of PDAF and
CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and
peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based
on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration.
As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district
representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively "underdeveloped" compared to the former. To
add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives – and in some years, even the
Vice-President – who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
These certainly are anathema to the Congressional Pork Barrel‘s original intent which is "to make equal the unequal."
Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had become personal funds under the effective control of each legislator and given
unto them on the sole account of their office.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the
functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to "assist the
corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development, and coordinating
development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction."234 Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions
are essentially geared towards managing local affairs,235 their programs, policies and resolutions should not be
overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority except
only when acting as a body. The undermining effect on local autonomy caused by the post-enactment authority
conferred to the latter was succinctly put by petitioners in the following wise:236
With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate projects on his own, and
even take sole credit for its execution. Indeed, this type of personality-driven project identification has not only
contributed little to the overall development of the district, but has even contributed to "further weakening
infrastructure planning and coordination efforts of the government."
Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters and thereby subvert genuine
local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed
unconstitutional.
With this final issue on the Congressional Pork Barrel resolved, the Court now turns to the substantive issues
involving the Presidential Pork Barrel.
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel.
1. Validity of Appropriation.
Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of PD1869 (now, amended by PD 1993), which
respectively provide for the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, as invalid appropriations laws since
they do not have the "primary and specific" purpose of authorizing the release of public funds from the National
Treasury. Petitioners submit that Section 8 of PD 910 is not an appropriation law since the "primary and specific‖
purpose of PD 910 is the creation of an Energy Development Board and Section 8 thereof only created a Special
Fund incidental thereto.237 In similar regard, petitioners argue that Section 12 of PD 1869 is neither a valid
appropriations law since the allocation of the Presidential Social Fund is merely incidental to the "primary and
specific" purpose of PD 1869 which is the amendment of the Franchise and Powers of PAGCOR.238 In view of the
foregoing, petitioners suppose that such funds are being used without any valid law allowing for their proper
appropriation in violation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."239
The Court disagrees.
"An appropriation made by law‖ under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists
when a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or determinable240 amount of money and (b) allocates the same
for a particular public purpose. These two minimum designations of amount and purpose stem from the very definition
of the word "appropriation," which means "to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose," and
hence, if written into the law, demonstrate that the legislative intent to appropriate exists. As the Constitution "does
not provide or prescribe any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by
Congress shall be made, except that it be ‘made by law,‘" an appropriation law may – according to Philconsa – be
"detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be" for as long as the intent to appropriate may be gleaned from the
same. As held in the case of Guingona, Jr.:241
There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of words or religious recitals in
which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be "made by law," such as
precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of
time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for
the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in
general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a
general appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or special application which appropriate public
funds for specific public purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the
legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the language employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P.
272), whether in the past or in the present. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, as ruled by the US Supreme Court in State of Nevada v. La Grave:242
To constitute an appropriation there must be money placed in a fund applicable to the designated purpose. The word
appropriate means to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose. An appropriation in the sense of
the constitution means the setting apart a portion of the public funds for a public purpose. No particular form of words
is necessary for the purpose, if the intention to appropriate is plainly manifested. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the argument that the appropriation must be the "primary and
specific" purpose of the law in order for a valid appropriation law to exist. To reiterate, if a legal provision designates a
determinate or determinable amount of money and allocates the same for a particular public purpose, then the
legislative intent to appropriate becomes apparent and, hence, already sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an
"appropriation made by law" under contemplation of the Constitution.
Section 8 of PD 910 pertinently provides:
Section 8. Appropriations. x x x
All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources including receipts from service contracts and
agreements such as application and processing fees, signature bonus, discovery bonus, production bonus; all money
collected from concessionaires, representing unspent work obligations, fines and penalties under the Petroleum Act
of 1949; as well as the government share representing royalties, rentals, production share on service contracts and
similar payments on the exploration, development and exploitation of energy resources, shall form part of a Special
Fund to be used to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government
and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President. (Emphases supplied)
Whereas Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, reads:
Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. — After deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%)
percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of the Corporation from this Franchise, or 60% if
the aggregate gross earnings be less than ₱150,000,000.00 shall be set aside and shall accrue to the General Fund
to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed
facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.
(Emphases supplied)
Analyzing the legal text vis-à-vis the above-mentioned principles, it may then be concluded that (a) Section 8 of PD
910, which creates a Special Fund comprised of "all fees, revenues, and receipts of the Energy Development Board
from any and all sources" (a determinable amount) "to be used to finance energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by
the President" (a specified public purpose), and (b) Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which similarly
sets aside, "after deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in
the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR, or 60%, if the aggregate gross earnings be less than ₱150,000,000.00"
(also a determinable amount) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and x x x the restoration of
damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of
the Philippines" (also a specified public purpose), are legal appropriations under Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
In this relation, it is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal appropriation
under the said constitutional provision precisely because, as earlier stated, it contains post-enactment measures
which effectively create a system of intermediate appropriations. These intermediate appropriations are the actual
appropriations meant for enforcement and since they are made by individual legislators after the GAA is passed, they
occur outside the law. As such, the Court observes that the real appropriation made under the 2013 PDAF Article is
not the ₱24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather the post-enactment determinations made by the
individual legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences outside of the law. Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article does
not constitute an "appropriation made by law" since it, in its truest sense, only authorizes individual legislators to
appropriate in violation of the non-delegability principle as afore-discussed.
2. Undue Delegation.
On a related matter, petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
since the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" gives the President
"unbridled discretion to determine for what purpose the funds will be used."243 Respondents, on the other hand, urged
the Court to apply the principle of ejusdem generis to the same section and thus, construe the phrase "and for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" to refer only to other purposes related "to energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government."244
The Court agrees with petitioners‘ submissions.
While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public purpose is sufficient for a legal
appropriation to exist, the appropriation law must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the same law delegates
rule-making authority to the Executive245 either for the purpose of (a) filling up the details of the law for its
enforcement, known as supplementary rule-making, or (b) ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation,
referred to as contingent rule-making.246 There are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative guidelines
for delegated rule-making are indeed adequate. The first test is called the "completeness test." Case law states that a
law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate. On
the other hand, the second test is called the "sufficient standard test." Jurisprudence holds that a law lays down a
sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate‘s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.247 To be sufficient, the standard must specify the
limits of the delegate‘s authority, announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented.248
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority
with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the
President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to
unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law. That the subject phrase may be confined only to
"energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government" under the principle of
ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or phrase is to be construed to include – or be restricted to – things
akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned,249 is belied by three (3) reasons:
first, the phrase "energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government" states a
singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the
general phrase "for such other purposes" may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it
represents, namely energy development programs of the government;250 and, third, the Executive department has, in
fact, used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting
respondents‘ own position that it is limited only to "energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government."251 Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the completeness test since the
policy of energy development is clearly deducible from its text, the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under the same provision of law should nonetheless be stricken down as
unconstitutional as it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. This
notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya
Funds "to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government," remains
legally effective and subsisting. Truth be told, the declared unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is but an
assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be used – as it should be used – only in accordance with the avowed
purpose and intention of PD 910.
As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Section 12 of PD 1869 has already
been amended by PD 1993 which thus moots the parties‘ submissions on the same.252 Nevertheless, since the
amendatory provision may be readily examined under the current parameters of discussion, the Court proceeds to
resolve its constitutionality.
Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used
"to first, finance the priority infrastructure development projects and second, to finance the restoration of damaged or
destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the
Philippines." The Court finds that while the second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the
President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities, the first
indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he
may so determine as a "priority". Verily, the law does not supply a definition of "priority in frastructure development
projects" and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a
project as one of "infrastructure" is too broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility.
This may be deduced from its lexicographic definition as follows: "the underlying framework of a system, especially
public services and facilities (such as highways, schools, bridges, sewers, and water-systems) needed to support
commerce as well as economic and residential development."253 In fine, the phrase "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects" must be stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar to the above-assailed
provision under Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating
law. As they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally
effective and subsisting.
D. Ancillary Prayers. 1.
Petitioners’ Prayer to be Furnished Lists and Detailed Reports.
Aside from seeking the Court to declare the Pork Barrel System unconstitutional – as the Court did so in the context
of its pronouncements made in this Decision – petitioners equally pray that the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM
be ordered to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of
their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the
recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto" (PDAF Use Schedule/List);254 and (b) "the use of the
Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances
from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or
individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"255 (Presidential Pork Use Report). Petitioners‘ prayer is grounded on
Section 28, Article II and Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
ARTICLE III Sec. 7.
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and
to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research
data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
The Court denies petitioners‘ submission.
Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the right to information is to file a petition for mandamus. As
explained in the case of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission:256
While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government agency in
custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot
be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the
discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any
whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be
compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.
But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public right to be enforced and the
concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution.
The decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is, whether the
information sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. (Emphases supplied)
Corollarily, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr.257 (Valmonte), it has been clarified that the right to information
does not include the right to compel the preparation of "lists, abstracts, summaries and the like." In the same case, it
was stressed that it is essential that the "applicant has a well -defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing
demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required." Hence, without the foregoing
substantiations, the Court cannot grant a particular request for information. The pertinent portions of Valmonte are
hereunder quoted:258
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official
records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists,
abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and
certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required.
The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be clear and specific Lemi v. Valencia,
G.R. No. L-20768, November 29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72
SCRA 443.
The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of respondent to prepare the
list requested. (Emphases supplied)
In these cases, aside from the fact that none of the petitions are in the nature of mandamus actions, the Court finds
that petitioners have failed to establish a "a well-defined, clear and certain legal right" to be furnished by the
Executive Secretary and/or the DBM of their requested PDAF Use Schedule/List and Presidential Pork Use Report.
Neither did petitioners assert any law or administrative issuance which would form the bases of the latter‘s duty to
furnish them with the documents requested. While petitioners pray that said information be equally released to the
CoA, it must be pointed out that the CoA has not been impleaded as a party to these cases nor has it filed any
petition before the Court to be allowed access to or to compel the release of any official document relevant to the
conduct of its audit investigations. While the Court recognizes that the information requested is a matter of significant
public concern, however, if only to ensure that the parameters of disclosure are properly foisted and so as not to
unduly hamper the equally important interests of the government, it is constrained to deny petitioners‘ prayer on this
score, without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they, or even the CoA, may choose to pursue through a
separate petition.
It bears clarification that the Court‘s denial herein should only cover petitioners‘ plea to be furnished with such
schedule/list and report and not in any way deny them, or the general public, access to official documents which are
already existing and of public record. Subject to reasonable regulation and absent any valid statutory prohibition,
access to these documents should not be proscribed. Thus, in Valmonte, while the Court denied the application for
mandamus towards the preparation of the list requested by petitioners therein, it nonetheless allowed access to the
documents sought for by the latter, subject, however, to the custodian‘s reasonable regulations,viz.:259
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to
reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end
that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the
records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured Legaspi
v. Civil Service Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387. The petition, as to the
second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e.,
"to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-
Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal
note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos."
The Court, therefore, applies the same treatment here.
2. Petitioners’ Prayer to Include Matters in Congressional Deliberations.
Petitioners further seek that the Court "order the inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all
presently, off-budget, lump sum, discretionary funds including but not limited to, proceeds from the x x x Malampaya
Fund, remittances from the PAGCOR and the PCSO or the Executive‘s Social Funds."260
Suffice it to state that the above-stated relief sought by petitioners covers a matter which is generally left to the
prerogative of the political branches of government. Hence, lest the Court itself overreach, it must equally deny their
prayer on this score.
3. Respondents’ Prayer to Lift TRO; Consequential Effects of Decision.
The final issue to be resolved stems from the interpretation accorded by the DBM to the concept of released funds. In
response to the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO that enjoined the release of the remaining PDAF allocated for the
year 2013, the DBM issued Circular Letter No. 2013-8 dated September 27, 2013 (DBM Circular 2013-8) which
pertinently reads as follows:
3.0 Nonetheless, PDAF projects funded under the FY 2013 GAA, where a Special Allotment Release Order (SARO)
has been issued by the DBM and such SARO has been obligated by the implementing agencies prior to the issuance
of the TRO, may continually be implemented and disbursements thereto effected by the agencies concerned.
Based on the text of the foregoing, the DBM authorized the continued implementation and disbursement of PDAF
funds as long as they are: first, covered by a SARO; and, second, that said SARO had been obligated by the
implementing agency concerned prior to the issuance of the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO.
Petitioners take issue with the foregoing circular, arguing that "the issuance of the SARO does not yet involve the
release of funds under the PDAF, as release is only triggered by the issuance of a Notice of Cash Allocation
[(NCA)]."261 As such, PDAF disbursements, even if covered by an obligated SARO, should remain enjoined.
For their part, respondents espouse that the subject TRO only covers "unreleased and unobligated allotments." They
explain that once a SARO has been issued and obligated by the implementing agency concerned, the PDAF funds
covered by the same are already "beyond the reach of the TRO because they cannot be considered as ‘remaining
PDAF.‘" They conclude that this is a reasonable interpretation of the TRO by the DBM.262
The Court agrees with petitioners in part.
At the outset, it must be observed that the issue of whether or not the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO should be
lifted is a matter rendered moot by the present Decision. The unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article as declared
herein has the consequential effect of converting the temporary injunction into a permanent one. Hence, from the
promulgation of this Decision, the release of the remaining PDAF funds for 2013, among others, is now permanently
enjoined.
The propriety of the DBM‘s interpretation of the concept of "release" must, nevertheless, be resolved as it has a
practical impact on the execution of the current Decision. In particular, the Court must resolve the issue of whether or
not PDAF funds covered by obligated SAROs, at the time this Decision is promulgated, may still be disbursed
following the DBM‘s interpretation in DBM Circular 2013-8.
On this score, the Court agrees with petitioners‘ posturing for the fundamental reason that funds covered by an
obligated SARO are yet to be "released" under legal contemplation. A SARO, as defined by the DBM itself in its
website, is "aspecific authority issued to identified agencies to incur obligations not exceeding a given amount during
a specified period for the purpose indicated. It shall cover expenditures the release of which is subject to compliance
with specific laws or regulations, or is subject to separate approval or clearance by competent authority."263
Based on this definition, it may be gleaned that a SARO only evinces the existence of an obligation and not the
directive to pay. Practically speaking, the SARO does not have the direct and immediate effect of placing public funds
beyond the control of the disbursing authority. In fact, a SARO may even be withdrawn under certain circumstances
which will prevent the actual release of funds. On the other hand, the actual release of funds is brought about by the
issuance of the NCA,264 which is subsequent to the issuance of a SARO. As may be determined from the statements
of the DBM representative during the Oral Arguments:265
Justice Bernabe: Is the notice of allocation issued simultaneously with the SARO?
xxxx
Atty. Ruiz: It comes after. The SARO, Your Honor, is only the go signal for the agencies to obligate or to enter into
commitments. The NCA, Your Honor, is already the go signal to the treasury for us to be able to pay or to liquidate
the amounts obligated in the SARO; so it comes after. x x x The NCA, Your Honor, is the go signal for the MDS for
the authorized government-disbursing banks to, therefore, pay the payees depending on the projects or projects
covered by the SARO and the NCA.
Justice Bernabe: Are there instances that SAROs are cancelled or revoked?
Atty. Ruiz: Your Honor, I would like to instead submit that there are instances that the SAROs issued are withdrawn
by the DBM.
Justice Bernabe: They are withdrawn?
Atty. Ruiz: Yes, Your Honor x x x. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be treated as funds which have been "released." In
this respect, therefore, the disbursement of 2013 PDAF funds which are only covered by obligated SAROs, and
without any corresponding NCAs issued, must, at the time of this Decision’s promulgation, be enjoined and
consequently reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund. Verily, in view of the declared
unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article, the funds appropriated pursuant thereto cannot be disbursed even
though already obligated, else the Court sanctions the dealing of funds coming from an unconstitutional source.
This same pronouncement must be equally applied to (a) the Malampaya Funds which have been obligated but not
released – meaning, those merely covered by a SARO – under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910; and (b) funds sourced from the Presidential
Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of
PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which were altogether declared by the Court as unconstitutional. However, these
funds should not be reverted to the general fund as afore-stated but instead, respectively remain under the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund to be utilized for their corresponding special purposes not
otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
E. Consequential Effects of Decision.
As a final point, it must be stressed that the Court‘s pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013
PDAF Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c) the
phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910,
and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD
1993, must only be treated as prospective in effect in view of the operative fact doctrine.
To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares
the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to
obedience and respect and should be properly enforced and complied with. As explained in the recent case of
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation,266 the doctrine merely "reflects awareness that
precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or
executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that
may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be
no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication."267 "In the language of an American Supreme Court
decision: ‘The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination of unconstitutionality, is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.‘"268
For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore applied prospectively.
Conclusion
The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in the chronicles of our history. In the final
analysis, the Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the
rules within which it operates. To recount, insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-
oversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system has violated the principle of
separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them personal,
discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine, it has
similarly violated the principle of non-delegability of legislative power ; insofar as it has created a system of budgeting
wherein items are not textualized into the appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment
and, in the process, denied the President the power to veto items ; insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of
congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of governance
which they may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public accountability ; insofar as
it has authorized legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the
existence of capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy ; and again, insofar as it has
conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended by law for energy-related purposes only to other
purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under the broad classification of "priority infrastructure
development projects," it has once more transgressed the principle of non-delegability.
For as long as this nation adheres to the rule of law, any of the multifarious unconstitutional methods and
mechanisms the Court has herein pointed out should never again be adopted in any system of governance, by any
name or form, by any semblance or similarity, by any influence or effect. Disconcerting as it is to think that a system
so constitutionally unsound has monumentally endured, the Court urges the people and its co-stewards in
government to look forward with the optimism of change and the awareness of the past. At a time of great civic unrest
and vociferous public debate, the Court fervently hopes that its Decision today, while it may not purge all the wrongs
of society nor bring back what has been lost, guides this nation to the path forged by the Constitution so that no one
may heretofore detract from its cause nor stray from its course. After all, this is the Court‘s bounden duty and no
other‘s.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional violations discussed in this
Decision, the Court hereby declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire 2013 PDAF Article; (b) all legal
provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and
the various Congressional Insertions, which authorize/d legislators – whether individually or collectively organized into
committees – to intervene, assume or participate in any of the various post-enactment stages of the budget
execution, such as but not limited to the areas of project identification, modification and revision of project
identification, fund release and/or fund realignment, unrelated to the power of congressional oversight; (c) all legal
provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and
the various Congressional Insertions, which confer/red personal, lump-sum allocations to legislators from which they
are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine; (d) all informal practices of similar import and
effect, which the Court similarly deems to be acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (e) the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President"
under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects"
under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, for both failing the
sufficient standard test in violation of the principle of non-delegability of legislative power.
Accordingly, the Court‘s temporary injunction dated September 10, 2013 is hereby declared to be PERMANENT.
Thus, the disbursement/release of the remaining PDAF funds allocated for the year 2013, as well as for all previous
years, and the funds sourced from (1) the Malampaya Funds under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may
be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910, and (2) the Presidential
Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of
Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, which are, at the time this Decision is
promulgated, not covered by Notice of Cash Allocations (NCAs) but only by Special Allotment Release Orders
(SAROs), whether obligated or not, are hereby ENJOINED. The remaining PDAF funds covered by this permanent
injunction shall not be disbursed/released but instead reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund,
while the funds under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund shall remain therein to be utilized for
their respective special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper substantiation, the Court hereby DENIES petitioners‘
prayer seeking that the Executive Secretary and/or the Department of Budget and Management be ordered to
provide the public and the Commission on Audit complete lists/schedules or detailed reports related to the availments
and utilization of the funds subject of these cases. Petitioners‘ access to official documents already available and of
public record which are related to these funds must, however, not be prohibited but merely subjected to the
custodian‘s reasonable regulations or any valid statutory prohibition on the same. This denial is without prejudice to a
proper mandamus case which they or the Commission on Audit may choose to pursue through a separate petition.
The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to order the inclusion of the funds subject of these cases in the budgetary
deliberations of Congress as the same is a matter left to the prerogative of the political branches of government.
Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the government to, within the bounds of reasonable
dispatch, investigate and accordingly prosecute all government officials and/or private individuals for possible criminal
offenses related to the irregular, improper and/or unlawful disbursement/utilization of all funds under the Pork Barrel
System.
This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.
SO ORDERED.
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as the
lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent several legal designations from “Congressional
Pork Barrel” to the latest “Priority Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the
annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to – P40 million for “hard projects” (infrastructure projects
like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for “soft projects” (scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood
programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members may request for the
realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator
concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes
from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project – this has been around since 1976, and (b) the
Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR – this has been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by
Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim
Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-government
organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact going
to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the
exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the
constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
 Constitution on local autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional. becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.

HELD: II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.

I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The executive, on the
other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the
law but under the pork barrel system, what’s happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators
themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to – a clear act of implementing the law they
enacted – a violation of the principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled
that pork barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the legislators only
recommend where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the concurrence of the
legislator concerned.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section
29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any
appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by
PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-related ventures shall form part
of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource development and for other
purposes which the President may direct;

b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the people legislative power
but only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be delegated
by Congress for it cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund
(the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation
contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD
910 and PD 1869.

(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;

(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times
of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress
may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the Government.

In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his PDAF money should go to
is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in
the two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it
state that the Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.

c. Principle of Checks and Balances

One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem
to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the
legislator can now identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto
the appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA – again, “Congress cannot
choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.”

d. Local Autonomy

As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs),
the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of
the members of the house of representatives, what’s happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project
by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a
national officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government – and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the

G.R. No. 196231               September 4, 2012
EMILIO A. GONZALES III, Petitioner,  not just of the deceased hostage-taker but also of the hostage victims, eight of whom died during the bungled police
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, acting through and represented by EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SENIOR DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY JOSE AMOR M.
AMORANDO, Officer in Charge, Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, ATTY. RONALDO
A. GERON, DIR. ROWENA TURINGAN-SANCHEZ, and ATTY. CARLITOD. CATAYONG, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 196232
WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT, Petitioner,  remaining passengers had been killed.
vs.
ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
ATTY. DENNIS F. ORTIZ, ATTY. CARLO D.SULAY and ATTY. FROILAN MONTALBAN, .JR., in their capacities
as CHAIRMAN and MEMBERS of the OFFICE OF MALACAÑANG LEGAL AFFAIRS, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The Case
These two petitions have been consolidated not because they stem from the same factual milieu but because they
raise a common thread of issues relating to the President's exercise of the power to remove from office herein
petitioners who claim the protective cloak of independence of the constitutionally-created office to which they belong -
the Office of the Ombudsman.
The first case, docketed as G.R. No. 196231, is a Petition for Certiorari (with application for issuance of temporary
restraining order or status quo order) which assails on jurisdictional grounds the Decision1 dated March 31, 2011
rendered by the Office of the President in OP Case No. 10-J-460 dismissing petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices (MOLEO), upon a finding of guilt on the
administrative charges of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting a Betrayal of Public Trust. The
petition primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known
as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives the President the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office
of the Ombudsman.
The second case, docketed as G.R. No. 196232, is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with application for
issuance of a temporary restraining order or status quo order) seeking to annul, reverse and set aside (1) the undated
Order2 requiring petitioner Wendell Barreras-Sulit to submit a written explanation with respect to alleged acts or
omissions constituting serious/grave offenses in relation to the Plea Bargaining Agreement (PLEBARA) entered into
with Major General Carlos F. Garcia; and (2) the April 7, 2011 Notice of Preliminary Investigation,3 both issued by the
Office of the President in OP-DC-Case No. 11-B-003, the administrative case initiated against petitioner as a Special
Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman. The petition likewise seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of
R.A. No. 6770 giving the President the power to dismiss a Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The facts from which these two cases separately took root are neither complicated nor unfamiliar.
In the morning of August 23, 2010, news media scampered for a minute-by-minute coverage of a hostage drama that
had slowly unfolded right at the very heart of the City of Manila. While initial news accounts were fragmented it was
not difficult to piece together the story on the hostage-taker, Police Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza. He was a
disgruntled former police officer attempting to secure his reinstatement in the police force and to restore the benefits
of a life-long, and erstwhile bemedaled, service. The following day, broadsheets and tabloids were replete with stories
operation to rescue the hapless innocents. Their tragic deaths triggered word wars of foreign relation proportions.
One newspaper headline ran the story in detail, as follows:
MANILA, Philippines - A dismissed policeman armed with an assault rifle hijacked a bus packed with tourists, and
killed most of its passengers in a 10 hour-hostage drama shown live on national television until last night.
Former police senior inspector Rolando Mendoza was shot dead by a sniper at past 9 p.m. Mendoza hijacked the bus
and took 21 Chinese tourists hostage, demanding his reinstatement to the police force.
The hostage drama dragged on even after the driver of the bus managed to escape and told police that all the
Late into the night assault forces surrounded the bus and tried to gain entry, but a pair of dead hostages hand-cuffed
to the door made it difficult for them. Police said they fired at the wheels of the bus to immobilize it.
Police used hammers to smash windows, door and wind-shield but were met with intermittent fire from the hos-tage
taker.
Police also used tear gas in an effort to confirm if the remaining hostages were all dead or alive. When the standoff
ended at nearly 9 p.m., some four hostages were rescued alive while Mendoza was killed by a sniper.
Initial reports said some 30 policemen stormed the bus. Shots also rang out, sending bystanders scampering for
safety.
It took the policemen almost two hours to assault the bus because gunfire reportedly rang out from inside the bus.
Mendoza hijacked the tourist bus in the morning and took the tourists hostage.
Mendoza, who claimed he was illegally dismissed from the police service, initially released nine of the hostages
during the drama that began at 10 a.m. and played out live on national television.
Live television footage showed Mendoza asking for food for those remaining in the bus, which was delivered, and fuel
to keep the air-conditioning going. The disgruntled former police officer was reportedly armed with an M-16 rifle, a 9
mm pistol and two hand grenades.
Mendoza posted a handwritten note on the windows of the bus, saying "big deal will start after 3 p.m. today." Another
sign stuck to another window said "3 p.m. today deadlock."
Stressing his demand, Mendoza stuck a piece of paper with a handwritten message: "Big mistake to correct a big
wrong decision." A larger piece of paper on the front windshield was headed, "Release final decision," apparently
referring to the case that led to his dismissal from the police force.
Negotiations dragged on even after Mendoza's self-imposed deadline.
Senior Police Officer 2 Gregorio Mendoza said his brother was upset over his dismissal from the police force. "His
problem was he was unjustly removed from service. There was no due process, no hearing, no com-plaint," Gregorio
said.
Last night, Gregorio was arrested by his colleagues on suspicions of being an accessory to his brother's action.
Tensions rose as relatives tried to prevent lawmen from arresting Gregorio in front of national television. This
triggered the crisis that eventually forced Mendoza to carry out his threat and kill the remaining hostages.
Negotiators led by Superintendent Orlando Yebra and Chief Inspector Romeo Salvador tried to talk Mendoza into
surrendering and releasing the 21 hostages, mostly children and three Filipinos, including the driver, the tourist guide
and a photographer. Yebra reportedly lent a cellphone to allow communications with Mendoza in-side the bus, which
was parked in front ofthe Quirino Grandstand.
Children could be seen peeking from the drawn curtains of the bus while police negotiators hovered near the scene.
Manila Police District (MPD) director Chief Superinten-dent Rodolfo Magtibay ordered the deployment of crack police
teams and snipers near the scene. A crisis man-agement committee had been activated with Manila Vice Mayor Isko
Moreno coordinating the actions with the MPD.
Earlier last night, Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez had a meeting with Moreno to discuss Mendoza's case that led
to his dismissal from the service. Ombudsman spokesman Jose de Jesus said Gutierrez gave a "sealed letter" to
Moreno to be delivered to Mendoza. De Jesus did not elaborate on the contents of the letter but said Moreno was
tasked to personally deliver the letter to Mendoza.
MPD spokesman Chief Inspector Edwin Margarejo said Mendoza was apparently distraught by the slow process of
the Ombudsman in deciding his motion for reconside-ration. He said the PNP-Internal Affairs Service and the Manila
Regional Trial Court had already dismissed crim-inal cases against him.
The hostage drama began when Mendoza flagged down the Hong Thai Travel Tourist bus (TVU-799), pretend-ing to
hitch a ride. Margarejo said the bus had just left Fort Santiago in Intramuros when Mendoza asked the driver to let
him get on and ride to Quirino Grandstand. Upon reaching the Quirino Grandstand, Mendoza an-nounced to the
passengers that they would be taken hostage. "Having worn his (police) uniform, of course there is no doubt that he
already planned the hostage taking," Margarejo said. - Sandy Araneta, Nestor Etolle, Delon Porcalla, Amanda Fisher,
Cecille Suerte Felipe, Christi-na Mendez, AP Grandstand Carnage, The Philippine Star, Updated August 24, 2010
12:00 AM, Val Rodri-guez.4
In a completely separate incident much earlier in time, more particularly in December of 2003, 28-year-old Juan
Paolo Garcia and 23-year-old Ian Carl Garcia were caught in the United States smuggling $100,000 from Manila by
concealing the cash in their luggage and making false statements to US Customs Officers. The Garcia brothers
pleaded guilty to bulk cash smuggling and agreed to forfeit the amount in favor of the US Government in exchange
for the dismissal of the rest of the charges against them and for being sentenced to time served. Inevitably, however,
an investigation into the source of the smuggled currency conducted by US Federal Agents and the Philippine
Government unraveled a scandal of military corruption and amassed wealth -- the boys' father, Retired Major General
Carlos F. Garcia, former Chief Procurement Officer of the Armed Forces, had accumulated more than ₱ 300 Million
during his active military service. Plunder and Anti-Money Laundering cases were eventually filed against Major
General Garcia, his wife and their two sons before the Sandiganbayan.
G.R. No. 196231
Sometime in 2008, a formal charge5 for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery extortion and physical
injuries) was filed before the Philippine National Police-National Capital Region (PNP-NCR) against Manila Police
District Senior Inspector (P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza, and four others, namely, Police Inspector Nelson Lagasca,
Senior Police Inspector I Nestor David, Police Officer III Wilson Gavino, and Police Officer II Roderick Lopena. A
similar charge was filed by the private complainant, Christian M. Kalaw, before the Office of the City Prosecutor,
Manila, docketed as I.S. No. 08E-09512.
On July 24, 2008, while said cases were still pending, the Office of the Regional Director of the National Police
Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the request of petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, all relevant documents and
evidence in relation to said case to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate administrative
adjudication.6 Subsequently, Case No. OMB-P-A-08-0670-H for Grave Misconduct was lodged against P/S Insp.
Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers, who filed their respective verified position papers as directed.
Meanwhile, on August 26, 2008, I.S. No. 08E-09512 was dismissed7 upon a finding that the material allegations made
by the complainant had not been substantiated "by any evidence at all to warrant the indictment of respondents of the
offenses charged." Similarly, the Internal Affairs Service of the PNP issued a Resolution8 dated October 17, 2008
recommending the dismissal without prejudice of the administrative case against the same police officers, for failure
of the complainant to appear in three (3) consecutive hearings despite due notice.
However, on February 16, 2009, upon the recommendation of petitioner Emilio Gonzales III, a Decision9 in Case No.
OMB-P-A-08-0670-H finding P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers guilty of Grave Misconduct
was approved by the Ombudsman. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that respondents P/S Insp. ROLANDO DEL ROSARIO MENDOZA
and PO3 WILSON MATIC GAVINO of PRO-ARMM, Camp Brig. Gen. Salipada K. Pendatun, Parang, Shariff
Kabunsuan; P/INSP. NELSON URBANO LAGASCA, SPO1 NESTOR REYES DAVID and PO2 RODERICK SALVA
LOPEÑA of Manila Police District, Headquarters, United Nations Avenue, Manila, be meted the penalty
of DISMISSAL from the Service, pursuant to Section 52 (A), Rule IV, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, with the accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in the government service pursuant to Section 58, Rule IV of the same Uniform Rules of Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, for having committed GRAVE MISCONDUCT.
On November 5, 2009, they filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 of the foregoing Decision, followed by a Supplement
to the Motion for Reconsideration11 on November 19, 2009. On December 14, 2009, the pleadings mentioned and the
records of the case were assigned for review and recommendation to Graft Investigation and Prosecutor Officer
Dennis L. Garcia, who released a draft Order12 on April 5, 2010 for appropriate action by his immediate superior,
Director Eulogio S. Cecilio, who, in turn, signed and forwarded said Order to petitioner Gonzalez's office on April 27,
2010. Not more than ten (10) days after, more particularly on May 6, 2010, petitioner endorsed the Order, together
with the case records, for final approval by Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez, in whose office it remained pending
for final review and action when P/S Insp. Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful day of
August 23, 2010 in a desperate attempt to have himself reinstated in the police service.
In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which ended in the tragic murder of eight HongKong Chinese
nationals, the injury of seven others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza, a public outcry against the
blundering of government officials prompted the creation of the Incident Investigation and Review Committee
(IIRC),13 chaired by Justice Secretary Leila de Lima and vice-chaired by Interior and Local Government Secretary
Jesus Robredo. It was tasked to determine accountability for the incident through the conduct of public hearings and
executive sessions. However, petitioner, as well as the Ombudsman herself, refused to participate in the IIRC
proceedings on the assertion that the Office of the Ombudsman is an independent constitutional body.
Sifting through testimonial and documentary evidence, the IIRC eventually identified petitioner Gonzales to be among
those in whom culpability must lie. In its Report,14 the IIRC made the following findings:
Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their own rules
of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9) months without any
justification, in violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative
disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission. The inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition
thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking.
More so, Mendoza's demand for immediate resolution of his motion for reconsideration is not without legal and
compelling bases considering the following:
(a) PSI Mendoza and four policemen were investigated by the Ombudsman involving a case for
alleged robbery (extortion), grave threats and physical injuries amounting to grave misconduct
allegedly committed against a certain Christian Kalaw. The same case, however, was previously
dismissed by the Manila City Prosecutors Office for lack of probable cause and by the PNP-NCR
Internal Affairs Service for failure of the complainant (Christian Kalaw) to submit evidence and
prosecute the case. On the other hand, the case which was filed much ahead by Mendoza et al.
against Christian Kalaw involving the same incident, was given due course by the City
Prosecutors Office.
(b) The Ombudsman exercised jurisdiction over the case based on a letter issued motu proprio
for Deputy Ombudsman Emilio A. Gonzalez III, directing the PNP-NCR - without citing any
reason - to endorse the case against Mendoza and the arresting policemen to his office for
administrative adjudication, thereby showing undue interest on the case. He also caused the
docketing of the case and named Atty. Clarence V. Guinto of the PNP-CIDG-NCR, who indorsed
the case records, as the nominal complainant, in lieu of Christian Kalaw. During the proceedings,
Christian Kalaw did not also affirm his complaint-affidavit with the Ombudsman or submit any
position paper as required.
(c) Subsequently, Mendoza, after serving preventive suspension, was adjudged liable for grave
misconduct by Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales (duly approved on May 21, 2009) based on the
sole and uncorroborated complaint-affidavit of Christian Kalaw, which was not previously
sustained by the City Prosecutor's Office and the PNP Internal Affairs Service. From the said
Resolution, Mendoza interposed a timely motion for reconsideration (dated and filed November
5, 2009) as well as a supplement thereto. No opposition or comment was filed thereto.
(d) Despite the pending and unresolved motion for reconsideration, the judgment of dismissal
was enforced, thereby abruptly ending Mendoza's 30 years of service in the PNP with forfeiture
of all his benefits. As a result, Mendoza sought urgent relief by sending several hand-written
letter-requests to the Ombudsman for immediate resolution of his motion for reconsideration. But
his requests fell on deaf ears.
xxxx
By allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for nine long (9) months without any justification,
Ombudsman Gutierrez and Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed complete and wanton violation of the
Ombudsman prescribed rule to resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases within five (5)
days from submission (Sec. 8, Ombudsman Rules of Procedure). The inaction is gross, there being no opposition to
the motion for reconsideration.
Besides, the Ombudsman, without first resolving the motion for reconsideration, arbitrarily enforced the judgment of
dismissal and ignored the intervening requests for immediate resolution, thereby rendering the inaction even more
inexcusable and unjust as to amount to gross negligence and grave misconduct.
SECOND, Ombudsman Gutierrez and Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious disregard of due process,
manifest injustice and oppression in failing to provisionally suspend the further implementation of the judgment of
dismissal against Mendoza pending disposition of his unresolved motion for reconsideration.
By enforcing the judgment of dismissal without resolving the motion for reconsideration for over nine months, the two
Ombudsman officials acted with arbitrariness and without regard to due process and the constitutional right of an
accused to the speedy disposition of his case. As long as his motion for reconsideration remained pending and
unresolved, Mendoza was also effectively deprived of the right to avail of the ordinary course of appeal or review to
challenge the judgment of dismissal before the higher courts and seek a temporary restraining order to prevent the
further execution thereof.
As such, if the Ombudsman cannot resolve with dispatch the motion for reconsideration, it should have provisionally
suspended the further enforcement of the judgment of dismissal without prejudice to its re-implementation if the
reconsideration is eventually denied. Otherwise, the Ombudsman will benefit from its own inaction. Besides, the
litigant is entitled to a stay of the execution pending resolution of his motion for reconsideration. Until the motion for
reconsideration is denied, the adjudication process before the Ombudsman cannot be considered as completely
finished and, hence, the judgment is not yet ripe for execution.
xxxx
When the two Ombudsman officials received Mendoza's demand for the release of the final order resolving his
motion for reconsideration, they should have performed their duty by resolving the reconsideration that same day
since it was already pending for nine months and the prescribed period for its resolution is only five days. Or if they
cannot resolve it that same day, then they should have acted decisively by issuing an order provisionally suspending
the further enforcement of the judgment of dismissal subject to revocation once the reconsideration is denied and
without prejudice to the arrest and prosecution of Mendoza for the hostage-taking. Had they done so, the crisis may
have ended peacefully, without necessarily compromising the integrity of the institution. After all, as relayed to the
negotiators, Mendoza did express willingness to take full responsibility for the hostage-taking if his demand for
release of the final decision or reinstatement was met.
But instead of acting decisively, the two Ombudsman officials merely offered to review a pending motion for review of
the case, thereby prolonging their inaction and aggravating the situation. As expected, Mendoza - who previously
berated Deputy Gonzales for allegedly demanding Php150,000 in exchange for favorably resolving the motion for
reconsideration - rejected and branded as trash ("basura") the Ombudsman [sic] letter promising review, triggering
the collapse of the negotiations. To prevent the situation from getting out of hand, the negotiators sought the
alternative option of securing before the PNP-NCRPO an order for Mendoza's provisional reinstatement pending
resolution of the motion for reconsideration. Unfortunately, it was already too late. But had the Ombudsman officials
performed their duty under the law and acted decisively, the entire crisis may have ended differently.
The IIRC recommended that its findings with respect to petitioner Gonzales be referred to the Office of the President
(OP) for further determination of possible administrative offenses and for the initiation of the proper administrative
proceedings.
On October 15, 2010, the OP instituted a Formal Charge15 against petitioner Gonzales for Gross Neglect of Duty
and/or Inefficiency in the Performance of Official Duty under Rule XIV, Section 22 of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292 and other pertinent Civil
Service Laws, rules and regulations, and for Misconduct in Office under Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.16 Petitioner filed his Answer17 thereto in due time.
Shortly after the filing by the OP of the administrative case against petitioner, a complaint dated October 29, 2010 committed acts and/or omissions tantamount to culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust,
was filed by Acting Assistant Ombudsman Joselito P. Fangon before the Internal Affairs Board of the Office of the which are violations under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and grounds for removal from office under the
Ombudsman charging petitioner with "directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, Ombudsman Act.
percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the
Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law"
The Office of the President initiated OP-DC-Case No. 11-B-003 against petitioner Barreras-Sulit. In her written
under Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and also, with solicitation or acceptance of gifts under
explanation, petitioner raised the defenses of prematurity and the lack of jurisdiction of the OP with respect to the
Section 7(d) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards.18 In a Joint Resolution19 dated February 17, 2011, which
administrative disciplinary proceeding against her. The OP, however, still proceeded with the case, setting it for
was approved by Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, the complaint was dismissed, as follows:
preliminary investigation on April 15, 2011.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding no probable cause to indict respondent Emilio A. Gonzales III for
Hence, the petition.
violations of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 and Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713, the complaint is hereby be
[sic] DISMISSED.
The Issues
Further, finding no sufficient evidence to hold respondent administratively liable for Misconduct, the same is
likewise DISMISSED. In G.R. No. 196231, petitioner Gonzales raises the following grounds, to wit:

Meanwhile, the OP notified20 petitioner that a Preliminary Clarificatory Conference relative to the administrative charge (A)
against him was to be conducted at the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA) on
February 8, 2011. Petitioner Gonzales alleged,21 however, that on February 4, 2011, he heard the news that the OP
RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE OTHER INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS,
had announced his suspension for one year due to his delay in the disposition of P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion for
HAS NO CONSTITUTIONAL OR VALID STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO SUBJECT PETITIONER TO AN
reconsideration. Hence, believing that the OP had already prejudged his case and that any proceeding before it
ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION AND TO THEREAFTER ORDER HIS REMOVAL AS DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN.
would simply be a charade, petitioner no longer attended the scheduled clarificatory conference. Instead, he filed an
Objection to Proceedings22 on February 7, 2011. Despite petitioner's absence, however, the OP pushed through with
the proceedings and, on March 31, 2011, rendered the assailed Decision,23 the dispositive portion of which reads: (B)

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Office finds Deputy Ombudsman Emilio A. Gonzales III guilty of Gross RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE OTHER INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS,
Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust, and hereby meted out the penalty GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
of DISMISSAL from service. CONDUCTED ITS INVESTIGATION AND RENDERED ITS DECISION IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONER'S RIGHT
TO DUE PROCESS.
SO ORDERED.
(C)
Hence, the petition.
RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS, GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT
G.R. No. 196232
PETITIONER COMMITTED DELAY IN THE DISPOSITION OF MENDOZA'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.

In April of 2005, the Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos
(D)
F. Garcia, his wife Clarita D. Garcia, their sons Ian Carl Garcia, Juan Paulo Garcia and Timothy Mark Garcia and
several unknown persons with Plunder (Criminal Case No. 28107) and Money Laundering (Criminal Case No.
SB09CRM0194) before the Sandiganbayan. RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS, GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT
PETITIONER TOOK UNDUE INTEREST IN MENDOZA'S CASE.
On January 7, 2010, the Sandiganbayan denied Major General Garcia's urgent petition for bail holding that strong
prosecution evidence militated against the grant of bail. On March 16, 2010, however, the government, represented
by petitioner, Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit ("Barreras-Sulit") and her prosecutorial staff sought the (E)
Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea Bargaining Agreement (hereinafter referred to as "PLEBARA") entered into with
the accused. On May 4, 2010, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding the change of plea warranted and the
PLEBARA compliant with jurisprudential guidelines. RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS, GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FAULTING PETITIONER
FOR NOT RELEASING THE RESOLUTION ON MENDOZA'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR FOR NOT
Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major General Garcia to get off the hook with nothing but a slap on SUSPENDING MENDOZA'S DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE DURING THE HOSTAGE CRISIS.
the hand notwithstanding the prosecution's apparently strong evidence of his culpability for serious public offenses,
the House of Representatives' Committee on Justice conducted public hearings on the PLEBARA. At the conclusion
of these public hearings, the Committee on Justice passed and adopted Committee Resolution No. (F)
3,24recommending to the President the dismissal of petitioner Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing of
appropriate charges against her Deputies and Assistants before the appropriate government office for having
RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS, GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT THERE
WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT PETITIONER DEMANDED A BRIBE FROM MENDOZA.25
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 196232, petitioner Barreras-Sulit poses for the Court the question -
AS OF THIS POINT IN TIME, WOULD TAKING AND CONTINUING TO TAKE ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY
PROCEEDING AGAINST PETITIONER BE LAWFUL AND JUSTIFIABLE? 26
Re-stated, the primordial question in these two petitions is whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to
exercise administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the
constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman.
(2)    Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or controlled corporation with
original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or
impropriety in the performance of duties.
(3)    Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and
recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
(4)    Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law,
to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the
disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for
appropriate action.

(5)    Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its
The Court's Ruling
responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.

Short of claiming themselves immune from the ordinary means of removal, petitioners asseverate that the President
(6)    Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence.
has no disciplinary jurisdiction over them considering that the Office of the Ombudsman to which they belong is
clothed with constitutional independence and that they, as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor therein,
necessarily bear the constitutional attributes of said office. (7)    Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government and
make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency.
The Court is not convinced.
(8)    Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may
be provided by law.31
The Ombudsman's administrative
disciplinary power over a Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prose-cutor is not exclusive. Congress thereafter passed, on November 17, 1989, Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, to shore
up the Ombudsman's institutional strength by granting it "full administrative disciplinary power over public officials and
employees,"32 as follows:
It is true that the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations proceeds from its
constitutional mandate to be an effective protector of the people against inept and corrupt government officers and
employees,27 and is subsumed under the broad powers "explicitly conferred" upon it by the 1987 Constitution and Sec. 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary
R.A. No. 6770.28 authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and
agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress,
The ombudsman traces its origins to the primitive legal order of Germanic tribes. The Swedish term, which literally
and the Judiciary.(Emphasis supplied)
means "agent" or "representative," communicates the concept that has been carried on into the creation of the
modern-day ombudsman, that is, someone who acts as a neutral representative of ordinary citizens against
government abuses.29 This idea of a people's protector was first institutionalized in the Philippines under the 1973 In the exercise of such full administrative disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman was explicitly conferred
Constitution with the creation of the Tanodbayan, which wielded the twin powers of investigation and prosecution. the statutory power to conduct administrative investigations under Section 19 of the same law, thus:
Section 6, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution provided thus:
Sec. 19. Administrative complaints. - The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or
Sec. 6. The Batasang Pambansa shall create an office of the Ombudsman, to be known as Tanodbayan, which shall omissions which:
receive and investigate complaints relative to public office, including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations, make appropriate recommendations, and in case of failure of justice as defined by law, file and
1. Are contrary to law or regulation;
prosecute the corresponding criminal, civil, or administrative case before the proper court or body.

2. Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;

The framers of the 1987 Constitution later envisioned a more effective ombudsman vested with authority to "act in a
quick, inexpensive and effective manner on complaints against administrative officials", and to function purely with the
"prestige and persuasive powers of his office" in correcting improprieties, inefficiencies and corruption in government 3. Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency's functions, though in accordance with law;
freed from the hampering effects of prosecutorial duties.30 Accordingly, Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
enumerates the following powers, functions, and duties of the Office of the Ombudsman, viz:
4. Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;

(1)    Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office
5. Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or
or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
6. Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.
While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all government officials,
whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those officials removable by impeachment, the members of
congress and the judiciary, such authority is by no means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they should be
solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 declares the
Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the
President express power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. Thus:
Section 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy.-
xxxx
(2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the President for any of the grounds provided
for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part thereof
be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting
provisions. A construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently
inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious
whole.33Otherwise stated, the law must not be read in truncated parts. Every part thereof must be considered together
with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.34
A harmonious construction of these two apparently conflicting provisions in R.A. No. 6770 leads to the inevitable
conclusion that Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise concurrent disciplinary
jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, respectively. This sharing of authority goes into the wisdom of the legislature, which prerogative falls
beyond the pale of judicial inquiry. The Congressional deliberations on this matter are quite insightful, viz:
x x x Senator Angara explained that the phrase was added to highlight the fact that the Deputy Tanodbayan may only
be removed for cause and after due process. He added that the President alone has the power to remove the Deputy
Tanodbayan.
Reacting thereto, Senator Guingona observed that this might impair the independence of the Tanodbayan and
suggested that the procedural removal of the Deputy Tanodbayan...; and that he can be removed not by the
President but by the Ombudsman.
However, the Chair expressed apprehension that the Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsman may try to protect
one another. The Chair suggested the substitution of the phrase "after due process" with the words after due notice
and hearing with the President as the ultimate authority.
Senator Guingona contended, however, that the Constitution provides for an independent Office of the Tanodbayan,
and to allow the Executive to have disciplinary powers over the Tanodbayan Deputies would be an encroachment on
the independence of the Tanodbayan.
Replying thereto, Senator Angara stated that originally, he was not averse to the proposal, however, considering the
Chair's observation that vesting such authority upon the Tanodbayan itself could result in mutual protection, it is
necessary that an outside official should be vested with such authority to effect a check and balance.35
Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in the same
Organic Act was to provide for an external authority, through the person of the President, that would exercise the
power of administrative discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least
diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all government officials and employees.
Such legislative design is simply a measure of "check and balance" intended to address the lawmakers' real and valid
concern that the Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect one another from administrative liabilities.
This would not be the first instance that the Office of the President has locked horns with the Ombudsman on the
matter of disciplinary jurisdiction. An earlier conflict had been settled in favor of shared authority in Hagad v. Gozo
Dadole.36 In said case, the Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Mandaue City, and a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod,
were charged before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No.
6713, and the Revised Penal Code. The pivotal issue raised therein was whether the Ombudsman had been divested
of his authority to conduct administrative investigations over said local elective officials by virtue of the subsequent
enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), the pertinent provision of which states:
Sec. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints.- A verified complaint against any erring local elective official
shall be prepared as follows:
(a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city, an independent component city or
component city shall be filed before the Office of the President.
The Court resolved said issue in the negative, upholding the ratiocination of the Solicitor General that R.A. No. 7160
should be viewed as having conferred on the Office of the President, but not on an exclusive basis, disciplinary
authority over local elective officials. Despite the fact that R.A. No. 7160 was the more recent expression of legislative
will, no repeal of pertinent provisions in the Ombudsman Act was inferred therefrom. Thus said the Court:
Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or
impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not
so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other. Well settled is
the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not favored, and that courts must generally assume their congruent
application. The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the
inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare legibus est
optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a
uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the
existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against
any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject.37
While Hagad v. Gozo Dadole38 upheld the plenary power of the Office of the Ombudsman to discipline elective
officials over the same disciplinary authority of the President under R.A. No. 7160, the more recent case of the Office
of the Ombudsman v. Delijero39 tempered the exercise by the Ombudsman of such plenary power invoking Section
23(2)40 of R.A. No. 6770, which gives the Ombudsman the option to "refer certain complaints to the proper disciplinary
authority for the institution of appropriate administrative proceedings against erring public officers or employees." The
Court underscored therein the clear legislative intent of imposing "a standard and a separate set of procedural
requirements in connection with administrative proceedings involving public school teachers"41 with the enactment of
R.A. No. 4670, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta for Public School Teachers." It thus declared that, while the
Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary authority over a public school teacher is concurrent with the proper
investigating committee of the Department of Education, it would have been more prudent under the circumstances
for the Ombudsman to have referred to the DECS the complaint against the public school teacher.
Unquestionably, the Ombudsman is possessed of jurisdiction to discipline his own people and mete out
administrative sanctions upon them, including the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service. However, it is
equally without question that the President has concurrent authority with respect to removal from office of the Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, albeit under specified conditions. Considering the principles attending
concurrence of jurisdiction where the Office of the President was the first to initiate a case against petitioner
Gonzales, prudence should have prompted the Ombudsman to desist from proceeding separately against petitioner
through its Internal Affairs Board, and to defer instead to the President's assumption of authority, especially when the
administrative charge involved "demanding and soliciting a sum of money" which constitutes either graft and
corruption or bribery, both of which are grounds reserved for the President's exercise of his authority to remove a
Deputy Ombudsman.
In any case, assuming that the Ombudsman's Internal Affairs Board properly conducted a subsequent and parallel
administrative action against petitioner, its earlier dismissal of the charge of graft and corruption against petitioner
could not have the effect of preventing the Office of the President from proceeding against petitioner upon the same
ground of graft and corruption. After all, the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers.42 In Montemayor v. Bundalian,43 the Court sustained the
President's dismissal from service of a Regional Director of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
who was found liable for unexplained wealth upon investigation by the now defunct Philippine Commission Against
Graft and Corruption (PCAGC). The Court categorically ruled therein that the prior dismissal by the Ombudsman of
similar charges against said official did not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case.
By granting express statutory
power to the President to remove
a Deputy Ombudsman and a
Special Prosecutor, Congress
merely filled an obvious gap in
the law.
Section 9, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution confers upon the President the power to appoint the Ombudsman and
his Deputies, viz:
Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least six nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees for every vacancy thereafter. Such
appointments shall require no confirmation. All vacancies shall be filled within three months after they occur.
While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the Constitution, which is by
impeachment under Section 244 of the same Article, there is, however, no constitutional provision similarly dealing
with the removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting Section
8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law without running afoul of any provision in the Constitution or
existing statutes. In fact, the Constitution itself, under Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all
other public officers, including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not subject to impeachment.
That the Deputies of the Ombudsman were intentionally excluded from the enumeration of impeachable officials is
clear from the following deliberations45 of the Constitutional Commission, thus:
MR. REGALADO. Yes, thank you. On Section 10, regarding the Ombudsman, there has been concern aired by
Commissioner Rodrigo about who will see to it that the Ombudsman will perform his duties because he is something
like a guardian of the government. This recalls the statement of Juvenal that while the Ombudsman is the guardian of
the people, "Quis custodiet ipsos custodies", who will guard the guardians? I understand here that the Ombudsman
who has the rank of a chairman of a constitutional commission is also removable only by impeachment.
MR. ROMULO. That is the intention, Madam President.
MR. REGALADO. Only the Ombudsman?
MR. MONSOD. Only the Ombudsman.
MR. REGALADO. So not his deputies, because I am concerned with the phrase "have the rank of". We know, for
instance, that the City Fiscal of Manila has the rank of a justice of the Intermediate Appellate Court, and yet he is not
a part of the judiciary. So I think we should clarify that also and read our discussions into the Record for purposes of
the Commission and the Committee.46
xxx
THE PRESIDENT. The purpose of the amendment of Commissioner Davide is not just to include the Ombudsman
among those officials who have to be removed from office only onimpeachment. Is that right?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote on the amendment, may I ask a question?
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO. The Ombudsman, is this only one man?
MR. DAVIDE. Only one man.
MR. RODRIGO. Not including his deputies.
MR. MONSOD. No.47 (Emphasis supplied)
The Power of the President to
Remove a Deputy Ombudsman
and a Special Prosecutor is
Implied from his Power to
Appoint.
Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove.48 As a general rule,
therefore, all officers appointed by the President are also removable by him.49 The exception to this is when the law
expressly provides otherwise - that is, when the power to remove is expressly vested in an office or authority other
than the appointing power. In some cases, the Constitution expressly separates the power to remove from the
President's power to appoint. Under Section 9, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Members of the Supreme
Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President. However, Members of the Supreme Court may
be removed after impeachment proceedings initiated by Congress (Section 2, Article XI), while judges of lower courts
may be removed only by the Supreme Court by virtue of its administrative supervision over all its personnel (Sections
6 and 11, Article VIII). The Chairpersons and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission Section 1(2), Article
IX(B), the Commission on Elections Section 1(2), Article IX(C), and the Commission on Audit Section 1(2), Article
IX(D) shall likewise be appointed by the President, but they may be removed only by impeachment (Section 2, Article
XI). As priorly stated, the Ombudsman himself shall be appointed by the President (Section 9, Article XI) but may also
be removed only by impeachment (Section 2, Article XI).
In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress simply laid
down in express terms an authority that is already implied from the President's constitutional authority to appoint the
aforesaid officials in the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Office of the Ombudsman is charged with monumental tasks that have been generally categorized into
investigatory power, prosecutorial power, public assistance, authority to inquire and obtain information and the
function to adopt, institute and implement preventive measures.50 In order to ensure the effectiveness of his
constitutional role, the Ombudsman was provided with an over-all deputy as well as a deputy each for Luzon, Visayas
and Mindanao. However, well into the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, a provision for the appointment
of a separate deputy for the military establishment was necessitated by Commissioner Ople's lament against the rise
within the armed forces of "fraternal associations outside the chain of command" which have become the common
soldiers' "informal grievance machinery" against injustice, corruption and neglect in the uniformed service,51 thus:
In our own Philippine Armed Forces, there has arisen in recent years a type of fraternal association outside the chain
of command proposing reformist objectives. They constitute, in fact, an informal grievance machinery against
injustices to the rank and file soldiery and perceive graft in higher rank and neglect of the needs of troops in combat
zones. The Reform the Armed Forces Movement of RAM has kept precincts for pushing logistics to the field, the
implied accusation being that most of the resources are used up in Manila instead of sent to soldiers in the field. The
Guardians, the El Diablo and other organizations dominated by enlisted men function, more or less, as grievance
collectors and as mutual aid societies.
This proposed amendment merely seeks to extend the office of the Ombudsman to the military establishment, just as
it champions the common people against bureaucratic indifference. The Ombudsman can designate a deputy to help
the ordinary foot soldier get through with his grievance to higher authorities. This deputy will, of course work in close
cooperation with the Minister of National Defense because of the necessity to maintain the integrity of the chain of
command. Ordinary soldiers, when they know they can turn to a military Ombudsman for their complaints, may not
have to fall back on their own informal devices to obtain redress for their grievances. The Ombudsman will help raise
troop morale in accordance with a major professed goal of the President and the military authorities themselves. x x x
The add-on now forms part of Section 5, Article XI which reads as follows:
Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be
known as Tanodbayan, one over-all Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. A
separate deputy for the military establishment shall likewise be appointed.(Emphasis supplied)
The integrity and effectiveness of the Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a military watchdog looking into abuses
and irregularities that affect the general morale and professionalism in the military is certainly of primordial
importance in relation to the President's own role asCommander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. It would not be
incongruous for Congress, therefore, to grant the President concurrent disciplinary authority over the Deputy
Ombudsman for the military and other law enforcement offices.
Granting the President the Power
to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman
does not Diminish the
Independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
The claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 granting the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman from
office totally frustrates, if not resultantly negates the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman is tenuous. The
independence which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested with was intended to free it from political considerations
in pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a protector of the people. What the Constitution secures for the Office of
the Ombudsman is, essentially, political independence. This means nothing more than that "the terms of office, the
salary, the appointments and discipline of all persons under the office" are "reasonably insulated from the whims of
politicians."52 And so it was that Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution had declared the creation of the
independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman and his Deputies, who are described as
"protectors of the people" and constitutionally mandated to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner
against public officials or employees of the Government Section 12, Article XI. Pertinent provisions under Article XI
prescribes a term of office of seven years without reappointment Section 11, prohibits a decrease in salaries during
the term of office Section 10, provides strict qualifications for the office Section 8, grants fiscal autonomy Section 14
and ensures the exercise of constitutional functions Section 12 and 13. The cloak of independence is meant to build
up the Office of the Ombudsman's institutional strength to effectively function as official critic, mobilizer of
government, constitutional watchdog53 and protector of the people. It certainly cannot be made to extend to
wrongdoings and permit the unbridled acts of its officials to escape administrative discipline.
Being aware of the constitutional imperative of shielding the Office of the Ombudsman from political influences and
the discretionary acts of the executive, Congress laid down two restrictions on the President's exercise of such power
of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman, namely: (1) that the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman must be for any of
the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman and (2) that there must be observance of due process.
Reiterating the grounds for impeachment laid down in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, paragraph 1 of
Section 8 of R.A. No. 6770 states that the Deputy Ombudsman may be removed from office for the same grounds
that the Ombudsman may be removed through impeachment, namely, "culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust." Thus, it cannot be rightly said that giving
the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor for that matter, would diminish or
compromise the constitutional independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. It is, precisely, a measure of protection
of the independence of the Ombudsman's Deputies and Special Prosecutor in the discharge of their duties that their
removal can only be had on grounds provided by law.
In Espinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman,54 the Court elucidated on the nature of the Ombudsman's independence in
this wise -
The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested in the Office of the Ombudsman. To insulate the
Office from outside pressure and improper influence, the Constitution as well as RA 6770 has endowed it with a wide
latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention. This
Court consistently refrains from interfering with the exercise of its powers, and respects the initiative and
independence inherent in the Ombudsman who, 'beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the
preserver of the integrity of public service.
Petitioner Gonzales may not be
removed from office where the
questioned acts, falling short of
constitutional standards, do not
constitute betrayal of public trust.
Having now settled the question concerning the validity of the President's power to remove the Deputy Ombudsman
and Special Prosecutor, we now go to the substance of the administrative findings in OP Case No. 10-J-460 which
led to the dismissal of herein petitioner, Deputy Ombudsman Emilio A. Gonzales, III.
At the outset, the Court finds no cause for petitioner Gonzales to complain simply because the OP proceeded with
the administrative case against him despite his non-attendance thereat. Petitioner was admittedly able to file an
Answer in which he had interposed his defenses to the formal charge against him. Due process is satisfied when a
person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative
proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the
accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process.55 Due process is simply having the
opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.56
The essence of due process is that a party is afforded reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any
evidence he may have in support of his defense.57 Mere opportunity to be heard is sufficient. As long as petitioner was
given the opportunity to explain his side and present evidence, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily
complied with because what the law abhors is an absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.58 Besides, petitioner only
has himself to blame for limiting his defense through the filing of an Answer. He had squandered a subsequent
opportunity to elucidate upon his pleaded defenses by adamantly refusing to attend the scheduled Clarificatory
Conference despite notice. The OP recounted as follows -
It bears noting that respondent Deputy Ombudsman Gonzalez was given two separate opportunities to explain his
side and answer the Formal Charge against him.
In the first instance, respondent was given the opportunity to submit his answer together with his documentary
evidence, which opportunity respondent actually availed of. In the second instance, this Office called a Clarificatory
Conference on 8 February 2011 pursuant to respondent's express election of a formal investigation. Despite due
notice, however, respondent Deputy Ombudsman refused to appear for said conference, interposing an objection
based on the unfounded notion that this Office has prejudged the instant case. Respondent having been given actual
and reasonable opportunity to explain or defend himself in due course, the requirement of due process has been
satisfied.59
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence,60 which is
more than a mere scintilla and means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.61 The fact, therefore, that petitioner later refused to participate in the hearings before the OP is
not a hindrance to a finding of his culpability based on substantial evidence, which only requires that a decision must
"have something upon which it is based."62
Factual findings of administrative bodies are controlling when supported by substantial evidence.63 The OP's
pronouncement of administrative accountability against petitioner and the imposition upon him of the corresponding
penalty of removal from office was based on the finding of gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct in office
amounting to a betrayal of public trust, which is a constitutional ground for the removal by impeachment of the
Ombudsman (Section 2, Article XI, 1987 Constitution), and a statutory ground for the President to remove from office
a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act.
The OP held that petitioner's want of care and wrongful conduct consisted of his unexplained action in directing the
PNP-NCR to elevate P/S Insp. Mendoza's case records to his office; his failure to verify the basis for requesting the
Ombudsman to take over the case; his pronouncement of administrative liability and imposition of the extreme
penalty of dismissal on P/S Insp. Mendoza based upon an unverified complaint-affidavit; his inordinate haste in
implementing P/S Insp. Mendoza's dismissal notwithstanding the latter's non-receipt of his copy of the Decision and
the subsequent filing of a motion for reconsideration; and his apparent unconcern that the pendency of the motion for
reconsideration for more than five months had deprived P/S Insp. Mendoza of available remedies against the
immediate implementation of the Decision dismissing him from the service.
Thus, taking into consideration the factual determinations of the IIRC, the allegations and evidence of petitioner in his
Answer as well as other documentary evidence, the OP concluded that: (1) petitioner failed to supervise his
subordinates to act with dispatch on the draft resolution of P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion for reconsideration and
thereby caused undue prejudice to P/S Insp. Mendoza by effectively depriving the latter of the right to challenge the
dismissal before the courts and prevent its immediate execution, and (2) petitioner showed undue interest by having
P/S Insp. Mendoza's case endorsed to the Office of the Ombudsman and resolving the same against P/S Insp.
Mendoza on the basis of the unverified complaint-affidavit of the alleged victim Christian Kalaw.
The invariable rule is that administrative decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on
proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law.64 In the instant case, while the evidence may show some
amount of wrongdoing on the part of petitioner, the Court seriously doubts the correctness of the OP's conclusion that
the imputed acts amount to gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct constitutive of betrayal of public trust. To say
that petitioner's offenses, as they factually appear, weigh heavily enough to constitute betrayal of public trust would
be to ignore the significance of the legislature's intent in prescribing the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman or the
Special Prosecutor for causes that, theretofore, had been reserved only for the most serious violations that justify the
removal by impeachment of the highest officials of the land.
Would every negligent act or misconduct in the performance of a Deputy Ombudsman's duties constitute betrayal of
public trust warranting immediate removal from office? The question calls for a deeper, circumspective look at the
nature of the grounds for the removal of a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor vis-a-vis common
administrative offenses.
Betrayal of public trust is a new ground for impeachment under the 1987 Constitution added to the existing grounds
of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption and other high crimes. While it was
deemed broad enough to cover any violation of the oath of office,65 the impreciseness of its definition also created
apprehension that "such an overarching standard may be too broad and may be subject to abuse and arbitrary
exercise by the legislature."66 Indeed, the catch-all phrase betrayal of public trust that referred to "all acts not
punishable by statutes as penal offenses but, nonetheless, render the officer unfit to continue in office"67 could be
easily utilized for every conceivable misconduct or negligence in office. However, deliberating on some workable
standard by which the ground could be reasonably interpreted, the Constitutional Commission recognized that human
error and good faith precluded an adverse conclusion.
MR. VILLACORTA: x x x One last matter with respect to the use of the words "betrayal of public trust" as embodying
a ground for impeachment that has been raised by the Honorable Regalado. I am not a lawyer so I can anticipate the
difficulties that a layman may encounter in understanding this provision and also the possible abuses that the
legislature can commit in interpreting this phrase. It is to be noted that this ground was also suggested in the 1971
Constitutional Convention. A review of the Journals of that Convention will show that it was not included; it was
construed as encompassing acts which are just short of being criminal but constitute gross faithlessness against
public trust, tyrannical abuse of power, inexcusable negligence of duty, favoritism, and gross exercise of discretionary
powers. I understand from the earlier discussions that these constitute violations of the oath of office, and also I heard
the Honorable Davide say that even the criminal acts that were enumerated in the earlier 1973 provision on this
matter constitute betrayal of public trust as well. In order to avoid confusion, would it not be clearer to stick to the
wording of Section 2 which reads: "may be removed from office on impeachment for and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, and other high crimes, graft and corruption or VIOLATION OF HIS
OATH OF OFFICE", because if betrayal of public trust encompasses the earlier acts that were enumerated, then it
would behoove us to be equally clear about this last provision or phrase.
MR. NOLLEDO: x x x I think we will miss a golden opportunity if we fail to adopt the words "betrayal of public trust" in
the 1986 Constitution. But I would like him to know that we are amenable to any possible amendment. Besides, I
think plain error of judgment, where circumstances may indicate that there is good faith, to my mind, will not
constitute betrayal of public trust if that statement will allay the fears of difficulty in interpreting the term."68 (Emphasis
supplied)
The Constitutional Commission eventually found it reasonably acceptable for the phrase betrayal of public trust to
refer to "acts which are just short of being criminal but constitute gross faithlessness against public trust, tyrannical
abuse of power, inexcusable negligence of duty, favoritism, and gross exercise of discretionary powers."69 In other
words, acts that should constitute betrayal of public trust as to warrant removal from office may be less than criminal
but must be attended by bad faith and of such gravity and seriousness as the other grounds for impeachment.
A Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor are not impeachable officers. However, by providing for their
removal from office on the same grounds as removal by impeachment, the legislature could not have intended to
redefine constitutional standards of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other
high crimes, as well as betrayal of public trust, and apply them less stringently. Hence, where betrayal of public trust,
for purposes of impeachment, was not intended to cover all kinds of official wrongdoing and plain errors of judgment,
this should remain true even for purposes of removing a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor from office.
Hence, the fact that the grounds for impeachment have been made statutory grounds for the removal by the
President of a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor cannot diminish the seriousness of their nature nor the
acuity of their scope. Betrayal of public trust could not suddenly "overreach" to cover acts that are not vicious or
malevolent on the same level as the other grounds for impeachment.
The tragic hostage-taking incident was the result of a confluence of several unfortunate events including system
failure of government response. It cannot be solely attributed then to what petitioner Gonzales may have negligently
failed to do for the quick, fair and complete resolution of the case, or to his error of judgment in the disposition
thereof. Neither should petitioner's official acts in the resolution of P/S Insp. Mendoza's case be judged based upon
the resulting deaths at the Quirino Grandstand. The failure to immediately act upon a party's requests for an early
resolution of his case is not, by itself, gross neglect of duty amounting to betrayal of public trust. Records show that
petitioner took considerably less time to act upon the draft resolution after the same was submitted for his appropriate
action compared to the length of time that said draft remained pending and unacted upon in the Office of
Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez. He reviewed and denied P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion for reconsideration within
nine (9) calendar days reckoned from the time the draft resolution was submitted to him on April 27, 2010 until he
forwarded his recommendation to the Office of Ombudsman Gutierrez on May 6, 2010 for the latter's final action. PLEBARA, there would no longer be any cause of complaint against her; if not, then the situation becomes ripe for
Clearly, the release of any final order on the case was no longer in his hands. the determination of her failings.

Even if there was inordinate delay in the resolution of P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion and an unexplained failure on
petitioner's part to supervise his subordinates in its prompt disposition, the same cannot be considered a vicious and
malevolent act warranting his removal for betrayal of public trust. More so because the neglect imputed upon
petitioner appears to be an isolated case.
Similarly, petitioner's act of directing the PNP-IAS to endorse P/S Insp. Mendoza's case to the Ombudsman without
citing any reason therefor cannot, by itself, be considered a manifestation of his undue interest in the case that would
amount to wrongful or unlawful conduct. After all, taking cognizance of cases upon the request of concerned
agencies or private parties is part and parcel of the constitutional mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman to be the
"champion of the people." The factual circumstances that the case was turned over to the Office of the Ombudsman
upon petitioner's request; that administrative liability was pronounced against P/S Insp. Mendoza even without the
private complainant verifying the truth of his statements; that the decision was immediately implemented; or that the
motion for reconsideration thereof remained pending for more than nine months cannot be simply taken as evidence
of petitioner's undue interest in the case considering the lack of evidence of any personal grudge, social ties or
business affiliation with any of the parties to the case that could have impelled him to act as he did. There was
likewise no evidence at all of any bribery that took place, or of any corrupt intention or questionable motivation.
The argument will not hold water. The incidents that have taken place subsequent to the submission in court of the
PLEBARA shows that the PLEBARA has been practically approved, and that the only thing which remains to be done
by the Sandiganbayan is to promulgate a judgment imposing the proper sentence on the accused Major General
Garcia based on his new pleas to lesser offenses. On May 4, 2010, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution declaring
that the change of plea under the PLEBARA was warranted and that it complied with jurisprudential guidelines. The
Sandiganbayan, thereafter, directed the accused Major General Garcia to immediately convey in favor of the State all
the properties, both real and personal, enumerated therein. On August 11, 2010, the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution, which, in order to put into effect the reversion of Major General Garcia's ill-gotten properties, ordered the
corresponding government agencies to cause the transfer of ownership of said properties to the Republic of the
Philippines. In the meantime, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) informed the Sandiganbayan that an
Order70 had been issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 on November 5, 2010 allowing the transfer
of the accused's frozen accounts to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to the terms of the PLEBARA as
approved by the Sandiganbayan. Immediately after the OSP informed the Sandiganbayan that its May 4, 2010
Resolution had been substantially complied with, Major General Garcia manifested71 to the Sandiganbayan on
November 19, 2010 his readiness for sentencing and for the withdrawal of the criminal information against his wife
and two sons. Major General Garcia's Motion to Dismiss,72 dated December 16, 2010 and filed with the
Sandiganbayan, reads:

Accordingly, the OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability against petitioner and the imposition upon him
1.0 The Co-Accused were impleaded under the theory of conspiracy with the Principal Accused MGen. Carlos F.
of the corresponding penalty of dismissal must be reversed and set aside, as the findings of neglect of duty or
Garcia (AFP Ret.), (Principal Accused) with the allegation that the act of one is the act of the others. Therefore, with
misconduct in office do not amount to a betrayal of public trust. Hence, the President, while he may be vested with
the approval by the Honorable Court of the Plea Bargaining Agreement executed by the Principal Accused, the
authority, cannot order the removal of petitioner as Deputy Ombudsman, there being no intentional wrongdoing of the
charges against the Co-Accused should likewise be dismissed since the charges against them are anchored on the
grave and serious kind amounting to a betrayal of public trust.
same charges against the Principal Accused.

This is not to say, however, that petitioner is relieved of all liability for his acts showing less than diligent performance
On December 16, 2010, the Sandiganbayan allowed accused Major General Garcia to plead guilty to the lesser
of official duties. Although the administrative acts imputed to petitioner fall short of the constitutional standard of
offenses of direct bribery and violation of Section 4(b), R.A. No. 9160, as amended. Upon Major General Garcia's
betrayal of public trust, considering the OP's factual findings of negligence and misconduct against petitioner, the
motion, and with the express conformity of the OSP, the Sandiganbayan allowed him to post bail in both cases, each
Court deems it appropriate to refer the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for further investigation of the charges in
at a measly amount of ₱ 30,000.00.
OP Case No. 10-J-460 and the imposition of the corresponding administrative sanctions, if any.

The approval or disapproval of the PLEBARA by the Sandiganbayan is of no consequence to an administrative

Inasmuch as there is as yet no existing ground justifying his removal from office, petitioner is entitled to reinstatement
finding of liability against petitioner Barreras-Sulit. While the court's determination of the propriety of a plea bargain is
to his former position as Deputy Ombudsman and to the payment of backwages and benefits corresponding to the
on the basis of the existing prosecution evidence on record, the disciplinary authority's determination of the
period of his suspension.
prosecutor's administrative liability is based on whether the plea bargain is consistent with the conscientious
consideration of the government's best interest and the diligent and efficient performance by the prosecution of its
The Office of the President is vested public duty to prosecute crimes against the State. Consequently, the disciplining authority's finding of ineptitude,
with statutory authority to proceed neglect or willfulness on the part of the prosecution, more particularly petitioner Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit, in
administratively against petitioner failing to pursue or build a strong case for the government or, in this case, entering into an agreement which the
Barreras-Sulit to determine the government finds "grossly disadvantageous," could result in administrative liability, notwithstanding court approval of
existence of any of the grounds for the plea bargaining agreement entered into.
her removal from office as provided
for under the Constitution and the
Plea bargaining is a process in criminal cases whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
Ombudsman Act.
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval.73 The essence of a plea bargaining agreement is the
allowance of an accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense than that charged against him. Section 2, Rule 116 of the
Petitioner Barreras-Sulit, on the other hand, has been resisting the President's authority to remove her from office Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the procedure therefor, to wit:
upon the averment that without the Sandiganbayan's final approval and judgment on the basis of the PLEBARA, it
would be premature to charge her with acts and/or omissions "tantamount to culpable violations of the Constitution
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. -- At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and
and betrayal of public trust," which are grounds for removal from office under Section 8, paragraph (2) of the
the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in
Ombudsman Act of 1989; and which also constitute a violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. 3019
the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) - causing undue injury to the Government or giving any private party any
offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (Sec. 4,
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
Cir. 38-98)
negligence. With reference to the doctrine of prejudicial procedural antecedent, petitioner Barreras-Sulit asserts that
the propriety of taking and continuing to take administrative disciplinary proceeding against her must depend on the
final disposition by the Sandiganbayan of the PLEBARA, explaining that if the Sandiganbayan would uphold the
Plea bargaining is allowable when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the
accused of the crime charged.74 However, if the basis for the allowance of a plea bargain in this case is the evidence
on record, then it is significant to state that in its earlier Resolution75 promulgated on January 7, 2010, the
Sandiganbayan had evaluated the testimonies of twenty (20) prosecution witnesses and declared that "the
conglomeration of evidence presented by the prosecution is viewed by the Court to be of strong character that
militates against the grant of bail."
Notwithstanding this earlier ruling by the Sandiganbayan, the OSP, unexplainably, chose to plea bargain with the
accused Major General Garcia as if its evidence were suddenly insufficient to secure a conviction. At this juncture, it
is not amiss to emphasize that the "standard of strong evidence of guilt which is sufficient to deny bail to an accused
is markedly higher than the standard of judicial probable cause which is sufficient to initiate a criminal case."76Hence,
in light of the apparently strong case against accused Major General Garcia, the disciplining authority would be hard-
pressed not to look into the whys and wherefores of the prosecution's turnabout in the case.
The Court need not touch further upon the substantial matters that are the subject of the pending administrative
proceeding against petitioner Barreras-Sulit and are, thus, better left to the complete and effective resolution of the
administrative case before the Office of the President.
The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act has, nonetheless, failed to obtain the
necessary votes to invalidate the law, thus, keeping said provision part of the law of the land. To recall, these cases
involve two distinct issues: (a) the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act; and (b) the validity of the
administrative action of removal taken against petitioner Gonzales. While the Court voted unanimously to reverse the
decision of the OP removing petitioner Gonzales from office, it was equally divided in its opinion on the
constitutionality of the assailed statutory provision in its two deliberations held on April 17, 2012 and September 4,
2012. There being no majority vote to invalidate the law, the Court, therefore, dismisses the challenge to the
constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act in accordance with Section 2(d), Rule 12 of the Internal Rules
of the Court.
Indeed, Section 4(2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution requires the vote of the majority of the Members of the Court
actually taking part in the deliberation to sustain any challenge to the constitutionality or validity of a statute or any of
its provisions.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the President in OP Case No. 10-J-460
isREVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED with payment of
backwages corresponding to the period of suspension effective immediately, even as the Office of the Ombudsman is
directed to proceed with the investigation in connection with the above case against petitioner. In G.R. No. 196232,
We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No. 11-B-003 against Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for
alleged acts and omissions tantamount to culpable violation of the Constitution and a betrayal of public trust, in
accordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 196231               September 4, 2012
EMILIO A. GONZALES III, vs.OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, acting through and represented by
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 196232
WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT, Petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
These two petitions have been because they raise a common thread of issues relating to the President's exercise of the power
to remove from office herein petitioners who claim the protective cloak of independence of the constitutionally-created office
to which they belong - the Office of the Ombudsman.
The cases, G.R. No. 196231 and G.R. No. 196232 primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives the President the
power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman.
FACTS: G.R. No. 196231: A formal charge for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery extortion and physical
injuries) was filed before PNP-NCR against Manila Police District Senior Inspector (P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza and four
others. Private complainant, Christian M. Kalaw, before the Office of the City Prosecutor, filed a similar charge. While said
cases were still pending, the Office of the Regional Director of the National Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon
the request of petitioner Gonzales III, all relevant documents and evidence in relation to said case to the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate administrative adjudication. Subsequently a case for Grave Misconduct was lodged
against P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers in the Office of the Ombudsman. Meanwhile, the case
filed before the Office of the city Prosecutor was dismissed upon a finding that the material allegations made by the
complainant had not been substantiated "by any evidence at all to warrant the indictment of respondents of the offenses
charged." Similarly, the Internal Affairs Service of the PNP issued a Resolution recommending the dismissal without
prejudice of the administrative case against the same police officers, for failure of the complainant to appear in three (3)
consecutive hearings despite due notice. However, upon the recommendation of petitioner Gonzales III, a Decision finding
P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman.
Mendoza and his colleagues filed for a motion for reconsideration which was forwarded to Ombudsman Gutierrez for final
approval, in whose office it remained pending for final review and action when P/S Insp. Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of
foreign tourists on that fateful day of August 23, 2010 in a desperate attempt to have himself reinstated in the police
service.
In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which ended in the tragic murder of eight HongKong Chinese nationals,
the injury of seven others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza, a public outcry against the blundering of
government officials prompted the creation of the Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC). It was tasked to
determine accountability for the incident through the conduct of public hearings and executive sessions. The IIRC found
Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their own
rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9) months
without any justification, in violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions for reconsideration
in administrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission. The inaction is gross, considering there is
no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking. Petitioner was
dismissed from service. Hence the petition.
G.R. No. 196232: Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F.
Garcia, his wife Clarita D. Garcia, their sons Ian Carl Garcia, Juan Paulo Garcia and Timothy Mark Garcia and several
unknown persons with Plunder and Money Laundering before the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan denied Major
General Garcia's urgent petition for bail holding that strong prosecution evidence militated against the grant of bail.
However, the government, represented by petitioner, Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit and sought the Sandiganbayan's
approval of a Plea Bargaining Agreement ("PLEBARA") entered into with the accused. The Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution finding the change of plea warranted and the PLEBARA compliant with jurisprudential guidelines.
Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major General Garcia to get off the hook with nothing but a slap
on the hand notwithstanding the prosecution's apparently strong evidence of his culpability for serious public
offenses, the House of Representatives' Committee on Justice conducted public hearings on the PLEBARA. At the
conclusion of these public hearings, the Committee on Justice passed and adopted Committee Resolution No. 3,
recommending to the President the dismissal of petitioner Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing of
appropriate charges against her Deputies and Assistants before the appropriate government office for having
committed acts and/or omissions tantamount to culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public
trust, which are violations under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and grounds for removal from office
under the Ombudsman Act. Hence the petition.
ISSUE: Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power over a
Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created Office of the
Ombudsman.
HELD: YES. The Ombudsman's administrativedisciplinary power over a DeputyOmbudsman and Special
Prosecutor is not exclusive. While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all
government officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those officials removable by impeachment
such authority is by no means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the
disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 of R.A. 6770 declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary
authority over all government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of removal
over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. A harmonious construction of these two apparently conflicting
provisions in R.A. No. 6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion that Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the
President to exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor,
respectively. Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in the
same Organic Act was to provide for an external authority, through the person of the President, that would exercise the
power of administrative discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing
the constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all government officials and employees. Such legislative
design is simply a measure of "check and balance" intended to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that the
Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect one another from administrative liabilities.
By granting express statutorypower to the President to removea Deputy Ombudsman and aSpecial Prosecutor,
Congressmerely filled an obvious gap inthe law. While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly
provided for in the Constitution, which is by impeachment under Section 2 of the same Article, there is, however, no
constitutional provision similarly dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor,
for that matter. By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law without running afoul of any
provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the Constitution itself, under Section 2, authorizes Congress to
provide for the removal of all other public officers, including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not
subject to impeachment.
The Power of the President toRemove a Deputy Ombudsmanand a Special Prosecutor isImplied from his Power
toAppoint. In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress simply
laid down in express terms an authority that is already implied from the President's constitutional authority to appoint
the aforesaid officials in the Office of the Ombudsman. The integrity and effectiveness of the Deputy Ombudsman for the
MOLEO as a military watchdog looking into abuses and irregularities that affect the general morale and professionalism in
the military is certainly of primordial importance in relation to the President's own role as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces. It would not be incongruous for Congress, therefore, to grant the President concurrent disciplinary
authority over the Deputy Ombudsman for the military and other law enforcement offices.
Granting the President the Powerto Remove a Deputy Ombudsmandoes not Diminish theIndependence of the
Office of theOmbudsman. he claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 granting the President the power to remove a
Deputy Ombudsman from office totally frustrates, if not resultantly negates the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman is tenuous. The independence which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested with was intended to free it from
political considerations in pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a protector of the people. What the Constitution
secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially, political independence. This means nothing more than that "the
terms of office, the salary, the appointments and discipline of all persons under the office" are "reasonably insulated from
the whims of politicians."
Petitioner Gonzales may not beremoved from office where thequestioned acts, falling short ofconstitutional
standards, do notconstitute betrayal of public trust. Petitioner's act of directing the PNP-IAS to endorse P/S Insp.
Mendoza's case to the Ombudsman without citing any reason therefor cannot, by itself, be considered a manifestation of
his undue interest in the case that would amount to wrongful or unlawful conduct. After all, taking cognizance of cases
upon the request of concerned agencies or private parties is part and parcel of the constitutional mandate of the Office of
the Ombudsman to be the "champion of the people." The factual circumstances that the case was turned over to the Office
of the Ombudsman upon petitioner's request; that administrative liability was pronounced against P/S Insp. Mendoza
even without the private complainant verifying the truth of his statements; that the decision was immediately
implemented; or that the motion for reconsideration thereof remained pending for more than nine months cannot be
simply taken as evidence of petitioner's undue interest in the case considering the lack of evidence of any personal
grudge, social ties or business affiliation with any of the parties to the case that could have impelled him to act as he did.
There was likewise no evidence at all of any bribery that took place, or of any corrupt intention or questionable
motivation. The OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability against petitioner and the imposition upon him of
the corresponding penalty of dismissal must be reversed and set aside, as the findings of neglect of duty or misconduct in
office do not amount to a betrayal of public trust. Hence, the President, while he may be vested with authority, cannot
order the removal of petitioner as Deputy Ombudsman, there being no intentional wrongdoing of the grave and serious
kind amounting to a betrayal of public trust.
The Office of the President is vestedwith statutory authority to proceedadministratively against petitioner
Barreras-Sulit to determine theexistence of any of the grounds forher removal from office as providedfor under
the Constitution and theOmbudsman Act.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the President in OP Case No. 10-J-460 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED with payment of backwages corresponding to the
period of suspension effective immediately, even as the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the
investigation in connection with the above case against petitioner. In G.R. No. 196232, We AFFIRM the continuation of
OP-DC Case No. 11-B-003 against Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts and omissions tantamount to
culpable violation of the Constitution and a betrayal of public trust, in accordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman
Act of 1989.
The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act is hereby DENIED.

[G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000]
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M.
LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO REYES, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining
order seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the
deployment of the Philippine Marines (the Marines) to join the Philippine National Police (the PNP) in visibility patrols
around the metropolis.
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and carnappings,
the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose
of crime prevention and suppression. The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (the AFP), the Chief of the PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked
to execute and implement the said order. In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police
Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 [1] (the LOI) which detailed the manner
by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted.[2] Task Force Tulungan was
placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila.
Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the Marines in a
Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000, addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief.[3] In the
Memorandum, the President expressed his desire to improve the peace and order situation in Metro Manila through a
more effective crime prevention program including increased police patrols. [4] The President further stated that to
heighten police visibility in the metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is necessary.[5] Invoking his powers as
Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff
and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the
PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence.[6] Finally, the President declared that the services of
the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such
time when the situation shall have improved.[7]
The LOI explains the concept of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols as follows:
xxx
2. PURPOSE:
The Joint Implementing Police Visibility Patrols between the PNP NCRPO and the Philippine Marines partnership in
the conduct of visibility patrols in Metro Manila for the suppression of crime prevention and other serious threats to
national security.
3. SITUATION:
Criminal incidents in Metro Manila have been perpetrated not only by ordinary criminals but also by organized
syndicates whose members include active and former police/military personnel whose training, skill, discipline and
firepower prove well-above the present capability of the local police alone to handle. The deployment of a joint PNP
NCRPO-Philippine Marines in the conduct of police visibility patrol in urban areas will reduce the incidence of crimes
specially those perpetrated by active or former police/military personnel.
4. MISSION:
The PNP NCRPO will organize a provisional Task Force to conduct joint NCRPO-PM visibility patrols to keep Metro
Manila streets crime-free, through a sustained street patrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of high-profile
crimes especially those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates whose members include those that are well-
trained, disciplined and well-armed active or former PNP/Military personnel.
5. CONCEPT IN JOINT VISIBILITY PATROL OPERATIONS:
a. The visibility patrols shall be conducted jointly by the NCRPO [National Capital Regional Police Office] and the
Philippine Marines to curb criminality in Metro Manila and to preserve the internal security of the state against
insurgents and other serious threat to national security, although the primary responsibility over Internal Security
Operations still rests upon the AFP.
b. The principle of integration of efforts shall be applied to eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes perpetrated by
organized crime syndicates operating in Metro Manila. This concept requires the military and police to work
cohesively and unify efforts to ensure a focused, effective and holistic approach in addressing crime prevention.
Along this line, the role of the military and police aside from neutralizing crime syndicates is to bring a wholesome
atmosphere wherein delivery of basic services to the people and development is achieved. Hand-in-hand with this
joint NCRPO-Philippine Marines visibility patrols, local Police Units are responsible for the maintenance of peace and
order in their locality.
c. To ensure the effective implementation of this project, a provisional Task Force TULUNGAN shall be organized to
provide the mechanism, structure, and procedures for the integrated planning, coordinating, monitoring and
assessing the security situation.
xxx.[8]
The selected areas of deployment under the LOI are: Monumento Circle, North Edsa (SM City), Araneta
Shopping Center, Greenhills, SM Megamall, Makati Commercial Center, LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA and
Domestic Airport.[9]
On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the IBP) filed the instant petition to annul LOI
02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void and unconstitutional, arguing that:
I
THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES IN METRO MANILA IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION,
IN THAT:
A) NO EMERGENCY SITUATION OBTAINS IN METRO MANILA AS WOULD JUSTIFY, EVEN ONLY REMOTELY,
THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOLDIERS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT WORK; HENCE, SAID DEPLOYMENT IS IN
DEROGATION OF ARTICLE II, SECTION 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION;
B) SAID DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES AN INSIDIOUS INCURSION BY THE MILITARY IN A CIVILIAN FUNCTION
OF GOVERNMENT (LAW ENFORCEMENT) IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 5 (4), OF THE
CONSTITUTION;
C) SAID DEPLOYMENT CREATES A DANGEROUS TENDENCY TO RELY ON THE MILITARY TO PERFORM THE
CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT.
II
IN MILITARIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN METRO MANILA, THE ADMINISTRATION IS UNWITTINGLY MAKING
THE MILITARY MORE POWERFUL THAN WHAT IT SHOULD REALLY BE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.[10]
Asserting itself as the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to uphold the rule of
law and the Constitution, the IBP questions the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the
PNP in law enforcement.
Without granting due course to the petition, the Court in a Resolution, [11] dated 25 January 2000, required the
Solicitor General to file his Comment on the petition. On 8 February 2000, the Solicitor General submitted his
Comment.
The Solicitor General vigorously defends the constitutionality of the act of the President in deploying the
Marines, contending, among others, that petitioner has no legal standing; that the question of deployment of the
Marines is not proper for judicial scrutiny since the same involves a political question; that the organization and
conduct of police visibility patrols, which feature the team-up of one police officer and one Philippine Marine soldier,
does not violate the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.
The issues raised in the present petition are: (1) Whether or not petitioner has legal standing; (2) Whether or
not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review; and,
(3) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP.
The petition has no merit.
First, petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession of the requisites of standing to raise the issues
in the petition. Second, the President did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction nor did he commit a violation of the civilian supremacy clause of the Constitution.
The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only
if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a
personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is
pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.[12]
The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.[13] The
term interest means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere
interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.[14] The gist of the question of standing is whether a
party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
[15]
In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law
and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus
standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly
true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other
groups and the whole citizenry. Based on the standards above-stated, the IBP has failed to present a specific and
substantial interest in the resolution of the case. Its fundamental purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of the
Rules of Court, is to elevate the standards of the law profession and to improve the administration of justice is alien
to, and cannot be affected by the deployment of the Marines. It should also be noted that the interest of the National
President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone, absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the
present action. To be sure, members of the BAR, those in the judiciary included, have varying opinions on the issue.
Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly authorized the National President to file the petition, has not shown any
specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned governmental act. Indeed, none of its
members, whom the IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the
joint visibility patrols. Neither is it alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that their civil liberties have
been violated by the deployment of the Marines. What the IBP projects as injurious is the supposed militarization of
law enforcement which might threaten Philippine democratic institutions and may cause more harm than good in the
long run. Not only is the presumed injury not personal in character, it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and
uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing. Since petitioner has not successfully established a direct and
personal injury as a consequence of the questioned act, it does not possess the personality to assail the validity of
the deployment of the Marines. This Court, however, does not categorically rule that the IBP has absolutely no
standing to raise constitutional issues now or in the future. The IBP must, by way of allegations and proof, satisfy this
Court that it has sufficient stake to obtain judicial resolution of the controversy.
Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a
suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved. [16] In not a few
cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft
an issue of transcendental significance to the people. [17] Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to
the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure.[18] In this case, a reading of the petition shows that
the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness,
novelty and weight as precedents.Moreover, because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless
violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal
controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore,
behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than later.
The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines.
In the case at bar, the bone of contention concerns the factual determination of the President of the necessity
of calling the armed forces, particularly the Marines, to aid the PNP in visibility patrols. In this regard, the IBP admits
that the deployment of the military personnel falls under the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President as stated in
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, specifically, the power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. What the IBP questions, however, is the basis for the calling of the Marines
under the aforestated provision. According to the IBP, no emergency exists that would justify the need for the calling
of the military to assist the police force. It contends that no lawless violence, invasion or rebellion exist to warrant the
calling of the Marines. Thus, the IBP prays that this Court review the sufficiency of the factual basis for said troop
[Marine] deployment.[19]
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that the issue pertaining to the necessity of calling the
armed forces is not proper for judicial scrutiny since it involves a political question and the resolution of factual issues
which are beyond the review powers of this Court.
As framed by the parties, the underlying issues are the scope of presidential powers and limits, and the extent
of judicial review. But, while this Court gives considerable weight to the parties formulation of the issues, the
resolution of the controversy may warrant a creative approach that goes beyond the narrow confines of the issues
raised. Thus, while the parties are in agreement that the power exercised by the President is the power to call out the
armed forces, the Court is of the view that the power involved may be no more than the maintenance of peace and
order and promotion of the general welfare.[20] For one, the realities on the ground do not show that there exist a state
of warfare, widespread civil unrest or anarchy. Secondly, the full brunt of the military is not brought upon the citizenry,
a point discussed in the latter part of this decision. In the words of the late Justice Irene Cortes in Marcos v.
Manglapus:
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the Presidents powers as protector of the peace. [Rossiter, The
American Presidency]. The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the
commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its
existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with
attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when
no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in
times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief
provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to
exclude the Presidents exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and
maintain public order and security.
xxx[21]
Nonetheless, even if it is conceded that the power involved is the Presidents power to call out the armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, the resolution of the controversy will reach a similar
result.
We now address the Solicitor Generals argument that the issue involved is not susceptible to review by the
judiciary because it involves a political question, and thus, not justiciable.
As a general proposition, a controversy is justiciable if it refers to a matter which is appropriate for court review.
[22]
 It pertains to issues which are inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law.
Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional cases brought before it
even in instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are political
questions. The reason is that political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the
legality, of a particular act or measure being assailed. Moreover, the political question being a function of the
separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch unless the
case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution.
As Taada v. Cuenco[23] puts it, political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government. Thus, if an issue is clearly identified by the text of the
Constitution as matters for discretionary action by a particular branch of government or to the people themselves then
it is held to be a political question. In the classic formulation of Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr,[24] [p]rominent on the
surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a courts undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on the
one question.
The 1987 Constitution expands the concept of judicial review by providing that (T)he Judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [25] Under this definition, the Court cannot
agree with the Solicitor General that the issue involved is a political question beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to
review. When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed
qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations respected, is justiciable - the problem being one of
legality or validity, not its wisdom.[26] Moreover, the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to
this Court.[27] When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination as to whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose
action is being questioned.[28]
By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all
in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.[29] Under this definition, a court is without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary
authority has been delegated. But while this Court has no power to substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of
the President, it may look into the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion.
[30]
 A showing that plenary power is granted either department of government, may not be an obstacle to judicial
inquiry, for the improvident exercise or abuse thereof may give rise to justiciable controversy.[31]
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he
necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom.This is clear from the intent of the framers
and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the Presidents wisdom
or substitute its own.However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within
permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In
view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out
the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual
basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the assertion that
there exist no justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the proposition
that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the
constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. In the performance of this Courts duty of purposeful
hesitation[32] before declaring an act of another branch as unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discretion
is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Presidents judgment. To doubt is to sustain.
There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full discretionary power
to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution, which embodies the powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, provides in part:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case
of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
xxx
The full discretionary power of the President to determine the factual basis for the exercise of the calling out
power is also implied and further reinforced in the rest of Section 18, Article VII which reads, thus:
xxx
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a
vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil
courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over
civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged
within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may
review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the
revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power
in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the three powers
and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where
the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other
matters.[33] That the intent of the Constitution is exactly what its letter says, i.e., that the power to call is fully
discretionary to the President, is extant in the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission, to wit:
FR. BERNAS. It will not make any difference. I may add that there is a graduated power of the President as
Commander-in-Chief. First, he can call out such Armed Forces as may be necessary to suppress lawless violence;
then he can suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then he can impose martial law. This is a graduated
sequence.
When he judges that it is necessary to impose martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, his
judgment is subject to review. We are making it subject to review by the Supreme Court and subject to concurrence
by the National Assembly. But when he exercises this lesser power of calling on the Armed Forces, when he says it is
necessary, it is my opinion that his judgment cannot be reviewed by anybody.
xxx
FR. BERNAS. Let me just add that when we only have imminent danger, the matter can be handled by the first
sentence: The President may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. So we feel that that is sufficient for handling imminent danger.
MR. DE LOS REYES. So actually, if a President feels that there is imminent danger, the matter can be handled by
the First Sentence: The President....may call out such Armed Forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. So we feel that that is sufficient for handling imminent danger, of invasion or rebellion, instead of
imposing martial law or suspending the writ of habeas corpus, he must necessarily have to call the Armed Forces of
the Philippines as their Commander-in-Chief. Is that the idea?
MR. REGALADO. That does not require any concurrence by the legislature nor is it subject to judicial review.[34]
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant the
President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the
lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the
power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and
individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by this Court.
Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the power to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions must concur: (1) there must be an actual
invasion or rebellion and, (2) public safety must require it. These conditions are not required in the case of the power
to call out the armed forces. The only criterion is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." The implication is that the President is
given full discretion and wide latitude in the exercise of the power to call as compared to the two other powers.
If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without factual basis,
then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling
out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for
satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the
absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such
judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or
wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is
a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.
On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information,
some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the
power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of
human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress
lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. Such a scenario is not
farfetched when we consider the present situation in Mindanao, where the insurgency problem could spill over the
other parts of the country. The determination of the necessity for the calling out power if subjected to unfettered
judicial scrutiny could be a veritable prescription for disaster, as such power may be unduly straitjacketed by an
injunction or a temporary restraining order every time it is exercised.
Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent
or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Unless the petitioner can show that the exercise of such
discretion was gravely abused, the Presidents exercise of judgment deserves to be accorded respect from this Court.
The President has already determined the necessity and factual basis for calling the armed forces. In his
Memorandum, he categorically asserted that, [V]iolent crimes like bank/store robberies, holdups, kidnappings and
carnappings continue to occur in Metro Manila... [35] We do not doubt the veracity of the Presidents assessment of the
situation, especially in the light of present developments. The Court takes judicial notice of the recent bombings
perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls, public utilities, and other public places. These are among the
areas of deployment described in the LOI 2000. Considering all these facts, we hold that the President has sufficient
factual basis to call for military aid in law enforcement and in the exercise of this constitutional power.
The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause nor does it infringe the civilian
character of the police force.
Prescinding from its argument that no emergency situation exists to justify the calling of the Marines, the IBP
asserts that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of Section
3, Article II[36] of the Constitution.
We disagree. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy
clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately 17. Peace and order policy formulation in local government units.[58]
circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently
provides the metes and bounds of the Marines authority. It is noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in This unquestionably constitutes a gloss on executive power resulting from a systematic, unbroken, executive
charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police practice, long pursued to the knowledge of Congress and, yet, never before questioned. [59] What we have here is
Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols.[37] Under the LOI, the police forces are mutual support and cooperation between the military and civilian authorities, not derogation of civilian supremacy.
tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures. [38] It is their responsibility to direct and manage the
In the United States, where a long tradition of suspicion and hostility towards the use of military force for
deployment of the Marines.[39] It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render
domestic purposes has persisted,[60] and whose Constitution, unlike ours, does not expressly provide for the power to
logistical support to these soldiers.[40] In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is
call, the use of military personnel by civilian law enforcement officers is allowed under circumstances similar to those
supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the
surrounding the present deployment of the Philippine Marines. Under the Posse Comitatus Act[61] of the US, the use
civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of the military in the task of law
of the military in civilian law enforcement is generally prohibited, except in certain allowable circumstances. A
enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.[41]
provision of the Act states:
In this regard, it is not correct to say that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the AFP, by his alleged
involvement in civilian law enforcement, has been virtually appointed to a civilian post in derogation of the aforecited 1385. Use of Army and Air Force as posse comitatus
provision. The real authority in these operations, as stated in the LOI, is lodged with the head of a civilian institution,
the PNP, and not with the military. Such being the case, it does not matter whether the AFP Chief actually
participates in the Task Force Tulungan since he does not exercise any authority or control over the same.Since Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress,
none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined
position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.[62]
character of the PNP.
To determine whether there is a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act in the use of military personnel, the US
Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render nothing more than assistance required in conducting
courts[63] apply the following standards, to wit:
the patrols. As such, there can be no insidious incursion of the military in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of
the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.
Were Army or Air Force personnel used by the civilian law enforcement officers at Wounded Knee in such a manner
It is worth mentioning that military assistance to civilian authorities in various forms persists in Philippine that the military personnel subjected the citizens to the exercise of military power which was regulatory, proscriptive,
jurisdiction. The Philippine experience reveals that it is not averse to requesting the assistance of the military in the or compulsory[64] George Washington Law Review, pp. 404-433 (1986), which discusses the four divergent standards
implementation and execution of certain traditionally civil functions. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, for assessing acceptable involvement of military personnel in civil law enforcement. See likewise HONORED IN
some of the multifarious activities wherein military aid has been rendered, exemplifying the activities that bring both THE BREECH: PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE THE LAWS WITH MILITARY FORCE, 83 Yale Law
the civilian and the military together in a relationship of cooperation, are: Journal, pp. 130-152, 1973. 64 in nature, either presently or prospectively?
1. Elections;[42]
x x x
2. Administration of the Philippine National Red Cross;[43]

3. Relief and rescue operations during calamities and disasters;[44] When this concept is transplanted into the present legal context, we take it to mean that military involvement, even
when not expressly authorized by the Constitution or a statute, does not violate the Posse Comitatus Act unless it
[45]
4. Amateur sports promotion and development; actually regulates, forbids or compels some conduct on the part of those claiming relief. A mere threat of some future
injury would be insufficient.(emphasis supplied)
5. Development of the culture and the arts;[46]

6. Conservation of natural resources;[47] Even if the Court were to apply the above rigid standards to the present case to determine whether there is
permissible use of the military in civilian law enforcement, the conclusion is inevitable that no violation of the civilian
7. Implementation of the agrarian reform program;[48] supremacy clause in the Constitution is committed. On this point, the Court agrees with the observation of the
8. Enforcement of customs laws;[49] Solicitor General:

9. Composite civilian-military law enforcement activities;[50] 3. The designation of tasks in Annex A[65] does not constitute the exercise of regulatory, proscriptive, or
[51] compulsory military power. First, the soldiers do not control or direct the operation. This is evident from Nos. 6,
10. Conduct of licensure examinations; [66]
 8(k)[67] and 9(a)[68] of Annex A. These soldiers, second, also have no power to prohibit or condemn. In No.
11. Conduct of nationwide tests for elementary and high school students;[52] 9(d)[69] of Annex A, all arrested persons are brought to the nearest police stations for proper disposition.And
last, these soldiers apply no coercive force. The materials or equipment issued to them, as shown in No. 8(c)
12. Anti-drug enforcement activities;[53] [70]
 of Annex A, are all low impact and defensive in character. The conclusion is that there being no exercise of
regulatory, proscriptive or compulsory military power, the deployment of a handful of Philippine Marines
13. Sanitary inspections;[54] constitutes no impermissible use of military power for civilian law enforcement.[71]
14. Conduct of census work;[55]
It appears that the present petition is anchored on fear that once the armed forces are deployed, the military will
15. Administration of the Civil Aeronautics Board;[56] gain ascendancy, and thus place in peril our cherished liberties. Such apprehensions, however, are unfounded. The
power to call the armed forces is just that - calling out the armed forces. Unless, petitioner IBP can show, which it has
16. Assistance in installation of weather forecasting devices;[57] not, that in the deployment of the Marines, the President has violated the fundamental law, exceeded his authority or
jeopardized the civil liberties of the people, this Court is not inclined to overrule the Presidents determination of the
factual basis for the calling of the Marines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
One last point. Since the institution of the joint visibility patrol in January, 2000, not a single citizen has
complained that his political or civil rights have been violated as a result of the deployment of the Marines. It was
precisely to safeguard peace, tranquility and the civil liberties of the people that the joint visibility patrol was
conceived. Freedom and democracy will be in full bloom only when people feel secure in their homes and in the
streets, not when the shadows of violence and anarchy constantly lurk in their midst.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED
IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000
IBP vs. Zamora
G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000  G.R. No. 198554               July 30, 2012
Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President directed
the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the
services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only,
until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of
the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to
judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional
provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP
Held:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he
necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution,
Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision
dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the
calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers
and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest
leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign
power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial
law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and
thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling
out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of
factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the
assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is
“militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a
breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for
civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real
authority belonging to the PNP
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force.
The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military.
Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to
civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the
civilian character of the PNP.
MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS F. GARCIA, AFP (RET.), Petitioner, 
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, representing the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; THE SECRETARY OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE VOLTAIRE T. GAZMIN; THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
GEN. EDUARDO SL. OBAN, JR., and LT. GEN. GAUDENCIO S. PANGILINAN, AFP (RET.), DIRECTOR,
BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For resolution of this Court is the Petition for Certiorari dated September 29, 2011 under Rule 65, Section 1 of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks to annul and set aside the Confirmation of Sentence dated September
9, 2011, promulgated by the Office of the President.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
On October 13, 2004, the Provost Martial General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Col. Henry A.
Galarpe, by command of Vice-Admiral De Los Reyes, issued a Restriction to Quarters1 containing the following:
1. Pursuant to Article of War 70 and the directive of the Acting Chief of Staff, AFP to the undersigned dtd
12 October 2004, you are hereby placed under Restriction to Quarters under guard pending investigation of
your case.
2. You are further advised that you are not allowed to leave your quarters without the expressed permission
from the Acting Chief of Staff, AFP.
3. In case you need immediate medical attention or required by the circumstance to be confined in a
hospital, you shall likewise be under guard.
Thereafter, a Charge Sheet dated October 27, 2004 was filed with the Special General Court Martial NR 2 presided
by Maj. Gen. Emmanuel R. Teodosio, AFP, (Ret.), enumerating the following violations allegedly committed by
petitioner:
CHARGE 1: VIOLATION OF THE 96TH ARTICLE OF WAR (CONDUCT UNBECOMING AN OFFICER AND
GENTLEMAN).
SPECIFICATION 1: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, on or about 16 March 2004, knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully
fail to disclose/declare all his existing assets in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net Worth for the
year 2003 as required by Republic Act No. 3019, as amended in relation to Republic Act 6713, such as the following:
cash holdings with the Armed Forces Police Savings and Loans Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) in the amount of six
million five hundred [thousand] pesos (P6,500,000.00); cash dividend received from AFPSLAI from June 2003 to
December 2003 in the amount of one million three hundred sixty-five thousand pesos (P1,365,000.00); dollar peso
deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines, Allied Banking Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of
Philippine Islands, United Coconut Planter's Bank and Planter's Development Bank; motor vehicles registered under
his and his wife’s names such as 1998 Toyota Hilux Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. WRY-843, Toyota Car with Plate Nr.
PEV-665, Toyota Previa with Plate Nr. UDS-195, 1997 Honda Civic Car with Plate Nr. FEC 134, 1997 Mitsubishi L-
300 Van with Plate Nr. FDZ 582 and 2001 Toyota RAV 4 Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. FEV-498, conduct unbecoming
an officer and gentleman.
SPECIFICATION 2: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, on or about 11 March 2003, knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully
fail to disclose/declare all his existing assets in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the
year 2002 as required by Republic Act No. 3019, as amended in relation to Republic Act 6713, such as the following:
his cash holdings with the Armed Forces Police Savings and Loans Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) in the amount of six
million five hundred [thousand] pesos (P6,500,000.00); cash dividend received form AFPSLAI in June 2002 and
December 2002 in the total amount of one million four hundred thirty-five thousand pesos (1,435,000.00), dollar and
peso deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines, Allied Banking Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of
the Philippine Islands, United Coconut Planter's Bank and Planter's Development Bank; motor vehicles registered
under his and his wife’s names such as 1998 Toyota Hilux Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. WRY-843, Toyota Car with
Plate Nr. PEV-665, Toyota Previa with Plate Nr. UDS-195, 1997 Honda Civic Car with Plate Nr. FEC-134, 1997
Mitsubishi L-300 Van with Plate Nr. FDZ-582, and 2001 Toyota RAV 4
Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. FEV-498, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman.
SPECIFICATION 3: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, while in the active military service of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully violate his solemn oath as a military officer to uphold the
Constitution and serve the people with utmost loyalty by acquiring and holding the status of an immigrant/permanent
residence of the United
States of America in violation of the State policy governing public officers, thereby causing dishonor and disrespect to
the military professional and seriously compromises his position as an officer and exhibits him as morally unworthy to
remain in the honorable profession of arms.
CHARGE II: VIOLATION OF THE 97TH ARTICLE OF WAR (CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO GOOD ORDER AND
MILITARY DISCIPLINE).
SPECIFICATION 1: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, on or about 16 March 2004, knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully
make untruthful statements under oath of his true assets in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for
the year 2003 as required by Republic Act No. 3019, as amended in relation to Republic Act 6713, conduct prejudicial
to good order and military discipline.
SPECIFICATION NO. 2: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, on or about 11 March 2003, knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully
make untruthful statements under oath of his true assts in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for
the year 2002 as required by Republic Act No. 3019, as amended in relation to Republic Act 6713, conduct prejudicial
to good order and military discipline.
Petitioner, upon arraignment on November 16, 2004, pleaded not guilty on all the charges.
The Office of the Chief of Staff, through a Memorandum2 dated November 18, 2004, directed the transfer of
confinement of petitioner from his quarters at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo to the ISAFP Detention Center. On the
same day, petitioner, having reached the age of fifty-six (56), compulsorily retired from military service after availing
of the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1650,3 amending Sections 3 and 5 of P.D. 1638, which establishes
a system of retirement for military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Pursuant to a Resolution4 dated June 1, 2005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was
transferred from the ISAFP Detention Center to the Camp Crame Custodial Detention Center.
After trial, at the Special General Court Martial No. 2, on December 2, 2005, the findings or the After-Trial Report5 of
the same court was read to the petitioner. The report contains the following verdict and sentence:
MGEN CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 AFP the court in closed session upon secret written ballot 2/3 of all the
members present at the time the voting was taken concurring the following findings. Finds you:
On Specification 1 of Charge 1 – Guilty except the words dollar deposits with Land Bank of the Phils, dollar peso
deposits with Allied Bank, Banco de Oro, Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine Island, United Coconut Planters
Bank and Planters Development Bank.
On Specification 2 of Charge 1 – Guilty except the words dollar deposits with Land Bank of the Phils, dollar peso
deposits with Allied Bank, Banco de Oro, Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine Island, United Coconut Planters
Bank and Planters Development Bank.
On Specification 3 of Charge 1 – Guilty
On Specification 1 of Charge 2 – Guilty
On Specification 2 of Charge 2 – Guilty
And again in closed session upon secret written ballot 2/3 all the members are present at the time the votes was
taken concurrently sentences you to be dishonorably [discharged] from the service, to forfeit all pay and allowances
due and to become due and to be confined at hard labor at such place the reviewing authority may direct for a period
of two (2) years. So ordered. (Emphases supplied)
Afterwards, in a document6 dated March 27, 2006, the Staff Judge Advocate stated the following recommended
action:
IV. RECOMMENDED ACTION:
The court, after evaluating the evidence, found accused: GUILTY on Charge 1, GUILTY on Specification 1 on Charge
1 – except the words dollar deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines, dollar and peso deposits with Allied Banking
Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine Islands, United Coconut Planter's Bank and
Planter's Development Bank; GUILTY on Charge 1, Specification 2 except the words dollar deposits with Land Bank
of the Philippines, dollar and peso deposits with Allied Banking Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of
the Philippine Islands, United Coconut Planters Bank and Planter's Development Bank; GUILTY on Specification 3 of
Charge 1; GUILTY on Charge 2 and all its specifications. The sentence imposed by the Special GCM is to be
dishonorably discharged from the service, to forfeit all pay and allowances due and to become due; and to be
confined at hard labor at such place the reviewing authority may direct for a period of two (2) years. As it is, the
sentence is proper and legal. Recommend that the sentence be approved. The PNP custodial facility in Camp
Crame, Quezon City, is the appropriate place of confinement. The period of confinement from 18 October 2004 shall
be credited in his favor and deducted from the two (2) years to which the accused was sentenced. Thus, confinement
will expire on 18 October 2006. Considering that the period left not served is less than one (1) year, confinement at
the National Penitentiary is no longer appropriate.
4. To carry this recommendation into effect, a draft "ACTION OF THE REVIEWING AUTHORITY" is hereto attached.
In an undated document,7 the AFP Board of Military Review recommended the following action:
8. RECOMMENDED ACTION:
A. Only so much of the sentence as provides for the mandatory penalty of dismissal from the military
service and forfeiture of pay and allowances due and to become due for the offenses of violation of AW 96
(Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and for violation of AW 97 (Conduct Prejudicial to
Good Order and Military Discipline) be imposed upon the Accused.
B. The records of the instant case should be forwarded to the President thru the Chief of Staff and the
Secretary of National Defense, for final review pursuant to AW 47, the Accused herein being a General
Officer whose case needs confirmation by the President.
C. To effectuate the foregoing, attached for CSAFP's signature/approval is a proposed 1st
Indorsement to the President, thru the Secretary of National Defense, recommending approval of the attached
prepared "ACTION OF THE PRESIDENT."
After six (6) years and two (2) months of preventive confinement, on December 16, 2010, petitioner was released
from the Camp Crame Detention Center.8
The Office of the President, or the President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP and acting as the Confirming
Authority under the Articles of War, confirmed the sentence imposed by the Court Martial against petitioner. The
Confirmation of Sentence,9 reads in part:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, do hereby confirm the sentence imposed by the Court Martial in the case of People of the Philippines
versus Major General Carlos Flores Garcia AFP:
a) To be dishonorable discharged from the service;
b) To forfeit all pay and allowances due and to become due; and
c) To be confined for a period of two (2) years in a penitentiary.
FURTHER, pursuant to the 48th and 49th Articles of War, the sentence on Major General Carlos Flores Garcia AFP
shall not be remitted/mitigated by any previous confinement. Major General Carlos Flores Garcia AFP shall serve the
foregoing sentence effective on this date.
DONE, in the City of Manila, this 9th day of September, in the year of our Lord, Two Thousand and Eleven.
Consequently, on September 15, 2011, respondent Secretary of National Defense Voltaire T. Gazmin, issued a
Memorandum10 to the Chief of Staff, AFP for strict implementation, the Confirmation of Sentence in the Court Martial
Case of People of the Philippines Versus Major General Carlos Flores Garcia AFP.
On September 16, 2011, petitioner was arrested and detained, and continues to be detained at the National
Penitentiary, Maximum Security, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City.11
Aggrieved, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari and petition for habeas corpus,
alternatively. However, this Court, in its Resolution12 dated October 10, 2011, denied the petition for habeas corpus.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration13 dated November 15, 2011, but was denied14 by this Court on December
12, 2011.
Petitioner enumerates the following grounds to support his petition:
GROUNDS
A.
THE JURISDICTION OF THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL CEASED IPSO FACTO UPON THE RETIREMENT OF
PETITIONER, FOR WHICH REASON THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN
ISSUING THE CONFIRMATION OF SENTENCE, AND PETITIONER'S ARREST AND CONFINEMENT PURSUANT
THERETO IS ILLEGAL, THUS WARRANTING THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.
B.
EVEN ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT PETITIONER REMAINED AMENABLE TO COURT
MARTIAL JURISDICTION AFTER HIS RETIREMENT, THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN IMPOSING THE SENTENCE OF TWO (2) YEARS CONFINEMENT WITHOUT ANY
LEGAL BASIS, FOR WHICH REASON PETITIONER'S ARREST AND CONFINEMENT IS ILLEGAL, THUS
WARRANTING THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.
C.
EVEN ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT THE PENALTY OF TWO (2) YEARS CONFINEMENT
MAY BE IMPOSED IN ADDITION TO THE PENALTIES OF DISMISSAL AND FORFEITURE, THE SENTENCE HAD
BEEN FULLY SERVED IN VIEW OF PETITIONER'S PREVENTIVE CONFINEMENT WHICH EXCEEDED THE 2-
YEAR SENTENCE, AND THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT HAS NO AUTHORITY TO REPUDIATE SAID
SERVICE OF SENTENCE, FOR WHICH REASON PETITIONER'S ARREST AND CONFINEMENT DESPITE FULL
SERVICE OF SENTENCE IS ILLEGAL, THUS WARRANTING THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.15
In view of the earlier resolution of this Court denying petitioner's petition for habeas corpus, the above grounds are
rendered moot and academic. Thus, the only issue in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure, which was properly filed with this
Court, is whether the Office of the President acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, in issuing the Confirmation of Sentence dated September 9, 2011.
In its Comment16 dated October 27, 2011, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) lists the following counter-
arguments:
I.
PETITIONER'S DIRECT RECOURSE TO THE HONORABLE COURT VIOLATES THE DOCTRINE OF HIERARCHY
OF COURTS; HENCE, THE PETITION SHOULD BE OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSED.
II.
THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL RETAINED JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONER DESPITE HIS RETIREMENT
DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HIM SINCE THE SAID TRIBUNAL'S JURISDICTION
HAD ALREADY FULLY ATTACHED PRIOR TO PETITIONER'S RETIREMENT.
III.
THE CONFIRMATION ISSUED BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT DIRECTING PETITIONER TO BE
CONFINED FOR TWO (2) YEARS IN A PENITENTIARY IS SANCTIONED BY C. A. NO. 408 AND EXECUTIVE
ORDER NO. 178, PURSUANT TO THE PRESIDENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY AS THE COMMANDER-IN-
CHIEF OF THE AFP.
IV.
PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF HIS CASE WAS NOT VIOLATED IN THIS CASE.
V.
THE IMPOSITION OF THE PENALTY OF TWO (2) YEARS CONFINEMENT ON PETITIONER BY THE GCM, AND
AS CONFIRMED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, IS VALID.
VI.
ACCORDINGLY, PUBLIC RESPONDENTS DID NOT ACT WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING
AND IMPLEMENTING THE CONFIRMATION OF SENTENCE.17
Petitioner, in his Reply18 dated January 20, 2012, disagreed with the arguments raised by the OSG due to the
following:
(A)
THE CONFIRMATION OF THE COURT MARTIAL SENTENCE IS AN ACT BY THE PRESIDENT, AS THE
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, AND NOT MERELY AS THE HEAD OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. THEREFORE, THE
HONORABLE COURT IS THE ONLY APPROPRIATE COURT WHERE HIS ACT MAY BE IMPUGNED, AND NOT
IN THE LOWER COURTS, I.E., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ("RTC") OR THE COURT OF APPEALS ("CA"), AS THE
OSG ERRONEOUSLY POSTULATES.
(B)
ALTHOUGH THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL ("GCM") RETAINED JURISDICTION "OVER THE PERSON" OF
PETITIONER EVEN AFTER HE RETIRED FROM THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES ('AFP"),
HOWEVER, HIS RETIREMENT, CONTRARY TO THE STAND OF THE OSG, SEVERED HIS "JURAL
RELATIONSHIP" WITH THE MILITARY, THEREBY PLACING HIM BEYOND THE SUBSTANTIVE REACH OF THE
AFP'S COURT MARTIAL JURISDICTION.
(C)
UNDER ART. 29, REVISED PENAL CODE ("RPC"), PETITIONER'S COURT MARTIAL SENTENCE OF TWO (2)
YEARS IN CARCERATION HAD ALREADY BEEN SERVED IN FULL SINCE HE HAD ALREADY SUFFERED
PREVENTIVE IMPRISONMENT OF AT LEAST SIX (6) YEARS BEFORE THE SENTENCE COULD BE
CONFIRMED, WHICH MEANS THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD NO MORE JURISDICTION WHEN HE CONFIRMED
IT, THEREBY RENDERING THE "CONFIRMATION OF SENTENCE" A PATENT NULLITY, AND,
CONSEQUENTLY, INVALIDATING THE OSG'S POSITION THAT THE PRESIDENT STILL HAD JURISDICTION
WHEN HE CONFIRMED THE SENTENCE.19
Petitioner raises the issue of the jurisdiction of the General Court Martial to try his case. According to him, the said
jurisdiction ceased ipso facto upon his compulsory retirement. Thus, he insists that the Office of the President had
acted without jurisdiction in issuing the confirmation of his sentence.
This Court finds the above argument bereft of merit.
Article 2 of the Articles of War20 circumscribes the jurisdiction of military law over persons subject thereto, to wit:
Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. - The following persons are subject to these articles and shall be understood
as included in the term "any person subject to military law" or "persons subject to military law," whenever used in
these articles:
(a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or of the Philippine
Constabulary; all members of the reserve force, from the dates of their call to active duty and while on such
active duty; all trainees undergoing military instructions; and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or
ordered into, or to duty or for training in, the said service, from the dates they are required by the terms of
the call, draft, or order to obey the same;
(b) Cadets, flying cadets, and probationary second lieutenants;
(c) All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving with the Armed Forces of the
Philippines in the field in time of war or when martial law is declared though not otherwise subject to these
articles;
(d) All persons under sentence adjudged by courts-martial.
(As amended by Republic Acts 242 and 516).
It is indisputable that petitioner was an officer in the active service of the AFP in March 2003 and 2004, when the
alleged violations were committed. The charges were filed on October 27, 2004 and he was arraigned on November
16, 2004. Clearly, from the time the violations were committed until the time petitioner was arraigned, the General
Court Martial had jurisdiction over the case. Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the
instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.21 Therefore, petitioner's retirement on November 18,
2004 did not divest the General Court Martial of its jurisdiction. In B/Gen. (Ret.) Francisco V. Gudani, et al. v. Lt./Gen.
Generoso Senga, et al.,22 this Court ruled that:
This point was settled against Gen. Gudani's position in Abadilla v. Ramos, where the Court declared that an officer
whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside the jurisdiction of military
authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him before the termination of his service. Once
jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is terminated. Thus, the Court held:
The military authorities had jurisdiction over the person of Colonel Abadilla at the time of the alleged offenses. This
jurisdiction having been vested in the military authorities, it is retained up to the end of the proceedings against
Colonel Abadilla. Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but
continues until the case is terminated.
Citing Colonel Winthrop's treatise on Military Law, the Court further stated:
We have gone through the treatise of Colonel Winthrop and We find the following passage which goes against the
contention of the petitioners, viz. —
3. Offenders in general — Attaching of jurisdiction. It has further been held, and is now settled law, in regard to
military offenders in general, that if the military jurisdiction has once duly attached to them previous to the date of the
termination of their legal period of service, they may be brought to trial by court-martial after that date, their discharge
being meanwhile withheld. This principle has mostly been applied to cases where the offense was committed just
prior to the end of the term. In such cases the interests of discipline clearly forbid that the offender should go
unpunished. It is held therefore that if before the day on which his service legally terminates and his right to a
discharge is complete, proceedings with a view to trial are commenced against him — as by arrest or the service of
charges, — the military jurisdiction will fully attach and once attached may be continued by a trial by court-martial
ordered and held after the end of the term of the enlistment of the accused x x x
Thus, military jurisdiction has fully attached to Gen. Gudani inasmuch as both the acts complained of and the
initiation of the proceedings against him occurred before he compulsorily retired on 4 October 2005. We see no
reason to unsettle the Abadilla doctrine. The OSG also points out that under Section 28 of Presidential Decree No.
1638, as amended, "an officer or enlisted man carried in the retired list of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall
be subject to the Articles of War x x x" To this citation, petitioners do not offer any response, and in fact have
excluded the matter of Gen. Gudani's retirement as an issue in their subsequent memorandum.23
It is also apt to mention that under Executive Order No. 178, or the Manual for Courts-Martial, AFP, the jurisdiction of
courts-martial over officers, cadets, soldiers, and other military personnel in the event of discharge or other
separation from the service, and the exceptions thereto, is defined thus:
jurisdiction having duly attached beforehand unless otherwise provided by law: Provided further, that the President
may, in the interest of justice, order or direct, at any time before arraignment, that a particular case be tried by the
appropriate civil court. (Emphasis supplied.)
Having established the jurisdiction of the General Court Martial over the case and the person of the petitioner, the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, therefore acquired the jurisdiction to confirm petitioner's sentence as mandated
under Article 47 of the Articles of War, which states:
Article 47. Confirmation – When Required. - In addition to the approval required by article forty-five, confirmation by
the President is required in the following cases before the sentence of a court-martial is carried into execution,
namely:
(a) Any sentence respecting a general officer;

10. COURT-MARTIAL – Jurisdiction in general – Termination – General Rules – The general rule is that court-martial
(b) Any sentence extending to the dismissal of an officer except that in time of war a sentence extending to
jurisdiction over officers, cadets, soldiers and others in the military service of the Philippines ceases on discharge or
the dismissal of an officer below the grade of brigadier general may be carried into execution upon
other separation from such service, and that jurisdiction as to any offense committed during a period of service thus
confirmation by the commanding general of the Army in the field;
terminated is not revived by a reentry into the military service.

(c) Any sentence extending to the suspension or dismissal of a cadet, probationary second lieutenant; and
Exceptions – To this general rule there are, however, some exceptions, among them the following:

(d) Any sentence of death, except in the case of persons convicted in time of war, of murder, mutiny,
xxxx
desertion, or as spies, and in such excepted cases of sentence of death may be carried into execution,
subject to the provisions of Article 50, upon confirmation by the commanding general of the Army in the
In certain case, where the person's discharge or other separation does not interrupt his status as a person belonging said field.
to the general category of persons subject to military law, court-martial jurisdiction does not terminate. Thus, where
an officer holding a reserve commission is discharged from said commission by reason of acceptance of a
When the authority competent to confirm the sentence has already acted as the approving authority no additional
commission in the Regular Force, there being no interval between services under the respective commissions, there
confirmation by him is necessary. (As amended by Republic Act No. 242). (Emphasis supplied.)
is no terminating of the officer's military status, but merely the accomplishment of a change in his status from that of a
reserve to that of a regular officer, and that court-martial jurisdiction to try him for an offense (striking enlisted men for
example) committed prior to the discharge is not terminated by the discharge. So also, where a dishonorable In connection therewith, petitioner argues that the confirmation issued by the Office of the President directing him to
discharged general prisoner is tried for an offense committed while a soldier and prior to his dishonorable discharge, be confined for two (2) years in the penitentiary had already been fully served in view of his preventive confinement
such discharge does not terminate his amenability to trial for the offense. (Emphases supplied.) which had exceeded two (2) years. Therefore, according to him, the Office of the President no longer has the
authority to order his confinement in a penitentiary. On the other hand, the OSG opines that petitioner cannot legally
demand the deduction of his preventive confinement in the service of his imposed two-year confinement in a
Petitioner also asserts that the General Court Martial's continuing jurisdiction over him despite his retirement holds
penitentiary, because unlike our Revised Penal Code29 which specifically mandates that the period of preventive
true only if the charge against him involves fraud, embezzlement or misappropriation of public funds citing this Court's
imprisonment of the accused shall be deducted from the term of his imprisonment, the Articles of War and/or the
ruling in De la Paz v. Alcaraz,et al.24 and Martin v. Ve r.25 However, this is not true. The OSG is correct in stating that
Manual for Courts-Martial do not provide for the same deduction in the execution of the sentence imposed by the
in De la Paz,26 military jurisdiction over the officer who reverted to inactive status was sustained by this Court because
General Court Martial as confirmed by the President in appropriate cases.
the violation involved misappropriation of public funds committed while he was still in the active military service, while
in Martin,27 military jurisdiction was affirmed because the violation pertained to illegal disposal of military property.
Both cited cases centered on the nature of the offenses committed by the military personnel involved, justifying the On the above matter, this Court finds the argument raised by the OSG unmeritorious and finds logic in the assertion
exercise of jurisdiction by the courts-martial. On the other hand, in the present case, the continuing military of petitioner that Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code can be made applicable in the present case.
jurisdiction is based on prior attachment of jurisdiction on the military court before petitioner's compulsory retirement.
This continuing jurisdiction is provided under Section 1 of P.D. 1850,28 as amended, thus:
The OSG maintains that military commissions or tribunals are not courts within the Philippine judicial system, citing
Olaguer, et al. v. Military Commission No. 4,30 hence, they are not expected to apply criminal law concepts in their
Section 1. Court Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated National Police and Members of the Armed Forces. - Any implementation and execution of decisions involving the discipline of military personnel. This is misleading. In
provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding – (a) uniformed members of the Integrated National Police who Olaguer, the courts referred to were military commissions created under martial law during the term of former
commit any crime or offense cognizable by the civil courts shall henceforth be exclusively tried by courts-martial President Ferdinand Marcos and was declared unconstitutional by this Court, while in the present case, the General
pursuant to and in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the Articles of Court Martial which tried it, was created under Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, and remains a valid entity.
War; (b) all persons subject to military law under article 2 of the aforecited Articles of War who commit any crime or
offense shall be exclusively tried by courts-martial or their case disposed of under the said Articles of War; Provided,
In Marcos v. Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines,31 this Court ruled that a court-martial case is a criminal
that, in either of the aforementioned situations, the case shall be disposed of or tried by the proper civil or judicial
case and the General Court Martial is a "court" akin to any other courts. In the same case, this Court clarified as to
authorities when court-martial jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under Article 38 of Commonwealth Act
what constitutes the words "any court" used in Section 1732 of the 1935 Constitution prohibiting members of Congress
Numbered 408, as amended, or court-martial jurisdiction over the person of the accused military or Integrated
National Police personnel can no longer be exercised by virtue of their separation from the active service without
to appear as counsel in any criminal case in which an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an
offense committed in relation to his office. This Court held:
We are of the opinion and therefore hold that it is applicable, because the words "any court" includes the General
Court-Martial, and a court-martial case is a criminal case within the meaning of the above quoted provisions of our
Constitution.
It is obvious that the words "any court," used in prohibiting members of Congress to appear as counsel "in any
criminal case in which an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his
office," refers, not only to a civil, but also to a military court or a Court-Martial. Because, in construing a Constitution,
"it must be taken as established that where words are used which have both a restricted and a general meaning, the
general must prevail over the restricted unless the nature of the subject matter of the context clearly indicates that the
limited sense is intended." (11 American Jurisprudence, pp. 680-682).
In the case of Ramon Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army,* 43 Off. Gaz., 855, we did not hold that the word
"court" in general used in our Constitution does not include a Court-Martial; what we held is that the words "inferior
courts" used in connection with the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to "review on appeal certiorari or writ
of error, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments of inferior courts in all criminal cases in which the
penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment," as provided for in section 2, Article VIII, of the Constitution, do not
refer to Courts-Martial or Military Courts.
Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, quoted by the petitioners and by this Court in the case of Ramon Ruffy et al
vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army, supra, has to say in this connection the following:
Notwithstanding that the court-martial is only an instrumentality of the executive power having no relation or
connection, in law, with the judicial establishments of the country, it is yet, so far as it is a court at all, and within its
field of action, as fully a court of law and justice as is any civil tribunal. As a court of law, it is bound, like any court, by
the fundamental principles of law, and, in the absence of special provision of the subject in the military code, it
observes in general the rules of evidence as adopted in the common-law courts. As a court of justice, it is required by
the terms of its statutory oath, (art. 84.) to adjudicate between the U.S. and the accused "without partiality, favor, or
affection," and according, not only to the laws and customs of the service, but to its "conscience," i.e. its sense of
substantial right and justice unaffected by technicalities. In the words of the Attorney General, court-martial are thus,
"in the strictest sense courts of justice. (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, Vol. 1 and 2, 2nd Ed., p. 54.)
In re Bogart, 3 Fed. Cas., 796, 801, citing 6 Op. Attys. Gen. 425, with approval, the court said:
In the language of Attorney General Cushing, a court-martial is a lawful tribunal existing by the same authority that
any other exists by, and the law military is a branch of law as valid as any other, and it differs from the general law of
the land in authority only in this: that it applies to officers and soldiers of the army but not to other members of the
body politic, and that it is limited to breaches of military duty.
And in re Davison, 21 F. 618, 620, it was held:
That court-martial are lawful tribunals existing by the same authority as civil courts of the United States, have the
same plenary jurisdiction in offenses by the law military as the latter courts have in controversies within their
cognizance, and in their special and more limited sphere are entitled to as untrammelled an exercise of their powers.
And lastly, American Jurisprudence says:
SEC. 99. Representation by Counsel. — It is the general rule that one accused of the crime has the right to be
represented before the court by counsel, and this is expressly so declared by the statues controlling the procedure in
court-martial. It has been held that a constitutional provision extending that right to one accused in any trial in any
court whatever applies to a court-martial and gives the accused the undeniable right to defend by counsel, and that a
court-martial has no power to refuse an attorney the right to appear before it if he is properly licensed to practice in
the courts of the state. (Citing the case of State ex rel Huffaker vs. Crosby, 24 Nev. 115, 50 Pac. 127; 36 American
Jurisprudence 253)
The fact that a judgment of conviction, not of acquittal, rendered by a court-martial must be approved by the
reviewing authority before it can be executed (Article of War 46), does not change or affect the character of a court-
martial as a court. A judgment of the Court of First Instance imposing death penalty must also be approved by the
Supreme Court before it can be executed.
That court-martial cases are criminal cases within the meaning of Section 17, Article VI, of the Constitution is also
evident, because the crimes and misdemeanors forbidden or punished by the Articles of War are offenses against the
Republic of the Philippines. According to section 1,
Rule 106, of the Rules of Court, a criminal action or case is one which involves a wrong or injury done to the
Republic, for the punishment of which the offender is prosecuted in the name of the People of the Philippines; and
pursuant to Article of War 17, "the trial advocate of a general or special court-martial shall prosecute (the accused) in
the name of the People of the Philippines."
Winthtrop, in his well known work "Military Law and Precedents' says the following:
In regard to the class of courts to which it belongs, it is lastly to be noted that the court-martial is strictly a criminal
court. It has no civil jurisdiction whatever; cannot enforce a contract, collect a debt, or award damages in favor of an
individual. . . . Its judgment is a criminal sentence not a civil verdict; its proper function is to award punishment upon
the ascertainment of guilt. (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, Vols. 1 & 2, 2nd Ed., p. 55.)
In N. Y. it was held that the term "criminal case," used in the clause, must be allowed some meaning, and none can
be conceived, other than a prosecution for a criminal offense. Ex parte Carter. 66 S. W. 540, 544, 166 No. 604, 57
L.R.A. 654, quoting People vs. Kelly, 24 N.Y. 74; Counselman vs. Hitchcock, 12 S. Ct. 195; 142 U.S. 547, L. Ed.
111o. (Words and Phrases, Vol. 10, p. 485.)
Besides, that a court-martial is a court, and the prosecution of an accused before it is a criminal and not an
administrative case, and therefore it would be, under certain conditions, a bar to another prosecution of the defendant
for the same offense, because the latter would place the accused in jeopardy, is shown by the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Grafton vs. United States, 206 U. S. 333; 51 Law. Ed., 1088, 1092,
in which the following was held:
If a court-martial has jurisdiction to try an officer or soldier for a crime, its judgment will be accorded the finality and
conclusiveness as to the issues involved which attend the judgments of a civil court in a case of which it may legally
take cognizance; x x x and restricting our decision to the above question of double jeopardy, we judge that,
consistently with the above act of 1902, and for the reasons stated, the plaintiff in error, a soldier in the Army, having
been acquitted of the crime of homicide, alleged to have been committed by him in the Philippines, by a military court
of competent jurisdiction, proceeding under the authority of the United States, could not be subsequently tried for the
same offense in a civil court exercising authority in that territory.33 (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, as extensively discussed above, the General Court Martial is a court within the strictest sense of the word and
acts as a criminal court. On that premise, certain provisions of the Revised Penal Code, insofar as those that are not
provided in the Articles of War and the Manual for Courts-Martial, can be supplementary. Under Article 10 of the
Revised Penal Code:
Art. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. - Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable
under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws,
unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
A special law is defined as a penal law which punishes acts not defined and penalized by the Revised Penal
Code.34In the present case, petitioner was charged with and convicted of Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and
Gentleman (96th Article of War) and Violation of the 97th Article of War, or Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and
Military Discipline, both of which are not defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code. The corresponding
penalty imposed by the General Court Martial, which is two (2) years of confinement at hard labor is penal in nature.
Therefore, absent any provision as to the application of a criminal concept in the implementation and execution of the
General Court Martial's decision, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, specifically Article 29 should be applied.
In fact, the deduction of petitioner's period of confinement to his sentence has been recommended in the Staff Judge
Advocate Review, thus:
x x x Recommend that the sentence be approved. The PNP custodial facility in Camp Crame, Quezon City, is the
appropriate place of confinement. The period of confinement from 18 October 2004 shall be credited in his favor and
deducted from the two (2) years to which the accused was sentenced. Thus, confinement will expire on 18 October
2006. Considering that the period left not served is less than one (1) year, confinement at the National Penitentiary is
no longer appropriate.35 (Emphasis supplied.)
The above was reiterated in the Action of the Reviewing Authority, thus:
In the foregoing General Court-Martial case of People of the Philippines versus MGEN. CARLOS F. GARCIA 0-5820
AFP (now Retired), the verdict of GUILTY is hereby approved.
The sentence to be dishonorably discharged from the service; to forfeit all pay and allowances due and to become
due; and to be confined at hard labor at such place as the reviewing authority may direct for a period of two (2) years
is also approved.
Considering that the Accused has been in confinement since 18 October 2004, the entire period of his confinement
since 18 October 2004 will be credited in his favor. Consequently, his two (2) year sentence of confinement will expire
on 18 October 2006.
The proper place of confinement during the remaining unserved portion of his sentence is an official military detention
facility.1âwphi1 However, the Accused is presently undergoing trial before the Sandiganbayan which has directed
that custody over him be turned over to the civilian authority and that he be confined in a civilian jail or detention
facility pending the disposition of the case(s) before said Court. For this reason, the Accused shall remain confined at
the PNP's detention facility in Camp Crame, Quezon City. The Armed Forces of the Philippines defers to the civilian
authority on this matter.
Should the Accused be released from confinement upon lawful orders by the Sandiganbayan before the expiration of
his sentence adjudged by the military court, the Provost Marshal General shall immediately take custody over the
Accused, who shall be transferred to and serve the remaining unserved portion thereof at the ISAFP detention facility
in Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City.36 (Emphasis supplied.)
Nevertheless, the application of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code in the Articles of War is in accordance with the
Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution. According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed.37 It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner.38 The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its improper
execution through the state's duly-constituted authorities.39 In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law
requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that
are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.40 It, however, does not require the universal application of the
laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) the classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it applies equally to all members of the same class.41 "Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification."42 In the present case, petitioner belongs to the class of those who have been convicted by any court,
thus, he is entitled to the rights accorded to them. Clearly, there is no substantial distinction between those who are
convicted of offenses which are criminal in nature under military courts and the civil courts. Furthermore, following the
same reasoning, petitioner is also entitled to the basic and time-honored principle that penal statutes are construed
strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.43 It must be remembered that the provisions of the
Articles of War which the petitioner violated are penal in nature.
The OSG is correct when it argued that the power to confirm a sentence of the President, as Commander-in-Chief,
includes the power to approve or disapprove the entire or any part of the sentence given by the court martial. As
provided in Article 48 of the Articles of War:
Article 48. Power Incident to Power to Confirm. - The power to confirm the sentence of a court-martial shall be held to
include:
(a) The power to confirm or disapprove a finding, and to confirm so much only of a finding of guilty of a
particular offense as involves a finding of guilty of a lesser included offense when, in the opinion of the
authority having power to confirm, the evidence of record requires a finding of only the lesser degree of
guilt;
(b) The power to confirm or disapprove the whole or any part of the sentence; and
(c) The power to remand a case for rehearing, under the provisions of Article 50. (Emphasis supplied.)
In addition, the President also has the power to mitigate or remit a sentence. Under Article 49 of the Articles of War:
Article 49. Mitigation or Remission of Sentence. - The power to order the execution of the sentence adjudged by a
court-martial shall be held to include, inter alia, the power to mitigate or remit the whole or any part of the sentence.
Any unexpected portion of a sentence adjudged by a court-martial may be mitigated or remitted by the military
authority competent to appoint, for the command, exclusive of penitentiaries and Disciplinary Barracks of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or Philippine Constabulary, in which the person under sentence is held, a court of the kind
that imposed the sentence, and the same power may be exercised by superior military authority; but no sentence
approved or confirmed by the President shall be remitted or mitigated by any other authority, and no approved
sentence of loss of files by an officer shall be remitted or mitigated by any authority inferior to the President, except
as provided in Article 52.
When empowered by the President to do so, the commanding general of the Army in the field or the area commander
may approve or confirm and commute (but not approve or confirm without commuting), mitigate, or remit and then
order executed as commuted, mitigated, or remitted any sentence which under those Articles requires the
confirmation of the President before the same may be executed. (As amended by Republic Act No. 242).
Thus, the power of the President to confirm, mitigate and remit a sentence of erring military personnel is a clear
recognition of the superiority of civilian authority over the military. However, although the law (Articles of War) which
conferred those powers to the President is silent as to the deduction of the period of preventive confinement to the
penalty imposed, as discussed earlier, such is also the right of an accused provided for by Article 29 of the RPC.
As to petitioner's contention that his right to a speedy disposition of his case was violated, this Court finds the same to
be without merit.
No less than our Constitution guarantees the right not just to a speedy trial but to the speedy disposition of
cases.44However, it needs to be underscored that speedy disposition is a relative and flexible concept. A mere
mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case.45 In determining whether or not the right to the speedy disposition of cases has
been violated, this Court has laid down the following guidelines: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for such
delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.46
In this case, there was no allegation, whatsoever of any delay during the trial. What is being questioned by petitioner
is the delay in the confirmation of sentence by the President. Basically, the case has already been decided by the
General Court Martial and has also been reviewed by the proper reviewing authorities without any delay. The only
thing missing then was the confirmation of sentence by the President. The records do not show that, in those six (6)
years from the time the decision of the General Court Martial was promulgated until the sentence was finally
confirmed by the President, petitioner took any positive action to assert his right to a speedy disposition of his case.
This is akin to what happened in Guerrero v. Court of Appeals,47 where, in spite of the lapse of more than ten years of
delay, the Court still held that the petitioner could not rightfully complain of delay violative of his right to speedy trial or
disposition of his case, since he was part of the reason for the failure of his case to move on towards its ultimate
resolution. The Court held, inter alia:
In the case before us, the petitioner merely sat and waited after the case was submitted for resolution in 1979. It was
only in 1989 when the case below was reraffled from the RTC of Caloocan City to the RTC of Navotas-Malabon and
only after respondent trial judge of the latter court ordered on March 14, 1990 the parties to follow-up and complete
the transcript of stenographic notes that matters started to get moving towards a resolution of the case. More
importantly, it was only after the new trial judge reset the retaking of the testimonies to November 9, 1990 because of
petitioner's absence during the original setting on October 24, 1990 that the accused suddenly became zealous of
safeguarding his right to speedy trial and disposition.
xxxx
In the present case, there is no question that petitioner raised the violation against his own right to speedy disposition
only when the respondent trial judge reset the case for rehearing. It is fair to assume that he would have just
continued to sleep on his right − a situation amounting to laches − had the respondent judge not taken the initiative of
determining the non-completion of the records and of ordering the remedy precisely so he could dispose of the case.
The matter could have taken a different dimension if during all those ten years between 1979 when accused filed his
memorandum and 1989 when the case was reraffled, the accused showed signs of asserting his right which was
granted him in 1987 when the new constitution took effect, or at least made some overt act (like a motion for early
disposition or a motion to compel the stenographer to transcribe stenographic notes) that he was not waiving it. As it
is, his silence would have to be interpreted as a waiver of such right.
While this Court recognizes the right to speedy disposition quite distinctly from the right to a speedy trial, and
although this Court has always zealously espoused protection from oppressive and vexatious delays not attributable
to the party involved, at the same time, we hold that a party's individual rights should not work against and preclude
the people's equally important right to public justice. In the instant case, three people died as a result of the crash of
the airplane that the accused was flying. It appears to us that the delay in the disposition of the case prejudiced not
just the accused but the people as well. Since the accused has completely failed to assert his right seasonably and
inasmuch as the respondent judge was not in a position to dispose of the case on the merits due to the absence of
factual basis, we hold it proper and equitable to give the parties fair opportunity to obtain (and the court to dispense)
substantial justice in the premises.48
Time runs against the slothful and those who neglect their rights.49 In fact, the delay in the confirmation of his
sentence was to his own advantage, because without the confirmation from the President, his sentence cannot be
served.
Anent petitioner's other arguments, the same are already rendered moot and academic due to the above
discussions.1âwphi1
Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion, as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.50 Thus, applying, the earlier disquisitions, this Court finds that the Office of the President did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Confirmation of Sentence in question.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari dated September 29, 2011 of Major General Carlos F. Garcia, AFP (Ret.) is
hereby DISMISSED. However, applying the provisions of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, the time within which
the petitioner was under preventive confinement should be credited to the sentence confirmed by the Office of the
President, subject to the conditions set forth by the same law.
SO ORDERED
The Supreme Court has dismissed the petition of former Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) comptroller Major
General Garlos F. Garcia that sought to annul the September 9, 2011 Confirmation of Sentence by the Office of the
President (OP). The sentence handed down by the Special General Court Martial No. 2 had ordered his dishonorable
discharge from service, forfeiture of all his pay and allowances, and confinement for two years in a penitentiary.
In a 28-page decision penned by Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, the Court’s Third Division held that the OP did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Confirmation of Sentence.
The Court upheld the authority of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to confirm the sentence. It held that the
General Court Martial had jurisdiction over the case since it was indisputable that Garcia was an officer in the active
service of AFP when he committed the violations until his arraignment. Garcia’s mandatory retirement on November
18, 2004 did not divest the General Court Martial of its jurisdiction. And since the General Court Martial has
jurisdiction, the Court held that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, also acquired jurisdiction as mandated under
Article 47 of the Articles of War.
The Court stressed that Article 48 of the Articles of War vests on the President, as Commander-in-Chief, the power to
approve or disapprove the entire or any part of the sentence given by the court martial, while Article 49 of the same
grants the President the power to mitigate or remit a sentence.
“Thus, the power of the President to confirm, mitigate and remit a sentence of erring military personnel is a clear
recognition of the superiority of civilian authority over the military. However, although the law (Articles of War)
which conferred those powers to the President is silent as to the deduction of the period of preventive confinement to
the penalty imposed, as discussed earlier, such is also the right of an accused provided for by Article 29 of the RPC,”
held the Court.
On September 16, 2011, or a week after the OP confirmed the sentence of the court martial against him, Garcia was
arrested and detained and continues to be detained at the maximum security compound of the National Penitentiary
in Muntinlupa. Garcia, tried by the Special General Court Martial NR 2, was charged with and convicted of violation
of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) and violation of the 97th Article of War
(Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline) for failing to disclose all his assets in his Sworn
Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Networth for the year 2003 as required by RA 3019, as amended in relation to
RA 6713.
Garcia, among others, argued that the confirmation issued by the OP directing his two-year detention in a
penitentiary had already been fully served following his preventive confinement. He was released on December 16,
2010 after a preventive confinement for six years and two months. He was initially confined at his quarters at Camp
General Emilio Aguinaldo before he was transferred to the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(ISAFP) Detention Center, and latter to the Camp Crame Custodial Detention Center.
The Court ruled that applying the provisions of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (Period of preventive
imprisonment deducted from time of imprisonment), the time within which the petitioner was under preventive
confinement should be credited to the sentence confirmed by the Office of the President, subject to the conditions set
forth by the same law.
The Court held that “the General Court Martial is a court within the strictest sense of the word and acts as a criminal
court.” As such, certain provisions of the RPC, insofar as those that are not provided in the Articles of War and the
Manual for Courts-Martial, can be supplementary. “[A]bsent any provision as to the application of a criminal concept
in the implementation and execution of the General Court Martial’s decision, the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code, specifically Article 29 should be applied. In fact, the deduction of petitioner’s (Garcia) period of confinement to
his sentence has been recommended in the Staff Judge Advocate Review.”
The Court further held that the application of Article 29 of the RPC in the Articles of War is in accordance with the
Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution. “[T]he concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to
govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a
legitimate governmental objective. It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or
things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification,” held the Court.
Finally, the Court found without merit Garcia’s contention that his right to a speedy disposition of his case was
violated. It noted that Garcia did not allege any delay during the trial only the delay in the confirmation of the
sentence by the President. The Court found such delay to Garcia’s advantage because his sentence could not be served
absent such confirmation. (GR No. 198554, Garcia v. Executive Secretary, July 30, 2012)
G.R. No. 134625. August 31, 1999]
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS, CHANCELLOR ROGER POSADAS, DR.
EMERLINDA ROMAN, DEAN CONSUELO PAZ, DR. ISAGANI MEDINA, DR. MARIA SERENA
DIOKNO, DR. OLIVIA CAOILI, DR. FRANCISCO NEMENZO II, DEAN PACIFICO AGABIN,
CARMELITA GUNO, and MARICHU LAMBINO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
AROKIASWAMY WILLIAM MARGARET CELINE, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
For review before the Court is the decision of the Court of Appeals [1] in CA-G.R. SP No. 42788, dated December 16, 1997,
which granted private respondents application for a writ of mandatory injunction, and its resolution, dated July 13, 1998, denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Private respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine is a citizen of India and holder of a Philippine visitors
visa. Sometime in April 1988, she enrolled in the doctoral program in Anthropology of the University of the Philippines College
of Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP) in Diliman, Quezon City.
After completing the units of course work required in her doctoral program, private respondent went on a two-year leave
of absence to work as Tamil Programme Producer of the Vatican Radio in the Vatican and as General Office Assistant at the
International Right to Life Federation in Rome. She returned to the Philippines in July 1991 to work on her dissertation entitled,
Tamil Influences in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines.
On December 22, 1992, Dr. Realidad S. Rolda, chairperson of the U.P. Department of Anthropology, wrote a letter to Dr.
Maria Serena Diokno, CSSP Associate Dean and Graduate Program Director, certifying that private respondent had finished her
dissertation and was ready for her oral defense. Dr. Rolda suggested that the oral defense be held on January 6, 1993 but, in a
letter, dated February 2, 1993, Dr. Serena Diokno rescheduled it on February 5, 1993. Named as members of the dissertation
panel were Drs. E. Arsenio Manuel, Serafin Quiason, Sri Skandarajah, Noel Teodoro, and Isagani Medina, the last included as
the deans representative.
After going over private respondents dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean Consuelo Joaquin-Paz that there was a
portion in private respondents dissertation that was lifted, without proper acknowledgment, from Balfours  Cyclopaedia of India
and Eastern and Southern Asia (1967), volume I, pp. 392-401 (3 v., Edward Balfour 1885 reprint) and from John Edyes article
entitled Description of the Various Classes of Vessels Constructed and Employed by the Natives of the Coasts of Coromandel,
Malabar, and the Island of Ceylon for their Coasting Navigation in the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland
Journal, volume I, pp. 1-14 (1833).[2]
Nonetheless, private respondent was allowed to defend her dissertation on February 5, 1993.  Four (4) out of the five (5)
panelists gave private respondent a passing mark for her oral defense by affixing their signatures on the approval form. These
were Drs. Manuel, Quiason, Skandarajah, and Teodoro. Dr. Quiason added the following qualification to his signature:
Ms. Arokiaswamy must incorporate the suggestions I made during the successful defense of her Ph.D. thesis. [3]
Dr. Medina did not sign the approval form but added the following comment:
Pipirmahan ko ang pagsang-ayon/di pagsang-ayon kapag nakita ko na ang mga revisions ng dissertation. [4]
Dr. Teodoro added the following note to his signature:
Kailangang isagawa ang mga mahahalagang pagbabago at ipakita sa panel ang bound copies.[5]
In a letter, dated March 5, 1993 and addressed to her thesis adviser, Dr. Manuel, private respondent requested a meeting
with the panel members, especially Dr. Medina, to discuss the amendments suggested by the panel members during the oral
defense. The meeting was held at the deans office with Dean Paz, private respondent, and a majority of the defense panel present.
[6]
 During the meeting, Dean Paz remarked that a majority vote of the panel members was sufficient for a student to pass,
notwithstanding the failure to obtain the consent of the Deans representative.
On March 24, 1993, the CSSP College Faculty Assembly approved private respondents graduation pending submission of
final copies of her dissertation.
In April 1993, private respondent submitted copies of her supposedly revised dissertation to Drs. Manuel, Skandarajah,
and Quiason, who expressed their assent to the dissertation. Petitioners maintain, however, that private respondent did not
incorporate the revisions suggested by the panel members in the final copies of her dissertation.
Private respondent left a copy of her dissertation in Dr. Teodoros office on April 15, 1993 and proceeded to submit her
dissertation to the CSSP without the approvals of Dr. Medina and Dr. Teodoro, relying on Dean Pazs March 5, 1993 statement.
Dr. Teodoro later indicated his disapproval, while Dr. Medina did not sign the approval form.[7]
Dean Paz then accepted private respondents dissertation in partial fulfillment of the course requirements for the doctorate
degree in Anthropology.
In a letter to Dean Paz, dated April 17, 1993, private respondent expressed concern over matters related to her
dissertation. She sought to explain why the signature of Dr. Medina was not affixed to the revision approval form. Private
respondent said that since she already had the approval of a majority of the panel members, she no longer showed her dissertation
to Dr. Medina nor tried to obtain the latters signature on the revision approval form.  She likewise expressed her disappointment
over the CSSP administration and charged Drs. Diokno and Medina with maliciously working for the disapproval of her
dissertation, and further warned Dean Paz against encouraging perfidious acts against her.
On April 17, 1993, the University Council met to approve the list of candidates for graduation for the second semester of
school year 1992-1993. The list, which was endorsed to the Board of Regents for final approval, included private respondents
name.
 On April 21, 1993, Dean Paz sent a letter to Dr. Milagros Ibe, Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs, requesting the
exclusion of private respondents name from the list of candidates for graduation, pending clarification of the problems regarding
her dissertation. Her letter reads:[8]
Abril 21, 1993
Dr. Milagros Ibe
Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs
Unibersidad ng Pilipinas
Quezon Hall, Diliman, Q.C.
Mahal na Dr. Ibe,
Mahigpit ko pong hinihiling na hwag munang isama ang pangalan ni Ms. Arokiaswam[y] William Margaret Celine sa listahan ng
mga bibigyan ng degri na Ph.D. (Anthropology) ngayon[g] semester, dahil sa mga malubhang bintang nya sa ilang myembro ng
panel para sa oral defense ng disertasyon nya at sa mga akusasyon ng ilan sa mga ito sa kanya.
Naniniwala po kami na dapat mailinaw muna ang ilang bagay bago makonfer ang degri kay Ms. Arokiaswam[y]. Kelangan po ito
para mapangalagaan ang istandard ng pinakamataas na degree ng Unibersidad.
(Sgd.)
CONSUELO JOAQUIN-PAZ, Ph.D.
Dekano
Apparently, however, Dean Pazs letter did not reach the Board of Regents on time, because the next day, April 22, 1993,
the Board approved the University Councils recommendation for the graduation of qualified students, including private
respondent. Two days later, on April 24, 1993, private respondent graduated with the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
Anthropology.
On the other hand, Dean Paz also wrote a letter to private respondent, dated April 21, 1993, that she would not be granted
an academic clearance unless she substantiated the accusations contained in her letter dated April 17, 1993.
In her letter, dated April 27, 1993, private respondent claimed that Dr. Medinas unfavorable attitude towards her
dissertation was a reaction to her failure to include him and Dr. Francisco in the list of panel members; that she made the
revisions proposed by Drs. Medina and Teodoro in the revised draft of her dissertation; and that Dr. Diokno was guilty of
harassment.
In a letter addressed to Dean Paz, dated May 1, 1993, Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and
recommended that the doctorate granted to her be withdrawn.[9]
On May 13, 1993, Dean Paz formed an ad hoc committee, composed of faculty members from various disciplines and
chaired by Dr. Eva Duka-Ventura, to investigate the plagiarism charge against private respondent. Meanwhile, she recommended
to U.P. Diliman Chancellor, Dr. Emerlinda Roman, that the Ph.D. degree conferred on private respondent be withdrawn. [10]
In a letter, dated June 7, 1993, Dean Paz informed private respondent of the charges against her. [11]
On June 15, 1993, the Ventura Committee submitted a report to Dean Paz, finding at least ninety (90) instances or portions
in private respondents thesis which were lifted from sources without proper or due acknowledgment.
On July 28, 1993, the CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the recommendation to withdraw private
respondents doctorate degree and forwarded its recommendation to the University Council.The University Council, in turn,
approved and endorsed the same recommendation to the Board of Regents on August 16, 1993.
On September 6, 1993, the Board of Regents deferred action on the recommendation to study the legal implications of its
approval.[12]
Meanwhile, in a letter, dated September 23, 1993, U.P. Diliman Chancellor Emerlinda Roman summoned private
respondent to a meeting on the same day and asked her to submit her written explanation to the charges against her.
During the meeting, Chancellor Roman informed private respondent of the charges and provided her a copy of the findings
of the investigating committee.[13] Private respondent, on the other hand, submitted her written explanation in a letter dated
September 25, 1993.
Another meeting was held on October 8, 1993 between Chancellor Roman and private respondent to discuss her answer to
the charges. A third meeting was scheduled on October 27, 1993 but private respondent did not attend it, alleging that the Board
of Regents had already decided her case before she could be fully heard.
On October 11, 1993, private respondent wrote to Dr. Emil Q. Javier, U.P. President, alleging that some members of the
U.P. administration were playing politics in her case.[14] She sent another letter, dated December 14, 1993, to Dr. Armand Fabella,
Chairman of the Board of Regents, complaining that she had not been afforded due process and claiming that U.P. could no
longer withdraw her degree since her dissertation had already been accepted by the CSSP. [15]
Meanwhile, the U.P. Office of Legal Services justified the position of the University Council in its report to the Board of
Regents. The Board of Regents, in its February 1, 1994 and March 24, 1994 meetings, further deferred action thereon.
On July 11, 1994, private respondent sent a letter to the Board of Regents requesting a re-investigation of her case. She
stressed that under the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline, it was the student disciplinary tribunal which
had jurisdiction to decide cases of dishonesty and that the withdrawal of a degree already conferred was not one of the authorized
penalties which the student disciplinary tribunal could impose.
On July 28, 1994, the Board of Regents decided to release private respondents transcript of grades without annotation
although it showed that private respondent passed her dissertation with 12 units of credit.
On August 17, 1994, Chancellor Roger Posadas issued Administrative Order No. 94-94 constituting a special committee
composed of senior faculty members from the U.P. units outside Diliman to review the University Councils recommendation to
withdraw private respondents degree. With the approval of the Board of Regents and the U.P. Diliman Executive Committee,
Posadas created a five-man committee, chaired by Dr. Paulino B. Zafaralla, with members selected from a list of nominees
screened by Dr. Emerenciana Arcellana, then a member of the Board of Regents.  On August 31, 1994, the members of the
Zafaralla committee and private respondent met at U.P. Los Baos.
Meanwhile, on August 23, 1994, the U.P. Diliman Registrar released to private respondent a copy of her transcript of
grades and certificate of graduation.
In a letter to Chancellor Posadas, dated September 1, 1994, private respondent requested that the Zafaralla committee be
provided with copies of the U.P. Charter (Act No. 1870), the U.P. Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline, her
letter-response to Chancellor Roman, dated September 25, 1993, as well as all her other communications.
On September 19, 1994, Chancellor Posadas obtained the Zafaralla Committees report, signed by its chairman,
recommending the withdrawal of private respondents doctorate degree. The report stated:[16]
After going through all the pertinent documents of the case and interviewing Ms. Arokiaswamy William, the following facts were
established:
1. There is overwhelming evidence of massive lifting from a published source word for word and, at times,
paragraph by paragraph without any acknowledgment of the source, even by a mere quotation mark. At least 22
counts of such documented liftings were identified by the Committee. These form part of the approximately
ninety (90) instances found by the Committee created by the Dean of the College and subsequently verified as
correct by the Special Committee. These instances involved the following forms of intellectual
dishonesty: direct lifting/copying without acknowledgment, full/partial lifting with improper documentation
and substitution of terms or words (e.g., Tamil in place of Sanskrit, Tamilization in place of Indianization) from
an acknowledged source in support of her thesis (attached herewith is a copy of the documents for reference);
and
 2. Ms. Arokiaswamy William herself admits of being guilty of the allegation of plagiarism. Fact is, she informed the
Special Committee that she had been admitting having lifted several portions in her dissertation from various
sources since the beginning.
In view of the overwhelming proof of massive lifting and also on the admission of Ms. Arokiaswamy William that she indeed
plagiarized, the Committee strongly supports the recommendation of the U.P. Diliman Council to withdraw the doctoral degree
of Ms. Margaret Celine Arokiaswamy William.
On the basis of the report, the University Council, on September 24, 1994, recommended to the Board of Regents that
private respondent be barred in the future from admission to the University either as a student or as an employee.
On January 4, 1995, the secretary of the Board of Regents sent private respondent the following letter:[17]
4 January 1995
Ms. Margaret Celine Arokiaswamy William
Department of Anthropology
College of Social Sciences and Philosophy
U.P. Diliman, Quezon City
Dear Ms. Arokiaswamy William:
This is to officially inform you about the action taken by the Board of Regents at its 1081st and 1082nd meetings held last 17
November and 16 December 1994 regarding your case, the excerpts from the minutes of which are attached herewith.
Please be informed that the members present at the 1081st BOR meeting on 17 November 1994 resolved, by a majority decision,
to withdraw your Ph.D. degree as recommended by the U.P. Diliman University Council and as concurred with by the External
Review Panel composed of senior faculty from U.P. Los Baos and U.P. Manila. These faculty members were chosen by lot from
names submitted by the University Councils of U.P. Los Baos and U.P. Manila.
In reply to your 14 December 1994 letter requesting that you be given a good lawyer by the Board, the Board, at its
1082nd meeting on 16 December 1994, suggested that you direct your request to the Office of Legal Aid, College of Law, U.P.
Diliman.
Sincerely yours,
(Sgd.)
VIVENCIO R. JOSE
Secretary of the University
and of the Board of Regents
On January 18, 1995, private respondent wrote a letter to Commissioner Sedfrey Ordoez, Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights, asking the commissions intervention.[18] In a letter, dated February 14, 1995, to Secretary Ricardo Gloria,
Chairman of the Board of Regents, she asked for a reinvestigation of her case. She also sought an audience with the Board of
Regents and/or the U.P. President, which request was denied by President Javier, in a letter dated June 2, 1995.
On August 10, 1995, private respondent then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction and damages, which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-24690 and assigned to Branch 81 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. [19] She alleged that petitioners had unlawfully withdrawn her degree without justification
and without affording her procedural due process. She prayed that petitioners be ordered to restore her degree and to pay
her P500,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages and P1,500,000.00 as compensation for lost earnings.
On August 6, 1996, the trial court, Branch 227, rendered a decision dismissing the petition for  mandamus for lack of merit.
[20]
 Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which on December 16, 1997, reversed the lower court. The dispositive
portion of the appellate courts decision reads:[21]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is hereby reversed and set aside. Respondents are ordered to restore to petitioner
her degree of Ph.D. in Anthropology.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN GRANTING THE WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND
ORDERING PETITIONERS TO RESTORE RESPONDENTS DOCTORAL DEGREE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTORAL DEGREE GIVEN
RESPONDENT BY U.P. CANNOT BE RECALLED WITHOUT VIOLATING HER RIGHT TO ENJOYMENT OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TO JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN DEPRIVING PETITIONERS OF THEIR RIGHT TO
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS.[22]
Petitioners argue that private respondent failed to show that she had been unlawfully excluded from the use and enjoyment
of a right or office to which she is entitled so as to justify the issuance of the writ of  mandamus. They also contend that she failed
to prove that the restoration of her degree is a ministerial duty of U.P. or that the withdrawal of the degree violated her right to the
enjoyment of intellectual property.
On the other hand, private respondent, unassisted by counsel, argue that petitioners acted arbitrarily and with grave abuse
of discretion in withdrawing her degree even prior to verifying the truth of the plagiarism charge against her; and that as her
answer to the charges had not been forwarded to the members of the investigating committees, she was deprived of the
opportunity to comment or refute their findings.
In addition, private respondent maintains that petitioners are estopped from withdrawing her doctorate degree; that
petitioners acted contrary to 9 of the U.P. Charter and the U.P. Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline of the
University, which according to her, does not authorize the withdrawal of a degree as a penalty for erring students; and that only
the college committee or the student disciplinary tribunal may decide disciplinary cases, whose report must be signed by a
majority of its members.
We find petitioners contention to be meritorious.
Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act required to be done when it or he
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being
no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. [23] In University of the Philippines Board of Regents v.
Ligot-Telan,[24] this Court ruled that the writ was not available to restrain U.P. from the exercise of its academic freedom. In that
case, a student who was found guilty of dishonesty and ordered suspended for one year by the Board of Regents, filed a petition
for mandamus and obtained from the lower court a temporary restraining order stopping U.P. from carrying out the order of
suspension. In setting aside the TRO and ordering the lower court to dismiss the students petition, this Court said:
[T]he lower court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction of May 29, 1993. The issuance of the
said writ was based on the lower courts finding that the implementation of the disciplinary sanction of suspension on Nadal
would work injustice to the petitioner as it would delay him in finishing his course, and consequently, in getting a decent and
good paying job. Sadly, such a ruling considers only the situation of Nadal without taking into account the circumstances, clearly
of his own making, which led him into such a predicament. More importantly, it has completely disregarded the overriding issue
of academic freedom which provides more than ample justification for the imposition of a disciplinary sanction upon an erring
student of an institution of higher learning.
From the foregoing arguments, it is clear that the lower court should have restrained itself from assuming jurisdiction over the
petition filed by Nadal. Mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and certain right on the part of the
petitioner being required. It is of no avail against an official or government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion
or judgment.[25]
In this case, the trial court dismissed private respondents petition precisely on grounds of academic freedom but the Court
of Appeals reversed holding that private respondent was denied due process. It said:
It is worthy to note that during the proceedings taken by the College Assembly culminating in its recommendation to the
University Council for the withdrawal of petitioners Ph.D. degree, petitioner was not given the chance to be heard until after the
withdrawal of the degree was consummated. Petitioners subsequent letters to the U.P. President proved unavailing.[26]
As the foregoing narration of facts in this case shows, however, various committees had been formed to investigate the
charge that private respondent had committed plagiarism and, in all the investigations held, she was heard in her defense. Indeed,
if any criticism may be made of the university proceedings before private respondent was finally stripped of her degree, it is that
there were too many committee and individual investigations conducted, although all resulted in a finding that private respondent
committed dishonesty in submitting her doctoral dissertation on the basis of which she was conferred the Ph.D. degree.
Indeed, in administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain ones side of a
controversy or a chance to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. [27] A party who has availed of the
opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to have been denied due process.[28]
In this case, private respondent was informed in writing of the charges against her [29] and afforded opportunities to refute
them. She was asked to submit her written explanation, which she forwarded on September 25, 1993. [30] Private respondent then
met with the U.P. chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla committee to discuss her case. In addition, she sent several letters
to the U.P. authorities explaining her position.[31]
It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have an audience before the Board of Regents. Due
process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice. [32] It is
noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not require the attendance of persons whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the
Board of Regents.[33]
Nor indeed was private respondent entitled to be furnished a copy of the report of the Zafaralla committee as part of her
right to due process. In Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong,[34] we held:
Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written
statements which became the basis of petitioners February 14, 1991 order, they were denied procedural due process. Granting
that they were denied such opportunity, the same may not be said to detract from the observance of due process, for disciplinary
cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to cross examination. An administrative proceeding conducted to
investigate students participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. . .
In this case, in granting the writ of mandamus, the Court of Appeals held:
First. Petitioner graduated from the U.P. with a doctorate degree in Anthropology. After graduation, the contact between U.P. and
petitioner ceased. Petitioner is no longer within the ambit of the disciplinary powers of the U.P. As a graduate, she is entitled to
the right and enjoyment of the degree she has earned. To recall the degree, after conferment, is not only arbitrary, unreasonable,
and an act of abuse, but a flagrant violation of petitioners right of enjoyment to intellectual property.
Second. Respondents aver that petitioners graduation was a mistake.
Unfortunately this mistake was arrived at after almost a year after graduation. Considering that the members of the thesis panel,
the College Faculty Assembly, and the U.P. Council are all men and women of the highest intellectual acumen and integrity, as
respondents themselves aver, suspicion is aroused that the alleged mistake might not be the cause of withdrawal but some other
hidden agenda which respondents do not wish to reveal.
At any rate, We cannot countenance the plight the petitioner finds herself enmeshed in as a consequence of the acts complained
of. Justice and equity demand that this be rectified by restoring the degree conferred to her after her compliance with the
academic and other related requirements.
Art. XIV, 5 (2) of the Constitution provides that [a]cademic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.
This is nothing new. The 1935 Constitution [35] and the 1973 Constitution [36]likewise provided for the academic freedom or, more
precisely, for the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning. As pointed out by this Court in Garcia
v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology,[37] it is a freedom granted to institutions of higher learning which is
thus given a wide sphere of authority certainly extending to the choice of students. If such institution of higher learning can
decide who can and who cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of
being its graduates.
Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud, a university has the right to
revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus conferred. This freedom of a university does not terminate upon the
graduation of a student, as the Court of Appeals held. For it is precisely the graduation of such a student that is in question. It is
noteworthy that the investigation of private respondents case began before her graduation. If she was able to join the graduation
ceremonies on April 24, 1993, it was because of too many investigations conducted before the Board of Regents finally decided
she should not have been allowed to graduate.
Wide indeed is the sphere of autonomy granted to institutions of higher learning, for the constitutional grant of academic
freedom, to quote again from Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, is not to be construed in a
niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion.
Under the U.P. Charter, the Board of Regents is the highest governing body of the University of the Philippines. [38] It has
the power to confer degrees upon the recommendation of the University Council. [39] It follows that if the conferment of a degree
is founded on error or fraud, the Board of Regents is also empowered, subject to the observance of due process, to withdraw what
it has granted without violating a students rights. An institution of higher learning cannot be powerless if it discovers that an
academic degree it has conferred is not rightfully deserved. Nothing can be more objectionable than bestowing a universitys
highest academic degree upon an individual who has obtained the same through fraud or deceit.  The pursuit of academic
excellence is the universitys concern. It should be empowered, as an act of self-defense, to take measures to protect itself from
serious threats to its integrity.
While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue their education, the USC as an educational institution is also
entitled to pursue its academic freedom and in the process has the concomitant right to see to it that this freedom is not
jeopardized.[40]
In the case at bar, the Board of Regents determined, after due investigation conducted by a committee composed of faculty
members from different U.P. units, that private respondent committed no less than ninety (90) instances of intellectual dishonesty
in her dissertation. The Board of Regents decision to withdraw private respondents doctorate was based on documents on record
including her admission that she committed the offense.[41]
On the other hand, private respondent was afforded the opportunity to be heard and explain her side but failed to refute the
charges of plagiarism against her. Her only claim is that her responses to the charges against her were not considered by the
Board of Regents before it rendered its decision. However, this claim was not proven. Accordingly, we must presume regularity Hence, Celine then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and damages,
in the performance of official duties in the absence of proof to the contrary.[42] alleging that petitioners had unlawfully withdrawn her degree without justification and without affording her procedural due
process.
Very much the opposite of the position of the Court of Appeals that, since private respondent was no longer a student of
the U.P., the latter was no longer within the ambit of disciplinary powers of the U.P., is private respondents contention that it is
ISSUE: Whether or not Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was deprived of her right to substantive due process.
the Student Disciplinary Tribunal which had jurisdiction over her case because the charge is dishonesty. Private respondent
invokes 5 of the U.P. Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline which provides:
RULING: No. Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was indeed heard several times.

Jurisdiction. All cases involving discipline of students under these rules shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the student Several committees and meetings had been formed to investigate the charge that private respondent had committed plagiarism
disciplinary tribunal, except the following cases which shall fall under the jurisdiction of the appropriate college or unit; and she was heard in her defense.

(a) Violation of college or unit rules and regulations by students of the college, or In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side of a controversy or a
chance seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A party who has availed of the opportunity to present his
(b) Misconduct committed by students of the college or unit within its classrooms or premises or in the course of an position cannot tenably claim to have been denied due process.
official activity;
In the case at bar, Celine was informed in writing of the charges against her and given opportunities to answer them. She was
Provided, that regional units of the University shall have original jurisdiction over all cases involving students of such units. asked to submit her written explanation which she submiited. She, as well, met with the U.P. chancellor and the members of
the Zafaralla committee to discuss her case. In addition, she sent several letters to the U.P. authorities explaining her position.
Private respondent argues that under 25 (a) of the said Rules and Regulations, dishonesty in relation to ones studies (i.e.,
It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have an audience before the Board of Regents. Due
plagiarism) may be punished only with suspension for at least one (1) year.
process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice. It is
As the above-quoted provision of 5 of the Rules and Regulations indicates, the jurisdiction of the student disciplinary noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not require the attendance of persons whose cases are included as items on the agenda of
tribunal extends only to disciplinary actions. In this case, U.P. does not seek to discipline private respondent. Indeed, as the the Board of Regents.
appellate court observed, private respondent is no longer within the ambit of disciplinary powers of the U.P. Private respondent
cannot even be punished since, as she claims, the penalty for acts of dishonesty in administrative disciplinary proceedings is
suspension from the University for at least one year. What U.P., through the Board of Regents, seeks to do is to protect its
academic integrity by withdrawing from private respondent an academic degree she obtained through fraud.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and the petition for mandamus is hereby
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED

FACTS: Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine enrolled in the doctoral program in Anthropology of the UP CSSP
Diliman. She already completed the units of course work required and finished her dissertation and was ready for oral defense.

After going over her dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean Paz that she committed plagiarism. However, respondent
was allowed to defend her dissertation. Four out of the five panelists gave a passing mark except Dr. Medina.

UP held meeting against her case and some of the panels indicated disapproval. Hence, she expressed her disappointments
over the CSSP administration and warned Dean Paz. However, Dean Paz request the exclusion of Celine’s name from the list of
candidates for graduation but it did not reach the Board of Regents on time, hence Celine graduated.

Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and recommended that the doctorate granted to her be
withdrawn. Dean Paz informed private respondent of the charges against her.

CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the recommendation to withdraw private respondent's doctorate degree.

The Board sent her a letter indicating that they resolved to withdraw her Doctorate Degree recommended by the University
Council.

She sought an audience with the Board of Regents and/or the U.P. President, which request was denied by President
 We granted, in our resolution of 23 June 1992, the temporary mandatory relief prayed for.

Manuelito was enrolled at the Perpetual Help College of Rizal ("PHCR") for the degree of Bachelor of Science in
Criminology. He was elected Public Relations Officer ("PRO") of the Supreme Student Council some time in August
1990. Until September 1991, he was the hold-over PRO and the acting Secretary of the student council. In this
capacity, he was invited to attend a meeting with PHCR officials on 08 May 1991. Prior to said meeting, he was
asked by the Vice President for Academic Affairs, Dr. Grace De Leon, to sign Resolution No. 105 that would
implement, among other things, a 20% tuition fee increase for the school year 1991-1992. 2 Manuelito refused to sign
the resolution; instead he asked for a 2-week period to take the matter up with fellow officers. 3

During the scheduled 08 May 1991 meeting, the student council presented to PHCR a 9-point proposal. With an
assurance that the request of the student council would be considered favorably, the petitioner finally signed
Resolution No. 105.

On 06 August 1991, PHCR announced that its application for increase in tuition fees and other school charges for SY
1991-1992 for the three levels, namely, the Grade School, High School and College, was approved by the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports ("DECS"). 4 The student council filed with the DECS a motion for
reconsideration. Acting on the students' motion, the DECS, in its letter of 28 August 1991 addressed to the President
of PHCR, advised that the "collection of the increase (should) be held in abeyance pending the resolution of (the)
matter." 5

In the meantime, the CMT commandant furnished PHCR a memorandum, dated 20 August 1991, containing a list of
PHCR CMT students (Manuelito included) who were dropped during the first semester of school year 1991-1992,
with a recommendation that appropriate action be taken on said students.6

On 04 September 1991, the school administration circulated a memorandum 7 to the effect that Manuelito had been
dropped from PHCR's list of students. On even date, a letter 8 from Registrar Necy Buen was received by Manuelito,
informing him that PHCR was voiding his enrollment for the first semester of 1991-1992 because of the following
G.R. No. 103142 November 8, 1993
deficiencies:

MANUELITO A. ISABELO, JR., petitioner, 

* Non compliance of CMT requirement as per DECS Order No. 9, S. 1990 and DECS
vs.
Memorandum No. 80, S. 1991 and PHCR Internal Memo. No. 891-007;
PERPETUAL HELP COLLEGE OF RIZAL, INC., and DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND
SPORTS, respondents.
* No NCEE during the admission in the BS Criminology course;
George I. Arboleda for petitioner.
* Official Admission Credential not yet submitted;
Evelyn Lucero Gutierrez for Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc.
* Void declaration of CMT subjects (MS 11, 12, 21 and 22) which are docketed in the registration
card.

Beginning 05 September 1991, Manuelito was no longer allowed to enter the school premises. He forthwith sent a
VITUG, J.:
letter to the DECS informing the latter of the matter.

A student, Manuelito Isabelo, Jr., filed the instant petition for mandamus with the following prayer:
On October 15, 1991, Director Rosas of the DECS issued an order9 addressed to the President of PHCR,
stating, inter alia, that:
WHEREFORE petitioner prays for a writ of mandamus addressed to the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) to implement its order to re-admit him as a senior
. . . concerning the dropping from the rolls without due process of the students petitioners . . . ,
graduating student of respondent Perpetual Help College of Rizal (PHCR), and for the latter to
Manuelito Isabelo, Jr., . . ., please be advised that pending resolution thereof, the propriety of
re-admit him as a senior graduating student for March, 1992.
allowing the students to continue attending their classes to protect their interest as well as that of
the school, is hereby enjoined.
He prays for a temporary mandatory restraining order to compel his re-admission as a senior
graduating student for March 1992 while his petition is pending resolution.1
 In this connection, it is hereby directed that the above-named students be re-admitted to classes
and be allowed to take all examinations that they have missed pending final resolution of this
case/issue.
PHCR did not comply with the directive.
Hence this recourse. The petitioner questions PHCR's act of voiding his enrollment.
While this Court, on 23 June 1992, issued a preliminary mandatory injunction ordering and directing PHCR to re-
admit the petitioner for
enrollment, 10 the same was interdicted by PHCR's motion for clarification 11 that indeed would require factual
assessments that have yet to be conclusively passed upon administratively.
The petitioner claims that the real reason why PHCR has voided his enrollment as a senior graduating student had
been because of his active participation in opposing PHCR's application for tuition fee increase with the DECS.
The private respondent, on the other hand, invokes "academic freedom" in dropping the petitioner from its roll of
students. It argues that the petitioner has only been allowed to enroll "conditionally" during the first semester of school
year 1991-92 pending the completion of his remedial classes in CMT, in which he failed.
The rule in this jurisdiction since Garcia vs. Loyola School of
Theology, 12 reiterated in Tangonan vs. Paño, 13 has been to uphold the rule that admission to an institution of higher
learning is discretionary upon the school and that such an admission is a mere privilege, rather than a right, on the
part of the student. In Ateneo de Manila University vs. Capulong, 14 this Court cited with approval the formulation
made by Justice Felix Frankfurter of the essential freedoms subsumed in the term "academic
freedom" 15encompassing not only "the freedom to determine . . . . on academic grounds who may teach, what may
be taught (and) how it shall be taught," but likewise "who may be admitted to study." We have thus sanctioned its
valid invocation by a school in rejecting students who are academically delinquent, 16 or a laywoman seeking
admission to a seminary, 17 or students violating "School Rules on Discipline." 18
Like any other right, however, academic freedom has never been meant to be an unabridged license. It is a privilege
that assumes a correlative duty to exercise it responsibly. An equally telling precept is a long recognized mandate, so
well expressed in Article 19 of the Civil Code, that every "person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."
Another observation. In Non vs. Dames II, 19 we have already abandoned our earlier ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA, 20(that
enrollment of a student is a semester-to-semester contract, and that the school may not be compelled to renew the
contract) by recognizing instead the right of a student to be enrolled for the entire period in order to complete his
course. We have also stressed that the contract between the school and the student, imbued, as it is, with public
interest, is not an ordinary contract. 21
In this instance, it would seem that the principal reason forwarded by the private respondent in dropping the petitioner
from its roll of students was his failure to complete some remaining units in the CMT course. He was
unceremoniously dropped from the roll when the semester was about to end some time in October. He took special
training during the semestral break (which was the most reasonable time to comply), and he was able to pass it, but
PHCR still refused to give him that accreditation, insisting that he by then had ceased to be a student of PHCR.
While we ordinarily would not delve into the exercise of sound judgment, we will not, however, hesitate to act when
we perceive taints of arbitrariness in the process. The punishment of expulsion appears to us rather disproportionate
to his having had some deficiencies in his CMT course. Indeed the DECS itself is conceding to the grant of the instant
petition. The circumstances lend truth to the petitioner's claim that the private respondent has strongly been
influenced by his active participation in questioning PHCR's application for tuition fee increase.
There remains, however, an administrative determination, to be yet resolved with finality by the DECS, i.e., whether
the petitioner really deserves to be in senior class, as he claims, or has a number of school deficiencies to overcome,
as the respondent school counters. Hence, the issuance of a writ of mandamus at this time would not be warranted.
We have repeatedly said that for a writ of mandamus to issue, a petitioner should, on the one hand, have a clear
legal right to the thing demanded, and there should be, upon the other hand, an imperative duty of respondent to
perform the act sought to be mandated. 22 This Court, not being a trier of facts, 23 must remand this matter to the
DECS for its own evaluation and final determination.
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby REMANDED to the department of Education, Culture, and Sports for its
expeditious determination on the unresolved administrative issues raised in the instant petition. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason and Puno, JJ., concur.
Facts:
          A student, Manuelito Isabelo, Jr., filed the instant petition for mandamus with prayer for a writ of mandamus
addressed to DECS to implement its order to re-admit him as a senior graduating student of Perpetual Help College
of Rizal (PHCR)
          Manuelito was enrolled at the Perpetual Help College of Rizal for BS Criminology. He was elected Public Relations
Officer ("PRO") of the Supreme Student Council
          He was invited to attend a meeting with PHCR officials on 08 May 1991. He was asked by the VP for Academic
Affairs, Dr. Grace De Leon, to sign Resolution No. 105 that would implement a 20% tuition fee increase for the school
year 1991-1992.
          Manuelito refused to sign the resolution; instead he asked for a 2-week period to take the matter up with fellow
officers.
          Since, the administration assured that the request of the student council would be considered favorably, the
petitioner finally signed Resolution No. 105.
          PHCR announced that it will increase tuition fees in all levels. The student council filed with the DECS a motion for
reconsideration. DECS held the advised that the "collection of the increase (should) be held in abeyance pending the
resolution of (the) matter."
          The administration dropped Manuelito from PHCR's list of students because of the following reasons:
o    Non compliance of CMT requirement as per DECS Order No. 9, S. 1990 and DECS Memorandum No. 80, S. 1991 and
PHCR Internal Memo. No. 891-007;
o    No NCEE during the admission in the BS Criminology course;
o    Official Admission Credential not yet submitted;
o    Void declaration of CMT subjects (MS 11, 12, 21 and 22)
          He took special training during the semestral break, and he was able to pass it, but PHCR still refused to give him
that accreditation, insisting that he by then had ceased to be a student of PHCR.
          Manuelito wrote to DECS, which in turn sent their letter to PHCR ordering that students should be allowed to
continue their classes pending the resolution. PHCR did not comply with the directive.
          Manuelito: Real reason PHCR has voided his enrollment is his active participation in opposing PHCR's application
for tuition fee increase with the DECS.
          PHCR: invokes "academic freedom" in dropping the petitioner from its roll of students. HE been allowed to enroll
"conditionally" pending the completion of his remedial classes in CMT, in which he failed.
Issue: WON PHCR may drop Manuelito from the list of students. CASE REMANDED.
          In Garcia vs. Loyola School of Theology: admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon
the school and that such an admission is a mere privilege, rather than a right, on the part of the student.
          In Ateneo de Manila University vs. Capulon: the term "academic freedom" "the freedom to determine on academic
grounds who may teach, what may be taught (and) how it shall be taught," but likewise "who may be admitted to
study."  
          However academic freedom is not an unabridged license. It is a privilege that assumes a correlative duty to
exercise it responsibly.
          In Non vs. Dames II: abandoned Alcuaz vs. PSBA, (that enrollment of a student is a semester-to-semester contract,
and that the school may not be compelled to renew the contract) by recognizing instead the right of a student to be
enrolled for the entire period in order to complete his course. We have also stressed that the contract between
the school and the student, imbued, as it is, with public interest, is not an ordinary contract.
          Expulsion is disproportionate to his deficiencies in his CMT course. The circumstances show that the PHCR has
strongly been influenced by his participation in questioning PHCR's application for tuition fee increase.
          However DECS should determine whether the petitioner really deserves to be in senior class or has a number of
school deficiencies to overcome, as the respondent school counters.  reconvened and the members cast their vote. The initial vote was 8-1: 8  found Cudia guilty and 1 acquitted Cudia.
G.R. No. 211362 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Academic Freedom
Remedial Law – Mandamus – Ministrant vs Discretionary Function
Aldrin Jeff Cudia was a member of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Siklab Diwa Class of 2014. On November
14, 2013, Cudia’s class had a lesson examination in their Operations Research (OR) subject the schedule of which
was from 1:30pm to 3pm.
However, after he submitted his exam paper, Cudia made a query to their OR teacher. Said teacher, then asked
Cudia to wait for her. Cudia complied and as a result, he was late for his next class (English). Later, the English
teacher reported Cudia for being late.
In his explanation, Cudia averred that he was late because his OR class was dismissed a bit late. The tactical officer
(TO) tasked to look upon the matter concluded that Cudia lied when he said that their OR class was dismissed late
because the OR teacher said she never dismissed her class late. Thus, Cudia was meted with demerits and touring
hours because of said infraction.
Cudia did not agree with the penalty hence he asked the TO about it. Not content with the explanation of the TO,
Cudia said he will be appealing the penalty he incurred to the senior tactical officer (STO). The TO then asked Cudia
to write his appeal.
In his appeal, Cudia stated that his being late was out of his control because his OR class was dismissed at 3pm
while his English class started at 3pm also. To that the TO replied: that on record, and based on the interview with the
teachers concerned, the OR teacher did not dismiss them (the class) beyond 3pm and the English class started at
3:05pm, not 3pm; that besides, under PMA rules, once a student submitted his examination paper, he is dismissed
from said class and may be excused to leave the classroom, hence, Cudia was in fact dismissed well before 3pm;
that it was a lie for Cudia to state that the class was dismissed late because again, on that day in the OR class, each
student was dismissed as they submit their examination, and were not dismissed as a class; that if  Cudia was
ordered by the teacher to stay, it was not because such transaction was initiated by the teacher, rather, it was
initiated by Cudia (because of his query to the teacher), although there were at least two students with Cudia at that
time querying the teacher, the three of them cannot be considered a “class”; Cudia could just have stated all that
instead of saying that his class was dismissed a bit late, hence he lied. The STO sustained the decision of the TO.
Later, the TO reported Cudia to the PMA’s Honor Committee (HC) for allegedly violating the Honor Code. Allegedly,
Cudia lied in his written appeal when he said his class was dismissed late hence, as a result, he was late for his next
class.
The Honor Code is PMA’s basis for the minimum standard of behavior required of their cadets. Any violation thereof
may be a ground to separate a cadet from PMA.
Cudia submitted an explanation to the HC. Thereafter, the HC, which is composed of nine (9) cadets, conducted an
investigation. After two hearings and after the parties involved were heard and with their witnesses presented, the HC
Under PMA rules (Honor System), a dissenting vote means the acquittal of Cudia. However, they also have a
practice of chambering where the members, particularly the dissenter, are made to explain their vote. This is to avoid
the “tyranny of the minority”. After the chambering, the dissenter was convinced that his initial  “not guilty vote” was
improper, hence he changed the same and the final vote became 9-0. Thus, Cudia was immediately placed inside
PMA’s holding center.
Cudia appealed to the HC chairman but his appeal was denied. Eventually, the Superintendent of the PMA ordered
the dismissal of Cudia from the PMA.
Cudia and several members of his family then sent letters to various military officers requesting for a re-investigation.
It was their claim that there were irregularities in the investigation done by the HC. As a result of such pleas, the case
of Cudia was referred to the Cadet Review and Appeals Board of PMA (CRAB).
Meanwhile, Cudia’s family brought the case to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) where it was alleged that
PMA’s “sham” investigation violated Cudia’s rights to due process, education, and privacy of communication.
Eventually, the CRAB ruled against Cudia. This ruling was affirmed by the AFP Chief of Staff. But on the other hand,
the CHR found in favor of Cudia.
PMA averred that CHR’s findings are at best recommendatory. Cudia filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus before the Supreme Court. PMA opposed the said petition as it argued that the same is not proper as
a matter of policy and that the court should avoid interfering with military matters.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Cudia’s petitions is proper.
2. Whether or not the PMA can validly dismiss Cudia based on its findings.
HELD: 
I. 
Mandamus is not proper
Mandamus will not prosper in this case. Cudia’s prayer that PMA should be compelled to reinstate him as well as to
give him his supposed academic awards is not proper. The Courts, even the Supreme Court, cannot compel PMA to
do so because the act of restoring Cudia’s rights and entitlements as a cadet as well as his awards is a discretionary
act. Mandamus cannot be availed against an official or government agency, in this case PMA, whose duty requires
the exercise of discretion or judgment. Further, such act which PMA was sought by Cudia to perform is within PMA’s
academic freedom as an educational institution – and such performance is beyond the jurisdiction of courts.
Certiorari is allowed
The petition for certiorari is allowed because the issue herein is whether or not PMA and its responsible officers acted
with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed Cudia. Under the Constitution, that is the duty of the courts to decide
actual controversies and to determine whether or not a government branch or instrumentality acted with grave abuse
of discretion. Thus, PMA cannot argue that judicial intervention into military affairs is not proper as a matter of policy.
Suffice it to say that judicial non-interference in military affairs is not an absolute rule.
On the civil liberties of PMA cadets
One of the arguments raised by PMA is that cadets, when they enrolled in the PMA, have surrendered parts of their
civil and political liberties. Hence, when they are disciplined and punished by the PMA, said cadets cannot question
the same, much less, question it in the courts. in short, they cannot raise due process.
On this, the SC held that such argument is wrong. It is true that a PMA cadet, by enrolling at PMA,  must be prepared
to subordinate his private interests for the proper functioning of the educational institution he attends to, one that is
with a greater degree than a student at a civilian public school. However, a cadet facing dismissal from PMA, whose
private interests are at stake (life, liberty, property) which includes his honor, good name, and integrity, is entitled to
due process. No one can be deprived of such without due process of law and the PMA, even as a military academy,
is not exempt from such strictures. Thus, when Cudia questioned in court the manner upon which he was dismissed
from the PMA, such controversy may be inquired upon by the courts.
(Author’s note: PMA, in essence, raised that due process, as contemplated by the Constitution, is not needed in
dismissing a cadet yet, as can be seen in the below discussion, PMA presented evidence that due process was, in
fact, complied with.)
II. Yes. It is within PMA’s right to academic freedom to decide whether or not a cadet is still worthy to be part of the
institution. Thus, PMA did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed Cudia. In fact, Cudia was
accorded due process. In this case, the investigation of Cudia’s Honor Code violation followed the prescribed
procedure and existing practices in the PMA. He was notified of the Honor Report submitted by his TO. He was then
given the opportunity to explain the report against him. He was informed about his options and the entire process that
the case would undergo. The preliminary investigation immediately followed after he replied and submitted a written
explanation. Upon its completion, the investigating team submitted a written report together with its recommendation
to the HC Chairman. The HC thereafter reviewed the findings and recommendations. When the honor case was
submitted for formal investigation, a new team was assigned to conduct the hearing. During the formal
investigation/hearing, he was informed of the charge against him and given the right to enter his plea. He had the
chance to explain his side, confront the witnesses against him, and present evidence in his behalf. After a thorough
discussion of the HC voting members, he was found to have violated the Honor Code. Thereafter, the guilty verdict
underwent the review process at the Academy level – from the OIC of the HC, to the SJA (Staff Judge Advocate), to
the Commandant of Cadets, and to the PMA Superintendent. A separate investigation was also conducted by the
HTG (Headquarters Tactics Group). Then, upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ (AFP-General Headquarters) to
reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB. Further, a Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body
composed of the CRAB members and the PMA senior officers was constituted to conduct a deliberate investigation of
the case. Finally, he had the opportunity to appeal to the President. Sadly for him, all had issued unfavorable rulings.
And there is no reason for the SC to disturb the findings of facts by these bodies.
Academic freedom of the PMA
Cudia would argue that there is no law providing that a guilty finding by the HC may be used by the PMA to dismiss
or recommend the dismissal of a cadet from the PMA; that Honor Code violation is not among those listed as
justifications for the attrition of cadets considering that the Honor Code and the Honor System (manner which PMA
conducts investigation of Honor Code violations) do not state that a guilty cadet is automatically terminated or
dismissed from service.
Such argument is not valid. Even without express provision of a law, the PMA has regulatory authority to
administratively dismiss erring cadets. Further, there is a law (Commonwealth Act No. 1) authorizing the President to
dismiss cadets. Such power by the President may be delegated to the PMA Superintendent, who may exercise direct
supervision and control over the cadets.
Further, as stated earlier, such power by the PMA is well within its academic freedom. Academic freedom or, to be
precise, the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning has been enshrined in the
Constitution.
The essential freedoms of academic freedom on the part of schools are as follows;
a. the right to determine who may teach;
b. the right to determine what may be taught;
c. the right to determine how it shall be taught;
d. the right to determine who may be admitted to study.
The Honor Code is just but one way for the PMA to exercise its academic freedom. If it determines that a cadet
violates it, then it has the right to dismiss said cadet. In this case, based on its findings, Cudia lied – which is a
violation of the Honor Code.
But Cudia’s lie is not even that big; is dismissal from the PMA really warranted?
The PMA Honor Code does not distinguish between a big lie and a minor lie. It punishes any form of lying. It does not
have a gradation of penalties. In fact, it is the discretion of the PMA as to what penalty may be imposed. When Cudia
enrolled at PMA, he agreed to abide by the Honor Code and the Honor System. Thus, while the punishment may be
severe, it is nevertheless reasonable and not arbitrary, and, therefore, not in violation of due process -also
considering that Cudia, as a cadet, must have known all of these.
G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015
FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY, REPRESENTED BY HIS FATHER RENATO P.
CUDIA, WHO ALSO ACTS ON HIS OWN BEHALF, AND BERTENI CATALUÑA CAUSING, Petitioners, v. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF
THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY (PMA), THE HONOR COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF THE PMA AND HC MEMBERS, AND THE
CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD (CRAB), Respondents.
FILIPINA P. CUDIA, IN BEHALF OF CADET FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA, AND ON HER OWN BEHALF, Petitioner-Intervenor.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The true test of a cadet’s character as a leader rests on his personal commitment to uphold what is morally and ethically
righteous at the most critical and trying times, and at the most challenging circumstances. When a cadet must face a dilemma
between what is true and right as against his security, well-being, pleasures and comfort, or dignity, what is at stake is his honor
and those that [define] his values. A man of an honorable character does not think twice and chooses the fore. This is the
essence of and the Spirit of the Honor Code – it is championing truth and righteousness even if it may mean the surrender of
one’s basic rights and privileges.1
The Procedural Antecedents
Six days prior to the March 16, 2014 graduation ceremonies of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), petitioners Renato P.
Cudia, acting for himself and in behalf of his son, Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia (Cadet 1CL Cudia), and Berteni Cataluña
Causing filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with application for extremely urgent temporary restraining
order (TRO).2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In a Resolution dated March 17, 2014, the Court denied the prayer for TRO and, instead, required respondents to file their
comment on the petition.3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On March 25, 2014, Filipina P. Cudia, acting for herself and in behalf of her son Cadet 1CL Cudia, filed a motion for leave to
intervene, attaching thereto the petition-in-intervention.4 Per Resolution dated March 31, 2014, the Court granted the motion
and resolved to await respondents’ comment on the petition.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A manifestation was then filed by petitioners on April 3, 2014, recommending the admission of the petition-in-intervention and
adopting it as an integral part of their petition.6 On May 20, 2014, petitioner-intervenor filed a manifestation with motion for
leave to admit the Final Investigation Report of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) dated April 25, 2014.7 The Report8 was
relative to CHR-CAR Case No. 2014-0029 filed by the spouses Renato and Filipina Cudia (Spouses Cudia), for themselves and in
behalf of their son, against the PMA Honor Committee (HC) members and Major Vladimir P. Gracilla (Maj. Gracilla)9 for
violation of Cadet 1CL Cudia’s rights to due process, education, and privacy of communication. Subsequently, on June 3, 2014,
petitioners filed a motion for leave to adopt the submission of the CHR Report.10 The manifestation was granted and the
motion was noted by the Court in its Resolution dated July 7, 2014.
After filing three motions for extension of time,11 respondents filed their Consolidated Comment12 on June 19, 2014. In a
motion, petitioner-intervenor filed a Reply, which was later adopted by petitioners.13 Submitted as Annex “A” of the Reply was
a copy of the CHR Resolution dated May 22, 2014 regarding CHR-CAR Case No. 2014-0029.14 We noted and granted the same
on August 11, 2014 and October 13, 2014.
Petitioner-intervenor twice filed a manifestation with motion to submit the case for early resolution,15 which the Court noted
in a Resolution dated August 11, 2014 and October 13, 2014.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Facts
Cadet 1CL Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the PMA, the country’s premiere military academy located at
Fort Gregorio del Pilar in Baguio City. He belonged to the “A” Company and was the Deputy Baron of his class. As claimed by
petitioners and petitioner-intervenor (hereinafter collectively called “petitioners,” unless otherwise indicated), he was
supposed to graduate with honors as the class salutatorian, receive the Philippine Navy Saber as the top Navy cadet graduate,
and be commissioned as an ensign of the Philippine Navy.
On November 14, 2013, the combined classes of the Navy and Air Force 1CL cadets had a lesson examination (LE) on Operations
Research (OR432) under Dr. Maria Monica C. Costales (Dr. Costales) at the PMAFI Room. Per published schedule from the
Headquarters Academic Group, the 4th period class in OR432 was from 1:30-3:00 p.m. (1330H-1500H), while the 5th period
class in ENG412 was from 3:05-4:05 p.m. (1505H-1605H).
Five days after, Professor Juanita Berong (Prof. Berong) of the 5th period class issued a Delinquency Report (DR) against Cadet
1CL Cudia because he was “[l]ate for two (2) minutes in his Eng 412 class x x x.”17 Cadets 1CL Narciso, Arcangel, Miranda,
Pontillas, Diaz, Otila, and Dela Cruz were also reported late for five minutes.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On December 4, 2013, the DRs reached the Department of Tactical Officers. They were logged and transmitted to the Company
Tactical Officers (CTO) for explanation of the concerned cadets. Two days later, Cadet 1CL Cudia received his DR.
In his Explanation of Report dated December 8, 2013, Cadet 1CL Cudia reasoned out that: “I came directly from OR432 Class.
We were dismissed a bit late by our instructor Sir.”19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On December 19, 2013, Major Rommel Dennis Hindang (Maj. Hindang), the CTO of Cadet 1CL Cudia, meted out to him the
penalty of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours. Immediately, Cadet 1CL Cudia clarified with Maj. Hindang his alleged violation. The
latter told him that the basis of the punishment was the result of his conversation with Dr. Costales, who responded that she
never dismissed her class late, and the protocol to dismiss the class 10-15 minutes earlier than scheduled. When he expressed
his intention to appeal and seek reconsideration of the punishment, he was advised to put the request in writing. Hence, that
same day, Cadet 1CL Cudia addressed his Request for Reconsideration of Meted Punishment to Maj. Benjamin L. Leander,
Senior Tactical Officer (STO), asserting:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our 4th period class ended 1500H and our 5th period class,
which is ENG412, started 1500H also. Immediately after 4th period class, I went to my next class without any intention of being
late Sir.20
A day after, Maj. Leander instructed Maj. Hindang to give his comments on the request of Cadet 1CL Cudia and to indicate if
there were other cadets belonging to the same section who were also late.
On December 28, 2013, Maj. Hindang submitted his reply to Maj. Leander pointing out that, based on his investigation, the 4th
period class was not dismissed late. As a result, Maj. Leander sustained the penalty imposed. Petitioners alleged that Cadet 1CL
Cudia came to know of the denial of his request only on January 24, 2014 upon inquiry with Maj. Leander.
Several days passed, and on January 7, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia was informed that Maj. Hindang reported him to the HC21 for
violation of the Honor Code. The Honor Report stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Lying that is giving statement that perverts the truth in his written appeal, stating that his 4th period class ended at 1500H that
made him late in the succeeding class.22
Upon asking the HC Chairman, Cadet 1CL Mike Anthony P. Mogol (Cadet 1CL Mogol), as to what Maj. Hindang meant in his
Report, Cadet 1CL Cudia learned that it was based on Maj. Hindang’s conversations with their instructors and classmates as well
as his statement in the request for reconsideration to Maj. Leander. He then verbally applied for and was granted an extension
of time to answer the charge against him because Dr. Costales, who could shed light on the matter, was on emergency leave.
On January 13, 2014, Dr. Costales sent text messages to Cadet 1CL Cudia, conveying:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Gud pm cdt cudia. Mam belandres gave me bkground na. She told me its a report dated november. When maj hindang ask me,
no time referens. (04:25:11 P.M.)
All the while I thot he was refering to dismisal during last day last december. Whc i told, i wud presume they wil finish early bec
its grp work. (04:29:21 P.M.)23
The next day, Cadets 1CL Cudia and Arcangel approached Dr. Costales, who reaffirmed that she and Maj. Hindang were not in
the same time reference when the latter asked her.
Later, Cadet 1CL Cudia submitted his letter of explanation on the Honor Report. He averred:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sir,
We had an LE that day (14 November 2013) in OR432 class. When the first bell rang (1455), I stood up, reviewed my paper and
submitted it to my instructor, Ms. Costales. After which, I and Cadet 1cl Arcangel asked for some query with regards (sic) to the
deductions of our previous LE. Our instructor gladly answered our question. She then told me that she will give the copy of our
section grade, so I waited at the hallway outside the ACAD5 office, and then she came out of the room and gave me a copy of
the grades. Cadet Arcangel, Cadet Narciso and I immediately went to our 5th period class which is ENG412.
With these statements, I would like to clarify the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
How could this be lying?
What is wrong with the side of Maj. Hindang (why did he come up to that honor report)?
What are his assumptions?
I appeal, in the name of clarity, fairness and truth[,] that my case be reopened and carefully reviewed for I did not violate the
honor code/system, I can answer NO to both questions (Did I intend to deceive? Did I intend to take undue advantage?) and for
the following reasons:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The honor report of Maj. Hindang was already settled and finalized given the fact that no face-to-face personal conversation
with Ms. Costales was conducted to clarify what and when exactly was the issue at hand.
Statements of the respondents support my explanation.
My explanation to my appeal to my DR (Request for reconsideration of meted punishment) further supports my explanation in
my delinquency report.
My understanding of the duration of the “CLASS” covers not just a lecture in a typical classroom instruction but includes every
transaction and communication a teacher does with her students, especially that in our case some cadets asked for queries, and
I am given instruction by which (sic) were directly related to our CLASS. Her transaction and communication with our other
classmates may have already ended but ours extended for a little bit.
I agree and consider that because Cadet CUDIA is under my instruction to wait, and the other cadets still have business with me,
it is reasonable enough for him to say that “Our class was dismissed a bit late” (dealing with matter of seconds or a minute
particularly 45 seconds to 1 minute and 30 seconds)
And with concern to (sic) OR432 class, I can say it ended on time (1500H).
(signed)
M. COSTALES
w/ attached certification
I was transparent and honest in explaining the 2-minute delay and did not attempt to conceal anything that happened or I did.
Furthermore, CPT DULAWAN PA, the Tactical Officer of Hawk Company[,] and I had a conversation with regards (sic) to the
same matter for which he can give important points of my case.
Cadet 1cl DIAZ “D” Co can also stand as a witness that I waited for Ms. Costales.24
On January 15, 2014, the HC constituted a team to conduct a preliminary investigation on the reported honor violation of Cadet
1CL Cudia. The Foxtrot Company was designated as the investigating team and was composed of Cadet 1CL Hasigan as Presiding
Officer, and Cadets 1CL Mogol, 1CL Raguindin, 2CL Gumilab, 2CL Saldua, 3CL Espejo, and 3CL Poncardas as members.25 Soon
after, the team submitted its Preliminary Investigation Report recommending that the case be formalized.
The formal investigation against Cadet 1CL Cudia then ensued. The Presiding Officer was Cadet 1CL Rhona K. Salvacion, while
the nine (9) voting members were Cadets 1CL Jairus O. Fantin, 1CL Bryan Sonny S. Arlegui, 1CL Kim Adrian R. Martal, 1CL
Jeanelyn P. Cabrido, 1CL Shu-Aydan G. Ayada, 1CL Dalton John G. Lagura, 2CL Renato A. Cariño, Jr., 2CL Arwi C. Martinez, and
2CL Niko Angelo C. Tarayao.26 Acting as recorders tasked to document the entire proceedings were 4CL Jennifer A. Cuarteron
and 3CL Leoncio Nico A. de Jesus II.27 Those who observed the trial were Cadets 1CL Balmeo, Dag-uman, Hasigan, Raguindin,
Paulino, Arcangel, and Narciso; Cadets 2CL Jocson and Saldua, Jr.; and Cadet 3CL Umaguing.28chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The first formal hearing started late evening of January 20, 2014 and lasted until early morning the next day. Cadet 1CL Cudia
was informed of the charge against him, as to which he pleaded “Not Guilty.” Among those who testified were Cadet 1CL Cudia,
Maj. Hindang, and Cadets 1CL Arcangel and Narciso. On the second night of the hearing held on January 21, 2014, Cadet 1CL
Cudia again appeared and was called to the witness stand along with Cadets Brit and Barrawed. Dr. Costales also testified under
oath via phone on a loudspeaker. Deliberation among the HC voting members followed. After that, the ballot sheets were
distributed. The members cast their votes through secret balloting and submitted their accomplished ballot sheets together
with their written justification. The result was 8-1 in favor of a guilty verdict. Cadet 1CL Dalton John G. Lagura (Cadet 1CL
Lagura) was the lone dissenter. Allegedly, upon the order of HC Chairman Cadet 1CL Mogol, the Presiding Officer and voting
members went inside a chamber adjoining the court room for further deliberation. After several minutes, they went out and
the Presiding Officer announced the 9-0 guilty verdict. Cadet 1CL Cudia, who already served nine (9) touring hours, was then
informed of the unanimous votes finding him guilty of violating the Honor Code. He was immediately placed in the PMA Holding
Center until the resolution of his appeal.
On January 24, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia filed a written appeal addressed to the HC Chairman, the full text of which
stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WRITTEN APPEAL
14 NOVEMBER 2013
This is when I was reported for “Late for two (2) minutes in Eng412 class”, my explanation on this delinquency report when I
received it, is that “Our class was dismissed a (little) bit late and I came directly from 4th period class... etc”. Knowing the fact
that in my delinquency report, it is stated that ENG412 classes started 1500H and I am late for two minutes, it is logical enough
for I (sic) to interpret it as “I came 1502H during that class”. This is the explanation that came into my mind that time. (I just
cannot recall the exact words I used in explaining that delinquency report, but what I want to say is that I have no intention to
be late). In my statements, I convey my message as “since I was not the only one left in that class, and the instructor is with us, I
used the term “CLASS”, I used the word “DISMISSED” because I was under instruction (to wait for her to give the section grade)
by the instructor, Ms. Costales. The other cadets (1CL MIRANDA, 1CL ARCANGEL) still have queries and business with her that
made me decide to use the word “CLASS”, while the others who don’t have queries and business with her (ex: 1CL NARCISO and
1CL DIAZ) were also around.
Note:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The four named cadets were also reported late.
Reference: Para 171.0. (Leaving the Classroom Prior to Dismissal Time)(Sec XVII, CCAFPR s2008)
It is stated in this reference that “Cadets shall not linger in the place of instruction after the section has been dismissed. EXCEPT
when told or allowed to do so by the instructor or by any competent authority for official purposes.”
The instruction by Ms. Costales was given to me before the two bells rang (indicating the end of class hour, 1500H). I waited for
her for about 45 seconds to 1 minute and 30 seconds, that made me to decide to write “a little bit late” in my explanation.
Truly, the class ENDED 1500H but due to official purpose (instruction by Ms. Costales to wait) and the conflict in academic
schedule (to which I am not in control of the circumstances, 4th PD class 1330H-1500H and 5th PD class 1500H-1600H), and
since Ms. Costales, my other classmates, and I were there, I used the word “CLASS”.
19 December 2013
I was informed that my delinquency report was awarded, 11 Demerits and 13 Touring hours. Not because I don’t want to serve
punishment, but because I know I did nothing wrong, I obeyed instruction, and believing that my reason is justifiable and valid,
that is why I approached our tactical officer, MAJ HINDANG PAF, to clarify and ask why it was awarded that day.
In our conversation, he said that he had a phone call to my instructor and he even added that they have a protocol to dismiss
the class, 15 minutes or 10 minutes before 1500H. I explained:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sir, I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our 4th period class ended 1500H and our 5th period class,
which is ENG412, started 1500H also. Immediately after 4th period class, I went to my next class without any intention of being
late Sir.
These statements are supplementary to my explanation in my delinquency report, in here, I specified the conflict in the
schedule and again, I have no intention to be late. After explaining it further with these statements, my tactical officer said that
since I was reported in a written form, I should make an appeal in a written form. Thinking that he already understood what I
want to say, I immediately made an appeal that day stating the words that I used in having conversation with him.29
Attached to the written appeal was a Certification dated January 24, 2014, wherein Dr. Costales
attested:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That Cadet MIRANDA, ARCANGEL, [and] NARCISO was (sic) with Cadet CUDIA in making query about their latest grades in
OR432 and/or results of UE1 outside the ACADS office. The following facts may explain their queries on 14 November
2013:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That I held my class in the PMAFI room instead of room 104.
That OR432 releases grades every Wednesday and cadets are informed during Thursday, either in class or posted grades in the
bulletin board (grades released was [sic] based on the previous LEs: latest LE before UE was Decision Trees).
That UE papers were already checked but not yet recorded due to (sic) other cadets have not taken the UE. Cadets were
allowed to verify scores but not to look at the papers.
Last 23 January 2014, Captain Dulawan clarified if indeed Cadet NARCISO and ARCANGEL verified grades. The two cadets said
that they verified something with me after the OR432 class and they were with Cadet CUDIA. That the statements of the three
(3) cadets are all the same and consistent, thus[,] I honor that as true.
As to the aspect of dismissing late, I could not really account for the specific time that I dismissed the class. To this date, I
[cannot] really recall an account that is more than two (2) months earlier. According to my records, there was a lecture followed
by an LE during (sic) on 14 November 2013. To determine the time of my dismissal, maybe it can be verified with the other
members of class I was handling on that said date.30
Respondents contend that the HC denied the appeal the same day, January 24, as it found no reason to conduct a re-trial based
on the arguments and evidence presented.31 Petitioners, however, claim that the written appeal was not acted upon until the
filing of the petition-in-intervention.32chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
From January 25 to February 7, 2014, respondents allege that the Headquarters Tactics Group (HTG) conducted an informal
review to check the findings of the HC. During the course of the investigation, Prof. Berong was said to have confirmed with the
Officer-in-Charge of the HC that classes started as scheduled (i.e., 3:05 p.m. or 1505H), and that Cadet 1CL Barrawed, the acting
class marcher of ENG412, verified before the Commandant, Assistant Commandant, and STO that the class started not earlier
than scheduled.
Meantime, on February 4, 2014, the OIC of the HC forwarded the Formal Investigation Report to the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA)
for review. The next day, the SJA found the report to be legally in order.
On February 8, 2014, Colonel Rozzano D. Briguez (Col. Briguez), the Commandant of Cadets, affirmed the HC findings and
recommended to Vice Admiral Edgar Abogado, then PMA Superintendent, the separation from the PMA of Cadet 1CL Cudia for
violation of the First Tenet of the Honor Code (Lying, pursuant to Sec. VII.12.b of the CCAFPR S-2008). On the same date, Special
Orders No. 26 was issued by the PMA Headquarters placing Cadet 1CL Cudia on indefinite leave of absence without pay and
allowances effective February 10, 2014 pending approval of his separation by the AFP-GHQ, barring him from future
appointment and/or admission as cadet, and not permitting him to qualify for any entrance requirements to the
PMA.33chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Two days later, Vice Admiral Abogado approved the recommendation to dismiss Cadet 1CL Cudia.
On February 13, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia submitted a letter to the Office of the Commandant of Cadets requesting for
reinstatement by the PMA of his status as a cadet.34chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Four days passed, Annavee P. Cudia (Annavee), the sister of Cadet 1CL Cudia, posted his plight in her Facebook account. The
day after, the Spouses Cudia gave a letter to Major General Oscar Lopez (Maj. Gen. Lopez), the new PMA Superintendent,
asking to recognize the 8-1 voting of the HC,35 copies of which were furnished to the AFP Chief of Staff and other concerned
military officials. Subsequently, Maj. Gen. Lopez was directed to review Cadet 1CL Cudia’s case. The latter, in turn, referred the
matter to the Cadet Review and Appeals Board (CRAB).
On February 19, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia made his personal appeal letter to Maj. Gen. Lopez. On even date, the AFP Chief of Staff
ordered a reinvestigation following the viral Facebook post of Annavee demanding the intervention of the military leadership.
Petitioners claim that, on February 21, 2014, Special Order No. 1 was issued directing all PMA cadets to ostracize Cadet 1CL
Cudia by not talking to him and by separating him from all activities/functions of the cadets. It is said that any violation shall be
a “Class 1” offense entailing 45 demerits, 90 hours touring, and 90 hours confinement. Cadet 1CL Cudia was not given a copy of
the order and learned about it only from the media.36 According to an alleged news report, PMA Spokesperson Major Agnes
Lynette Flores (Maj. Flores) confirmed the HC order to ostracize Cadet 1CL Cudia. Among his offenses were: breach of
confidentiality by putting documents in the social media, violation of the PMA Honor Code, lack of initiative to resign, and
smearing the name of the PMA.37chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On February 24, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia requested the CRAB for additional time, until March 4, 2014, to file an appeal on the
ground that his intended witnesses were in on-the-job training (OJT).38 As additional evidence to support his appeal, he also
requested for copies of the Minutes of the HC proceedings, relevant documents pertaining to the case, and video footages and
recordings of the HC hearings.
The next day, Cadet 1CL Cudia and his family engaged the services of the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) in Baguio City.
The CRAB conducted a review of the case based on the following: (a) letter of appeal of the Spouses Cudia dated February 18,
2014; (b) directive from the AFP-GHQ to reinvestigate the case; and (c) guidance from Maj. Gen. Lopez.
On February 26, 2014, Brigadier General Andre M. Costales, Jr. (Brig. Gen. Costales, Jr.), the CRAB Chairman, informed Cadet
1CL Cudia that, pending approval of the latter’s request for extension, the CRAB would continue to review the case and submit
its recommendations based on whatever evidence and testimonies received, and that it could not favorably consider his
request for copies of the HC minutes, relevant documents, and video footages and recordings of the HC hearings since it was
neither the appropriate nor the authorized body to take action thereon.39 Subsequently, upon verbal advice, Cadet 1CL Cudia
wrote a letter to Maj. Gen. Lopez reiterating his request.40chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Two days after, the Spouses Cudia filed a letter-complaint before the CHR-Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) Office against
the HC members and Maj. Gracilla for alleged violation of the human rights of Cadet 1CL Cudia, particularly his rights to due
process, education, and privacy of communication.41chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On March 4, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia, through the PAO, moved for additional time, until March 19, 2014, to file his appeal and
submit evidence. PAO also wrote a letter to AFP Chief of Staff General Emmanuel T. Bautista (Gen. Bautista) seeking for
immediate directive to the PMA to expeditiously and favorably act on Cadet 1CL Cudia’s requests.42chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Exactly a week prior to the commencement exercises of Siklab Diwa Class, the following events
transpired:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On March 10, 2014, Annavee sought the assistance of PAO Chief Public Attorney Persida V. Rueda-Acosta.43 On the other hand,
the CRAB submitted a report to the AFP-GHQ upholding the dismissal of Cadet 1CL Cudia.44chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On March 11, 2014, PAO received a letter from Maj. Gen. Lopez stating the denial of Cadet 1CL Cudia’s requests for extension of
time to file an Appeal Memorandum in view of the ample time already given, and to be furnished with a copy of relevant
documents because of confidentiality and presumption of regularity of the HC proceedings.45 Cadet 1CL Cudia, through PAO,
then filed an Appeal Memorandum46 before the CRAB.
On March 12, 2014, Spouses Cudia wrote a letter to President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III (Pres. Aquino), who is the
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP, attaching thereto the Appeal Memorandum.47 On the same day, Special Orders No. 48 was
issued by the PMA constituting a Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body composed of the CRAB members and PMA senior
officers to conduct a deliberate investigation pertaining to Cadet 1CL Cudia’s Appeal Memorandum.48 The focus of the inquiry
was not just to find out whether the appeal has merit or may be considered but also to investigate possible involvement of
other cadets and members of the command related to the incident and to establish specific violation of policy or regulations
that had been violated by other cadets and members of the HC.49chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On March 13, 2014, the Cudia family and the Chief Public Attorney had a dialogue with Maj. Gen. Lopez.
On March 14, 2014, the CHR-CAR came out with its preliminary findings, which recommended the
following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
For the PMA and the Honor Committee to respect and uphold the 8 Guilty – 1 Not guilty vote;chanrobleslaw
For the PMA and the Honor Committee to officially pronounce Cdt Cudia as Not Guilty of the charge filed against him before the
Honor Committee;chanrobleslaw
For the PMA to restore Cadet Cudia’s rights and entitlements as a full-fledge graduating cadet and allow him to graduate on
Sunday, 16 March 2014;chanrobleslaw
For the PMA to fully cooperate with the CHR in the investigation of Cudia’s Case.50
On March 15, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia and his family had a meeting with Pres. Aquino and Department of National Defense
(DND) Secretary Voltaire T. Gazmin. The President recommended that they put in writing their appeal, requests, and other
concerns. According to respondents, the parties agreed that Cadet 1CL Cudia would not join the graduation but it was without
prejudice to the result of the appeal, which was elevated to the AFP Chief of Staff. The President then tasked Gen. Bautista to
handle the reinvestigation of the case, with Maj. Gen. Oscar Lopez supervising the group conducting the review.
Four days after Siklab Diwa Class’ graduation day, petitioner Renato S. Cudia received a letter dated March 11, 2014 from the
Office of the AFP Adjutant General and signed by Brig. Gen. Ronald N. Albano for the AFP Chief of Staff, affirming the CRAB’s
denial of Cadet 1CL Cudia’s appeal. It held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
After review, The Judge Advocate General, AFP finds that the action of the PMA CRAB in denying the appeal for reinvestigation
is legally in order. There was enough evidence to sustain the finding of guilt and the proprietary (sic) of the punishment
imposed. Also, your son was afforded sufficient time to file his appeal from the date he was informed of the final verdict on
January 21, 2014, when the decision of the Honor Committee was read to him in person, until the time the PMA CRAB
conducted its review on the case. Moreover, the continued stay of your son at the Academy was voluntary. As such, he
remained subject to the Academy’s policy regarding visitation. Further, there was no violation of his right to due process
considering that the procedure undertaken by the Honor Committee and PMA CRAB was consistent with existing policy. Thus,
the previous finding and recommendation of the Honor Committee finding your son, subject Cadet guilty of “Lying” and
recommending his separation from the Academy is sustained.
In view of the foregoing, this Headquarters resolved to deny your appeal for lack of merit.51 Cdt 1CL BRYAN SONNY S. ARLEGUI, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
Thereafter, the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body issued its Final Investigation Report on March 23, 2014 denying Cadet 1CL 3.10
Cudia’s appeal.52 Subsequently, on April 28, 2014, the special investigation board tasked to probe the case submitted its final Cdt 1CL DALTON JOHN G. LAGURA, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
report to the President.53 Pursuant to the administrative appeals process, the DND issued a Memorandum dated May 23, 3.11
2014, directing the Office of AFP Chief of Staff to submit the complete records of the case for purposes of DND review and Cdt 1CL BIANCHIHEIMER L. EDRA, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
recommendation for disposition by the President.54chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary 3.12
Cdt 4CL JENNIFER A. CUARTERON (recorder)
Meanwhile, on May 22, 2014, the CHR-CAR issued its Resolution with respect to CHR-CAR Case No. 2014-0029, concluding and 3.13
recommending as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Cdt 3CL LEONCIO NICO A. DE JESUS II (recorder)
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission on Human Rights-CAR Office finds PROBABLE CAUSE FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS against the officers and members of the PMA Honor Committee and certain PMA officials, specifically for The Office of the AFP Chief of Staff and the PMA competent authorities should investigate and file appropriate charges against
violations of the rights of CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA to dignity, due process, education, privacy/privacy of communication, Maj. VLADIMIR P. GRACILLA, for violation of the right to privacy of Cadet Cudia and/or failure, as intelligence officer, to ensure
and good life. the protection of the right to privacy of Cudia who was then billeted at the PMA Holding Center;chanrobleslaw

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the CHR-CAR Office RESOLVED to indorse to competent authorities for their immediate
appropriate action on the following recommendations:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Philippine Military Academy must set aside the “9-Guilty, 0-Not Guilty” verdict against Cadet Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia, for being
null and void; to uphold and respect the “8-Guilty, 1-Not Guilty” voting result and make an official pronouncement of NOT
GUILTY in favor of Cadet Cudia;chanrobleslaw
The PMA, the AFP Chief of Staff, and the President in whose hands rest the ends of justice and fate of Cadet Cudia,
to:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Office of the AFP Chief of Staff and PMA competent authorities should investigate Maj. DENNIS ROMMEL HINDANG for his
failure and ineptness to exercise his responsibility as a competent Tactical Officer and a good father of his cadets, in this case, to
Cadet Cudia; for failure to respect exhaustion of administrative remedies;chanrobleslaw
The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philppines, the PMA Superintendent, to
immediately cause the comprehensive review of all rules of procedures, regulations, policies, including the so-called practices in
the implementation of the Honor Code; and, thereafter, adopt new policies, rules of procedures and relevant regulations which
are human-rights based and consistent with the Constitution and other applicable laws;chanrobleslaw

2.1 The Congress of the Philippines to consider the enactment of a law defining and penalizing ostracism and discrimination, which
officially proclaim Cadet Cudia a graduate and alumnus of the Philippine Military Academy; is apparently being practiced in the PMA, as a criminal offense in this jurisdiction;chanrobleslaw
2.2
issue to Cadet Cudia the corresponding Diploma for the degree of Bachelors of Science; and His Excellency The President of the Philippines to certify as priority, the passage of an anti-ostracism and/or anti-discrimination
2.3 law; and
Issue to Cadet Cudia the corresponding official transcript of his academic records for his BS degree, without conditions therein
as to his status as a PMA cadet. Finally, for the AFP Chief of Staff and the PMA authorities to ensure respect and protection of the rights of those who testified
for the cause of justice and truth as well as human rights of Cadet Cudia.
The Public Attorneys’ Office to provide legal services to Cadet Cudia in pursuing administrative, criminal and civil suits against RESOLVED FURTHER, to monitor the actions by the competent authorities on the foregoing CHR recommendations.
the officers and members of the Honor Committee named hereunder, for violation of the Honor Code and System and the
Procedure in Formal Investigation, dishonesty, violation of the secrecy of the ballot, tampering the true result of the voting, Let copy of this resolution be served by personal service or by substituted service to the complainants (the spouses Renato and
perjury, intentional omission in the Minutes of substantive part of the formal trial proceedings which are prejudicial to the Filipina Cudia; and Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia), and all the respondents. Also, to the PMA Superintendent, the AFP Chief of Staff, the
interest of justice and Cadet Cudia’s fundamental rights to dignity, non-discrimination and due process, which led to the Secretary of National Defense, His Excellency The President of the Philippines, The Public Attorneys’ Office.
infringement of his right to education and even transgressing his right to a good life.
SO RESOLVED.55
3.1 On June 11, 2014, the Office of the President sustained the findings of the AFP Chief of Staff and the CRAB. The letter, which
Cdt 1CL MIKE ANTHONY MOGUL, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP was addressed to the Spouses Cudia and signed by Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., stated in
3.2 whole:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Cdt 1CL RHONA K. SALVACION, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP This refers to your letters to the President dated 12 March 2014 and 26 March 2014 appealing for a reconsideration of the
3.3 decision of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Honor Committee on the case of your son, Cadet 1CL Aldrin Jeff Cudia.
Cdt 2CL ARWI C. MARTINEZ
3.4 After carefully studying the records of the case of Cadet Cudia, the decision of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Cdt 2CL RENATO A. CARIÑO, JR. Philippines (AFP), and the Honor Code System of the AFP Cadet Corps, this Office has found no substantial basis to disturb the
3.5 findings of the AFP and the PMA Cadet Review Appeals Board (CRAB). There is no competent evidence to support the claim that
Cdt 2CL NIKO ANGELO C. TARAYAO the decision of the Honor Committee members was initially at 8 “Guilty” votes and 1 “Not Guilty” vote. The lone affidavit of an
3.6 officer, based on his purported conversation with one Honor Committee member, lacks personal knowledge on the
Cdt 1CL JEANELYN P. CABRIDO, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP deliberations of the said Committee and is hearsay at best.
3.7
Cdt 1CL KIM ADRIAN R. MARTAL, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP Similarly, the initial recommendations of the Commission on Human Rights cannot be adopted as basis that Cadet Cudia’s due
3.8 process rights were violated. Apart from being explicitly preliminary in nature, such recommendations are anchored on a
Cdt 1CL JAIRUS O. FANTIN, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP finding that there was an 8-1 vote which, as discussed above, is not supported by competent evidence.
3.9
In the evaluation of Cadet Cudia’s case, this Office has been guided by the precept that military law is regarded to be in a class
of its own, “applicable only to military personnel because the military constitutes an armed organization requiring a system of
discipline separate from that of civilians” (Gonzales v. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, 10 August 2005 citing Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.
2d 184 [1975] and Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 US 83 [1953]). Thus, this Office regarded the findings of the AFP Chief, particularly
his conclusion that there was nothing irregular in the proceedings that ensued, as carrying great weight.
Accordingly, please be informed that the President has sustained the findings of the AFP Chief and the PMA CRAB.56
The Issues
To petitioners, the issues for resolution are:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I.
WHETHER THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY, THE HONOR COMMITTEE AND THE CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING CADET FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA FROM THE ACADEMY IN
UTTER DISREGARD OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
CONSIDERING THAT:
Despite repeated requests for relevant documents regarding his case, Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia was deprived of his
right to have access to evidence which would have proven his defense, would have totally belied the charge against him, and
more importantly, would have shown the irregularity in the Honor Committee’s hearing and rendition of decision
Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia was vaguely informed of the decisions arrived at by the Honor Committee, the Cadet Review
and Appeals Board and the Philippine Military Academy
The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and the Philippine Military Academy have afforded Cadet First
Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia nothing but a sham trial
The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and the Philippine Military Academy violated their own rules and
principles as embodied in the Honor Code
The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and the Philippine Military Academy, in deciding Cadet First Class
Aldrin Jeff Cudia’s case, grossly and in bad faith, misapplied the Honor Code so as to defy the 1987 Constitution,
notwithstanding the unquestionable fact that the former should yield to the latter.
II
WHETHER THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY, THE HONOR COMMITTEE AND THE CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT CADET FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA LIED, THEREBY
VIOLATING THE HONOR CODE
III
WHETHER THE RESULT OF THE FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION INDEPENDENTLY CONDUCTED BY THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS IS OF SUCH GREAT WEIGHT AND PERSUASIVE NATURE THAT THIS HONORABLE COURT MAY HONOR, UPHOLD AND
RESPECT57
On the other hand, in support of their prayer to dismiss the petition, respondents presented the issues
below:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
PROCEDURAL GROUNDS
I.
THE MANDAMUS PETITION PRAYING THAT CADET CUDIA BE INCLUDED IN THE LIST OF GRADUATES OF SIKLAB DIWA CLASS OF
2014 AND BE ALLOWED TO TAKE PART IN THE COMMENCEMENT EXERCISES HAS ALREADY BEEN RENDERED MOOT.
II.
THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE PETITIONS ARE ACTUALLY FACTUAL WHICH ARE BEYOND THE SCOPE OF A PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS.
III.
MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE TO COMPEL RESPONDENTS TO GRANT THE RELIEFS PRAYED FOR.
IV.
IT IS PREMATURE TO INVOKE JUDICIAL REDRESS PENDING THE DECISION OF THE PRESIDENT ON CADET CUDIA’S APPEAL.
V.
WITH UTMOST DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT MUST EXERCISE CAREFUL RESTRAINT AND REFRAIN FROM UNDULY OR
PREMATURELY INTERFERING WITH LEGITIMATE MILITARY MATTERS.
SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS
VI.
CADET CUDIA HAS NECESSARILY AND VOLUNTARILY RELINQUISHED CERTAIN CIVIL LIBERTIES BY VIRTUE OF HIS ENTRY INTO THE
PMA.
VII.
THE PMA ENJOYS THE ACADEMIC FREEDOM WHICH AUTHORIZES IT TO IMPOSE DISCIPLINARY MEASURES AND PUNISHMENT AS
IT DEEMS FIT AND CONSISTENT WITH THE PECULIAR NEEDS OF THE ACADEMY.
VIII.
CADET CUDIA WAS PROPERLY AFFORDED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.
The PMA has regulatory authority to administratively terminate cadets despite the absence of statutory authority.
Violation of the Honor Code warrants the administrative dismissal of a guilty cadet.
Cadet Cudia violated the first tenet of the Honor Code by providing untruthful statements in the explanation for his tardiness.
The higher authorities of the PMA did not blindly adopt the findings of the Honor Committee.
The procedural safeguards in a student disciplinary case were properly accorded to Cadet Cudia.
The subtle evolution in the voting process of the Honor Committee, by incorporating executive session/chambering, was
adopted to further strengthen the voting procedure of the Honor Committee.
Cadet Lagura voluntarily changed his vote without any pressure from the other voting members of the Honor Committee.
Ostracism is not a sanctioned practice of the PMA.
The findings of the Commission on Human Rights are not binding on the Honorable Court, and are, at best, recommendatory.
Cadet Cudia was not effectively deprived of his future when he was dismissed from the PMA.58
The Ruling of the Court
PROCEDURAL GROUNDS
Propriety of a petition for mandamus
Respondents argue that the mandamus aspect of the petition praying that Cadet 1CL Cudia be included in the list of graduating
cadets and for him to take part in the commencement exercises was already rendered moot and academic when the graduation
ceremonies of the PMA Siklab Diwa Class took place on March 16, 2014. Also, a petition for mandamus is improper since it does
not lie to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Invoking Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School
of Theology,59 respondents assert that a mandamus petition could not be availed of to compel an academic institution to allow
a student to continue studying therein because it is merely a privilege and not a right. In this case, there is a clear failure on
petitioners’ part to establish that the PMA has the ministerial duty to include Cadet 1CL Cudia in the list, much less award him
with academic honors and commission him to the Philippine Navy. Similar to the case of University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals,60 it is submitted that the PMA may rightfully exercise its discretionary power on who may be admitted to study
pursuant to its academic freedom.
In response, petitioners contend that while the plea to allow Cadet 1CL Cudia to participate in the PMA 2014 commencement
exercises could no longer be had, the Court may still grant the other reliefs prayed for. They add that Garcia enunciated that a
respondent can be ordered to act in a particular manner when there is a violation of a constitutional right, and that the
certiorari aspect of the petition must still be considered because it is within the province of the Court to determine whether a
branch of the government or any of its officials has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess thereof.
We agree that a petition for mandamus is improper.
Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station. It may also be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.
For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a ministerial act or duty. An act is ministerial if the act should be
performed "[under] a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without
regard to or the exercise of [the tribunal or corporation's] own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done."
The tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person must have no choice but to perform the act specifically enjoined by law. This
is opposed to a discretionary act whereby the officer has the choice to decide how or when to perform the
duty.61chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In this case, petitioners pray for, among others:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Also, after due notice and hearing, it is prayed of the Court to issue a Writ of Mandamus to:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
direct the PMA to include Cadet Cudia in the list of graduates of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the PMA, including inclusion in the
yearbook;chanrobleslaw
direct the PMA to allow Cadet Cudia to take part in the commencement exercises if he completed all the requirements for his
baccalaureate degree;chanrobleslaw
direct the PMA to award unto Cadet Cudia the academic honors he deserves, and the commission as a new Philippine Navy
ensign;chanrobleslaw
direct the Honor Committee to submit to the CRAB of the PMA all its records of the proceedings taken against Cadet Cudia,
including the video footage and audio recordings of the deliberations and voting, for the purpose of allowing the CRAB to
conduct intelligent review of the case of Cadet Cudia;chanrobleslaw
direct the PMA’s CRAB to conduct a review de novo of all the records without requiring Cadet Cudia to submit new evidence if it
was physically impossible to do so;chanrobleslaw
direct the PMA’s CRAB to take into account the certification signed by Dr. Costales, the new evidence consisting of the affidavit
of a military officer declaring under oath that the cadet who voted “not guilty” revealed to this officer that this cadet was
coerced into changing his vote, and other new evidence if there is any;chanrobleslaw
direct the PMA’s CRAB to give Cadet Cudia the right to a counsel who is allowed to participate actively in the proceedings as
well as in the cross-examinations during the exercise of the right to confront witnesses against him; and
direct the Honor Committee in case of remand of the case by the CRAB to allow Cadet Cudia a representation of a counsel.62
Similarly, petitioner-intervenor seeks for the following reliefs:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A. x x x
B. a Writ of Mandamus be issued commanding:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a.)
The PMA, Honor Committee, and CRAB to respect and uphold the 8 Guilty - 1 Not Guilty vote;
b.)
The PMA, Honor Committee, and CRAB to officially pronounce Cadet Cudia as Not Guilty of the charge filed against him before
the Honor Committee;
c.)
The PMA to restore Cadet Cudia’s rights and entitlements as a full-fledged graduating cadet, including his diploma and
awards.63
Anent the plea to direct the PMA to include Cadet 1CL Cudia in the list of graduates of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 and to allow
him to take part in the commencement exercises, the same was rendered moot and academic when the graduation ceremonies
pushed through on March 16, 2014 without including Cadet 1CL Cudia in the roll of graduates.
With respect to the prayer directing the PMA to restore Cadet 1CL Cudia’s rights and entitlements as a full-fledged graduating
cadet, including his diploma, awards, and commission as a new Philippine Navy ensign, the same cannot be granted in a petition
for mandamus on the basis of academic freedom, which We shall discuss in more detail below. Suffice it to say at this point that
these matters are within the ambit of or encompassed by the right of academic freedom; therefore, beyond the province of the
Court to decide.64 The powers to confer degrees at the PMA, grant awards, and commission officers in the military service are
discretionary acts on the part of the President as the AFP Commander-in-Chief. Borrowing the words of
Garcia:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
There are standards that must be met. There are policies to be pursued. Discretion appears to be of the essence. In terms of
Hohfeld's terminology, what a student in the position of petitioner possesses is a privilege rather than a right. She [in this case,
Cadet 1CL Cudia] cannot therefore satisfy the prime and indispensable requisite of a mandamus proceeding.65
Certainly, mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases. It cannot be availed against an official or government agency whose duty
requires the exercise of discretion or judgment.66 For a writ to issue, petitioners should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded, and there should be an imperative duty on the part of respondents to perform the act sought to be
mandated.67chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The same reasons can be said as regards the other reliefs being sought by petitioners, which pertain to the HC and the CRAB
proceedings. In the absence of a clear and unmistakable provision of a law, a mandamus petition does not lie to require anyone
to a specific course of conduct or to control or review the exercise of discretion; it will not issue to compel an official to do
anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to do or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by
law.68chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The foregoing notwithstanding, the resolution of the case must proceed since, as argued by petitioners, the Court is
empowered to settle via petition for certiorari whether there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondents in
dismissing Cadet 1CL Cudia from the PMA.
Factual nature of the issues
According to respondents, the petition raises issues that actually require the Court to make findings of fact because it sets forth
several factual disputes which include, among others: the tardiness of Cadet 1CL Cudia in his ENG412 class and his explanation
thereto, the circumstances that transpired in the investigation of his Honor Code violation, the proceedings before the HC, and
the allegation that Cadet 1CL Lagura was forced to change his vote during the executive session/“chambering.”
In opposition, petitioners claim that the instant controversy presents legal issues. Rather than determining which between the
two conflicting versions of the parties is true, the case allegedly centers on the application, appreciation, and interpretation of a
person’s rights to due process, to education, and to property; the interpretation of the PMA Honor Code and Honor System;
and the conclusion on whether Cadet 1CL Cudia’s explanation constitutes lying. Even if the instant case involves questions of
fact, petitioners still hold that the Court is empowered to settle mixed questions of fact and law.
Petitioners are correct.
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of evidence presented, the
truth or falsehood of facts being admitted and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the
matter. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts. When there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct is a
question of law.69
The petition does not exclusively present factual matters for the Court to decide. As pointed out, the all-encompassing issue of
more importance is the determination of whether a PMA cadet has rights to due process, to education, and to property in the
context of the Honor Code and the Honor System, and, if in the affirmative, the extent or limit thereof. Notably, even
respondents themselves raise substantive grounds that We have to resolve. In support of their contention that the Court must
exercise careful restraint and should refrain from unduly or prematurely interfering in legitimate military matters, they argue
that Cadet 1CL Cudia has necessarily and voluntarily relinquished certain civil liberties by virtue of his entry into the PMA, and
that the Academy enjoys academic freedom authorizing the imposition of disciplinary measures and punishment as it deems fit
and consistent with the peculiar needs of the PMA. These issues, aside from being purely legal questions, are of first
impression; hence, the Court must not hesitate to make a categorical ruling.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies
Respondents assert that the Court must decline jurisdiction over the petition pending President Aquino’s resolution of Cadet
1CL Cudia’ appeal. They say that there is an obvious non-exhaustion of the full administrative process. While Cadet 1CL Cudia
underwent the review procedures of his guilty verdict at the Academy level – the determination by the SJA of whether the HC
acted according to the established procedures of the Honor System, the assessment by the Commandant of Cadets of the
procedural and legal correctness of the guilty verdict, the evaluation of the PMA Superintendent to warrant the administrative
separation of the guilty cadet, and the appellate review proceedings before the CRAB – he still appealed to the President, who
has the utmost latitude in making decisions affecting the military. It is contended that the President’s power over the persons
and actions of the members of the armed forces is recognized in B/Gen. (Ret.) Gudani v. Lt./Gen. Senga70 and in Section 3171
of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 1 (also known as "The National Defense Act"). As such, the President could still overturn the
decision of the PMA. In respondents’ view, the filing of this petition while the case is pending resolution of the President is an
irresponsible defiance, if not a personal affront. For them, comity dictates that courts of justice should shy away from a dispute
until the system of administrative redress has been completed.
From the unfolding of events, petitioners, however, consider that President Aquino effectively denied the appeal of Cadet 1CL
Cudia. They claim that his family exerted insurmountable efforts to seek reconsideration of the HC recommendation from the
AFP officials and the President, but was in vain. The circumstances prior to, during, and after the PMA 2014 graduation rites,
which was attended by President Aquino after he talked to Cadet 1CL Cudia’s family the night before, foreclose the possibility
that the challenged findings would still be overturned. In any case, petitioners insist that the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not absolute based on the Corsiga v. Defensor72 and Verceles v. BLR-DOLE73 rulings.
We rule for petitioners.
In general, no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy
has been exhausted. The rationale behind the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is that “courts, for reasons of
law, comity, and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted
to and the proper authorities, who are competent to act upon the matter complained of, have been given the appropriate
opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum.”74 In the U.S. case of
Ringgold v. United States,75 which was cited by respondents, it was specifically held that in a typical case involving a decision by
military authorities, the plaintiff must exhaust his remedies within the military before appealing to the court, the doctrine being
designed both to preserve the balance between military and civilian authorities and to conserve judicial resources.
Nonetheless, there are exceptions to the rule. In this jurisdiction, a party may directly resort to judicial remedies if any of the
following is present:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
when there is a violation of due process;
when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;
when there is irreparable injury;
when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the implied and assumed
approval of the latter;
when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;
when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;
when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and
when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.76
Petitioners essentially raise the lack of due process in the dismissal of Cadet 1CL Cudia from the PMA. Thus, it may be a ground
to give due course to the petition despite the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Yet more significant is the fact that
during the pendency of this case, particularly on June 11, 2014, the Office of the President finally issued its ruling, which
sustained the findings of the AFP Chief and the CRAB. Hence, the occurrence of this supervening event bars any objection to the
petition based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Court’s interference within military affairs
Respondents cite the U.S. cases of Bois v. Marsh77 and Schlesinger v. Councilman78 to support their contention that judicial
intervention would pose substantial threat to military discipline and that there should be a deferential review of military
statutes and regulations since political branches have particular expertise and competence in assessing military needs. Likewise,
in Orloff v. Willoughby79 and Parker v. Levy,80 it was allegedly opined by the U.S. Supreme Court that the military constitutes a
specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian. According to respondents, the U.S. courts’
respect to the military recognizes that constitutional rights may apply differently in the military context than in civilian society
as a whole. Such military deference is exercised either by refusing to apply due process and equal protection doctrines in
military cases or applying them but with leniency.
In respondents’ view, although Philippine courts have the power of judicial review in cases attended with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, policy considerations call for the widest latitude of deference to military
affairs. Such respect is exercised by the court where the issues to be resolved entail a substantial consideration of legitimate
governmental interest. They suppose that allowing Cadet 1CL Cudia’s case to prosper will set an institutionally dangerous
precedent, opening a Pandora’s box of other challenges against the specialized system of discipline of the PMA. They state that
with the PMA’s mandate to train cadets for permanent commission in the AFP, its disciplinary rules and procedure necessarily
must impose a different standard of conduct compared with civilian institutions.
Petitioners, on the other hand, consider that this Court is part of the State’s check-and-balance machinery, specifically
mandated by Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to ensure that no branch of the government or any of its officials acts without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. They assert that judicial
non-interference in military affairs is not deemed as absolute even in the U.S. They cite Schlesinger and Parker, which were
invoked by respondents, as well as Burns v. Wilson81 and Harmon v. Brucker,82 wherein the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the
proceedings of military tribunals on account of issues posed concerning due process and violations of constitutional rights. Also,
in Magno v. De Villa83 decided by this Court, petitioners note that We, in fact, exercised the judicial power to determine
whether the AFP and the members of the court martial acted with grave abuse of discretion in their military investigation.
Petitioners’ contentions are tenable.
Admittedly, the Constitution entrusts the political branches of the government, not the courts, with superintendence and
control over the military because the courts generally lack the competence and expertise necessary to evaluate military
decisions and they are ill-equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military authority
might have.84 Nevertheless, for the sake of brevity, We rule that the facts as well as the legal issues in the U.S. cases cited by
respondents are not on all fours with the case of Cadet 1CL Cudia. Instead, what applies is the 1975 U.S. case of Andrews v.
Knowlton,85 which similarly involved cadets who were separated from the United States Military Academy due to Honor Code
violations. Following Wasson v. Trowbridge86 and Hagopian v. Knowlton,87 Andrews re-affirmed the power of the district
courts to review procedures used at the service academies in the separation or dismissal of cadets and midshipmen. While it
recognized the “constitutional permissibility of the military to set and enforce uncommonly high standards of conduct and
ethics,” it said that the courts “have expanded at an accelerated pace the scope of judicial access for review of military
determinations.” Later, in Kolesa v. Lehman,88 it was opined that it has been well settled that federal courts have jurisdiction
"where there is a substantial claim that prescribed military procedures violates one's constitutional rights." By 1983, the U.S.
Congress eventually made major revisions to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) by expressly providing, among others,
for a direct review by the U.S. Supreme Court of decisions by the military’s highest appellate
authority.89chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Even without referring to U.S. cases, the position of petitioners is still formidable. In this jurisdiction, Section 1 Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution expanded the scope of judicial power by mandating that the duty of the courts of justice includes not only “to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable” but also “to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government” even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.90 Grave
abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, which must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.91chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The proceedings of the Cadet Honor Committee can, for purposes of the Due Process Clause, be considered a governmental
activity. As ruled in Andrews:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The relationship between the Cadet Honor Committee and the separation process at the Academy has been sufficiently
formalized, and is sufficiently interdependent, so as to bring that committee's activities within the definition of governmental
activity for the purposes of our review. While the Academy has long had the informal practice of referring all alleged violations
to the Cadet Honor Committee, the relationship between that committee and the separation process has to a degree been
formalized. x x x
Regardless of whether the relationship be deemed formal or informal, the Honor Committee under its own procedures provides
that a single "not guilty" vote by a member ends the matter, while a "guilty" finding confronts a cadet with the hard choice of
either resigning or electing to go before a Board of Officers. An adverse finding there results not only in formal separation from
the Academy but also in a damaging record that will follow the cadet through life. Accordingly, we conclude that the Cadet
Honor Committee, acting not unlike a grand jury, is clearly part of the process whereby a cadet can ultimately be adjudged to
have violated the Cadet Honor Code and be separated from the Academy. Therefore, the effect of the committee's procedures
and determinations on the separation process is sufficiently intertwined with the formal governmental activity which may
follow as to bring it properly under judicial review.92
No one is above the law, including the military. In fact, the present Constitution declares it as a matter of principle that civilian
authority is, at all times, supreme over the military.93 Consistent with the republican system of checks and balances, the Court
has been entrusted, expressly or by necessary implication, with both the duty and the obligation of determining, in appropriate
cases, the validity of any assailed legislative or executive action.94chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS
Cadet’s relinquishment of certain civil liberties
Respondents assert that the standard of rights applicable to a cadet is not the same as that of a civilian because the former’s
rights have already been recalibrated to best serve the military purpose and necessity. They claim that both Gudani and Lt. Col.
Kapunan, Jr. v. Gen. De Villa95 recognized that, to a certain degree, individual rights of persons in the military service may be
curtailed by the rules of military discipline in order to ensure its effectiveness in fulfilling the duties required to be discharged
under the law. Respondents remind that, as a military student aspiring to a commissioned post in the military service, Cadet 1CL
Cudia voluntarily gave up certain civil and political rights which the rest of the civilian population enjoys. The deliberate
surrender of certain freedoms on his part is embodied in the cadets’ Honor Code Handbook. It is noted that at the beginning of
their academic life in the PMA, Cadet 1CL Cudia, along with the rest of Cadet Corps, took an oath and undertaking to stand by
the Honor Code and the Honor System.
To say that a PMA cadet surrenders his fundamental human rights, including the right to due process, is, for petitioners,
contrary to the provisions of Section 3, Article II of the 1987 Constitution,96 Executive Order (E.O.) No. 17897 (as amended by
E.O. No. 100598), AFP Code of Ethics, Oath of Cadet Corps to the Honor Code and the Honor System, military professionalism,
and, in general, military culture. They maintain that the HC, the CRAB, and the PMA, grossly and in bad faith misapplied the
Honor Code and the Honor System in deciding Cadet 1CL Cudia’s case considering that these should not be implemented at the
expense of human rights, due process, and fair play. Further, under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, they can never
overpower or defy the 1987 Constitution since the former should yield to the latter. Petitioners stress that the statement that
“a cadet can be compelled to surrender some civil rights and liberties in order for the Code and System to be implemented”
simply pertains to what cadets have to sacrifice in order to prove that they are men or women of integrity and honor, such as
the right to entertain vices and the right to freely choose what they want to say or do. In the context of disciplinary
investigation, it does not contemplate a surrender of the right to due process but, at most, refers to the cadets’ rights to privacy
and to remain silent.
We concur with the stand of petitioners.
Of course, a student at a military academy must be prepared to subordinate his private interests for the proper functioning of
the educational institution he attends to, one that is with a greater degree than a student at a civilian public school.99 In fact,
the Honor Code and Honor System Handbook of the PMA expresses that, “[as] a training environment, the Cadet Corps is a
society which has its own norms. Each member binds himself to what is good for him, his subordinates, and his peers. To be
part of the Cadet Corps requires the surrender of some basic rights and liberties for the good of the
group.”100chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is clear, however, from the teachings of Wasson and Hagopian, which were adopted by Andrews, that a cadet facing dismissal
from the military academy for misconduct has constitutionally protected private interests (life, liberty, or property); hence,
disciplinary proceedings conducted within the bounds of procedural due process is a must.101 For that reason, the PMA is not
immune from the strictures of due process. Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of
what the government is doing to him, the minimal requirements of the due process clause must be satisfied.102 Likewise, the
cadet faces far more severe sanctions of being expelled from a course of college instruction which he or she has pursued with a
view to becoming a career officer and of probably being forever denied that career.103chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The cases of Gudani and Kapunan, Jr. are inapplicable as they do not specifically pertain to dismissal proceedings of a cadet in a
military academy due to honor violation. In Gudani, the Court denied the petition that sought to annul the directive from then
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, which enjoined petitioners from testifying before the Congress without her consent. We
ruled that petitioners may be subjected to military discipline for their defiance of a direct order of the AFP Chief of Staff. On the
other hand, in Kapunan, Jr., this Court upheld the restriction imposed on petitioner since the conditions for his “house arrest”
(particularly, that he may not issue any press statements or give any press conference during the period of his detention) are
justified by the requirements of military discipline. In these two cases, the constitutional rights to information, transparency in
matters of public concern, and to free speech – not to due process clause – were restricted to better serve the greater military
purpose.
Academic freedom of the PMA
Petitioners posit that there is no law providing that a guilty finding by the HC may be used by the PMA to dismiss or recommend
the dismissal of a cadet from the PMA. They argue that Honor Code violation is not among those listed as justifications for the
attrition of cadets considering that the Honor Code and the Honor System do not state that a guilty cadet is automatically
terminated or dismissed from service. To them, the Honor Code and Honor System are “gentleman’s agreement” that cannot
take precedence over public interest – in the defense of the nation and in view of the taxpayer’s money spent for each cadet.
Petitioners contend that, based on the Civil Code, all written or verbal agreements are null and void if they violate the law, good
morals, good customs, public policy, and public safety.
In opposition, respondents claim that the PMA may impose disciplinary measures and punishment as it deems fit and consistent
with the peculiar needs of the Academy. Even without express provision of a law, the PMA has regulatory authority to
administratively dismiss erring cadets since it is deemed reasonably written into C.A. No. 1. Moreover, although said law grants
to the President the authority of terminating a cadet’s appointment, such power may be delegated to the PMA Superintendent,
who may exercise direct supervision and control over the cadets.
Respondents likewise contend that, as an academic institution, the PMA has the inherent right to promulgate reasonable
norms, rules and regulations that it may deem necessary for the maintenance of school discipline, which is specifically
mandated by Section 3 (2),104 Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution. As the premiere military educational institution of the AFP
in accordance with Section 30,105 Article III of C.A. No. 1 and Sections 58 and 59,106 Chapter 9, Subtitle II, Title VIII, Book IV of
E.O. No. 292 (“Administrative Code of 1987?), the PMA is an institution that enjoys academic freedom guaranteed by Section 5
(2),107 Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution. In Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,108 it was held that
concomitant with such freedom is the right and duty to instill and impose discipline upon its students. Also, consistent with
Isabelo, Jr. v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc.109 and Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong,110 the PMA has the
freedom on who to admit (and, conversely, to expel) given the high degree of discipline and honor expected from its students
who are to form part of the AFP.
For respondents, Cadet 1CL Cudia cannot, therefore, belatedly assail the Honor Code as basis of the HC’s decision to
recommend his dismissal from the PMA. When he enlisted for enrolment and studied in the PMA for four years, he knew or
should have been fully aware of the standards of discipline imposed on all cadets and the corresponding penalty for failing to
abide by these standards.
In their Reply, petitioners counter that, as shown in Isabelo, Jr. and Ateneo, academic freedom is not absolute and cannot be
exercised in blatant disregard of the right to due process and the 1987 Constitution. Although schools have the prerogative to
choose what to teach, how to teach, and who to teach, the same does not go so far as to deprive a student of the right to
graduate when there is clear evidence that he is entitled to the same since, in such a case, the right to graduate becomes a
vested right which takes precedence over the limited and restricted right of the educational institution.
While both parties have valid points to consider, the arguments of respondents are more in line with the facts of this case.
We have ruled that the school-student relationship is contractual in nature. Once admitted, a student’s enrolment is not only
semestral in duration but for the entire period he or she is expected to complete it.111 An institution of learning has an
obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue.112 Such contract is imbued with
public interest because of the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and
regulatory powers over all educational institutions.113chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The school-student relationship has also been held as reciprocal. “[It] has consequences appurtenant to and inherent in all
contracts of such kind – it gives rise to bilateral or reciprocal rights and obligations. The school undertakes to provide students
with education sufficient to enable them to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the students agree to
abide by the academic requirements of the school and to observe its rules and regulations.”114chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Academic freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning,115 has been
enshrined in our
Constitutions of 1935, 1973, and 1987.116 In Garcia, this Court espoused the concurring opinion of U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Felix Frankfurter in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,117 which enumerated “the four essential freedoms” of a university: To
determine for itself on academic grounds (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall be taught, and (4) who
may be admitted to study.118 An educational institution has the power to adopt and enforce such rules as may be deemed
expedient for its government, this being incident to the very object of incorporation, and indispensable to the successful
management of the college.119 It can decide for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them, free from outside
coercion or interference except when there is an overriding public welfare which would call for some restraint.120 Indeed,
“academic freedom has never been meant to be an unabridged license. It is a privilege that assumes a correlative duty to
exercise it responsibly. An equally telling precept is a long recognized mandate, so well expressed in Article 19 of the Civil Code,
that every ‘person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.’”121chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The schools’ power to instill discipline in their students is subsumed in their academic freedom and that “the establishment of
rules governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not
merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival.”122 As a Bohemian proverb puts it: "A
school without discipline is like a mill without water." Insofar as the water turns the mill, so does the school's disciplinary power
assure its right to survive and continue operating.123 In this regard, the Court has always recognized the right of schools to
impose disciplinary sanctions, which includes the power to dismiss or expel, on students who violate disciplinary rules.124 In
Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,125 this Court elucidated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the third freedom, i.e., "how it shall be taught." A school
certainly cannot function in an atmosphere of anarchy.
Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational institution requires rules and regulations necessary for
the maintenance of an orderly educational program and the creation of an educational environment conducive to learning.
Such rules and regulations are equally necessary for the protection of the students, faculty, and property.
Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of
learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis
in the freedom "what to teach."
Incidentally, the school not only has the right but the duty to develop discipline in its students. The Constitution no less imposes
such duty.
[All educational institutions] shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love of humanity, respect for human rights,
appreciation of the role of national heroes in the historical development of the country, teach the rights and duties of
citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character and personal discipline, encourage critical and
creative thinking, broaden scientific and technological knowledge, and promote vocational efficiency.
In Angeles vs. Sison, we also said that discipline was a means for the school to carry out its responsibility to help its students
"grow and develop into mature, responsible, effective and worthy citizens of the community."
Finally, nowhere in the above formulation is the right to discipline more evident than in "who may be admitted to study." If a
school has the freedom to determine whom to admit, logic dictates that it also has the right to determine whom to exclude or
expel, as well as upon whom to impose lesser sanctions such as suspension and the withholding of graduation privileges.126
The power of the school to impose disciplinary measures extends even after graduation for any act done by the student prior
thereto. In University of the Phils. Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals,127 We upheld the university’s withdrawal of a
doctorate degree already conferred on a student who was found to have committed intellectual dishonesty in her dissertation.
Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. XIV, §5 (2) of the Constitution provides that "[a]cademic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." This
is nothing new. The 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitution likewise provided for the academic freedom or, more
precisely, for the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning. As pointed out by this Court in Garcia
v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, it is a freedom granted to "institutions of higher learning" which is
thus given "a wide sphere of authority certainly extending to the choice of students." If such institution of higher learning can
decide who can and who cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of
being its graduates.
Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud, a university has the right to
revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus conferred. This freedom of a university does not terminate upon the
"graduation" of a student, as the Court of Appeals held. For it is precisely the "graduation" of such a student that is in question.
It is noteworthy that the investigation of private respondent's case began before her graduation. If she was able to join the
graduation ceremonies on April 24, 1993, it was because of too many investigations conducted before the Board of Regents
finally decided she should not have been allowed to graduate.
Wide indeed is the sphere of autonomy granted to institutions of higher learning, for the constitutional grant of academic
freedom, to quote again from Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, "is not to be construed in a
niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion."
Under the U.P. Charter, the Board of Regents is the highest governing body of the University of the Philippines. It has the power
to confer degrees upon the recommendation of the University Council. It follows that if the conferment of a degree is founded
on error or fraud, the Board of Regents is also empowered, subject to the observance of due process, to withdraw what it has
granted without violating a student's rights. An institution of higher learning cannot be powerless if it discovers that an
academic degree it has conferred is not rightfully deserved. Nothing can be more objectionable than bestowing a university's
highest academic degree upon an individual who has obtained the same through fraud or deceit. The pursuit of academic
excellence is the university's concern. It should be empowered, as an act of self-defense, to take measures to protect itself from
serious threats to its integrity.
While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue their education, the USC as an educational institution is also
entitled to pursue its academic freedom and in the process has the concomitant right to see to it that this freedom is not
jeopardized.128
It must be borne in mind that schools are established, not merely to develop the intellect and skills of the studentry, but to
inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes; nay, the development, or flowering if you will, of the total man.129 Essentially,
education must ultimately be religious, i.e., one which inculcates duty and reverence.130 Under the rubric of "right to
education," students have a concomitant duty to learn under the rules laid down by the school.131 Every citizen has a right to
select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirements.132chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The PMA is not different. As the primary training and educational institution of the AFP, it certainly has the right to invoke
academic freedom in the enforcement of its internal rules and regulations, which are the Honor Code and the Honor System in
particular.
The Honor Code is a set of basic and fundamental ethical and moral principle. It is the minimum standard for cadet behavior
and serves as the guiding spirit behind each cadet’s action. It is the cadet’s responsibility to maintain the highest standard of
honor. Throughout a cadet’s stay in the PMA, he or she is absolutely bound thereto. It binds as well the members of the Cadet
Corps from its alumni or the member of the so-called “Long Gray Line.”
Likewise, the Honor Code constitutes the foundation for the cadets’ character development. It defines the desirable values they
must possess to remain part of the Corps; it develops the atmosphere of trust so essential in a military organization; and it
makes them professional military soldiers.133 As it is for character building, it should not only be kept within the society of
cadets. It is best adopted by the Cadet Corps with the end view of applying it outside as an officer of the AFP and as a product of
the PMA.134chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Honor Code and System could be justified as the primary means of achieving the cadets’ character development and as
ways by which the Academy has chosen to identify those who are deficient in conduct.135 Upon the Code rests the ethical
standards of the Cadet Corps and it is also an institutional goal, ensuring that graduates have strong character, unimpeachable
integrity, and moral standards of the highest order.136 To emphasize, the Academy's disciplinary system as a whole is
characterized as "correctional and educational in nature rather than being legalistic and punitive." Its purpose is to teach the
cadets "to be prepared to accept full responsibility for all that they do or fail to do and to place loyalty to the service above self-
interest or loyalty to friends or associates."137chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Procedural safeguards in a student disciplinary case
Respondents stress that Guzman v. National University138 is more appropriate in determining the minimum standards for the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions. Similarly, with the guideposts set in Andrews, they believe that
Cadet 1CL Cudia was accorded due process.
On the other hand, petitioners argue that the HC, the CRAB and the PMA fell short in observing the important safeguards laid
down in Ang Tibay v. CIR139 and Non v. Judge Dames II,140 which set the minimum standards to satisfy the demands of
procedural due process in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions. For them, Guzman did not entirely do away with the due
process requirements outlined in Ang Tibay as the Court merely stated that the minimum requirements in the Guzman case are
more apropos.
Respondents rightly argued.
Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong141 already settled the issue as it held that although both Ang Tibay and Guzman
essentially deal with the requirements of due process, the latter case is more apropos since it specifically deals with the
minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions. That Guzman is the
authority on the procedural rights of students in disciplinary cases was reaffirmed by the Court in the fairly recent case of Go v.
Colegio De San Juan De Letran.142chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In Guzman, the Court held that there are minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due
process, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the
right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence
against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered
by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.143
We have been consistent in reminding that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and
hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice;144 that the proceedings may be
summary;145 that cross-examination is not an essential part of the investigation or hearing;146 and that the required proof in a
student disciplinary action, which is an administrative case, is neither proof beyond reasonable doubt nor preponderance of
evidence but only substantial evidence or “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.”147chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
What is crucial is that official action must meet minimum standards of fairness to the individual, which generally encompass the
right of adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.148 As held in De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals:149
Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is among the primary rights that must be
respected even in administrative proceedings. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. So long as the party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it
cannot be said that there was denial of due process.
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process – it is enough that the parties are
given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence
on which a fair decision can be based. “To be heard” does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court – one
may also be heard through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial
of due process.150
The PMA Honor Code explicitly recognizes that an administrative proceeding conducted to investigate a cadet’s honor violation
need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. It articulates that –
The Spirit of the Honor Code guides the Corps in identifying and assessing misconduct. While cadets are interested in legal
precedents in cases involving Honor violations, those who hold the Spirit of the Honor Code dare not look into these precedents
for loopholes to justify questionable acts and they are not to interpret the system to their own advantage.
The Spirit of the Honor Code is a way for the cadets to internalize Honor in a substantive way. Technical and procedural
misgivings of the legal systems may avert the true essence of imparting the Spirit of the Code for the reason that it can be used
to make unlawful attempt to get into the truth of matters especially when a cadet can be compelled to surrender some civil
rights and liberties in order for the Code and System to be implemented. By virtue of being a cadet, a member of the CCAFP
becomes a subject of the Honor Code and System. Cadet’s actions are bound by the existing norms that are logically applied
through the Code and System in order to realize the Academy’s mission to produce leaders of character – men of integrity and
honor.151
One of the fundamental principles of the Honor System also states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Honor System correlates with legal procedures of the state’s Justice System but it does not demean its Spirit by reducing
the Code to a systematic list of externally observed rules. Where misinterpretations and loopholes arise through legalism and
its technicalities, the objective of building the character of the cadets becomes futile. While, generally, Public Law penalizes
only the faulty acts, the Honor System tries to examine both the action and the intention.152
Like in other institutions of higher learning, there is aversion towards undue judicialization of an administrative hearing in the
military academy. It has been said that the mission of the military is unique in the sense that its primary business is to fight or
be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise, and that over-proceduralizing military determinations necessarily gives soldiers
less time to accomplish this task.153 Extensive cadet investigations and complex due process hearing could sacrifice simplicity,
practicality, and timeliness. Investigations that last for several days or weeks, sessions that become increasingly involved with
legal and procedural points, and legal motions and evidentiary objections that are irrelevant and inconsequential tend to
disrupt, delay, and confuse the dismissal proceedings and make them unmanageable. Excessive delays cannot be tolerated
since it is unfair to the accused, to his or her fellow cadets, to the Academy, and, generally, to the Armed Forces. A good
balance should, therefore, be struck to achieve fairness, thoroughness, and efficiency.154chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Considering that the case of Cadet 1CL Cudia is one of first impression in the sense that this Court has not previously dealt with
the particular issue of a dismissed cadet’s right to due process, it is necessary for Us to refer to U.S. jurisprudence for some
guidance. Notably, our armed forces have been patterned after the U.S. Army and the U.S. military code produced a salutary
effect in the military justice system of the Philippines.155 Hence, pertinent case laws interpreting the U.S. military code and
practices have persuasive, if not the same, effect in this jurisdiction.
We begin by stating that U.S. courts have uniformly viewed that “due process” is a flexible concept, requiring consideration in
each case of a variety of circumstances and calling for such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands.156Hagopian opined:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In approaching the question of what process is due before governmental action adversely affecting private interests may
properly be taken, it must be recognized that due process is not a rigid formula or simple rule of thumb to be applied
undeviatingly to any given set of facts. On the contrary, it is a flexible concept which depends upon the balancing of various
factors, including the nature of the private right or interest that is threatened, the extent to which the proceeding is adversarial
in character, the severity and consequences of any action that might be taken, the burden that would be imposed by requiring
use of all or part of the full panoply of trial-type procedures, and the existence of other overriding interests, such as the
necessity for prompt action in the conduct of crucial military operations. The full context must therefore be considered in each
case.157 (Emphasis supplied)
Wasson, which was cited by Hagopian, broadly outlined the minimum standards of due process required in the dismissal of a
cadet. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[W]hen the government affects the private interests of individuals, it may not proceed arbitrarily but must observe due process
of law. x x x Nevertheless, the flexibility which is inherent in the concept of due process of law precludes the dogmatic
application of specific rules developed in one context to entirely distinct forms of government action. "For, though 'due process
of law' generally implies and includes actor, reus, judex, regular allegations, opportunity to answer, and a trial according to
some settled course of judicial proceedings, * * * yet, this is not universally true." x x x Thus, to determine in any given case
what procedures due process requires, the court must carefully determine and balance the nature of the private interest
affected and of the government interest involved, taking account of history and the precise circumstances surrounding the case
at hand.
While the government must always have a legitimate concern with the subject matter before it may validly affect private
interests, in particularly vital and sensitive areas of government concern such as national security and military affairs, the
private interest must yield to a greater degree to the governmental. x x x Few decisions properly rest so exclusively within the
discretion of the appropriate government officials than the selection, training, discipline and dismissal of the future officers of
the military and Merchant Marine. Instilling and maintaining discipline and morale in these young men who will be required to
bear weighty responsibility in the face of adversity -- at times extreme -- is a matter of substantial national importance scarcely
within the competence of the judiciary. And it cannot be doubted that because of these factors historically the military has
been permitted greater freedom to fashion its disciplinary procedures than the civilian authorities.
We conclude, therefore, that due process only requires for the dismissal of a Cadet from the Merchant Marine Academy that he
be given a fair hearing at which he is apprised of the charges against him and permitted a defense. x x x For the guidance of the
parties x x x the rudiments of a fair hearing in broad outline are plain. The Cadet must be apprised of the specific charges
against him. He must be given an adequate opportunity to present his defense both from the point of view of time and the use
of witnesses and other evidence. We do not suggest, however, that the Cadet must be given this opportunity both when
demerits are awarded and when dismissal is considered. The hearing may be procedurally informal and need not be
adversarial.158 (Emphasis supplied)
In Andrews, the U.S. Court of Appeals held that Wasson and Hagopian are equally controlling in cases where cadets were
separated from the military academy for violation of the Honor Code. Following the two previous cases, it was ruled that in
order to be proper and immune from constitutional infirmity, a cadet who is sought to be dismissed or separated from the
academy must be afforded a hearing, be apprised of the specific charges against him, and be given an adequate opportunity to
present his or her defense both from the point of view of time and the use of witnesses and other evidence.159 Conspicuously,
these vital conditions are not too far from what We have already set in Guzman and the subsequent rulings in Alcuaz v.
Philippine School of Business Administration160 and De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals.161chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In this case, the investigation of Cadet 1CL Cudia’s Honor Code violation followed the prescribed procedure and existing
practices in the PMA. He was notified of the Honor Report from Maj. Hindang. He was then given the opportunity to explain the
report against him. He was informed about his options and the entire process that the case would undergo. The preliminary
investigation immediately followed after he replied and submitted a written explanation. Upon its completion, the investigating
team submitted a written report together with its recommendation to the HC Chairman. The HC thereafter reviewed the
findings and recommendations. When the honor case was submitted for formal investigation, a new team was assigned to
conduct the hearing. During the formal investigation/hearing, he was informed of the charge against him and given the right to
enter his plea. He had the chance to explain his side, confront the witnesses against him, and present evidence in his behalf.
After a thorough discussion of the HC voting members, he was found to have violated the Honor Code. Thereafter, the guilty
verdict underwent the review process at the Academy level – from the OIC of the HC, to the SJA, to the Commandant of Cadets,
and to the PMA Superintendent. A separate investigation was also conducted by the HTG. Then, upon the directive of the AFP-
GHQ to reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB. Further, a Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body
composed of the CRAB members and the PMA senior officers was constituted to conduct a deliberate investigation of the case.
Finally, he had the opportunity to appeal to the President. Sadly for him, all had issued unfavorable rulings.
It is well settled that by reason of their special knowledge and expertise gained from the handling of specific matters falling
under their respective jurisdictions, the factual findings of administrative tribunals are ordinarily accorded respect if not finality
by the Court, unless such findings are not supported by evidence or vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; where the
procedure which led to the findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion,
arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest.162 In the case of Cadet 1CL Cudia, We find no reason to deviate from the general
rule. The grounds therefor are discussed below seriatim:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As to the right to be represented by a counsel –
For petitioners, respondents must be compelled to give Cadet 1CL Cudia the right to be represented by a counsel who could
actively participate in the proceedings like in the cross-examination of the witnesses against him before the CRAB or HC, if
remanded. This is because while the CRAB allowed him to be represented by a PAO lawyer, the counsel was only made an
observer without any right to intervene and demand respect of Cadet 1CL Cudia’s rights.163 According to them, he was not
sufficiently given the opportunity to seek a counsel and was not even asked if he would like to have one. He was only properly
represented when it was already nearing graduation day after his family sought the assistance of the PAO. Petitioners assert
that Guzman is specific in stating that the erring student has the right to answer the charges against him or her with the
assistance of counsel, if desired.
On the other hand, respondents cited Lumiqued v. Exevea164 and Nera v. The Auditor General165 in asserting that the right to
a counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations or non-criminal proceedings. Also, based on Cadet 1CL Cudia’s
academic standing, he is said to be obviously not untutored to fully understand his rights and express himself. Moreover, the
confidentiality of the HC proceedings worked against his right to be represented by a counsel. In any event, respondents claim
that Cadet 1CL Cudia was not precluded from seeking a counsel’s advice in preparing his defense prior to the HC hearing.
Essentially, petitioners claim that Cadet 1CL Cudia is guaranteed the right to have his counsel not just in assisting him in the
preparation for the investigative hearing before the HC and the CRAB but in participating fully in said hearings. The Court
disagrees.
Consistent with Lumiqued and Nera, there is nothing in the 1987 Constitution stating that a party in a non-litigation proceeding
is entitled to be represented by counsel. The assistance of a lawyer, while desirable, is not indispensable. Further, in Remolona
v. Civil Service Commission,166 the Court held that “a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel,
irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body
to furnish the person being investigated with counsel.” Hence, the administrative body is under no duty to provide the person
with counsel because assistance of counsel is not an absolute requirement.
More in point is the opinion in Wasson, which We adopt. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The requirement of counsel as an ingredient of fairness is a function of all of the other aspects of the hearing. Where the
proceeding is non-criminal in nature, where the hearing is investigative and not adversarial and the government does not
proceed through counsel, where the individual concerned is mature and educated, where his knowledge of the events x x x
should enable him to develop the facts adequately through available sources, and where the other aspects of the hearing taken
as a whole are fair, due process does not require representation by counsel.167
To note, U.S. courts, in general, have declined to recognize a right to representation by counsel, as a function of due process, in
military academy disciplinary proceedings.168 This rule is principally motivated by the policy of "treading lightly on the military
domain, with scrupulous regard for the power and authority of the military establishment to govern its own affairs within the
broad confines of constitutional due process" and the courts' views that disciplinary proceedings are not judicial in nature and
should be kept informal, and that literate and educated cadets should be able to defend themselves.169 In Hagopian, it was
ruled that the importance of informality in the proceeding militates against a requirement that the cadet be accorded the right
to representation by counsel before the Academic Board and that unlike the welfare recipient who lacks the training and
education needed to understand his rights and express himself, the cadet should be capable of doing so.170 In the subsequent
case of Wimmer v. Lehman,171 the issue was not access to counsel but the opportunity to have counsel, instead of oneself,
examine and cross-examine witnesses, make objections, and argue the case during the hearing. Disposing of the case, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was not persuaded by the argument that an individual of a midshipman's presumed
intelligence, selected because he is expected to be able to care for himself and others, often under difficult circumstances, and
who has full awareness of what he is facing, with counsel's advice, was deprived of due process by being required to present his
defense in person at an investigatory hearing.
In the case before Us, while the records are bereft of evidence that Cadet 1CL Cudia was given the option or was able to seek
legal advice prior to and/or during the HC hearing, it is indubitable that he was assisted by a counsel, a PAO lawyer to be exact,
when the CRAB reviewed and reinvestigated the case. The requirement of due process is already satisfied since, at the very
least, the counsel aided him in the drafting and filing of the Appeal Memorandum and even acted as an observer who had no
right to actively participate in the proceedings (such as conducting the cross-examination). Moreover, not to be missed out are
the facts that the offense committed by Cadet 1CL Cudia is not criminal in nature; that the hearings before the HC and the CRAB
were investigative and not adversarial; and that Cadet 1CL Cudia’s excellent academic standing puts him in the best position to
look after his own vested interest in the Academy.
As to the confidentiality of records of the proceedings –
Petitioners allege that when Maj. Gen. Lopez denied in his March 11, 2014 letter Cadet 1CL Cudia’s request for documents,
footages, and recordings relevant to the HC hearings, the vital evidence negating the regularity of the HC trial and supporting
his defense have been surely overlooked by the CRAB in its case review. Indeed, for them, the answers on whether Cadet 1CL
Cudia was deprived of due process and whether he lied could easily be unearthed from the video and other records of the HC
investigation. Respondents did not deny their existence but they refused to present them for the parties and the Court to
peruse. In particular, they note that the Minutes of the HC dated January 21, 2014 and the HC Formal Investigation Report
dated January 20, 2014 were considered by the CRAB but were not furnished to petitioners and the Court; hence, there is no
way to confirm the truth of the alleged statements therein. In their view, failure to furnish these documents could only mean
that it would be adverse if produced pursuant to Section 3 (e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.172chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For lack of legal basis on PMA’s claim of confidentiality of records, petitioners contend that it is the ministerial duty of the HC to
submit to the CRAB, for the conduct of intelligent review of the case, all its records of the proceedings, including video footages
of the deliberations and voting. They likewise argue that PMA’s refusal to release relevant documents to Cadet 1CL Cudia under
the guise of confidentiality reveals another misapplication of the Honor Code, which merely provides: “A cadet who becomes
part of any investigation is subject to the existing regulations pertaining to rules of confidentiality and, therefore, must abide to
the creed of secrecy. Nothing shall be disclosed without proper guidance from those with authority” (IV. The Honor System,
Honor Committee, Cadet Observer). This provision, they say, does not deprive Cadet 1CL Cudia of his right to obtain copies and
examine relevant documents pertaining to his case.
Basically, petitioners want Us to assume that the documents, footages, and recordings relevant to the HC hearings are
favorable to Cadet 1CL Cudia’s cause, and, consequently, to rule that respondents’ refusal to produce and have them examined
is tantamount to the denial of his right to procedural due process. They are mistaken.
In this case, petitioners have not particularly identified any documents, witness testimony, or oral or written presentation of
facts submitted at the hearing that would support Cadet 1CL Cudia’s defense. The Court may require that an administrative
record be supplemented, but only "where there is a 'strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior' on the part of the
agency,"173 both of which are not present here. Petitioners have not specifically indicated the nature of the concealed
evidence, if any, and the reason for withholding it. What they did was simply supposing that Cadet 1CL Cudia’s guilty verdict
would be overturned with the production and examination of such documents, footages, and recordings. As will be further
shown in the discussions below, the requested matters, even if denied, would not relieve Cadet 1CL Cudia’s predicament. If at
all, such denial was a harmless procedural error since he was not seriously prejudiced thereby.
As to the ostracism in the PMA –
To petitioners, the CRAB considered only biased testimonies and evidence because Special Order No. 1 issued on February 21,
2014, which directed the ostracism of Cadet 1CL Cudia, left him without any opportunity to secure statements of his own
witnesses. He could not have access to or approach the cadets who were present during the trial and who saw the 8-1 voting
result. It is argued that the Order directing Cadet 1CL Cudia’s ostracism is of doubtful legal validity because the Honor Code
unequivocally announced: “x x x But by wholeheartedly dismissing the cruel method of ostracizing Honor Code violators, PMA
will not have to resort to other humiliating means and shall only have the option to make known among its alumni the names of
those who have not sincerely felt remorse for violating the Honor Code.”
On their part, respondents assert that neither the petition nor the petition-in-intervention attached a full text copy of the
alleged Special Order No. 1. In any case, attributing its issuance to PMA is improper and misplaced because of petitioners’
admission that ostracism has been absolutely dismissed as an Academy-sanctioned activity consistent with the trend in
International Humanitarian Law that the PMA has included in its curriculum. Assuming that said Order was issued, respondents
contend that it purely originated from the cadets themselves, the sole purpose of which was to give a strong voice to the Cadet
Corps by declaring that they did not tolerate Cadet 1CL Cudia’s honor violation and breach of confidentiality of the HC
proceedings.
More importantly, respondents add that it is highly improbable and unlikely that Cadet 1CL Cudia was ostracized by his fellow
cadets. They manifest that as early as January 22, 2014, he was already transferred to the Holding Center. The practice of
billeting an accused cadet at the Holding Center is provided for in the Honor Code Handbook. Although within the PMA
compound, the Holding Center is off-limits to cadets who do not have any business to conduct therein. The cadets could not
also ostracize him during mess times since Cadet 1CL Cudia opted to take his meals at the Holding Center. The circumstances
obtaining when Special Order No. 1 was issued clearly foreclose the possibility that he was ostracized in common areas
accessible to other cadets. He remained in the Holding Center until March 16, 2014 when he voluntarily left the PMA. Contrary
to his claim, guests were also free to visit him in the Holding Center.
However, petitioners swear that Cadet 1CL Cudia suffered from ostracism in the PMA. The practice was somehow recognized by
respondents in their Consolidated Comment and by PMA Spokesperson Maj. Flores in a news report. The CHR likewise
confirmed the same in its Resolution dated May 22, 2014. For them, it does not matter where the ostracism order originated
from because the PMA appeared to sanction it even if it came from the cadets themselves. There was a tacit approval of an
illegal act. If not, those cadets responsible for ostracism would have been charged by the PMA officials. Finally, it is claimed that
Cadet 1CL Cudia did not choose to take his meals at the Holding Center as he was not allowed to leave the place. Petitioners
opine that placing the accused cadet in the Holding Center is inconsistent with his or her presumed innocence and certainly
gives the implication of ostracism.
We agree with respondents. Neither the petition nor the petition-in-intervention attached a full text copy or even a pertinent
portion of the alleged Special Order No. 1, which authorized the ostracism of Cadet 1CL Cudia. Being hearsay, its existence and
contents are of doubtful veracity. Hence, a definite ruling on the matter can never be granted in this case.
The Court cannot close its eyes though on what appears to be an admission of Cadet 1CL Mogol during the CHR hearing that,
upon consultation with the entire class, the baron, and the Cadet Conduct Policy Board, they issued an ostracism order against
Cadet 1CL Cudia.174 While not something new in a military academy,175 ostracism’s continued existence in the modern times
should no longer be countenanced. There are those who argue that the "silence" is a punishment resulting in the loss of private
interests, primarily that of reputation, and that such penalty may render illusory the possibility of vindication by the reviewing
body once found guilty by the HC.176 Furthermore, in Our mind, ostracism practically denies the accused cadet’s protected
rights to present witnesses or evidence in his or her behalf and to be presumed innocent until finally proven otherwise in a
proper proceeding.
As to Cadet 1CL Cudia’s stay in the Holding Center, the Court upholds the same. The Honor Code and Honor System Handbook
provides that, in case a cadet has been found guilty by the HC of violating the Honor Code and has opted not to resign, he or
she may stay and wait for the disposition of the case. In such event, the cadet is not on full-duty status and shall be billeted at
the HTG Holding Center.177 Similarly, in the U.S., the purpose of “Boarders Ward” is to quarter those cadets who are
undergoing separation actions. Permitted to attend classes, the cadet is sequestered therein until final disposition of the case.
In Andrews, it was opined that the segregation of cadets in the Ward was a proper exercise of the discretionary authority of
Academy officials. It relied on the traditional doctrine that "with respect to decisions made by Army authorities, 'orderly
government requires us to tread lightly on the military domain, with scrupulous regard for the power and authority of the
military establishment to govern its own affairs within the broad confines of constitutional due process.'" Also, in Birdwell v.
Schlesinger,178 the “administrative segregation” was held to be a reasonable exercise of military discipline and could not be
considered an invasion of the rights to freedom of speech and freedom of association.
Late and vague decisions –
It is claimed that Cadet 1CL Cudia was kept in the dark as to the charge against him and the decisions arrived at by the HC, the
CRAB, and the PMA. No written decision was furnished to him, and if any, the information was unjustly belated and the
justifications for the decisions were vague. He had to constantly seek clarification and queries just to be apprised of what he
was confronted with.
Petitioners relate that upon being informed of the “guilty” verdict, Cadet 1CL Cudia immediately inquired as to the grounds
therefor, but Cadet 1CL Mogol answered that it is confidential since he would still appeal the same. By March 11, 2014, Maj.
Gen. Lopez informed Cadet 1CL Cudia that the CRAB already forwarded their recommendation for his dismissal to the General
Headquarters sometime in February-March 2014. Even then, he received no decision/recommendation on his case, verbally or
in writing. The PMA commencement exercises pushed through with no written decision from the CRAB or the PMA on his
appeal. The letter from the Office of the Adjutant General of the AFP was suspiciously delayed when the Cudia family received
the same only on March 20, 2014. Moreover, it fell short in laying down with specificity the factual and legal bases used by the
CRAB and even by the Office of the Adjutant General. There remains no proof that the CRAB and the PMA considered the
evidence presented by Cadet 1CL Cudia, it being uncertain as to what evidence was weighed by the CRAB, whether the same is
substantial, and whether the new evidence submitted by him was ever taken into account.
In refutation, respondents allege the existence of PMA’s practice of orally declaring the HC finding, not putting it in a written
document so as to protect the integrity of the erring cadet and guard the confidentiality of the HC proceedings pursuant to the
Honor System. Further, they aver that a copy of the report of the CRAB, dated March 10, 2014, was not furnished to Cadet 1CL
Cudia because it was his parents who filed the appeal, hence, were the ones who were given a copy thereof.
Petitioners’ contentions have no leg to stand on. While there is a constitutional mandate stating that “[no] decision shall be
rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,”179 such
provision does not apply in Cadet 1CL Cudia’s case. Neither Guzman nor Andrews require a specific form and content of a
decision issued in disciplinary proceedings. The Honor Code and Honor System Handbook also has no written rule on the
matter. Even if the provision applies, nowhere does it demand that a point-by-point consideration and resolution of the issues
raised by the parties are necessary.180 What counts is that, albeit furnished to him late, Cadet 1CL Cudia was informed of how
it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the reviewing body, assuring
that it went through the processes of legal reasoning. He was not left in the dark as to how it was reached and he knows exactly
the reasons why he lost, and is able to pinpoint the possible errors for review.
As to the blind adoption of the HC findings –
Petitioners assert that, conformably with Sections 30 and 31 of C.A. No. 1, only President Aquino as the Commander-in-Chief
has the power to appoint and remove a cadet for a valid/legal cause. The law gives no authority to the HC as the sole body to
determine the guilt or innocence of a cadet. It also does not empower the PMA to adopt the guilty findings of the HC as a basis
for recommending the cadet’s dismissal. In the case of Cadet 1CL Cudia, it is claimed that the PMA blindly followed the HC’s
finding of guilt in terminating his military service.
Further, it is the ministerial duty of the CRAB to conduct a review de novo of all records without requiring Cadet 1CL Cudia to
submit new evidence if it is physically impossible for him to do so. In their minds, respondents cannot claim that the CRAB and
the PMA thoroughly reviewed the HC recommendation and heard Cadet 1CL Cudia’s side. As clearly stated in the letter from the
Office of the AFP Adjutant General, “[in] its report dated March 10, 2014, PMA CRAB sustained the findings and
recommendations of the Honor Committee x x x It also resolved the appeal filed by the subject Cadet.” However, the Final
Investigation Report of the CRAB was dated March 23, 2014. While such report states that a report was submitted to the AFP
General Headquarters on March 10, 2014 and that it was only on March 12, 2014 that it was designated as a Fact-Finding
Board/Investigating Body, it is unusual that the CRAB would do the same things twice. This raised a valid and well-grounded
suspicion that the CRAB never undertook an in-depth investigation/review the first time it came out with its report, and the
Final Investigation Report was drafted merely as an afterthought when the lack of written decision was pointed out by
petitioners so as to remedy the apparent lack of due process during the CRAB investigation and review.
Despite the arguments, respondents assure that there was a proper assessment of the procedural and legal correctness of the
guilty verdict against Cadet 1CL Cudia. They assert that the higher authorities of the PMA did not merely rely on the findings of
the HC, noting that there was also a separate investigation conducted by the HTG from January 25 to February 7, 2014.
Likewise, contrary to the contention of petitioners that the CRAB continued with the review of the case despite the absence of
necessary documents, the CRAB conducted its own review of the case and even conducted another investigation by constituting
the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body. For respondents, petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proof in showing bad
faith on the part of the PMA. In the absence of evidence to the contrary and considering further that petitioners’ allegations are
merely self-serving and baseless, good faith on the part of the PMA’s higher authorities is presumed and should, therefore,
prevail.
We agree with respondents.
The Honor Committee, acting on behalf of the Cadet Corps, has a limited role of investigating and determining whether or not
the alleged offender has actually violated the Honor Code.181 It is given the responsibility of administering the Honor Code
and, in case of breach, its task is entirely investigative, examining in the first instance a suspected violation. As a means of
encouraging self-discipline, without ceding to it any authority to make final adjudications, the Academy has assigned it the
function of identifying suspected violators.182 Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, the HC does not have the authority to order
the separation of a cadet from the Academy. The results of its proceedings are purely recommendatory and have no binding
effect. The HC determination is somewhat like an indictment, an allegation, which, in Cadet 1CL Cudia’s case, the PMA-CRAB
investigated de novo.183 In the U.S., it was even opined that due process safeguards do not actually apply at the Honor
Committee level because it is only a "charging body whose decisions had no effect other than to initiate de novo proceedings
before a Board of Officers."184chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Granting, for argument’s sake, that the HC is covered by the due process clause and that irregularities in its proceedings were in
fact committed, still, We cannot rule for petitioners. It is not required that procedural due process be afforded at every stage of
developing disciplinary action. What is required is that an adequate hearing be held before the final act of dismissing a cadet
from the military academy.185 In the case of Cadet 1CL Cudia, the OIC of HC, the SJA, the Commandant of Cadets, and the PMA
Superintendent reviewed the HC findings. A separate investigation was also conducted by the HTG. Then, upon the directive of
the AFP-GHQ to reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB. Finally, a Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body
composed of the CRAB members and the PMA senior officers was constituted to conduct a deliberate investigation of the case.
The Board/Body actually held hearings on March 12, 13, 14 and 20, 2014. Instead of commendation, petitioners find it
“unusual” that the CRAB would do the same things twice and suspect that it never undertook an in-depth investigation/review
the first time it came out with its report. Such assertion is mere conjecture that deserves scant consideration.
As to the dismissal proceedings as sham trial –
According to petitioners, the proceedings before the HC were a sham. The people behind Cadet 1CL Cudia’s charge,
investigation, and conviction were actually the ones who had the intent to deceive and who took advantage of the situation.
Cadet 1CL Raguindin, who was a senior HC member and was the second in rank to Cadet 1CL Cudia in the Navy cadet 1CL, was
part of the team which conducted the preliminary investigation. Also, Cadet 1CL Mogol, the HC Chairman, previously charged
Cadet 1CL Cudia with honor violation allegedly for cheating (particularly, conniving with and tutoring his fellow cadets on a
difficult topic by giving solutions to a retake exam) but the charge was dismissed for lack of merit. Even if he was a non-voting
member, he was in a position of influence and authority. Thus, it would be a futile exercise for Cadet 1CL Cudia to resort to the
procedure for the removal of HC members.186chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Further, no sufficient prior notice of the scheduled CRAB hearing was given to Cadet 1CL Cudia, his family, or his PAO counsel.
During one of her visits to him in the Holding Center, petitioner-intervenor was advised to convince his son to resign and
immediately leave the PMA. Brig. Gen. Costales, who later became the CRAB Head, also categorically uttered to Annavee: “Your
brother, he lied!” The CRAB conferences were merely used to formalize his dismissal and the PMA never really intended to hear
his side. For petitioners, these are manifestations of PMA’s clear resolve to dismiss him no matter what.
For their part, respondents contend that the CHR’s allegation that Maj. Hindang acted in obvious bad faith and that he failed to
discharge his duty to be a good father of cadets when he “paved the road to [Cadet 1CL Cudia’s] sham trial by the Honor
Committee” is an unfounded accusation. They note that when Maj. Hindang was given the DR of Cadet 1CL Cudia, he revoked
the penalty awarded because of his explanation. However, all revocations of awarded penalties are subject to the review of the
STO. Therefore, it was at the instance of Maj. Leander and the established procedure followed at the PMA that Maj. Hindang
was prompted to investigate the circumstances surrounding Cadet 1 CL Cudia’s tardiness. Respondents add that bad faith
cannot likewise be imputed against Maj. Hindang by referring to the actions taken by Maj. Jekyll Dulawan, the CTO of Cadets
1CL Narciso and Arcangel who also arrived late for their next class. Unlike the other cadets, Cadet 1CL Cudia did not admit his
being late and effectively evaded responsibility by ascribing his tardiness to Dr. Costales.
As to the CHR’s finding that Cadet 1CL Mogol was likewise “in bad faith and determined to destroy [Cadet 1CL] Cudia, for
reasons of his own” because the former previously reported the latter for an honor violation in November 2013, respondents
argue that the bias ascribed against him is groundless as there is failure to note that Cadet 1CL Mogol was a non-voting member
of the HC. Further, he cannot be faulted for reporting a possible honor violation since he is the HC Chairman and nothing less is
expected of him. Respondents emphasize that the representatives of the HC are elected from each company, while the HC
Chairman is elected by secret ballot from the incoming first class representatives. Thus, if Cadet 1CL Cudia believed that there
was bias against him, he should have resorted to the procedure for the removal of HC members provided for in the Honor Code
Handbook.
Finally, respondents declare that there is no reason or ill-motive on the part of the PMA to prevent Cadet 1CL Cudia from
graduating because the Academy does not stand to gain anything from his dismissal. On the contrary, in view of his academic
standing, the separation militates against PMA’s mission to produce outstanding, honorable, and exceptional cadets.
The Court differs with petitioners.
Partiality, like fraudulent intent, can never be presumed. Absent some showing of actual bias, petitioners’ allegations do not
hold water. The mere imputation of ill-motive without proof is speculative at best. Kolesa teaches us that to sustain the
challenge, specific evidence must be presented to overcome
a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators; and it must convince that, under a realistic appraisal of
psychological tendencies and human weaknesses, conferring investigative and adjudicative powers on the same individual
poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be
implemented.187
Although a CTO like Maj. Hindang must decide whether demerits are to be awarded, he is not an adversary of the cadet but an
educator who shares an identity of interest with the cadet, whom he counsels from time to time as a future leader.188 When
the occasion calls for it, cadets may be questioned as to the accuracy or completeness of a submitted work. A particular point or
issue may be clarified. In this case, the question asked of Cadet 1CL Cudia concerning his being late in class is proper, since there
is evidence indicating that a breach of regulation may have occurred and there is reasonable cause to believe that he was
involved in the breach of regulations.189chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For lack of actual proof of bad faith or ill-motive, the Court shall rely on the non-toleration clause of the Honor Code, i.e., “We
do not tolerate those who violate the Code.” Cadets are reminded that they are charged with a tremendous duty far more
superior to their personal feeling or friendship.190 They must learn to help others by guiding them to accept the truth and do
what is right, rather than tolerating actions against truth and justice.191 Likewise, cadets are presumed to be characteristically
honorable; they cannot overlook or arbitrarily ignore the dishonorable action of their peers, seniors, or subordinates.192 These
are what Cadet 1CL Mogol exactly did, although he was later proven to have erred in his accusation. Note that even the Honor
Code and Honor System Handbook recognizes that interpretation of one’s honor is generally
subjective.193chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Moreover, assuming, for the sake of argument, that Cadets 1CL Raguindin and Mogol as well as Brig. Gen. Costales have an axe
to grind against Cadet 1CL Cudia and were bent on causing, no matter what, the latter’s downfall, their nefarious conduct would
still be insignificant. This is so since the HC (both the preliminary and formal investigation), the CRAB, and the Fact-Finding
Board/Investigating Body are collegial bodies. Hence, the claim that the proceedings/hearings conducted were merely a farce
because the three personalities participated therein is tantamount to implying the existence of a conspiracy, distrusting the
competence, independence, and integrity of the other members who constituted the majority. Again, in the absence of
specifics and substantial evidence, the Court cannot easily give credence to this baseless insinuation.
As to the HC executive session/chambering –
Petitioners narrate that there was an irregular administrative hearing in the case of Cadet 1CL Cudia because two voting rounds
took place. After the result of the secret balloting, Cadet 1CL Mogol ordered the voting members to go to a room without the
cadet recorders. Therein, the lone dissenter, Cadet 1CL Lagura, was asked to explain his “not guilty” vote. Pressured to change
his vote, he was made to cast a new one finding Cadet 1CL Cudia guilty. The original ballot was discarded and replaced. There
was no record of the change in vote from 8-1 to 9-0 that was mentioned in the HC formal report.
The Affidavit of Commander Junjie B. Tabuada executed on March 6, 2014 was submitted by petitioners since he purportedly
recalled Cadet 1CL Lagura telling him that he was pressured to change his “not guilty” vote after the voting members were
“chambered.” In the sworn statement, Commander Tabuada said:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That after CDT 1CL CUDIA [was] convicted for honor violation, I [cannot] remember exactly the date but sometime in the
morning of 23rd or 24th of January 2014, I was in my office filling up forms for the renewal of my passport, CDT 1CL LAGURA
entered and had business with my staff;chanrobleslaw
When he was about to leave I called him. “Lags, halika muna dito,” and he approached me and I let him sit down on the chair in
front of my table. I told and asked him, “Talagang nadali si Cudia ah... ano ba ang nangyari? Mag-Tagalog or mag-Bisaya ka.” He
replied, “Talagang NOT GUILTY ang vote ko sa kanya sir”, and I asked him, “Oh, bakit naging guilty di ba pag may isang nag NOT
GUILTY, abswelto na? He replied “Chinamber ako sir, bale pinapa-justify kung bakit NOT GUILTY vote ko, at na-pressure din ako
sir kaya binago ko, sir.” So, I told him, “Sayang sya, matalino at mabait pa naman” and he replied “oo nga sir”. After that
conversation, I let him go.194
It is claimed that the HC gravely abused its discretion when it committed voting manipulation since, under the rules, it is
required to have a unanimous nine (9) votes finding an accused cadet guilty. There is nothing in the procedure that permits the
HC Chairman to order the “chambering” of a member who voted contrary to the majority and subjects him or her to reconsider
in order to reflect a unanimous vote. Neither is there an order from the Chief of Staff or the President sanctioning the HC
procedure or approving any change therein pursuant to Sections 30 and 31 of C.A. No. 1. The HC, the CRAB, and the PMA
violated their own rules and principles as embodied in the Honor Code. Being a clear deviation from the established
procedures, the second deliberation should be considered null and void.
Petitioners further contend that the requirement of unanimous vote involves a substantive right which cannot be
unceremoniously changed without a corresponding amendment/revision in the Honor Code and Honor System Handbook. In
their view, “chambering” totally defeats the purpose of voting by secret ballot as it glaringly destroys the very essence and
philosophy behind the provisions of the Honor System, which is to ensure that the voting member is free to vote what is in his
or her heart and mind and that no one can pressure or persuade another to change his or her vote. They suggest that if one
voting member acquits an accused cadet who is obviously guilty of the offense, the solution is to remove him or her from the
HC through the vote of non-confidence as provided for in the Honor Code.195chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Anent the above arguments, respondents contend that a distinction must be made between the concepts of the Honor Code
and the Honor System. According to them, the former sets the standard for a cadet’s minimum ethical and moral behavior and
does not change, while the latter is a set of rules for the conduct of the observance and implementation of the Honor Code and
may undergo necessary adjustments as may be warranted by the incumbent members of the HC in order to be more responsive
to the moral training and character development of the cadets. The HC may provide guidelines when the Honor System can be
used to supplement regulations. This being so, the voting process is continuously subject to change.
Respondents note that, historically, a non-unanimous guilty verdict automatically acquits a cadet from the charge of Honor
violation. The voting members only write either “guilty” or “not guilty” in the voting sheets without stating their name or their
justification. However, this situation drew criticisms since there were instances where a reported cadet already admitted his
honor violation but was acquitted due to the lone vote of a sympathetic voting member.
In the case of Cadet 1CL Cudia, the HC adopted an existing practice that should the voting result in 7-2 or 8-1 the HC would
automatically sanction a jury type of discussion called “executive session” or “chambering,” which is intended to elicit the
explanation and insights of the voting member/s. This prevents the tyranny of the minority or lone dissenter from prevailing
over the manifest proof of guilt. The assailed voting practice has been adopted and widely accepted by the PMA Siklab Diwa
Class of 2014 since their first year in the Academy. The allegations of conspiracy and sham trial are, therefore, negated by the
fact that such practice was in place and applied to all cases of honor violations, not solely to the case of Cadet 1CL Cudia.
It is emphasized by respondents that any decision to change vote rests solely on the personal conviction of the dissenter/s,
without any compulsion from the other voting members. There can also be no pressuring to change one’s vote to speak of since
a vote may only be considered as final when the Presiding Officer has affixed his signature.
To debunk Commander Tabuada’s statements, respondents raise the argument that the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body
summoned Cadet 1CL Lagura for inquiry. Aside from his oral testimony made under oath, he submitted to the Board/Body an
affidavit explaining that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
11.
Sometime on 23rd or 24th of January 2014, I went to the Department of Naval Warfare to ask permission if it is possible not to
attend the Navy duty for the reason that I will be attending our baseball game outside the Academy.
12.
After I was permitted not to attend my Navy Duty and when I was about to exit out of the Office, CDR JUNJIE B TABUADA PN,
our Head Department Naval Warfare Officer, called my attention. I approached him and he said: “Talagang nadali si Cudia ah.
Ano ba talaga ang nangyari?” At first, I was hesitant to answer because of the confidentiality of the Honor Committee
proceedings. He again said: “Wag kang mag-alala, atin, atin lang ito, alam ko naman na bawal magsabi.” Then I answered: “Ako
yung isang not guilty Sir. Kaya [yung] Presiding Officer nagsabi na pumunta muna kami sa Chamber. Nung nasa chamber kami,
nagsalita [yung] mga nagvote ng Guilty tapos isa-isa nagsabi kung bakit ang boto nila Guilty. Nung pakinggan ko, eh naliwanagan
ako. Pinalitan ko yung boto ko from Not Guilty to Guilty Sir.” He replied: “Sayang si Cudia ano?” And I said: “Oo nga sir, [s]ayang
si Cudia, mabait pa naman at matalino.”196
Cadet 1CL Lagura restated the above in the Counter-Affidavit executed on March 12, 2014, which he submitted before the CHR
wherein he attested to the following:
3.
I was chosen to be a voting member of the Honor Committee for Honor Code violation committed by Cadet Cudia, for “lying”.
As a voting member, we are the one who assess or investigate the case whether the reported Cadet is Guilty for his actions or
not.
4.
I was the only one who INITIALLY voted “NOT GUILTY” among the nine (9) voting members of the Honor Committee in the case
of Cdt Cudia for Lying.
5.
I initially voted “NOT GUILTY” for the reason that after the proceedings and before the presiding Officer told the members to
vote, I was confused of the case of Cadet Cudia. I have gathered some facts from the investigation to make my decision but for
me it is not yet enough to give my verdict of guilty to Cdt Cudia so I decided to vote “NOT GUILTY” with a reservation in my
mind that we will still be discussing our verdicts if we will arrive at 8-1 or 7-2. Thus, I can still change my vote if I may be
enlightened with the other’s justifications.
6.
After the votes were collected, the Presiding Officer told us that the vote is 8 for guilty and 1 for not guilty. By way of practice
and as I predicted, we were told to go inside the anteroom for executive meeting and to discuss our respective justifications. I
have been a member for two (2) years and the voting committee will always go for executive meeting whenever it will meet 8-1
or 7-2 votes.
7.
I listened to them and they listened to me, then I saw things that enlightened my confusions that time. I gave a thumbs-up sign
and asked for another sheet of voting paper. I then changed my vote from “NOT GUILTY” to “GUILTY” and the voting members
of the Honor Committee came up with the final vote of nine (9) votes for guilty and zero (0) votes for not guilty.
9.
Cdt Cudia was called inside the courtroom and told that the verdict was GUILTY of LYING. After that, all persons inside the
courtroom went back to barracks.
10.
Right after I changed to sleeping uniform, I was approached by Cdt Jocson and Cdt Cudia, inquiring and said: “Bakit ka naman
nagpalit ng boto?” I answered: “Nasa process yan, may mali talaga sa rason mo.” They also asked who were inside the Chamber
and I mentioned only Cdt Arlegui and Cdt Mogol. That was the last time that Cdt Cudia and Cdt Jocson talked to me.
11.
Sometime on 23rd or 24th of January 2014, I went to the Department of Naval Warfare to asked (sic) permission if it is possible
not to attend the Navy duty for the reason that I will be attending our baseball game outside the Academy.
12.
After I was permitted not to attend my Navy Duty and when I was about to exit out of the Office, CDR JUNJIE B TABUADA PN,
our Head Department Naval Warfare Officer, called my attention. I approached him and he said: “Talagang nadali si Cudia ah.
Ano ba talaga ang nangyari?” At first, I was hesitant to answer because of the confidentiality of the Honor Committee
proceedings. He again said: “Wag kang mag-alala, atin, atin lang ito, alam ko naman na bawal magsabi.” Then I answered: “Ako
yung isang not guilty Sir. Kaya [yung] Presiding Officer nagsabi na pumunta muna kami sa Chamber. Nung nasa chamber kami,
nagsalita [yung] mga nagvote ng Guilty tapos isa-isa nagsabi kung bakit ang boto nila Guilty. Nung pakinggan ko, eh naliwanagan
ako. Pinalitan ko yung boto ko from Not Guilty to Guilty Sir.” He replied: “Sayang si Cudia ano?” And I said: “Oo nga sir, [s]ayang
si Cudia, mabait pa naman at matalino.”197
Still not to be outdone, petitioners argue that the very fact that Cadet 1CL Lagura, as the lone dissenter, was made to explain in
the presence of other HC members, who were in disagreement with him, gives a semblance of intimidation, force, or pressure.
For them, the records of the HC proceedings, which were not presented assuming they actually exist, could have been the best
way to ensure that he was free to express his views, reject the opinion of the majority, and stick to his decision. Also, it was
pointed out that Cadet 1CL Lagura failed to clearly explain in his affidavit why he initially found Cadet 1CL Cudia “not guilty” and
what made him change his mind. His use of general statements like he “was confused of the case” and “saw things that
enlightened my confusions” could hardly suffice to establish why he changed his vote. Finally, petitioners note the admission of
Cadet 1CL Lagura during the CHR investigation that he was the only one who was given another ballot sheet while in the
chamber and that he accomplished it in the barracks which he only submitted the following day. However, as the CHR found,
the announcement of the 9-0 vote was done immediately after the HC came out from the chamber and before Cadet 1CL
Lagura submitted his accomplished ballot sheet.
We rule for respondents.
As to the manner of voting by the HC members, the Honor Code tersely provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
After a thorough discussion and deliberation, the presiding member of the Board will call for the members to vote whether the
accused is GUILTY or NOT GUILTY. A unanimous vote (9 votes) of GUILTY decides that a cadet is found guilty of violating the
Honor Code.198
From the above-quoted provision, it readily appears that the HC practice of conducting “executive session” or “chambering” is
not at all prohibited. The HC is given leeway on the voting procedures in actual cases taking into account the exigency of the
times. What is important is that, in the end, there must be a unanimous nine votes in order to hold a cadet guilty of violating
the Honor Code.
Granting, for argument’s sake, that the HC violated its written procedure,199 We still rule that there is nothing inherently
wrong with the practice of “chambering” considering that the presence of intimidation or force cannot automatically be
inferred therefrom. The essence of secret balloting and the freedom to vote based on what is in the heart and mind of the
voting member is not necessarily diluted by the fact that a second/final voting was conducted. As explained by Cadet 1CL Mogol
before the CRAB:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x [The] dissenting voter would have to explain his side and insights regarding the case at hand. The other members, on the
other hand, would be given the chance to explain their votes as well as their insights to the dissenting voter. The decision to
change the vote of the dissenting voter rests solely on his personal conviction. Thus, if he [or she] opted not to change his/her
vote despite the discussion, his [or her] vote is accorded respect by the Honor Committee.200
It is elementary that intimidation or force is never presumed. Mere allegation is definitely not evidence. It must be
substantiated and proved because a person is presumed to be innocent of a crime or wrong and that official duty has been
regularly performed.201chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The oral and written statements of Cadet 1CL Lagura should settle the issue. Before the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body
and the CHR, he consistently denied that he was pressured by the other voting members of the HC. His representation must be
accepted as it is regardless of whether he has satisfactorily elaborated his decision to change his vote. Being the one who was
“chambered,” he is more credible to clarify the issue. In case of doubt, We have to rely on the faith that Cadet 1CL Lagura
observed the Honor Code, which clearly states that every cadet must be his or her own Final Authority in honor; that he or she
should not let other cadets dictate on him or her their sense of honor.202 Moreover, the Code implies that any person can have
confidence that a cadet and any graduate of the PMA will be fair and just in dealing with him; that his actions, words and ways
are sincere and true.203chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As to the other alleged “irregularities” committed such as not putting on record the initial/first voting and Cadet 1CL Lagura’s
bringing of his ballot sheet to and accomplishing it in the barracks, the Court shall no longer dwell on the same for being
harmless procedural errors that do not materially affect the validity of the HC proceedings.
Cadet 1CL Cudia’s alleged untruthful statements
Petitioners insist that Cadet 1CL Cudia did not lie. According to them, there is no clear time reference as to when was the actual
dismissal or what was the exact time of dismissal – whether it should be the dismissal inside the room or the dismissal after the
section grade was given by Dr. Costales – in the minds of Cadet 1CL Cudia, Maj. Hindang, and the HC investigators and voting
members. They claim that during long examinations, the time of dismissal was usually five minutes before the class was set to
end and the protocol of dismissing the class 15 minutes earlier was not observed. When Maj. Hindang stated in accusatory
language that Cadet 1CL Cudia perverted the truth by stating that OR432 class ended at 1500H, he did not state what was the
true time of dismissal. He did not mention whether the truth he was relying on was 5 or 15 minutes before the scheduled end
of class.
It is also averred that Cadet 1CL Cudia’s only business was to ask Dr. Costales a query such that his business was already finished
as soon as she gave an answer. However, a new business was initiated by Dr. Costales, which is, Cadet 1CL Cudia must stay and
wait for the section grade. At that point in time, he was no longer in control of the circumstances. Petitioners claim that Dr.
Costales never categorically stated that Cadet 1CL Cudia was lying. She recognized the confusion. Her text messages to him
clarified his alleged violation. Also, the CHR noted during its investigation that she could not exactly recall what happened in her
class on November 14, 2013.
Furthermore, petitioners reasoned out that when respondents stated that ENG412 class started at 3:05 p.m., it proves that
Cadet 1CL Cudia was obviously not late. If, as indicated in his Delinquency Report, he was late two (2) minutes in his 1500-
1600H class in ENG 412, he must have arrived 3:02 p.m. Respondents, however, claim that the class started at 3:05 p.m. Thus,
Cadet 1CL Cudia was not late.
Relative to his explanation to the delinquency report, petitioners were of the view that what appears to have caused confusion
in the minds of respondents is just a matter of semantics; that the entire incident was a product of inaccuracy, not lying. It is
malicious for them to insinuate that Cadet 1CL Cudia purposely used incorrect language to hide the truth. Citing Merriam
Webster’s Dictionary, petitioners argue that “dismiss” means to permit or cause to leave, while “class” refers to a body of
students meeting regularly to study the same subject. According to them, these two words do not have definite and precise
meanings but are generic terms. Other than the words “class” and “dismiss” used by Cadet 1CL Cudia, which may actually be
used in their generic sense, there is nothing deceiving about what he said. Thus, the answer he chose might be wrong or not
correct, but it is not false or not true.
For petitioners, Cadet 1CL Cudia’s explanations are evidently truthful and with no intent to deceive or mislead. He did not
manipulate any fact and was truthful of his explanation. His statements were clear and unambiguous but were given a narrow-
minded interpretation. Even the Honor Code acknowledges that “[e]xperience demonstrates that human communication is
imperfect at best, and some actions are often misinterpreted.”
Lastly, petitioners contend that Cadet 1CL Cudia’s transcript of records reflects not only his outstanding academic performance
but proves his good conduct during his four-year stay in the Academy. He has above-average grades in Conduct, with grades
ranging from 96 to 100 in Conduct I to XI. His propensity to lie is, therefore, far from the truth.
On the other hand, respondents were equally adamant to contend that Cadet 1CL Cudia was obviously quibbling, which, in the
military parlance, is tantamount to lying. He fell short in telling a simple truth. He lied by making untruthful statements in his
written explanation. Respondents want Us to consider the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
First, their OR432 class was not dismissed late. During the formal investigation, Dr. Costales testified that a class is dismissed as
long as the instructor is not there and the bell has rung. In cases of lesson examinations (LE), cadets are dismissed from the time
they have answered their respective LEs. Here, as Cadet Cudia stated in his Request for Reconsideration of Meted Punishment,
“We had an LE that day (14 November 2013) in OR432 class. When the first bell rang (1455), I stood up, reviewed my paper and
submitted it to my instructor, Ms. Costales. xxx” Clearly, at the time Cadet Cudia submitted his papers, he was already
considered dismissed. Thus, he cannot claim that his [OR432] class ended at 3:00 in the afternoon (1500H) or “a bit late.”
Second, Cadet Cudia was in control of the circumstances leading to his tardiness. After submitting his paper, Cadet Cudia is free
to leave and attend his next class. However, he initiated a conversation with Dr. Costales regarding their grades. He was not
under instruction by Dr. Costales to stay beyond the period of her class.
Furthermore, during the investigation of the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body, Dr. Costales clarified her statements in her
written explanation. She explained that the “instruction to wait” is a response to Cadet Cudia’s request and that it was not her
initiated instruction. Clearly, there was no directive from Dr. Costales for Cadet Cudia and the other cadets to stay. On the
contrary, it was them who wanted to meet with the instructor.
Third, contrary to Cadet Cudia’s explanation, his subsequent class, ENG412, did not exactly start at 3:00 in the afternoon
(1500H). In the informal review conducted by the HTG to check the findings of the HC, Professor Berong confirmed that her
English class started as scheduled (3:05 in the afternoon, or 1505H) and not earlier. Cadet 1 CL Barrawed, the acting class
marcher of ENG412 also testified that their class started as scheduled (3:05 in the afternoon, or 1505) and not earlier.204
Respondents were unimpressed with the excuse that Cadet 1CL Cudia had no intention to mislead or deceive but merely used
wrong and unfitting words in his explanations. For them, considering his academic standing, it is highly improbable that he used
incorrect language to justify his mistake.
Respondents’ arguments are tenable.
The issue of whether Cadet 1CL Cudia committed lying is an issue of fact. Unfortunately for petitioners, the Court, not being a
trier of facts, cannot pass upon factual matters as it is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in
the proceedings below. Moreover, We reiterate the long standing rule that factual findings of administrative tribunals are
ordinarily accorded respect if not finality by the Court. In this case, as shown in the previous discussions, there is no evidence
that the findings of the investigating and reviewing bodies below are not supported by evidence or vitiated by fraud, imposition
or collusion; that the procedure which led to the findings is irregular; that palpable errors were committed; or that a grave
abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest. With respect to the core issue of whether lying is present in this
case, all investigating and reviewing bodies are in consonance in holding that Cadet 1CL Cudia in truth and in fact lied.
For purposes of emphasis though, We shall supplement some points.
As succinctly worded, the Honor Code of the Cadet Corps Armed Forces of the Philippines (CCAFP) states: “We, the Cadets, do
not lie, cheat, steal, nor tolerate among us those who do.”
The First Tenet of the Honor Code is “We do not lie.” Cadets violate the Honor Code by lying if they make an oral or written
statement which is contrary to what is true or use doubtful information with the intent to deceive or mislead.205 It is expected
that every cadet’s word is accepted without challenge on its truthfulness; that it is true without qualification; and that the
cadets must answer directly, completely and truthfully even though the answer may result in punitive action under the CCPB
and CCAFPR.206chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
To refresh, in his Explanation of Report dated December 8, 2013, Cadet 1CL Cudia justified that: “I came directly from OR432
Class. We were dismissed a bit late by our instructor Sir.” Subsequently, in his Request for Reconsideration of Meted
Punishment to Maj. Leander, he reasoned out as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our 4th period class ended 1500H and our 5th period class,
which is ENG412, started 1500H also. Immediately after 4th period class, I went to my next class without any intention of being
late Sir.207
In this case, the Court agrees with respondents that Cadet 1CL Cudia committed quibbling; hence, he lied in violation of the
Honor Code.
Following an Honor Reference Handbook, the term "Quibbling" has been defined in one U.S. case as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A person can easily create a false impression in the mind of his listener by cleverly wording what he says, omitting relevant
facts, or telling a partial truth. When he knowingly does so with the intent to deceive or mislead, he is quibbling. Because it is an
intentional deception, quibbling is a form of lying.208
The above definition can be applied in the instant case. Here, instead of directly and completely telling the cause of his being
late in the ENG412 class of Prof. Berong, Cadet 1CL Cudia chose to omit relevant facts, thereby, telling a half-truth.
The two elements that must be presented for a cadet to have committed an honor violation are:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. The act and/or omission, and
2. The intent pertinent to it.cralawred
Intent does not only refer to the intent to violate the Honor Code, but intent to commit or omit the act
itself.209chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The basic questions a cadet must always seek to answer unequivocally are:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Do I intend to deceive?
2. Do I intend to take undue advantage?
If a cadet can answer NO to BOTH questions, he or she is doing the honorable thing.210chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Intent, being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof, but must ordinarily be inferred from the facts, and therefore,
can only be proved by unguarded expressions, conduct and circumstances generally.211 In this case, Cadet 1CL Cudia’s intent to
deceive is manifested from the very act of capitalizing on the use of the words “dismiss” and “class.” The truth of the matter is
that the ordinary usage of these two terms, in the context of an educational institution, does not correspond to what Cadet 1CL
Cudia is trying to make it appear. In that sense, the words are not generic and have definite and precise meaning.
By no stretch of the imagination can Cadets 1CL Cudia, Miranda, Arcangel, and Narciso already constitute a “class.” The Court
cannot agree that such term includes “every transaction and communication a teacher does with her students.” Clearly, it does
not take too much intelligence to conclude that Cadet 1CL Cudia should have been accurate by pinpointing who were with him
when he was late in the next class. His deceptive explanation is made more obvious when compared with what Cadets 1CL
Archangel and Narciso wrote in their DR explanation, which was: “We approached our instructor after our
class.”212chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Further, it is unimportant whether the time of dismissal on November 14, 2013 was five or fifteen minutes ahead of the
scheduled end of class. Worth noting is that even Dr. Costales, who stood as a witness for Cadet 1CL Cudia, consistently
admitted before the HC, the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body, and the CHR that he was already dismissed when he passed
his LE paper.213 During the hearing of the Board/Body, she also declared that she merely responded to his request to see the
results of the UE1 and that she had reservations on the phrases “under my instruction” and “dismissed a bit late” used in his
letter of explanation to the HC. In addition, Dr. Costales manifested her view before the CHR that the act of Cadet 1CL Cudia of
inquiring about his grade outside their classroom after he submitted his LE paper is not part of the class time because the
consultation, being cadet-initiated, is voluntary.214chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that a new business was initiated by Dr. Costales when Cadet 1CL Cudia was asked to stay
and wait for the section grade, still, this does not acquit him. Given such situation, a responsible cadet who is fully aware of the
time constraint has the last say, that is, to politely decline the invitation and immediately go to the next class. This was not done
by Cadet 1CL Cudia. Thus, it cannot be said that he already lost control over the circumstances.
It is apparent, therefore, that Cadet 1CL Cudia cunningly chose words which led to confusion in the minds of respondents and
eventually commenced the HC inquiry. His case is not just a matter of semantics and a product of plain and simple inaccuracy.
There is manipulation of facts and presentation of untruthful explanation constitutive of Honor Code violation.
Evidence of prior good conduct cannot clear Cadet 1CL Cudia. While his Transcript of Records (TOR) may reflect not only his
outstanding academic performance but his excellent grade in subjects on Conduct during his four-year stay in the PMA,215 it
does not necessarily follow that he is innocent of the offense charged. It is enough to say that “evidence that one did or did not
do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at another time.”216
While the TOR may be received to prove his identity or habit as an exceptional PMA student, it does not show his specific
intent, plan, or scheme as cadet accused of committing a specific Honor Code violation.
Dismissal from the PMA as unjust and cruel punishment
Respondents insist that violation of the Honor Code warrants separation of the guilty cadet from the cadet corps. Under the
Cadet Corps Armed Forces of the Philippines Regulation (CCAFPR), a violation of the Cadet Honor Code is considered Grave
(Class 1) delinquency which merits a recommendation for a cadet’s dismissal from the PMA Superintendent. The same is
likewise clear from the Honor Code and Honor System Handbook. Cadet 1CL Cudia is, therefore, presumed to know that the
Honor Code does not accommodate a gradation or degree of offenses. There is no difference between a little lie and a huge
falsehood. Respondents emphasize that the Honor Code has always been considered as an absolute yardstick against which
cadets have measured themselves ever since the PMA began and that the Honor Code and System seek to assure that only
those who are able to meet the high standards of integrity and honor are produced by the PMA. As held in Andrews, it is
constitutionally permissible for the military “to set and enforce uncommonly high standards of conduct and ethics.” Thus, in
violating the Honor Code, Cadet 1CL Cudia forfeits his privilege to graduate from the PMA.
On their part, petitioners concede that if it is proven that a cadet breached the Honor Code, the offense warrants his or her
dismissal since such a policy may be the only means to maintain and uphold the spirit of integrity in the military.217 They
maintain though that in Cadet 1CL Cudia’s case there is no need to distinguish between a “little lie” and a “huge falsehood”
since he did not lie at all. Absent any intent to deceive and to take undue advantage, the penalty imposed on him is considered
as unjust and cruel. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the penalty of dismissal is not commensurate to the fact
that he is a graduating cadet with honors and what he allegedly committed does not amount to an academic deficiency or an
intentional and flagrant violation of the PMA non-academic rules and regulations. Citing Non, petitioners argue that the penalty
imposed must be proportionate to the offense. Further, Isabelo, Jr. is squarely applicable to the facts of the case. Cadet 1CL
Cudia was deprived of his right to education, the only means by which he may have a secure life and future.
Considering Our finding that Cadet 1CL Cudia in truth and in fact lied and his acceptance that violation of the Honor Code
warrants the ultimate penalty of dismissal from the PMA, there is actually no more dispute to resolve. Indeed, the sanction is
clearly set forth and Cadet 1CL Cudia, by contract, risked this when he entered the Academy.218 We adopt the ruling in
Andrews219 wherein it was held that, while the penalty is severe, it is nevertheless reasonable and not arbitrary, and,
therefore, not in violation of due process. It quoted the disposition of the district court, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The fact that a cadet will be separated from the Academy upon a finding that he has violated the Honor Code is known to all
cadets even prior to the beginning of their careers there. The finding of a Code violation by hypothesis includes a finding of
scienter on the part of the offender. While separation is admittedly a drastic and tragic consequence of a cadet's transgression,
it is not an unconstitutionally arbitrary one, but rather a reasonable albeit severe method of preventing men who have suffered
ethical lapses from becoming career officers. That a policy of admonitions or lesser penalties for single violations might be more
compassionate -- or even more effective in achieving the intended result -- is quite immaterial to the question of whether the
harsher penalty violates due process.220
Nature of the CHR Findings
Petitioners contend that the PMA turned a blind eye on the CHR’s recommendations. The CHR, they note, is a constitutional
body mandated by the 1987 Constitution to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights,
and to conduct investigative monitoring of economic, social, and cultural rights, particularly of vulnerable sectors of society.
Further, it was contended that the results of CHR’s investigation and recommendations are so persuasive that this Court, on
several occasions like in the cases of Cruz v. Sec. of Environment & Natural Resources221 and Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v.
Commission on Elections,222 gave its findings serious consideration. It is not, therefore, too late for the Court to hear what an
independent and unbiased fact-finding body has to say on the case.
In opposition, respondents assert that Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights223 ruled that the CHR is merely a
recommendatory body that is not empowered to arrive at a conclusive determination of any controversy.
We are in accord with respondents.
The findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the CHR are merely recommendatory and, therefore, not binding to this Court.
The reason is that the CHR’s constitutional mandate extends only to the investigation of all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights.224 As held in Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights225 and a number of subsequent
cases,226 the CHR is only a fact-finding body, not a court of justice or a quasi-judicial agency. It is not empowered to adjudicate
claims on the merits or settle actual case or controversies. The power to investigate is not the same as
adjudication:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive
evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding
is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official.
The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided
or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.
This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

xxxx

[i]t cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To
investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood
and quite distinct meanings.

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The
dictionary definition of “investigate” is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: "to search or inquire into: x x x
to subject to an official probe x x x: to conduct an official inquiry;" The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find
out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy
involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To
trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition;
examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn
described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257;
x x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on,
settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of
issues raised: xx to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x x act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a
judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: xx to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy x x x."

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with
adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or
condemn. x x x Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."227
All told, petitioners are not entitled to moral and exemplary damages in accordance with Articles 19, 2217, 2219 and 2229 of
the Civil Code. The dismissal of Cadet 1CL Cudia from the PMA did not effectively deprive him of a future. Cliché though it may
sound, being a PMA graduate is not the “be-all and end-all” of his existence. A cadet separated from the PMA may still continue
to pursue military or civilian career elsewhere without suffering the stigma attached to his or her dismissal. For one, as
suggested by respondents, DND-AFP Circular No. 13, dated July 15, 1991, on the enlistment and reenlistment in the AFP Regular
Force, provides under Section 14 (b) thereof that priority shall be given to, among others, the ex-PMA or PAFFFS cadets.228 If
the positions open does not appeal to his interest for being way below the rank he could have achieved as a PMA graduate,
Cadet 1CL Cudia could still practice other equally noble profession or calling that is best suited to his credentials, competence,
and potential. Definitely, nobody can deprive him of that choice.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia from the Philippine Military Academy
is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.