[G.R. No. 127930. December 15, 2000.]
Nag-akmang mag-aalis ng pangitaas na kapirasong
MIRIAM COLLEGE FOUNDATION, INC., Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, JASPER BRIONES, JEROME GOMEZ, RELLY CARPIO, ELIZABETH
VALDEZCO, JOSE MARI RAMOS, CAMILLE PORTUGAL, JOEL TAN and
GERALD GARY RENACIDO, Respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
"Obscene," "vulgar," "indecent," "gross," "sexually explicit," "injurious to young
readers," and devoid of all moral values." 1 This was now some members of the
Miriam College community allegedly described the contents of the September-
October 1994 issue (Vol. 41, No. 14) of Miriam College’s school paper (Chi-Rho),
and magazine (Ang Magasing Pampanitikan ng Chi-Rho). The articles in the Chi-
Rho included:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
. . . a story, clearly fiction, entitled ‘Kaskas’ written by one Gerald Garry Renacido
...
Kaskas, written in Tagalog, treats of the experience of a group of young, male,
combo players who, one evening, after their performance went to see a bold
show in a place called "Flirtation." This was the way the author described the
group’s exposure during that stage show:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"Sige, sa Flirtation tayo. Happy hour na halos . . . he! he! he! sambit ng kanilang
bokalistang kanina pa di maitago ang pagkahayok sa karneng babae na kanyang
pinananabikan nuong makalawa pa, susog naman ang tropa.
". . . Pumasok ang unang mananayaw. Si ‘Red Raven’ ayon sa emcee. Nakasuot
lamang ng bikining pula na may palamuting dilaw sa gilid-gilid at sa bandang
utong. Nagsimula siya sa kanyang pag-giling nang tumugtog na ang unang tono
ng "Goodbye" ng Air Supply. Dahan-dahan ang kanyang mga malalantik at
mapang-akit na galaw sa una. Mistulang sawa na nililingkis ang hangin, paru-
parong padapo-dapo sa mga bulaklak na lamesa, di-upang umamoy o kumuha ng
nektar, ngunit para ipaglantaran ang sariling bulaklak at ang angkin nitong
malansang nektar.
"Kaskas mo babe, sige . . . kaskas."cralaw virtua1aw library
Napahaling ang tingin ng balerinang huwad kay Mike. Mistulang natipuhan, dahil
sa harap niya’y nagtagal.
tela. Hindi nakahinga si Mike, nanigas sa kanyang kinauupuan, nanigas pati ang
nasa gitna ng kanyang hita. Ang mga mata niya’y namagnet sa kayamanang
ngayo’y halos isang pulgada lamang mula sa kanyang naglalaway na bunganga.
Naputol-putol ang kanyang hininga nang kandungan ni ‘Red Raven’ ang kanyang
kanang hita. Lalo naghingalo siya nang kabayuhin ito ng dahan dahan . . . Pabilis
ng pabilis.’
The author further described Mike’s responses to the dancer as follows (quoted in
part):chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . Nagsimulang lumaban na ng sabayan si Mike sa dancer. Hindi nagpatalo ang
ibong walang pakpak, inipit ng husto ang hita ni Mike at pinag-udyukan ang
kanyang dibdib sa mukha nito.
"Kaskas mo pa, kaskas mo pa!"
Palpakan at halagpakan na tawanan ang tumambad sa kanya ng biglang halikan
siya nito sa labi at iniwang bigla, upang kanyang muniin ang naudlot niyang
pagtikim ng karnal na nektar. Hindi niya maanto kung siya ay nanalo o natalo sa
nangyaring sagupaan ng libog. Ang alam lang niya ay nanlata na siya."cralaw
virtua1aw library
After the show the group went home in a car with the bokalista driving. A
pedestrian happened to cross the street and the driver deliberately hit him with
these words:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Pare tingnan natin kung immortal itong baboy na ito. He! He! He! He! Sabad ng
sabog nilang drayber/bokalista."cralaw virtua1aw library
The story ends (with their car about to hit a truck) in these words: . . . "Pare . . .
trak!!! Put . . .!!!!
Ang Magasing Pampanitikan, October, 1994 issue, was in turn, given the cover
title of "Libog at iba pang tula."cralaw virtua1aw library
In his foreword which Jerome Gomez entitled "Foreplay", Jerome wrote: "Alam
ko, nakakagulat ang aming pamagat." Jerome then proceeded to write about
previous reactions of readers to women-writers writing about matters erotic and
to gay literature. He justified the Magazine’s erotic theme on the ground that
many of the poems passed on to the editors were about "sekswalidad at iba’t
ibang karanasan nito." Nakakagulat ang tapang ng mga manunulat . . . tungkol
sa maselang usaping ito . . . at sa isang institusyon pang katulad ng Miriam!"
Mr. Gomez quoted from a poem entitled "Linggo" written by himself:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
may mga palangganang nakatiwangwang —
mga putang biyak na sa gitna,
‘di na puwedeng paglabhan,
‘di na maaaring pagbabaran . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
Gomez stated that the poems in the magazine are not "garapal" and "sa mga
tulang ito namin maipagtatanggol ang katapangan (o pagka-sensasyonal) ng
pamagat na "Libog at iba pang Tula." He finished "Foreplay" with these words:
"Dahil para saan pa ang libog kung hindi ilalabas?"
The cover title in question appears to have been taken from a poem written by
Relly Carpio of the same title. The poem dealt on a woman and a man who met
each other, gazed at each other, went up close and "Naghalikan, Shockproof."
The poem contained a background drawing of a woman with her two mammary
and nipples exposed and with a man behind embracing her with the woman in a
pose of passion-filled mien.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Another poem entitled ‘Virgin Writes Erotic’ was about a man having fantasies in
his sleep. The last verse said: "At zenith I pull it out and find myself alone in this
fantasy." Opposite the page where this poem appeared was a drawing of a man
asleep and dreaming of a naked woman (apparently of his dreams) lying in bed
on her buttocks with her head up (as in a hospital bed with one end rolled up).
The woman’s right nipple can be seen clearly. Her thighs were stretched up with
her knees akimbo on the bed.
In the next page (page 29) one finds a poem entitled "Naisip ko Lang" by Belle
Campanario. It was about a young student who has a love-selection problem: ". .
. Kung sinong pipiliin: ang teacher kong praning, o ang boyfriend kong bading."
The word "praning" as the court understands it, refers to a paranoid person;
while the word "bading" refers to a sward or "bakla" or "badidang." This poem
also had an illustration behind it: of a young girl with large eyes and sloping hair
cascading down her curves and holding a peeled banana whose top the illustrator
shaded up with downward-slanting strokes. In the poem, the girl wanted to eat
banana topped by peanut butter. In line with Jerome’s "Foreplay" and by the way
it was drawn that banana with peanut butter top was meant more likely than not,
to evoke a spiritedly mundane, mental reaction from a young audience.
Another poem entitled "Malas ang Tatlo" by an unknown author went like
this:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘Na picture mo na ba
no’ng magkatabi tayong dalawa
sa pantatluhang sofa —
ikaw, the legitimate asawa
at ako, biro mo, ang kerida?
tapos, tumabi siya, shit!
kumpleto na:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
ikaw, ako at siya
kulang na lang, kamera."cralaw virtua1aw library
A poem "Sa Gilid ng Itim" by Gerald Renacido in the Chi-Rho broadsheet spoke of
a fox (lobo) yearning for "karneng sariwa, karneng bata, karneng may
kalambutan . . . isang bahid ng dugong dalaga, maamo’t malasa, ipahid sa mga
labing sakim sa romansa’ and ended with ‘hinog na para himukin bungang
bibiyakin." 2
Following the publication of the paper and the magazine, the members of the
editorial board, 3 and Relly Carpio, author of Libog, all students of Miriam
College, received a letter signed by Dr. Aleli Sevilla, Chair of the Miriam College
Discipline Committee. The Letter dated 4 November 1994 stated:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
This is to inform you that the letters of complain filed against you by members of
the Miriam Community and a concerned Ateneo grade five student have been
forwarded to the Discipline Committee for inquiry and investigation. Please find
enclosed complaints.
As expressed in their complaints you have violated regulations in the student
handbook specifically Section 2 letters B and R, pages 30 and 32, Section 4
(Major offenses) letter j, page 36 letters m, n, and p, page 37 and no. 2 (minor
offenses) letter a, page 37.
You are required to submit a written statement in answer to the charge/s on or
before the initial date of hearing to be held on November 15, 1994, Tuesday,
1:00 in the afternoon at the DSA Conference Room. 4
cum laude;
None of the students submitted their respective answers. They instead requested
Dr. Sevilla to transfer the case to the Regional Office of the Department of 5. Elizabeth Valdezco suspension up to (summer)
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) which under Rule XII of DECS Order No.
94, Series of 1992, supposedly had jurisdiction over the case. 5 March, 1995;

In a Letter dated 21 November 1994, Dr. Sevilla again required the students to 6. Camille Portugal graduation privileges withheld,
file their written answers.
including diploma. She is an
In response, Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, lawyer for the students, submitted a letter 6
to the Discipline Committee reiterating his clients’ position that said Committee Octoberian;
had no jurisdiction over them. According to Atty. Valmonte, the Committee was
"trying to impose discipline on [his clients] on account of their having written
7. Joel Tan suspension for two (2) weeks to
articles and poems in their capacity as campus journalists." Hence, he argued
that "what applies is Republic Act No. 7079 [The Campus Journalism Act] and its
expire on February 2, 1995;
implementing rules and regulations." He also questioned the partiality of the
members of said Committee who allegedly "had already articulated their position"
against his clients.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary 8. Gerald Gary Renacido Expelled and given transfer

The Discipline Committee proceeded with its investigation ex parte. Thereafter, credentials. He is a 2nd year
the Discipline Board, after a review of the Discipline Committee’s report, imposed
disciplinary sanctions upon the students, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library student. He wrote the fiction

1. Jasper Briones Expulsion. Briones is the story "Kaskas" ;

Editor-in-Chief of Chi-Rho and 9. Relly Carpio Dismissed and given transfer

a 4th year student; credentials. He is in 3rd year

2. Daphne Cowper suspension up to (summer) and wrote the poem "Libog" ;

March, 1995; 10. Jerome Gomez Dismissed and given transfer

3. Imelda Hilario suspension for two (2) weeks to . credentials. He is in 3rd year.

expire on February 2, 1995; He wrote the foreword

"Foreplay" to the questioned

4. Deborah Ligon suspension up to May, 1995.
Anthology of Poems; and
Miss Ligon is a 4th year student

and could graduate as summa 11. Jose Mari Ramos Expelled and given transfer
papers. He is a 2nd year
student and art editor of Chi-
Rho. 7
The above students thus filed a petition for prohibition and certiorari with
preliminary injunction/restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City questioning the jurisdiction of the Discipline Board of Miriam College over
them.
On 17 January 1995, the Regional Trial Court, Branch CIII, presided by Judge
Jaime N. Salazar, Jr., issued an order denying the plaintiffs’ prayer for a
Temporary Restraining Order. It held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
There is nothing in the DECS Order No. 94, S. 1992 dated August 19, 1992 that
excludes school Administrators from exercising jurisdiction over cases of the
nature involved in the instant petition. R.A. 7079 also does not state anything on
the matter of jurisdiction. The DECS undoubtedly cannot determine the extent of
the nature of jurisdiction of schools over disciplinary cases. Moreover, as this
Court reads that DECS Order No. 94, S. of 1992, it merely prescribes for
purposes of internal administration which DECS officer or body shall hear cases
arising from R A. 7079 if and when brought to it for resolution. The said order
never mentioned that it has exclusive jurisdiction over cases falling under R.A.
707. 8
The students thereafter filed a "Supplemental Petition and Motion for
Reconsideration." The College followed with its Answer.
Subsequently, the RTC issued an Order dated 10 February 1995 granting the writ
of preliminary injunction.
ACCORDINGLY, so as not to render the issues raised moot and academic, let a
writ of preliminary injunction issue enjoining the defendants, including the
officers and members of the Disciplinary Committee, the Disciplinary Board, or
any similar body and their agents, and the officers and members of the Security
Department, Division, or Security Agency securing the premises and campus of
Miriam College Foundation, Inc. from:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
1. Enforcing and/or implementing the expulsion or dismissal resolutions or orders
complained of against herein plaintiffs (a) Jasper Briones; (b) Gerald Gary
Renacido; (c) Relly Carpio; (d) Jerome Gomez; and (e) Jose Mari Ramos, but
otherwise allowing the defendants to impose lesser sanctions on aforementioned
plaintiffs; and
2. Disallowing, refusing, barring or in any way preventing the herein plaintiffs (all
eleven of them) from taking tests or exams and entering the Miriam campus for
such purpose as extended to all students of Miriam College Foundation, Inc.;
neither should their respective course or subject teachers or professors withhold
their grades, including final grades, if and when they meet the requirements
similarly prescribed for all other students, this current 2nd Semester of 1994-95.
The sanctions imposed on the other plaintiffs, namely, Deborah Ligon, Imelda
Hilario, Elizabeth Valdezco, Camille Portugal and Daphne Cowper, shall remain in
force and shall not be covered by this Injunction: Provided, that Camille Portugal
now a graduate, shall have the right to receive her diploma, but defendants are
not hereby prevented from refusing her the privilege of walking on the graduation
stage so as to prevent any likely public tumults.
The plaintiffs are required to post an injunction bond in the sum of Four Thousand
Pesos (P4,000.00) each.
SO ORDERED. 9
Both parties moved for a reconsideration of the above order. In an Order dated
22 February 1995, the RTC dismissed the petition, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
4. On the matter raised by both parties that it is the DECS which has jurisdiction,
inasmuch as both parties do not want this court to assume jurisdiction here then
this court will not be more popish than the Pope and in fact is glad that it will
have one more case out of its docket.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the
parties going to another forum.
All orders heretofore issued here are hereby recalled and set aside.
SO ORDERED. 10
The students, excluding Deborah Ligon, Imelda Hilario and Daphne Cowper,
sought relief in this Court through a petition for certiorari and prohibition of
preliminary injunction/restraining order 11 questioning the Orders of the RTC
dated 10 and 24 February 1995.
On 15 March 1995, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals
(CA) for disposition. 12 On 19 May 1995, the CA issued a resolution
stating:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The respondents are hereby required to file comment on the instant petition and
to show cause why no writ of preliminary injunction should be issued, within ten
(10) days from notice hereof, and the petitioners may file reply thereto within
five (5) days from receipt of former’s comment.
In order not to render ineffectual the instant petition, let a Temporary Restraining
Order be issued enjoining the public respondents from enforcing letters of
dismissal/suspension dated January 19, 1995.
SO ORDERED. 13
In its Decision dated 26 September 1996, respondent court granted the students’
petition. The CA declared the RTC Order dated 22 February 1995, as well as the
students’ suspension and dismissal, void.
Hence, this petition by Miriam College.
We limit our decision to the resolution of the following issues:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
(1) The alleged moot character of the case.
(2) The jurisdiction of the trial court to entertain the petition for certiorari filed by
the students.
(3) The power of petitioner to suspend or dismiss respondent students.
(4) The jurisdiction of petitioner over the complaints against the students.
We do not tackle the alleged obscenity of the publication, the propriety of the
penalty imposed or the manner of the imposition thereof. These issues, though
touched upon by the parties in the proceedings below, were not fully ventilated
therein.
I prevailing when the CA issued its TRO dated 19 May 1995. 21 By that time
Petitioner asserts the Court of Appeals found the case moot thus:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
While this petition may be considered moot and academic since more than one
year have passed since May 19, 1995 when this court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining respondents from enforcing the dismissal and
suspension on petitioners . . . 14
Since courts do not adjudicate moot cases, petitioner argues that the CA should
not have proceeded with the adjudication of the merits of the case.
We find that the case is not moot.
It may be noted that what the court issued in 19 May 1995 was a temporary
restraining order, not a preliminary injunction. The records do not show that the
CA ever issued a preliminary injunction.
Preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding
prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a
person to perform to refrain from performing a particular act or acts. 15 As an
extraordinary remedy, injunction is calculated to preserve or maintain the status
quo of things and is generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts,
until the merits of the case can be heard. 16 A preliminary injunction persists
until it is dissolved or until the termination of the action without the court issuing
a final injunction.
The basic purpose of restraining order, on the other hand, is to preserve the
status quo until the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction. 17
Under the former §5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, as amended by §5, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 224, a judge (or justice) may issue a temporary restraining order
with a limited life of twenty days from date of issue. 18 If before the expiration of
the 20-day period the application for preliminary injunction is denied, the
temporary order would thereby be deemed automatically vacated. If no action is
taken by the judge on the application for preliminary injunction within the said 20
days, the temporary restraining order would automatically expire on the 20th day
by the sheer force of law, no judicial declaration to that effect being necessary.
19 In the instant case, no such preliminary injunction was issued; hence, the TRO
earlier issued automatically expired under the aforesaid provision of the Rules of
Court. 20
This limitation as to the duration of the temporary restraining order was the rule
respondents Elizabeth Valdezco and Joel Tan had already served their respective
suspensions. The TRO was applicable only to respondents Jasper Briones, Jerome
Gomez, Relly Carpio, Jose Mari Ramos and Gerald Gary Renacido all of whom
were dismissed, and respondent Camille Portugal whose graduation privileges
were withheld. The TRO, however, lost its effectivity upon the lapse of the twenty
days. It can hardly be said that in that short span of time, these students had
already graduated as to render the case moot.chanrob1es virtua1 law library
Either the CA was of the notion that its TRO was effective throughout the
pendency of the case or that what is issued was a preliminary injunction. In
either case, it was error on the part of the CA to assume that its order
supposedly enjoining Miriam from enforcing the dismissal and suspension was
complied with. A case becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing
upon the merits. 22 To determine the moot character of a question before it, the
appellate court may receive proof or take notice of facts appearing outside the
record. 23 In the absence of such proof or notice of facts, the Court of Appeals
should not have assumed that its TRO was enforced, and that the case was
rendered moot by the mere lapse of time.
Indeed, private respondents in their Comment herein 24 deny that the case has
become moot since Miriam refused them readmission in violation of the TRO. This
fact is unwittingly conceded by Miriam itself when, to counter this allegation by
the students, it says that private respondents never sought readmission after the
restraining order was issued. 25 In truth, Miriam relied on legal technicalities to
subvert the clear intent of said order, which states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In order not to render ineffectual the instant petition, let a Temporary Restraining
Order be issued enjoining the public respondents from enforcing letters of
dismissal/suspension dated January 19, 1995.
Petitioner says that the above order is "absurd" since the order "incorrectly
directs public respondent, the Hon. Jaime Salazar, presiding judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City not to dismiss or suspend the students." 26
We do not agree. Padua v. Robles 27 lays down the rules in construing
judgments. We find these rules to be applicable to court orders as
well:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
[T]he sufficiency and efficacy of a judgment must be tested by its substance
rather than its form. In construing a judgment, its legal effects including such
effects that necessarily follow because of legal implications, rather than the
language used, govern. Also, its meaning, operation, and consequences must be
ascertained like any other written instrument. Thus, a judgment rests on the
intent of the court as gathered from every part thereof, including the situation to
which it applies and attendant circumstances. (Emphasis supplied.)
Tested by such standards, we find that the order was indeed intended for private
respondents (in the appellate court) Miriam College, Et Al., and not public
respondent Judge. In dismissing the case, the trial judge recalled and set aside
all orders it had previously issued, including the writ of preliminary injunction. In
doing so, the trial court allowed the dismissal and suspension of the students to
remain in force. Thus, it would indeed be absurd to construe the order as being
directed to the RTC. Obviously, the TRO was intended for Miriam College.
True, respondent-students should have asked for a clarification of the above
order. They did not. Nevertheless, if Miriam College found the order "absurd,"
then it should have sought a clarification itself so the Court of Appeals could have
cleared up any confusion. It chose not to. Instead, it took advantage of the
supposed vagueness of the order and used the same to justify its refusal to
readmit the students.
As Miriam never readmitted the students, the CA’s ruling that the case is moot
has no basis. How then can Miriam argue in good faith that the case had become
moot when it knew all along that the facts on which the purported moot character
of the case were based did not exist? Obviously, Miriam is clutching to the CA’s
wrongful assumption that the TRO it issued was enforced to justify the reversal of
the CA’s decision.
Accordingly, we hold that the case is not moot, Miriam’s pretensions to the
contrary notwithstanding.
II
"To uphold and protect the freedom of the press even at the campus level and to
promote the development and growth of campus journalism as a means of
strengthening ethical values, encouraging critical and creative thinking, and
developing moral character and personal discipline of the Filipino youth," 28
Congress enacted in 1991 Republic Act No. 7079. Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING
FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND PROMOTION OF CAMPUS JOURNALISM AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES," 29 the law contains provisions for the selection of the
editorial board 30 and publication adviser, 31 the funding of the school
publication, 32 and the grant of exemption to donations used actually, directly
and exclusively for the promotion of campus journalism from donor’s or gift tax.
33
Noteworthy are provisions clearly intended to provide autonomy to the editorial
board and its members. Thus, the second paragraph of Section 4 states that"
(o)nce the publication is established, its editorial board shall freely determine its
editorial policies and-manage the publication’s funds."cralaw virtua1aw library
Section 7, in particular, provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A member of the publication staff must maintain his or her status as student in
order to retain membership in the publication staff. A student shall not be
expelled or suspended solely on the basis of articles he or she has written, or on
the basis of the performance of his or her duties in the student publication.
Section 9 of the law mandates the DECS to "promulgate the rules and regulations
necessary for the effective implementation of this Act." 34 Pursuant to said
authority, then DECS Secretary Armand Fabella, issued DECS Order No. 94,
Series of 1992, providing under Rule XII that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
GENERAL PROVISIONS
SECTION 1. The Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) shall help
ensure and facilitate the proper carrying out of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 7079. It shall also act on cases on appeal brought
before it.
The DECS regional office shall have the original jurisdiction over cases as a result
of the decisions, actions and policies of the editorial board of a school within its
area of administrative responsibility. It shall conduct investigations and hearings
on the these cases within fifteen (15) days after the completion of the resolution
of each case. (Emphasis supplied.)
The latter two provisions of law appear to be decisive of the present case.
It may be recalled that after the Miriam Disciplinary Board imposed disciplinary
sanctions upon the students, the latter filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition in the Regional Trial Court raising, as grounds therefor,
that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I that jurisdiction and to render a decision in a case properly submitted to it. 38
DEFENDANT’S DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE AND DISCIPLINARY BOARD OF
DEFENDANT SCHOOL HAVE NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE. 35
II
DEFENDANT SCHOOL’S DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE AND THE DISCIPLINARY
BOARD DO NOT HAVE THE QUALIFICATION OF AN IMPARTIAL AND NEUTRAL
ARBITER AND, THEREFORE THEIR TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE AGAINST
PLAINTIFFS WILL DENY THE LATTER OF THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. 36
Anent the first ground, the students theorized that under Rule XII of the Rules
and Regulations for the Implementation of R.A. No. 7079, the DECS Regional
Office, and not the school, had jurisdiction over them. The second ground, on the
other hand, alleged lack of impartiality of the Miriam Disciplinary Board, which
would thereby deprive them of due process. This contention, if true, would
constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the trial court. These were the same grounds invoked by the students
in their refusal to answer the charges against them. The issues were thus limited
to the question of jurisdiction — a question purely legal in nature and well within
the competence and the jurisdiction of the trial court, not the DECS Regional
Office. This is an exception to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. As the Court
held in Phil. Global Communications, Inc. v. Relova. 37
Absent such clarity as to the scope and coverage of its franchise, a legal question
arises which is more appropriate for the judiciary than for an administrative
agency to resolve. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction calls for application when
there is such competence to act on the part of an administrative body. Petitioner
assumes that such is the case. That is to beg the question. There is merit,
therefore, to the approach taken by private respondents to seek judicial remedy
as to whether or not the legislative franchise could be so interpreted as to enable
the National Telecommunications Commission to act on the matter. A
jurisdictional question thus arises and calls for an answer.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
However, when Miriam College in its motion for reconsideration contended that
the DECS Regional Office, not the RTC, had jurisdiction, the trial court, refusing
to "be more popish than the Pope," dismissed the case. Indeed, the trial court
could hardly contain its glee over the fact that "it will have one more case out of
its docket." We remind the trial court that a court having jurisdiction of a case
has not only the right and the power or authority, but also the duty, to exercise
Accordingly, the trial court should not have dismissed the petition without settling
the issues presented before it.
III
Before we address the question of which between the DECS Regional Office and
Miriam College has jurisdiction over the complaints against the students, we first
delve into the power of either to impose disciplinary sanctions upon the students.
Indeed, the resolution of the issue of jurisdiction would be reduced to an
academic exercise if neither the DECS Regional Office nor Miriam College had the
power to impose sanctions upon the students.
Recall, for purposes of this discussion, that Section 7 of the Campus Journalism
Act prohibits the expulsion or suspension of a student solely on the basis of
articles he or she has written.
A.
Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher
learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right
of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best
to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the
overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. 39 The essential freedoms
subsumed in the term "academic freedom" encompasses the freedom to
determine for itself on academic grounds:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) Who may teach,
(2) What may be taught,
(3) How it shall be taught, and
(4) Who may be admitted to study. 40
The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the third
freedom, i.e., "how it shall be taught." A school certainly cannot function in an
atmosphere of anarchy.
Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational institution
requires rules and regulations necessary for the maintenance of an orderly
educational program and the creation of an educational environment conducive to
learning. Such rules and regulations are equally necessary for the protection of
the students, faculty, and property. 41
Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a
necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling
discipline, the school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the
student likewise finds basis in the freedom "what to teach."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Incidentally, the school not only has the right but the duty to develop discipline in
its students. The Constitution no less imposes such duty.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
[All educational institutions] shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love
of humanity, respect for human rights, appreciation of the role of national heroes
in the historical development of the country, teach the rights and duties of
citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character and
personal discipline, encourage critical and creative thinking, broaden scientific
and technological knowledge, and promote vocational efficiency. 42
In Angeles v. Sison, we also said that discipline was a means for the school to
carry out its responsibility to help its students "grow and develop into mature,
responsible, effective and worthy citizens of the community." 43
Finally, nowhere in the above formulation is the right to discipline more evident
than in "who may be admitted to study." If a school has the freedom to
determine whom to admit, logic dictates that it also has the right to determine
whom to exclude or expel, as well as upon whom to impose lesser sanctions such
as suspension and the withholding of graduation privileges.
Thus, in Ateneo de Manila v. Capulong, 44 the Court upheld the expulsion of
students found guilty of hazing by petitioner therein, holding that:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the immediate reinstatement of
respondent students who have been investigated and found guilty by the
Disciplinary Board to have violated petitioner university’s disciplinary rules and
standards will certainly undermine the authority of the administration of the
school. This we would be most loathe to do.
More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner university’s academic freedom
which has been enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and the present 1987 Constitution.
45
Tracing the development of academic freedom, the Court continued:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, we have consistently upheld the
salutary proposition that admission to an institution of higher learning is
discretionary upon a school, the same being a privilege on the part of the student
rather than a right. While under the Education Act of 1982, students have a right
"to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue
their course therein up to graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are, to
the established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic
institution.
"For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations
for the admission, discipline and promotion of students. This right . . . extends as
well to parents . . . as parents under a social and moral (if not legal) obligation,
individually and collectively, to assist and cooperate with the schools."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and indispensable to
the successful management of the college. The rules may include those governing
student discipline." Going a step further, the establishment of the rules governing
university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline,
may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the
institution, but to its very survival.
Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of militancy in the
academic groves as collectively, the students demanded and plucked for
themselves from the panoply of academic freedom their own rights encapsulized
under the rubric of "right to education" forgetting that, In Hohfeldian terms, they
have the concomitant duty, and that is, their duty to learn under the rules laid
down by the school.
. . . It must be borne in mind that universities are established, not merely to
develop the intellect and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty values,
ideals and attitudes; may, the development, or flowering if you will, of the total
man.
In essence, education must ultimately be religious — not in the sense that the
founders or charter members of the institution are sectarian or profess a religious
ideology. Rather, a religious education, as the renowned philosopher Alfred North
Whitehead said, is ‘an education which inculcates duty and reverence.’ It appears
that the particular brand of religious education offered by the Ateneo de Manila
University has been lost on the respondent students.
Certainly, they do not deserve to claim such a venerable institution as the Ateneo
de Manila University as their own a minute longer, for they may foreseeably cast
a malevolent influence on the students currently enrolled, as well as those who
come after them.
Quite applicable to this case is our pronouncement in Yap Chin Fah v. Court of
Appeals that: "The maintenance of a morally conducive and orderly educational
environment will be seriously imperilled, if, under the circumstances of this case,
Grace Christian is forced to admit petitioner’s children and to reintegrate them to
the student body." Thus, the decision of petitioner university to expel them is but
congruent with the gravity of their misdeeds. 46
B.
Section 4 (1), Article XIV of the Constitution recognizes the State’s power to
regulate educational institution:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and private institutions in
the educational system and shall exercise reasonable supervision and regulation
of all educational institutions.
As may be gleaned from the above provision, such power to regulate is subject to
the requirement of reasonableness. Moreover, the Constitution allows merely the
regulation and supervision of educational institutions, not the deprivation of their
rights.
C.
In several cases, this Court has upheld the right of the students to free speech in
school premises. In the landmark case of Malabanan v. Ramento, 47 students of
the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, believing that the merger of the
Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture would result in the
increase in their tuition, held a demonstration to protest the proposed merger.
The rally however was held at a place other than that specified in the school
permit and continued longer than the time allowed. The protest, moreover,
disturbed the classes and caused the stoppage of the work of non-academic
personnel. For the illegal assembly, the university suspended the students for
one year. In affirming the students’ rights to peaceable assembly and free
speech, the Court through Mr. Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, echoed the ruling
of the US Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines School District. 48
Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. They are
entitled to do so. They enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom to express
their views and communicate their thoughts to those disposed to listen in
gatherings such as was held in this case. They do not, to borrow from the opinion
of Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, ‘shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.’
While, therefore, the authority of educational institutions over the conduct of
students must be recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative of
constitutional safeguards. On a more specific level there is persuasive force to
this Fortas opinion. "The principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to
accommodate students during prescribed hours for the purpose of certain types
of activities. Among those activities is personal intercommunication among the
students. This is not only inevitable part of the educational process. A student’s
rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom hours. When he is in the
cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours,
he may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects like the conflict in
Vietnam, if he does so without ‘materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school’ and without
colliding with the rights of others. . . . But conduct by the student, in class or out
of it, which for any reason — whether it stems from time, place, or type of
behavior — materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or narrower one. 57 Thus, Section 7 should be read in a manner as not to infringe
invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional upon the school’s right to discipline its students. At the same time, however, we
guarantee of freedom of speech. 49 should not construe said provision as to unduly restrict the right of the students
to free speech. Consistent with jurisprudence, we read Section 7 of the Campus
The Malabanan ruling was followed in Villar v. Technological Institute of the Journalism Act to mean that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely
Philippines, 50 Arreza v. Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, 51 and Non v. on the basis of the articles he or she has written, except when such article
Dames II. 52 materially disrupt class work or involve substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The right of the students to free speech in school premises, however, is not
absolute. The right to free speech must always be applied in light of the special IV.
characteristics of the school environment. 53 Thus, while we upheld the right of
the students to free expression in these cases, we did not rule out disciplinary
action by the school for "conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for From the foregoing, the answer to the question of who has jurisdiction over the
any reason — whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior — which cases filed against respondent students becomes self-evident. The power of the
materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a
rights of others." 54 Thus, in Malabanan, we held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulations and the
maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment conducive to
6. Objection is made by private respondents to the tenor of the speeches by the learning. 58 That power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part
student leaders. That there would be a vigorous presentation of view opposed to of the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning guaranteed by the
the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Constitution. We therefore rule that Miriam College has the authority to hear and
Agriculture was to be expected. There was no concealment of the fact that they decide the cases filed against respondent students.
were against such a move as it confronted them with a serious problem ("isang
malaking suliranin.") They believed that such a merger would result in the WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
increase in tuition fees, an additional headache for their parents ("isa na naman Petitioner Miriam College is ordered to READMIT private respondent Joel Tan
sakit sa ulo ng ating mga magulang.") If in the course of such demonstration, whose suspension has long lapsed.
with an enthusiastic audience goading them on, utterances extremely critical at
times, even vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite understandable. Student leaders SO ORDERED
are hardly the timid, different types. They are likely to be assertive and
dogmatic. They would be ineffective if during a rally they speak in the guarded
and judicious language of the academe. At any rate, even a sympathetic
audience is not disposed to accord full credence to their fiery exhortations. They
take into account the excitement of the occasion, the propensity of speakers to
exaggerate, the exuberance of youth. They may give the speakers the benefit of
their applause, but with the activity taking place in the school premises and
during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public disorder is discernible.
This is without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct, which, to
borrow from Tinker, "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others." 55

It is in the light of this standard that we read Section 7 of the Campus Journalism
Act. Provisions of law should be construed in harmony with those of the
Constitution; acts of the legislature should be construed, wherever possible, in a
manner that would avoid their conflicting with the fundamental law. 56 A statute
should not be given a broad construction if its validity can be saved by a
 [G.R. NO. 161172 : December 13, 2004]
NADINE ROSARIO M. MORALES, Petitioner, v. THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
"It is an accepted principle that schools of learning are given ample discretion to
formulate rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of
graduation. This is part of academic freedom. Within the parameters of these
rules, it is within the competence of universities and colleges to determine who
are entitled to the grant of honors among the graduating students. Its discretion
on this academic matter may not be disturbed much less controlled by the courts
unless there is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise." 1
The Case
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals3 dated 28 November 2003, reversing the 05 September 2002 Order 4 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 87.
The pivotal issue from which this case arose is the interpretation and application
of Article 410 of the University of the Philippines (UP) Code which provides:
ART. 410. Students who complete their courses with the following absolute
minimum weighted average grade shall be graduated with honors:
Summa Cum Laude - ' - . .' 1.20
Magna Cum Laude - ' . 1.45
Cum Laude .' .1.75
Provided, that all the grades in all subjects prescribed in the curriculum, as well
as subjects that qualify as electives, shall be included in the computation of the
weighted average grade; provided further that in cases where the electives taken
are more than those required in the program, the following procedure will be
used in selecting the electives to be included in the computation of the weighted
average grade:
(I) For students who did not shift programs, consider the required number of
electives in chronological order.
(II) For students who shifted from one program to another, the electives to be
considered shall be selected according to the following order of priority:
(1) Electives taken in the program where the student is graduating will be
selected in chronological order.
(2) Electives taken in the previous program and acceptable as electives in the
second program will be selected in chronological order.
(3) Prescribed courses taken in the previous program, but qualify as electives in
the second program will be selected in chronological order.5
The Facts
In the school year 1997-1998, petitioner Nadine Rosario M. Morales transferred
from the UP Manila campus, where she was taking up Speech Pathology, to UP
Diliman and enrolled in the European Languages undergraduate program under
the College of Arts and Letters. Said program has three curricula, namely, Plan A,
Plan B, and Plan C. Upon the petitioner's transfer, she chose the Plan A
curriculum and elected French as her major and German as her minor. Under the
Plan A curriculum, the student is required to complete 141 units worth of subjects
in the University, 27 of which should be electives in his or her minor field of
study.
During the first semester of school year 1997-1998, the petitioner enrolled in the
subjects German 10 and German 11 where she obtained the grades of 1.0 in both
subjects. At the start of the second semester, however, the petitioner changed
her language minor from German to Spanish, while maintaining French as her
major.
By the end of the first semester of school year 1999-2000, the petitioner was
included in the list of candidates for graduation "with probable honors" issued by
the College of Arts and Letters of UP Diliman. The inclusion of the petitioner in
the said list was based on the computation made by the College of Arts and
Letters of the petitioner's General Weighted Average (GWA) inclusive of her
grades of 1.0 in German 10 and 11. According to the college's computation, the
petitioner had a GWA of 1.725, clearly above the minimum weighted average
grade6 for conferment of cum laude honors.7 Petitioner obtained an average of
1.708 for her remaining subjects in her final semester in the University, bringing
her GWA to 1.729, which is definitely higher than the 1.75 average grade
required for cum laude honors.
During the assessment for graduation though, the petitioner was not
granted cum laude honors because her grades of 1.0 in the subjects German 10
and 11, which she took when her minor was still German, were excluded in the
computation of her GWA, thus bringing her GWA to 1.760, which is lower than
the minimum weighted average grade required for the conferment of cum
laude honors.
Prof. Edwin Thaddeus L. Bautista, Chair of the Department of European
Languages, explained that a student following the Plan A curriculum is required to
major in one European language other than Spanish, and minor in another or any
of the disciplines allowed under the curriculum. In petitioner's case, her major is
French and her minor is Spanish, thus, German does not fit into her curriculum.
Furthermore, the Plan A curriculum does not allow for free electives. Electives
under said curriculum must be major language electives, which, in the case of
petitioner, must have been taken from French courses in either literature or
translation. German 10 and 11, being basic language courses, do not fall under
electives as contemplated in the Plan A curriculum.
Maintaining that the college's manner of computing her grades was erroneous,
the petitioner wrote Dr. Ofelia Silapan, College Secretary of the College of Arts
and Letters, on 06 April 2000, requesting that her German language subjects
(i.e., German 10 and 11) be included in the computation of her GWA, it
appearing that such had been done in connection with the inclusion of her name
in the list of those graduating "with probable honors." Said letter was followed-up
by another letter signed by petitioner's father, and addressed to Dr. Elena L.
Samonte, University Registrar, on 08 April 2000, explaining why petitioner's
German 10 and 11 grades should be included in the computation of her GWA.
These letters were taken up on a no-name basis during the 68th meeting of the
University Council on 10 April 2000 upon the University Registrar's endorsement.
After deliberating on the matter, the University Council, by a vote of 207 in favor
and 4 against, affirmed the recommendation of the European Languages
Department and the College of Arts and Letters of not awarding the cum
laude honors to the petitioner.
In view of the adverse decision of the University Council, the petitioner, together
with her parents, wrote UP President Francisco A. Nemenzo, on 18 April 2000,
asking that the merits of petitioner's case be reviewed and, if deemed
appropriate, the same be elevated to the UP Board of Regents in order to correct
the error in the computation of the petitioner's GWA.
At the 1142nd meeting of the Board of Regents held on 26 May 2000, petitioner's
appeal was thus discussed, and it was resolved that said appeal be returned to
the University Council for further consideration, with full disclosure of who is
involved in the matter.
Petitioner's case was then again considered by the University Council during its
69th meeting held on 21 June 2000. After much deliberation, the University
Council, by a vote of 99 for, 12 against, and 6 abstentions, resolved to reaffirm
its earlier decision of 10 April 2000 denying the award of cum laude honors to
petitioner.
Upon the denial of the appeal, petitioner's parents, on petitioner's behalf and for
themselves, submitted a Notice of Appeal dated 27 June 2000 to the Board of
Regents through President Nemenzo and, subsequently, an Appeal Memorandum
and Supplemental Memorandum dated 24 and 30 August 2000, respectively. The
appeal was taken up during the 1144th meeting of the Board of Regents held on
31 August 2000. After a thorough discussion on the proper interpretation and
application of Article 410 of the UP Code, the Board of Regents, by a vote of 9
against 2, elected to deny the appeal. Petitioner's parents thereafter filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was also denied.
Assailing the decision of the UP Board of Regents as erroneous, petitioner, on 21
March 2001, brought a Petition for Certiorari and mandamus before the RTC,
which resolved the case in her favor under Order of 05 September 2002.
According to the said Order, the UP Board of Regents gravely abused its
discretion in the improper application of its academic discretion in interpreting
Article 410 of the UP Code. The lower court, hence, required the respondent UP
Board of Regents to re-compute petitioner's grades by including her grades in
German 10 and 11 and to confer upon petitioner cum laude honors. The
respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 07 October 2002, which was
subsequently denied by the lower court. Upon said denial, the respondent
appealed the RTC's Order to the Court of Appeals by filing a Notice of Appeal
dated 14 February 2003.
The petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the appeal on 24 April 2003, advancing
that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the appeal,
inasmuch as it raised only questions of law. Said argument was reiterated in
petitioner's Memorandum, together with the position that the lower court was
correct to find that respondent had gravely abused its discretion in arbitrarily
excluding petitioner's grades in German 10 and 11 from the computation of her
GWA.
The respondent, for its part, contended that the lower court failed to take into
consideration the interpretation of the pertinent provision of the UP Code arrived
at by the University Council during its deliberations. It instead, substituted its
own interpretation in violation of the academic freedom of UP as an institution of
higher learning.
Noting the identity of the arguments raised by petitioner in both her Motion to
Dismiss and Memorandum, the Court of Appeals, in a resolution, deemed the
case submitted for decision. In deciding the appeal, the appellate court initially
determined whether only questions of law are involved in the case. Eventually,
the appellate court declared that an analysis of the facts of the case is
indispensable. According to the Court of Appeals:
To resolve these issues, an incursion or investigation of the facts attending the
case of the petitioner-appellee is indispensable. The Court must sift through the
contrasting evidence submitted to determine the specific situation of appellee's
academic standing, and the chronology of appellee's scholastic progress, her
grades and scholastic average, as well as what particular rules were used or
misused by the Respondent Board, and by the lower court, in coming up with its
respective decisions. The Court is called upon to make a calibration and
resolution of all these elements, and to determine the existence and relevancy
[sic] of specific surrounding circumstances, its relation to each other and to the
whole and the probabilities of the situation.
This is not a simple matter of determining what the [sic] law is applicable on a
given or specific set of facts. Indeed, the facts itself [sic] must be determined and
reviewed, before a legal adjudication could be made.
To be sure, questions of law are attendant in the instant appeal, but to resolve
the same, a review and determination of [the] facts, based on evidence and
matters on record, is necessary before such issues could be resolved. The Court,
therefore, as a legal reviewer of issues of fact and law, is competent, and legally
empowered, to take cognizance of and resolve the instant appeal. 8
Having resolved the issue of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals went on to
determine whether the lower court erred in not finding that academic freedom
should apply in the instant case. According to the appellate court, the RTC's
Order involved an intrusion on the discretion and authority of the UP Board of
Regents in the matter of whether or not to confer academic honors upon the
petitioner. The Court of Appeals stated that the lower court violated UP's
constitutionally protected right to academic freedom when it substituted its own
interpretation of the internal rules and regulations of the University for that of the
UP Board of Regents, and applied the same to the petitioner's case. The appellate
court further made a determination that respondent is not guilty of grave abuse
of discretion in deciding not to confer academic honors upon the petitioner,
inasmuch as respondent proceeded fairly in reaching its decision, giving the
petitioner and her parents ample opportunity to present their case. Accordingly,
on 28 November 2003, the Court of Appeals issued a decision granting the UP
Board of Regents' appeal:
The Order, dated September 5, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 87 is hereby SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by petitioner-appellee
Nadine Rosario M. Morales.9
Claiming that the Court of Appeals committed grave and reversible errors in
issuing its 28 November 2003 decision, petitioner filed before this Court a Petition
for Review on Certiorari, raising the following assignment of errors:10
I
The Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over respondent's appeal of the RTC's
Order (the CA Appeal) because the essential facts here were never in dispute,
this case involves purely questions of law.
II
The RTC correctly required respondent to confer cum laude honors on petitioner
because respondent gravely abused its discretion in refusing to comply with
Article 410 of the UP Code (which respondent itself issued) and in arbitrarily
excluding petitioner's grades in German 10 and 11 from the computation of her
GWA. The Court of Appeals therefore gravely erred in reversing the RTC's Order.
According to the petitioner, it was erroneous for the appellate court to assume
jurisdiction over respondent's appeal of the RTC Order as said appeal involved
purely questions of law, and that respondents should have challenged said Order
directly with the Supreme Court through a Petition for Review on Certiorari and
not before the Court of Appeals through a Notice of Appeal. The petitioner further
argues that it was error for the Court of Appeals to rule that respondent's refusal
to interpret and apply Article 410 of the UP Code in order to confer cum
laude honors to petitioner did not constitute grave abuse of discretion. Lastly,
petitioner advances that the appellate court mischaracterized this case as one
involving academic freedom, thus condoning respondent's alleged injustice to
petitioner.
Ruling of the Court
First, we shall endeavor to dispose of the issue of jurisdiction.
Petitioner submits that this case involves only the interpretation of a rule (i.e.,
Article 410 of the UP Code) and the determination of whether the subjects
German 10 and 11 can be considered as "qualified electives" under the assailed
rule in relation to petitioner's situation. According to petitioner, the facts of the
case have never been in dispute. Both petitioner and respondent have presented
the same pieces of evidence, albeit of course, their respective interpretations and
positions on the legal effects of their common evidence are different. Petitioner
also points out that the total absence of questions of fact is precisely the reason
why the RTC did not require, and the parties themselves did not demand, an
evidentiary hearing for the case before the lower court.
We agree with petitioner that respondent's appeal to the appellate court raises
only questions of law. There is a question of law when the issue does not call for
an examination of the probative value of evidence presented, the truth or
falsehood of facts being admitted and the doubt concerns the correct application
of law and jurisprudence on the matter.11 On the other hand, there is a question
of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts. When there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not
the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct is a question of law.12
Contrary to what the Court of Appeals postulates, the resolution of the issues
presented by respondent UP Board of Regents does not necessitate an incursion
of the facts attending the case. Whether the lower court erred in finding that
respondent gravely abused its discretion in interpreting and applying the
provisions of the UP Code on the case of petitioner is a question of law, the
determination of which calls for the analysis of the proper application of law and
jurisprudence. While the Court of Appeals is correct in saying that in order to
resolve the issues raised by the parties, the court must consider all the facts and
evidence presented in the case, it does not, however, rule on the truth or falsity
of such facts, based on the evidence and matters on record. It must be stressed
that the facts were admitted by both parties. Therefore, any conclusion based on
these facts would not involve a calibration of the probative value of such pieces of
evidence, but would be limited to an inquiry of whether the law was properly
applied given the state of facts of the case.
It is thus evident that the controversy centered on, and the doubt arose with
respect to, the correct interpretation and application of Rule 410 of the UP Code
in relation to petitioner's situation and not as to any fact or evidence advanced by
the parties. And since the appeal brought by respondent UP Board of Regents
before the Court of Appeals raises only questions of law, the proper mode of
appeal is by way of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 45.13 Therefore, the
appellate court did not have jurisdiction to take cognizance of and to resolve
respondent's appeal.
The above conclusion, however, will not deter this Court from proceeding with the
judicial determination of the basic legal issues herein. We must bear in mind that
procedural rules are intended to ensure the proper administration of law and
justice. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical
sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice. 14 A
deviation from its rigid enforcement may thus be allowed to attain its prime
objective, for after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the
existence of courts.15 Noting that this case involves the exercise of a fundamental
right - academic freedom no less - of the State University, and that the petitioner
has, in any event, raised before us the legal question of whether the RTC
correctly required respondent to confer cum laude honors on the petitioner
because of respondent's alleged grave abuse of discretion, for pragmatic reasons
and consideration of justice and equity, the Court must go on to resolve the
second assignment of error.
As enunciated by this Court in the case of University of San Carlos v. Court of
Appeals,16 the discretion of schools of learning to formulate rules and guidelines
in the granting of honors for purposes of graduation forms part of academic
freedom. And such discretion may not be disturbed much less controlled by the
courts, unless there is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise. Therefore, absent
any showing of grave abuse of discretion, the courts may not disturb the
University's decision not to confer honors to petitioner.
"Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or in other words, where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all
in contemplation of law."17
A judicious review of the records will show that the respondent proceeded fairly
in evaluating petitioner's situation, giving her and her parents ample opportunity
to present their side on different occasions and before different fora, i.e., the
Department of European Languages, the College of Arts and Letters, the
University Council and finally, the Board of Regents. Contrary to the trial court's
findings, there is no showing that respondent acted arbitrarily or capriciously in
interpreting Article 410 of the UP Code and consequently not conferring academic
honors on petitioner.
For clarity, Article 410 of the UP Code is again quoted hereunder:
ART. 410. Students who complete their courses with the following absolute
minimum weighted average grade shall be graduated with honors:
Summa Cum Laude - ' - . . 1.20
Magna Cum Laude 1.45
Cum Laude - . ... 1.75
Provided, that all the grades in all subjects prescribed in the curriculum, as well
as subjects that qualify as electives, shall be included in the computation of the
weighted average grade; provided further that in cases where the electives taken
are more than those required in the program, the following procedure will be
used in selecting the electives to be included in the computation of the weighted
average grade:
(I) For students who did not shift programs, consider the required number of
electives in chronological order.
(II) For students who shifted from one program to another, the electives to be
considered shall be selected according to the following order of priority:
(1) Electives taken in the program where the student is graduating will be
selected in chronological order.
(2) Electives taken in the previous program and acceptable as electives in the
second program will be selected in chronological order.
(3) Prescribed courses taken in the previous program, but qualify as electives in
the second program will be selected in chronological order.18
As can be seen from the minutes of the meetings of the University Council and
the Board of Regents, petitioner's case was subjected to an exhaustive and
judicious deliberation. During the 68th Meeting of the University Council, where
petitioner's case was first submitted to the body for discussion on a no-name
basis, a member raised the issue of whether German 10 and 11 could be counted
as electives in the program of petitioner, to which the University Registrar replied
that the student's program is European Languages, major in French, minor in
Spanish under which German 10 and 11 are not required in the checklist; neither
can these subjects be considered electives as said electives should be non-
language electives. Since the student chose Spanish as her minor language,
German 10 and 11 are excess subjects.19 Another member argued that if the
student had satisfied all the requirements in the curriculum, then German 10 and
11 should be included in the computation of the GWA since the student had good
grades.20 To this, Dean Josefina Agravante of the College of Arts and Letters
replied that while they empathize with the student and her parents, this same
rule had been applied in the past, and if the student would be allowed to
graduate with honors, she (Dean Agravante) will be forced to recommend the
same for the other students who were denied the same request in the past. 21 At
the 1142nd Meeting of the Board of Regents, both positions of the petitioner and
the University Council on the proper interpretation of Article 410 of the UP Code
were presented before the Board and an agreement was reached among the
members to return petitioner's appeal to the University Council for further
consideration, with full disclosure of who is involved in the matter.
Upon the appeal's return to the University Council, the issue of whether the
University rule allows for excess electives more than those required by the
program was raised. Prof. Cao22 answered this query by pointing to Section 2 of
Article 41023 which provides for the manner of selecting which electives shall be
considered. Since the rule provides for an order of priority, it is clear that not all
electives taken by a student may be included in the computation of the GWA.
Dean Yu,24 on the other hand, pointed out that the more basic issue is whether
German 10 and 11 can be considered as electives under petitioner's curriculum
within the contemplation of the assailed rule. Dean Yu further stated that the
determination of which subjects will qualify as electives is best left to the
Department of European Languages and the student's curriculum. To this issue,
Prof. Bautista, Chair of the Department of European Languages, replied that this
matter had been taken up again at the Department level and they stood by their
decision that in the Plan A of the BA European Languages program, there is a
major and a minor language. There are no free electives and for the minor
language, subjects that fall under the same language were the ones counted. In
the case of Ms. Morales, she initially thought that she would minor in German so
she took German 10 and 11 during her first semester in UP Diliman, but
eventually, she changed her minor to Spanish. He said that the Advising
Committee of the Department allows a student to change his major or minor, but
courses which had been previously taken before the shifting of major or minor
are not counted as part of the courses with credit in the curriculum. As to the
interpretation of the rules, Dean Tabunda 25 said that it is a matter of course that
the traditional interpretation of the Department be taken. And the Department
made it clear that a free elective is different from a course taken as a minor. With
respect to the question of what interpretation should prevail, she (Dean Tabunda)
believed that the traditional interpretation must be taken into account.26
In trying to get into the heart of the issue, the Board of Regents, at its
1144th Meeting, went into an examination of Rule 410.27 Regent
Hernandez28 considers the rule as referring to the computation of the GWA, not
only with respect to the subjects prescribed in the curriculum, but also takes into
account all subjects that qualify as electives. Thus, those electives may not only
be part of the Plan A curriculum but are part of the program. On the contrary,
Vice President Diokno29 said that the understanding of the Department and the
University Council is that subjects that qualify as electives must be in the
curriculum. Otherwise, the student can take anything they want. Vice President
Diokno stated further that in cases where there are free electives, the electives
are applied chronologically. Moreover, the Plan A curriculum, incidentally, does
not allow free electives, therefore, there was nothing to put in chronologically.
This has always been the practice of the Department which is being supported by
the College Assembly and the University Council.30
Further discussing the matter, Regent Hernandez requested for an interpretation
of Article 41031 on the issue of whether or not the German subjects which are
supposedly electives should be included in the computation of the petitioner's
GWA. Atty. Azura,32 University General Counsel, explained that the words
"subjects that qualify as electives" must be read in conjunction with the
immediately preceding qualifying phrase "in the curriculum." Where the first
conjunctive part contains the descriptive phrase/modifier "in the curriculum," so
too must the second conjunctive part be subject to the same modifier. Thus,
"subjects that qualify as electives" is modified by the words "in the curriculum."
In other words, in the computation of the GWA, the grades of subjects prescribed
in the curriculum and the grades of subjects that qualify as electives in the
curriculum are included. Seen in this light, the view that German 10 and 11 must
be considered in the computation of petitioner's GWA, being electives in the
European Languages undergraduate program, is incorrect. The word program in
Article 41033 must be interpreted in the context of a particular curriculum. A
student fulfills the requirements of a program by following a certain curriculum.
Atty. Azura said that the University Council, in excluding German 10 and 11 from
the computation of petitioner's GWA, effectively ruled that these subjects do not
qualify as electives in the course curriculum for a degree in BA European
Languages, major in French, minor in Spanish. 34
In deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration submitted by petitioner, the
Board of Regents, during its 1147th Meeting, reviewed the interpretation of
petitioner's curriculum. University General Counsel, Prof. Marvic Leonen,
explained that the interpretation of the required subjects or allowable electives in
the curriculum must be taken in the context of the entire courses. A student in
Plan A is required to take:
Minor Language 12/Elective.b
Minor Language 13/Elective.b
Minor Language 20/Elective.b
Minor Language 21/Elective.b
Minor Language 30/Elective.b
Minor Language 40/Elective.b
Minor Language 31/Elective.b
The numbered sequencing of the courses therefore clearly implies that if German
10 and 11 would be equivalent to Minor Language 10 and 11, then German 12,
13, 20, 21, 30, 40, 31 should have been taken by the student. The pattern would
be different if the student took up Spanish. This is so because there are no
Spanish 12, 13, and 21 offered. This also explains why footnote "b" that
uniformly qualifies the quoted entries states:
(b) Courses in English, Comparative Literature, Creative Writing, Filipino,
Panitikan ng Pilipinas, Speech, Theater Arts, Art Studies, Social Science,
Philosophy, Music, Fine Arts, Education, Mass Communication or Tourism. As
minor discipline, these non-language electives must be taken only in one
department provided that the prerequisites has/have been satisfied. For those
taking Spanish as minor, the following are recommended: Spanish 3, 20, 30, 31,
40, 60, 80, 100 and 105.35
The first two sentences in the footnote could not refer to "minor language." The
last sentence, on the other hand, could not refer to the entry "elective." There is
nothing in the footnote that could be read to imply that the "electives" could be
language courses other than those enumerated in the footnote's first sentence.
Petitioner argues that German 10 and 11 should be appreciated as the minor
languages 10 and 11 required. And that the Spanish subjects should be taken as
the "elective" subjects in the curriculum. The difficulty with this position is that
the description of "elective" is very clear and leaves no further room for
interpretation. For purposes of graduation and for honors, petitioner has to abide
by the requirements of the curriculum. Petitioner's decision to shift her minor
language caused the exclusion of her grades in German 10 and 11 in the
computation of her GWA.
It must be stressed that it is the policy of the University to thoroughly evaluate
all candidates for graduation with honors to ensure that students do not earn
extra credits in order to increase their GWA. A perusal of petitioner's official
transcript of records36 will show that the subjects German 10 and 11 are in
excess of the requirements of the program (i.e., 141 units, 27 of which are Sec. 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution provides that "[a]cademic freedom shall
electives in the minor field of study), to illustrate: be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." Academic freedom accords an
institution of higher learning the right to decide for itself its aims and objectives
Subjects Number of and how best to attain them. This constitutional provision is not to be construed
Units Earned in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion.39 Certainly, the wide sphere of
General Education Subjects (i.e. common 69 autonomy given to universities in the exercise of academic freedom extends to
subjects for BA programs and required subjects the right to confer academic honors. Thus, exercise of academic freedom grants
under the BA European Languages program) the University the exclusive discretion to determine to whom among its graduates
French (major) 45 it shall confer academic recognition, based on its established standards. And the
Spanish (minor) 27 courts may not interfere with such exercise of discretion unless there is a clear
German 6 showing that the University has arbitrarily and capriciously exercised its
Total Units 147 judgment. Unlike the UP Board of Regents that has the competence and expertise
in granting honors to graduating students of the University, courts do not have
the competence to constitute themselves as an Honor's Committee and substitute
The fact that the UP Board of Regents chose to accept the interpretation of Article their judgment for that of the University officials.
410 of the UP Code as construed by the University Council based on its time-
honored interpretation and application of said rule, after the latter has
Therefore, for failure to establish that the respondent committed grave abuse of
deliberated on the matter twice, vis - Ã -vis petitioner's interpretation, is not
discretion in not conferring cum laude honors to petitioner, the lower court erred
tantamount to a whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the respondent. It
in mandating that petitioner's grades be re-computed including her marks in
is not grave abuse of discretion on the part of the UP Board of Regents to uphold
German 10 and 11 and to confer upon petitioner academic honors.
the decisions of the Department of European Languages, the College of Arts and
Letters and the University Council, when said decisions were reached after a
thorough discussion of the merits of petitioner's case in relation to the WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the UP Board of Regents
established interpretation and analysis of its very own internal rules. on 31 August 2000 denying the appeal of the petitioner is AFFIRMED. The Order
of the Regional Trial Court dated 05 September 2002 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. No costs.
In the case of University of the Philippines v. Ayson,37 UP has been likened to an
administrative agency whose findings must be accorded respect within its areas
of competence. Well-settled is the principle that by reason of the special SO ORDERED
knowledge and expertise of administrative agencies over matters falling under
their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon; thus,
their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded great respect, if not
finality, by the courts.38 Accordingly, the conclusion arrived at by the UP Board of
Regents that petitioner's grades in German 10 and 11 should not be included in
computing her GWA must be respected and given finality, the interpretation and
application of Article 410 of the UP Code being within the competence and
expertise of the Department of European Languages, the College of Arts and
Letters and the University Council to make.

Therefore, it was error on the part of the lower court to rule that respondent's
discretion has been gravely abused, thus justifying the substitution of judicial
discretion in the interpretation of Article 410 of the UP Code. The decision of the
lower court in substituting its own interpretation of the University's internal rules
for that of the respondent UP Board of Regents, is an intrusion into the
constitutionally protected right of the University to academic freedom.
G.R. No. L-40779 November 28, 1975
EPICHARIS T. GARCIA, petitioner,
vs.
THE FACULTY ADMISSION COMMITTEE, LOYOLA SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY,
herein represented by FR. ANTONIO B. LAMBINO, respondent.
Epicharis T Garcia in her own behalf.
Bengzon, Villegas, Zarraga, Narciso and Cudala for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
The specific issue posed by this mandamus proceeding to compel the Faculty Admission
Committee of the Loyola School of Theology, represented by Father Antonio B. Lambino,
to allow petitioner Epicharis T. Garcia, to continue studying therein is whether she is
deemed possessed of such a right that has to be respected. That is denied not only on
general principle, but also in view of the character of the particular educational institution
involved. It is a seminary. It would appear therefore that at most she can lay claim to a
privilege, no duty being cast on respondent school. Moreover, as a reinforcement to such
an obvious conclusion, there is the autonomy recognized by the Constitution in this
explicit language: "All institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom."  The
1
petition must therefore fail.
Petitioner alleged: "3. That in summer, 1975, Respondent admitted Petitioner for studies
leading to an M.A. in Theology; 4. That on May 30, 1975, when Petitioner wanted to
enroll for the same course for the first semester, 1975-76, Respondent told her about the
letter he had written her, informing her of the faculty's decision to bar her from re-
admission in their school; 5. That the reasons stated in said letter, dated May 19, 1975 ...
do not constitute valid legal ground for expulsion, for they neither present any violation of
any of the school's regulation, nor are they indicative of gross misconduct; 6. That from
June 25, 1975, Petitioner spent much time and effort in said school for the purpose of
arriving at a compromise that would not duly inconvenience the professors and still allow
her to enjoy the benefits of the kind of instruction that the school has to offer, but all in
vain; she was in fact told by Fr. Pedro Sevilla, the school's Director, that the
compromises she was offering were unacceptable, their decision was final, and that it
were better for her to seek for admission at the UST Graduate School; 7 Petitioner then
subsequently made inquiries in said school, as to the possibilities for her pursuing her
graduate studies for an for M.A. in Theology, and she was informed that she could enroll
at the UST Ecclesiastical Faculties, but that she would have to fulfill their requirements
for Baccalaureate in Philosophy in order to have her degree later in Theology — which
would entail about four to five years more of studies — whereas in the Loyola School of
Studies to which she is being unlawfully refused readmission, it would entail only about
two years more; 8. That Petitioner, considering that time was of the essence in her case,
and not wanting to be deprived of an opportunity for gaining knowledge necessary for her
life's work, enrolled as a special student at said UST Ecclesiastical Faculties, even if she
would not thereby be credited with any academic units for the subject she would take; 9.
That Petitioner could have recourse neither to the President of her school, Fr. Jose Cruz,
he being with the First Couple's entourage now in Red China, nor with the Secretary of
Education, since this is his busiest time of the year, and June 11, 1975 is the last day for
registration; ... "  She prayed for a writ of mandamus for the purpose of allowing her to
2
enroll in the current semester. She made it more specific in a pleading she called
Amended Petition so that she would be allowed cross-enrollment even beyond the June
11, 1975 deadline for registration and that whatever units may be accredited to her in the
UST Ecclesiastical Faculties be likewise recognized by respondent. Her petition included
the letter of respondent Father Lambino which started on a happy note that she was
given the grade of B+ and B in two theology subjects, but ended in a manner far from
satisfactory for her, as shown by this portion thereof: "Now, you will have to forgive me
for going into a matter which is not too pleasant. The faculty had a meeting after the
summer session and several members are strongly opposed to having you back with us
at Loyola School of Theology. In the spirit of honesty may I report this to you as their
reason: They felt that your frequent questions and difficulties were not always pertinent
and had the effect of slowing down the progress of the class; they felt you could have
tried to give the presentation a chance and exerted more effort to understand the point
made before immediately thinking of difficulties and problems. The way things are, I
would say that the advisability of your completing a program (with all the course work
and thesis writing) with us is very questionable. That you have the requisite intellectual
ability is not to be doubted. But it would seem to be in your best interests to work with a
faculty that is more compatible with your orientation. I regret to have to make this report,
but I am only thinking of your welfare."
3
This Court, in a resolution of June 23, 1975, required comment on the part of respondent
Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology.  As submitted on behalf of
4
Father Lambino, it set forth the following: "Respondent is the Chairman of the Faculty
Admission Committee of the Loyola School of Theology, which is a religious seminary
situated in Loyola Heights, Quezon City; In collaboration with the Ateneo de Manila
University, the Loyola School of Theology allows some lay students to attend its classes
and/or take courses in said Loyola School of Theology but the degree, if any, to be
obtained from such courses is granted by the Ateneo de Manila University and not by the
Loyola School of Theology; For the reason above given, lay students admitted to the
Loyola School of Theology to take up courses for credit therein have to be officially
admitted by the Assistant Dean of the Graduate School of the Ateneo de Manila
University in order for them to be considered as admitted to a degree program; Petitioner
in the summer of 1975 was admitted by respondent to take some courses for credit but
said admission was not an admission to a degree program because only the Assistant
Dean of the Ateneo de Manila Graduate School can make such admission; That in the
case of petitioner, no acceptance by the Assistant Dean of the Ateneo de Manila
Graduate School was given, so that she was not accepted to a degree program but was
merely allowed to take some courses for credit during the summer of 1975; Furthermore,
petitioner was not charged a single centavo by the Loyola School of Theology and/or the
Ateneo de Manila University in connection with the courses she took in the summer of
1975, as she was allowed to take it free of charge; That respondent Fr. Antonio B.
Lambino, S.J., and/or the Loyola School of Theology thru its Faculty Admission
Committee, necessarily has discretion as to whether to admit and/or to continue
admitting in the said school any particular student, considering not only academic or
intellectual standards but also other considerations such as personality traits and
character orientation in relation with other students as well as considering the nature of
Loyola School of Theology as a seminary. The Petition for Mandamus therefore does not
lie, as there is no duty, much less a clear duty, on the part of respondent to admit the
petitioner therein in the current year to take up further courses in the Loyola School of
Theology."  It was likewise alleged in the aforesaid comment that as set forth in the letter
5
of May 19, 1975, the decision not to allow petitioner to take up further courses in said
seminary "is not arbitrary, as it is based on reasonable grounds, ... ."  Then reference
6
was made to the availability of non-judicial remedies which petitioner could have
pursued.  The prayer was for the dismissal of the petition for lack of merit. Petitioner
7
sought permission to reply and it was granted. Thereafter, she had a detailed recital of
why under the circumstances she is entitled to relief from the courts. In a resolution of
August 8, 1975, this Court considered the comment of respondent as answer and
required the parties to file their respective memoranda. That they did, and the petition
was deemed submitted for decision. As was made clear at the outset, we do not see
merit in it. It must therefore be dismissed.
1. In respondent's memorandum, it was made clear why a petition for mandamus is not
the proper remedy. Thus: "Petitioner cannot compel by mandamus, the respondent to
admit her into further studies in the Loyola School of Theology. For respondent has
no clear duty to so admit the petitioner. The Loyola School of Theology is a seminary for
the priesthood. Petitioner is admittedly and obviously not studying for the priesthood, she
being a lay person and a woman. And even assuming ex gratia argumenti that she is
qualified to study for the priesthood, there is still no duty on the part of respondent to
admit her to said studies, since the school has clearly the discretion to turn down even
qualified applicants due to limitations of space, facilities, professors and optimum
classroom size and component considerations."  No authorities were cited, respondent
8
apparently being of the view that the law has not reached the stage where the matter of
admission to an institution of higher learning rests on the sole and uncontrolled discretion
of the applicant. There are standards that must be met. There are policies to be pursued.
Discretion appears to be of the essence. In terms of Hohfeld's terminology, what a
student in the position of petitioner possesses is a privilege rather than a right. She
cannot therefore satisfy the prime and indispensable requisite of a mandamus
proceeding. Such being the case, there is no duty imposed on the Loyola School of
Theology. In a rather comprehensive memorandum of petitioner, who unfortunately did
not have counsel, an attempt was made to dispute the contention of respondent. There
was a labored effort to sustain her stand, but it was not sufficiently persuasive. It is
understandable why. It was the skill of a lay person rather than a practitioner that was
evident. While she pressed her points with vigor, she was unable to demonstrate the
existence of the clear legal right that must exist to justify the grant of this writ.
2. Nor is this all. There is, as previously noted, the recognition in the Constitution of
institutions of higher learning enjoying academic freedom. It is more often identified with
the right of a faculty member to pursue his studies in his particular specialty and
thereafter to make known or publish the result of his endeavors without fear that
retribution would be visited on him in the event that his conclusions are found distasteful
or objectionable to the powers that be, whether in the political, economic, or academic
establishments. For the sociologist, Robert McIver it is "a right claimed by the accredited
educator, as teacher and as investigator, to interpret his findings and to communicate his
conclusions without being subjected to any interference, molestation, or penalization
because these conclusions are unacceptable to some constituted authority within or
beyond the institution." 9 As for the educator and philosopher Sidney Hook, this is his version: "What is academic
freedom? Briefly put, it is the freedom of professionally qualified persons to inquire, discover, publish and teach the truth as
they see it in the field of their competence. It is subject to no control or authority except the control or authority of the rational
methods by which truths or conclusions are sought and established in these disciplines." 10
3. That is only one aspect though. Such a view does not comprehend fully the scope of
academic freedom recognized by the Constitution. For it is to be noted that the reference
is to the "institutions of higher learning" as the recipients of this boon. It would follow then
that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for itself its aims
and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or
interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It
has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. This
constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a gradging
fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose, nullify its intent. Former President Vicente
G. Sinco of the University of the Philippines, in his Philippine Political Law, is similarly of
the view that it "definitely grants the right of academic freedom to the university as an
institution as distinguished from the academic freedom of a university professor."   He 11
cited the following from Dr. Marcel Bouchard, Rector of the University of Dijon, France,
President of the conference of rectors and vice-chancellors of European universities: " "It
is a well-established fact, and yet one which sometimes tends to be obscured in
discussions of the problems of freedom, that the collective liberty of an organization is by
no means the same thing as the freedom of the individual members within it; in fact, the
two kinds of freedom are not even necessarily connected. In considering the problems of
academic freedom one must distinguish, therefore, between the autonomy of the
university, as a corporate body, and the freedom of the individual university teacher."
"   Also: "To clarify further the distinction between the freedom of the university and that
12
of the individual scholar, he says: "The personal aspect of freedom consists in the right of rate, as indicated earlier, only the legal aspect of the controversy was touched upon in
each university teacher — recognized and effectively guaranteed by society — to seek this decision.
and express the truth as he personally sees it, both in his academic work and in his
capacity as a private citizen. Thus the status of the individual university teacher is at WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
least as important, in considering academic freedom, as the status of the institutions to
which they belong and through which they disseminate their learning."'   He likewise
13
Makalintal, C.J., Barredo, Antonio, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr. and
quoted from the President of the Queen's University in Belfast, Sir Eric Ashby: "'The Martin, JJ., concur.
internal conditions for academic freedom in a university are that the academic staff
should have de facto control of the following functions: (i) the admission and examination
Castro, J., took no part.
of students; (ii) the curricula for courses of study; (iii) the appointment and tenure of
office of academic staff; and (iv) the allocation of income among the different categories
of expenditure. It would be a poor prospect for academic freedom if universities had to
rely on the literal interpretation of their constitutions in order to acquire for their academic
members control of these four functions, for in one constitution or another most of these
functions are laid on the shoulders of the law governing body .'"   Justice Frankfurter,
14

with his extensive background in legal education as a former Professor of the Harvard
Law School, referred to what he called the business of a university and the four essential
freedoms in the following language: "It is the business of a university to provide that
atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an
atmosphere in which there prevail "the four essential freedoms" of a university — to
determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study."   Thus is reinforced the conclusion
15

reached by us that mandamus does not lie in this case.

4. It is not an easy matter then to disregard the views of persons knowledgeable in the
field, to whom cannot be imputed lack of awareness of the need to respect freedom of
thought on the part of students and scholars. Moreover, it could amount to minimizing the
full respect that must be accorded the academic freedom expressly granted by the
Constitution "to institutions of higher learning." It is equally difficult to yield conformity to
the approach taken that colleges and universities should be looked upon as public
utilities devoid of any discretion as to whom to admit or reject. Education, especially
higher education, belongs to a different, and certainly higher, category.

5. It only remains to be added that the futility that marked the persistence of petitioner to
continue her studies in the Loyola School of Theology is the result solely of a legal
appraisal of the situation before us. The decision is not to be construed as in any way
reflecting on the scholastic standing of petitioner. There was on the part of respondent
due acknowledgment of her intelligence. Nonetheless, for reasons explained in the letter
of Father Lambino, it was deemed best, considering the interest of the school as well as
of the other students and her own welfare, that she continue her graduate work
elsewhere. There was nothing arbitrary in such appraisal of the circumstances deemed
relevant. It could be that on more mature reflection, even petitioner would realize that her
transfer to some other institution would redound to the benefit of all concerned. At any
G.R. No. 127980             December 19, 2007
violent incidents on March 29, 1995 involving private respondents occurred:
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY, INC., EMMANUEL SALES, RONALD HOLMES, JUDE
DELA TORRE, AMPARO RIO, CARMELITA QUEBENGCO, AGNES YUHICO and
JAMES YAP, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WILFREDO D. REYES, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court of Manila, THE COMMISSION
ON HIGHER EDUCATION, THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE AND
SPORTS, ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, RICHARD REVERENTE
and ROBERTO VALDES, JR., respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
NAGTATAGIS sa kasong ito ang karapatang mag-aral ng apat na estudyante na
nasangkot sa away ng dalawang fraternity at ang karapatang akademiko ng isang
pamantasan.
PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and
Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by
the De La Salle University (DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde (CSB) 1 Joint Discipline
Board because of their involvement in an offensive action causing injuries to petitioner
James Yap and three other student members of Domino Lux Fraternity. This is the
backdrop of the controversy before Us pitting private respondents' right to education vis-
a-vis the University's right to academic freedom.
ASSAILED in this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court are the following: (1) Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July
30, 1996 dismissing DLSU's petition for certiorari against respondent Judge and private
respondents Aguilar, Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr.;2 (2) Resolution of the CA
dated October 15, 1996 denying the motion for reconsideration; 3 (3) Order dated January
7, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 36 Manila granting private respondent
Aguilar's motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction; 4 and (4) Resolution No. 181-96
dated May 14, 1996 of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) exonerating private
respondent Aguilar and lowering the penalties for the other private respondents from
expulsion to exclusion.5
Factual Antecedents
Gleaned from the May 3, 1995 Decision of the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board, two
x x x From the testimonies of the complaining witnesses, it appears that one
week prior to March 29, 1995, Mr. James Yap was eating his dinner alone in
Manang's Restaurant near La Salle, when he overheard two men bad-mouthing
and apparently angry at Domino Lux. He ignored the comments of the two. When
he arrived at his boarding house, he mentioned the remarks to his two other
brods while watching television. These two brods had earlier finished eating their
dinner at Manang's. Then, the three, together with four other persons went back
to Manang's and confronted the two who were still in the restaurant. By
admission of respondent Bungubung in his testimony, one of the two was a
member of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity. There was no rumble or physical
violence then.
After this incident, a meeting was conducted between the two heads of the
fraternity through the intercession of the Student Council. The Tau Gamma Phi
Fraternity was asking for an apology. "Kailangan ng apology" in the words of
respondent Aguilar. But no apology was made.
Then, 5 members of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity went to the tambayan of the
Domino Lux Fraternity in the campus. Among them were respondents
Bungubung, Reverente and Papio. They were looking for a person whose
description matched James Yap. According to them, this person supposedly
"nambastos ng brod." As they could not find Mr. Yap, one of them remarked
"Paano ba iyan. Pasensiya na lang."
Came March 29, 1995 and the following events.
Ten minutes before his next class at 6:00 p.m., Mr. James Yap went out of the
campus using the Engineering Gate to buy candies across Taft Avenue. As he
was about to re-cross Taft Avenue, he heard heavy footsteps at his back. Eight to
ten guys were running towards him. He panicked. He did not know what to do.
Then, respondent Bungubung punched him in the head with something heavy in
his hands – "parang knuckles." Respondents Reverente and Lee were behind
Yap, punching him. Respondents Bungubung and Valdes who were in front of
him, were also punching him. As he was lying on the street, respondent Aguilar
kicked him. People shouted; guards arrived; and the group of attackers left.
Mr. Yap could not recognize the other members of the group who attacked him.
With respect to respondent Papio, Mr. Yap said "hindi ko nakita ang mukha niya,
hindi ko nakita sumuntok siya." What Mr. Yap saw was a long haired guy also
running with the group.
Two guards escorted Mr. Yap inside the campus. At this point, Mr. Dennis
Pascual was at the Engineering Gate. Mr. Pascual accompanied Yap to the
university clinic; reported the incident to the Discipline Office; and informed his
fraternity brods at their tambayan. According to Mr. Pascual, their head of the
Domino Lux Fraternity said: "Walang gagalaw. Uwian na lang."
Mr. Ericson Cano, who was supposed to hitch a ride with Dennis Pascual, saw
him under the clock in Miguel Building. However, they did not proceed directly for
home. With a certain Michael Perez, they went towards the direction of Dagonoy
Street because Mr. Pascual was supposed to pick up a book for his friend from
another friend who lives somewhere in the area.
As they were along Dagonoy Street, and before they could pass the Kolehiyo ng
Malate Restaurant, Mr. Cano first saw several guys inside the restaurant. He said
not to mind them and just keep on walking. However, the group got out of the
restaurant, among them respondents Reverente, Lee and Valdes. Mr. Cano told
Mr. Lee: "Ayaw namin ng gulo." But, respondent Lee hit Mr. Cano without
provocation. Respondent Reverente kicked Mr. Pascual and respondent Lee also
hit Mr. Pascual. Mr. Cano and Mr. Perez managed to run from the mauling and
they were chased by respondent Lee and two others.
Mr. Pascual was left behind. After respondent Reverente first kicked him, Mr.
Pascual was ganged-upon by the rest. He was able to run, but the group was
able to catch up with him. His shirt was torn and he was hit at the back of his
head with a lead pipe. Respondent Lee who was chasing Cano and Perez, then
returned to Mr. Pascual.
Mr. Pascual identified respondents Reverente and Lee, as among those who hit
him. Although Mr. Pascual did not see respondent Valdes hit him, he identified
respondent Valdez (sic) as also one of the members of the group.
In fact, Mr. Cano saw respondent Valdes near Mr. Pascual. He was almost near
the corner of Leon Guinto and Estrada; while respondent Pascual who managed
to run was stopped at the end of Dagonoy along Leon Guinto. Respondent
Valdes shouted: "Mga putang-ina niyo." Respondent Reverente hit Mr. Pascual
for the last time. Apparently being satisfied with their handiwork, the group left.
The victims, Cano, Perez and Pascual proceeded to a friend's house and waited
for almost two hours, or at around 8:00 in the evening before they returned to the
campus to have their wounds treated. Apparently, there were three cars roaming
the vicinity.6
The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The victims, namely: petitioner
James Yap and Dennis Pascual, Ericson Cano, and Michael Perez, are members of the
"Domino Lux Fraternity," while the alleged assailants, private respondents Alvin Aguilar,
James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of
"Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity," a rival fraternity.
The next day, March 30, 1995, petitioner Yap lodged a complaint 7 with the Discipline
Board of DLSU charging private respondents with "direct assault." Similar
complaints8 were also filed by Dennis Pascual and Ericson Cano against Alvin Lee and
private respondents Valdes and Reverente. Thus, cases entitled "De La Salle University
and College of St. Benilde v. Alvin Aguilar (AB-BSM/9152105), James Paul Bungubung
(AB-PSM/9234403), Robert R. Valdes, Jr. (BS-BS-APM/9235086), Alvin Lee
(EDD/9462325), Richard Reverente (AB-MGT/9153837) and Malvin A. Papio (AB-
MGT/9251227)" were docketed as Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.
The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate notices to private respondents
Aguilar, Bungubung and Valdes, Jr. and Reverente informing them of the complaints and
requiring them to answer. Private respondents filed their respective answers. 9
As it appeared that students from DLSU and CSB10 were involved in the mauling
incidents, a joint DLSU-CSB Discipline Board11 was formed to investigate the incidents.
Thus, petitioner Board Chairman Emmanuel Sales sent notices of hearing 12 to private
respondents on April 12, 1995. Said notices uniformly stated as follows:
Please be informed that a joint and expanded Discipline Board had been
constituted to hear and deliberate the charge against you for violation of CHED
Order No. 4 arising from the written complaints of James Yap, Dennis C.
Pascual, and Ericson Y. Cano.
You are directed to appear at the hearing of the Board scheduled on April 19,
1995 at 9:00 a.m. at the Bro. Connon Hall for you and your witnesses to give
testimony and present evidence in your behalf. You may be assisted by a lawyer
when you give your testimony or those of your witnesses.
On or before April 18, 1995, you are further directed to provide the Board,
through the Discipline Office, with a list of your witnesses as well as the sworn
statement of their proposed testimony.
Your failure to appear at the scheduled hearing or your failure to submit the list of
witnesses and the sworn statement of their proposed testimony will be
considered a waiver on your part to present evidence and as an admission of the
principal act complained of.
 For your strict compliance.13
During the proceedings before the Board on April 19 and 28, 1995, private respondents
interposed the common defense of alibi, summarized by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline
Board as follows:
First, in the case of respondent Bungubung, March 29, 1995 was one of the few
instances when he was picked-up by a driver, a certain Romeo S. Carillo. Most of
the time, respondent Bungubung goes home alone sans driver. But on this
particular date, respondent Bungubung said that his dad asked his permission to
use the car and thus, his dad instructed this driver Carillo to pick-up his son. Mr.
Carillo is not a family driver, but works from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for the
Philippine Ports Authority where the elder Bungubung is also employed.
Thus, attempting to corroborate the alibi of respondent Bungubung, Mr. Carillo
said that he arrived at La Salle at 4:56 p.m.; picked-up respondent at 5:02 p.m.;
took the Roxas Blvd. route towards respondent's house in BF Parañaque (on a
Wednesday in Baclaran); and arrived at the house at 6:15 p.m. Respondent
Bungubung was dropped-off in his house, and taking the same route back, Mr.
Carillo arrived at the South Harbor at 6:55 p.m. the Philippine Ports Authority is
located at the South Harbor.14
xxxx
Secondly, respondent Valdes said that he was with his friends at McDonald's Taft
just before 6:00 p.m. of March 29, 1995. He said that he left McDonald at 5:50
p.m. together to get some medicine at the university clinic for his throat irritation.
He said that he was at the clinic at 5:52 p.m. and went back to McDonald, all
within a span of 3 or even 4 minutes.
Two witnesses, a certain Sharon Sia and the girlfriend of respondent Valdes, a
certain Jorgette Aquino, attempted to corroborate Valdez' alibi. 15
xxxx
Third, respondent Reverente told that (sic) the Board that he was at his home at
5:00 p.m. of March 29, 1995. He said that he was given the responsibility to be
the paymaster of the construction workers who were doing some works in the
apartment of his parents. Although he had classes in the evening, the workers
according to him would wait for him sometimes up to 9:00 p.m. when he arrives
from his classes. The workers get paid everyday.
Respondent Reverente submitted an affidavit, unsigned by the workers listed
there, supposedly attesting to the fact that he paid the workers at the date and
time in question.16
xxxx
Fourth, respondent Aguilar "solemnly sw[ore] that [he] left DLSU at 5:00 p.m. for
Camp Crame for a meeting with some of the officers that we were preparing." 17
On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a Resolution 18 finding
private respondents guilty. They were meted the supreme penalty of automatic
expulsion,19 pursuant to CHED Order No. 4.20 The dispositive part of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, the Board finds respondents ALVIN
AGUILAR (AB-BSM/9152105), JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG (AB-
PSM/9234403), ALVIN LEE (EDD/94623250) and RICHARD V. REVERENTE
(AB-MGT/9153837) guilty of having violated CHED Order No. 4 and thereby
orders their automatic expulsion.
In the case of respondent MALVIN A. PAPIO (AB-MGT/9251227), the Board
acquits him of the charge.
SO ORDERED.21
Private respondents separately moved for reconsideration 22 before the Office of the
Senior Vice-President for Internal Operations of DLSU. The motions were all denied in a
Letter-Resolution23 dated June 1, 1995.
On June 5, 1995, private respondent Aguilar filed with the RTC, Manila, against
petitioners a petition for certiorari and injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. It was
docketed as Civil Case No. 95-74122 and assigned to respondent Judge of Branch 36.
The petition essentially sought to annul the May 3, 1995 Resolution of the DLSU-CSB
Joint Discipline Board and the June 1, 1995 Letter-Resolution of the Office of the Senior
Vice-President for Internal Affairs.
The following day, June 6, 1995, respondent Judge issued a TRO 24 directing DLSU, its
subordinates, agents, representatives and/or other persons acting for and in its behalf to
refrain and desist from implementing Resolution dated May 3, 1995 and Letter-
Resolution dated June 1, 1995 and to immediately desist from barring the enrollment of
Aguilar for the second term of school year (SY) 1995.
Subsequently, private respondent Aguilar filed an ex parte motion to amend his petition
to correct an allegation in paragraph 3.2125 of his original petition. Respondent Judge
amended the TRO26 to conform to the correction made in the amended petition. 27
On June 7, 1995, the CHED directed DLSU to furnish it with copies of the case records
of Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121, 28 in view of the authority granted to it under Section
77(c) of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (MRPS).
On the other hand, private respondents Bungubung and Reverente, and later, Valdes,
filed petitions-in-intervention29 in Civil Case No. 95-74122. Respondent Judge also issued
corresponding temporary restraining orders to compel petitioner DLSU to admit said
private respondents.
On June 19, 1995, petitioner Sales filed a motion to dismiss30 in behalf of all petitioners,
except James Yap. On June 20, 1995, petitioners filed a supplemental motion to
dismiss31 the petitions-in-intervention.
On September 20, 1995, respondent Judge issued an Order 32 denying petitioners'
(respondents there) motion to dismiss and its supplement, and granted private
respondents' (petitioners there) prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. The pertinent
part of the Order reads:
For this purpose, respondent, its agents, representatives or any and all other
persons acting for and in its behalf is/are restrained and enjoined from –
1. Implementing and enforcing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995
ordering the automatic expulsion of petitioner and the petitioners-in-
intervention from the De La Salle University and the letter-resolution
dated June 1, 1995, affirming the Resolution dated May 3, 1995; and
2. Barring the enrolment of petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention in the
courses offered at respondent De La Salle University and to immediately
allow them to enroll and complete their respective courses/degrees until
their graduation thereat in accordance with the standards set by the
latter.
WHEREFORE, the ancillary remedy prayed for is granted. Respondent, its
agents, representatives, or any and all persons acting for and its behalf are
hereby restrained and enjoyed from:
1. Implementing and enforcing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995
ordering the automatic expulsion of petitioner and petitioners-in-
intervention and the Letter-Resolution dated June 1, 1995; and
2. Barring the enrollment of petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention in
the courses offered at respondent (De La Salle University) and to
forthwith allow all said petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention to enroll
and complete their respective courses/degrees until their graduation
thereat.
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction shall take effect upon petitioner and petitioners-
in-intervention posting an injunctive bond in the amount of P15,000.00 executed
in favor of respondent to the effect that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention
will pay to respondent all damages that the latter may suffer by reason of the
injunction if the Court will finally decide that petitioner and petitioners-in-
intervention are not entitled thereto.
The motion to dismiss and the supplement thereto is denied for lack of merit.
Respondents are directed to file their Answer to the Petition not later than fifteen
(15) days from receipt thereof.
SO ORDERED.33
Despite the said order, private respondent Aguilar was refused enrollment by petitioner
DLSU when he attempted to enroll on September 22, 1995 for the second term of SY
1995-1996. Thus, on September 25, 1995, Aguilar filed with respondent Judge an urgent
motion to cite petitioners (respondents there) in contempt of court. 34 Aguilar also prayed
that petitioners be compelled to enroll him at DLSU in accordance with respondent
Judge's Order dated September 20, 1995. On September 25, 1995, respondent Judge
issued35 a writ of preliminary injunction, the relevant portion of which reads:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the undersigned of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF MANILA that until further orders, you the said DE LA SALLE University as
well as your subordinates, agents, representatives, employees and any other
person assisting or acting for or on your behalf, to immediately desist from
implementing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering the automatic expulsion
of petitioner and the intervenors in DLSU, and the letter-resolution dated June 1,
1995 affirming the said Resolution of May 3, 1995 and to immediately desist from
barring the enrolment of petitioner and intervenors in the courses offered at
DLSU and to allow them to enroll and complete their degree courses until their
graduation from said school. 36
On October 16, 1995, petitioner DLSU filed with the CA a petition for certiorari 37 (CA-G.R.
SP No. 38719) with prayer for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
enforcement of respondent Judge's September 20, 1995 Order and writ of preliminary
injunction dated September 25, 1995.
On April 12, 1996, the CA granted petitioners' prayer for preliminary injunction.
On May 14, 1996, the CHED issued its questioned Resolution No. 181-96,
summarily disapproving the penalty of expulsion for all private respondents. As
for Aguilar, he was to be reinstated, while other private respondents were to be
excluded.38 The Resolution states:
RESOLUTION 181-96
RESOLVED THAT THE REQUEST OF THE DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY
(DLSU), TAFT AVENUE, MANILA FOR THE APPROVAL OF THE PENALTY OF
EXPULSION IMPOSED ON MR. ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL
BUNGUBUNG, ROBERT R. VALDES, JR., ALVIN LEE AND RICHARD V.
REVERENTE BE, AS IT IS HEREBY IS, DISAPPROVED.
RESOLVED FURTHER, THAT THE COMMISSION DIRECT THE DLSU TO
IMMEDIATELY EFFECT THE REINSTATEMENT OF MR. AGUILAR AND THE
LOWERING OF THE PENALTY OF MR. JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, MR.
ROBER R. VALDEZ, JR., (sic) MR. ALVIN LEE AND MR. RICHARD V.
REVERENTE FROM EXPULSION TO EXCLUSION.39
Despite the directive of CHED, petitioner DLSU again prevented private respondent
Aguilar from enrolling and/or attending his classes, prompting his lawyer to write several
demand letters40 to petitioner DLSU. In view of the refusal of petitioner DLSU to enroll
private respondent Aguilar, CHED wrote a letter dated June 26, 1996 addressed to
petitioner Quebengco requesting that private respondent Aguilar be allowed to continue
attending his classes pending the resolution of its motion for reconsideration of
Resolution No. 181-96. However, petitioner Quebengco refused to do so, prompting
CHED to promulgate an Order dated September 23, 1996 which states:
Acting on the above-mentioned request of Mr. Aguilar through counsel enjoining
De La Salle University (DLSU) to comply with CHED Resolution 181-96 (Re:
Expulsion Case of Alvin Aguilar, et al. v. DLSU) directing DLSU to reinstate Mr.
Aguilar and finding the urgent request as meritorious, there being no other plain
and speedy remedy available, considering the set deadline for enrollment this
current TRIMESTER, and in order to prevent further prejudice to his rights as a
student of the institution, DLSU, through the proper school authorities, is hereby
directed to allow Mr. Alvin Aguilar to provisionally enroll, pending the
Commission's Resolution of the instant Motion for Reconsideration filed by
DLSU.
SO ORDERED.41
Notwithstanding the said directive, petitioner DLSU, through petitioner Quebengco, still
refused to allow private respondent Aguilar to enroll. Thus, private respondent Aguilar's
counsel wrote another demand letter to petitioner DLSU. 42
Meanwhile, on June 3, 1996, private respondent Aguilar, using CHED Resolution No.
181-96, filed a motion to dismiss43 in the CA, arguing that CHED Resolution No. 181-96
rendered the CA case moot and academic.
On July 30, 1996, the CA issued its questioned resolution granting the motion to
dismiss of private respondent Aguilar, disposing thus:
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, dismissal of herein petition is hereby
directed.
SO ORDERED.44
On October 15, 1996, the CA issued its resolution denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration, as follows:
It is obvious to Us that CHED Resolution No. 181-96 is immediately executory in
character, the pendency of a Motion for Reconsideration notwithstanding.
After considering the Opposition and for lack of merit, the Motion for
Reconsideration is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.45
On October 28, 1996, petitioners requested transfer of case records to the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) from the CHED.46 Petitioners claimed that it is the
DECS, not CHED, which has jurisdiction over expulsion cases, thus, necessitating the
transfer of the case records of Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121 to the DECS.
On November 4, 1996, in view of the dismissal of the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP
No. 38719 and the automatic lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction, private
respondent Aguilar filed an urgent motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction dated
September 25, 1995 before respondent RTC Judge of Manila. 47
On January 7, 1997, respondent Judge issued its questioned order granting
private respondent Aguilar's urgent motion to reiterate preliminary injunction. The
pertinent portion of the order reads:
 In light of the foregoing, petitioner Aguilar's urgent motion to reiterate writ of
preliminary injunction is hereby granted, and respondents' motion to dismiss is
denied.
The writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 is declared to be in
force and effect.
Let a copy of this Order and the writ be served personally by the Court's sheriff
upon the respondents at petitioners' expense.
SO ORDERED. 48
Accordingly, private respondent Aguilar was allowed to conditionally enroll in petitioner
DLSU, subject to the continued effectivity of the writ of preliminary injunction dated
September 25, 1995 and to the outcome of Civil Case No. 95-74122.
On February 17, 1997, petitioners filed the instant petition.
On June 15, 1998, We issued a TRO49 as prayed for by the urgent motion for the
issuance of a TRO50 dated June 4, 1998 of petitioners, and enjoined respondent Judge
from implementing the writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 issued in
Civil Case No. 95-74122, effective immediately and until further orders from this Court.
On March 27, 2006, private respondent Aguilar filed his manifestation 51 stating that he
has long completed his course at petitioner DLSU. He finished and passed all his
enrolled subjects for the second trimester of 1997-1998, as indicated in his transcript of
records52 issued by DLSU. However, despite having completed all the academic
requirements for his course, DLSU has not issued a certificate of completion/graduation
in his favor.
Issues
We are tasked to resolve the following issues:
1. Whether it is the DECS or the CHED which has legal authority to review
decisions of institutions of higher learning that impose disciplinary action on their
students found violating disciplinary rules.
2. Whether or not petitioner DLSU is within its rights in expelling private
respondents.
2.a Were private respondents accorded due process of law?
2.b Can petitioner DLSU invoke its right to academic freedom?
2.c Was the guilt of private respondents proven by substantial evidence?
3. Whether or not the penalty imposed by DLSU on private respondents is
proportionate to their misdeed.
Our Ruling
Prefatorily, there is merit in the observation of petitioners 53 that while CHED Resolution
No. 181-96 disapproved the expulsion of other private respondents, it nonetheless
authorized their exclusion from petitioner DLSU. However, because of the dismissal of
the CA case, petitioner DLSU is now faced with the spectacle of having two different
directives from the CHED and the respondent Judge – CHED ordering the exclusion of
private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr., and the Judge ordering
petitioner DLSU to allow them to enroll and complete their degree courses until their
graduation.
This is the reason We opt to decide the whole case on the merits, brushing aside
technicalities, in order to settle the substantial issues involved. This Court has the power
to take cognizance of the petition at bar due to compelling reasons, and the nature and
importance of the issues raised warrant the immediate exercise of Our jurisdiction. 54 This
is in consonance with our case law now accorded near-religious reverence that rules of
procedure are but tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when its
rigid application tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court has
the duty to suspend their operation. 55
I. It is the CHED, not DECS, which has the
power of supervision and review over
disciplinary cases decided by institutions
of higher learning.
Ang CHED, hindi ang DECS, ang may kapangyarihan ng pagsubaybay at
pagrepaso sa mga desisyong pandisiplina ng mga institusyon ng mas mataas na
pag-aaral.
Petitioners posit that the jurisdiction and duty to review student expulsion cases, even
those involving students in secondary and tertiary levels, is vested in the DECS not in the
CHED. In support of their stance, petitioners cite Sections 4,56 15(2) &
(3),57 54,58 57(3)59 and 7060 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 232, otherwise known as the
"Education Act of 1982."
According to them, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7722 did not transfer to the CHED the DECS'
power of supervision/review over expulsion cases involving institutions of higher learning.
They say that unlike B.P. Blg. 232, R.A. No. 7722 makes no reference to the right and
duty of learning institutions to develop moral character and instill discipline among its
students. The clear concern of R.A. No. 7722 in the creation of the CHED was academic,
i.e., the formulation, recommendation, setting, and development of academic plans,
programs and standards for institutions of higher learning. The enumeration of CHED's
powers and functions under Section 8 does not include supervisory/review powers in
student disciplinary cases. The reference in Section 3 to CHED's "coverage" of
institutions of higher education is limited to the powers and functions specified in Section
8. The Bureau of Higher Education, which the CHED has replaced and whose functions
and responsibilities it has taken over, never had any authority over student disciplinary
cases.
We cannot agree.
On May 18, 1994, Congress approved R.A. No. 7722, otherwise known as "An Act
Creating the Commission on Higher Education, Appropriating Funds Thereof and for
other purposes."
Section 3 of the said law, which paved the way for the creation of the CHED, provides:
Section 3. Creation of the Commission on Higher Education. – In pursuance of
the abovementioned policies, the Commission on Higher Education is hereby
created, hereinafter referred to as Commission.
The Commission shall be independent and separate from the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) and attached to the office of the President
for administrative purposes only. Its coverage shall be both public and private
institutions of higher education as well as degree-granting programs in all post
secondary educational institutions, public and private.
The powers and functions of the CHED are enumerated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7722.
They include the following:
Sec. 8. Powers and functions of the Commission. – The Commission shall have
the following powers and functions:
xxxx
n) promulgate such rules and regulations and exercise such other powers and
functions as may be necessary to carry out effectively the purpose and objectives
of this Act; and
o) perform such other functions as may be necessary for its effective operations
and for the continued enhancement of growth or development of higher
education.
Clearly, there is no merit in the contention of petitioners that R.A. No. 7722 did not
transfer to the CHED the DECS' power of supervision/review over expulsion cases
involving institutions of higher learning.
First, the foregoing provisions are all-embracing. They make no reservations of powers
to the DECS insofar as institutions of higher learning are concerned. They show that the
authority and supervision over all public and private institutions of higher education, as
well as degree-granting programs in all post-secondary educational institutions, public
and private, belong to the CHED, not the DECS.
Second, to rule that it is the DECS which has authority to decide disciplinary cases
involving students on the tertiary level would render nugatory the coverage of the
CHED, which is "both public and private institutions of higher education as well as
degree granting programs in all post secondary educational institutions, public and
private." That would be absurd.
It is of public knowledge that petitioner DLSU is a private educational institution which
offers tertiary degree programs. Hence, it is under the CHED authority.
Third, the policy of R.A. No. 772261 is not only the protection, fostering and promotion of
the right of all citizens to affordable quality education at all levels and the taking of
appropriate steps to ensure that education shall be accessible to all. The law
is likewise concerned with ensuring and protecting academic freedom and with
promoting its exercise and observance for the continued intellectual growth of students,
the advancement of learning and research, the development of responsible and effective
leadership, the education of high-level and middle-level professionals, and the
enrichment of our historical and cultural heritage.
It is thus safe to assume that when Congress passed R.A. No. 7722, its members were
aware that disciplinary cases involving students on the tertiary level would continue to
arise in the future, which would call for the invocation and exercise of institutions of
higher learning of their right to academic freedom.
Fourth, petitioner DLSU cited no authority in its bare claim that the Bureau of Higher
Education, which CHED replaced, never had authority over student disciplinary cases. In
fact, the responsibilities of other government entities having functions similar to those of
the CHED were transferred to the CHED.62
Section 77 of the MRPS63 on the process of review in student discipline cases should
therefore be read in conjunction with the provisions of R.A. No. 7722.
Fifth, Section 18 of R.A. No. 7722 is very clear in stating that "[j]urisdiction over DECS-
supervised or chartered state-supported post-secondary degree-granting
vocational and tertiary institutions shall be transferred to the Commission [On
Higher Education]." This provision does not limit or distinguish that what is being
transferred to the CHED is merely the formulation, recommendation, setting and
development of academic plans, programs and standards for institutions of higher
learning, as what petitioners would have us believe as the only concerns of R.A. No.
7722. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus: Where the law does not
distinguish, neither should we.
To Our mind, this provision, if not an explicit grant of jurisdiction to the
CHED, necessarily includes the transfer to the CHED of any jurisdiction which the
DECS might have possessed by virtue of B.P. Blg. 232 or any other law or rule for that
matter.
IIa. Private respondents were accorded due process of law.
Ang mga private respondents ay nabigyan ng tamang proseso ng batas.
The Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution embodies a system of
rights based on moral principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our
people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our entire
history.64 The constitutional behest that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law is solemn and inflexible. 65
In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found violating school
discipline, "[t]here are withal minimum standards which must be met before to satisfy the
demands of procedural due process and these are: that (1) the students must be
informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall
have the right to answer the charges against them and with the assistance if counsel, if
desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the
right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly
considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities
to hear and decide the case."66
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to
do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process.67 Notice and hearing is the
bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is among the primary rights that
must be respected even in administrative proceedings. 68 The essence of due process is
simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of.69 So long as the party is given the opportunity to advocate her
cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be said that there was denial of due
process.70
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due
process – it is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on
which a fair decision can be based.71 "To be heard" does not only mean presentation of
testimonial evidence in court – one may also be heard through pleadings and where the
opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due
process.72
Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against them by the
DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board through petitioner Sales. They were given the
opportunity to answer the charges against them as they, in fact, submitted their
respective answers. They were also informed of the evidence presented against them as
they attended all the hearings before the Board. Moreover, private respondents were
given the right to adduce evidence on their behalf and they did. Lastly, the Discipline
Board considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the parties before
rendering its resolution in Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.
Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied due process when they were not
allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them. This argument was already
rejected in Guzman v. National University73 where this Court held that "x x x the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process. And
it bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail
proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in
courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary; and
cross examination is not, x x x an essential part thereof."
IIb. Petitioner DLSU, as an institution of higher learning, possesses academic
freedom which includes determination of who to admit for study.
Ang petitioner DLSU, bilang institusyon ng mas mataas na pag-aaral, ay
nagtataglay ng kalayaang akademiko na sakop ang karapatang pumili ng mga
mag-aaral dito.
Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of higher learning
academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or
college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from
outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public interest calls
for some restraint.74 According to present jurisprudence, academic freedom
encompasses the independence of an academic institution to determine for itself (1) who
may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted
to study.75
It cannot be gainsaid that "the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a
necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the
school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds
basis in the freedom "what to teach." 76 Indeed, while it is categorically stated under the
Education Act of 1982 that students have a right "to freely choose their field of study,
subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation," 77 such
right is subject to the established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the
academic institution. Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can very well exercise its academic
freedom, which includes its free choice of students for admission to its school.
IIc. The guilt of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes, Jr. was
proven by substantial evidence.
Ang pagkakasala ng private respondents na sina Bungubung, Reverente at
Valdes, Jr. ay napatunayan ng ebidensiyang substansyal.
As has been stated earlier, private respondents interposed the common defense of alibi.
However, in order that alibi may succeed as a defense, "the accused must establish by
clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the
perpetration of the offense and (b) the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene
of the crime."78
On the other hand, the defense of alibi may not be successfully invoked where the
identity of the assailant has been established by witnesses.79 Positive identification of
accused where categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill motive on the part
of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of appellants whose
testimonies are not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. 80 Well-settled is the
rule that denial and alibi, being weak defenses, cannot overcome the positive testimonies
of the offended parties.81
Courts reject alibi when there are credible eyewitnesses to the crime who can positively
identify the accused.82 Alibi is an inherently weak defense and courts must receive it with
caution because one can easily fabricate an alibi. 83 Jurisprudence holds that denial, like
alibi, is inherently weak and crumbles in light of positive declarations of truthful witnesses
who testified on affirmative matters that accused were at the scene of the crime and
were the victim's assailants. As between categorical testimonies that ring of truth on one
hand and a bare denial on the other, the former must prevail. 84 Alibi is the weakest of all
defenses for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove, and it is for this reason that it
cannot prevail over the positive identification of accused by the witnesses. 85
The required proof in administrative cases, such as in student discipline cases, is neither
proof beyond reasonable doubt nor preponderance of evidence but only substantial
evidence. According to Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations,86 it means "such
reasonable evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."
Viewed from the foregoing, We reject the alibi of private respondents Bungubung, Valdes
Jr., and Reverente.  They were unable to show convincingly that they were not at the
1awphi1
scene of the crime on March 29, 1995 and that it was impossible for them to have been
there. Moreover, their alibi cannot prevail over their positive identification by the victims.
We hark back to this Court's pronouncement affirming the expulsion of several students
found guilty of hazing:
No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the immediate reinstatement of
respondent students who have been investigated and found guilty by the
Disciplinary Board to have violated petitioner university's disciplinary rules and
standards will certainly undermine the authority of the administration of the
school. This we would be most loathe to do.
More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner university's academic freedom
which has been enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and the present 1987 Constitution. 87
Certainly, private respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes, Jr. do not deserve to
claim a venerable institution as their own, for they may foreseeably cast a malevolent
influence on the students currently enrolled, as well as those who come after them. 88 It
must be borne in mind that universities are established, not merely to develop the
intellect and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes; nay,
the development, or flowering if you will, of the total man. 89
As for private respondent Aguilar, however, We are inclined to give credence to his alibi
that he was at Camp Crame in Quezon City at the time of the incident in question on
March 29, 1995. This claim was amply corroborated by the certification that he submitted
before the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board, to wit:
CERTIFICATION
TO WHOM THIS MAY CONCERN:
We, the undersigned, hereby declare and affirm by way of this
Certification that sometime on March 29, 1995, at about and between
4:30 P.M. and 5:30 P.M., we were together with Alvin A. Aguilar, at
Kiangan Hall, inside Camp Crame, Quezon City, meeting in connection
 with an affair of our class known as Class 7, Batch 89 of the Philippine
Constabulary discussing on the proposed sponsorship of TAU GAMMA
PHI from said Batch '89 affair.
That the meeting was terminated at about 6:30 P.M. that evening and Alvin
Aguilar had asked our permission to leave and we saw him leave Camp Crame,
in his car with the driver.
April 18, 1995, Camp Crame, Quezon City. 90
The said certification was duly signed by PO3 Nicanor R. Faustino (Anti-Organized
Crime CIC, NCR), PO3 Alejandro D. Deluviar (ODITRM, Camp Crame, Quezon City),
PO2 Severino C. Filler (TNTSC, Camp Crame, Quezon City), and PO3 Ireneo M.
Desesto (Supply Center, PNPLSS). The rule is that alibi assumes significance or
strength when it is amply corroborated by credible and disinterested witnesses. 91 It is true
that alibi is a weak defense which an accused can easily fabricate to escape criminal
liability. But where the prosecution evidence is weak, and betrays lack of credibility as to
the identification of defendant, alibi assumes commensurate strength. This is but
consistent with the presumption of innocence in favor of accused. 92
Alibi is not always undeserving of credit, for there are times when accused has no other
possible defense for what could really be the truth as to his whereabouts at the crucial
time, and such defense may, in fact, tilt the scales of justice in his favor.93
few seconds and the victims did not suffer any serious injury. Disciplinary measures
especially where they involve suspension, dismissal or expulsion, cut significantly into
the future of a student. They attach to him for life and become a mortgage of his future,
hardly redeemable in certain cases. Officials of colleges and universities must be
anxious to protect it, conscious of the fact that, appropriately construed, a disciplinary
action should be treated as an educational tool rather than a punitive measure. 96
Accordingly, We affirm the penalty of exclusion97 only, not expulsion,98 imposed on them
by the CHED. As such, pursuant to Section 77(b) of the MRPS, petitioner DLSU may
exclude or drop the names of the said private respondents from its rolls for being
undesirable, and transfer credentials immediately issued.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals
Resolutions dated July 30, 1996 and dated October 15, 1996, and Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 36, Order dated January 7, 1997 are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE,
while CHED Resolution 181-96 dated May 14, 1996 is AFFIRMED.
Petitioner DLSU is ordered to issue a certificate of completion/graduation in favor of
private respondent Aguilar. On the other hand, it may exclude or drop the names of
private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. from its rolls, and their
transfer credentials immediately issued.
SO ORDERED.

III. The penalty of expulsion imposed by DLSU on private respondents is

disproportionate to their misdeed.

Ang parusang expulsion na ipinataw ng DLSU sa private respondents ay hindi

angkop sa kanilang pagkakasala.

It is true that schools have the power to instill discipline in their students as subsumed in
their academic freedom and that "the establishment of rules governing university-student
relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not
merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very
survival."94 This power, however, does not give them the untrammeled discretion to
impose a penalty which is not commensurate with the gravity of the misdeed. If the
concept of proportionality between the offense committed and the sanction imposed is
not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise to a due process
question.95

We agree with respondent CHED that under the circumstances, the penalty of expulsion
is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the acts committed by private respondents
Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. Each of the two mauling incidents lasted only for
G.R. No. 99327 May 27, 1993
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY, FATHER JOAQUIN BERNAS, S. J., DEAN
CYNTHIA ROXAS-DEL CASTILLO, JUDGE RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR., JUSTICE
VENICIO ESCOLIN, FISCAL MIGUEL ALBAR, ATTYS. MARCOS HERRAS,
FERDINAND CASIS, JOSE CLARO TESORO, RAMON CAGUIOA, and RAMON
ERENETA. petitioners,
vs.
HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of the RTC-Makati, Br. 134,
ZOSIMO MENDOZA, JR. ERNEST MONTECILLO, ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO
AMADO SABBAN, DALMACIO LIM JR., MANUEL ESCONA and JUDE
FERNANDEZ, respondents.
Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson, Benson & Jimenes for petitioners.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De Los Angeles for petitioner Cynthia Roxas-
del Castillo.
Fabregas, Calida & Remollo for private respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
In 1975, the Court was confronted with a mandamus proceeding to compel the Faculty
Admission Committee of the Loyola School of Theology, a religious seminary which has
a working arrangement with the Ateneo de Manila University regarding accreditation of
common students, to allow petitioner who had taken some courses therein for credit
during summer, to continue her studies.  Squarely meeting the issue, we dismissed the
1
petition on the ground that students in the position of petitioner possess, not a right, but a
privilege, to be admitted to the institution. Not having satisfied the prime and
indispensable requisite of a mandamus proceeding since there is no duty, much less a
clear duty, on the part of the respondent to admit the petitioner, the petition did not
prosper.
In support of its decision, the Court invoked academic freedom of institutions of higher
learning, as recognized by the Constitution, the concept encompassing the right of a
school to choose its students.
Eighteen (18) years later, the right of a University to refuse admittance to its students,
this time in Ateneo de Manila University proper, is again challenged.
Whereas, in the Garcia case referred to in the opening paragraph, the individual
concerned was not a regular student, the respondents in the case at bar, having been
previously enrolled in the University, seek re-admission. Moreover, in the earlier case,
the petitioner was refused admittance, not on such considerations as personality traits
and character orientation, or even inability to meet the institution's academic or
intellectual standards, but because of her behavior in the classroom. The school
pointedly informed her that ". . . it would seem to be in your best interest to work with a
Faculty that is more compatible with your orientations."
On the other hand, students who are now being refused admission into petitioner
University have been found guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules
on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. The case attracted much
publicity due to the death of one of the neophytes and serious physical injuries inflicted
on another.
Herein lies an opportunity for the Court to add another dimension to the concept of
academic freedom of institutions of higher learning, this time a case fraught with social
and emotional overtones.
The facts which gave rise to this case which is far from novel, are as follows:
As a requisite to membership, the Aquila Legis, a fraternity organized in the Ateneo Law
School, held its initiation rites on February 8, 9 and 10, 1991, for students interested in
joining its ranks. As a result of such initiation rites, Leonardo "Lennie" H. Villa, a first year
student of petitioner university, died of serious physical injuries at Chinese General
Hospital on February 10, 1991. He was not the lone victim, though, for another freshman
by the name of Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center
for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on
the same occasion.
In a notice dated February 11, 1991, petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint
Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee  which was tasked to investigate
2
and submit a report within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the death of
Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent students to submit their written
statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. Although respondent students
received a copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the meantime, they
were placed on preventive suspension.  Through their respective counsels, they
3
requested copies of the charges and pertinent documents or affidavits.
In a notice dated February 14, 1991, the Joint Administration-Faculty-Student
Investigating Committee, after receiving the written statements and hearing the
testimonies of several witness, found a prima facie case against respondent students for
violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline."
4
Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to the formal charge
on or before February 18, 1991; otherwise, they would be deemed to have waived their
right to present their defenses.
On February 20, 1991, petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board composed of
petitioners Judge Ruperto Kapunan, Justice Venicio Escolin, Atty. Marcos Herras, Fiscal
Miguel Albar and Atty. Ferdinand Casis, to hear the charges against respondent
students.
In a letter dated February 20, 1991, respondent students were informed that they had
violated Rule No. 3 of the Rules on Discipline contained in the Law School Catalogue.
Said letter also states: "The complaint/charge against you arose from initiations held on
February 8-10, 1991. The evidence against you consist of testimonies of students,
showing your participation in acts prohibited by the School regulations." Finally, it
ordered respondent students to file their written answers to the above charge on or
before February 22 1991, otherwise they would be deemed to have waived their
defenses. 5
In a motion dated February 21, 1991, respondent students, through counsel, requested
that the investigation against them be held in abeyance, pending action on their request
for copies of the evidence against them.6
Respondent students were then directed by the Board to appear before it at a hearing on
February 28, 1991 to clarify their answer with regard to the charges filed by the
investigating committee for violation of Rule No. 3. However, in a letter to a petitioners
dated February 27, 1991, counsel for respondent students moved to postpone the
hearing from February 28, 1991 to March 1, 1991. 7 President of the Ateneo de Manila University, accepted the factual findings of the Board,
Subsequently, respondent students were directed to appear on March 2, 1991 for
clarificatory questions.  They were also informed that:
8 accordance with the principle that "where two or more persons act together in the
a) The proceedings will be summary in nature in accordance with the
rules laid down in the case of Guzman vs. National University; 9
b) Petitioners have no right to cross-examine the affiants-neophytes;
c) Hazing which is not defined in the School catalogue shall be defined in
accordance with the proposed bill of Sen. Jose Lina, Senate Bill No.
3815;
d) The Board will take into consideration the degree of participation of the
petitioners in the alleged hazing incident in imposing the penalty;
e) The Decision of the Board shall be appealable to the President of the
University, i. e., Respondent Joaquin Bernas S. J.
On March 5, 1991, petitioner Bernas wrote Dean Castillo that, "in cases where the
Disciplinary Board is not prepared to impose the penalty of dismissal, I would prefer that
the Board leave the decision on the penalty to the Administration so that this case be
decided not just on the Law School level but also on the University level." 10
In a resolution dated March 9, 1991, the Board found respondent students guilty of
violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits
participation in hazing activities. The Board found that respondent students acted as
master auxiliaries or "auxies" during the initiation rites of Aquila Legis, and exercised the
"auxies privilege," which allows them to participate in the physical hazing. Although
respondent students claim that they were there to assist and attend to the needs of the
neophytes, actually they were assigned a definite supportive role to play in the organized
activity. Their guilt was heightened by the fact that they made no effort to prevent the
infliction of further physical punishment on the neophytes under their care. The Board
considered respondent students part and parcel of the integral process of hazing. In
conclusion, the Board pronounced respondents guilty of hazing, either by active
participation or through acquiescence. However, in view of the lack of unanimity among
the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the
penalty to the University Administration.  Petitioner Dean del Castillo waived her
11
prerogative to review the decision of the Board and left to the President of the University
the decision of whether to expel respondents or not.
Consequently, in a resolution dated March 10, 1991, petitioner Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, as
thus: "that as Master Auxiliaries they exercised the 'auxie's privilege;' that even assuming
they did not lay hands on the neophytes," respondents students are still guilty in
commission of a crime, whether they act through the physical volition of one or of all,
proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose will contributes to the
wrongdoing is responsible for the whole." Fr. Bernas, in describing the offense which led
to the death of Leonardo Villa, concluded that the "offense of the respondents can be
characterized as grave and serious, subversive of the goals of Christian education and
contrary to civilized behavior." Accordingly, he imposed the penalty of dismissal on all
respondent students. 12
In a resolution dated March 18, 1991 and concurred in by petitioner Fr. Bernas,  the
13
Board excluded respondent students Abas and Mendoza from the coverage of the
resolution of March 10, 1991, inasmuch as at the time the latter resolution was
promulgated, neither had as yet submitted their case to the Board. Said resolution also
set the investigation of the two students on March 21, 1991.
On March 18, 1991, respondent students filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction  alleging that they were currently enrolled as students
14
for the second semester of school year 1990-91. Unless a temporary restraining order is
issued, they would be prevented from taking their examinations. The petition principally
centered on the alleged lack of due process in their dismissal.
On the same day, Judge Madayag issued a temporary restraining order the enjoining
petitioners from dismissing respondent students and stopping the former from conducting
hearings relative to the hazing incident. 15
Hearings in connection with the issuance of the temporary restraining order were then
held. On April 7, 1991, the temporary restraining order were issued on March 18, 1991
lapsed. Consequently, a day after the expiration of the temporary restraining order, Dean
del Castillo created a Special Board composed of Atty.(s) Jose Claro Tesoro, Ramon
Caguioa, and Ramon Ereñeta to investigate the charges of hazing against respondent
students Abas and Mendoza.
Respondent students reacted immediately by filing a Supplemental Petition of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction, to include the aforesaid members of the Special Board, as additional
respondents to the original petition.16
Petitioners moved to strike out the Supplement Petition arguing that the creation of the
Special Board was totally unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack of due
process in the conduct of investigations by the Disciplinary Board against respondent
students; that a supplemental petition cannot be admitted without the same being set for
hearing and that the supplemental petition for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order will, in effect, extend the previous restraining order beyond its mandatory 20-day
lifetime.  Acting on the urgent motion to admit the supplemental petition with prayer for a
17
temporary restraining order, Judge Amin, as pairing judge of respondents Judge
Capulong, granted respondent students' prayer on April 10, 1991. 18
On May 17, 1991, respondent Judge ordered petitioners to reinstate respondent
students. Simultaneously, the court ordered petitioners to conduct special examinations
in lieu of the final examinations which allegedly the students were not allowed to take,
and enjoined them to maintain the status quo with regard to the cases of Adel Abas and
Zosimo Mendoza pending final determination of the issue of the instant case. Lastly, it
directed respondent students to file a bond in the amount of P50,000.00. 19
On the same date, May 17, 1991, the Special Board investigating petitioners Abas and
Mendoza and directed the dropping of their names from its roll of students. 20
The following day or on May 21, 1991, respondent judge issued the writ of preliminary
injunction upon posting by respondents of a bond dated May 17, 1991 in the amount of
P50,000.00.
Hence, this special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 with prayer for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the May 17, 1991 order of
respondent judge. 21
In the case at bar, we come to grips with two relevant issues on academic freedom,
namely: (1) whether a school is within its rights in expelling students from its academic
community pursuant to its disciplinary rules and moral standards; and (2) whether or not
the penalty imposed by the school administration is proper under the circumstances.
We grant the petition and reverse the order of respondent judge ordering readmission of
respondent students. Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he
ruled that respondent students had been denied due process in the investigation of the
charges against them.
It is the threshold argument of respondent students that the decision of petitioner Fr.
Joaquin Bernas, S. J., then President of the Ateneo de Manila University, to expel them
was arrived at without affording them their right to procedural due process. We are
constrained to disagree as we find no indication that such right has been violated. On the
contrary, respondent students' rights in a school disciplinary proceeding, as enunciated
in the cases of Guzman v. National University,  Alcuaz v. PSBA, Q.C. Branch  and Non
22 23
v. Dames II  have been meticulously respected by petitioners in the various investigative
24
proceedings held before they were expelled.
Corollary to their contention of denials of due process is their argument that it is Ang
Tibay case  and not the Guzman case which is applicable in the case at bar. Though
25
both cases essentially deal with the requirements of due process, the Guzman case is
more apropos to the instant case, since the latter deals specifically with the minimum
standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic
institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of
any accusation against them; (2) that they shall have the right to answer
the charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired: (3)
they shall be informed of the evidence against them (4) they shall have
the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence
 must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. 26
It cannot seriously be asserted that the above requirements were not met. When, in view
of the death of Leonardo Villa, petitioner Cynthia del Castillo, as Dean of the Ateneo Law
School, notified and required respondent students on February 11, 1991 to submit within
twenty-four hours their written statement on the incident,  the records show that instead
27
of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of the
charges.  While of the students mentioned in the February 11, 1991 notice duly
28
submitted written statements, the others failed to do so. Thus, the latter were granted an
extension of up to February 18, 1991 to file their statements. 29
Indubitably, the nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in
petitioners' notices dated February 14 and 20, 1991.  It is to be noted that the February
30
20, 1991 letter which quoted Rule No. 3 of its Rules of Discipline as contained in the
Ateneo Law School Catalogue was addressed individually to respondent students.
Petitioners' notices/letters dated February 11, February 14 and 20 clearly show that
respondent students were given ample opportunity to adduce evidence in their behalf
and to answer the charges leveled against them.
The requisite assistance of counsel was met when, from the very start of the
investigations before the Joint Administration Faculty-Student Committee, the law firm of
Gonzales Batiler and Bilog and Associates put in its appearance and filed pleadings in
behalf of respondent students.
Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not accorded the
opportunity to see and examine the written statements which became the basis of
petitioners' February 14, 1991 order, they were denied procedural due
process.  Granting that they were denied such opportunity, the same may not be said to
31
detract from the observance of due process, for disciplinary cases involving students
need not necessarily include the right to cross examination. An administrative proceeding
conducted to investigate students' participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed
with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. A closer examination of the March 2, 1991
hearing which characterized the rules on the investigation as being summary in nature
and that respondent students have no right to examine affiants-neophytes, reveals that
this is but a reiteration of our previous ruling in Alcuaz.
32
Respondent students' contention that the investigating committee failed to consider their
evidence is far from the truth because the February 14, 1992 ordered clearly states that it
was reached only after receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of
several witnesses.  Similarly, the Disciplinary Board's resolution dated March 10, 1991
33
was preceded by a hearing on March 2, 1991 wherein respondent students were
summoned to answer clarificatory questions.
With regard to the charge of hazing, respondent students fault petitioners for not
explicitly defining the word "hazing" and allege that there is no proof that they were
furnished copies of the 1990-91 Ateneo Law School Catalogue which prohibits hazing.
Such flawed sophistry is not worthy of students who aspire to be future members of the
Bar. It cannot be overemphasized that the charge filed before the Joint Administration-
Faculty-Student Investigating Committee and the Disciplinary Board is not a criminal
case requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt but is merely administrative in character.
As such, it is not subject to the rigorous requirements of criminal due process,
particularly with respect to the specification of the charge involved. As we have had
occasion to declare in previous cases a similar nature, due process in disciplinary cases
involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings identical to those prescribed
for actions and proceedings in courts of justice.  Accordingly, disciplinary charges
34
against a student need not be drawn with the precision of a criminal information or
complaint. Having given prior notice to the students involved that "hazing" which is not
defined in the School Catalogue shall be defined in accordance with Senate Bill No.
3815, the proposed bill on the subject of Sen. Jose Lina, petitioners have said what
needs to be said. We deem this sufficient for purposes of the investigation under
scrutiny.
Hazing, as a ground for disciplining a students, to the extent of dismissal or expulsion,
finds its raison d' etre in the increasing frequency of injury, even death, inflicted upon the
neophytes by their insensate "masters." Assuredly, it passes the test of reasonableness
and absence of malice on the part of the school authorities. Far from fostering
comradeship and esprit d' corps, it has merely fed upon the cruel and baser instincts of
those who aspire to eventual leadership in our country.
Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant petition
under Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before
the trial court, thereby by passing the latter and the Court of Appeals. 35
It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is
when the case involves a question of law,  as in this case, where the issue is whether or
36
not respondent students have been afforded procedural due process prior to their
dismissal from petitioner university.
Lastly, respondent students argue that we erred in issuing a Temporary Restraining
Order since petitioners do not stand to suffer irreperable damage in the event that private
respondents are allowed to re-enroll. No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the
immediate reinstatement of respondent students who have been investigated and found
by the Disciplinary Board to have violated petitioner university's disciplinary rules and
standards will certainly undermine the authority of the administration of the school. This
we would be most loathe to do.
More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner university's academic freedom which
has been enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and the present 1987 Constitutions.
At this juncture, it would be meet to recall the essential freedoms subsumed by Justice
Felix Frankfurter in the term "academic freedom" cited in the case of Sweezy v. New
Hampshire,  thus: (1) who may teach: (2) what may be taught; (3) how it shall be taught;
37
and (4) who may be admitted to study.
Socrates, the "first of the great moralists of Greece," proud to claim the title "gadfly of the
State" has deservedly earned for himself a respected place in the annals of history as a
martyr to the cause of free intellectual inquiry. To Plato, this great teacher of his was the
"best, the most sensible, and the most sensible, and the most just man of his age." In
399 B.C., he willingly quaffed the goblet of hemlock as punishment for alleged
"corruption" of the youth of Athens. He describes in his own words how this charge of
"corruption," the forerunner of the concept of academic freedom, came about:
Young men of the richer classes, who have not much to do, come about
me of their own accord: they like to heart the pretenders examined, and
they often imitate me, and examine others themselves; there are plenty of
person, as they soon discover, who think that they know something, but
really know little or nothing; and then those who are examined by them
instead of being angry with themselves are angry with me. This
confounded Socrates, they say; this villainous misleader of youth. And
then if somebody asks them, Why, what evil does he practice or teach?
they do not know, and cannot tell; but in order that they may not appear
to be at a loss, they repeat the ready-made charges which are used
against all philosophers about teaching things up in the clouds and under
the earth, and having no gods, and making the worse appear the better
cause; for they do not like to confess that their pretense of knowledge
has been detected — which is the truth; and as they are numerous and
ambitious and energetic, and are all in battle array and have persuasive
tongues, they have filled your ears with their loud and inveterate
calumnies. 38
Since Socrates, numberless individuals of the same heroic mold have similarly defied the
stifling strictures of authority, whether State, Church, or various interest groups, to be
able to give free rein to their ideas. Particularly odious were the insidious and blatant
attempts at thought control during the time of the Inquisition until even the Medieval
universities, renowned as intellectual centers in Europe, gradually lost their autonomy.
In time, such noble strivings, gathering libertarian encrustations along the way, were
gradually crystallized in the cluster of freedoms which awaited the champions and
martyrs of the dawning modern age. This was exemplified by the professors of the new
German universities in the 16th and 17th centuries such as the Universities of Leiden
(1554), Helmstatdt (1574) and Heidelberg (1652). The movement back to freedom of
inquiry gained adherents among the exponents of fundamental human rights of the 19th
and 20th centuries. "Academic freedom", the term as it evolved to describe the emerging
rights related to intellectual liberty, has traditionally been associated with freedom of
thought, speech, expression and the press; in other words, with the right of individuals in
university communities, such as professors, researchers and administrators, to
investigate, pursue, discuss and, in the immortal words of Socrates, "to follow the
argument wherever it may lead," free from internal and external interference or pressure.
But obviously, its optimum impact is best realized where the freedom is exercised
judiciously and does not degenerate into unbridled license. Early cases on this individual
aspect of academic freedom have been stressed the need for assuring to such
individuals a measure of independence through the guarantees of autonomy and security
of tenure. The components of this aspect of academic freedom have been categorized
under the areas of: (1) who may teach and (2) how to teach.
It is to be realized that this individual aspects of academic freedom could have developed
only pari passu with its institutional counterpart. As corporate entities, educational
institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with the right to establish their
policies, academic and otherwise, unhampered by external controls or pressure. In
the Frankfurter formulation, this is articulated in the areas of: (1) what shall be taught,
e.g., the curriculum and (2) who may be admitted to study.
In the Philippines, the Acts which are passed with the change of sovereignty from the
Spanish to the American government, namely, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the
Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 made no mention of the rights now subsumed under
the catch-all term of "academic freedom." This is most especially true with respect to the
institutional aspect of the term. It had to await the drafting of the Philippine Constitutions
to be recognized as deserving of legal protection.
The breakthrough for the concept itself was found in Section 5 of the 1935 Constitution
which stated: "Universities established by the State shall enjoy academic freedom." The
only State University at that time, being the University of the Philippines, the Charter was
perceived by some as exhibiting rank favoritism for the said institution at the expense of
the rest.
In attempt to broaden the coverage of the provision, the 1973 Constitution provided in its
Section 8(2): "All institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom." In his
interpretation of the provision, former U.P. President Vicente G. Sinco, who was also a
delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, declared that it "definitely grants the right
of academic freedom to the University as an institution as distinguished from the
academic freedom of a university professor." 39
Has the right been carried over the to the present Constitution? In an attempt to give an
explicit definition with an expanded coverage, the Commissioners of the Constitutional
Commission of the 1986 came up with this formulation: "Academic freedom shall be
enjoyed by students, by teachers, and by researchers." After protracted debate and
ringing speeches, the final version which was none too different from the way it was
couched in the previous two (2) Constitutions, as found in Article XIV, Section 5(2)
states: "Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." In
anticipation of the question as to whether and what aspects of academic freedom are
included herein, ConCom Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna explained: "Since academic
freedom is a dynamic concept, we want to expand the frontiers of freedom, especially in
education, therefore, we shall leave it to the courts to develop further the parameters of
academic freedom." 40
More to the point, Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon asked: "When we speak of
the sentence 'academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning,' do
we mean that academic freedom shall be enjoyed by the institution itself?" Azcuna
replied: "Not only that, it also includes . . . . " Gascon finished off the broken thought,—
"the faculty and the students." Azcuna replied: "Yes."
Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology,  we have consistently upheld the salutary
41
proposition that admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a
school, the same being a privilege on the part of the student rather than a right. While
under the education Act of 1982, students have a right "to freely choose their field of
study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation,"
such right is subject, as all rights are, to the established academic and disciplinary
standards laid down by the academic institution. 42
"For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the
admission, discipline and promotion of students. This . . . extends as well to parents . . .
as parents are under a social and moral (if not legal) obligation, individually and
collectively, to assist and cooperate with the schools."43
Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and indispensable to the
successful management of the college. The rules may include those governing student
discipline."  Going a step further, the establishment of rules governing university-student
44
relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not
merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival.
Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of militancy in the academic
groves as collectively, the students demanded and plucked for themselves from the
ponoply of academic freedom their own rights encapsulized under the rubric of "right to
education" forgetting that, in Holfeldian terms, they have a concomitant duty, and that is,
their duty to learn under the rules laid down by the school.
Considering that respondent students are proud to claim as their own a Christian school
that includes Theology as part of its curriculum and assidously strives to turn out
individuals of unimpeachable morals and integrity in the mold of the founder of the order
of the Society of Jesus, St. Ignatius of Loyola, and their God-fearing forbears, their
barbaric and ruthless acts are the more reprehensible. It must be borne in mind that
universities are established, not merely to develop the intellect and skills of the studentry,
but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes; nay, the development, or flowering if
you will, of the total man.
In essence, education must ultimately be religious — not in the sense that the founders
or charter members of the institution are sectarian or profess a religious ideology.
Rather, a religious education, as the renowned philosopher Alfred North Whitehead said,
is "an education which inculcates duty and reverence."  It appears that the particular
45
brand of religious education offered by the Ateneo de Manila has been lost on the
respondent students.
Certainly, they do not deserve to claim such a venerable institution as the Ateneo de
Manila University as their own a minute longer, for they may foreseeably cast a
malevolent influence on the students currently enrolled, as well as those who come after
them.
Quite applicable to this case is our pronouncement in Yap Chin Fah v. Court of
Appeals that: "The maintenance of a morally conducive and orderly educational
environment will be seriously imperiled if, under the circumstances of this case, Grace
Christian is forced to admit petitioner's children and to reintegrate them to the student
body."  Thus, the decision of petitioner university to expel them is but congruent with the
46
gravity of their misdeeds. That there must be such a congruence between the offense
committed and the sanction imposed was stressed in Malabanan v. Ramento. 47
Having carefully reviewed the records and the procedure followed by petitioner
university, we see no reason to reverse its decision founded on the following undisputed
facts: that on February 8, 9 and 10, 1991, the Aquila Legis Fraternity conducted hazing
activities; that respondent students were present at the hazing as auxiliaries, and that as
a result of the hazing, Leonardo Villa died from serious physical injuries, while
Bienvenido Marquez was hospitalized. In light of the vicious acts of respondent students
upon those whom ironically they would claim as "brothers" after the initiation rites, how
can we countenance the imposition of such nominal penalties as reprimand or even
suspension? We, therefore, affirm petitioners' imposition of the penalty of dismissal upon
respondent students. This finds authority and justification in Section 146 of the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools. 48
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED; the order of respondent Judge dated
May 17, 1991 reinstating respondents students into petitioner university is hereby
REVERSED. The resolution of petitioner Joaquin Bernas S. J., then President of Ateneo
de Manila University dated March 1991, is REINSTATED and the decision of the Special
Board DISMISSING respondent students ADEL ABAS and ZOSIMO MENDOZA dated
May 20, 1991 is hereby AFFIRMED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo
and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Griño-Aquino, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991
HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Education, Culture & Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as
Superintendent of City Schools of Manila, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN,
ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA
REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar, instituted by
the Solicitor General, may be formulated as follows: where the relief sought from the
Commission on Human Rights by a party in a case consists of the review and reversal or
modification of a decision or order issued by a court of justice or government agency or
official exercising quasi-judicial functions, may the Commission take cognizance of the
case and grant that relief? Stated otherwise, where a particular subject-matter is placed
by law within the jurisdiction of a court or other government agency or official for
purposes of trial and adjudgment, may the Commission on Human Rights take
cognizance of the same subject-matter for the same purposes of hearing and
adjudication?
The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the respondents and are hence taken
as substantially correct for purposes of ruling on the legal questions posed in the present
action. These facts,   together with others involved in related cases recently resolved by
1
this Court   or otherwise undisputed on the record, are hereunder set forth.
2
1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers,
among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and
Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as "mass
concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged
failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been
brought to the latter's attention. According to them they had decided to undertake said
"mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on
September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to
negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of
Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes, converging
at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their
representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order
of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a
memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings
against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements. Those directives
notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week, with more teachers joining in
the days that followed.  3
Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8) private respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had agreed to support the non-political demands of the
MPSTA. 4
2. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also
preventively suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" and temporarily replaced (unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H). An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges in
accordance with P.D. 807. 5
 the
3. In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario Esber were, among others, named respondents, 6
latter filed separate answers, opted for a formal investigation, and also moved "for
suspension of the administrative proceedings pending resolution by . . (the Supreme)
Court of their application for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining order."
But when their motion for suspension was denied by Order dated November 8, 1990 of
the Investigating Committee, which later also denied their motion for reconsideration
orally made at the hearing of November 14, 1990, "the respondents led by their counsel
staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings."   The case 7
eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cariño dated December 17, 1990,
rendered after evaluation of the evidence as well as the answers, affidavits and
documents submitted by the respondents, decreeing dismissal from the service of
Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del
Castillo.  8
4. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner (Cariño), which was dismissed (unmarked CHR Exhibit, Annex I). Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court
(on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation of the striking teachers" right to due process and peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No. 95445, supra. The ACT also filed a similar petition
 Both petitions in this Court were filed in behalf of the teacher
before the Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No. 95590." 9
associations, a few named individuals, and "other teacher-members so numerous
similarly situated" or "other similarly situated public school teachers too numerous to be
impleaded."
5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements dated
September 27, 1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they
were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacements
as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown
to them.  10
6. Their complaints — and those of other teachers also "ordered suspended by the . . . (DECS)," all numbering forty-two (42) — were docketed as "Striking Teachers CHR Case No. 90775." In connection therewith the Commission
scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11, 1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cariño requiring his attendance therein. 11
On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was "not certain whether he (Sec. Cariño) received the subpoena which was served at his office, . . . (the) Commission, with the Chairman presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio
R. Mallilin and Narciso C. Monteiro, proceeded to hear the case;" it heard the complainants' counsel (a) explain that his clients had been "denied due process and suspended without formal notice, and unjustly, since they did not join
  The Commission
the mass leave," and (b) expatiate on the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize." 12
It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28, 1990 that the Solicitor
thereafter issued an Order   reciting these facts and making the following disposition:
13
General, in behalf of petitioner Cariño, has commenced the present action
of certiorari and prohibition.
To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be accordingly guided in
its investigation and resolution of the matter, considering that these forty two The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it does not feel bound
teachers are now suspended and deprived of their wages, which they need very by this Court's joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra. It has also made
badly, Secretary Isidro Cariño, of the Department of Education, Culture and plain its intention "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No.
Sports, Dr. Erlinda Lolarga, school superintendent of Manila and the Principal of 90-775) on the merits." It intends, in other words, to try and decide or hear and
Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, are hereby enjoined to appear and determine, i.e., exercise jurisdiction over the following general issues:
enlighten the Commission en banc on October 19, 1990 at 11:00 A.M. and to
bring with them any and all documents relevant to the allegations aforestated 1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process, and just cause exists
herein to assist the Commission in this matter. Otherwise, the Commission will for the imposition of administrative disciplinary sanctions on them by their superiors; and
resolve the complaint on the basis of complainants' evidence.
2) whether or not the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA
x x x           x x x          x x x teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize," justify their
mass action or strike.
7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cariño sought and was granted
leave to file a motion to dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss was submitted on The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with
November 14, 1990 alleging as grounds therefor, "that the complaint states no cause of character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon
action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case."  14
and decided by the Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports, subject to appeal to the
Civil Service Commission, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the
teachers affected may take appeals to the Civil Service Commission on said matters, if
still timely.
8. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss, judgments affecting the "striking teachers" were promulgated in two (2) cases, as
aforestated, viz.: The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the
power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice,   or even a
19

quasi-judicial agency,   it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try
20

and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human
a) The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of Education Secretary Cariño in Case No. DECS 90-082, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, rights violations involving civil or political rights.
Budoy and del Castillo; 15 and

b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590 dismissing the petitions "without prejudice to any appeals, if still timely, that the individual petitioners may take to the Civil
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it
Service Commission on the matters complained of," 16 and  inter alia "ruling that it was  prima facie lawful for petitioner Cariño to issue return-to-work orders, file administrative charges against recalcitrants, was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this
preventively suspend them, and issue decision on those charges." 17
country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
9. In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent Commission denied Sec. Cariño's motion to dismiss and required him and Superintendent Lolarga "to submit their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days . . . (after which) the
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is
 It held that the "striking teachers" "were
Commission shall proceed to hear and resolve the case on the merits with or without respondents counter affidavit." 18

that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards

denied due process of law; . . . they should not have been replaced without a chance to
claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not
reply to the administrative charges;" there had been a violation of their civil and political
adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a
rights which the Commission was empowered to investigate; and while expressing its
quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining
"utmost respect to the Supreme Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are different from those
therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be
in the case decided by the Supreme Court" (the reference being unmistakably to this
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
Court's joint Resolution of August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra).
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as
may be provided by law.   This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. 
21 22
The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the powers of the Commission on Human Rights.
 Upon its constitution, it succeeded and superseded the
The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent office. 23
Presidential Committee on Human Rights existing at the time of the effectivity of the
Constitution.   Its powers and functions are the following 
24 25
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing
abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need
protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of
human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power
to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it
may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any
person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of
its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings. 26
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate
or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or
 The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to
inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." 27
find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of
settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by
application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by
patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire
into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of
evidence; a legal inquiry;"   "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in
28
turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not
require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the
discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."  29
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case)
 And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a
on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." 30
judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of
controversy . . . ."  31
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or
to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." 32
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits"
(adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a
claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil
or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the
mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on
and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by
the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the
grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be
imposed for said acts or omissions.

These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers
granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

 and it appears that appeals have been

Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already taken cognizance of the issues and resolved them, 33

seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties to the Civil Service Commission; and even
this Court itself has had occasion to pass upon said issues.  34

Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately
based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and
whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be
passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict,
may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.

The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has no business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the
Education Secretary or the Civil Service Commission. It has no business going over the same ground traversed by the latter and making its own judgment
on the questions involved. This would accord success to what may well have been the complaining teachers' strategy to abort, frustrate or negate the
judgment of the Education Secretary in the administrative cases against them which they anticipated would be adverse to them.

This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done.

In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would serve no useful purpose. If its investigation should result in conclusions contrary to those reached by Secretary Cariño, it would have no power anyway to
reverse the Secretary's conclusions. Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil Service Commission and lastly by this Court. The only thing the Commission can do, if it concludes that Secretary Cariño was in error, is to refer the

matter to the appropriate Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil Service Commission. 35
 It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December 29, 1990 is ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE, and the respondent Commission on Human Rights and the Chairman
and Members thereof are prohibited "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers
HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits."

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994
BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND
GENEROSO OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN
DOES, respondents.
The City Attorney for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
VITUG, J.:
The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights ("CHR") is
again placed into focus in this petition for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order
and preliminary injunction. The petitioners ask us to prohibit public respondent CHR from
further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs.
Quimpo, et al."
The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos
Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon
City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was
sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being the officers and members of the
North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were
given a grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the
questioned premises of North EDSA.  Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the
1 5. that the complainants (were) occupying government land, particularly
private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be
removed to give way to the "People's Park".  On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their
2
President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay)
with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion
Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to
stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores,
and carinderia along North EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-
1580.  On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist
3
from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the
vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to
appear before the CHR. 4
On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July
1990, as well as CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990 the
petitioners carried out the demolition of private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderia,  the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the disbursement of
5
financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of the private respondents to
purchase light housing materials and food under the Commission's supervision and
again directed the petitioners to "desist from further demolition, with the warning that
violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest." 6
A motion to dismiss,  dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The
7
motion also averred, among other things, that:
1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by the (petitioners) of
the Inter-Agency Memorandum of Agreement whereby Metro-Manila
Mayors agreed on a moratorium in the demolition of the dwellings of poor
dwellers in Metro-Manila;
xxx xxx xxx
3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the moratorium
referred to therein refers to moratorium in the demolition of the structures
of poor dwellers;
4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but
independent business entrepreneurs even this Honorable Office admitted
in its resolution of 1 August 1990 that the complainants are indeed,
vendors;
the sidewalk of EDSA corner North Avenue, Quezon City; . . . and
6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive
discretion and authority whether or not a certain business establishment
(should) be allowed to operate within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, to
revoke or cancel a permit, if already issued, upon grounds clearly
specified by law and ordinance. 8
During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement, arguing
that the motion to dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be resolved. The
petitioners likewise manifested that they would bring the case to the courts.
On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners, The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution  of 25 June 1991; it was
15

stating that the Commission's authority should be understood as being confined only to subsequently reinstated, however, in our resolution  of 18 June 1991, in which we also
16

the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly issued a temporary restraining order, directing the CHR to "CEASE and DESIST from
violated in this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but) their privilege to engage in further hearing CHR No. 90-1580." 17

business." 9

The petitioners pose the following:

On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for resolution,
along with the contempt charge that had meantime been filed by the private respondents, Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:
albeit vigorously objected to by petitioners (on the ground that the motion to dismiss was
still then unresolved). 10
a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents
whose stalls were demolished by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by
In an Order,  dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for
11
the Mayor of Quezon City;
carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order
to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them. b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and

On 1 March 1991,  the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and
12
c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by the
supplemental motion to dismiss, in this wise: demolition.

Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor-General was excused from
mandate had jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the squatters- filing his comment for public respondent CHR. The latter thus filed its own
vendors who complained of the gross violations of their human and comment,  through Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of its Commissioners. The Court also
18

constitutional rights. The motion to dismiss should be and is hereby resolved to dispense with the comment of private respondent Roque Fermo, who had
DENIED for lack of merit. 13
since failed to comply with the resolution, dated 18 July 1991, requiring such comment.

The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to The petition has merit.
create only a paper tiger limited only to investigating civil and political rights, but it
(should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body with the power to provide appropriate legal
The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987
measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines . . . ." It
Constitution.  It was formally constituted by then President Corazon Aquino via Executive
19

added:
Order No. 163,  issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her legislative power at the
20

time. It succeeded, but so superseded as well, the Presidential Committee on Human

The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to development, Rights.21

to life and to dignity. All these brazenly and violently ignored and
trampled upon by respondents with little regard at the same time for the
The powers and functions  of the Commission are defined by the 1987 Constitution,
22

basic rights of women and children, and their health, safety and welfare.
thus: to —
Their actions have psychologically scarred and traumatized the children,
who were witness and exposed to such a violent demonstration of Man's
inhumanity to man. (1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and political rights;
In an Order,  dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.
14

(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for
contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
Hence, this recourse.
 (3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of
of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and
and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
protection; likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities; therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights; authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that
the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human
provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human
rights, or their families;
After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the other kernel
of this controversy and, its is, to determine the extent of CHR's investigative power.
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international
treaty obligations on human rights;
It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a term that any
attempt to define it, albeit not a few have tried, could at best be described as
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or
inconclusive. Let us observe. In a symposium on human rights in the Philippines,
whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or
sponsored by the University of the Philippines in 1977, one of the questions that has
convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or
been propounded is "(w)hat do you understand by "human rights?" The participants,
under its authority;
representing different sectors of the society, have given the following varied answers:
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency
Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his
in the performance of its functions;
humanity. They are the same in all parts of the world, whether the
Philippines or England, Kenya or the Soviet Union, the United States or
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and Japan, Kenya or Indonesia . . . .

(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes
that the intention of the members of the Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a
quasi-judicial body.  This view, however, has not heretofore been shared by this Court.
23
In Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights,  the Court, through then Associate Justice,
24
Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and
property; freedom of speech, of the press, of religion, academic freedom,
and the rights of the accused to due process of law; political rights, such
as the right to elect public officials, to be elected to public office, and to
form political associations and engage in politics; and social rights, such
as the right to an education, employment, and social services. 25

now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, has observed that it is "only the first of the
enumerated powers and functions that bears any resemblance to adjudication or
adjudgment," but that resemblance can in no way be synonymous to the adjudicatory
power itself. The Court explained:
Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person from
the sheer fact of his humanity. . . . Because they are inherent, human
rights are not granted by the State but can only be recognized and
protected by it.26

. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the

fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this (Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural
country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. rights defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 27
 Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human.
They are part of his natural birth, right, innate and inalienable.
28
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests that the scope of human rights can be
understood to include those that relate to an individual's social, economic, cultural,
political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the term to the universally
accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is generally considered to
be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life.
Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our 1986
Constitutional Commission in adopting the specific provisions on human rights and in
creating an independent commission to safeguard these rights? It may of value to look
back at the country's experience under the martial law regime which may have, in fact,
impelled the inclusions of those provisions in our fundamental law. Many voices have
been heard. Among those voices, aptly represented perhaps of the sentiments
expressed by others, comes from Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a respected jurist and an
advocate of civil liberties, who, in his paper, entitled "Present State of Human Rights in
the Philippines,"  observes:
29
But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in their Bill
of Rights most of the human rights expressed in the International
Covenant, these rights became unavailable upon the proclamation of
Martial Law on 21 September 1972. Arbitrary action then became the
rule. Individuals by the thousands became subject to arrest upon
suspicion, and were detained and held for indefinite periods, sometimes
for years, without charges, until ordered released by the Commander-in-
Chief or this representative. The right to petition for the redress of
grievances became useless, since group actions were forbidden. So
were strikes. Press and other mass media were subjected to censorship
and short term licensing. Martial law brought with it the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus, and judges lost independence and security of
tenure, except members of the Supreme Court. They were required to
submit letters of resignation and were dismissed upon the acceptance
thereof. Torture to extort confessions were practiced as declared by
international bodies like Amnesty International and the International
Commission of Jurists.
Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we can see
the following discussions during its 26 August 1986 deliberations:
MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task must be made clear in
view of the importance of human rights and also because civil and
political rights have been determined by many international covenants
and human rights legislations in the Philippines, as well as the
Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights and subsequent legislation.
Otherwise, if we cover such a wide territory in area, we might diffuse its
impact and the precise nature of its task, hence, its effectivity would also
be curtailed.
So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its tasks so that the
commission can be most effective.
MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and political
rights are very broad. The Article on the Bill of Rights covers civil and
political rights. Every single right of an individual involves his civil right or
his political right. So, where do we draw the line?
MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights have been made
clear in the language of human rights advocates, as well as in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which addresses a number of
articles on the right to life, the right against torture, the right to fair and
public hearing, and so on. These are very specific rights that are
considered enshrined in many international documents and legal
instruments as constituting civil and political rights, and these are
precisely what we want to defend here.
MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil and political rights
as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the International Covenant
of Civil and Political Rights distinguished this right against torture.
MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other rights that we
have?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will encompass social and
economic rights, and there are other violations of rights of citizens which
can be addressed to the proper courts and authorities.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to define its
functions, and, therefore, in doing that the commission will be authorized
to take under its wings cases which perhaps heretofore or at this moment
are under the jurisdiction of the ordinary investigative and prosecutorial
agencies of the government. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier that we would like
to define the specific parameters which cover civil and political rights as
covered by the international standards governing the behavior of
governments regarding the particular political and civil rights of citizens,
especially of political detainees or prisoners. This particular aspect we
have experienced during martial law which we would now like to
safeguard.
MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I had. Therefore,
what we are really trying to say is, perhaps, at the proper time we could
specify all those rights stated in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and defined as human rights. Those are the rights that we
envision here?
MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights of
our Constitution. They are integral parts of that.
MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that all the rights
under the Bill of Rights covered by human rights?
MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and political rights.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the scope of human
rights, I would like to state that in the past regime, everytime we invoke
the violation of human rights, the Marcos regime came out with the
defense that, as a matter of fact, they had defended the rights of people
to decent living, food, decent housing and a life consistent with human
dignity.
So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to political
rights. Is that the sense of the committee, so as not to confuse the issue?
MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.
MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also to repeated
points raised by the previous speaker.
There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights
could act effectively: 1) protection of rights of political detainees; 2)
treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public
trials; 4) cases of disappearances; 5) salvagings and hamletting; and 6)
other crimes committed against the religious.
xxx xxx xxx
The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.
I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner Garcia that
we should, in order to make the proposed Commission more effective,
delimit as much as possible, without prejudice to future expansion. The
coverage of the concept and jurisdictional area of the term "human
rights". I was actually disturbed this morning when the reference was
made without qualification to the rights embodied in the universal
Declaration of Human Rights, although later on, this was qualified to refer
to civil and political rights contained therein.
If I remember correctly, Madam President, Commissioner Garcia, after
mentioning the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,
mentioned or linked the concept of human right with other human rights
specified in other convention which I do not remember. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to the Declaration of
Torture of 1985?
MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner mentioned
another.
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights of which we are signatory.
MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that, although I have a copy
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights here, I do not have a copy
of the other covenant mentioned. It is quite possible that there are rights
specified in that other convention which may not be specified here. I was
wondering whether it would be wise to link our concept of human rights to
general terms like "convention," rather than specify the rights contained in
the convention.
As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is concerned, the
Committee, before the period of amendments, could specify to us which
of these articles in the Declaration will fall within the concept of civil and
political rights, not for the purpose of including these in the proposed
constitutional article, but to give the sense of the Commission as to what
human rights would be included, without prejudice to expansion later on,
if the need arises. For example, there was no definite reply to the
question of Commissioner Regalado as to whether the right to marry
would be considered a civil or a social right. It is not a civil right?
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the various specific
civil and political rights that we felt must be envisioned initially by this
provision — freedom from political detention and arrest prevention of
torture, right to fair and public trials, as well as crimes involving
disappearance, salvagings, hamlettings and collective violations. So, it is
limited to politically related crimes precisely to protect the civil and
political rights of a specific group of individuals, and therefore, we are not
opening it up to all of the definite areas.
MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the record, the Gentlemen
is no longer linking his concept or the concept of the Committee on
Human Rights with the so-called civil or political rights as contained in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, I was referring to an international instrument.
MR. GUINGONA. I know.
MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to each and every
specific article therein, but only to those that pertain to the civil and
politically related, as we understand it in this Commission on Human
Rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not even clear as to the
distinction between civil and social rights.
MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants: the International
Covenant and Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The second covenant contains all
the different rights-the rights of labor to organize, the right to education,
housing, shelter, et cetera.
MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of the
committee to those that the Gentlemen has specified.
MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
xxx xxx xxx
SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the victims of human
rights, I cannot stress more on how much we need a Commission on
Human Rights. . . .
. . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They cannot pay and very
few lawyers will accept clients who do not pay. And so, they are the ones
more abused and oppressed. Another reason is, the cases involved are
very delicate — torture, salvaging, picking up without any warrant of
arrest, massacre — and the persons who are allegedly guilty are people
in power like politicians, men in the military and big shots. Therefore, this
Human Rights Commission must be independent.
I would like very much to emphasize how much we need this
commission, especially for the little Filipino, the little individual who needs
this kind of help and cannot get it. And I think we should concentrate only
on civil and political violations because if we open this to land, housing
and health, we will have no place to go again and we will not receive any
response. . . .  (emphasis supplied)
30
The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a
provision empowering the Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on
complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights" (Sec. 1).
The term "civil rights,"  has been defined as referring —
31
(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in
wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the
organization or administration of the government. They include the rights
of property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract,
etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are rights appertaining to a
person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community. Such term
may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or
redressed in a civil action.
Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious
persecution, unreasonable searches and seizures, and imprisonment for debt. 32
Political rights,  on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or
33
indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the
right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to
citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government. 34
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily
apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus
its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for
instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2)
treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases
of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed
against the religious." While the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any
preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless,
significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take
comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of
investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress
may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the
authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendation." 35
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are
the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by
private respondents on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park".
More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can
take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb
is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is
claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it
is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-
a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that
the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private
respondents can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil
and political rights" intended by the Constitution.
On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational
guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in
accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in
providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect
contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and
sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however,
should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and
rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the
power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate
with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor
summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work. The "order to desist" (a
semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is not
investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not
possess. In Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights,  the 36
Court, speaking through Madame Justice Carolina Griño-Aquino, explained:
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive
measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human
rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to
confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ
of injunction for, it that were the intention, the Constitution would have
expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by
law". It is never derived by implication.
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in
the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a
writ of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from proper
courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a
court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a
writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any
court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of
the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. . . . A writ of preliminary
injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal
action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interests of a
party thereto, and for no other purpose." (footnotes omitted).
The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its findings
and recommendations to any appropriate agency of government. 37
The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way of
financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition is not an appropriate issue in the
instant petition. Not only is there lack of locus standi on the part of the petitioners to
question the disbursement but, more importantly, the matter lies with the appropriate
administrative agencies concerned to initially consider.
The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the petitioners has
become moot and academic since the case before it (CHR Case No. 90-1580) has
already been fully heard, and that the matter is merely awaiting final resolution. It is true
that prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done,
and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished.   Here, however,
38
said Commission admittedly has yet to promulgate its resolution in CHR Case No. 90-
1580. The instant petition has been intended, among other things, to also prevent CHR
from precisely doing that.
39

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission on
Human Rights is hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580
and from implementing the P500.00 fine for contempt. The temporary restraining order
heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent. No costs.

SO ORDERED
G.R. No. L-22554 August 29, 1975
DELFIN LIM and JIKIL TAHA, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FRANCISCO PONCE DE LEON AND ORLANDO MADDELA, defendants-appellees.
Ricardo L. Manalilig for plaintiffs-appellants.
Iñigo R. Peña for defendants-appellees.
MARTIN, J.:
Appeal on a question of law from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Palawan in
Civil Case No. 416, entitled "Delfin Lim and Jikil Taha vs. Francisco Ponce de Leon and
Orlando Maddela", dismissing the complaint of the plaintiffs and ordering them to pay
each of the defendants jointly and severally the sum of P500.00 by way of actual
damages; P500.00 by way of attorney's fees; and P1,000.00 by way of exemplary
damages.
On April 29, 1961, plaintiff-appellant Jikil Taha sold to a certain Alberto Timbangcaya of
Brooke's Point, Palawan a motor launch named M/L "SAN RAFAEL". A year later or on
April 9, 1962 Alberto Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Palawan alleging that after the sale Jikil Taha forcibly took away the motor
launch from him.
On May 14, 1962, after conducting a preliminary investigation, Fiscal Francisco Ponce
de Leon in his capacity as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Palawan, filed with the Court of
First Instance of Palawan the corresponding information for Robbery the Force and
Intimidation upon Persons against Jikil Taha. The case was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 2719.
On June 15, 1962, Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, upon being informed that the motor
launch was in Balabac, Palawan, wrote the Provincial Commander of Palawan
requesting him to direct the detachment commander-in Balabac to impound and take
custody of the motor launch. 1
On June 26, 1962, Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request to the Provincial
Commander to impound the motor launch, explaining that its subsequent sale to a third
party, plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim, cannot prevent the court from taking custody of the
same.  So, on July 6, 1962 upon order of the Provincial Commander, defendant-appellee
2
Orlando Maddela, Detachment Commander of Balabac, Palawan, seized the motor
launch "SAN RAFAEL" from plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim and impounded it.
On July 15, 1962 plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim pleaded with Orlando Maddela to return
the motor launch but the latter refused. Likewise, on September 20, 1962, Jikil Taha
through his counsel made representations with Fiscal Ponce de Leon to return the seized
property to plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim but Fiscal Ponce de Leon refused, on the ground
that the same was the subject of a criminal offense.
All efforts to recover the motor launch going to naught, plaintiffs-appellants Delfin Lim
and Jikil Taha, on November 19, 1962, filed with the Court of First Instance of Palawan a
complaint for damages against defendants-appellees Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon
and Orlando Maddela, alleging that on July 6, 1962 Orlando Maddela entered the
premises of Delfin Lim without a search warrant and then and there took away the hull of
the motor launch without his consent; that he effected the seizure upon order of Fiscal
Ponce de Leon who knew fully well that his office was not vested with authority to order
the seizure of a private property; that said motor launch was purchased by Delfin Lim
from Jikil Taha in consideration of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00), Two Thousand
Pesos (P2,000.00) of which has been given to Jikil Taha as advance payment; that as a
consequence of the unlawful seizure of the motor launch, its sale did not materialize; and
that since July 6, 1962, the said motor launch had been moored at the Balabac Bay,
Palawan and because of exposure to the elements it had become worthless and beyond
repair. For the alleged violation of their constitutional rights, plaintiffs-appellants prayed
that defendants-appellees be ordered to pay jointly and severally each of them the sum
of P5,750.00 representing actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
In their answer, defendants-appellees denied the material allegations of the complaint
and as affirmative defenses alleged that the motor launch in question which was sold by
Jikil Taha to Alberto Timbangcaya on April 29, 1961 was sometime in April 1962, forcibly
taken with violence upon persons and with intent to gain by Jikil Taha from Alfredo
Timbangcaya without the latter's knowledge and consent, thus giving rise to the filing of a
criminal charge of robbery against Jikil Taha; that Fiscal Ponce de Leon, in his capacity
as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Palawan ordered Orlando Maddela to seize and impound
the motor launch "SAN RAFAEL", for being the corpus delicti of the robbery; and that
Orlando Maddela merely obeyed the orders of his superior officer to impound said
launch. By way of counterclaim, defendants-appellees alleged that because of the
malicious and groundless filing of the complaint by plaintiffs-appellants, they were
constrained to engage the services of lawyers, each of them paying P500.00 as
attorney's fees; and that they suffered moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00 each
and actual damages in the amount of P500.00 each. They also prayed that each of them
awarded exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000.00.
On September 13, 1965, the trial court rendered its decision, upholding the validity of the
seizure of the motor launch on the ground that "the authority to impound evidences or
exhibits or corpus delicti in a case pending investigation is inherent in the Provincial
Fiscal who controls the prosecution and who introduces those exhibits in the court."
Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the complaint of plaintiffs-appellants and ordered
them to pay jointly and severally each of the defendants-appellees the amount of
P500.00 by way of actual damages another amount of P500.00 for attorney's fees and
P1,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Hence, this appeal.
Two vital issues call for resolution by this Court. First, whether or not defendant-appellee
Fiscal Ponce de Leon had the power to order the seizure of the motor launch in question
without a warrant of search and seizure even if the same was admittedly the corpus
delicti of the crime. Second, whether or not defendants-appellees are civilly liable to
plaintiffs-appellants for damages allegedly suffered by them granting that the seizure of
the motor launch was unlawful.
The gravamen of plaintiffs-appellants' argument is that the taking of the motor launch on
July 6, 1962 by Orlando Maddela upon the order of Fiscal Ponce de Loon was in
violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures
since it was done without a warrant.
The pertinent provision of the Constitution then in force reads:
3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.3
A cursory reading of the above provision easily brings into focus the unreasonableness
of the seizure of the aforementioned motor launch. A search and seizure to be
reasonable, must be effected by means of a valid search warrant. And for a search
warrant to be valid: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause
must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person;
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the
warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things
to be seized.  Thus in a long line of decisions, this Court has declared invalid search
4
warrants which were issued in utter disregard of the constitutional injunction.5
Defendants-appellees admitted that when Orlando Maddela entered the premises of
Delfin Lim and impounded the motor launch he was not armed with a search warrant;
that he effected the seizure of the motor launch in the absence of and without the
consent of Delfin Lim. There can be no question that without the proper search warrant,
no public official has the right to enter the premises of another without his consent for the
purpose of search and seizure.  And since in the present case defendants-appellees
6
seized the motor launch without a warrant, they have violated the constitutional right of
plaintiffs-appellants against unreasonable search and seizure.
Defendants-appellees however would want to justify the seizure of the motor launch
even without a warrant because of Fiscal Ponce de Leon's alleged inherent power to
order the seizure of a personal property which is the corpus delicti of a crime, he being
a quasi judicial officer who has the control of the prosecution and the presentation of the
evidence in the criminal case. They argue that inasmuch as the motor launch in question
was allegedly stolen by Jikil Taha from Timbangcaya, Fiscal Ponce de Leon could order
its seizure even without a search warrant. We cannot agree. Under the old
Constitution  the power to issue a search warrant is vested in a judge or magistrate and
7
in no other officer and no search and seizure can be made without a proper warrant. At
the time the act complained of was committed, there was no law or rule that recognized
the authority of Provincial Fiscals to issue a search warrant. In his vain attempt to justify
the seizure of the motor launch in question without a warrant Fiscal Ponce de Leon
invoked the provisions of Republic Act No. 732, which amended Sections 1674 and 1687
of the Revised Administrative Code. But there is nothing in said law which confers upon
the provincial fiscal; the authority to issue warrants, much less to order without warrant
the seizure of a personal property even if it is the corpus delicti of a crime. True,
Republic Act No. 732 has broadened the power of provincial fiscals to conduct
preliminary investigations, but said law did not divest the judge or magistrate of its power
to determine, before issuing the corresponding warrant, whether or not probable cause
exists therefor. 8
Moreover, under Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court  9 which complement the
constitutional provision earlier cited, two principles are made clear, namely: (1) that in the seizure of a stolen property search
warrant is still necessary; and (2) that in issuing a search warrant the judge alone determines whether or not there is a
probable cause. The fact that a thing is a corpus delicti of a crime does not justify its seizure without a warrant. As held
in U.S. v. de los Reyes and Esguerra, 10 citing McClurg v. Brenton: 11
The mere fact that a man is an officer, whether of high or low degree,
gives him no more right than is possessed by the ordinary private citizen
to break in upon the privacy of a home and subject its occupant to the
indignity of a search for the evidence of crime, without a legal warrant
procured for that purpose. No amount of incriminating evidence whatever
its source, will supply the place of such warrant. At the closed door of the
home be it palace or hovel even bloodhounds must wait till the law, by
authoritative process, bids it open. (Emphasis supplied.)
Defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon would also invoke lack of time to procure a
search warrant as an excuse for the seizure of the motor launch without one. He claimed
that the motor launch had to be seized immediately in order to preserve it and to prevent
its removal out of the locality, since Balabac, Palawan, where the motor launch was at
the time, could only be reached after three to four days' travel by boat.   The claim
12
cannot be sustained. The records show that on June 15, 1962   Fiscal Ponce de Leon
13
made the first request to the Provincial Commander for the impounding of the motor
launch; and on June 26, 1962   another request was made. The seizure was not effected
14
until July 6, 1962. In short, Fiscal Ponce de Leon had all the time to procure a search
warrant had he wanted to and which he could have taken in less than a day, but he did
not. Besides, there is no basis for the apprehension that the motor launch might be
moved out of Balabac because even prior to its seizure the motor launch was already
without its engine.   In sum, the fact that there was no time to secure a search warrant
15
would not legally justify a search without one. 
16
As to whether or not they are entitled to damages, plaintiffs-appellants anchor their claim
for damages on Articles 32 and 2219 of the New Civil Code which provide in part as
follows:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes
or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall
be liable to the latter for damages.
xxx xxx xxx
(9) The rights to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
xxx xxx xxx
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may
also be adjudicated.
ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) Illegal search;
xxx xxx xxx
(1) Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34
and 35.
Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional rights have been
violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer or
employee responsible therefor. In addition, exemplary damages may also be awarded. In
the instant case, plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim claimed that he purchased the motor
launch from Jikil Taha in consideration of P3,000.00, having given P2,000.00 as
advanced payment; that since or seizure on July 6, 1962 the motor launch had been
moored at Balabac Bay and because of exposure to the elements it has become
worthless at the time of the filing of the present action; that because of the illegality of the
seizure of the motor launch, he suffered moral damages in the sum of P1,000.00; and
that because of the violation of their constitutional rights they were constrained to engage
the services of a lawyer whom they have paid P1,500.00 for attorney's fees. We find
these claims of Delfin Lim amply supported by the evidence and therefore should be
awarded the sum of P3,000.00 as actual damages; P1,000.00 as moral damages and
P750.00 for attorney's fees. However, with respect co plaintiff Jikil Taha, he is not entitled
to recover any damage which he alleged he had suffered from the unlawful seizure of the
motor launch inasmuch as he had already transferred the ownership and possession of
the motor launch to Delfin Lim at the time it was seized and therefore, he has no legal
standing to question the validity of the seizure. Well settled is the rule that the legality of
a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,
and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot
be availed of by third parties.   Consequently, one who is not the owner, lessee, or lawful
17
occupant of the premise searched cannot raise the question of validity of the search and
seizure.   Jikil Taha is not without recourse though. He can still collect from his co-
18
plaintiff, Delfin Lim the unpaid balance of P1,000.00.
Defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon wanted to wash his hands of the incident by
claiming that "he was in good faith, without malice and without the slightest intention of
inflicting injury to plaintiff-appellant, Jikil Taha"   when he ordered the seizure of the
19
motor launch. We are not prepared to sustain his defense of good faith. To be liable
under Article 32 of the New Civil Code it is enough that there was a violation of the
constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants should have
acted with malice or bad faith. Dr. Jorge Bocobo, Chairman of the Code Commission,
gave the following reasons during the public hearings of the Joint Senate and House
Committees, why good faith on the part of the public officer or employee is immaterial.
Thus:
DEAN BOCOBO. Article 32, regarding individual rights; Attorney Cirilo
Paredes proposes that Article 32 be so amended as to make a public
official liable for violation of another person's constitutional rights only if
the public official acted maliciously or in bad faith. The Code Commission
opposes this suggestion for these reasons:
 The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It actual damages, plus P1,000.00 moral damages, and, in addition, P750.00 for attorney's
is not necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To fees. With costs against defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon.
make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which
is the effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past SO ORDERED.
have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good
faith in the performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article
is to put an end to official abuse by the plea of good faith. In the United
States this remedy is in he nature of a tort.

Mr. Chairman, this article is firmly one of the fundamental articles

introduced in the New Civil Code to implement democracy. There is no
real democracy if a public official is abusing, and we made the article so
strong and so comprehensive that it concludes an abuse of individual
rights even if done in good faith, that official is liable. As a matter of fact,
we know that there are very few public officials who openly and definitely
abuse the individual rights of the citizens. In most cases, the abuse is
justified on a plea of desire to enforce the law to comply with one's duty.
And so, if we should limit the scope of this article, that would practically
nullify the object of the article. Precisely, the opening object of the article
is to put an end to abuses which are justified by a plea of good faith,
which is in most cases the plea of officials abusing individual rights.  20

But defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela cannot be held accountable because he

impounded the motor launch upon the order of his superior officer. While a subordinate
officer may be held liable for executing unlawful orders of his superior officer, there are
certain circumstances which would warrant Maddela's exculpation from liability. The
records show that after Fiscal Ponce de Leon made his first request to the Provincial
Commander on June 15, 1962 Maddela was reluctant to impound the motor launch
despite repeated orders from his superior officer.   It was only after he was furnished a
21

copy of the reply of Fiscal Ponce de Leon, dated June 26, 1962, to the letter of the
Provincial Commander, justifying the necessity of the seizure of the motor launch on the
ground that the subsequent sale of the launch to Delfin Lim could not prevent the court
from taking custody of the same,   that he impounded the motor launch on July 6, 1962.
22

With said letter coming from the legal officer of the province, Maddela was led to believe
that there was a legal basis and authority to impound the launch. Then came the order of
his superior officer to explain for the delay in the seizure of the motor launch.   Faced
23

with a possible disciplinary action from his Commander, Maddela was left with no
alternative but to seize the vessel. In the light of the above circumstances. We are not
disposed to hold Maddela answerable for damages.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and
another one entered declaring the seizure illegal and ordering defendant-appellee Fiscal
Francisco Ponce de Leon to pay to plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim the sum of P3,000.00 as
G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988
ROGELIO ABERCA, RODOLFO BENOSA, NESTOR BODINO NOEL ETABAG
DANILO DE LA FUENTE, BELEN DIAZ-FLORES, MANUEL MARIO GUZMAN, ALAN
JAZMINEZ, EDWIN LOPEZ, ALFREDO MANSOS, ALEX MARCELINO, ELIZABETH
PROTACIO-MARCELINO, JOSEPH OLAYER, CARLOS PALMA, MARCO PALO,
ROLANDO SALUTIN, BENJAMIN SESGUNDO, ARTURO TABARA, EDWIN
TULALIAN and REBECCA TULALIAN petitioners,
vs.
MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER, COL. FIDEL SINGSON, COL. ROLANDO ABADILLA, COL.
GERARDO B. LANTORIA, COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, 1ST LT. COL. PANFILO M.
LACSON, MAJ. RODOLFO AGUINALDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, 1ST LT. PEDRO
TANGO, 1ST LT. ROMEO RICARDO, 1ST LT. RAUL BACALSO, MSGT BIENVENIDO
BALABA and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch
XCV (95), Quezon City, respondents.
YAP, J.:
This petition for certiorari presents vital issues not heretofore passed upon by this Court. It poses the question whether the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by
military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. If such action for damages
may be maintained, who can be held liable for such violations: only the military personnel directly involved and/or their
superiors as well.
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the
rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to
conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground
houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro
Manila," Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said order, elements of the
TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search
warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a
number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested
without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they
were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of
their rights to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated them employed
threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory
information or confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs
constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract
information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and
punish them, said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.
Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages amounting to P39,030.00; moral
damages in the amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00;
exemplary damages in the amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of
P3,000,000.00; and attorney's fees amounting to not less than P200,000.00.
A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel, then Solicitor-
General Estelito Mendoza, alleging that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into
the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to them,
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) assuming that the courts can
entertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the
performance of their official duties; and (3) the complaint states no cause of action
against the defendants. Opposition to said motion to dismiss was filed by plaintiffs Marco
Palo, Danilo de la Fuente, Benjamin Sesgundo, Nel Etabag, Alfredo Mansos and
Rolando Salutin on July 8, 1983, and by plaintiffs Edwin Lopez, Manuel Mario Guzman,
Alan Jasminez, Nestor Bodino, Carlos Palma, Arturo Tabara, Joseph Olayer, Rodolfo
Benosa, Belen Diaz, Flores, Rogelio Aberca, Alex Marcelino and Elizabeth Marcelino on
July 21, 1983. On November 7, 1983, a Consolidated Reply was filed by defendants'
counsel.
Then, on November 8, 1983, the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch
95, Judge Willelmo C. Fortun, Presiding,   issued a resolution granting the motion to
1
dismiss. I sustained, lock, stock and barrel, the defendants' contention (1) the plaintiffs
may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a
damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended; (2) that assuming that the court can entertain the present action, defendants
are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties; and (3)
that the complaint states no cause of action against defendants, since there is no
allegation that the defendants named in the complaint confiscated plaintiffs' purely
personal properties in violation of their constitutional rights, and with the possible
exception of Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Sergeant Bienvenido Balabo committed acts
of torture and maltreatment, or that the defendants had the duty to exercise direct
supervision and control of their subordinates or that they had vicarious liability as
employers under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court stated, "After a careful
study of defendants' arguments, the court finds the same to be meritorious and must,
therefore, be granted. On the other hand, plaintiffs' arguments in their opposition are
lacking in merit."
A motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint and a supplemental motion for In its resolution of September 21, 1984, the respondent court dealt with both motions (1)
reconsideration was filed by the plaintiffs on November 18, 1983, and November 24, to reconsider its order of May 11, 1984 declaring that with respect to certain plaintiffs, the
1983, respectively. On December 9, 1983, the defendants filed a comment on the resolution of November 8, 1983 had already become final, and (2) to set aside its
aforesaid motion of plaintiffs, furnishing a copy thereof to the attorneys of all the plaintiffs, resolution of November 8, 1983 granting the defendants' motion to dismiss. In the
namely, Attys. Jose W. Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren Mercado, dispositive portion of the order of September 21, 1984, the respondent court resolved:
Auguso Sanchez, Antonio L. Rosales, Pedro B. Ella Jr., Arno V. Sanidad, Alexander
Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene Saguisag, Ramon Esguerra and Felicitas Aquino. (1) That the motion to set aside the order of finality, dated May 11, 1984,
of the Resolution of dismissal of the complaint of plaintiffs Rogelio
On December 15, 1983, Judge Fortun issued an order voluntarily inhibiting himself from Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente, Marco Palo, Alan Jasminez Alex Marcelino,
further proceeding in the case and leaving the resolution of the motion to set aside the Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin is
order of dismissal to Judge Lising, "to preclude any suspicion that he (Judge Fortun) deed for lack of merit;
cannot resolve [the] aforesaid pending motion with the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge and to put an end to plaintiffs assertion that the undersigned has no authority or (2) For lack of cause of action as against the following defendants, to wit:
jurisdiction to resolve said pending motion." This order prompted plaintiffs to reesolve an
amplificatory motion for reconsideration signed in the name of the Free Legal Assistance 1. Gen Fabian Ver
Group (FLAG) of Mabini Legal Aid Committee, by Attys. Joker P. Arroyo, Felicitas Aquino
and Arno Sanidad on April 12, 1984. On May 2,1984, the defendants filed a comment on
2. Col. Fidel Singson
said amplificatory motion for reconsideration.
3. Col. Rolando Abadilla
In an order dated May 11, 1984, the trial court, Judge Esteban Lising, Presiding, without
acting on the motion to set aside order of November 8, 1983, issued an order, as follows:
4. Lt. Col. Conrado Lantoria, Jr.
It appearing from the records that, indeed, the following plaintiffs, Rogelio
Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente and Marco Palo, represented by counsel, 5. Col. Galileo Montanar
Atty. Jose W. Diokno, Alan Jasminez represented by counsel, Atty.
Augusta Sanchez, Spouses Alex Marcelino and Elizabeth Protacio- 6. Col. Panfilo Lacson
Marcelino, represented by counsel, Atty. Procopio Beltran, Alfredo
Mansos represented by counsel, Atty. Rene Sarmiento, and Rolando 7. Capt. Danilo Pizaro
Salutin, represented by counsel, Atty. Efren Mercado, failed to file a
motion to reconsider the Order of November 8, 1983, dismissing the 8. 1 Lt Pedro Tango
complaint, nor interposed an appeal therefrom within the reglementary
period, as prayed for by the defendants, said Order is now final against 9. Lt. Romeo Ricardo
said plaintiffs.
10. Lt. Raul Bacalso
Assailing the said order of May 11, 1984, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration
on May 28,1984, alleging that it was not true that plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la the motion to set aside and reconsider the Resolution of dismissal of the
Fuente, Marco Palo, Alan Jasminez, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, present action or complaint, dated November 8, 1983, is also denied but
Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin failed to file a motion to reconsider the order of in so far as it affects and refers to defendants, to wit:
November 8, 1983 dismissing the complaint, within the reglementary period. Plaintiffs
claimed that the motion to set aside the order of November 8, 1983 and the amplificatory
motion for reconsideration was filed for all the plaintiffs, although signed by only some of 1. Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo, and
the lawyers.
2. Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba
 the motion to reconsider and set aside the Resolution of dismissal dated
November 3, 1983 is granted and the Resolution of dismissal is, in this
respect, reconsidered and modified.
Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari on March 15, 1985 seeking to
annul and set aside the respondent court's resolution of November 8, 1983, its order of
May 11, 1984, and its resolution dated September 21, 1984. Respondents were required
to comment on the petition, which it did on November 9, 1985. A reply was filed by
petitioners on August 26, 1986.
We find the petition meritorious and decide to give it due course.
At the heart of petitioners' complaint is Article 32 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual who
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes
or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall
be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process
(7) of law;
(8) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for
public use;
(9) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(10) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures;
(11) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(12) The privacy of cmmunication and correspondence;
(13) The right to become a member of associations or societies for
purposes not contrary to law;
(14) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the
Government for redress of grievances;
(15) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(16) The rigth of the accused against excessive bail;
(17) The rigth of the aaccused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in behalf;
(18) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against ones self, or
from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of
immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person
confessing becomes a State witness;
(19) Freedom from excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment,
unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute
which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and
(20) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the
defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the against
grieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct
civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be
instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may
also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless
his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other
penal statute.
It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a sanction to the
deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear;
no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. In times of great upheaval
or of social and political stress, when the temptation is strongest to yield — borrowing the
words of Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee — to the law of force rather than the force of
law, it is necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are
immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the
ruling power. The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish. Our commitment to
democratic principles and to the rule of law compels us to reject the view which reduces
law to nothing but the expression of the will of the predominant power in the community.
"Democracy cannot be a reign of progress, of liberty, of justice, unless the law is
respected by him who makes it and by him for whom it is made. Now this respect implies
a maximum of faith, a minimum of Idealism. On going to the bottom of the matter, we
discover that life demands of us a certain residuum of sentiment which is not derived
from reason, but which reason nevertheless controls.  2
Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, the respondents postulate the view
that as public officers they are covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit for acts
done in the performance of official duties or function In support of said contention,
respondents maintain that —
Respondents are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Their
primary duty is to safeguard public safety and order. The Constitution no
less provides that the President may call them "to prevent or supress
lawless violence, invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger
thereof." (Constitution, Article VII, Section 9).
On January 17, 1981, the President issued Proclamation No. 2045 lifting
martial law but providing for the continued suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in view of the remaining dangers to the security
of the nation. The proclamation also provided "that the call to the Armed
Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
insuitection rebellion and subversion shall continue to be in force and
effect."
Petitioners allege in their complaint that their causes of action proceed
from respondent General Ver's order to Task Force Makabansa to launch
pre-emptive strikes against communist terrorist underground houses in
Metro Manila. Petitioners claim that this order and its subsequent
implementation by elements of the task force resulted in the violation of
their constitutional rights against unlawful searches, seizures and arrest,
rights to counsel and to silence, and the right to property and that,
therefore, respondents Ver and the named members of the task force
should be held liable for damages.
But, by launching a pre-emptive strike against communist terrorists,
respondent members of the armed forces merely performed their official
and constitutional duties. To allow petitioners to recover from
respondents by way of damages for acts performed in the exercise of
such duties run contrary to the policy considerations to shield
respondents as public officers from undue interference with their duties
and from potentially disabling threats of hability (Aarlon v. Fitzgerald 102
S. Ct. 2731-1 Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil. 634), and upon the
necessity of protecting the performance of governmental and public
functions from being harassed unduly or constantly interrupted by private
suits (McCallan v. State, 35 Cal. App. 605; Metran v. Paredes, 79 Phil.
819).
xxx xxx xxx
The immunity of public officers from liability arising from the performance
of their duties is now a settled jurisprudence Alzua v. Johnson, 21 Phil.
308; Zulueta v. Nicolas, 102 Phil. 944; Spalding v. Vilas, 161 US 483; 40
L. Ed. 780, 16 S. Ct. 631; Barr v. Mateo, 360; Butz v. Economon, 438 US
478; 57 L. Ed. 2d 895, 98 S. Ct. 2894; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 US 232;
Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, supra; Miller v. de Leune, 602 F. 2d 198; Sami
v. US, 617 F. 2d 755).
Respondents-defendants who merely obeyed the lawful orders of the
President and his call for the suppression of the rebellion involving
petitioners enjoy such immunity from Suit. 3
We find respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally
misplaced. The cases invoked by respondents actually involved acts done by officers in
the performance of official duties written the ambit of their powers. As held in Forbes, etc.
vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield:  4
No one can be held legally responsible in damages or otherwise for doing
in a legal manner what he had authority, under the law, to do. Therefore,
if the Governor-General had authority, under the law to deport or expel
the defendants, and circumstances justifying the deportation and the
method of carrying it out are left to him, then he cannot be held liable in
damages for the exercise of this power. Moreover, if the courts are
without authority to interfere in any manner, for the purpose of controlling
or interferring with the exercise of the political powers vested in the chief
executive authority of the Government, then it must follow that the courts
cannot intervene for the purpose of declaring that he is liable in damages
for the exeercise of this authority.
It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
were merely responding to their duty, as they claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion" in accordance with Proclamation No.
2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on January 27, 1981, and in
pursuance of such objective, to launch pre- emptive strikes against alleged communist
terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or a
roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress
upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the
Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials,
high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private
individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another,
as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only
judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions
do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing their assigned task
or carrying out their mission with vigor. We have no quarrel with their duty to protect the
Republic from its enemies, whether of the left or of the right, or from within or without,
seeking to destroy or subvert our democratic institutions and imperil their very existence.
What we are merely trying to say is that in carrying out this task and mission,
constitutional and legal safeguards must be observed, otherwise, the very fabric of our
faith will start to unravel. In the battle of competing Ideologies, the struggle for the mind is
just as vital as the struggle of arms. The linchpin in that psychological struggle is faith in
the rule of law. Once that faith is lost or compromised, the struggle may well be
abandoned.
We do not find merit in respondents' suggestion that plaintiffs' cause of action is barred
by the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Respondents contend
that "Petitioners cannot circumvent the suspension of the privilege of the writ by resorting
to a damage suit aimed at the same purpose-judicial inquiry into the alleged illegality of
their detention. While the main relief they ask by the present action is indemnification for
alleged damages they suffered, their causes of action are inextricably based on the
same claim of violations of their constitutional rights that they invoked in the habeas
corpus case as grounds for release from detention. Were the petitioners allowed the
present suit, the judicial inquiry barred by the suspension of the privilege of the writ will
take place. The net result is that what the courts cannot do, i.e. override the suspension
ordered by the President, petitioners will be able to do by the mere expedient of altering
the title of their action."
We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners' contention that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of
action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their
constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or
detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from
detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.
Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of action for damages are
explicitly recognized in P.D. No. 1755 which amended Article 1146 of the Civil Code by
adding the following to its text:
However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a
quasi-delict) arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public
officer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial
Law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same
must be brought within one (1) year.
Petitioners have a point in contending that even assuming that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspends petitioners' right of action for damages
for illegal arrest and detention, it does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of
action for injuries suffered because of respondents' confiscation of their private
belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other
cruel and inhuman treatment.
However, we find it unnecessary to address the constitutional issue pressed upon us. On
March 25, 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 2, revoking
Proclamation Nos. 2045 and 2045-A and lifting the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. The question therefore has become moot and academic.
This brings us to the crucial issue raised in this petition. May a superior officer under the
notion of respondent superior be answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his
subordinates, to the person whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated?
Respondents contend that the doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to the case.
We agree. The doctrine of respondent superior has been generally limited in its
application to principal and agent or to master and servant (i.e. employer and employee)
relationship. No such relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their
subordinates.
Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language
of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly"
responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is
not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages
under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or
injury caused to the aggrieved party.
By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the
Constitution   acquires added meaning and asgilrnes a larger dimension. No longer may
5
a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates,
secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the transgressions committed
by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Part
of the factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held
perception that the government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible
for, the rampant violations of human rights. While it would certainly be go naive to expect
that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage
suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no ones terms that Article 32 of the Civil
Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the
transgression joint tortfeasors.
In the case at bar, the trial court dropped defendants General Fabian Ver, Col. Fidel
Singson, Col. Rolando Abadilla, Col. Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Col. Galileo Kintanar, Col.
Panfilo Lacson, Capt. Danilo Pizarro, lst Lt. Pedro Tango, Lt. Romeo Ricardo and Lt.
Ricardo Bacalso from the acts of their subordinates. Only Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and
Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba were kept as defendants on the ground that they alone
'have been specifically mentioned and Identified to have allegedly caused injuries on the
persons of some of the plaintiff which acts of alleged physical violence constitute a delict
or wrong that gave rise to a cause of action. But such finding is not supported by the
record, nor is it in accord with law and jurisprudence.
Firstly, it is wrong to at the plaintiffs' action for damages 5 Section 1, Article 19. to 'acts of
alleged physical violence" which constituted delict or wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies
as actionable the act of violating or in any manner impeding or impairing any of the
constitutional rights and liberties enumerated therein, among others —
1. Freedom from arbitrary arrest or illegal detention;
2. The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
3. The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures;
4. The privacy of communication and correspondence;
5. Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or
from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of
immunity or reward to make a confession, except when the person
confessing becomes a state witness.
The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant clarity and details,
how plaintiffs' constitutional rights and liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code
were violated and impaired by defendants. The complaint speaks of, among others,
searches made without search warrants or based on irregularly issued or substantially
defective warrants; seizures and confiscation, without proper receipts, of cash and
personal effects belonging to plaintiffs and other items of property which were not
subversive and illegal nor covered by the search warrants; arrest and detention of
plaintiffs without warrant or under irregular, improper and illegal circumstances; detention
of plaintiffs at several undisclosed places of 'safehouses" where they were kept
incommunicado and subjected to physical and psychological torture and other inhuman,
degrading and brutal treatment for the purpose of extracting incriminatory statements.
The complaint contains a detailed recital of abuses perpetrated upon the plaintiffs
violative of their constitutional rights.
Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly"
should be held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its
provisions those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its violation.
The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set forth in the
complaint. It is well established in our law and jurisprudence that a motion to dismiss on
the ground that the complaint states no cause of action must be based on what appears
on the face of the complaint.   To determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only
6
the facts alleged in the complaint, and no others, should be considered.   For this
7
purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in
the complaint.  8
Applying this test, it is difficult to justify the trial court's ruling, dismissing for lack of cause
of action the complaint against all the defendants, except Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and
Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba. The complaint contained allegations against all the
defendants which, if admitted hypothetically, would be sufficient to establish a cause or
causes of action against all of them under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
This brings us to the last issue. Was the trial court correct in dismissing the complaint
with respect to plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Puente, Marco Palo, Alan
Jazminez, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando
Salutin, on the basis of the alleged failure of said plaintiffs to file a motion for
reconsideration of the court's resolution of November 8, 1983, granting the respondent's
motion to dismiss?
It is undisputed that a timely motion to set aside said order of November 8, 1983 was
filed by 'plaintiffs, through counsel. True, the motion was signed only by Atty. Joker P.
Arroyo, counsel for Benjamin Sesgulido; Atty. Antonio Rosales, counsel for Edwin Lopez
and Manuel Martin Guzman; Atty. Pedro B. Ella, Jr., counsel for Nestor Bodino and
Carlos Palma; Atty. Arno V. Sanidad, counsel for Arturo Tabara; Atty. Felicitas S. Aquino,
counsel for Joseph Olayer; and Atty. Alexander Padilla, counsel for Rodolfo Benosa.

But the body of the motion itself clearly indicated that the motion was filed on behalf of all
the plaintiffs. And this must have been also the understanding of defendants' counsel
himself for when he filed his comment on the motion, he furnished copies thereof, not
just to the lawyers who signed the motion, but to all the lawyers of plaintiffs, to wit: Attys.
Jose Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren Mercado, Augusto Sanchez,
Antonio Rosales, Pedro Efla Jr., Arno Sanidad, Alexander Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene
Saguisag, Ramon Esguerra and Felicitas S. Aquino.

In filing the motion to set aside the resolution of November 8, 1983, the signing attorneys
did so on behalf of all the plaintiff. They needed no specific authority to do that. The
authority of an attorney to appear for and in behalf of a party can be assumed, unless
questioned or challenged by the adverse party or the party concerned, which was never
done in this case. Thus, it was grave abuse on the part of respondent judge to take it
upon himself to rule that the motion to set aside the order of November 8, 1953
dismissing the complaint was filed only by some of the plaintiffs, when by its very
language it was clearly intended to be filed by and for the benefit of all of them. It is
obvious that the respondent judge took umbrage under a contrived technicality to declare
that the dismissal of the complaint had already become final with respect to some of the
plaintiffs whose lawyers did not sign the motion for reconsideration. Such action tainted
with legal infirmity cannot be sanctioned.

Accordingly, we grant the petition and annul and set aside the resolution of the
respondent court, dated November 8, 1983, its order dated May 11, 1984 and its
resolution dated September 21, 1984. Let the case be remanded to the respondent court
for further proceedings. With costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 86720 September 2, 1994 A criminal complaint for unfair competition was then filed against private
respondents.   During its pendency, petitioner de Guzman exacted from private
2

MHP GARMENTS, INC., and LARRY C. DE GUZMAN, petitioners, respondent Lugatiman the sum of THREE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED PESOS
vs. (P3,100.00) in order to be dropped from the complaint. On December 6, 1983, after a
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AGNES VILLA CRUZ, MIRASOL preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed the complaint against
LUGATIMAN, and GERTRUDES GONZALES, respondents. all the private respondents. On February 6, 1984, he also ordered the return of the
seized items. The seized items were not immediately returned despite
Benjamin M. Dacanay for petitioners. demands.   Private respondents had to go personally to petitioners' place of business to
3

recover their goods. Even then, not all the seized items were returned. The other items
returned were of inferior quality.
Emmanuel O. Tansingco for private respondents.
Private respondents then filed Civil Case No. 51144 against the petitioners for sums of
money and damages.   In its Decision dated January 9, 1987, the trial court ruled for the
4

private respondents, thus:

PUNO, J.:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and
The constitutional protection of our people against unreasonable search and seizure is against defendants, ordering the latter jointly and severally:
not merely a pleasing platitude. It vouchsafes our right to privacy and dignity against
undesirable intrusions committed by any public officer or private individual. An
infringement of this right justifies an award for damages. 1. To return the amount of P3,100.00 to plaintiff Mirasol Lugatiman with
interest at 12% per annum from January 12, 1984, the date of the last
receipt issued, until fully paid;
On February 22, 1983, petitioner MHP Garments, Inc., was awarded by the Boy Scouts
of the Philippines, the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts
uniforms, supplies, badges, and insignias. In their Memorandum Agreement, petitioner 2. To pay plaintiff Agnes Villa Cruz the sum of P2,000.00 for the 26
corporation was given the authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken the pieces of girl scout items not returned;
prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and other scouting supplies." 
1

3. To pay plaintiffs the amount of P50,000.00 for and as moral damages

Sometime in October 1983, petitioner corporation received information that private and P15,000.00 for and as exemplary damages; and
respondents Agnes Villa Cruz, Mirasol Lugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling
Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia without any authority. Petitioner de Guzman, an 4. P5,000.00 for and as attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
employee of petitioner corporation, was tasked to undertake the necessary surveillance
and to make a report to the Philippine Constabulary (PC). Costs against the defendants.

On October 25, 1983, at about 10:30 A.M., petitioner de Guzman, Captain Renato M. SO ORDERED.
Peñafiel, and two (2) other constabulary men of the Reaction Force Battalion, Sikatuna
Village, Diliman, Quezon City went to the stores of respondents at the Marikina Public The decision was appealed to the respondent court. On January 18, 1989, its Fifth
Market. Without any warrant, they seized the boy and girl scouts pants, dresses, and Division,   affirmed the Decision with modification, thus:
5

suits on display at respondents' stalls. The seizure caused a commotion and

embarrassed private respondents. Receipts were issued for the seized items. The items WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with
were then turned over by Captain Peñafiel to petitioner corporation for safekeeping. MODIFICATION; and, as modified, the dispositive portion thereof now
reads as follows:
 Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs (private respondents)
and against defendants (petitioners), ordering the latter jointly and
severally;
1. To return the amount of P3,100.00 to plaintiff (respondent) Mirasol
Lugatiman and cancel her application for distributor's license;
2. To pay plaintiff (respondent) Agnes Villa Cruz the sum of P2,000.00 for
the unreturned 26 pieces of girl scouts items with interest at 12% per
annum from June 4, 1984 (date the complaint was filed) until it is fully
paid;
3. To pay plaintiffs (respondents) the amount of P10,000.00 each, or a
total of P30,000.00, for and as moral damages; and P5,000.00 each, or a
total of P15,000.00, for and as exemplary damages; and
4. To pay plaintiffs (respondents) P5,000.00 for and as attorney's fees
and litigation expenses.
Costs of the case a quo and the instant appeal are assessed jointly and
severally against defendants-appellants (petitioners) MHP Garments, Inc.
and Larry de Guzman.
SO ORDERED.
In this petition for certiorari, petitioners contend:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IMPUTING LIABILITY FOR
DAMAGES TO THE PETITIONERS WHO DID NOT EFFECT THE
SEIZURE OF THE SUBJECT MERCHANDISE.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT MADE A FINDING THAT
THE MANNER WITH WHICH THE CONFISCATION OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS WAS TORTIOUS BUT PENALIZED INSTEAD THE
PETITIONERS WHO DID NOT COMMIT THE ACT OF CONFISCATION.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FOUND FOR THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND AGAINST THE PETITIONERS.
We affirm.
Article III, section 2, of the Constitution protects our people from unreasonable search
and seizure. It provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
This provision protects not only those who appear to be innocent but also those who
appear to be guilty but are nevertheless to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved.   In the case at bench, the seizure was made without any warrant. Under the
6
Rules of Court,   a warrantless search can only be undertaken under the following
7
circumstance:
Sec. 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. - A person lawfully arrested
may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used
as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
We hold that the evidence did not justify the warrantless search and seizure of private
respondents' goods. Petitioner corporation received information that private respondents
were illegally selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia in October 1983. The specific
date and time are not established in the evidence adduced by the parties. Petitioner de
Guzman then made a surveillance of the stores of private respondents. They reported to
the Philippine Constabulary and on October 25, 1983, the raid was made on the stores of
private respondents and the supposed illicit goods were seized. The progression of time
between the receipt of the information and the raid of the stores of private respondents
shows there was sufficient time for petitioners and the PC raiding party to apply for a
judicial warrant. Despite the sufficiency of time, they did not apply for a warrant and
seized the goods of private respondents. In doing so, they took the risk of a suit for
damages in case the seizure would be proved to violate the right of private respondents
against unreasonable search and seizure. In the case at bench, the search and seizure
were clearly illegal. There was no probable cause for the seizure. Probable cause for a
search has been defined as "such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched."   These facts and circumstances were not in any way shown by the
8
petitioners to justify their warrantless search and seizure. Indeed, after a preliminary
investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed their complaint for unfair
competition and later ordered the return of the seized goods.
Petitioners would deflect their liability with the argument that it was the Philippine
Constabulary that conducted the raid and their participation was only to report the
alleged illegal activity of private respondents.
While undoubtedly, the members of the PC raiding team should have been included in
the complaint for violation of the private respondents' constitutional rights, still, the
omission will not exculpate petitioners.
In the case of Lim vs. Ponce de Leon,   we ruled for the recovery of damages for violation
9 States this remedy is in the nature of a tort. (emphasis supplied)
of constitutional rights and liberties from public officer or private individual, thus:
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the latter for damages.
xxx xxx xxx
(9) The rights to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
xxx xxx xxx
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may
also be adjudged.
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) Illegal search;
(1) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34,
and 35.
Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional rights
have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages
from the public officer or employee responsible therefor. In addition,
exemplary damages may also be awarded.
xxx xxx xxx
The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It
is not necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To
make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which
is the effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past
have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good
faith in the performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article
is to put an end to official abuse by plea of the good faith. In the United
In the subsequent case of Aberca vs. Ver,   the Court En Banc explained the liability of
10
persons indirectly responsible, viz:
[T]he decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article
32. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or
indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and
liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e., the one directly
responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person
indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury
caused to the aggrieved party.
xxx xxx xxx
While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human
rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damages suits, it
should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of
the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly,
responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.
xxx xxx xxx
[N]either can it be said that only those shown to have participated
"directly" should be held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses
within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly,
responsible for its violations. (emphasis supplied)
Applying the aforecited provisions and leading cases, the respondent court correctly
granted damages to private respondents. Petitioners were indirectly involved in
transgressing the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure.
Firstly, they instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum
Agreement to undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting
supplies.   As correctly observed by respondent court:
11
Indeed, the acts committed by the PC soldiers of unlawfully seizing
appellees' (respondents') merchandise and of filing the criminal complaint
for unfair competition against appellees (respondents) were for the
protection and benefit of appellant (petitioner) corporation. Such being
the case, it is, thus, reasonably fair to infer from those acts that it was
upon appellant (petitioner) corporation's instance that the PC soldiers
conducted the raid and effected the illegal seizure. These circumstances
should answer the trial court's query — posed in its decision now under
consideration — as to why the PC soldiers immediately turned over the
seized merchandise to appellant (petitioner) corporation. 12
The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee. Larry de Guzman
did not lift a finger to stop the seizure of the boy and girl scouts items. By standing by
and apparently assenting thereto, he was liable to the same extent as the officers
themselves.   So with the petitioner corporation which even received for safekeeping the
13
goods unreasonably seized by the PC raiding team and de Guzman, and refused to
surrender them for quite a time despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair
competition.
Secondly, Letter of Instruction No. 1299 was precisely crafted on March 9, 1983 to
safeguard not only the privilege of franchise holder of scouting items but also the citizen's
constitutional rights, to wit:
TITLE: APPREHENSION OF UNAUTHORIZED
MANUFACTURERS AND DISTRIBUTORS OF
SCOUT PARAPHERNALIA AND IMPOUNDING
OF SAID PARAPHERNALIA.
ABSTRACT:
Directs all law enforcement agencies of the Republic of the Philippines, to
apprehend immediately unauthorized manufacturers and distributors of
Scout paraphernalia, upon proper application by the Boy Scouts of the
Philippines and/or Girl Scouts of the Philippines for warrant of arrest
and/or search warrant with a judge, or such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law; and to impound the said paraphernalia to be
used as evidence in court or other appropriate administrative body.
Orders the immediate and strict compliance with the Instructions.  14
Under the above provision and as aforediscussed, petitioners miserably failed to report
the unlawful peddling of scouting goods to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines for the
proper application of a warrant. Private respondents' rights are immutable and cannot be
sacrificed to transient needs.   Petitioners did not have the unbridled license to cause the
15
seizure of respondents' goods without any warrant.
And thirdly, if petitioners did not have a hand in the raid, they should have filed a third-
party complaint against the raiding team for contribution or any other relief,   in respect of
16
respondents' claim for Recovery of Sum of Money with Damages. Again, they did not.
We have consistently ruled that moral damages are not awarded to penalize the
defendant but to compensate the plaintiff for the injuries he may have
suffered.   Conformably with our ruling in Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, op. cit., moral
17
damages can be awarded in the case at bench. There can be no doubt that petitioners
must have suffered sleepless nights, serious anxiety, and wounded feelings due the
tortious raid caused by petitioners. Private respondents' avowals of embarrassment and
humiliation during the seizure of their merchandise were supported by their testimonies.
Respondent Cruz declared:
I felt very nervous. I was crying to loss (sic) my goods and capital
because I am doing business with borrowed money only, there was
commotion created by the raiding team and they even stepped on some
of the pants and dresses on display for sale. All passersby stopped to
watch and stared at me with accusing expressions. I was trembling and
terribly ashamed, sir. 18
Respondent Lugatiman testified:
I felt very nervous. I was crying and I was very much ashamed because
many people have been watching the PC soldiers hauling my items, and
many/I (sic) heard say "nakaw pala ang mga iyan" for which I am
claiming P25,000.00 for damages. 19
While respondent Gonzalez stated thus:
I do not like the way the raid was conducted by the team sir because it
looked like that what I have been selling were stolen items that they
should be confiscated by uniformed soldiers. Many people were around
and the more the confiscation was made in a scandalous manner; every
clothes, T-shirts, pants and dresses even those not wrapped dropped to
 the ground. I was terribly shamed in the presence of market goers that
morning. 20

Needles to state, the wantonness of the wrongful seizure justifies the award of exemplary
damages.   It will also serve as a stern reminder to all and sundry that the constitutional
21

protection against unreasonable search and seizure is a virile reality and not a mere
burst of rhetoric. The all encompassing protection extends against intrusions directly
done both by government and indirectly by private entities.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. We

impose a SIX PERCENT (6%) interest from January 9, 1987 on the TWO THOUSAND
PESOS (P2,000.00) for the unreturned twenty-six (26) pieces of girl scouts items and a
TWELVE PERCENT (12%) interest, in lieu of SIX PERCENT (6%), on the said amount
upon finality of this Decision until the payment thereof.   Costs against petitioners.
22

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 189220, December 07, 2016
ALBERT WILSON, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
EDUARDO ERMITA, SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ALBERTO ROMULO,
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAUL GONZALES, BUREAU OF JAIL
MANAGEMENT AND PENOLOGY, BOARD OF CLAIMS, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, SOLICITOR GENERAL AGNES DEVANADERA, AND BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Mandamus1 filed by Albert Wilson (Wilson) to
enforce the United Nations Human Rights Committee (the Committee)
Communication No. 868/19992 (View) against the Republic of the Philippines
(RP).chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Antecedent Facts
The present case has its roots in the incarceration and subsequent acquittal of
Wilson for the crime of rape which was the subject of the Court's ruling in GR.
No. 135915 entitled People of the Philippines v. Wilson.3
Proceedings in G.R. No. 135915
On September 16, 1996, Wilson, a British national, was accused and charged
with the crime of consummated rape4 by a 12-year-old girl, the daughter of his
Filipina live-in partner. The girl was assisted by her biological father in filing the
criminal complaint. Immediately thereafter, Wilson was taken into custody.
After trial, Wilson was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 171, in its
Decision dated September 30, 1998 and was imposed the death penalty pursuant
to Section 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 76595 and ordered to indemnify the
victim the amount of P50,000.00.6 The case was elevated to the Supreme Court
for automatic review.
Pending appeal, or on June 15, 1999, Wilson filed with the Committee, pursuant
to Article 5, paragraph 4 of the Optional Protocol, a case7against the RP for
violations of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
specifically: Article 2, paragraphs 2 and 3;8 Articles 6;9 7;10 9;11 10, paragraphs 1
and 2;12 and Article 14, paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 and 6.13
In the Decision14 dated December 21, 1999, the Court reversed the ruling of the
RTC. It found that there were serious discrepancies and inconsistent statements
particularly in the testimony given by the victim. It concluded that there was not
enough evidence to support the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of rape by Wilson. The Court, thus, acquitted Wilson stating:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is reversed and set aside. The
accused is hereby acquitted of the charge of consummated rape. The Director of
the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to effect his immediate release from custody
unless he is being held in custody for some other legal cause.
SO ORDERED.15ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Present Case
Wilson was released from detention the day after the acquittal. He immediately
left the Philippines for the United Kingdom (UK). Upon his return in the UK,
Wilson sought compensation from the Board of Claims (BOC) of the Department
of Justice (DOJ) pursuant to R.A. No. 730916 through counsel as one who was
unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned but released by virtue of an acquittal.
On January 1, 2001, the BoC-DOJ awarded to Wilson P14,000.00 as
compensation. On February 21, 2001, Wilson was informed of the BoC-DOJ
award and that he had to claim the compensation in person in the Philippines.
Wilson moved for reconsideration arguing that under R.A. No. 7309, he was
entitled to P40,000.00.17
On April 23, 2001, the BoC-DOJ informed Wilson that a memorandum was issued
directing the BOC to raise the award to the maximum amount that may be paid
to those unjustly imprisoned or detained subject to the availability of funds. 18
Wilson applied for and was denied a tourist visa to travel to the Philippines due to
his presence in the Bureau of Immigration (BI) watch list. 19 According to the BI,
Wilson's presence in the watch list could be attributed to his overstaying and his
previous conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.20
The BoC-DOJ, thereafter, issued Resolution No. 2001-25 dated August 24, 2001
granting Wilson an additional award of P26,000.00 in addition to the initial
amount of P14,000.00 bringing the total award to P40,000.00. 21
In September 2001, the DOJ issued a check amounting to P26,000.00
representing the additional award. The check was made out to Wilson, care of the
Ambassador of UK at the request of the former.22
On November 11, 2003, the Committee issued the View. It found that the
allegations falling under Article 14, paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 6 of the ICCPR were
inadmissible.23 The Committee stated:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
9. In accordance with article 2, paragraph 3 (a), of the [ICCPR], the State party
is under an obligation to provide the author with an effective remedy. In respect
of the violations of article 9 the State party should compensate the author.
As to the violations of articles 7 and 10 suffered while in detention, including
subsequent to sentence of death, the Committee observes that
the compensation provided by the State party under its domestic law was
not directed at these violations, and that compensation due to the author
should take due account both of the seriousness of the violations and the
damage to the author caused. In this context, the Committee recalls the duty
upon the State party to undertake a comprehensive and impartial
investigation of the issues raised in the course of the author's detention,
and to draw the appropriate penal and disciplinary consequences for the
individuals found responsible. As to the imposition of immigration fees and
visa exclusion, the Committee takes the view that in order to remedy the
violations of the Covenant the State party should refund to the author the
moneys claimed from him. All monetary compensation thus due to the author by
the State party should be made available for payment to the author at the venue
of his choice, be it within the State party's territory or abroad. The State party is
also under an obligation to avoid similar violations in the
future.24ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In a letter25cralawred dated June 19, 2008, Wilson, through his counsel, asked
the Executive Secretary [ES]:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As with internationally wrongful acts, a breach of a State obligation gives rise first
to a duty of reparation. The Committee found that the breach of Covenant
obligations required that the Philippines provide compensation or redress. In
accordance with the decision of the Committee, we thus pray that this Honorable
Office:
1. take steps to effect payment of compensation to Mr. Wilson, taking
into consideration the seriousness of the breach of his human
rights;chanrobleslaw
2. direct the [BOC] to release the sums awarded to Mr. Wilson to his
authorized representatives, the undersigned counsel Roque and
Butuyan Law Office.
3. direct the [BI] to refund the amount unjustly imposed upon Mr.
Wilson for overstaying his tourist visa, such be indirectly
attributable to the wrongful decision of the trial court.26
In his letter27 dated October 20, 2008, Wilson reiterated his June 19, 2008 letter
and asked that the payment of compensation be effected, a comprehensive and
impartial investigation be conducted, and the monies paid by Wilson with respect
to immigration fees and visa exclusion be refunded.28
On October 29, 2008, the letter was referred by the ES to the DOJ Secretary for
appropriate action.29
On September 9, 2009, Wilson filed the present petition for mandamus.30 He
insists his entitlement to the writ of mandamus owing to the ICCPR and the
Optional Protocol. He argues that by virtue of the doctrine of transformation, the
RP is in breach of an international obligation since any View issued by the
Committee constitutes part of international law and that the RP is obligated to
enforce the same. He prays that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Respondents take steps to ensure that Albert Wilson is paid and
given reparation in the amount sufficient to compensate him for
the torture and abuse he suffered under the penal system of the
Philippines, in compliance with Philippine treaty obligations in the
ICCPR as embodied in the Communication of the Human Rights
Committee in Case no. 868/1999 in keeping with international law
on reparations.
2. Respondents undertake continual efforts and steps to ensure that
no torture and inhuman and degrading treatment are suffered by
prisoners in the National Penitentiary and other places of detention
and imprisonment in the Philippines, in the manner laid down in
the Manila Bay case.31
The RP, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opines that the petition
is without merit. It argues that Wilson was not able to prove that there is any
national law giving life to the ICCPR and Optional Protocol in order for it to have
force and effect in our jurisdiction as required under Article 2(2) of the ICCPR.32 It
further avers that the findings of the Committee are merely recommendatory and
does not give rise to an obligation to enforce and implement the View. Thus,
being recommendatory, the View cannot be used to compel the Philippine
Government to compensate Wilson.33 In any event, Wilson's documents show
that BoC-DOJ had already awarded in his favor P40,000.00 pursuant to R.A. No.
7309 and it was of Wilson's own volition that the amount remains unclaimed. 34 It
disagrees that the case of Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, et al. v.
Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, et al.35 is applicable because unlike the
Manila Bay case, the petitioner, in this case, seeks to enforce international law
and not domestic law.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Issue
Simply, the issue before this Court ts whether mandamus lies to compel the
enforcement of the View.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Ruling of the Court
The petition is without merit.
Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, mandamus is a writ issued to
compel a tribunal to perform an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust or station, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 3. Petition for mandamus. - When any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent,
immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act
required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
respondent.
The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as
provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46. (Emphasis
ours)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Yuvienco v. Hon. Canonoy, etc., et al.,37 and several times reiterated
thereafter, the Court held that a purely ministerial duty must exist and a clear
legal right must be established by the petitioner for mandamus to lie, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Two pertinent principles arc well settled in this jurisdiction: (a) one is that
mandamus would lie only to compel a tribunal, board or officer to comply with a
purely ministerial duty, or to allow a party to exercise a right or to occupy and
enjoy the privileges of an office to which he is lawfully entitled; (b) the others is
that for the writ of mandamus to issue, petitioner must establish a clear legal
right to the relief sought, and a mandatory duty on the part of the respondent in
relation thereto.38ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It behooves the Court to examine whether the View dated November 11, 2003
relied upon by Wilson confers upon him any legal right which the respondents are
ministerially required to perform but have unlawfully neglected.
No Ministerial Duty
It is well-settled that a ministerial duty must be clear and specific as to leave no
room for the exercise of discretion in its performance.39 As stated in Lord Allan
Jay Q. Velasco v. Hon. Speaker Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr., Secretary General
Marilyn B. Barua-Yap and Regina Ongsiako Reyes:40
A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a
given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a
legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public
officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be
performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial
only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official
discretion or judgment.41ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
R.A. No. 7309 was passed on March 30, 1992 creating a BoC-DOJ to evaluate and
investigate claims for compensation for persons who were: (1) unjustly accused,
convicted and imprisoned but released by virtue of an acquittal; (2) unjustly
detained and released without being charged; (3) a victim of arbitrary or illegal
detention and released without being charged; and (4) victim of a violent
crime.42 Under R.A. No. 7309, compensation for victims of unjust imprisonment
or detention will be based on the number of months of imprisonment.
Compensation for each month of imprisonment shall not exceed P1,000.00.43
It is clear, however, that Wilson has been granted compensation under R.A. No.
7309. In fact, the BoC-DOJ granted to Wilson the maximum allowed
compensation under that law. It was Wilson's decision not to collect the money
granted to him.
Other than the R.A. No. 7309, under which Wilson had already been granted
compensation, there is no other law or regulation that forms the basis of such
ministerial right that the government is impelled to grant. Wilson does not
present any law by which his ministerial right arises from with respect to
additional compensation. It is not within this Court's discretion to adjust any
monetary grant arbitrarily.
There is No Clear and Complete Legal Right
On December 19, 1966, the RP became party to the ICCPR and the Optional
Protocol.44 The ICCPR recognized the "inherent dignity of the human person" and
its concomitant rights. At the same time, the Philippines made a declaration that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Philippine Government, in accordance with article 41 of the said Covenant,
recognizes the competence of the Human Rights Committee set up in the
aforesaid Covenant, to receive and consider communications to the effect that a
State Party claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under
the Covenant.45ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Pursuant to Article 41 of the ICCPR, the Committee was organized. Signatories
recognized the competence of the Committee to receive and consider
communications to the effect that a State Party claims that another State Party is
not fulfilling its obligations under the ICCPR.46 In addition, under Article 1 of the
Optional Protocol, the State parties agreed to recognize the competence of the
Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals who claim to
be victims of a violation by that State Party of any rights set forth in the ICCPR.
The Philippine Congress ratified the ICCPR on October 23, 1986 and the Optional
Protocol on August 22, 1989.
As the OSG points out, the Court in the case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care
Association of the Philippines v. Health Sec. Duque III47 stated that a treaty is
transformed into domestic law through a constitutional mechanism. The Court
explained:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of
domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation
method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic
law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.
The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional
declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic
law.
Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to
Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that "[n]o treaty or
international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at
least two-thirds of. all the members of the Senate." Thus, treaties or conventional
international law must go through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it
to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic
conflicts.48 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In sum, there must be an act more than ratification to make a treaty applicable
in our jurisdiction. To be sure, what was ratified were the ICCPR and the Optional
Protocol, nowhere in the instrument does it say that the View of the Committee
forms part of the treaty. Even the Committee in its General Comment No. 33
stated that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
11. While the function of the Human Rights Committee in considering individual
communications is not, as such, that of a judicial body, the views issued by the
Committee under the Optional Protocol exhibit some important characteristics of
a judicial decision. xxx.49ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Any View issued by the Committee only displays "important characteristics of a
judicial decision" and are not per se decisions which may be enforced outright.
These Views, therefore, are mere recommendations to guide the State it is issued
against.
Once again, the Court would like to stress that it is beyond its purview to act on
such recommendations as these are matters which are best taken up by the
Legislative and the Executive branches of government as can be seen by the
formation of the Presidential Human Rights Committee.50 To recall, the Court
derives its powers under its basic mandate under Section 1, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
l9wer courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Court finds that there is no ministerial duty and clear legal right which would
justify the issuance of a writ of mandamus.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.