March 6 SPL

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 139250. August 15, 2000.]
GABRIEL CAPILI, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., Respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals 1 in CA G.R. CR No. 19336 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Gabriel Capili,
et. al." affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court 2 of the National Capital
Judicial Region, Branch 34, finding Gabriel Capili guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Presidential Decree 1612
Gabriel Capili y Recto (GABRIEL) together with his wife Ferma Capili y Inot were
charged with violation of Presidential Decree 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-
Fencing Law, in an information that reads: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about November 5, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other. With
intent to gain for themselves or for another, did then and there willfully and knowingly
receive, possess, keep, acquire and sell or dispose of the following, to wit: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Assorted pieces of jewelry
Several pieces of old coins (U.S. dollar)
all valued at P3,000,000.00, which they knew or should have known to have been
derived from the proceeds of a (sic) crime of theft. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Contrary to law." 3
On December 3, 1993, both accused entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged
with the assistance of counsel. 4 Thereafter, trial ensued.
The trial court summarized the testimonies of the witnesses as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"x x x
Christine Diokno testified that at 4:00 P.M. on November 4, 1993, when she went home
from her office, she discovered that some of her (sic) items at (sic) her closet and the
jewelries (sic) and money at (sic) her mother’s room were taken. Upon call, two Makati
police responded and surveyed the room where the robbery took place. The police
officer took her statement (Exhs. "F", "F-1" and "F-2") and then investigated the theft
case. Police prepared the police report and concluded that Michael Manzo, her former
houseboy, committed the offense so a case against Manzo was filed. She described all
the properties that were taken as those reflected in the police report because according
to her she gave the police a list of the items and is part of her statement (tsn, p. 11,
May 11, 1994). Allegedly the value is about 3 Million pesos, some were of 20 years and
some were of 30 years vintage, acquired by her parents since their wedding in 1945.
Some from abroad, States or Hongkong acquired during trips.
On November 27, 1993, Quiapo sub-station informed her that Michael Manzo was
there. She talked to Michael Manzo who admitted the commission of the stealing and
that he sold the items to Gabriel Capili and his wife for P50,000.00. Likewise Michael
Manzo admitted that on two occasions Gabriel Capili returned some of the items. The
first was before he went to Isabela. That Capili returned to him (Manzo) the
memorabilia taken from her room consisting of (sic) school ring, bracelets, key chain
and some custom jewelries (sic) and some other items. That three days before the
apprehension Gabriel returned the Raymond Wiel watch and two cast rings with
diamonds. The first ring is valued at P3,000.00 the second watch was (sic) cost
P20,000.00 to P60,000.00 and the two cast rings about P80,000.00. Then Manzo
informed her that he sold those items returned to other buyers, near Claro M. Recto,
who paid P1,500.00 and P1,000.00 for the ring which police officer (sic) failed to
recover because the stand was no longer there. She was shown by the police officer the
items recovered from Gabriel Capili and his wife which she identified as her property.
Shown with Exhs. "A", "B", "C", she said those are her properties and that the coins
(sic) were acquired during the trips to the States. She kept John F. Kennedy dollar
coins contained in a small box. She further relayed that the coins, Exh. "A" came from a
brooch owned by her mother. The chain with medal of our Lady was bought by her
mother and was given to her together with other belongings. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
That before the discovery of the incident her mother had the list of all the items by
counting them physically because her mother used to check the jewelry every week in
her presence. That all is worth three (3) Million Pesos because the jewelries (sic) were
sometimes brought to a jeweler for a change or for removal of stones or replacement
that is why she considered that all the jewelries (sic) were appraised. She does not
know, however, what exactly were brought by her mother. That she was present during
the last inventory of the items and the land titles by her mother, presenting the alleged
inventory on August 1, 1993 (Exh. "S"), after her father died on July 15, 1993. While
her mother was checking them, she was in the room writing the description of the
jewelries (sic), the cost and date when bought. That the corresponding value stated
came from her mother kept inside the vault.
That on November 2, 1993, she took out all the items because November 9 was her
mother’s birthday and would like to select the items she and her mother were going to
wear for the occasion then check the jewelries (sic) against the prepared list. The list
included the items lost but did not include the box of memorabilia which was taken
from her room. She claimed that the records including the receipts from where the list
was taken were lost together with the jewelries (sic) that were taken.
x x x
To support the allegation in the Information Michael Manzo testified that after he asked
his friend Emilio Benitez where he can sell his jewelries (sic) he was brought to Boy
Recto’s (accused) house at 1260 Carola St., Sampaloc, Manila, to whom he gave one
bag of jewelries (sic) with the information that he stole them while he was a house boy.
Recto agreed to pay him P50,000.00 (p. 3, tsn, March 3, 1994). He left and went back
after a week or on November 5, as he needed the money. He was paid P1,500.00. He
left again and went back after two weeks and was paid again P6,000.00. He left again
but in his return he was not paid anymore. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
When he visited his friend Emilio Benitez at the precinct, having been charged with
vagrancy, he was caught by the police asking him where he brought the jewelries (sic),
so he pointed to Boy Recto, who was picked-up and brought to the station and
investigated. During the frisking and searching at the station, police officers found
pearls and old coins from Gabriel Capili. The following day, Mrs. Ferma Capili was
investigated at sub-station 3, Quiapo, WPD. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
He identified the pearl earring with copper (sic) with diamond (Exh. "A"). He likewise
identified the old coin 4 pieces of dollars marked as Exhs. "B-1", "B-2", "B-3" and "B-
4" ; "B-1", "B-2" dimes, "B-3" and "B-4" quarter cents; pendant with inscription Boy
Recto, Exh. "C." He admitted that the statement marked as Exh. "D" and sub-markings
is his.
Describing the contents of the bag, he said that there were more or less 20 pieces of
rings, some with pearls and some with diamonds and birthstones; more or less 20 pairs
of earrings, diamond with pearls; more or less 10 pieces of necklaces of plain gold with
pendant with the replica of God and cast with diamond. There were Quartz watches; 3
pieces Bulova watches; 5 pieces of Seiko watches, Raymond Wiel. That per
complainant’s information, all of them costs (sic) 3 Million Pesos which he merely gave
to the accused without counting them. He however, claims that they will cost only one
to two million pesos. Despite which value, he entrusted them to Boy Recto without
counting the pieces.
Defense adopted Exhibit "B" as Exhibit "1" and sub-markings, Exhibit "D" as their
Exhibit "2" and "2-a" .
That during the investigation, when he was given another lawyer, he stated that he told
the accused to sell the jewelries (sic) he stole. (p. 6, tsn, March 16, 1994)
That witness explained that only the fancy ones were returned to him.
That three days after he left the jewelries (sic) to (sic) Recto, they had drinking session
somewhere at Recto, on which occasion, he did not ask for the jewelries (sic). chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
That the P1,500.00 was given to him near the bus terminal at Sampaloc near UST and
when the fancies (sic) were returned, which he came to know as such because he had it
appraised in a pawnshop when they arrived from Roxas, Isabela. When the jewelries
(sic) were returned contained in the bag, he accepted, opened (sic) for a couple of
minutes without counting. That Emilio Benitez glanced on (sic) them because the bus
was about leave. Recto gave the instruction that he can come back within two weeks
because Boy Recto will pay.
The witness admitted that he is facing a charge of Qualified Theft in Makati pending
before a court where he posted his bail. That he is testifying before this Court out of his
own volition. He explained that they went to Isabela per instruction of Gabriel Capili
that they should lie low because the police were hunting for them and that Emilio
Benitez is from Roxas, Isabela.
After more or less two weeks when (sic) they arrived from Isabela, he was requested
by Boy Recto (Gabriel Capili) to sign a blank document somewhere at Espana
(Document Exh. "3" to "3-A"). He was not, however, forced. That upon arrival from
Isabela, they went to the house of the accused then proceeded to wait at a hotel in Sta.
Cruz. After three hours of waiting, the accused arrived and gave him P6,000.00 in the
presence of Emilio Benitez without receipt. He declared that he himself is not sure
whether all the jewelries (sic) inside the bag are (sic) genuine or not.
Having admitted to the police that he is Michael Manzo, he was asked where he brought
the jewelries (sic) so he pointed to Boy Recto. He admitted to have signed a blank
document, Exhibit "4" and "3", his signature, Exh. "4-1" and Exh. "3-A", but do (sic)
not know where the originals were, but later said that the originals are in the hands of
the police officers.
SPO3 Ernesto Ramirez testified that as police officer of Station 3, on November 27,
1993 he investigated Michael Manzo who was accused of Qualified Theft at Makati and
who admitted to him having committed said offense and pointed to the house of Gabriel
Capili at Sampaloc, Manila where he sold the jewelries (sic). Thereafter, he and his
companions SPO2 Reyes, SPO3 Salalia and SPO3 Fuentes with Michael Manzo went to
the place and saw the wife of Gabriel Capili wearing the pair of earrings, one of the
jewelries (sic) stolen. They were allowed by Gabriel Capili to get (sic) inside the
residence where Gabriel Capili showed him the signed document of Michael Manzo, Exh.
"4" and said he returned the jewelries (sic). It was however, denied by Manzo although
he admitted the signature. Gabriel Capili went with them to the police precinct where
he (Gabriel Capili) was referred to the investigator and found (sic) from his pockets 4
pieces of coins. Allegedly while the wife was then being investigated, Manzo pointed to
the earrings worn by the (sic) wife as part of those stolen properties. The same was
taken by the investigator. He pointed to both accused inside the courtroom.
SPO1 Eduardo San Diego also from Station 3, Quiapo, Manila, investigator, investigated
the case of Qualified Theft that happened at the house of Christine Diokno. Both
accused were positively identified by Michael Manzo so he took the latter’s statement.
That during his investigation he recovered a necklace with pendant, US dollar coins with
different denominations and one pair of earrings (Exh. "A", "B" and "C"). In their
investigation they tried to recover the other items but failed because the establishment
of the other buyer pointed to them by Michael Manzo was no longer existing. He
prepared the booking sheet and arrest report Exhs. "D" and "E" and sub-markings. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
x x x
Gabriel Capili denied any knowledge about the charge against him and declared that
what Michael Manzo stated in court that he agreed to pay P50,000.00 but paid only
P1,800.00 is not true. He was at home on November 10, 1993 selling junk foods (sic)
when he was called by Emil, companion of Michael Manzo, through the phone which
number he gave to Emil when the latter bought something on credit from him a week
before that date. Emil asked him if he would like to buy jewelry to whom he relayed if
he will see the jewelry. Emil arrived at 2:00 o’clock P.M. together with Michael Manzo,
the first time he saw the latter and showed him two (2) pieces of jewelry, one
birthstone and an old coin with a price of P2,000.00. He inquired from (sic) where the
jewelries (sic) came from and was answered by Michael Manzo that it came from and
(sic) being sold by his mother. He declined because he cannot pay for it. Michael Manzo
handed to Emil something wrapped of which he was asked to appraise. Michael Manzo
asked him if he knew somebody who can buy. He said he has but hard to see because
he seldom see the man already but was invited to see the person at Recto. After
boarding the taxi they did not proceed immediately to the place. Michael Manzo ordered
the taxi cab to go back to Sta. Mesa Love Hotel where he was told to wait. Michael
Manzo went up the hotel while Emil went towards Aurora Boulevard walking carrying
some items but did not know what happened. After one hour of waiting at the taxicab
and worried about the taxi fare, he went inside the hotel and after inquiring from the
counter where his companion was, Michael Manzo went down with two women
companions. Fifteen minutes after the two women left, Emil arrived and said he went to
Cubao selling the jewelries (sic). Thereafter, they went to Recto at (sic) a business
establishment near the Galaxy Theater. He was offered to drink from almost dark until
dawn asking him if he had already find (sic) his friend buyer. They parted ways and
went home. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On November 15, Manzo and Emil called him up again asking if it was possible to see
him which he positively answered. He went to UST somewhere near Mambusco station
where he saw Emil with Michael Manzo about 5 meters from Emil standing talking to
someone. He asked Emil if he was able to sell the jewelries (sic) and was answered "not
yet." Emil was borrowing P700.00 but he has no such amount, so Emil gave him the
jewelries (sic) formerly offered to him, the birthstone and watch allegedly as a gift from
Michael Manzo. Emil informed him that he and Michael Manzo together with two others
were going to Isabela so he gave the P700.00. After they (Emil and his friend) boarded
the bus he went home.
On November 21, he was fetched by Emil, brought to a place near the UST along
Dapitan Street where he found Michael Manzo retrieving the gift given to him. Because
of Manzo’s insistence, he returned them but asked Manzo to sign Exh. "3." They failed
to return his P700.00 so he asked Manzo to sign another documents (sic), Exhs. "4"
and "4-A", the original of which was given to the policeman and which was not returned
to him.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
After several days Pat. Ramirez arrived informing him that Michael Manzo sold him
jewelries (sic). Invited (sic) he went to the police at the Hidalgo sub-station 3. Michael
Manzo was not immediately investigated but Michael Manzo and Emil were incarcerated.
After fifteen (15) minutes from the second floor he was brought to the ground floor
inside the cell and detained for several days. He alleged that on the same day he was
brought in a room at the second floor where he was mauled by Pat. Ramirez (sic) not
convinced with what he said about the paper (Exh. "4"), he gave them then brought
back to the cell. He told the police that the jewelries (sic) they are looking for are in the
possession of Michael Manzo. He further claimed that Michael Manzo talked to a certain
Go and pointed to some other buyers who were brought to the precinct. He, however,
did not know if they were released. On November 27 when his wife visited him at 7:00
P.M. she was likewise incarcerated because Michael Manzo pointed to the earrings of his
wife.
He further declared that prior to his wife’s arrival, policeman and Michael planned that
when his wife arrived, Michael will point to her earrings, allegedly because Emil gave
P500.00 to the police officer while planning to include his wife. His wife was then
brought to the second floor but did not know what happened, thereafter was
incarcerated.
He testified that the earrings of his wife was given by her brother and that the old coin,
Exh. "B" is his acquired when he helped, per order of Pat. Nick Golahan, in carrying
dead body (sic) when MV Nucnucan sank in Cebu where the son of one he carried gave
him coin. The other coin belongs to him which he picked up in Cebu. That the necklace
with print Boy Recto on the pendant belongs to him and which was taken at the
precinct from the dancer to whom he gave it. Further stating that the same came from
Pat. Alex Aguirre when he was still single. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
That upon inquest, the Fiscal told the police that they should be released but were not
and (sic) brought back to the cell. The following morning they were brought to the City
Hall. There again, the Fiscal ordered that they be released but were not and (sic)
brought back to the cell once more. On the third time when he was brought to the
Fiscal, the latter allegedly told him that San Diego altered the testimony that is why
they will be incarcerated.
He denied that Manzo signed Exh. "3" without any writing and pointed to the
typewritten statement therein as his relaying that the same was thru Michael’s
suggestion at the time when they were already quarreling while accusing Manzo to have
stolen the properties subject matter of this case and even questioned that there is
something wrongly written, the giving as a gift.
That although they did not know the accused Michael Manzo and did not know of any
reason why he pointed to him and his wife as buyers of the jewelries (sic) worth 3
Million Pesos, he believed that it was because of the quarrel when he started accusing
Manzo of stealing of which he was being blamed.
He now claims that the he came to know Emilio Benitez only on November 5, the same
time he came to know Michael. (tsn, p. 22, Aug. 8, 1994), hence, there is no reason
why Benitez will approach him selling the property. There is no quarrel with the police
officers and so he has no knowledge why these people would like to implicate him and
his wife. He likewise did not know of any reason why the police officer stated in their
affidavit of arrest that the items "US Dollars" were recovered from him at the time of
the investigation. He admitted that only one of the coins belongs to him, picked-up
from Cebu (Exh. "B-4") and his two (2) LRT coins are still missing so with P20.00 and
two more Abraham Lincoln coins. Although he claimed that San Diego did not release
them after the Fiscal’s order he did not file any action against San Diego. That on
December 1, 1993, the Prosecutor ordered the police to release them and was present
asking the Fiscal if he can be allowed to go home but since they did not have any
document, the Fiscal said the policemen will take care of them. They did not execute
any statement because according to him he was not given any chance. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
SPO1 Beinvenido Inot testified that he is a member of the National Police Force of
Precinct 1, Olongapo City and that the accused Ferma Capili, wife of Gabriel, is his
sister. He was asked by his sister to testify about the pair of earring (sic) that he gave
Ferma on June 24, 1990, a U. S. Fancy jewel which was given by her sister from
abroad. It has brillantitos which is the same as a base of the glass. The same was
confiscated from Ferma by the police.
The last time he saw the pair of earring was on the date his sister celebrated her
birthday. Showing all the exhibits of the prosecution to the witness, at first he answered
"There are no brillantitos pair of earrings, sir.." And later witness answered: "Ay ito
pala." (holding the pair of earrings marked as Exh. "A-1", tsn p. 5, Oct. 14, 1994). He
later claimed that the pair of earrings is actually for his wife sent by her sister abroad to
Olongapo. He cannot remember having seen Ferma Capili on December 1993 to
September 9, 1994, they saw each other two times and that they talked about those
jewelries (sic) thru the phone at that time when the accused was apprehended and
incarcerated. However, despite the information of Ferma Capili that she was
apprehended because of the pair of earrings he did not do anything because allegedly
he was too busy and they have operation. He admitted that this is the first time he
declared that the earrings came from him without executing any written statement.
(Defense marked Exh. "A-1" pair of earring (sic) as their Exh. "8") (Decision, pp. 1-15;
Rollo, pp. 31-45)." 5
On August 17, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision acquitting Ferma Capili but
finding the accused, Gabriel Capili, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
the dispositive portion of the decision reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, finding the prosecution’s evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction

beyond moral certainty, for violation of P.D. 1612 in relation to Sec. 3 par. A of the
same law which required that the penalty to be imposed shall be in the maximum
period if the value of the property is more than P22,000.00, adding one (1) year for its
additional P10,000.00, the total penalty of which shall not exceed twenty (20) years,
further considering that the consideration of the purchase is
P50,000.00, Accused Gabriel Capili is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
violation of said law. Without any mitigating or aggravating circumstances attendant to
its commission, but granting the accused with the benefit of the indeterminate sentence
law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years
of prision mayor medium and to suffer the additional penalty of three years (one for
every P10,000.00) and to further suffer the accessory penalty thereof. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The accused shall be credited with the full extent of his preventive imprisonment in
accordance with Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
Since the claim of P3 Million has not been sufficiently proven but the agreed price
between the seller and herein accused is only P50,000.00, the accused is hereby
directed to indemnify the complainant Christine Diokno the sum of P50,000.00, less the
value of the jewelries (sic) presented in Court, Exhibits "A" "B" and "C" and its sub-
markings, to be returned to the owner upon proper receipt and photograph.
The bond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled.
The body of the accused is hereby committed to the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections, National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, through the City Warden
of Manila.
Considering that there is no evidence to show complicity and/or that Ferma Capili
conspired and confederated with her husband Gabriel Capili, she is hereby acquitted
from the offense charged in the Information.
The bond posted by the accused for her provisional liberty is hereby cancelled.
SO ORDERED." 6
GABRIEL appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the RTC the
dispositive portion of its decision reads: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court dated August 17, 1995 convicting the
appellant for violation of P.D. 1612 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED." 7
Motion for reconsideration was denied 8 , hence this appeal where the accused assigns
the following error:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"THE COURT OF APPEALS IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN NOT REMANDING THE CASE TO THE COURT A QUO FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
DESPITE OF (SIC) THE FAVORABLE RECOMMENDATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL CONSIDERING THAT THE ACTUAL VALUE OF THE FENCED
ARTICLES WERE NOT CORRECTLY ESTABLISHED BY THE PROSECUTION." 9
The petitioner maintains that even for the sake of argument that the prosecution has
established that the petitioner committed the crime of fencing (violation of P.D. 1612)
beyond reasonable doubt, there is no legal basis for him to suffer the entire penalty
imposed by the trial court. Petitioner claims that the Office of the Solicitor General, in
its appellee’s brief filed with the Court of Appeals, agrees that basis of the penalty for
the offense of fencing is the value of the property actually involved and not the agreed
selling price of the stolen item. The petitioner also maintains that since the prosecution
failed to prove the value of the stolen goods, the guilt of the petitioner has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt. The petitioner therefore prays that the decision of the
Court of Appeals be reversed and a new one be issued either acquitting the petitioner
or remanding the case to the court a quo for further proceedings. 10
The respondent through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that on April
25, 1997, it filed a Manifestation/Clarification modifying the recommendation it made in
its appellee’s brief to the effect that a remand of the case would unduly delay the
disposition of the case. Therefore, to expedite the final resolution of the case, the OSG
recommended that as an alternative to a remand that the assessment and findings of
the trial court on the value of the subject articles, which is P50,000.00 be adopted and
used instead. 11 It is therefore the contention of the OSG that there is no merit in the
petitioner’s claim that the OSG agreed to the remand of the case for further reception
of evidence to determine the value of the stolen goods inasmuch as this would be
prejudicial to the rights of the petitioner. The OSG also opines that the petitioner is not
entitled to an acquittal since the value of the stolen property is not determinative of the
guilt of the accused and is not an element of the crime but is only determinative of the
penalty therefor.
The petition is partly meritorious.
Fencing is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall
buy receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or
in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he
knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft. 12 The essential elements of the crime of fencing are: chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused, who is not a principal or an accomplice in the commission of the crime
of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or
disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or
anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the said crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft;
and
4. There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another." 13
All these elements are present in the case at bench. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The first element or the fact of theft was proved by prosecution witness, Christine
Diokno (DIOKNO) who testified that several pieces of jewelry, watches and money were
stolen from her mother’s bedroom. She reported the theft to the police who after
conducting an investigation, concluded that her houseboy, Michael Manzo (MANZO),
committed the offense. Consequently, a criminal case was filed against MANZO. In her
testimony, DIOKNO stated that the major items that were taken consisted of two
diamond rings each having a diamond solitaire of three (3) carats each, a pair of
diamond earrings each having a diamond solitaire of two point five (2.5) carats, a
diamond cross with twelve (12) half (1/2) carat diamond, her mother’s wedding band,
an emerald set consisting of an emerald ring set with diamonds with a pair of matching
earrings, a sapphire set consisting of two sapphire rings set with diamonds and
matching earrings, a South Sea pearl set consisting of a ring and two pairs of matching
earrings also set with diamonds, three cultured pearl necklaces with matching cultured
pearl earrings set with diamonds, a topaz set consisting of two rings with diamonds and
one with rubies with a set of matching earrings, a cameo set consisting of a ring,
matching earrings and a brooch all set with diamonds and four solid gold watches, a
Rolex, Piaget, Universal Geneve and a Gabriel Peregaux. She alleged that the total
value of the items amounted to approximately three million (P3,000,000.00) pesos. In
court, DIOKNO identified some of the recovered stolen items consisting of a set of pearl
earrings with two small diamonds (Exhibit "A"), a gold chain with pendant (Exhibit "B")
and old United States dollar coins (Exhibit "C"). 14
DIOKNO’s testimony is corroborated by MANZO, who admitted that he stole the jewelry
from DIOKNO. And that after stealing the jewelry, he delivered them to the petitioner,
GABRIEL with the information that the jewelry was stolen and for the purpose of selling
the same. He identified GABRIEL in court as the person to whom he delivered the stolen
jewelry. 15 MANZO testified that GABRIEL was not a participant in the theft of the
jewelry and that he told GABRIEL that the jewelry was stolen. He also established the
fact that the petitioner agreed to pay fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos for the stolen
jewelry which clearly manifests intent to gain on the part of the petitioner.
Consequently, MANZO’s testimony proves the second, third and fourth elements of the
crime of fencing. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
At any rate, the law does not require proof of purchase of the stolen articles by the
accused as mere possession thereof is enough to give rise to a presumption of fencing.
16 GABRIEL, who was in possession of at least two of the stolen items, has not
rebutted this presumption.
We also disagree with the petitioner that the prosecution failed to prove the value of
the stolen items.
Although DIOKNO’s testimony is hearsay and is inadmissible for purposes of

determining the value of the stolen items inasmuch as her testimony was not based on
her own personal knowledge but on the appraisals made by jewelers and what her
mother told her, MANZO’s testimony remains unrebutted. MANZO established that he
sold the stolen items to GABRIEL for P50,000.00 and in the absence of any evidence to
the contrary, said amount is presumed to be the value thereof as it is the only value
established by the prosecution. Besides, the valuation of the stolen items made by the
trial court is a factual issue and factual findings of the trial court especially when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals are entitled to great weight and generally should not
be disturbed on appeal. 17
We note however that the trial court was mistaken in imposing the penalty. A person
found guilty of fencing property the value of which exceeds P22,000.00 is punished
under Presidential Decree 1612 as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 3. Penalties. — Any person guilty of fencing shall be punished as hereunder

indicated:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
a) The penalty of prision mayor, if the value of the property involved is more than
12,000 pesos but not exceeding 22,000 pesos; if the value of such property exceeds
the latter sum, the penalty provided for in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos, but the total
penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, the
penalty shall be termed reclusion temporal and the accessory penalty pertaining thereto
provided in the Revised Penal Code shall also be imposed." cralaw virtua1aw library
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law 18 , the court shall sentence an accused to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed and the minimum of which shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense; and if the
offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence an accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum
fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed
by the same. 19
Applying the foregoing, the petitioner should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of
prision mayor maximum. The fact that the value of the fenced items exceeds
P22,000.00 should not, like in cases of estafa, be considered in the initial determination
of the indeterminate penalty. 20 In the absence of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, this should be imposed in its medium period which ranges from ten (10)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to eleven (11) years and four (4) months.
Adding the additional two (2) year sentence, one for each P10,000.00 in excess of
P22,000.00, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is anywhere within ten (10)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor to thirteen (13) years and
four (4) months of reclusion temporal21 . On the other hand, the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence should be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower
which is prision correccional maximum 22 which ranges from four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals
finding the petitioner, Gabriel Capili guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Presidential Decree 1612 otherwise known as the Anti-fencing law is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the petitioner is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
minimum to thirteen (13) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
SO ORDERED. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Melo, Vitug, Panganiban and Purisima, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 102342. July 3, 1992.]
LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, Petitioner, v. HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., in his capacity as

Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region,
Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Hector B. Almeyda for Petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; PRESCRIPTION; 1985 RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE;

PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD DOES NOT APPLY TO OFFENSES SUBJECT TO SUMMARY
PROCEDURE. — Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on summary
procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does not apply to
offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing
in the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is,
those offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. This interpretation
conforms to the canon that words in a statute should be read in relation to and not
isolation from the rest of the measure, to discover the true legislative intent.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION (B) REFERS TO SECTION 32(2) OF BP NO. 129. —
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious
reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts: Exclusive original
jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years
and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the
civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving
damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos. These
offenses are not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
3. ID.; ID.; RULE ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE; APPLIES TO VIOLATIONS OF MUNICIPAL

OR CITY ORDINANCES. — As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure
that among the offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it
should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal
ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD STARTS ONLY WHEN THE CASE IS ACTUALLY
FILED IN COURT. — Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint
or information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary
examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this provision does
not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to.
However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether
or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that
the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually
filed in court and not on any date before that.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INTERPRETATION IN CONSONANCE WITH ACT NO. 3326. — This
interpretation is in consonance with Act No. 3326 which says that the period of
prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings,"
contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative
proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not
distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; SPECIAL LAW PREVAILS OVER GENERAL LAW; PRESCRIPTION IN
CRIMINAL CASES IS A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT. — The Court feels that if there be a
conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there
be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power,
is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII,
Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right.
7. ID.; ID.; CRIME PRESCRIBES IF THE PROSECUTOR DELAYS INTENTIONALLY OR NOT

THE INSTITUTION OF NECESSARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS. — The Court realizes that
under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed
seasonably with the prosecutor’s office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution
of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should
not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as
reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the
meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be
corrected.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
The Court is asked to determine the applicable law specifying the prescriptive period for
violations of municipal ordinances.
The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor’s
permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez,
in the Province of Rizal. chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. 1 The referral-complaint of the
police was received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990.
2 The corresponding information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on
October 2, 1990. 3
The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had
prescribed, but the motion was denied. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Rizal,
the denial was sustained by the responded judge. 4
In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner first argues that the
charge against her is governed by the following provisions of the Rule on Summary
Procedure: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 1. Scope. — This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Court in the following
cases:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
B. Criminal Cases: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
2. Violations of rental law;
3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances; chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged
does not exceed six months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other impossible penalties, accessory or otherwise,
or of the civil liability arising therefrom. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)
x x x
SECTION 9. How commenced. — The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the
scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information filed directly in court
without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation: Provided,
however, That in Metropolitan Manila and chartered cities, such cases shall be
commenced only by information; Provided, further, That when the offense cannot be
prosecuted de officio, the corresponding complaint shall be signed and sworn to before
the fiscal by the offended party.
She then invokes Act No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of
Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to
Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run," reading as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such
acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: . . . Violations penalized by
municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
SECTION 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and
penalizing violations of law not included in the Penal Code." (Emphasis supplied)
Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond the two-month statutory
period from the date of the alleged commission of the offense, the charge against her
should have been dismissed on the ground prescription.
For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon
the filing of the complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
Agreeing with the respondent judge, the Solicitor General also invokes Section 1, Rule
110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, providing as follows: cralawnad
SECTION 1. How Instituted. — For offenses not subject to the rule on summary
procedure in special cases, the institution of criminal action shall be as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, by filing the
complaint with the appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite
preliminary investigation therein;
b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the complaint directly with the said courts, or a complaint
with the fiscal’s office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the
complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal.
In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The respondent maintains that the filing of the
complaint with the Officer of the Provincial Prosecutor comes under the phrase "such
institution" and that the phrase "in all cases" applies to all cases, without distinction,
including those falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure.
The said paragraph, according to the respondent, was an adoption of the following
dictum in Francisco v. Court of Appeals: 5
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and
Bar, this Court has re-examined the question and, after mature consideration, has
arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established
by the decisions holding that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it
be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does,
interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where
the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several reasons
buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in
declaring that the period of prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information" without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the
court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits.
Second, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed
to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the
proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the
right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that
the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the
requisite complaint.
It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 30, 1983, two
months before the promulgation of the Rule on Summary Procedure on August 1, 1983.
On the other hand, Section 1 of Rule 110 is new, having been incorporated therein with
the revision of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985, except for the last
paragraph, which was added on October 1, 1988.
That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule
on summary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does
not apply to offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all
cases" appearing in the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the
Section, that is, those offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. This
interpretation conforms to the canon that words in a statute should be read in relation
to and not isolation from the rest of the measure, to discover the true legislative
intent.
chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it
covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge
against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is
governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious
reference is to Section 32 (2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos,
or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in
offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty
thousand pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall
be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary
investigation." 6 Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor
from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be
deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution
decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the
prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actual filed in court and not
on any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that
the period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against
the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial
proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include
administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law
does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary
Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former
should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this
Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution
Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right. 7
Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not irrelevant to observe that the decision
would have been conformable to Section 1, Rule 110, as the offense involved was grave
oral defamation punishable under the Revised Penal Code with arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period. By contrast, the
prosecution in the instant case is for violation of a municipal ordinance, for which the
penalty cannot exceed six months, 8 and is thus covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure.
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if
the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor’s office if, intentionally or not, he
delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However,
that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their
obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a
distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem
here sought to be corrected. cralawnad
Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner
commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months
thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not
interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on
May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could
have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the Municipal Trial
Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had
already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged Order dated October 2, 1991
is SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 90-089 in the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, Rizal,
is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of prescription. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea,

Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 165510-33 July 28, 2006
BENJAMIN ("KOKOY") T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner,

vs.
HON. SIMEON V. MARCELO, in his official capacity as the Ombudsman, and PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For resolution is petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration 1 assailing the Decision dated September 23,
2005, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The resolutions dated July 12, 2004 and
September 6, 2004 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.2
Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in recommending
the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned
cases which were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10,
2004; that the defense of prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and thus there
is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a quo. Thus, this Court may
accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and
Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on
the ground of prescription.
In its Comment,3 the Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the informations in Criminal Case
Nos. 13406-13429 does not mean that petitioner was thereafter exempt from criminal prosecution;
that new informations may be filed by the Ombudsman should it find probable cause in the conduct
of its preliminary investigation; that the filing of the complaint with the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan in 1989
interrupted the prescriptive period; that the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines from 1986
until 2000 also interrupted the aforesaid period based on Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
For its part, the PCGG avers in its Comment4 that, in accordance with the 1987 Constitution and RA
No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Omdudsman need not wait for a new complaint with a
new docket number for it to conduct a preliminary investigation on the alleged offenses of the
petitioner; that considering that both RA No. 3019 and Act No. 3326 or the Act To Establish Periods
of Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide
When Prescription Shall Begin To Run, are silent as to whether prescription should begin to run
when the offender is absent from the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, which answers the same
in the negative, should be applied.
The issues for resolution are: (1) whether the preliminary investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 was a nullity; and (2) whether the offenses for
which petitioner are being charged have already prescribed.
Anent the first issue, we reiterate our ruling in the assailed Decision that the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 is a valid proceeding despite the
previous dismissal thereof by the Sandiganbayan in its Minute Resolution 5 dated February 10, 2004
which reads:
Crim. Cases Nos. 13406-13429–PEO. vs. BENJAMIN T. ROMUALDEZ
Considering that the Decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in G.R. Nos. 143618-41,
entitled "Benjamin ‘Kokoy’ Romualdez vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (First Division, et
al.)" promulgated on July 30, 2002 annulled and set aside the orders issued by this Court on
June 8, 2000 which, among others, denied the accused’s motion to quash the informations in
these cases; that in particular the above-mentioned Decision ruled that the herein
informations may be quashed because the officer who filed the same had no authority to do
so; and that the said Decision has become final and executory on November 29, 2002, these
cases are considered DISMISSED. Let these cases be sent to the archives.
The aforesaid dismissal was effected pursuant to our ruling in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan6 where
petitioner assailed the Sandiganbayan’s Order dated June 8, 2000 in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-
13429 which denied his Motion to Quash, terminated the preliminary investigation conducted by
Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero and set his arraignment for violations of Section 7 of RA No. 3019 on
June 26, 2000.7 In annulling and setting aside the aforesaid Order of the Sandiganbayan, we held
that:
In the case at bar, the flaw in the information is not a mere remediable defect of form, as
in Pecho v. Sandiganbayan where the wording of the certification in the information was
found inadequate, or in People v. Marquez, where the required certification was absent.
Here, the informations were filed by an unauthorized party. The defect cannot be cured even
by conducting another preliminary investigation. An invalid information is no information at all
and cannot be the basis for criminal proceedings.8
In effect, we upheld in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan9 petitioner’s Motion to Quash and directed the

dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 because the informations were filed by an
unauthorized party, hence void.
In such a case, Section 6, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court is pertinent and applicable. Thus:
SEC. 6. Order sustaining the motion to quash not a bar to another prosecution; exception. –
An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in section 3(g) and (i) 10 of this
Rule.
An order sustaining a motion to quash on grounds other than extinction of criminal liability or double
jeopardy does not preclude the filing of another information for a crime constituting the same facts.
Indeed, we held in Cudia v. Court of Appeals11 that:
In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former
prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or information was insufficient because it was so
defective in form or substance that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its
dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the fiscal had no
authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first information would not be a bar in
petitioner’s subsequent prosecution. x x x.12
Be that as it may, the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in the instant cases
was not a violation of petitioner’s right to be informed of the charges against him. It is of no moment
that the cases investigated by the Ombudsman bore the same docket numbers as those cases
which have already been dismissed by the Sandiganbayan, to wit: Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429.
As we have previously stated:
The assignment of a docket number is an internal matter designed for efficient record
keeping. It is usually written in the Docket Record in sequential order corresponding to the
date and time of filing a case.
This Court agrees that the use of the docket numbers of the dismissed cases was merely for
reference. In fact, after the new informations were filed, new docket numbers were
assigned, i.e., Criminal Cases Nos. 28031-28049 x x x.13
Besides, regardless of the docket numbers, the Ombudsman conducted the above-referred
preliminary investigation pursuant to our Decision in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan14 when we
categorically declared therein that:
The Sandiganbayan also committed grave abuse of discretion when it abruptly terminated
the reinvestigation being conducted by Prosecutor Lucero. It should be recalled that our
directive in G.R. No. 105248 for the holding of a preliminary investigation was based on our
ruling that the right to a preliminary investigation is a substantive, rather than a procedural
right. Petitioner’s right was violated when the preliminary investigation of the charges against
him were conducted by an officer without jurisdiction over the said cases. It bears stressing
that our directive should be strictly complied with in order to achieve its objective of affording
petitioner his right to due process.15
Anent the issue on the prescription of the offenses charged, we should first resolve the question of
whether this Court may validly take cognizance of and resolve the aforementioned issue considering
that as we have said in the assailed Decision, "this case has never progressed beyond the filing of
the informations against the petitioner"16and that "it is only prudent that evidence be gathered
through trial on the merits to determine whether the offense charged has already prescribed."17 We
reconsider our stance and shall rule in the affirmative.
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the accused may, at any time before he enters his plea,
move to quash the complaint and information18 on the ground that the criminal action or liability has
been extinguished,19 which ground includes the defense of prescription considering that Article 89 of
the Revised Penal Code enumerates prescription as one of those grounds which totally extinguishes
criminal liability. Indeed, even if there is yet to be a trial on the merits of a criminal case, the accused
can very well invoke the defense of prescription.
Thus, the question is whether or not the offenses charged in the subject criminal cases have
prescribed? We held in the case of Domingo v. Sandiganbayan20 that:
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be
considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of
prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted. 21
Petitioner is being charged with violations of Section 7 of RA No. 3019 for failure to file his
Statements of Assets and Liabilities for the period 1967-1985 during his tenure as Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and for the period 1963-1966 during his tenure as Technical
Assistant in the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Section 11 of RA No. 3019 provides that all offenses punishable therein shall prescribe in 15 years.
Significantly, this Court already declared in the case of People v. Pacificador22 that:
It appears however, that prior to the amendment of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 by B.P. Blg.
195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable
under the said statute was only ten (10) years. The longer prescriptive period of fifteen (15)
years, as provided in Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, does not
apply in this case for the reason that the amendment, not being favorable to the accused
(herein private respondent), cannot be given retroactive effect. Hence, the crime prescribed
on January 6, 1986 or ten (10) years from January 6, 1976. 23
Thus, for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner from 1962 up to March 15, 1982, the same
shall prescribe in 10 years. On the other hand, for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner
during the period from March 16, 1982 until 1985, the same shall prescribe in 15 years.
As to when these two periods begin to run, reference is made to Act No. 3326 which governs the
computation of prescription of offenses defined by and penalized under special laws. Section 2 of
Act No. 3326 provides:
SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the
law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution
of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
In the case of People v. Duque,24 we construed the aforequoted provision, specifically the rule on the
running of the prescriptive period as follows:
In our view, the phrase "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment" may be either disregarded as surplusage or should be deemed preceded by the
word "until." Thus, Section 2 may be read as:
"Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the
law; and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof;"
or as:
"Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the
law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof
and until institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment."
(Emphasis supplied)25
Thus, this Court rules that the prescriptive period of the offenses herein began to run from the
discovery thereof or on May 8, 1987, which is the date of the complaint filed by the former Solicitor
General Francisco I. Chavez against the petitioner with the PCGG.
In the case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto 26 this Court
already took note that:
In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the February 1986 EDSA
Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the government as the
aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the time the questioned
transactions were made. Moreover, no person would have dared to question the legality of
those transactions. Thus, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the date of
discovery of the offense in 1992 after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc
Committee on Behest Loans.27
However, both respondents in the instant case aver that, applying Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code suppletorily, the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 until April 27, 2000
prevented the prescriptive period for the alleged offenses from running.
We disagree.
Section 2 of Act. No. 3326 is conspicuously silent as to whether the absence of the offender from the
Philippines bars the running of the prescriptive period. The silence of the law can only be interpreted
to mean that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not intend such an interruption of the prescription unlike
the explicit mandate of Article 91. Thus, as previously held:
Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by such an omission,
neither could the Court presume otherwise and supply the details thereof, because a
legislative lacuna cannot be filled by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of the
interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided nor
intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time of the enactment, whether careless or
calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however after later wisdom may recommend the
inclusion. Courts are not authorized to insert into the law what they think should be in it or to
supply what they think the legislature would have supplied if its attention has been called to
the omission.28
The only matter left to be resolved is whether the filing of the complaint with the PCGG in 1987 as
well as the filing of the informations with the Sandiganbayan to initiate Criminal Case Nos. 13406-
13429 in 1989 interrupted the running of the prescriptive period such that when the Ombudsman
directed petitioner to file his counter-affidavit on March 3, 2004, the offenses have already
prescribed.
Under Section 2 of Act No. 3326, the prescriptive period shall be interrupted "when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person." However, there is no such proceeding instituted against the
petitioner to warrant the tolling of the prescriptive periods of the offenses charged against him.
In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,29 petitioner averred that PCGG acted without jurisdiction and/or

grave abuse of discretion in conducting a preliminary investigation of cases not falling within its
competence.30 This Court, in its resolve to "deal with the merits of the case to remove the possibility
of any misunderstanding as to the course which it wishes petitioner’s cases in the Sandiganbayan to
take"31declared invalid –
the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG over the 24 offenses ascribed to
Romualdez (of failure to file annual statements of assets and liabilities), for lack of jurisdiction
of said offenses.32
In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,33 petitioner assailed the validity of the informations filed with the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 considering that the same were subscribed and
filed by the PCGG. In granting petitioner’s plea, this Court held, thus:
Here, the informations were filed by an unauthorized party. The defect cannot be cured by
conducting another preliminary investigation. An invalid information is no information at all and
cannot be the basis for criminal proceedings.34
Indeed, the nullity of the proceedings initiated by then Solicitor General Chavez in 1987 with the
PCGG and by the PCGG with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 is judicially settled. In contemplation of
the law, no proceedings exist that could have merited the suspension of the prescriptive periods.
Besides, the only proceeding that could interrupt the running of prescription is that which is filed or
initiated by the offended party before the appropriate body or office. Thus, in the case of People v.
Maravilla,35 this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the municipal mayor for purposes of
preliminary investigation had the effect of suspending the period of prescription. Similarly, in the
case of Llenes v. Dicdican,36 this Court held that the filing of a complaint against a public officer with
the Ombudsman tolled the running of the period of prescription.
In the case at bar, however, the complaint was filed with the wrong body, the PCGG. Thus, the same
could not have interrupted the running of the prescriptive periods.
However, in his Dissenting Opinion, Mr. Justice Carpio contends that the offenses charged against
the petitioner could not have prescribed because the latter was absent from the Philippines from
1986 to April 27, 2000 and thus the prescriptive period did not run from the time of discovery on May
8, 1987, citing Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "[t]he term of prescription
should not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago."
Mr. Justice Carpio argues that –
Article 10 of the same Code makes Article 91 "x x x supplementary to [special laws], unless
the latter should x x x provide the contrary." Nothing in RA 3019 prohibits the supplementary
application of Article 91 to that law. Hence, applying Article 91, the prescriptive period in
Section 11 of RA 3019, before and after its amendment, should run only after petitioner
returned to this jurisdiction on 27 April 2000.
There is no gap in the law. Where the special law is silent, Article 10 of the RPC applies
suppletorily, as the Court has held in a long line of decisions since 1934, starting with People
v. Moreno. Thus, the Court has applied suppletorily various provisions of the RPC to resolve
cases where the special laws are silent on the matters in issue. The law on the applicability
of Article 10 of the RPC is thus well-settled, with the latest reiteration made by this Court in
2004 in Jao Yu v. People.
He also expresses his apprehension on the possible effects of the ruling of the Majority Opinion and
argues that –
The accused should not have the sole discretion of preventing his own prosecution by the
simple expedient of escaping from the State’s jurisdiction. x x x An accused cannot acquire
legal immunity by being a fugitive from the State’s jurisdiction. x x x.
To allow an accused to prevent his prosecution by simply leaving this jurisdiction unjustifiably
tilts the balance of criminal justice in favor of the accused to the detriment of the State’s
ability to investigate and prosecute crimes. In this age of cheap and accessible global travel,
this Court should not encourage individuals facing investigation or prosecution for violation of
special laws to leave Philippine jurisdiction to sit-out abroad the prescriptive period. The
majority opinion unfortunately chooses to lay the basis for such anomalous practice.
With all due respect, we beg to disagree.
Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the
future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code.
This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the
contrary.
Pursuant thereto, one may be tempted to hastily conclude that a special law such as RA No. 3019 is
supplemented by the Revised Penal Code in any and all cases. As it is, Mr. Justice Carpio stated in
his Dissenting Opinion that –
There is no gap in the law. Where the special law is silent, Article 10 of the RPC applies
suppletorily, as the Court has held in a long line of decisions since 1934, starting with People
v. Moreno. Thus, the Court has applied suppletorily various provisions of the RPC to resolve
cases where the special laws are silent on the matters in issue. The law on the applicability
of Article 10 of the RPC is thus well-settled, with the latest reiteration made by this Court in
2004 in Jao Yu v. People.
However, it must be pointed out that the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code to special
laws, by virtue of Article 10 thereof, finds relevance only when the provisions of the special law are
silent on a particular matteras evident from the cases cited and relied upon in the Dissenting
Opinion:
In the case of People v. Moreno,37 this Court, before ruling that the subsidiary penalty under Article
39 of the Revised Penal Code may be applied in cases of violations of Act No. 3992 or the Revised
Motor Vehicle Law, noted that the special law did not contain any provision that the defendant can
be sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
In the case of People v. Li Wai Cheung, 38 this Court applied the rules on the service of sentences
provided in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code in favor of the accused who was found guilty of
multiple violations of RA No. 6425 or The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 considering the lack of
similar rules under the special law.
In the case of People v. Chowdury,39 the Court applied Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the Revised Penal
Code to define the words "principal," "accomplices" and "accessories" under RA No. 8042 or
the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 because it was not defined therein although
it referred to the same terms in enumerating the persons liable for the crime of illegal recruitment.
In the case at bar, the silence of RA No. 3019 on the question of whether or not the absence of the
accused from the Philippines prevents or tolls the running of the prescriptive period is more apparent
than real.
Even before the enactment of RA No. 3019 in 1960, Act No. 3326 was already in effect as early as
December 4, 1926. Section 3 thereof categorically defines "special acts" as "acts defining and
penalizing violations of the law not included in the Penal Code".
Thus, in the case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, 40 this
Court was categorical in ruling that –
The law on prescription of offenses is found in Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code
for offenses punishable thereunder. For those penalized under special laws, Act No. 3326
applies.
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The running
of the prescriptive period shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy. Clearly, Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not provide that the absence of the
accused from the Philippines prevents the running of the prescriptive period. Thus, the only
inference that can be gathered from the foregoing is that the legislature, in enacting Act No. 3326,
did not consider the absence of the accused from the Philippines as a hindrance to the running of
the prescriptive period. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. To elaborate, -
Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one
person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar
maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly
limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others.
The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified
enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its
terms to those expressly mentioned.41
Had the legislature intended to include the accused’s absence from the Philippines as a ground for
the interruption of the prescriptive period in special laws, the same could have been expressly
provided in Act No. 3326. A case in point is RA No. 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997 where the
legislature made its intention clear and was thus categorical that –
SEC. 281. Prescription for Violations of any Provision of this Code – All violations of any
provision of this Code shall prescribe after five (5) years.
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and
if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
persons and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the
Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
According to Mr. Justice Carpio, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code fills the so-called "gap" in Act
No. 3326. Thus, while Act No. 3326 governs the operation of the prescriptive period for violations of
R.A. No. 3019, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code can and shall still be applied in cases where
the accused is absent from the Philippines. In effect, Article 91 would supplement Act No. 3326.
This could not have been the intention of the framers of the law.
While it is true that Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code makes the Code suppletory to special laws,
however, Act No. 3326 cannot fall within the ambit of "special law" as contemplated and used in
Article 10 of the RPC.
In the case of United States v. Serapio,42 the Court had the occasion to interpret the term "special
laws" mentioned in Article 7 of then Penal Code of the Philippines, which is now Article 10 of the
Revised Penal Code, as referring to penal laws that punish acts not defined and penalized by the
Penal Code of the Philippines. Thus –
This contention makes it necessary to define "special laws," as that phrase is used in article
7 of the Penal Code. Does this phrase "leyes especiales," as used in the Penal Code (article
7) have the meaning applied to the phrase "special laws," as the same is generally used? x x
x It is confidently contended that the phrase "leyes especiales," as used in the Penal Code
(article 7) is not used with this general signification: In fact, said phrase may refer not to a
special law as above defined, but to a general law. A careful reading of said article 7 clearly
indicates that the phrase "leyes especiales" was not used to signify "special laws" in the
general signification of that phrase. The article, it will be noted, simply says, in effect, that
when a crime is made punishable under some other law than the Penal Code, it (the crime)
is not subject to the provisions of said code.43
Even if we consider both Act No. 3326 and Article 91 as supplements to RA No. 3019, the same
result would obtain. A conflict will arise from the contemporaneous application of the two laws. The
Revised Penal Code explicitly states that the absence of the accused from the Philippines shall be a
ground for the tolling of the prescriptive period while Act No. 3326 does not. In such a situation, Act
No. 3326 must prevail over Article 91 because it specifically and directly applies to special laws while
the Revised Penal Code shall apply to special laws only suppletorily and only when the latter do not
provide the contrary. Indeed, elementary rules of statutory construction dictate that special legal
provisions must prevail over general ones.
The majority notes Mr. Justice Carpio’s reservations about the effects of ruling that the absence of
the accused from the Philippines shall not suspend the running of the prescriptive period. Our duty,
however, is only to interpret the law. To go beyond that and to question the wisdom or effects of the
law is certainly beyond our constitutionally mandated duty. As we have already explained –
Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by such an omission,
neither could the Court presume otherwise and supply the details thereof, because a
legislative lacuna cannot be filled by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of
interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided nor
intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time of the enactment, whether careless or
calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however after later wisdom may recommend the
inclusion. Courts are not authorized to insert into the law what they think should be in it or to
supply what they think the legislature would have supplied if its attention has been called to
the omission.44
Mr. Justice Carpio also remarks that the liberal interpretation of the statute of limitations in favor of
the accused only relates to the following issues: (1) retroactive or prospective application of laws
providing or extending the prescriptive period; (2) the determination of the nature of the felony
committed vis-à-vis the applicable prescriptive period; and (3) the reckoning of when the prescriptive
period runs. Therefore, the aforementioned principle cannot be utilized to support the Majority
Opinion’s conclusion that the prescriptive period in a special law continues to run while the accused
is abroad.
We take exception to the foregoing proposition.
We believe that a liberal interpretation of the law on prescription in criminal cases equally provides
the authority for the rule that the prescriptive period runs while the accused is outside of Philippine
jurisdiction. The nature of the law on prescription of penal statutes supports this conclusion. In the
old but still relevant case of People v. Moran,45 this Court extensively discussed the rationale behind
and the nature of prescription of penal offenses –
"We should at first observe that a mistake is sometimes made in applying to statutes of
limitation in criminal suits the construction that has been given to statutes of limitation in civil
suits. The two classes of statutes, however, are essentially different. In civil suits the statute
is interposed by the legislature as an impartial arbiter between two contending parties. In the
construction of the statute, therefore, there is no intendment to be made in favor of either
party. Neither grants the right to the other; there is therefore no grantor against whom the
ordinary presumptions, of construction are to be made. But it is, otherwise when a statute of
limitation is granted by the State. Here the State is the grantor, surrendering by act of grace
its rights to prosecute, and declaring the offense to be no longer the subject of
prosecution.' The statute is not a statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly
applied, but an amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over
the offence; that the offender shall be at liberty to return to his country, and resume
his immunities as a citizen and that from henceforth he may cease to preserve the
proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out. Hence it is that
statutes of limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of the defendant, not only because
such liberality of construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and grace, but because the very
existence of the statute, is a recognition and notification by the legislature of the fact that
time, while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned to it fixed and positive
periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt. Independently of these views, it must be
remembered that delay in instituting prosecutions is not only productive of expense to the
State, but of peril to public justice in the attenuation and distortion, even by mere natural
lapse of memory, of testimony. It is the policy of the law that prosecutions should be prompt,
and that statutes, enforcing such promptitude should be vigorously maintained. They are not
merely acts of grace, but checks imposed by the State upon itself, to exact vigilant activity
from its subalterns, and to secure for criminal trials the best evidence that can be obtained."
(Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, there is no reason why we should deny petitioner the benefits accruing from the liberal
construction of prescriptive laws on criminal statutes. Prescription emanates from the liberality of the
State. Any bar to or cause of interruption in the operation of prescriptive periods cannot simply be
implied nor derived by mere implication. Any diminution of this endowment must be directly and
expressly sanctioned by the source itself, the State. Any doubt on this matter must be resolved in
favor of the grantee thereof, the accused.
The foregoing conclusion is logical considering the nature of the laws on prescription. The
exceptions to the running of or the causes for the interruption of the prescriptive periods may and
should not be easily implied. The prescriptive period may only be prevented from operating or may
only be tolled for reasons explicitly provided by the law.
In the case of People v. Pacificador,46 we ruled that:
It bears emphasis, as held in a number of cases, that in the interpretation of the law on
prescription of crimes, that which is more favorable to the accused is to be adopted. The said
legal principle takes into account the nature of the law on prescription of crimes which is an
act of amnesty and liberality on the part of the state in favor of the offender. In the case
of People v. Moran, this Court amply discussed the nature of the statute of limitations in
criminal cases, as follows:
The statute is not statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but an
amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offense;
that the offender shall be at liberty to return to his country, and resume his
immunities as a citizen; and that from henceforth he may cease to preserve the
proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out. Hence, it is that
statues of limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of the defendant, not only
because such liberality of construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and grace, but
because the very existence of the statute is a recognition and notification by the
legislature of the fact that time, while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has
assigned to it fixed and positive periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt. 47
In view of the foregoing, the applicable 10-and-15-year prescriptive periods in the instant case, were
not interrupted by any event from the time they began to run on May 8, 1987. As a consequence, the
alleged offenses committed by the petitioner for the years 1963-1982 prescribed 10 years from May
8, 1987 or on May 8, 1997. On the other hand, the alleged offenses committed by the petitioner for
the years 1983-1985 prescribed 15 years from May 8, 1987 or on May 8, 2002.
Therefore, when the Office of the Special Prosecutor initiated the preliminary investigation of
Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 on March 3, 2004 by requiring the petitioner to submit his counter-
affidavit, the alleged offenses subject therein have already prescribed. Indeed, the State has lost its
right to prosecute petitioner for the offenses subject of Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending
before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. Criminal

Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–
04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila are all hereby ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Carpio, Azcuna, J.J., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 151258 December 1, 2014
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 154954
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, JR.,
JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO
GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO
MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI, VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE
FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO SABBAN, PERCIVAL D. BRIGOLA, PAUL
ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH
LLEDO, and RONAN DE GUZMAN, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 155101
FIDELITO DIZON, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080
GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ
SARUCA, JR., and ANSELMO ADRIANO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ:
We are asked to revisit our Decision in the case involving the death of Leonardo "Lenny" Villa due to
fraternity hazing. While there is nothing new in the arguments raised by the parties in their respective
Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration, we find a few remaining matters needing to be clarified
and resobed. Sorne oJ' these matters include the effect of our Decision on the finality of the Court of
Appeals judgments insofar as respondents Antonio Mariano A!meda (Almeda), June] Anthony D.
Arna (Arna), Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug), and Vincent Tecson (Tecson) are concerned; the question
of who are eligible to seek probation; and the issue of the validity of the probation proceedings and
the concomitant orders of a court that allegedly had no jurisdiction over the case.
Before the Court are the respective Motions for Reconsideration or Clarification filed by petitioners
People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), and Gerarda H. Villa
(Villa); and by respondents Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson (collectively, Tecson et al.)
concerning the Decision of this Court dated 1 February 2012. The Court modified the assailed
1
judgments of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 15520 and found respondents Fidelito
2
Dizon (Dizon), Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The modification had the effect of lowering the criminal
liability of Dizon from the crime of homicide, while aggravating the verdict against Tecson et al. from
slight physical injuries. The CA Decision itself had modified the Decision of the Caloocan City
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 121 finding all of the accused therein guilty of the crime of
homicide. 3
Also, we upheld another CA Decision in a separate but related case docketed as CA-G.R. S.P. Nos.
4
89060 & 90153 and ruled that the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed
the criminal case against Manuel Escalona II (Escalona), Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos), Crisanto
Saruca, Jr. (Saruca), and Anselmo Adriano (Adriano) on the ground that their right to speedy trial
was violated. Reproduced below is the dispositive portion of our Decision: 5
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgmentin G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty of
homicide is hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. The appealed Judgment in G.R. No.
154954 – finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent
Tecson guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries – is also MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART.
Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and
Vincent Tecson are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one
(1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
as maximum. In addition, accused are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa
civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of 50,000, and moral damages in the amount of 1,000,000,
plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from the date of the finality of this
Decision until satisfaction. Costs de oficio.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby AFFIRMED. The
appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the criminal case filed against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of
the Revised Penal Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case
against Artemio Villareal deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the
fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as
aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
SO ORDERED.
To refresh our memories, we quote the factual antecedents surrounding the present case: 6
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law
signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar
"Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez III, Roberto Francis "Bert"
Navera, Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo "Lenny" Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila Fraternity
(Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufo’s Restaurant to have
dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the
neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be
physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for
three days. After their "briefing," they were brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for
the commencement of their initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults from the
Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards the pelota court of
the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were
then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation rites." These rites included the "Indian Run,"
which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering
blows to the neophytes; the "Bicol Express," which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their
backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over
their legs; the "Rounds," in which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the
"auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation
rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or withknee blows on their thighs by
two Aquilans; and the "Auxies’ Privilege Round," in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity
to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with
the fraternity principles. They survived their first day of initiation.
On the morning of their second day – 9 February 1991 – the neophytes were made to present comic
plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila
Fraternity’s principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or
legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment
them physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing
that they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the day officially
ended.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio
Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson
Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he
reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected
the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle
blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him
complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings,
Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the
initiation for the day was officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at
the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and incoherent
mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just
1avvphi1
overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans
started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him
warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was
pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans:
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)
4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)
13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
16. Antonio General (General)
17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)

21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
25. Adel Abas (Abas)
26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)
In Criminal Case No. C-38340
1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried. On the
other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in
abeyance due to certain matters that had to be resolved first.
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), holding
the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion
temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. A few weeks after the trial court rendered its
judgment, or on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine accused
commenced anew.
On 10 January 2002, the CAin (CA-G.R. No. 15520) set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial
court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of each of the accused
according to individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so the following
Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:
1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants– Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi, Perez,

De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero,
Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.) – were acquitted,as their individual
guilt was not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Four of the accused-appellants– Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio Mariano
Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) – were found guilty of the crime of slight
physical injuriesand sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They were also ordered to
jointly pay the heirs of the victim the sum of ₱30,000 as indemnity.
3. Two of the accused-appellants– Fidelito Dizonand Artemio Villareal– were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code. Having found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA sentenced them to
an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17 years of reclusion temporal.
They were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum
of ₱50,000 and to pay the additional amount of ₱1,000,000 by way of moral damages.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge against accused
Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial. Meanwhile, on different dates
between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of
accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos.
89060 & 90153 reversed the trial court’s Orders and dismissed the criminal case against Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to speedy trial.
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were individually brought
before this Court. (Citations omitted)
Motion for Partial Reconsideration

filed by Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa
Petitioner Villa filed the present Motion for Partial Reconsideration in connection with G.R. Nos.
7
178057 & 178080 (Villa v. Escalona) asserting that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion
when it dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos,Saruca, and Adriano (collectively,
Escalona et al.) in its assailed Decision and Resolution. Villa reiterates her previous arguments that
8
the right to speedy trial of the accused was not violated, since they had failed to assert that right
within a reasonable period of time. She stresses that, unlike their co-accused Reynaldo Concepcion,
respondents Escalona et al.did not timely invoke their right to speedy trial during the time that the
original records and pieces of evidence were unavailable. She again emphasizes that the
prosecution cannot be faulted entirely for the lapse of 12 years from the arraignment until the initial
trial, as there were a number of incidents attributable to the accused themselves that caused the
delay of the proceedings. She then insists that we apply the balancing test in determining whether
the right to speedy trial of the accused was violated.
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG
The OSG, in its Motion for Reconsideration of G.R. Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People) and 154954
9
(People v. Court of Appeals), agrees with the findings of this Court that accused Dizon and Tecson
et al. had neither the felonious intent to kill (animus interficendi) nor the felonious intent to injure
(animus iniuriandi) Lenny Villa. In fact, it concedes that the mode in which the accused committed
the crime was through fault (culpa). However, it contends that the penalty imposed should have
been equivalent to that for deceit (dolo) pursuant to Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal
Code. It argues that the nature and gravity of the imprudence or negligence attributable to the
accused was so gross that it shattered the fine distinction between dolo and culpaby considering the
act as one committed with malicious intent. It maintains that the accused conducted the initiation
rites in such a malevolent and merciless manner that it clearly endangered the lives of the initiates
and was thus equivalent to malice aforethought.
With respect to the 19 other accused, or Victorino et al., the OSG asserts that their acquittal may
also be reversed despite the rule on double jeopardy, as the CA also committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing its assailed Decision (CA-G.R. No. 15520). The OSG insists that Victorino et al.
should have been similarly convicted like their other co-accused Dizon, Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and
Tecson, since the former also participated in the hazing of Lenny Villa, and their actions contributed
to his death.
Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Tecson et al.
Respondents Tecson et al., filed their respective motions pertaining to G.R. No. 154954 (People v.
10
Court of Appeals). They essentially seek a clarification as to the effect of our Decision insofar as
their criminal liability and service of sentence are concerned. According to respondents, they
immediately applied for probation after the CA rendered its Decision (CAG.R. No. 15520) lowering
their criminal liability from the crime of homicide, which carries a non-probationable sentence, to
slight physical injuries, which carries a probationable sentence. Tecson et al.contend that, as a
result, they have already been discharged from their criminal liability and the cases against them
closed and terminated. This outcome was supposedly by virtue of their Applications for Probation on
various dates in January 2002 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended, otherwise
11
known as the Probation Law. They argue that Branch 130 of Caloocan City Regional Trial Court
(RTC) had already granted their respective Applications for Probation on 11 October 2002 and,
12
upon their completion of the terms and conditions thereof, discharged them from probation and
declared the criminal case against them terminated on various dates in April 2003. 13
To support their claims, respondents attached certified true copies of their respective Applications
14
for Probation and the RTC Orders granting these applications, discharging them from probation, and
declaring the criminal case against them terminated. Thus, they maintain that the Decision in CA-
G.R. No. 15520 had already lapsed into finality, insofar as they were concerned, whenthey waived
their right to appeal and applied for probation.
ISSUES
I. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for
violation of their right to speedy trial
II. Whether the penalty imposed on Tecson et al. should have corresponded to that for
intentional felonies
III. Whether the completion by Tecson et al. of the terms and conditions of their probation
discharged them from their criminal liability, and closed and terminated the cases against
them DISCUSSION
Findings on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of

Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa
As regards the first issue, we take note that the factual circumstances and legal assertions raised by
petitioner Villa in her Motion for Partial Reconsideration concerning G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080
have already been thoroughly considered and passed uponin our deliberations, which led to our
Decision dated 1 February 2012. We emphasize that in light of the finding of violation of the right of
Escalona et al. to speedy trial, the CA’s dismissal of the criminal case against them amounted to an
acquittal, and that any appeal or reconsideration thereof would result in a violation of their right
15
against double jeopardy. Though we have recognized that the acquittal of the accused may be
16
challenged where there has been a grave abuse of discretion, certiorari would lie if it is convincingly
17
established that the CA’s Decision dismissing the case was attended by a whimsical or capricious
exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must be shown that the assailed judgment
constitutes "a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or toact in contemplation of law; an exercise of
power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility; or a blatant abuse of
authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense
justice." Thus, grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly
18
misappreciated the facts and the evidence. 19
We have taken a second look at the court records, the CA Decision, and petitioner’s arguments and
found no basis to rule that the CA gravely abused its discretion in concluding that the right to speedy
trial of the accused was violated. Its findings were sufficiently supported by the records of the case
and grounded in law. Thus, we deny the motion of petitioner Villa with finality.
Ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG
We likewise deny with finality the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG with respect to G.R.
Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People) and 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals). Many of the arguments
raised therein are essentially a mere rehash of the earlier grounds alleged in its original Petition for
Certiorari.
Furthermore, we cannot subscribe to the OSG’s theory that even if the act complained of was born
of imprudence or negligence, malicious intent can still be appreciated on account of the gravity of the
actions of the accused. We emphasize that the finding of a felony committed by means of culpa is
legally inconsistent with that committed by means of dolo. Culpable felonies involve those wrongs
done as a result of an act performed without malice or criminal design. The Revised Penal Code
expresses thusly:
ARTICLE 365. Imprudence and Negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall
commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayorin its maximum period toprisión correccional in its medium period; if it would
have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayorin its medium and maximum
periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum period shall be imposed.
xxxx
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform suchact, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and
place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage
impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest. (Emphases supplied)
On the other hand, intentional felonies concern those wrongs in which a deliberate malicious intent
to do an unlawful act is present. Below is our exhaustive discussion on the matter: Our Revised
20
Penal Code belongs tothe classical school of thought. x x x The identity of mens rea– defined as a
guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent – is the predominant consideration. Thus,
it is not enough to do what the law prohibits. In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary
that the act be committed by means of doloor "malice."
The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence, and
intent. x x x x The element of intent – on which this Court shall focus – is described as the state of
mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act. It refers to the purpose of the mind and the
resolve with which a person proceeds.It does not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act,
while intentconcerns the result of the act. While motive is the "moving power" that impels one to
action for a definite result, intent is the "purpose" of using a particular means to produce the result.
On the other hand, the term "felonious"means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding
from an evil heart or purpose.With these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in
intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind
accompanying a forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence of dolus
malus– that the act or omission be done "willfully," "maliciously," "with deliberate evil intent," and
"with malice aforethought." The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea– a crime is not
committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent. As is required of
the other elements of a felony, the existence of malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
xxxx
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in establishing
the commission of the intentional felony of homicide. Being mala in se, the felony of homicide
requires the existence of malice or dolo immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of
injuries. Intent to kill – or animus interficendi– cannot and should not be inferred, unless there is
proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent. Furthermore, the victim’s death must not have been
the product of accident, natural cause, or suicide. If death resulted from an act executed without
malice or criminal intent – but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence – the act must be
qualified as reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide.
xxxx
In order to be found guilty ofany of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised Penal
Code, the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala
in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of
the wrongdoer – iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused
cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, incase of physical injuries under the Revised
Penal Code, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the
physical integrity or wellbeing of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain
bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt
act of inflicting physical injuries per semerely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an
intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his
intentions are.
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances that the mere infliction of physical injuries,
absentmalicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional felony.x x x.
xxxx
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused fraternity
members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies
that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the
wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from which an
immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of
precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing it. In this case, the danger is visible
and consciously appreciated by the actor. In contrast, simple imprudence or negligence comprises
an act done without grave fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a
mere lack of foresight or skill. Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not
openly visible.
The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as follows: Would a
prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the
person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law
imposes on the doer the duty to take precaution against the mischievous resultsof the act. Failure to
do so constitutes negligence.
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness, the degree of
precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the danger involved. If, on account of a
certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to another person is great, the individual who
chooses to follow that particular course of conduct is bound to be very careful, inorder to prevent or
avoid damage or injury. In contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is required. It is thus
possible that there are countless degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required of an
individual, "from a transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort." The duty of the person to
employ more or less degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case.
(Emphases supplied, citations omitted)
We thus reiterate that the law requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious
intent or dolus malus before an accused can be adjudged liable for committing an intentional felony.
Since the accused were found to have committed a felony by means of culpa, we cannot agree with
the argument of the OSG. It contends that the imposable penalty for intentional felony can also be
applied to the present case on the ground that the nature of the imprudence or negligence of the
accused was so gross that the felony already amounted to malice. The Revised Penal Code has
carefully delineated the imposable penalties as regards felonies committed by means of culpaon the
one hand and felonies committed by means of doloon the other in the context of the distinctions it
has drawn between them. The penalties provided in Article 365 (Imprudence and Negligence) are
mandatorily applied if the death of a person occurs as a result of the imprudence or negligence of
another. Alternatively, the penalties outlined in Articles 246 to 261 (Destruction of Life) are
automatically invoked if the death was a result of the commission of a forbidden act accompanied by
a malicious intent. These imposable penalties are statutory, mandatory, and not subjectto the
discretion of the court. We have already resolved – and the OSG agrees – that the accused Dizon
and Tecson et al. had neither animus interficendi nor animus iniuriandi in inflicting physical pain on
Lenny Villa. Hence, we rule that the imposable penalty is what is applicable to the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide as defined and penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Ruling on the Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration
filed by Tecson et al.
We clarify, however, the effect of our Decision in light of the motions of respondents Tecson et al.
vis-à-vis G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals).
The finality of a CA decision will not

bar the state from seeking the
annulment of the judgment via a
Rule 65 petition.
In their separate motions, respondents insist that the previous verdict of the CA finding them guilty
21
of slight physical injuries has already lapsed into finality as a result of their respective availments of
the probation program and their ultimate discharge therefrom. Hence, they argue that they can no
longer be convicted of the heavier offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide. Respondents allude to our Decision in Tan v. People to support their contention that the
22 23
CA judgment can no longer be reversed or annulled even by this Court.
The OSG counters that the CA judgment could not have attained finality, as the former had timely
24
filed with this Court a petition for certiorari. It argues that a Rule 65 petition is analogous to an
appeal, or a motion for new trial or reconsideration, in that a petition for certiorarialso prevents the
case from becoming final and executory until after the matter is ultimately resolved.
Indeed, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court speaks of the finality of a criminal judgment once the
accused applies for probation, viz:
SECTION 7. Modification of judgment. — A judgment of convictionmay, upon motion of the accused,

be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the
death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes finalafter the lapse of the period for perfecting an
appeal, or whenthe sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the
accusedhas waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. (7a) (Emphases
supplied)
Coupled with Section 7 of Rule 117 and Section 1 of Rule 122, it can be culled from the foregoing
25 26
provisions that only the accused may appeal the criminal aspect of a criminal case, especially if the
relief being sought is the correction or review of the judgment therein. This rule was instituted in
order to give life to the constitutional edict against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment
27
for the same offense. It is beyond contention that the accused would be exposed to double jeopardy
if the state appeals the criminal judgment in order to reverse an acquittal or even to increase criminal
liability. Thus, the accused’s waiver of the right to appeal – as when applying for probation – makes
the criminal judgment immediately final and executory. Our explanation in People v. Nazareno is
worth reiterating:28
Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred because the
government has already been afforded a complete opportunity to prove the criminal defendant’s
culpability; after failing to persuade the court to enter a final judgment of conviction, the underlying
reasons supporting the constitutional ban on multiple trials applies and becomes compelling. The
reason is not only the defendant’s already established innocence at the first trial where he had been
placed in peril of conviction, but also the same untoward and prejudicial consequences of a second
trial initiated by a government who has at its disposal all the powers and resources of the State.
Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result, as the government would then be allowed
another opportunity to persuade a second trier of the defendant’s guilt while strengthening any
weaknesses that had attended the first trial, all in a process where the government’s power and
resources are once again employed against the defendant’s individual means. That the second
opportunity comesvia an appeal does not make the effects any less prejudicial by the standards of
reason, justice and conscience. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)
It must be clarified, however, that the finality of judgment evinced in Section 7 of Rule 120 does not
confer blanket invincibility on criminal judgments. We have already explained in our Decision that the
rule on double jeopardy is not absolute, and that this rule is inapplicable to cases in which the state
assails the very jurisdiction of the court that issued the criminal judgment. The reasoning behind the
29
exception is articulated in Nazareno, from which we quote: 30
In such instance, however, no review of facts and law on the merits, in the manner done in an
appeal, actually takes place; the focus of the review is on whether the judgment is per sevoid on
jurisdictional grounds, i.e., whether the verdict was rendered by a court that had no jurisdiction; or
where the court has appropriate jurisdiction, whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In other words, the review is on the question of whether
there has been a validly rendered decision, not on the question of the decision’s error or
correctness. Under the exceptional nature of a Rule 65 petition, the burden — a very heavy one — is
on the shoulders of the party asking for the review to show the presence of a whimsical or capricious
exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or of a patent and gross abuse of discretion
amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to
act in contemplation of law; or to an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion and hostility. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted) While this Court’s Decision in Tan
may have created an impression of the unassailability of a criminal judgment as soon as the
accused applies for probation, we point out that what the state filed therein was a mere motion for
the modification of the penalty, and not a Rule 65 petition. A petition for certiorari is a special civil
action that is distinct and separate from the main case. While in the main case, the core issue is
whether the accused is innocent or guilty of the crime charged, the crux of a Rule 65 petition is
whether the court acted (a) without or in excess of its jurisdiction; or (b) with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Hence, strictly speaking, there is
nomodification of judgment in a petition for certiorari, whose resolution does not call for a re-
evaluation of the merits of the case in order to determine the ultimate criminal responsibility of the
accused. In a Rule 65 petition, any resulting annulment of a criminal judgment is but a consequence
of the finding of lack of jurisdiction.
In view thereof, we find that the proper interpretation of Section 7 of Rule 120 must be that it is
inapplicable and irrelevant where the court’s jurisdiction is being assailed through a Rule 65 petition.
Section 7 of Rule 120 bars the modification of a criminal judgment only if the appeal brought before
the court is in the nature of a regular appeal under Rule 41, or an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45,
and if that appeal would put the accused in double jeopardy. As it is, we find no irregularity in the
partial annulment of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520 in spite of its finality, as the judgment
therein was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The orders of Caloocan City RTC

Branch 130 have no legal effect, as
they were issued without jurisdiction.
First, Tecson et al. filed their Applications for Probation with the wrong court. Part and parcel of our
criminal justice system is the authority or jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate and decide the case
before it. Jurisdiction refers to the power and capacity of the tribunal to hear, try, and decide a
particular case or matter before it. That power and capacity includes the competence to pronounce
31
a judgment, impose a punishment, and enforce or suspend the execution of a sentencein

32 33
accordance with law.
The OSG questions the entire proceedings involving the probation applications of Tecson et al.
34
before Caloocan City RTC Branch 130. Allegedly, the trial court did not have competence to take
cognizance of the applications, considering that it was not the court of origin of the criminal case.
The OSG points out that the trial court that originally rendered the Decision in Criminal Case No. C-
38340(91) was Branch 121 of the Caloocan City RTC.
The pertinent provision of the Probation Law is hereby quoted for reference:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it
shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the
period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on
probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That
no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal
from the judgment of conviction. x x x x (Emphases supplied)
It is obvious from the foregoing provision that the law requires that an application for probation be
filed withthe trial court that convicted and sentenced the defendant, meaning the court of origin.
Here, the trial court that originally convicted and sentenced Tecson et al.of the crime of homicide
was Branch 121 – not Branch 130 – of the Caloocan City RTC. Neither the judge of Branch 130 in
35
his Orders nor Tecson et al.in their pleadings have presented any explanation or shown any special
authority that would clarify why the Applications for Probation had not been filed with or taken
cognizance of by Caloocan City RTC Branch 121. While we take note that in a previous case, the
CA issued a Decision ordering the inhibition of Branch 121 Judge Adoracion G. Angeles from
hearing and deciding Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), the ruling was made specifically applicable to
the trial of petitioners therein, i.e. accused Concepcion, Ampil, Adriano, and S. Fernandez. 36
Tecson et al. thus committed a fatal error when they filed their probation applications with Caloocan
City RTC Branch 130, and not with Branch 121. We stress that applicants are not at liberty to
choose the forum in which they may seek probation, as the requirement under Section 4 of the
Probation law is substantive and not merely procedural. Considering, therefore, that the probation
proceedings were premised on an unwarranted exercise of authority, we find that Caloocan City
RTC Branch 130 never acquired jurisdiction over the case.
Second, the records of the casewere still with the CA when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 granted
the probation applications. Jurisdiction over a case is lodged with the court in which the criminal
action has been properly instituted. If a party appeals the trial court’s judgment or final
37
order, jurisdiction is transferred to the appellate court. The execution of the decision is thus stayed
38
insofar as the appealing party is concerned. The court of origin then loses jurisdiction over the
39
entire case the moment the other party’s time to appeal has expired. Any residual jurisdiction of the
40
court of origin shall cease – including the authority to order execution pending appeal – the moment
the complete records of the case are transmitted to the appellate court. Consequently, it is the
41
appellate court that shall have the authority to wield the power to hear, try, and decide the case
before it, as well as to enforce its decisions and resolutions appurtenant thereto. That power and
authority shall remain with the appellate court until it finally disposes of the case. Jurisdiction cannot
be ousted by any subsequent event, even if the nature of the incident would have prevented
jurisdiction from attaching in the first place.
According to Article 78 of the Revised Penal Code, "[n]o penalty shall be executed except by virtue
of a final judgment." A judgment of a court convicting or acquitting the accused of the offense
charged becomes final under any of the following conditions among others: after the lapse of the
42
period for perfecting an appeal; when the accused waives the right to appeal; upon the grant of a
withdrawal ofan appeal; when the sentence has already been partially or totally satisfied or served;
or when the accused applies for probation. When the decision attains finality, the judgment or final
order is entered in the book of entries of judgments. If the case was previously appealed to the CA,
43
a certified true copy of the judgment or final order must be attached to the original record, which
shall then be remanded to the clerk of the court from which the appeal was taken. The court of
44
origin then reacquires jurisdiction over the case for appropriate action. It is during this time that the
court of origin may settle the matter of the execution of penalty or the suspension of the execution
thereof, including the convicts’ applications for probation.
45 46
A perusal of the case records reveals that the CA had not yet relinquished its jurisdiction over the
case when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 took cognizance of the Applications for Probation of
Tecson et al. It shows that the accused filed their respective applications while a motion for
47
reconsideration was still pending before the CA and the records were still with that court. The CA
48 49
settled the motion only upon issuing the Resolution dated 30 August 2002 denying it, or about seven
months after Tecson et al. had filed their applications with the trial court. In September 2002, or
50
almost a month before the promulgation of the RTC Order dated 11 October 2002 granting the
probation applications, the OSG had filed Manifestations of Intent to File Petition for Certiorari with
51
the CA and this Court. Ultimately, the OSG assailed the CA judgments by filing before this Court a
52 53
Petition for Certiorari on 25 November 2002. We noted the petition and then required respondents
54
to file a comment thereon. After their submission of further pleadings and motions, we eventually
55
required all parties to file their consolidated memoranda. The records of the case remained with the
56
CA until they were elevated to this Court in 2008. 57
For the foregoing reasons, we find that RTC Branch 130 had no jurisdiction to act on the probation
applications of Tecson et al. It had neither the power nor the authority to suspend their sentence,
place them on probation, order their final discharge, and eventually declare the case against them
terminated. This glaring jurisdictional faux pasis a clear evidence of either gross ignorance of the law
oran underhanded one-upmanship on the part of RTC Branch 130 or Tecson et al., or both – to
which this Court cannot give a judicial imprimatur.
In any event, Tecson et al. were ineligible to seek probation at the time they applied for it.
Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to penitent qualified offenders who immediately
58
admit their liability and thus renounce their right to appeal. In view of their acceptance of their fate
and willingness to be reformed, the state affords them a chance to avoid the stigma of an
incarceration recordby making them undergo rehabilitation outside of prison. Some of the major
purposes of the law are to help offenders to eventually develop themselves into law-abiding and self
respecting individuals, as well as to assist them in their reintegration with the community.
It must be reiterated that probation is not a right enjoyed by the accused. Rather, it is an act of grace
orclemency conferred by the state. In Francisco v. Court of Appeals, this Court explained thus:
59
It is a special prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons not enjoyed by others or by
all. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court which is to be
exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the
accused. The Probation Law should not therefore be permitted to divest the state or its government
of any of the latter’s prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the intention of the legislature to this
end is clearly expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms of the law who is not clearly
within them. (Emphases supplied)
The OSG questions the validity of the grant of the probation applications of Tecson et al. It points
60
out that when they appealed to the CA their homicide conviction by the RTC, they thereby made
themselves ineligible to seek probation pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (the
Probation Law).
We refer again to the full text ofSection 4 of the Probation Law as follows:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it
shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the
period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on
probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That
no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal
from the judgment of conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An
application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (Emphases supplied)
Indeed, one of the legal prerequisites of probation is that the offender must not have appealed the
conviction. In the 2003 case Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals, this Court was faced with the issue of
61 62
whether a convict may still apply for probation even after the trial court has imposed a non
probationable verdict, provided that the CA later on lowers the original penalty to a sentence within
the probationable limit. In that case, the trial court sentenced the accused to a maximum term of
eight years of prisión mayor, which was beyond the coverage of the Probation Law. They only
became eligible for probation after the CA reduced the maximum term of the penalty imposed to 1
year, 8 months and 21 days of prisión correccional.
In deciding the case, this Court invoked the reasoning in Francisco and ruled that the accused was
ineligiblefor probation, since they had filed an appeal with the CA. In Francisco, we emphasized that
Section 4 of the Probation Law offers no ambiguity and does not provide for any distinction,
qualification, or exception. What is clearis that all offenders who previously appealed their cases,
regardless of their reason for appealing, are disqualified by the law from seeking probation.
Accordingly, this Court enunciated in Lagrosathat the accused are disallowed from availing
themselves of the benefits of probation if they obtain a genuine opportunity to apply for probation
only on appeal as a result of the downgrading of their sentence from non-probationable to
probationable.
While Lagrosa was promulgated three months after Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 issued its
various Orders discharging Tecson et al. from probation, the ruling in Lagrosa, however, was a mere
reiteration of the reasoning of this Court since the 1989 case Llamado v. Court of Appeals and 63
Francisco. The Applications for Probation of Tecson et al., therefore, should not have been granted
by RTC Branch 130, as they had appealed their conviction to the CA. We recall that respondents
were originally found guilty of homicide and sentenced to suffer 14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of
reclusion temporal as maximum. Accordingly, even if the CA later downgraded their conviction to
slight physical injuries and sentenced them to 20 days of arresto menor, which made the sentence
fall within probationable limits for the first time, the RTC should have nonetheless found them
ineligible for probation at the time.
The actions of the trial court must thus be adjudged as an arbitrary and despotic use of authority, so
gross that it divested the court of its very power to dispense justice. As a consequence, the RTC
Orders granting the Applications for Probation of Tecson et al. and thereafter discharging them from
their criminal liability must be deemed to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Whether for lack of jurisdiction orfor grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, we declare all orders, resolutions, and judgments of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 in
relation to the probation applications of Tecson et al. null and void for having been issued without
jurisdiction. We find our pronouncement in Galman v. Sandiganbayan applicable, viz:
64
A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. Through it, no
rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It
neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void.
(Emphasis supplied)
The ultimate discharge of Tecson et

al. from probation did not totally
extinguish their criminal liability.
Accused Bantug asserts that, in any event, their criminal liability has already been extinguished as
65
a result of their discharge from probation and the eventual termination of the criminal case against
them by Caloocan City RTC Branch 130. To support his argument, he cites the following provision of
the Revised Penal Code:
ARTICLE 89. How Criminal Liability is Totally Extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties,
liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment.
2. By service of the sentence.
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
4. By absolute pardon.
5. By prescription of the crime.
6. By prescription of the penalty.
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in article 344 of this Code.
(Emphasis supplied)
As previously discussed, a void judgment cannot be the source of legal rights; legally speaking, it is
as if no judgment had been rendered at all. Considering our annulment of the Orders of Caloocan
City RTC Branch 130 in relation to the probation proceedings, respondents cannot claim benefits
that technically do not exist.
In any event, Tecson et al.cannot invoke Article89 of the Revised Penal Code, as we find it
inapplicable to this case. One of the hallmarks of the Probation Law is precisely to "suspend the
execution of the sentence," and not to replace the original sentence with another, as we pointed out
66
in our discussion in Baclayon v. Mutia: 67
An order placing defendant on "probation" is not a "sentence" but is rather in effect a suspension of
the imposition of sentence. It is not a final judgment but is rather an "interlocutory judgment"in the
nature of a conditional order placing the convicted defendant under the supervision of the court for
his reformation, to be followed by a final judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation are
complied with, or by a final judgment of sentence if the conditions are violated. (Emphases supplied)
Correspondingly, the criminal liability of Tecson et al.remains.

In light of our recent Decision in
Colinares v. People, Tecson et al.
may now reapply for probation.
Very recently, in Colinares v. People, we revisited our ruling in Franciscoand modified our
68
pronouncements insofar as the eligibility for probation of those who appeal their conviction is
concerned. Through a majority vote of 9-6, the Court En Bancin effect abandoned Lagrosaand
settled the following once and for all:
69
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals "from the judgment of
conviction" is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two
judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by
the regional trial court,now set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme
Court.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion’s hard position, it will apply the probation law on
Arnel based on the trial court’s annulled judgment against him. He will not be entitled to probation
because of the severe penalty that such judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme Court’s
judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to the
trial court’s judgment — even if this has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be
made to pay for the trial court’s erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for
probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw(the horse errs, the carabao gets
the whip). Where is justice there?
The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for probation would
dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v. Court of Appealsthat the probation law requires that an
accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. But there is
a huge difference between Franciscoand this case.
xxxx
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for
probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. Hewas not in a position to say,
"By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation." The stiff penalty that the trial court
imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation
under this Court’s greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains
that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for
probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.
xxxx
In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of
attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable
penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have found him guilty of the correct
offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four months maximum. This would
have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of his.
The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is
not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions. As Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere
privilege to be given to the accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its letter; to do so
would be to disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be applied in favor
of the accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose.
xxxx
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on Arnel the correct
penalty of two years and four months maximum, he would havehad the right to apply for probation.
No one could say with certainty that he would have availed himself of the right had the RTC
doneright by him. The idea may not even have crossed his mind precisely since the penalty he got
was not probationable.
The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness. Is it fair to deny Arnel the right to apply for
1âwphi1
probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him is, unlike the one erroneously
imposed by the trial court, subject to probation? (Emphases supplied)
In our Decision, we set aside the RTC and the CA judgments and found Tecson et al.ultimately liable
for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Pursuant to Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code, the offense is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period (from 4 months and 1
day to 6 months) to prisión correccional in its medium period (from 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 4
years and 2 months). Considering that the new ruling in Colinares is more favorable to Tecson et al.,
we rule that they are now eligible to apply for probation. Since Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) was convicted
of the same crime, we hereby clarify that Dizon is also eligible for probation.
While we cannot recognize the validityof the Orders of RTC Branch 130, which granted the
Applications for Probation, we cannot disregard the fact that Tecson et al. have fulfilled the terms
and conditions of their previous probation program and have eventually been discharged therefrom.
Thus, should they reapply for probation, the trial court may, at its discretion, consider their
antecedent probation service in resolving whether to place them under probation at this time and in
determining the terms, conditions, and period thereof.
Final clarificatory matters
We now take this opportunity to correct an unintentional typographical error in the minimum term of
the penalty imposed on the accused Dizon and Tecson et al. While this issue was not raised by any
of the parties before us, this Court deems it proper to discuss the matter ex proprio motuin the
interest of justice. In the first paragraph of the dispositive portion of our Decision dated 1 February
2012, the fourth sentence reads as follows:
They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión correccional, as
maximum.
As we had intended to impose on the accused the maximum term of the "penalty next lower" than
that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide, in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL), the phrase "and one (1) day,"
70
which had been inadvertently added, must be removed. Consequently, in the first paragraph of the
dispositive portion, the fourth sentence should now read as follows:
They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión correccional, as maximum. In
this instance, we further find it important to clarify the accessory penalties inherent to the principal
penalty imposed on Dizon and Tecson et al.
By operation of Articles 40 to 45 and 73 of the Revised Penal Code, a corresponding accessory

penalty automatically attaches every time a court lays down a principal penalty outlined in Articles 25
and 27 thereof. The applicable accessory penalty is determined by using as reference the principal
71
penaltyimposed by the court before the prison sentence is computed in accordance with the
ISL. This determination is made in spite of the two classes ofpenalties mentioned in an
72
indeterminate sentence. It must be emphasized that the provisions on the inclusion of accessory
penalties specifically allude to the actual "penalty" imposed, not to the "prison sentence" set by a
73 74
court. We believe that the ISL did not intend to have the effect of imposing on the convict two distinct
sets of accessory penalties for the same offense. The two penalties are only relevant insofar as
75
setting the minimum imprisonment period is concerned, after which the convict may apply for parole
and eventually seek the shortening of the prison term. 76
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty for the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccionalin its
medium period. As this provision grants courts the discretion tolay down a penalty without regard to
the presence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the imposable penaltymust also be within
the aforementioned range. Hence, before applying the ISL, we ultimately imposed on Dizon and
77
Tecson et al. the actual (straight) penalty of four years and two months of prisión
78
correccional. Pursuant to Article 43 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of prisión correccional
79
automatically carries with it the following accessory penalties: ARTICLE 43. Prisión Correccional—
80
Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prisión correccional shall carry with it that of suspension
from public office, from the right tofollow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen
months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to
the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
The duration of their suspension shall be the same as that of their principal penalty sans the ISL;
that is, for four years and two months or until they have served their sentence in accordance with
81
law. Their suspension takes effect immediately, once the judgment of conviction becomes final. 82
We further point out that if the length of their imprisonment exceeds 18 months, they shall
furthermore suffer a perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. Under Article 32 of
the RevisedPenal Code, if this accessory penalty attaches, it shall forever deprive them of the
exercise of their right (a) to vote in any popular election for any public office; (b) to be elected to that
office; and (c) to hold any public office. Any public office that they may be holding becomes vacant
83
upon finality of the judgment. The aforementioned accessory penalties can only be wiped out if
84
expressly remitted in a pardon. 85
Of course, the aforementioned accessory penalties are without prejudice to a grant of probation,
shouldthe trial court find them eligible therefor. As we explained in Baclayon, the grant of probation
86
suspends the execution of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as that of the accessory
penalties. We have reiterated this point in Moreno v. Commission on Elections: 87
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation is not a
sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held that the grant
of probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well
as the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and from the right to follow a profession
or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. We thus deleted
from the order granting probation the paragraph which required that petitioner refrain from continuing
with her teaching profession.
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from public office,
from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the
right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period imposed upon Moreno were similarly suspended upon the grant
of probation.
It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from
running for a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on
hold for the duration of the probation. x x x x. During the period of probation, the probationer does
not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the
conditions prescribed in the probation order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of petitioner Gerarda H.
Villa in connection with G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 is hereby DENIED. The Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General concerning G.R. Nos. 155101 and
154954 is also DENIED.
The respective Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel
Anthony D. Arna, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are likewise DENIED. In light of the
finding that Caloocan City Regional Trial Court Branch 130 acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the aforementioned Applications for Probation, we hereby
ANNUL the entire probation proceedings and SET ASIDE all orders, resolutions, or judgments
issued in connection thereto. We, however, CLARIFY that Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony
D. Arna, Renato Bantug, Jr., Vincent Tecson, and Fidelito Dizon are eligible to apply or reapply for
probation in view of our recent ruling in Colinares v. People of the Philippines, without prejudice to
88
their remaining civil liability, if any.
Furthermore, we issue a CORRECTION of the dispositive portion of our Decision dated 1 February
2012 and hereby delete the phrase "and one (1) day" located in the fourth sentence of the first
paragraph thereof. The sentence shall now read as follows: "They are hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two
(2) months of prisi6n correccional, as maximum."
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
WE CONCUR:
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 211465, December 03, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHIRLEY A. CASIO, Accused-

Appellant.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
“Chicks mo dong?”1
With this sadly familiar question being used on the streets of many of our cities, the
fate of many desperate women is sealed and their futures vanquished. This case
resulted in the rescue of two minors from this pernicious practice. Hopefully, there will
be more rescues. Trafficking in persons is a deplorable crime. It is committed even
though the minor knew about or consented to the act of trafficking.
This case involves Republic Act No. 9208,2 otherwise known as the “Anti-Trafficking in
Persons Act of 2003.”3
Accused Shirley A. Casio was charged for the violation of Republic Act No. 9208,
Section 4(a), qualified by Section 6(a). The information against accused, dated May 5,
2008, states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That on or about the 3rd day of May 2008, at about 1:00 o’clock A.M., in the City of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
with deliberate intent, with intent to gain, did then and there hire and/or recruit AAA, a
minor, 17 years old and BBB for the purpose of prostitution and sexual exploitation, by
acting as their procurer for different customers, for money, profit or any other
consideration, in Violation of Sec. 4, Par. (a), Qualified by Sec. 6, Par. ( a), of R.A. 9208
(Qualified Trafficking in Persons).
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
The facts, as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
On May 2, 2008, International Justice Mission (IJM), 5 a non-governmental organization,

coordinated with the police in order to entrap persons engaged in human trafficking in
Cebu City.6
Chief PSI George Ylanan, SPO1 Felomino Mendaros, SPO1 Fe Altubar, PO1 Albert
Luardo, and PO1 Roy Carlo Veloso composed the team of police operatives. 7 PO1
Luardo and PO1 Veloso were designated as decoys, pretending to be tour guides
looking for girls to entertain their guests.8 IJM provided them with marked money,
which was recorded in the police blotter. 9
The team went to Queensland Motel and rented Rooms 24 and 25. These rooms were
adjacent to each other. Room 24 was designated for the transaction while Room 25 was
for the rest of the police team.10
PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street in Barangay Kamagayan,
Cebu City’s red light district. Accused noticed them and called their attention by saying
“Chicks mo dong?” (Do you like girls, guys?).11
During trial, PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso testified that their conversation with accused
went as follows: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Accused: Chicks mo dong? (Do you like girls, guys?)

PO1 Unya mga bag-o? Kanang batan-on kay naa mi guests naghulat sa motel. (Are they
Luardo: new? They must be young because we have guests waiting at the motel.)
Accused: Naa, hulat kay magkuha ko. (Yes, just wait and I’ll get them.)12
At that point, PO1 Luardo sent a text message to PSI Ylanan that they found a
prospective subject.13
After a few minutes, accused returned with AAA and BBB, private complainants in this
case.14
Accused: Kining duha kauyon mo ani? (Are you satisfied with these two?)
PO1 Maayo man kaha na sila modala ug kayat? (Well, are they good in sex?)15
Veloso:
Accused gave the assurance that the girls were good in sex. PO1 Luardo inquired how
much their services would cost. Accused replied, “Tag kinientos” (P500.00).16
PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo convinced accused to come with them to Queensland
Motel. Upon proceeding to Room 24, PO1 Veloso handed the marked money to
accused.17
As accused counted the money, PO1 Veloso gave PSI Ylanan a missed call. This was
their pre-arranged signal. The rest of the team proceeded to Room 24, arrested
accused, and informed her of her constitutional rights. The police confiscated the
marked money from accused.18 Meanwhile, AAA and BBB “were brought to Room 25
and placed in the custody of the representatives from the IJM and the DSWD.” 19
During trial, AAA testified that she was born on January 27, 1991. This statement was
supported by a copy of her certificate of live birth. 20
AAA narrated that in 2007, she worked as a house helper in Mandaue City. In March
2008 she stopped working as a house helper and transferred to Cebu City. She stayed
with her cousin, but she subsequently moved to a boarding house. It was there where
she met her friend, Gee Ann. AAA knew that Gee Ann worked in a disco club. When Gee
Ann found out that AAA was no longer a virgin, she offered AAA work. AAA agreed
because she needed the money in order to help her father. AAA recalled that she had
sex with her first customer. She was paid P200.00 and given an additional P500.00 as
tip. For the first few weeks, Gee Ann provided customers for AAA. Eventually, Gee Ann
brought her to Barangay Kamagayan, telling her that there were more customers in
that area.21
AAA stated that she knew accused was a pimp because AAA would usually see her
pimping girls to customers in Barangay Kamagayan. 22 AAA further testified that on May
2, 2008, accused solicited her services for a customer. That was the first time that she
was pimped by accused.23 Accused brought her, BBB, and a certain Jocelyn to
Queensland Motel.24
AAA testified that Jocelyn stayed in the taxi, while she and BBB went to Room 24. It
was in Room 24 where the customer paid Shirley. The police rushed in and told AAA
and BBB to go to the other room. AAA was then met by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development personnel who informed her that she was rescued and not
arrested.25
AAA described that her job as a prostitute required her to display herself, along with
other girls, between 7 p.m. to 8 p.m. She received P400.00 for every customer who
selected her.26
The prosecution also presented the police operatives during trial. PSI Ylanan, SPO1
Mendaros, and SPO1 Altubar testified that after PO1 Veloso had made the missed call to
PSI Ylanan, they “rushed to Room 24 and arrested the accused.” 27 SPO1 Altubar
retrieved the marked money worth P1,000.00 from accused’s right hand “and upon
instruction from PCINSP Ylanan recorded the same at the ‘police blotter prior
operation’. . . .”28
The trial court noted that AAA requested assistance from the IJM “in conducting the
operation against the accused.”29
Version of the accused
In defense, accused testified that she worked as a laundrywoman. On the evening of

May 2, 2008, she went out to buy supper. While walking, she was stopped by two men
on board a blue car. The two men asked her if she knew someone named Bingbing. She
replied that she only knew Gingging but not Bingbing. The men informed her that they
were actually looking for Gingging, gave her a piece of paper with a number written on
it, and told her to tell Gingging to bring companions. When accused arrived home, she
contacted Gingging. Gingging convinced her to come because allegedly, she would be
given money by the two males.30
Ruling of the trial court
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City found accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and held31that: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Accused had consummated the act of trafficking of person[s] . . . as defined under

paragraph (a), Section 3 of R.A. 9208 for the purpose of letting her engage in
prostitution as defined under paragraph [c] of the same Section; the act of “sexual
intercourse” need not have been consummated for the mere “transaction” i.e. the
‘solicitation’ for sex and the handing over of the “bust money” of Php1,000.00 already
consummated the said act.
....
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused, SHIRLEY A. CASIO, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of trafficking in persons under paragraph (a), Section 4 as qualified under
paragraph (a), Section 6 of R.A. 9208 and sentenced to suffer imprisonment of TWENTY
(20) YEARS and to pay a fine of ONE MILLION (Php1,000,000.00).
Finally, accused is ordered to pay the costs of these proceedings.
SO ORDERED[.]32
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court but modified the fine and
awarded moral damages. The dispositive portion of the decision 33 reads: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED.
The assailed Decision dated 10 August 2010 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 14 in Cebu City in Crim. Case No. CBU-83122 is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS. The accused-appellant is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment and a fine of Php2,000,000 and is ordered to pay each of the
private complainants Php150,000 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.34
Accused filed a notice of appeal35 on August 28, 2013, which the Court of Appeals noted
and gave due course in its resolution36 dated January 6, 2014.
The case records of CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 01490 were received by this court on March
17, 2014.37
In the resolution38 dated April 29, 2014, this court resolved to notify the parties that
they may file their respective supplemental briefs within 30 days from notice. This court
also required the Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women to confirm
the confinement of accused.39
Counsel for accused40 and the Office of the Solicitor General41 filed their respective
manifestations, stating that they would no longer file supplemental briefs considering
that all issues had been discussed in the appellant’s brief and appellee’s brief filed
before the Court of Appeals. Through a letter 42 dated June 17, 2014, Superintendent IV
Rachel D. Ruelo confirmed accused’s confinement at the Correctional Institution for
Women since October 27, 2010.
The sole issue raised by accused is whether the prosecution was able to prove her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
However, based on the arguments raised in accused’s brief, the sole issue may be
dissected into the following:
(1) Whether the entrapment operation conducted by the police was valid, considering that there
was no prior surveillance and the police did not know the subject of the operation;43
(2) Whether the prosecution was able to prove accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt even
though there was no evidence presented to show that accused has a history of engaging in
human trafficking;44 and
(3) Whether accused was properly convicted of trafficking in persons, considering that AAA
admitted that she works as a prostitute.45
Arguments of accused
Accused argues that there was no valid entrapment. Instead, she was instigated into
committing the crime.46The police did not conduct prior surveillance and did not even
know who their subject was.47 Neither did the police know the identities of the alleged
victims.
Accused further argues that under the subjective test, she should be acquitted because
the prosecution did not present evidence that would prove she had a history of
engaging in human trafficking or any other offense. She denied being a pimp and
asserted that she was a laundrywoman.48 In addition, AAA admitted that she worked as
a prostitute. Thus, it was her decision to display herself to solicit customers. 49
Arguments of the plaintiff-appellee
The Office of the Solicitor General, counsel for plaintiff-appellee People of the
Philippines, argued that the trial court did not err in convicting accused because
witnesses positively identified her as the person who solicited customers and received
money for AAA and BBB.50 Entrapment operations are valid and have been recognized
by courts.51 Likewise, her arrest in flagrante delicto is valid. 52 Hence, the trial court was
correct in stating that accused had “fully consummated the act of trafficking of persons.
. .”53
We affirm accused Shirley A. Casio’s conviction.
I.
Background of Republic Act No. 9208
The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN CTOC) was
“adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession” 54 on November 15, 2000.
The UN CTOC is supplemented by three protocols: (1) the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; (2) the Protocol
against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; and, (3) the Protocol against
the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and
Ammunition.55
On December 14, 2000, the Philippines signed the United Nations “Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children”
(Trafficking Protocol).56 This was ratified by the Philippine Senate on September 30,
2001.57 The Trafficking Protocol’s entry into force was on December 25, 2003. 58
In the Trafficking Protocol, human trafficking is defined as: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Article 3
Use of terms
For the purposes of this Protocol:
(a) “Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer,

harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms
of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position
of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the
consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar
to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs;
(b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set
forth in subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set
forth in subparagraph (a) have been used;
(c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the
purpose of exploitation shall be considered “trafficking in persons” even if this does not
involve any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article;
(d) “Child” shall mean any person under eighteen years of age.
Senator Loren Legarda, in her sponsorship speech, stated that the “Anti-Trafficking Act
will serve as the enabling law of the country’s commitment to [the] protocol.” 59
Senator Luisa Ejercito Estrada also delivered a sponsorship speech and described
trafficking in persons as follows:
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Trafficking in human beings, if only to emphasize the gravity of its hideousness, is

tantamount to modern-day slavery at work. It is a manifestation of one of the most
flagrant forms of violence against human beings. Its victims suffer the brunt of this
insidious form of violence. It is exploitation, coercion, deception, abduction, rape,
physical, mental and other forms of abuse, prostitution, forced labor, and indentured
servitude.
....
As of this time, we have signed the following: the Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Discrimination Against Women; the 1995 Convention on the Rights of the
Child; the United Nations Convention on the Protection of Migrant Workers and their
Families; and the United Nations’ Resolution on Trafficking in Women and Girls, among
others.
Moreover, we have also expressed our support for the United Nations’ Convention
Against Organized Crime, including the Trafficking Protocol in October last year.
At first glance, it appears that we are very responsive to the problem. So it seems.
Despite these international agreements, we have yet to come up with a law that shall
squarely address human trafficking.60
During the interpellation of Republic Act No. 9208, then numbered as Senate Bill No.
2444, Senator Teresa Aquino-Oreta asked if there was a necessity for an anti-trafficking
law when other laws exist that cover trafficking. 61
Senator Luisa Ejercito Estrada explained: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
At present, Mr. President, the relevant laws to the trafficking issue are the Revised
Penal Code, Republic Act No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act,
R[epublic] A[ct] No. 6955 or the Mail-Order Bride Act, and Republic Act No. 8239 or the
Philippine Passport Act. These laws address issues such as illegal recruitment,
prostitution, falsification of public documents and the mail-order bride scheme. These
laws do not respond to the issue of recruiting, harboring or transporting persons
resulting in prostitution, forced labor, slavery and slavery-like practices. They only
address to one or some elements of trafficking independent of their results or
consequence.62(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Republic Act No. 9208 was enacted in order to fully address the issue of human
trafficking. Republic Act No. 9208 was passed on May 12, 2003, and approved on May
26, 2003.
II.
Elements of trafficking in persons
The elements of trafficking in persons can be derived from its definition under Section
3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, thus: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1) The act of “recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or receipt of persons with or

without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national borders.”
(2) The means used which include “threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction,
fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the
person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person
having control over another; and
(3) The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes “exploitation or the prostitution of
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or
the removal or sale of organs.”63
On January 28, 2013, Republic Act No. 10364 64 was approved, otherwise known as the
“Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012.” Section 3(a) of Republic Act No.
9208 was amended by Republic Act No. 10364 as follows: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 3. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended to read as follows:
“SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act:
“(a) Trafficking in Persons – refers to the recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing,

offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or
without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means
of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse
of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having
control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a
minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of
organs.
“The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption or receipt of a child for

the purpose of exploitation or when the adoption is induced by any form of
consideration for exploitative purposes shall also be considered as ‘trafficking in
persons’ even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding
paragraph. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of trafficking in persons have been
expanded to include the following acts: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1) The act of “recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation,

transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim’s consent
or knowledge, within or across national borders;”
(2) The means used include “by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the
consent of a person having control over another person”
(3) The purpose of trafficking includes “the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or
sale of organs” (Emphasis supplied)
The Court of Appeals found that AAA and BBB were recruited by accused when their
services were peddled to the police who acted as decoys. 65 AAA was a child at the time
that accused peddled her services.66 AAA also stated that she agreed to work as a
prostitute because she needed money.67 Accused took advantage of AAA’s vulnerability
as a child and as one who need money, as proven by the testimonies of the witnesses. 68
III.
Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense under Republic Act No.
9208.
Accused claims that AAA admitted engaging in prostitution even before May 2, 2008.
She concludes that AAA was predisposed to having sex with “customers” for
money.69 For liability under our law, this argument is irrelevant. As defined under
Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, trafficking in persons can still be committed even
if the victim gives consent.
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act:
a. Trafficking in Persons - refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer
or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or
knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of
force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of
power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the persons,
or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent
of a person having control over another person for the purpose of
exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or
services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
The recruitment transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for

the purpose of exploitation shall also be considered as “trafficking in
persons” even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the
preceding paragraph.70 (Emphasis supplied)
The victim’s consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive
means employed by perpetrators of human trafficking. 71 Even without the use of
coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a minor’s consent is not given out of his or her
own free will.
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9208 enumerates the different acts of trafficking in
persons. Accused was charged under Section 4(a), which states: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. — It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or
judicial, to commit any of the following acts.
a. To recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means,
including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas employment or training
or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation,
forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage; 72
Republic Act No. 9208 further enumerates the instances when the crime of trafficking in
persons is qualified.
SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. — The following are considered as qualified
trafficking:
a. When the trafficked person is a child;
b. When the adoption is effected through Republic Act No. 8043, otherwise
known as the “Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995” and said adoption is
for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced
labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
c. When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking

is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3)
or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is
deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more
persons, individually or as a group;
d. When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person
who exercise authority over the trafficked person or when the offense is
committed by a public officer or employee;
e. When the trafficked person is recruited to engage in prostitution with any

member of the military or law enforcement agencies;
f. When the offender is a member of the military or law enforcement

agencies; and
g. When by reason or on occasion of the act of trafficking in persons, the

offended party dies, becomes insane, suffers mutilation or is afflicted with
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) or the Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS). (Emphasis supplied)73
Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 9208 defines “child” as: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act:
. . . .

b. Child - refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or one who is over eighteen (18)
but is unable to fully take care of or protect himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition.74
Based on the definition of trafficking in persons and the enumeration of acts of
trafficking in persons, accused performed all the elements in the commission of the
offense when she peddled AAA and BBB and offered their services to decoys PO1 Veloso
and PO1 Luardo in exchange for money. The offense was also qualified because the
trafficked persons were minors.
Here, AAA testified as to how accused solicited her services for the customers waiting at
Queensland Motel. AAA also testified that she was only 17 years old when accused
peddled her. Her certificate of live birth was presented as evidence to show that she
was born on January 27, 1991.
The prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused committed
the offense of trafficking in persons, qualified by the fact that one of the victims was a
child. As held by the trial court:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[T]he act of “sexual intercourse” need not have been consummated for the mere
“transaction” i.e. that ‘solicitation’ for sex and the handing over of the “bust money” of
Php.1,000.00 already consummated the said act.75
IV.
Validity of the entrapment operation
In People v. Doria,76 this court discussed the objective test and the subjective test to
determine whether there was a valid entrapment operation: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
. . . American federal courts and a majority of state courts use the “subjective” or
“origin of intent” test laid down in Sorrells v. United States to determine whether
entrapment actually occurred. The focus of the inquiry is on the accused's
predisposition to commit the offense charged, his state of mind and inclination before
his initial exposure to government agents. All relevant facts such as the accused's
mental and character traits, his past offenses, activities, his eagerness in committing
the crime, his reputation, etc., are considered to assess his state of mind before the
crime. The predisposition test emphasizes the accused's propensity to commit the
offense rather than the officer's misconduct and reflects an attempt to draw a line
between a “trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal.” If the
accused was found to have been ready and willing to commit the offense at any
favorable opportunity, the entrapment defense will fail even if a police agent used an
unduly persuasive inducement.
Some states, however, have adopted the “objective” test. . . . Here, the court considers
the nature of the police activity involved and the propriety of police conduct. The
inquiry is focused on the inducements used by government agents, on police conduct,
not on the accused and his predisposition to commit the crime. For the goal of the
defense is to deter unlawful police conduct. The test of entrapment is whether the
conduct of the law enforcement agent was likely to induce a normally law-abiding
person, other than one who is ready and willing, to commit the offense; for purposes of
this test, it is presumed that a law-abiding person would normally resist the temptation
to commit a crime that is presented by the simple opportunity to act unlawfully.
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)77
Accused argued that in our jurisprudence, courts usually apply the objective test in
determining the whether there was an entrapment operation or an
instigation.78 However, the use of the objective test should not preclude courts from
also applying the subjective test. She pointed out that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Applying the “subjective ” test it is worth invoking that accused-appellant procures

income from being a laundry woman. The prosecution had not shown any proof
evidencing accused-appellant’s history in human trafficking or engagement in any
offense. She is not even familiar to the team who had has [sic] been apprehending
human traffickers for quite some time. 79 (Citations omitted)
Accused further argued that the police should have conducted a prior surveillance
before the entrapment operation.
Time and again, this court has discussed the difference between entrapment and
instigation. In Chang v. People,80 this court explained that: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the
apprehension of the criminal while in the actual commission of the crime. There is
instigation when the accused is induced to commit the crime. The difference in the
nature of the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the mens
rea originates from the mind of the criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the
crime comes from him. In instigation, the law officer conceives the commission of the
crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution. 81
Accused contends that using the subjective test, she was clearly instigated by the police
to commit the offense. She denied being a pimp and claimed that she earned her living
as a laundrywoman. On this argument, we agree with the finding of the Court of
Appeals:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[I]t was the accused-appellant who commenced the transaction with PO1 Luardo and
PO1 Veloso by calling their attention on whether they wanted girls for that evening, and
when the officers responded, it was the accused-appellant who told them to wait while
she would fetch the girls for their perusal.82
This shows that accused was predisposed to commit the offense because she initiated
the transaction. As testified by PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo, accused called out their
attention by saying “Chicks mo dong?” If accused had no predisposition to commit the
offense, then she most likely would not have asked PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo if they
wanted girls.
The entrapment would still be valid using the objective test. The police merely
proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street in Barangay Kamagayan. It was accused who asked
them whether they wanted girls. There was no illicit inducement on the part of the
police for the accused to commit the crime.
When accused was arrested, she was informed of her constitutional rights. 83 The
marked money retrieved from her was recorded in the police blotter prior to the
entrapment operation and was presented in court as evidence. 84
On accused’s alibi that she was merely out to buy her supper that night, the Court of
Appeals noted that accused never presented Gingging in court. Thus, her alibi was
unsubstantiated and cannot be given credence.85
With regard to the lack of prior surveillance, prior surveillance is not a condition for an
entrapment operation’s validity.86 In People v. Padua87 this court underscored the value
of flexibility in police operations: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment or buy-bust

operation, the conduct of which has no rigid or textbook method. Flexibility is a trait of
good police work. However the police carry out its entrapment operations, for as long
as the rights of the accused have not been violated in the process, the courts will not
pass on the wisdom thereof. The police officers may decide that time is of the essence
and dispense with the need for prior surveillance.88(Citations omitted)
This flexibility is even more important in cases involving trafficking of persons. The
urgency of rescuing the victims may at times require immediate but deliberate action
on the part of the law enforcers.
V.
Imposition of fine and award of damages
The Court of Appeals properly imposed the amount of P2,000,000.00. Section 10 (b) of
Republic Act No. 9208 provides that: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 10. Penalties and Sanctions. — The following penalties and sanctions are hereby
established for the offenses enumerated in this Act:
. . . .

c. Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section 6 shall suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00) but not
more than Five million pesos (P5,000,000.00);
However, we modify by raising the award of moral damages from P150,000.00 89 to
P500,000.00. We also award exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00. These
amounts are in accordance with the ruling in People v. Lalli90 where this court held
that: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The payment of P500,000 as moral damages and P100,000 as exemplary damages for
the crime of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute finds basis in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code, which states: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
....
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to the
crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact, it is worse. To be
trafficked as a prostitute without one’s consent and to be sexually violated four to five
times a day by different strangers is horrendous and atrocious. There is no doubt that
Lolita experienced physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation when she
was trafficked as a prostitute in Malaysia. Since the crime of Trafficking in Persons was
aggravated, being committed by a syndicate, the award of exemplary damages is
likewise justified.91
Human trafficking indicts the society that tolerates the kind of poverty and its
accompanying desperation that compels our women to endure indignities. It reflects the
weaknesses of that society even as it convicts those who deviantly thrive in such
hopelessness. We should continue to strive for the best of our world, where our choices
of human intimacies are real choices, and not the last resort taken just to survive.
Human intimacies enhance our best and closest relationships. It serves as a foundation
for two human beings to face life’s joys and challenges while continually growing
together with many shared experiences. The quality of our human relationships defines
the world that we create also for others.
Regardless of the willingness of AAA and BBB, therefore, to be trafficked, we affirm the
text and spirit of our laws. Minors should spend their adolescence moulding their
character in environments free of the vilest motives and the worse of other human
beings. The evidence and the law compel us to affirm the conviction of accused in this
case.
But this is not all that we have done. By fulfilling our duties, we also express the hope
that our people and our government unite against everything inhuman. We contribute
to a commitment to finally stamp out slavery and human trafficking.
There are more AAA’s and BBBs out there. They, too, deserve to be rescued. They, too,
need to be shown that in spite of what their lives have been, there is still much good in
our world.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals

dated June 27, 2013, finding accused Shirley A. Casio guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating Section 4(a), qualified by Section 6(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, and
sentencing her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P2,000,000.00,
with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant shall not be eligible for parole under Act
No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law) in accordance with Section 3 of Republic Act
No. 9346.92
The award of damages is likewise MODIFIED as follows:
Accused is ordered to pay each of the private complainants:
(1) P500,000.00 as moral damages; and
(2) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr.,* and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 135981 January 15, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her prayer for acquittal on a novel theory -- the
"battered woman syndrome" (BWS), which allegedly constitutes self-defense. Under the proven
facts, however, she is not entitled to complete exoneration because there was no unlawful
aggression -- no immediate and unexpected attack on her by her batterer-husband at the time she
shot him.
Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete.
But all is not lost. The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted on appellant constituted a form of
cumulative provocation that broke down her psychological resistance and self-control. This
"psychological paralysis" she suffered diminished her will power, thereby entitling her to the
mitigating factor under paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
In addition, appellant should also be credited with the extenuating circumstance of having acted
upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. The acute
battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she
was eight months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional
and mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and her unborn
child's.
Considering the presence of these two mitigating circumstances arising from BWS, as well as the
benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she may now apply for and be released from custody
on parole, because she has already served the minimum period of her penalty while under detention
during the pendency of this case.
The Case
For automatic review before this Court is the September 25, 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial
1
Court (RTC) of Ormoc City (Branch 35) in Criminal Case No. 5016-0, finding Marivic Genosa guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of parricide. The decretal portion of the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court finds the accused,
Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide as
provided under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code as restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659,
and after finding treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance and none of mitigating
circumstance, hereby sentences the accused with the penalty of DEATH.
"The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as indemnity and another sum of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral damages." 2
The Information charged appellant with parricide as follows:

3
"That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of

Isabel, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound one BEN
GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which the accused
had provided herself for the purpose, [causing] the following wounds, to wit:
'Cadaveric spasm.
'Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.
'Face, black, blownup & swollen w/ evident post-mortem lividity. Eyes protruding from
its sockets and tongue slightly protrudes out of the mouth.
'Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone of the head,
resulting [in] laceration of the brain, spontaneous rupture of the blood vessels on the
posterior surface of the brain, laceration of the dura and meningeal vessels
producing severe intracranial hemorrhage.
'Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/ shedding of the
epidermis.
'Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.'
which caused his death." 4
With the assistance of her counsel, appellant pleaded not guilty during her arraignment on March 3,
5
1997. In due course, she was tried for and convicted of parricide.
6
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the prosecution's version of the facts in this
wise:
"Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on November 19, 1983 in Ormoc City.
Thereafter, they lived with the parents of Ben in their house at Isabel, Leyte. For a time,
Ben's younger brother, Alex, and his wife lived with them too. Sometime in 1995, however,
appellant and Ben rented from Steban Matiga a house at Barangay Bilwang, Isabel, Leyte
where they lived with their two children, namely: John Marben and Earl Pierre.
"On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight after receiving their
salary. They each had two (2) bottles of beer before heading home. Arturo would pass Ben's
house before reaching his. When they arrived at the house of Ben, he found out that
appellant had gone to Isabel, Leyte to look for him. Ben went inside his house, while Arturo
went to a store across it, waiting until 9:00 in the evening for the masiaorunner to place a
bet. Arturo did not see appellant arrive but on his way home passing the side of the
Genosas' rented house, he heard her say 'I won't hesitate to kill you' to which Ben replied
'Why kill me when I am innocent?' That was the last time Arturo saw Ben alive. Arturo also
noticed that since then, the Genosas' rented house appeared uninhabited and was always
closed.
"On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her close friend and neighbor
living about fifty (50) meters from her house, to look after her pig because she was going to
Cebu for a pregnancy check-up. Appellant likewise asked Erlinda to sell her motorcycle to
their neighbor Ronnie Dayandayan who unfortunately had no money to buy it.
"That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was waiting for a bus going to
Ormoc when he saw appellant going out of their house with her two kids in tow, each one
carrying a bag, locking the gate and taking her children to the waiting area where he was.
Joseph lived about fifty (50) meters behind the Genosas' rented house. Joseph, appellant
and her children rode the same bus to Ormoc. They had no conversation as Joseph noticed
that appellant did not want to talk to him.
"On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him about the foul odor
emanating from his house being rented by Ben and appellant. Steban went there to find out
the cause of the stench but the house was locked from the inside. Since he did not have a
duplicate key with him, Steban destroyed the gate padlock with a borrowed steel saw. He
was able to get inside through the kitchen door but only after destroying a window to reach a
hook that locked it. Alone, Steban went inside the unlocked bedroom where the offensive
smell was coming from. There, he saw the lifeless body of Ben lying on his side on the bed
covered with a blanket. He was only in his briefs with injuries at the back of his head. Seeing
this, Steban went out of the house and sent word to the mother of Ben about his son's
misfortune. Later that day, Iluminada Genosa, the mother of Ben, identified the dead body as
that of [her] son.
"Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo Acodesin, then assigned at the
police station at Isabel, Leyte, received a report regarding the foul smell at the Genosas'
rented house. Together with SPO1 Millares, SPO1 Colon, and Dr. Refelina Cerillo, SPO3
Acodesin proceeded to the house and went inside the bedroom where they found the dead
body of Ben lying on his side wrapped with a bedsheet. There was blood at the nape of Ben
who only had his briefs on. SPO3 Acodesin found in one corner at the side of an aparadora
metal pipe about two (2) meters from where Ben was, leaning against a wall. The metal pipe
measured three (3) feet and six (6) inches long with a diameter of one and half (1 1/2)
inches. It had an open end without a stop valve with a red stain at one end. The bedroom
was not in disarray.
"About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because of its stench, had to be taken
outside at the back of the house before the postmortem examination was conducted by Dr.
Cerillo in the presence of the police. A municipal health officer at Isabel, Leyte responsible
for medico-legal cases, Dr. Cerillo found that Ben had been dead for two to three days and
his body was already decomposing. The postmortem examination of Dr. Cerillo yielded the
findings quoted in the Information for parricide later filed against appellant. She concluded
that the cause of Ben's death was 'cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe intracranial
hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the occipital [bone].'
"Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going home after work on November 15,
1995, she got worried that her husband who was not home yet might have gone gambling
since it was a payday. With her cousin Ecel Araño, appellant went to look for Ben at the
marketplace and taverns at Isabel, Leyte but did not find him there. They found Ben drunk
upon their return at the Genosas' house. Ecel went home despite appellant's request for her
to sleep in their house.
"Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even challenging her to a fight.
She allegedly ignored him and instead attended to their children who were doing their
homework. Apparently disappointed with her reaction, Ben switched off the light and, with the
use of a chopping knife, cut the television antenna or wire to keep her from watching
television. According to appellant, Ben was about to attack her so she ran to the bedroom,
but he got hold of her hands and whirled her around. She fell on the side of the bed and
screamed for help. Ben left. At this point, appellant packed his clothes because she wanted
him to leave. Seeing his packed clothes upon his return home, Ben allegedly flew into a
rage, dragged appellant outside of the bedroom towards a drawer holding her by the neck,
and told her 'You might as well be killed so nobody would nag me.' Appellant testified that
she was aware that there was a gun inside the drawer but since Ben did not have the key to
it, he got a three-inch long blade cutter from his wallet. She however, 'smashed' the arm of
Ben with a pipe, causing him to drop the blade and his wallet. Appellant then 'smashed' Ben
at his nape with the pipe as he was about to pick up the blade and his wallet. She thereafter
ran inside the bedroom.
"Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her husband by shooting him. She
supposedly 'distorted' the drawer where the gun was and shot Ben. He did not die on the
spot, though, but in the bedroom." (Citations omitted)
7
Version of the Defense
Appellant relates her version of the facts in this manner:
"1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on November 19, 1983. Prior to her
marriage, Marivic had graduated from San Carlos, Cebu City, obtaining a degree of Bachelor
of Science in Business Administration, and was working, at the time of her husband's death,
as a Secretary to the Port Managers in Ormoc City. The couple had three (3) children: John
Marben, Earl Pierre and Marie Bianca.
"2. Marivic and Ben had known each other since elementary school; they were neighbors in
Bilwang; they were classmates; and they were third degree cousins. Both sets of parents
were against their relationship, but Ben was persistent and tried to stop other suitors from
courting her. Their closeness developed as he was her constant partner at fiestas.
"3. After their marriage, they lived first in the home of Ben's parents, together with Ben's
brother, Alex, in Isabel, Leyte. In the first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben 'lived happily'.
But apparently, soon thereafter, the couple would quarrel often and their fights would
become violent.
"4. Ben's brother, Alex, testified for the prosecution that he could not remember when Ben
and Marivic married. He said that when Ben and Marivic quarreled, generally when Ben
would come home drunk, Marivic would inflict injuries on him. He said that in one incident in
1993 he saw Marivic holding a kitchen knife after Ben had shouted for help as his left hand
was covered with blood. Marivic left the house but after a week, she returned apparently
having asked for Ben's forgiveness. In another incident in May 22, 1994, early morning, Alex
and his father apparently rushed to Ben's aid again and saw blood from Ben's forehead and
Marivic holding an empty bottle. Ben and Marivic reconciled after Marivic had apparently
again asked for Ben's forgiveness.
"Mrs. Iluminada Genosa, Marivic's mother-in-law, testified too, saying that Ben and Marivic
married in '1986 or 1985 more or less here in Fatima, Ormoc City.' She said as the marriage
went along, Marivic became 'already very demanding. Mrs. Iluminada Genosa said that after
the birth of Marivic's two sons, there were 'three (3) misunderstandings.' The first was when
Marivic stabbed Ben with a table knife through his left arm; the second incident was on
November 15, 1994, when Marivic struck Ben on the forehead 'using a sharp instrument until
the eye was also affected. It was wounded and also the ear' and her husband went to Ben to
help; and the third incident was in 1995 when the couple had already transferred to the
house in Bilwang and she saw that Ben's hand was plastered as 'the bone cracked.'
"Both mother and son claimed they brought Ben to a Pasar clinic for medical intervention.
"5. Arturo Basobas, a co-worker of Ben, testified that on November 15, 1995 'After we
collected our salary, we went to the cock-fighting place of ISCO.' They stayed there for three
(3) hours, after which they went to 'Uniloks' and drank beer – allegedly only two (2) bottles
each. After drinking they bought barbeque and went to the Genosa residence. Marivic was
not there. He stayed a while talking with Ben, after which he went across the road to wait 'for
the runner and the usher of the masiao game because during that time, the hearing on
masiao numbers was rampant. I was waiting for the ushers and runners so that I can place
my bet.' On his way home at about 9:00 in the evening, he heard the Genosas arguing. They
were quarreling loudly. Outside their house was one 'Fredo' who is used by Ben to feed his
fighting cocks. Basobas' testimony on the root of the quarrel, conveniently overheard by him
was Marivic saying 'I will never hesitate to kill you', whilst Ben replied 'Why kill me when I am
innocent.' Basobas thought they were joking.
"He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the road from the Genosa residence.
Basobas admitted that he and Ben were always at the cockpits every Saturday and Sunday.
He claims that he once told Ben 'before when he was stricken with a bottle by Marivic
Genosa' that he should leave her and that Ben would always take her back after she would
leave him 'so many times'.
"Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben, but it was a long time that they had
been quarreling. He said Ben 'even had a wound' on the right forehead. He had known the
couple for only one (1) year.
"6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben became cruel to her and was a
habitual drinker. She said he provoked her, he would slap her, sometimes he would pin her
down on the bed, and sometimes beat her.
"These incidents happened several times and she would often run home to her parents, but
Ben would follow her and seek her out, promising to change and would ask for her
forgiveness. She said after she would be beaten, she would seek medical help from Dr. Dino
Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo. These doctors would enter the injuries inflicted upon her
by Ben into their reports. Marivic said Ben would beat her or quarrel with her every time he
was drunk, at least three times a week.
"7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely related to Marivic, testified as to the
abuse and violence she received at the hands of Ben.
'7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor] of the Genosas, testified that on
November 15, 1995, he overheard a quarrel between Ben and Marivic. Marivic was shouting
for help and through the open jalousies, he saw the spouses 'grappling with each other'. Ben
had Marivic in a choke hold. He did not do anything, but had come voluntarily to testify.
(Please note this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo Busabos. )8
'7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother of Mr. Joe Barrientos, testified
that he heard his neighbor Marivic shouting on the night of November 15, 1995. He peeped
through the window of his hut which is located beside the Genosa house and saw 'the
spouses grappling with each other then Ben Genosa was holding with his both hands the
neck of the accused, Marivic Genosa'. He said after a while, Marivic was able to extricate
he[r]self and enter the room of the children. After that, he went back to work as he was to go
fishing that evening. He returned at 8:00 the next morning. (Again, please note that this was
the same night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas).
'7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the Genosas while they were living in
Isabel, Leyte. His house was located about fifty (50) meters from theirs. Marivic is his niece
and he knew them to be living together for 13 or 14 years. He said the couple was always
quarreling. Marivic confided in him that Ben would pawn items and then would use the
money to gamble. One time, he went to their house and they were quarreling. Ben was so
angry, but would be pacified 'if somebody would come.' He testified that while Ben was alive
'he used to gamble and when he became drunk, he would go to our house and he will say,
'Teody' because that was what he used to call me, 'mokimas ta,' which means 'let's go and
look for a whore.' Mr. Sarabia further testified that Ben 'would box his wife and I would see
bruises and one time she ran to me, I noticed a wound (the witness pointed to his right
breast) as according to her a knife was stricken to her.' Mr. Sarabia also said that once he
saw Ben had been injured too. He said he voluntarily testified only that morning.
'7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a cousin of Marivic, testified that in the
afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic went to her house and asked her help to look for
Ben. They searched in the market place, several taverns and some other places, but could
not find him. She accompanied Marivic home. Marivic wanted her to sleep with her in the
Genosa house 'because she might be battered by her husband.' When they got to the
Genosa house at about 7:00 in the evening, Miss Arano said that 'her husband was already
there and was drunk.' Miss Arano knew he was drunk 'because of his staggering walking and
I can also detect his face.' Marivic entered the house and she heard them quarrel noisily.
(Again, please note that this is the same night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas) Miss
Arano testified that this was not the first time Marivic had asked her to sleep in the house as
Marivic would be afraid every time her husband would come home drunk. At one time when
she did sleep over, she was awakened at 10:00 in the evening when Ben arrived because
the couple 'were very noisy in the sala and I had heard something was broken like a vase.'
She said Marivic ran into her room and they locked the door. When Ben couldn't get in he
got a chair and a knife and 'showed us the knife through the window grill and he scared us.'
She said that Marivic shouted for help, but no one came. On cross-examination, she said
that when she left Marivic's house on November 15, 1995, the couple were still quarreling.
'7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic were co-employees at
PHILPHOS, Isabel, Leyte. Marivic was his patient 'many times' and had also received
treatment from other doctors. Dr. Caing testified that from July 6, 1989 until November 9,
1995, there were six (6) episodes of physical injuries inflicted upon Marivic. These injuries
were reported in his Out-Patient Chart at the PHILPHOS Hospital. The prosecution admitted
the qualifications of Dr. Caing and considered him an expert witness.'
xxx xxx xxx
'Dr. Caing's clinical history of the tension headache and hypertention of Marivic on twenty-
three (23) separate occasions was marked at Exhibits '2' and '2-B.' The OPD Chart of
Marivic at the Philphos Clinic which reflected all the consultations made by Marivic and
the six (6) incidents of physical injuries reported was marked as Exhibit '3.'
"On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he is not a psychiatrist, he could not say whether
the injuries were directly related to the crime committed. He said it is only a psychiatrist who
is qualified to examine the psychological make-up of the patient, 'whether she is capable of
committing a crime or not.'
'7.6 Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in the place where the Genosas resided, testified
that about two (2) months before Ben died, Marivic went to his office past 8:00 in the
evening. She sought his help to settle or confront the Genosa couple who were experiencing
'family troubles'. He told Marivic to return in the morning, but he did not hear from her again
and assumed 'that they might have settled with each other or they might have forgiven with
each other.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it was her
husband who began the provocation. Marivic said she was frightened that her husband
would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In fact,
Marivic had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering from
eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born prematurely on December 1, 1995.
"Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five (5)
times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. Marivic said that the
reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because 'he was crazy
about his recent girlfriend, Lulu x x x Rubillos.'
"On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a gun; she said that he died in the
bedroom; that their quarrels could be heard by anyone passing their house; that Basobas
lied in his testimony; that she left for Manila the next day, November 16, 1995; that she did
not bother anyone in Manila, rented herself a room, and got herself a job as a field
researcher under the alias 'Marvelous Isidro'; she did not tell anyone that she was leaving
Leyte, she just wanted to have a safe delivery of her baby; and that she was arrested in San
Pablo, Laguna.
'Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she threw the gun away; that she did
not know what happened to the pipe she used to 'smash him once'; that she was wounded
by Ben on her wrist with the bolo; and that two (2) hours after she was 'whirled' by Ben, he
kicked her 'ass' and dragged her towards the drawer when he saw that she had packed his
things.'
"9. The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18, 1995 after an investigation was
made of the foul odor emitting from the Genosa residence. This fact was testified to by all the
prosecution witnesses and some defense witnesses during the trial.
"10. Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was the Municipal Health Officer of Isabel, Leyte at
the time of the incident, and among her responsibilities as such was to take charge of all
medico-legal cases, such as the examination of cadavers and the autopsy of cadavers. Dra.
Cerillo is not a forensic pathologist. She merely took the medical board exams and passed in
1986. She was called by the police to go to the Genosa residence and when she got there,
she saw 'some police officer and neighbor around.' She saw Ben Genosa, covered by a
blanket, lying in a semi-prone position with his back to the door. He was wearing only a brief.
xxxxxxxxx
"Dra. Cerillo said that 'there is only one injury and that is the injury involving the skeletal area
of the head' which she described as a 'fracture'. And that based on her examination, Ben had
been dead 2 or 3 days. Dra. Cerillo did not testify as to what caused his death.
"Dra. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defense counsel.

"11. The Information, dated November 14, 1996, filed against Marivic Genosa charged her
with the crime of PARRICIDE committed 'with intent to kill, with treachery and evidence
premeditation, x x x wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound x x x
her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon x x x which caused his death.'
"12. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997, 21 July 1997, 17, 22 and 23
September 1997, 12 November 1997, 15 and 16 December 1997, 22 May 1998, and 5 and 6
August 1998.
"13. On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the day of the last trial date, the
Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City, rendered a
JUDGMENT finding Marivic guilty 'beyond reasonable doubt' of the crime of parricide, and
further found treachery as an aggravating circumstance, thus sentencing her to the ultimate
penalty of DEATH.
"14. The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon automatic review and, under date
of 24 January 2000, Marivic's trial lawyer, Atty. Gil Marvel P. Tabucanon, filed a Motion to
Withdraw as counsel, attaching thereto, as a precautionary measure, two (2) drafts of
Appellant's Briefs he had prepared for Marivic which, for reasons of her own, were not
conformed to by her.
"The Honorable Court allowed the withdrawal of Atty. Tabucanon and permitted the entry of
appearance of undersigned counsel.
"15. Without the knowledge of counsel, Marivic Genosa wrote a letter dated 20 January
2000, to the Chief Justice, coursing the same through Atty. Teresita G. Dimaisip, Deputy
Clerk of Court of Chief Judicial Records Office, wherein she submitted her 'Brief without
counsels' to the Court.
"This letter was stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 4 February 2000.
"16. In the meantime, under date of 17 February 2000, and stamp-received by the Honorable
Court on 19 February 2000, undersigned counsel filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION
praying that the Honorable Court allow the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-
examination of the cause of his death; allow the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified
psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed her
husband; and finally, to allow a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of
said psychologists and psychiatrists.
"Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was a letter of Dr. Raquel Fortun, then the
only qualified forensic pathologist in the country, who opined that the description of the death
wound (as culled from the post-mortem findings, Exhibit 'A') is more akin to a gunshot wound
than a beating with a lead pipe.
"17. In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September 2000, the Honorable Court partly granted
Marivic's URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION and remanded the case 'to the trial court for the
reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the 'battered woman
syndrome' plea, within ninety (90) days from notice, and, thereafter to forthwith report to this
Court the proceedings taken, together with the copies of the TSN and relevant documentary
evidence, if any, submitted.'
"18. On 15 January 2001, Dra. Natividad A. Dayan appeared and testified before the Hon.
Fortunito L. Madrona, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
"Immediately before Dra. Dayan was sworn, the Court a quo asked if she had interviewed
Marivic Genosa. Dra. Dayan informed the Court that interviews were done at the Penal
Institution in 1999, but that the clinical interviews and psychological assessment were done
at her clinic.
"Dra. Dayan testified that she has been a clinical psychologist for twenty (20) years with her
own private clinic and connected presently to the De La Salle University as a professor.
Before this, she was the Head of the Psychology Department of the Assumption College; a
member of the faculty of Psychology at the Ateneo de Manila University and St. Joseph's
College; and was the counseling psychologist of the National Defense College. She has an
AB in Psychology from the University of the Philippines, a Master of Arts in Clinical
[Counseling], Psychology from the Ateneo, and a PhD from the U.P. She was the past
president of the Psychological Association of the Philippines and is a member of the
American Psychological Association. She is the secretary of the International Council of
Psychologists from about 68 countries; a member of the Forensic Psychology Association;
and a member of the ASEAN [Counseling] Association. She is actively involved with the
Philippine Judicial Academy, recently lecturing on the socio-demographic and psychological
profile of families involved in domestic violence and nullity cases. She was with the Davide
Commission doing research about Military Psychology. She has written a book entitled
'Energy Global Psychology' (together with Drs. Allan Tan and Allan Bernardo). The Genosa
case is the first time she has testified as an expert on battered women as this is the first case
of that nature.
"Dra. Dayan testified that for the research she conducted, on the socio-demographic and
psychological profile of families involved in domestic violence, and nullity cases, she looked
at about 500 cases over a period of ten (10) years and discovered that 'there are lots of
variables that cause all of this marital conflicts, from domestic violence to infidelity, to
psychiatric disorder.'
"Dra. Dayan described domestic violence to comprise of 'a lot of incidents of psychological
abuse, verbal abuse, and emotional abuse to physical abuse and also sexual abuse.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dra. Dayan testified that in her studies, 'the battered woman usually has a very low opinion
of herself. She has a self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x they usually
think very lowly of themselves and so when the violence would happen, they usually think
that they provoke it, that they were the one who precipitated the violence, they provoke their
spouse to be physically, verbally and even sexually abusive to them.' Dra. Dayan said that
usually a battered x x x comes from a dysfunctional family or from 'broken homes.'
"Dra. Dayan said that the batterer, just like the battered woman, 'also has a very low opinion
of himself. But then emerges to have superiority complex and it comes out as being very
arrogant, very hostile, very aggressive and very angry. They also had (sic) a very low
tolerance for frustrations. A lot of times they are involved in vices like gambling, drinking and
drugs. And they become violent.' The batterer also usually comes from a dysfunctional family
which over-pampers them and makes them feel entitled to do anything. Also, they see often
how their parents abused each other so 'there is a lot of modeling of aggression in the
family.'
"Dra. Dayan testified that there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not leave
her husband: poverty, self-blame and guilt that she provoked the violence, the cycle itself
which makes her hope her husband will change, the belief in her obligations to keep the
family intact at all costs for the sake of the children.
xxx xxx xxx
"Dra. Dayan said that abused wives react differently to the violence: some leave the house,
or lock themselves in another room, or sometimes try to fight back triggering 'physical
violence on both of them.' She said that in a 'normal marital relationship,' abuses also
happen, but these are 'not consistent, not chronic, are not happening day in [and] day out.' In
an 'abnormal marital relationship,' the abuse occurs day in and day out, is long lasting and
'even would cause hospitalization on the victim and even death on the victim.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dra. Dayan said that as a result of the battery of psychological tests she administered, it
was her opinion that Marivic fits the profile of a battered woman because 'inspite of her
feeling of self-confidence which we can see at times there are really feeling (sic) of loss,
such feelings of humiliation which she sees herself as damaged and as a broken person.
And at the same time she still has the imprint of all the abuses that she had experienced in
the past.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dra. Dayan said Marivic thought of herself as a loving wife and did not even consider filing
for nullity or legal separation inspite of the abuses. It was at the time of the tragedy that
Marivic then thought of herself as a victim.
xxx xxx xxx
"19. On 9 February 2001, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, a physician, who has since passed away,
appeared and testified before RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
"Dr. Pajarillo was a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry; a Fellow of the
Philippine Board of Psychiatry and a Fellow of the Philippine Psychiatry Association. He was
in the practice of psychiatry for thirty-eight (38) years. Prior to being in private practice, he
was connected with the Veterans Memorial Medical Centre where he gained his training on
psychiatry and neurology. After that, he was called to active duty in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, assigned to the V. Luna Medical Center for twenty six (26) years. Prior to his
retirement from government service, he obtained the rank of Brigadier General. He obtained
his medical degree from the University of Santo Tomas. He was also a member of the World
Association of Military Surgeons; the Quezon City Medical Society; the Cagayan Medical
Society; and the Philippine Association of Military Surgeons.
"He authored 'The Comparative Analysis of Nervous Breakdown in the Philippine Military
Academy from the Period 1954 – 1978' which was presented twice in international
congresses. He also authored 'The Mental Health of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
2000', which was likewise published internationally and locally. He had a medical textbook
published on the use of Prasepam on a Parke-Davis grant; was the first to use Enanthate
(siquiline), on an E.R. Squibb grant; and he published the use of the drug Zopiclom in 1985-
86.
"Dr. Pajarillo explained that psychiatry deals with the functional disorder of the mind and
neurology deals with the ailment of the brain and spinal cord enlarged. Psychology, on the
other hand, is a bachelor degree and a doctorate degree; while one has to finish medicine to
become a specialist in psychiatry.
"Even only in his 7th year as a resident in V. Luna Medical Centre, Dr. Pajarillo had already
encountered a suit involving violent family relations, and testified in a case in 1964. In the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, violent family disputes abound, and he has seen probably
ten to twenty thousand cases. In those days, the primordial intention of therapy was
reconciliation. As a result of his experience with domestic violence cases, he became a
consultant of the Battered Woman Office in Quezon City under Atty. Nenita Deproza.
"As such consultant, he had seen around forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence,
where there is physical abuse: such as slapping, pushing, verbal abuse, battering and
boxing a woman even to an unconscious state such that the woman is sometimes confined.
The affliction of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 'depends on the vulnerability of the victim.'
Dr. Pajarillo said that if the victim is not very healthy, perhaps one episode of violence may
induce the disorder; if the psychological stamina and physiologic constitutional stamina of
the victim is stronger, 'it will take more repetitive trauma to precipitate the post-traumatic
stress disorder and this x x x is very dangerous.'
"In psychiatry, the post-traumatic stress disorder is incorporated under the 'anxiety neurosis
or neurologic anxcietism.' It is produced by 'overwhelming brutality, trauma.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo explained that with 'neurotic anxiety', the victim relives the beating or trauma as
if it were real, although she is not actually being beaten at that time. She thinks 'of nothing
but the suffering.'
xxx xxx xxx
"A woman who suffers battery has a tendency to become neurotic, her emotional tone is
unstable, and she is irritable and restless. She tends to become hard-headed and persistent.
She has higher sensitivity and her 'self-world' is damaged.
"Dr. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family background relates to an individual's illness, such
as the deprivation of the continuous care and love of the parents. As to the batterer, he
normally 'internalizes what is around him within the environment.' And it becomes his own
personality. He is very competitive; he is aiming high all the time; he is so macho; he shows
his strong façade 'but in it there are doubts in himself and prone to act without thinking.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that 'even though without the presence of the precipator (sic) or the
one who administered the battering, that re-experiencing of the trauma occurred (sic)
because the individual cannot control it. It will just come up in her mind or in his mind.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic stress disorder try to defend
themselves, and 'primarily with knives. Usually pointed weapons or any weapon that is
available in the immediate surrounding or in a hospital x x x because that abound in the
household.' He said a victim resorts to weapons when she has 'reached the lowest rock
bottom of her life and there is no other recourse left on her but to act decisively.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his office in an interview he conducted
for two (2) hours and seventeen (17) minutes. He used the psychological evaluation and
social case studies as a help in forming his diagnosis. He came out with a Psychiatric
Report, dated 22 January 2001.
xxx xxx xxx
"On cross-examination by the private prosecutor, Dr. Pajarillo said that at the time she killed
her husband Marivic'c mental condition was that she was 're-experiencing the trauma.' He
said 'that we are trying to explain scientifically that the re-experiencing of the trauma is not
controlled by Marivic. It will just come in flashes and probably at that point in time that things
happened when the re-experiencing of the trauma flashed in her mind.' At the time he
interviewed Marivic 'she was more subdued, she was not super alert anymore x x x she is
mentally stress (sic) because of the predicament she is involved.'
xxx xxx xxx
"20. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by either the private or the public
prosecutor. Thus, in accord with the Resolution of this Honorable Court, the records of the
partially re-opened trial a quo were elevated." 9
Ruling of the Trial Court
Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the RTC gave credence to the prosecution
evidence that appellant had killed the deceased while he was in bed sleeping. Further, the trial court
appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery, because Ben Genosa was
supposedly defenseless when he was killed -- lying in bed asleep when Marivic smashed him with a
pipe at the back of his head.
The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was elevated to this Court for automatic review.
Supervening Circumstances
On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that this Court allow (1) the
exhumation of Ben Genosa and the reexamination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of
appellant by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she
had killed her spouse; and (3) the inclusion of the said experts' reports in the records of the case for
purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial reopening of the case for the lower
court to admit the experts' testimonies.
On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution granting in part appellant's Motion,
remanding the case to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric
opinion on the "battered woman syndrome" plea; and requiring the lower court to report thereafter to
this Court the proceedings taken as well as to submit copies of the TSN and additional evidence, if
any.
Acting on the Court's Resolution, the trial judge authorized the examination of Marivic by two clinical
psychologists, Drs. Natividad Dayan and Alfredo Pajarillo, supposedly experts on domestic
10 11
violence. Their testimonies, along with their documentary evidence, were then presented to and
admitted by the lower court before finally being submitted to this Court to form part of the records of
the case.12
The Issues
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court for this Court's consideration:
"1. The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an obviously hasty decision without reflecting
on the evidence adduced as to self-defense.
"2. The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that Ben and Marivic Genosa were legally
married and that she was therefore liable for parricide.
"3. The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death to be by beating with a pipe.
"4. The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and disregarding evidence adduced from impartial
and unbiased witnesses that Ben Genosa was a drunk, a gambler, a womanizer and wife-
beater; and further gravely erred in concluding that Ben Genosa was a battered husband.
"5. The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony from the children of Marivic
Genosa.
"6. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that Marivic's flight to Manila and her
subsequent apologies were indicia of guilt, instead of a clear attempt to save the life of her
unborn child.
"7. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there was an aggravating circumstance of
treachery.
"8. The trial court gravely erred in refusing to re-evaluate the traditional elements in
determining the existence of self-defense and defense of foetus in this case, thereby
erroneously convicting Marivic Genosa of the crime of parricide and condemning her to the
ultimate penalty of death." 13
In the main, the following are the essential legal issues: (1) whether appellant acted in self-defense
and in defense of her fetus; and (2) whether treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Collateral Factual Issues

The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in nature, if not collateral to the resolution
of the principal issues. As consistently held by this Court, the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to a high degree of respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that the trial judge gravely abused his discretion
or overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied material facts or circumstances of weight and substance
that could affect the outcome of the case. 14
In appellant's first six assigned items, we find no grave abuse of discretion, reversible error or
misappreciation of material facts that would reverse or modify the trial court's disposition of the case.
In any event, we will now briefly dispose of these alleged errors of the trial court.
First, we do not agree that the lower court promulgated "an obviously hasty decision without
reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense." We note that in his 17-page Decision, Judge
Fortunito L. Madrona summarized the testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense
witnesses and -- on the basis of those and of the documentary evidence on record -- made his
evaluation, findings and conclusions. He wrote a 3-page discourse assessing the testimony and the
self-defense theory of the accused. While she, or even this Court, may not agree with the trial
judge's conclusions, we cannot peremptorily conclude, absent substantial evidence, that he failed to
reflect on the evidence presented.
Neither do we find the appealed Decision to have been made in an "obviously hasty" manner. The
Information had been filed with the lower court on November 14, 1996. Thereafter, trial began and at
least 13 hearings were held for over a year. It took the trial judge about two months from the
conclusion of trial to promulgate his judgment. That he conducted the trial and resolved the case
with dispatch should not be taken against him, much less used to condemn him for being unduly
hasty. If at all, the dispatch with which he handled the case should be lauded. In any case, we find
his actions in substantial compliance with his constitutional obligation. 15
Second, the lower court did not err in finding as a fact that Ben Genosa and appellant had been
legally married, despite the non-presentation of their marriage contract. In People v. Malabago, this16
Court held:
"The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In the case of
parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the
deceased is the marriage certificate. In the absence of a marriage certificate, however, oral
evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered by the trial court if such proof is not
objected to."
Two of the prosecution witnesses -- namely, the mother and the brother of appellant's deceased
spouse -- attested in court that Ben had been married to Marivic. The defense raised no objection to
17
these testimonies. Moreover, during her direct examination, appellant herself made a judicial
admission of her marriage to Ben. Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon
18
the party making it, except only when there is a showing that (1) the admission was made through a
palpable mistake, or (2) no admission was in fact made. Other than merely attacking the non-
19
presentation of the marriage contract, the defense offered no proof that the admission made by
appellant in court as to the fact of her marriage to the deceased was made through a palpable
mistake.
Third, under the circumstances of this case, the specific or direct cause of Ben's death -- whether by
a gunshot or by beating with a pipe -- has no legal consequence. As the Court elucidated in its
September 29, 2000 Resolution, "[c]onsidering that the appellant has admitted the fact of killing her
husband and the acts of hitting his nape with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of his
head, the Court believes that exhumation is unnecessary, if not immaterial, to determine which of
said acts actually caused the victim's death." Determining which of these admitted acts caused the
death is not dispositive of the guilt or defense of appellant.
Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully appreciating evidence that Ben was a drunk,
gambler, womanizer and wife-beater. Until this case came to us for automatic review, appellant had
not raised the novel defense of "battered woman syndrome," for which such evidence may have
been relevant. Her theory of self-defense was then the crucial issue before the trial court. As will be
discussed shortly, the legal requisites of self-defense under prevailing jurisprudence ostensibly
appear inconsistent with the surrounding facts that led to the death of the victim. Hence, his personal
character, especially his past behavior, did not constitute vital evidence at the time.
Fifth, the trial court surely committed no error in not requiring testimony from appellant's children. As
correctly elucidated by the solicitor general, all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction
and control of the public prosecutor, in whom lies the discretion to determine which witnesses and
evidence are necessary to present. As the former further points out, neither the trial court nor the
20
prosecution prevented appellant from presenting her children as witnesses. Thus, she cannot now
fault the lower court for not requiring them to testify.
Finally, merely collateral or corroborative is the matter of whether the flight of Marivic to Manila and
her subsequent apologies to her brother-in-law are indicia of her guilt or are attempts to save the life
of her unborn child. Any reversible error as to the trial court's appreciation of these circumstances
has little bearing on the final resolution of the case.
First Legal Issue:
Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus
Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid criminal liability, invokes self-defense and/or
defense of her unborn child. When the accused admits killing the victim, it is incumbent upon her to
prove any claimed justifying circumstance by clear and convincing evidence. Well-settled is the rule
21
that in criminal cases, self-defense (and similarly, defense of a stranger or third person) shifts the
burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense. 22
The Battered Woman Syndrome
In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the battered woman syndrome. While
new in Philippine jurisprudence, the concept has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions as a form of
self-defense or, at the least, incomplete self-defense. By appreciating evidence that a victim or
23
defendant is afflicted with the syndrome, foreign courts convey their "understanding of the justifiably
fearful state of mind of a person who has been cyclically abused and controlled over a period of
time."24
A battered woman has been defined as a woman "who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful
physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to
do without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate
relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must
go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship
with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a
battered woman." 25
Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem, traditional beliefs about
the home, the family and the female sex role; emotional dependence upon the dominant male; the
tendency to accept responsibility for the batterer's actions; and false hopes that the relationship will
improve. 26
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called "cycle of
violence," which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident;
27
and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.

28
During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could be verbal or slight physical
abuse or another form of hostile behavior. The woman usually tries to pacify the batterer through a
show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his way. What actually happens is that
she allows herself to be abused in ways that, to her, are comparatively minor. All she wants is to
prevent the escalation of the violence exhibited by the batterer. This wish, however, proves to be
double-edged, because her "placatory" and passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the
right to abuse her in the first place.
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate him are not usually
successful, and the verbal and/or physical abuse worsens. Each partner senses the imminent loss of
control and the growing tension and despair. Exhausted from the persistent stress, the battered
woman soon withdraws emotionally. But the more she becomes emotionally unavailable, the more
the batterer becomes angry, oppressive and abusive. Often, at some unpredictable point, the
violence "spirals out of control" and leads to an acute battering incident.29
The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality, destructiveness and,

sometimes, death. The battered woman deems this incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable.
During this phase, she has no control; only the batterer may put an end to the violence. Its nature
can be as unpredictable as the time of its explosion, and so are his reasons for ending it. The
battered woman usually realizes that she cannot reason with him, and that resistance would only
exacerbate her condition.
At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible pain, although she may
later clearly remember every detail. Her apparent passivity in the face of acute violence may be
rationalized thus: the batterer is almost always much stronger physically, and she knows from her
past painful experience that it is futile to fight back. Acute battering incidents are often very savage
and out of control, such that innocent bystanders or intervenors are likely to get hurt.30
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident ends. During
this tranquil period, the couple experience profound relief. On the one hand, the batterer may show
a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He knows that he has been viciously cruel and
tries to make up for it, begging for her forgiveness and promising never to beat her again. On the
other hand, the battered woman also tries to convince herself that the battery will never happen
again; that her partner will change for the better; and that this "good, gentle and caring man" is the
real person whom she loves.
A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the emotional stability of the
batterer. Sensing his isolation and despair, she feels responsible for his well-being. The truth,
though, is that the chances of his reforming, or seeking or receiving professional help, are very slim,
especially if she remains with him. Generally, only after she leaves him does he seek professional
help as a way of getting her back. Yet, it is in this phase of remorseful reconciliation that she is most
thoroughly tormented psychologically.
The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a battered woman's psyche. In this
phase, she and her batterer are indeed emotionally dependent on each other -- she for his nurturant
behavior, he for her forgiveness. Underneath this miserable cycle of "tension, violence and
forgiveness," each partner may believe that it is better to die than to be separated. Neither one may
really feel independent, capable of functioning without the other.
31
History of Abuse
in the Present Case
To show the history of violence inflicted upon appellant, the defense presented several witnesses.
She herself described her heart-rending experience as follows:
"ATTY. TABUCANON
Q How did you describe your marriage with Ben Genosa?
A In the first year, I lived with him happily but in the subsequent year he was cruel to me and
a behavior of habitual drinker.
Q You said that in the subsequent year of your marriage, your husband was abusive to you
and cruel. In what way was this abusive and cruelty manifested to you?
A He always provoke me in everything, he always slap me and sometimes he pinned me

down on the bed and sometimes beat me.
Q How many times did this happen?
A Several times already.
Q What did you do when these things happen to you?
A I went away to my mother and I ran to my father and we separate each other.
Q What was the action of Ben Genosa towards you leaving home?
A He is following me, after that he sought after me.
Q What will happen when he follow you?
A He said he changed, he asked for forgiveness and I was convinced and after that I go to
him and he said 'sorry'.
Q During those times that you were the recipient of such cruelty and abusive behavior by
your husband, were you able to see a doctor?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who are these doctors?
A The company physician, Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said that you saw a doctor in relation to your injuries?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who inflicted these injuries?
A Of course my husband.
Q You mean Ben Genosa?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
[Court] /to the witness
Q How frequent was the alleged cruelty that you said?
A Everytime he got drunk.
Q No, from the time that you said the cruelty or the infliction of injury inflicted on your
occurred, after your marriage, from that time on, how frequent was the occurrence?
A Everytime he got drunk.
Q Is it daily, weekly, monthly or how many times in a month or in a week?
A Three times a week.
Q Do you mean three times a week he would beat you?
A Not necessarily that he would beat me but sometimes he will just quarrel me." 32
Referring to his "Out-Patient Chart" on Marivic Genosa at the Philphos Hospital, Dr. Dino D. Caing
33
bolstered her foregoing testimony on chronic battery in this manner:
"Q So, do you have a summary of those six (6) incidents which are found in the chart of your
clinic?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who prepared the list of six (6) incidents, Doctor?
A I did.
Q Will you please read the physical findings together with the dates for the record.
A 1. May 12, 1990 - physical findings are as follows: Hematoma (R) lower eyelid and
redness of eye. Attending physician: Dr. Lucero;
2. March 10, 1992 - Contusion-Hematoma (L) lower arbital area, pain and contusion
(R) breast. Attending physician: Dr. Canora;
3. March 26, 1993 - Abrasion, Furuncle (L) Axilla;
4. August 1, 1994 - Pain, mastitis (L) breast, 2o to trauma. Attending physician: Dr.
Caing;
5. April 17, 1995 - Trauma, tenderness (R) Shoulder. Attending physician: Dr.
Canora; and
6. June 5, 1995 - Swelling Abrasion (L) leg, multiple contusion Pregnancy. Attending
physician: Dr. Canora.
Q Among the findings, there were two (2) incidents wherein you were the attending
physician, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you actually physical examine the accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, going to your finding no. 3 where you were the one who attended the patient. What
do you mean by abrasion furuncle left axilla?
A Abrasion is a skin wound usually when it comes in contact with something rough
substance if force is applied.
Q What is meant by furuncle axilla?
A It is secondary of the light infection over the abrasion.
Q What is meant by pain mastitis secondary to trauma?
A So, in this 4th episode of physical injuries there is an inflammation of left breast. So, [pain]
meaning there is tenderness. When your breast is traumatized, there is tenderness pain.
Q So, these are objective physical injuries. Doctor?
xxx xxx xxx
Q Were you able to talk with the patient?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did she tell you?

A As a doctor-patient relationship, we need to know the cause of these injuries. And she told
me that it was done to her by her husband.
Q You mean, Ben Genosa?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q By the way Doctor, were you able to physical examine the accused sometime in the month
of November, 1995 when this incident happened?
A As per record, yes.
Q What was the date?
A It was on November 6, 1995.
Q So, did you actually see the accused physically?
A Yes, sir.
Q On November 6, 1995, will you please tell this Honorable Court, was the patient pregnant?
A Yes, sir.
Q Being a doctor, can you more engage at what stage of pregnancy was she?
A Eight (8) months pregnant.
Q So in other words, it was an advance stage of pregnancy?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was your November 6, 1995 examination, was it an examination about her
pregnancy or for some other findings?
A No, she was admitted for hypertension headache which complicates her pregnancy.
Q When you said admitted, meaning she was confined?
A Yes, sir.
Q For how many days?
A One day.
Q Where?
A At PHILPHOS Hospital.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Lets go back to the clinical history of Marivic Genosa. You said that you were able to
examine her personally on November 6, 1995 and she was 8 months pregnant.
What is this all about?
A Because she has this problem of tension headache secondary to hypertension and I think I
have a record here, also the same period from 1989 to 1995, she had a consultation for
twenty-three (23) times.
Q For what?
A Tension headache.
Q Can we say that specially during the latter consultation, that the patient had hypertension?
A The patient definitely had hypertension. It was refractory to our treatment. She does not
response when the medication was given to her, because tension headache is more or less
stress related and emotional in nature.
Q What did you deduce of tension headache when you said is emotional in nature?
A From what I deduced as part of our physical examination of the patient is the family history
in line of giving the root cause of what is causing this disease. So, from the moment you ask
to the patient all comes from the domestic problem.
Q You mean problem in her household?
A Probably.
Q Can family trouble cause elevation of blood pressure, Doctor?
A Yes, if it is emotionally related and stressful it can cause increases in hypertension which
is unfortunately does not response to the medication.
Q In November 6, 1995, the date of the incident, did you take the blood pressure of the
accused?
A On November 6, 1995 consultation, the blood pressure was 180/120.
Q Is this considered hypertension?
A Yes, sir, severe.

Q Considering that she was 8 months pregnant, you mean this is dangerous level of blood
pressure?
A It was dangerous to the child or to the fetus."

34
Another defense witness, Teodoro Sarabia, a former neighbor of the Genosas in Isabel, Leyte,
testified that he had seen the couple quarreling several times; and that on some occasions Marivic
would run to him with bruises, confiding that the injuries were inflicted upon her by Ben.
35
Ecel Arano also testified that for a number of times she had been asked by Marivic to sleep at the
36
Genosa house, because the latter feared that Ben would come home drunk and hurt her. On one
occasion that Ecel did sleep over, she was awakened about ten o'clock at night, because the couple
"were very noisy … and I heard something was broken like a vase." Then Marivic came running into
Ecel's room and locked the door. Ben showed up by the window grill atop a chair, scaring them with
a knife.
On the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic again asked her help -- this time to find Ben -- but
they were unable to. They returned to the Genosa home, where they found him already drunk. Again
afraid that he might hurt her, Marivic asked her to sleep at their house. Seeing his state of
drunkenness, Ecel hesitated; and when she heard the couple start arguing, she decided to leave.
On that same night that culminated in the death of Ben Genosa, at least three other witnesses saw
or heard the couple quarreling. Marivic relates in detail the following backdrop of the fateful night
37
when life was snuffed out of him, showing in the process a vivid picture of his cruelty towards her:
"ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Please tell this Court, can you recall the incident in November 15, 1995 in the evening?
A Whole morning and in the afternoon, I was in the office working then after office hours, I
boarded the service bus and went to Bilwang. When I reached Bilwang, I immediately asked
my son, where was his father, then my second child said, 'he was not home yet'. I was
worried because that was payday, I was anticipating that he was gambling. So while waiting
for him, my eldest son arrived from school, I prepared dinner for my children.
Q This is evening of November 15, 1995?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time did Ben Genosa arrive?
A When he arrived, I was not there, I was in Isabel looking for him.
Q So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you come back to your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q By the way, where was your conjugal residence situated this time?
A Bilwang.
Q Is this your house or you are renting?
A Renting.
Q What time were you able to come back in your residence at Bilwang?
A I went back around almost 8:00 o'clock.
Q What happened when you arrived in your residence?
A When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom I requested to sleep with me at that time
because I had fears that he was again drunk and I was worried that he would again beat me
so I requested my cousin to sleep with me, but she resisted because she had fears that the
same thing will happen again last year.
Q Who was this cousin of yours who you requested to sleep with you?
A Ecel Araño, the one who testified.
Q Did Ecel sleep with you in your house on that evening?
A No, because she expressed fears, she said her father would not allow her because of Ben.
Q During this period November 15, 1995, were you pregnant?
A Yes, 8 months.
Q How advance was your pregnancy?
A Eight (8) months.
Q Was the baby subsequently born?
A Yes, sir.
Q What's the name of the baby you were carrying at that time?
A Marie Bianca.
Q What time were you able to meet personally your husband?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time?
A When I arrived home, he was there already in his usual behavior.
Q Will you tell this Court what was his disposition?
A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly behavior.
Q What was he yelling all about?
A His usual attitude when he got drunk.
Q You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and yelling at you? What else did he do if
any?
A He is nagging at me for following him and he dared me to quarrel him.
Q What was the cause of his nagging or quarreling at you if you know?
A He was angry at me because I was following x x x him, looking for him. I was just worried
he might be overly drunk and he would beat me again.
Q You said that he was yelling at you, what else, did he do to you if any?
A He was nagging at me at that time and I just ignore him because I want to avoid trouble for
fear that he will beat me again. Perhaps he was disappointed because I just ignore him of his
provocation and he switch off the light and I said to him, 'why did you switch off the light
when the children were there.' At that time I was also attending to my children who were
doing their assignments. He was angry with me for not answering his challenge, so he went
to the kitchen and [got] a bolo and cut the antenna wire to stop me from watching television.
Q What did he do with the bolo?
A He cut the antenna wire to keep me from watching T.V.
Q What else happened after he cut the wire?
A He switch off the light and the children were shouting because they were scared and he
was already holding the bolo.
Q How do you described this bolo?
A 1 1/2 feet.
Q What was the bolo used for usually?
A For chopping meat.
Q You said the children were scared, what else happened as Ben was carrying that bolo?
A He was about to attack me so I run to the room.

Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you?
A When I attempt to run he held my hands and he whirled me and I fell to the bedside.
Q So when he whirled you, what happened to you?
A I screamed for help and then he left.
Q You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell on the bedside?
A Yes, sir.
Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where he was going?
A Outside perhaps to drink more.
Q When he left what did you do in that particular time?
A I packed all his clothes.
Q What was your reason in packing his clothes?
A I wanted him to leave us.
Q During this time, where were your children, what were their reactions?
A After a couple of hours, he went back again and he got angry with me for packing his
clothes, then he dragged me again of the bedroom holding my neck.
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he drag
you?
COURT INTERPRETER:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in her
front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on shouting at me
that 'you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag me.'
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(At this juncture the witness started crying).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he could not
open it because he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet which contained a blade
about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and
then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe
about that long, and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him
then I ran to the other room, and on that very moment everything on my mind was to pity on
myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment was the same when I was admitted in
PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Talking of drawer, is this drawer outside your room?
A Outside.
Q In what part of the house?
A Dining.
Q Where were the children during that time?
A My children were already asleep.
Q You mean they were inside the room?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe this blade
about 3 inches long, how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.
Q Is it a flexible blade?
A It's a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me." 38
In addition, Dra. Natividad Dayan was called by the RTC to testify as an expert witness to assist it in
understanding the psyche of a battered person. She had met with Marivic Genosa for five sessions
totaling about seventeen hours. Based on their talks, the former briefly related the latter's ordeal to
the court a quo as follows:
"Q: What can you say, that you found Marivic as a battered wife? Could you in layman's term
describe to this Court what her life was like as said to you?
A: What I remember happened then was it was more than ten years, that she was suffering
emotional anguish. There were a lot of instances of abuses, to emotional abuse, to verbal
abuse and to physical abuse. The husband had a very meager income, she was the one
who was practically the bread earner of the family. The husband was involved in a lot of
vices, going out with barkadas, drinking, even womanizing being involved in cockfight and
going home very angry and which will trigger a lot of physical abuse. She also had the
experience a lot of taunting from the husband for the reason that the husband even accused
her of infidelity, the husband was saying that the child she was carrying was not his own. So
she was very angry, she was at the same time very depressed because she was also aware,
almost like living in purgatory or even hell when it was happening day in and day out." 39
In cross-examining Dra. Dayan, the public prosecutor not merely elicited, but wittingly or unwittingly
put forward, additional supporting evidence as shown below:
"Q In your first encounter with the appellant in this case in 1999, where you talked to her
about three hours, what was the most relevant information did you gather?
A The most relevant information was the tragedy that happened. The most important
information were escalating abuses that she had experienced during her marital life.
Q Before you met her in 1999 for three hours, we presume that you already knew of the facts
of the case or at least you have substantial knowledge of the facts of the case?
A I believe I had an idea of the case, but I do not know whether I can consider them as
substantial.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Did you gather an information from Marivic that on the side of her husband they were fond
of battering their wives?
A I also heard that from her?
Q You heard that from her?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you ask for a complete example who are the relatives of her husband that were fond of
battering their wives?
A What I remember that there were brothers of her husband who are also battering their
wives.
Q Did she not inform you that there was an instance that she stayed in a hotel in Ormoc
where her husband followed her and battered [her] several times in that room?
A She told me about that.
Q Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc?
A Sir, I could not remember but I was told that she was battered in that room.
Q Several times in that room?
A Yes, sir. What I remember was that there is no problem about being battered, it really
happened.
Q Being an expert witness, our jurisprudence is not complete on saying this matter. I think
that is the first time that we have this in the Philippines, what is your opinion?
A Sir, my opinion is, she is really a battered wife and in this kind happened, it was really a
self-defense. I also believe that there had been provocation and I also believe that she
became a disordered person. She had to suffer anxiety reaction because of all the battering
that happened and so she became an abnormal person who had lost she's not during the
time and that is why it happened because of all the physical battering, emotional battering,
all the psychological abuses that she had experienced from her husband.
Q I do believe that she is a battered wife. Was she extremely battered?
A Sir, it is an extreme form of battering. Yes. 40
Parenthetically, the credibility of appellant was demonstrated as follows:

"Q And you also said that you administered [the] objective personality test, what x x x [is this]
all about?
A The objective personality test is the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory. The purpose of that
test is to find out about the lying prone[ne]ss of the person.
Q What do you mean by that?
A Meaning, am I dealing with a client who is telling me the truth, or is she someone who can
exaggerate or x x x [will] tell a lie[?]
Q And what did you discover on the basis of this objective personality test?
A She was a person who passed the honesty test. Meaning she is a person that I can trust.
That the data that I'm gathering from her are the truth."41
The other expert witness presented by the defense, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, testified on his Psychiatric
Report, which was based on his interview and examination of Marivic Genosa. The Report said that
42
during the first three years of her marriage to Ben, everything looked good -- the atmosphere was
fine, normal and happy -- until "Ben started to be attracted to other girls and was also enticed in[to]
gambling[,] especially cockfighting. x x x. At the same time Ben was often joining his barkada in
drinking sprees."
The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he showed toward his family, particularly to
his wife. The Report continued: "At first, it was verbal and emotional abuses but as time passed, he
became physically abusive. Marivic claimed that the viciousness of her husband was progressive
every time he got drunk. It was a painful ordeal Marivic had to anticipate whenever she suspected
that her husband went for a drinking [spree]. They had been married for twelve years[;] and
practically more than eight years, she was battered and maltreated relentlessly and mercilessly by
her husband whenever he was drunk."
Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law, but her efforts were in vain. Further quoting from the
Report, "[s]he also sought the advice and help of close relatives and well-meaning friends in spite of
her feeling ashamed of what was happening to her. But incessant battering became more and more
frequent and more severe. x x x." 43
From the totality of evidence presented, there is indeed no doubt in the Court's mind that Appellant
Marivic Genosa was a severely abused person.
Effect of Battery on Appellant
Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the abused woman, her state of mind
metamorphoses. In determining her state of mind, we cannot rely merely on the judgment of an
ordinary, reasonable person who is evaluating the events immediately surrounding the incident. A
Canadian court has aptly pointed out that expert evidence on the psychological effect of battering on
wives and common law partners are both relevant and necessary. "How can the mental state of the
appellant be appreciated without it? The average member of the public may ask: Why would a
woman put up with this kind of treatment? Why should she continue to live with such a man? How
could she love a partner who beat her to the point of requiring hospitalization? We would expect the
woman to pack her bags and go. Where is her self-respect? Why does she not cut loose and make a
new life for herself? Such is the reaction of the average person confronted with the so-called
'battered wife syndrome.'" 44
To understand the syndrome properly, however, one's viewpoint should not be drawn from that of an
ordinary, reasonable person. What goes on in the mind of a person who has been subjected to
repeated, severe beatings may not be consistent with -- nay, comprehensible to -- those who have
not been through a similar experience. Expert opinion is essential to clarify and refute common
myths and misconceptions about battered women. 45
The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well as her research on domestic violence, has
had a significant impact in the United States and the United Kingdom on the treatment and
prosecution of cases, in which a battered woman is charged with the killing of her violent partner.
The psychologist explains that the cyclical nature of the violence inflicted upon the battered woman
immobilizes the latter's "ability to act decisively in her own interests, making her feel trapped in the
relationship with no means of escape." In her years of research, Dr. Walker found that "the abuse
46
often escalates at the point of separation and battered women are in greater danger of dying then." 47
Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said that "the battered woman usually has a very
low opinion of herself. She has x x x self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x [W]hen
the violence would happen, they usually think that they provoke[d] it, that they were the one[s] who
precipitated the violence[; that] they provoke[d] their spouse to be physically, verbally and even
sexually abusive to them." 48
According to Dra. Dayan, there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not readily leave an
abusive partner -- poverty, self-blame and guilt arising from the latter's belief that she provoked the
violence, that she has an obligation to keep the family intact at all cost for the sake of their children,
and that she is the only hope for her spouse to change. 49
The testimony of another expert witness, Dr. Pajarillo, is also helpful. He had previously testified in
suits involving violent family relations, having evaluated "probably ten to twenty thousand" violent
family disputes within the Armed Forces of the Philippines, wherein such cases abounded. As a
result of his experience with domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered
Woman Office in Quezon City. As such, he got involved in about forty (40) cases of severe domestic
violence, in which the physical abuse on the woman would sometimes even lead to her loss of
consciousness. 50
Dr. Pajarillo explained that "overwhelming brutality, trauma" could result in posttraumatic stress
disorder, a form of "anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxietism." After being repeatedly and severely
51
abused, battered persons "may believe that they are essentially helpless, lacking power to change
their situation. x x x [A]cute battering incidents can have the effect of stimulating the development of
coping responses to the trauma at the expense of the victim's ability to muster an active response to
try to escape further trauma. Furthermore, x x x the victim ceases to believe that anything she can
do will have a predictable positive effect." 52
A study conducted by Martin Seligman, a psychologist at the University of Pennsylvania, found that
53
"even if a person has control over a situation, but believes that she does not, she will be more likely
to respond to that situation with coping responses rather than trying to escape." He said that it was
the cognitive aspect -- the individual's thoughts -- that proved all-important. He referred to this
phenomenon as "learned helplessness." "[T]he truth or facts of a situation turn out to be less
important than the individual's set of beliefs or perceptions concerning the situation. Battered women
don't attempt to leave the battering situation, even when it may seem to outsiders that escape is
possible, because they cannot predict their own safety; they believe that nothing they or anyone else
does will alter their terrible circumstances."
54
Thus, just as the battered woman believes that she is somehow responsible for the violent behavior
of her partner, she also believes that he is capable of killing her, and that there is no
escape. Battered women feel unsafe, suffer from pervasive anxiety, and usually fail to leave the
55
relationship. Unless a shelter is available, she stays with her husband, not only because she
56
typically lacks a means of self-support, but also because she fears that if she leaves she would be
found and hurt even more. 57
In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for specific evidence establishing that
appellant, due to the repeated abuse she had suffered from her spouse over a long period of time,
became afflicted with the battered woman syndrome. We, however, failed to find sufficient evidence
that would support such a conclusion. More specifically, we failed to find ample evidence that would
confirm the presence of the essential characteristics of BWS.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the "cycle of violence" supposedly
characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering
incidents. In relating to the court a quohow the fatal incident that led to the death of Ben started,
Marivic perfectly described the tension-building phase of the cycle. She was able to explain in
adequate detail the typical characteristics of this stage. However, that single incident does not prove
the existence of the syndrome. In other words, she failed to prove that in at least another battering
episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern.
How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up prior to acute battering? How did
Marivic normally respond to Ben's relatively minor abuses? What means did she employ to try to
prevent the situation from developing into the next (more violent) stage?
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle. She simply
mentioned that she would usually run away to her mother's or father's house; that Ben would seek
58
her out, ask for her forgiveness and promise to change; and that believing his words, she would
return to their common abode.
Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents between her and her spouse? Did she
believe that she was the only hope for Ben to reform? And that she was the sole support of his
emotional stability and well-being? Conversely, how dependent was she on him? Did she feel
helpless and trapped in their relationship? Did both of them regard death as preferable to
separation?
In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual experiences and thoughts that
would clearly and fully demonstrate the essential characteristics of the syndrome.
The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert witnesses for the defense. Indeed, they
were able to explain fully, albeit merely theoretically and scientifically, how the personality of the
battered woman usually evolved or deteriorated as a result of repeated and severe beatings inflicted
upon her by her partner or spouse. They corroborated each other's testimonies, which were culled
from their numerous studies of hundreds of actual cases. However, they failed to present in court the
factual experiences and thoughts that appellant had related to them -- if at all -- based on which they
concluded that she had BWS.
We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a modifying circumstance must be proven
in order to be appreciated. To repeat, the records lack supporting evidence that would establish all
the essentials of the battered woman syndrome as manifested specifically in the case of the
Genosas.
BWS as Self-Defense
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal
right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of
self-defense. 59
From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court reckons further that crucial to the BWS
defense is the state of mind of the battered woman at the time of the offense -- she must have
60
actually feared imminent harm from her batterer and honestly believed in the need to kill him in order
to save her life.
Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face
a real threat on one's life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not
merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides the following requisites and effect of self-
61
defense: 62
"Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. -- The following do not incur any criminal liability:
"1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself."
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden
63
and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. In the
64
present case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time
interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already
been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children's bedroom. During that
time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the
danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual
threat on her life or safety.
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their children's bedroom -- and based on
past violent incidents, there was a great probability that he would still have pursued her and inflicted
graver harm -- then, the imminence of the real threat upon her life would not have ceased yet.
Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical
assault at the time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a
predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she can
defend her life "would amount to sentencing her to 'murder by installment.'" Still, impending danger
65
(based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the defendant's use of
deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required
imminence of danger. Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may
66
be appreciated.
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense. In the
67
absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense -- complete or incomplete -- on the part of
the victim. Thus, Marivic's killing of Ben was not completely justified under the circumstances.
68
Mitigating Circumstances Present
In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not raise any other modifying circumstances
that would alter her penalty, we deem it proper to evaluate and appreciate in her favor
circumstances that mitigate her criminal liability. It is a hornbook doctrine that an appeal in a criminal
case opens it wholly for review on any issue, including that which has not been raised by the
parties.
69
From several psychological tests she had administered to Marivic, Dra. Dayan, in her Psychological
Evaluation Report dated November 29, 2000, opined as follows:
"This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The repeated battering Marivic
experienced with her husband constitutes a form of [cumulative] provocation which broke
down her psychological resistance and natural self-control. It is very clear that she developed
heightened sensitivity to sight of impending danger her husband posed continuously. Marivic
truly experienced at the hands of her abuser husband a state of psychological paralysis
which can only be ended by an act of violence on her part." 70
Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. Dayan. He explained that the effect of "repetitious pain
taking, repetitious battering, [and] repetitious maltreatment" as well as the severity and the prolonged
administration of the battering is posttraumatic stress disorder. Expounding thereon, he said:
71
"Q What causes the trauma, Mr. Witness?
A What causes the trauma is probably the repetitious battering. Second, the severity of the
battering. Third, the prolonged administration of battering or the prolonged commission of the
battering and the psychological and constitutional stamina of the victim and another one is
the public and social support available to the victim. If nobody is interceding, the more she
will go to that disorder....
xxx xxx xxx
Q You referred a while ago to severity. What are the qualifications in terms of severity of the
postraumatic stress disorder, Dr. Pajarillo?
A The severity is the most severe continuously to trig[g]er this post[t]raumatic stress disorder
is injury to the head, banging of the head like that. It is usually the very very severe stimulus
that precipitate this post[t]raumatic stress disorder. Others are suffocating the victim like
holding a pillow on the face, strangulating the individual, suffocating the individual, and
boxing the individual. In this situation therefore, the victim is heightened to painful stimulus,
like for example she is pregnant, she is very susceptible because the woman will not only
protect herself, she is also to protect the fetus. So the anxiety is heightened to the end [sic]
degree.
Q But in terms of the gravity of the disorder, Mr. Witness, how do you classify?
A We classify the disorder as [acute], or chronic or delayed or [a]typical.

Q Can you please describe this pre[-]classification you called delayed or [atypical]?
A The acute is the one that usually require only one battering and the individual will manifest
now a severe emotional instability, higher irritability remorse, restlessness, and fear and
probably in most [acute] cases the first thing will be happened to the individual will be
thinking of suicide.
Q And in chronic cases, Mr. Witness?
A The chronic cases is this repetitious battering, repetitious maltreatment, any prolonged, it
is longer than six (6) months. The [acute] is only the first day to six (6) months. After this six
(6) months you become chronic. It is stated in the book specifically that after six (6) months
is chronic. The [a]typical one is the repetitious battering but the individual who is abnormal
and then become normal. This is how you get neurosis from neurotic personality of these
cases of post[t]raumatic stress disorder." 72
Answering the questions propounded by the trial judge, the expert witness clarified further:
"Q But just the same[,] neurosis especially on battered woman syndrome x x x affects x x x
his or her mental capacity?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q As you were saying[,] it x x x obfuscated her rationality?
A Of course obfuscated." 73
In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted upon appellant resulted in
"cumulative provocation which broke down her psychological resistance and natural self-control,"
"psychological paralysis," and "difficulty in concentrating or impairment of memory."
Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such manifestations were analogous to an
illness that diminished the exercise by appellant of her will power without, however, depriving her of
consciousness of her acts.There was, thus, a resulting diminution of her freedom of action,
intelligence or intent. Pursuant to paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, this
74 75
circumstance should be taken in her favor and considered as a mitigating factor. 76
In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an
impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. It has been held that
this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of
passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to
overcome reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there
77
is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far
removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the
accused might recover her normal equanimity. 78
Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the unlawful aggressor, preceded his
being killed by Marivic. He had further threatened to kill her while dragging her by the neck towards a
cabinet in which he had kept a gun. It should also be recalled that she was eight months pregnant at
the time. The attempt on her life was likewise on that of her fetus. His abusive and violent acts, an
79
aggression which was directed at the lives of both Marivic and her unborn child, naturally produced
passion and obfuscation overcoming her reason. Even though she was able to retreat to a separate
room, her emotional and mental state continued. According to her, she felt her blood pressure rise;
she was filled with feelings of self-pity and of fear that she and her baby were about to die. In a fit of
indignation, she pried open the cabinet drawer where Ben kept a gun, then she took the weapon and
used it to shoot him.
The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion that there was no considerable period of
time within which Marivic could have recovered her normal equanimity. Helpful is Dr. Pajarillo's
testimony that with "neurotic anxiety" -- a psychological effect on a victim of "overwhelming brutality
80
[or] trauma" -- the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually
being beaten at the time. She cannot control "re-experiencing the whole thing, the most vicious and
the trauma that she suffered." She thinks "of nothing but the suffering." Such reliving which is
beyond the control of a person under similar circumstances, must have been what Marivic
experienced during the brief time interval and prevented her from recovering her normal equanimity.
Accordingly, she should further be credited with the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation.
It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion and
obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.
On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery
inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time
resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of
her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from the violent aggression he had inflicted
on her prior to the killing. That the incident occurred when she was eight months pregnant with their
child was deemed by her as an attempt not only on her life, but likewise on that of their unborn child.
Such perception naturally produced passion and obfuscation on her part.
Second Legal Issue:
Treachery
There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense that the
offended party might make. In order to qualify an act as treacherous, the circumstances invoked
81
must be proven as indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere inferences, or
conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation of evidence. Because of the gravity of the
82
resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself.83
Ruling that treachery was present in the instant case, the trial court imposed the penalty of death
upon appellant. It inferred this qualifying circumstances merely from the fact that the lifeless body of
Ben had been found lying in bed with an "open, depressed, circular" fracture located at the back of
his head. As to exactly how and when he had been fatally attacked, however, the prosecution failed
to establish indubitably. Only the following testimony of appellant leads us to the events surrounding
his death:
"Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he drag
you?
COURT:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in her
front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on shouting at me
that 'you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag me'
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER
(At this juncture the witness started crying)
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he could not
open it because he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet which contained a blade
about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and
then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe
about that long, and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him
then I ran to the other room, and on that very moment everything on my mind was to pity on
myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment was the same when I was admitted in
PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe this blade
about 3 inches long, how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and ½ inch wide.
Q It is a flexible blade?
A It's a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said that this blade fell from his grip, is it correct?
A Yes, because I smashed him.
Q What happened?
A Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I pick-up the pipe and I smashed him and I
ran to the other room.
Q What else happened?
A When I was in the other room, I felt the same thing like what happened before when I was
admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit. I know my blood pressure was raised. I
was frightened I was about to die because of my blood pressure.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(Upon the answer of the witness getting the pipe and smashed him, the witness at
the same time pointed at the back of her neck or the nape).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said you went to the room, what else happened?

A Considering all the physical sufferings that I've been through with him, I took pity on myself
and I felt I was about to die also because of my blood pressure and the baby, so I got that
gun and I shot him.
COURT
/to Atty. Tabucanon
Q You shot him?
A Yes, I distorted the drawer." 84
The above testimony is insufficient to establish the presence of treachery. There is no showing of the
victim's position relative to appellant's at the time of the shooting. Besides, equally axiomatic is the
rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as
a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have
anticipated aggression from the assailant. 85
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must

have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the
unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up by the party attacked. There is no
86
showing, though, that the present appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully
attacking her husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might make. To the
contrary, it appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the same moment
when she decided to kill her batterer-spouse. In the absence of any convincing proof that she
consciously and deliberately employed the method by which she committed the crime in order to
ensure its execution, this Court resolves the doubt in her favor. 87
Proper Penalty
The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to
death. Since two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance have been found to
have attended the commission of the offense, the penalty shall be lowered by one (1) degree,
pursuant to Article 64 of paragraph 5 of the same Code. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
88 89
medium period is imposable, considering that two mitigating circumstances are to be taken into
account in reducing the penalty by one degree, and no other modifying circumstances were shown
to have attended the commission of the offense. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
90
minimum of the penalty shall be within the range of that which is next lower in degree -- prision
mayor -- and the maximum shall be within the range of the medium period of reclusion temporal.
Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just and proper to impose the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period, or six (6) years and one (1) day in prison as
minimum; to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14 years 8 months and 1 day as maximum.
Noting that appellant has already served the minimum period, she may now apply for and be
released from detention on parole. 91
Epilogue
Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered woman syndrome was neither easy nor
simple to analyze and recognize vis-à-vis the given set of facts in the present case. The Court
agonized on how to apply the theory as a modern-day reality. It took great effort beyond the normal
manner in which decisions are made -- on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence applicable to
the proven facts. To give a just and proper resolution of the case, it endeavored to take a good look
at studies conducted here and abroad in order to understand the intricacies of the syndrome and the
distinct personality of the chronically abused person. Certainly, the Court has learned much. And
definitely, the solicitor general and appellant's counsel, Atty. Katrina Legarda, have helped it in such
learning process.
While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered persons, we can only work within the limits of
law, jurisprudence and given facts. We cannot make or invent them. Neither can we amend the
Revised Penal Code. Only Congress, in its wisdom, may do so.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered
woman syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases of the cycle of
violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant
and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the
batterer must have produced in the battered person's mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from
her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the
time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual --
grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the
latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the
existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED.

However, there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attending
her commission of the offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon
her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon
due determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful
cause. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., join Justice Santiago in her dissent.
Vitug and Quisumbing JJ., in the result.
Ynares-Santiago J., see dissenting opinion.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 177218 October 3, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
NOEL T. SALES, Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A father ought to discipline his children for committing a misdeed. However, he may not employ
sadistic beatings and inflict fatal injuries under the guise of disciplining them.
This appeal seeks the reversal of the December 4, 2006 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01627 that affirmed the August 3, 2005 Joint Decision 2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 63 of Calabanga, Camarines Sur in Criminal Case Nos. RTC’03-782 and
RTC’03-789, convicting appellant Noel T. Sales (appellant) of the crimes of parricide and slight
physical injuries, respectively. The Information3 for parricide contained the following allegations:
That on or about the 20th day of September, 2002, at around or past 8:00 o’clock in the evening at
Brgy. San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with evident premeditation and [in] a fit of anger, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hit [several] times, the different parts of the body of
his legitimate eldest son, Noemar Sales, a 9-year old minor, with a [piece of] wood, measuring more
or less one meter in length and one [and] a half inches in diameter, [thereby] inflicting upon the latter
mortal wounds, which cause[d] the death of the said victim, to the damage and prejudice of the
latter’s heirs in such amount as may be proven in court.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On the other hand, the Information5 in Criminal Case No. RTC’03-789 alleges that appellant inflicted
slight physical injuries in the following manner:
That on or about the 20th day of September, 2002, at around or past 8:00 o’clock in the evening, at
Brgy. San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named [accused] assault[ed] and hit with a piece of wood, one Noel
Sales, Jr., an 8-year old minor, his second legitimate son, thereby inflicting upon him physical
injuries which have required medical attendance for a period of five (5) days to the damage and
prejudice of the victim’s heirs in such amount as may be proven in court.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.6
When arraigned on April 11, 2003 and July 1, 2003, appellant pleaded not guilty for the charges of
parricide7 and slight physical injuries8 respectively. The cases were then consolidated upon
manifestation of the prosecution which was not objected to by the defense. 9 During the pre-trial
conference, the parties agreed to stipulate that appellant is the father of the victims, Noemar Sales
(Noemar) and Noel Sales, Jr. (Junior); that at the time of the incident, appellant’s family was living in
the conjugal home located in Barangay San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur; and, that appellant
voluntarily surrendered to the police.10
Thereafter, trial ensued.
The Version of the Prosecution
On September 19, 2002, brothers Noemar and Junior, then nine and eight years old, respectively,
left their home to attend the fluvial procession of Our Lady of Peñafrancia without the permission of
their parents. They did not return home that night. When their mother, Maria Litan Sales (Maria),
looked for them the next day, she found them in the nearby Barangay of Magsaysay. Afraid of their
father’s rage, Noemar and Junior initially refused to return home but their mother prevailed upon
them. When the two kids reached home at around 8 o’clock in the evening of September 20, 2002, a
furious appellant confronted them. Appellant then whipped them with a stick which was later broken
so that he brought his kids outside their house. With Noemar’s and Junior’s hands and feet tied to a
coconut tree, appellant continued beating them with a thick piece of wood. During the beating Maria
stayed inside the house and did not do anything as she feared for her life.
When the beating finally stopped, the three walked back to the house with appellant assisting
Noemar as the latter was staggering, while Junior fearfully followed. Maria noticed a crack in
Noemar’s head and injuries in his legs. She also saw injuries in the right portion of the head, the left
cheek, and legs of Junior. Shortly thereafter, Noemar collapsed and lost consciousness. Maria tried
to revive him and when Noemar remained motionless despite her efforts, she told appellant that their
son was already dead. However, appellant refused to believe her. Maria then told appellant to call a
quack doctor. He left and returned with one, who told them that they have to bring Noemar to a
hospital. Appellant thus proceeded to take the unconscious Noemar to the junction and waited for a
vehicle to take them to a hospital. As there was no vehicle and because another quack doctor they
met at the junction told them that Noemar is already dead, appellant brought his son back to their
house.
Noemar’s wake lasted only for a night and he was immediately buried the following day. His body
was never examined by a doctor.
The Version of the Defense
Prior to the incident, Noemar and Junior had already left their residence on three separate occasions
without the permission of their parents. Each time, appellant merely scolded them and told them not
to repeat the misdeed since something untoward might happen to them. During those times, Noemar
and Junior were never physically harmed by their father.
However, Noemar and Junior again left their home without their parents’ permission on September
16, 2002 and failed to return for several days. Worse, appellant received information that his sons
stole a pedicab. As they are broke, appellant had to borrow money so that his wife could search for
Noemar and Junior. When his sons finally arrived home at 8 o’clock in the evening of September 20,
2002, appellant scolded and hit them with a piece of wood as thick as his index finger. He hit
Noemar and Junior simultaneously since they were side by side. After whipping his sons in their
buttocks three times, he noticed that Noemar was chilling and frothing. When Noemar lost
consciousness, appellant decided to bring him to a hospital in Naga City by waiting for a vehicle at
the crossroad which was seven kilometers away from their house.
Appellant held Noemar while on their way to the crossroad and observed his difficulty in breathing.
The pupils of Noemar’s eyes were also moving up and down. Appellant heard him say that he
wanted to sleep and saw him pointing to his chest in pain. However, they waited in vain since a
vehicle never came. It was then that Noemar died. Appellant thus decided to just bring Noemar back
to their house.
Appellant denied that his son died from his beating since no parent could kill his or her child. He
claimed that Noemar died as a result of difficulty in breathing. In fact, he never complained of the
whipping done to him. Besides, appellant recalled that Noemar was brought to a hospital more than
a year before September 2002 and diagnosed with having a weak heart.
On the other hand, Maria testified that Noemar suffered from epilepsy. Whenever he suffers from
epileptic seizures, Noemar froths and passes out. But he would regain consciousness after 15
minutes. His seizures normally occur whenever he gets hungry or when scolded.
The death of Noemar was reported to the police by the barangay captain. 11 Thereafter, appellant
surrendered voluntarily.12
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In a Joint Decision,13 the trial court held that the evidence presented by the prosecution was
sufficient to prove that appellant was guilty of committing the crimes of parricide and slight physical
injuries in the manner described in the Informations. In the crime of parricide, the trial court did not
consider the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation against appellant since there is no
proof that he planned to kill Noemar. But the trial court appreciated in his favor the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong. The dispositive
portion of said Joint Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution having proven the guilt of Noel Sales,
beyond reasonable doubt, he is found guilty of parricide in Crim. Case No. RTC’03-782 and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of
Noemar Sales, the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;
₱25,000,00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
Furthermore, accused Noel Sales is also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of slight
physical injuries in Crim. Case No. RTC’03-789 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of twenty (20)
days of Arresto Menor in its medium period.
Accused Noel Sales is likewise meted the accessory penalties as provided under the Revised Penal
Code. Considering that herein accused has undergone preventive imprisonment, he shall be
credited in the service of his sentence with the time he has undergone preventive imprisonment in
accordance with and subject to the conditions provided for in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.14
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal15 which was given due course in an Order16 dated September 21,
2005.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
However, the appellate court denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The
dispositive portion of its Decision17 reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed decision dated August 3,
2005 in Criminal Case Nos. RTC’03-782 and RTC’03-789 for Parricide and Slight Physical Injuries,
respectively, is AFFIRMED.
Pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, appellant may
appeal this case to the Supreme Court via a Notice of Appeal filed before this Court.
SO ORDERED.18
Issues
Hence, appellant is now before this Court with the following two-fold issues:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONIES OF
THE DEFENSE WITNESSES.19
Our Ruling
The appeal is without merit.
The Charge of Parricide
Appellant admits beating his sons on September 20, 2002 as a disciplinary measure, but denies
battering Noemar to death. He believes that no father could kill his own son. According to him,
Noemar had a weak heart that resulted in attacks consisting of loss of consciousness and froth in his
mouth. He claims that Noemar was conscious as they traveled to the junction where they would take
a vehicle in going to a hospital. However, Noemar had difficulty in breathing and complained of chest
pain. He contends that it was at this moment that Noemar died, not during his whipping. To
substantiate his claim, appellant presented his wife, Maria, who testified that Noemar indeed
suffered seizures, but this was due to epilepsy.
The contentions of appellant fail to persuade. The imposition of parental discipline on children of
tender years must always be with the view of correcting their erroneous behavior. A parent or
guardian must exercise restraint and caution in administering the proper punishment. They must not
exceed the parameters of their parental duty to discipline their minor children. It is incumbent upon
them to remain rational and refrain from being motivated by anger in enforcing the intended
punishment. A deviation will undoubtedly result in sadism.
Prior to whipping his sons, appellant was already furious with them because they left the family
dwelling without permission and that was already preceded by three other similar incidents. This was
further aggravated by a report that his sons stole a pedicab thereby putting him in disgrace.
Moreover, they have no money so much so that he still had to borrow so that his wife could look for
the children and bring them home. From these, it is therefore clear that appellant was motivated not
by an honest desire to discipline the children for their misdeeds but by an evil intent of venting his
anger. This can reasonably be concluded from the injuries of Noemar in his head, face and legs. It
was only when Noemar’s body slipped from the coconut tree to which he was tied and lost
consciousness that appellant stopped the beating. Had not Noemar lost consciousness, appellant
would most likely not have ceased from his sadistic act. His subsequent attempt to seek medical
attention for Noemar as an act of repentance was nevertheless too late to save the child’s life. It
bears stressing that a decent and responsible parent would never subject a minor child to sadistic
punishment in the guise of discipline.
Appellant attempts to evade criminal culpability by arguing that he merely intended to discipline
Noemar and not to kill him. However, the relevant portion of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code
states:
Art. 4. Criminal liability. – Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended.
xxxx
In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he intended to
commit, it is indispensible (a) that a felony was committed and (b) that the wrong done to the
aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the perpetrator. 20 Here, there
is no doubt appellant in beating his son Noemar and inflicting upon him physical injuries, committed
a felony. As a direct consequence of the beating suffered by the child, he expired. Appellant’s
criminal liability for the death of his son, Noemar, is thus clear.
Appellant’s claim that it was Noemar’s heart ailment that caused his death deserves no merit. This
declaration is self-serving and uncorroborated since it is not substantiated by evidence. While Dr.
Salvador Betito, a Municipal Health Officer of Tinambac, Camarines Sur issued a death certificate
indicating that Noemar died due to cardio-pulmonary arrest, the same is not sufficient to prove that
his death was due mainly to his poor health. It is worth emphasizing that Noemar’s cadaver was
never examined. Also, even if appellant presented his wife, Maria, to lend credence to his
contention, the latter’s testimony did not help as same was even in conflict with his testimony.
Appellant testified that Noemar suffered from a weak heart which resulted in his death while Maria
declared that Noemar was suffering from epilepsy. Interestingly, Maria’s testimony was also
unsubstantiated by evidence.
Moreover, as will be discussed below, all the elements of the crime of parricide are present in this
case.
All the Elements of Parricide are present in the case at bench.
We find no error in the ruling of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, that appellant
committed the crime of parricide.
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines parricide as follows:
Art. 246. Parricide. – Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and
shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
"Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the
deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other
ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused." 21
In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the first element, that is, a person
was killed. Maria testified that her son Noemar did not regain consciousness after the severe beating
he suffered from the hands of his father. Thereafter, a quack doctor declared Noemar dead.
Afterwards, as testified to by Maria, they held a wake for Noemar the next day and then buried him
the day after. Noemar’s Death Certificate22 was also presented in evidence.
There is likewise no doubt as to the existence of the second element that the appellant killed the
deceased. Same is sufficiently established by the positive testimonies of Maria and Junior. Maria
testified that on September 20, 2002, Noemar and his younger brother, Junior, were whipped by
appellant, their father, inside their house. The whipping continued even outside the house but this
time, the brothers were tied side by side to a coconut tree while appellant delivered the lashes
indiscriminately. For his part, Junior testified that Noemar, while tied to a tree, was beaten by their
father in the head. Because the savagery of the attack was too much for Noemar’s frail body to
endure, he lost consciousness and died from his injuries immediately after the incident.
As to the third element, appellant himself admitted that the deceased is his child. While Noemar’s
birth certificate was not presented, oral evidence of filial relationship may be considered. 23 As earlier
stated, appellant stipulated to the fact that he is the father of Noemar during the pre-trial conference
and likewise made the same declaration while under oath. 24 Maria also testified that Noemar and
Junior are her sons with appellant, her husband. These testimonies are sufficient to establish the
relationship between appellant and Noemar.
Clearly, all the elements of the crime of parricide are obtaining in this case.
There is Mitigating Circumstance of Voluntary Surrender but not Lack of Intention to Commit so
Grave a Wrong
The trial court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of
appellant since the evidence shows that he went to the police station a day after the barangay
captain reported the death of Noemar. The presentation by appellant of himself to the police officer
on duty in a spontaneous manner is a manifestation of his intent "to save the authorities the trouble
and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture" 25 which is the essence of voluntary
surrender.
However, there was error in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit
so grave a wrong. Appellant adopted means to ensure the success of the savage battering of his
sons. He tied their wrists to a coconut tree to prevent their escape while they were battered with a
stick to inflict as much pain as possible. Noemar suffered injuries in his face, head and legs that
immediately caused his death. "The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong as that actually perpetrated cannot be appreciated where the acts employed by the accused
were reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce the death of the victim." 26
The Award of Damages and Penalty for Parricide
We find proper the trial court’s award to the heirs of Noemar of the sums of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. However, the award of exemplary damages of
₱25,000.00 should be increased to ₱30,000.00 in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. 27 "In
addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the monetary awards for
damages an interest at the legal rate of 6% from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid." 28
As regards the penalty, parricide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua when it considered the presence of the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong. However, even
if we earlier ruled that the trial court erred in considering the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent
to commit so grave a wrong, we maintain the penalty imposed. This is because the exclusion of said
mitigating circumstance does not result to a different penalty since the presence of only one
mitigating circumstance, which is, voluntary surrender, with no aggravating circumstance, is
sufficient for the imposition of reclusion perpetua as the proper prison term. Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code provides in part as follows:
Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - x x x
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following
rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
xxxx
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
xxxx
The crime of parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to death. With
one mitigating circumstance, which is voluntary surrender, and no aggravating circumstance, the
imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua and not the penalty of death on appellant was
thus proper.29
The Charge of Slight Physical Injuries
The victim himself, Junior testified that he, together with his brother Noemar, were beaten by their
father, herein appellant, while they were tied to a coconut tree. He recalled to have been hit on his
right eye and right leg and to have been examined by a physician thereafter. 30 Maria corroborated
her son’s testimony.31
Junior’s testimony was likewise supported by Dr. Ursolino Primavera, Jr. (Dr. Primavera) of
Tinambac Community Hospital who examined him for physical injuries. He issued a Medical
Certificate for his findings and testified on the same. His findings were (1) muscular contusions with
hematoma on the right side of Junior’s face just below the eye and on both legs, which could have
been caused by hitting said area with a hard object such as a wooden stick and, (2) abrasions of
brownish color circling both wrist with crust formation which could have been sustained by the
patient due to struggling while his hands were tied. When asked how long does he think the injuries
would heal, Dr. Primavera answered one to two weeks.32 But if applied with medication, the injuries
would heal in a week.33
We give full faith and credence to the categorical and positive testimony of Junior that he was
beaten by his father and that by reason thereof he sustained injuries. His testimony deserves
credence especially since the same is corroborated by the testimony of his mother, Maria, and
supported by medical examination. We thus find that the RTC correctly held appellant guilty of the
crime of slight physical injuries.
1awphil
Penalty for Slight Physical Injuries
We likewise affirm the penalty imposed by the RTC. Dr. Primavera testified that the injuries
sustained by Junior should heal in one week upon medication. Hence, the trial court correctly meted
upon appellant the penalty under paragraph 1, Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides:
ART. 266. Slight Physical Injuries and maltreatment. – The crime of slight physical injuries shall be
punished:
1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the
offended party for labor from one to nine days or shall require medical attendance during the same
period.
xxxx
There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance present in the commission of the crime, the
penalty shall be in its medium period. The RTC was thus correct in imposing upon appellant the
penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto menor in its medium period.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 01627 that affirmed the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63 of Calabanga,
Camarines Sur in Criminal Case Nos. RTC’03-782 and RTC’03-789, convicting Noel T. Sales of the
crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that the award of
exemplary damages is increased to ₱30,000.00. In addition, an interest of 6% is imposed on all
monetary awards from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

March 6 SPL

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THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 139250. August 15, 2000.]

GABRIEL CAPILI, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., Respondents.

Assorted pieces of jewelry

Several pieces of old coins (U.S. dollar)

"WHEREFORE, finding the prosecution’s evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction

The petition is partly meritorious.

"1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;

Although DIOKNO’s testimony is hearsay and is inadmissible for purposes of

"SECTION 3. Penalties. — Any person guilty of fencing shall be punished as hereunder

SO ORDERED. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Melo, Vitug, Panganiban and Purisima, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 102342. July 3, 1992.]

LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, Petitioner, v. HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., in his capacity as

Hector B. Almeyda for Petitioner.

1. REMEDIAL LAW; PRESCRIPTION; 1985 RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE;

3. ID.; ID.; RULE ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE; APPLIES TO VIOLATIONS OF MUNICIPAL

7. ID.; ID.; CRIME PRESCRIBES IF THE PROSECUTOR DELAYS INTENTIONALLY OR NOT

B. Criminal Cases: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;

2. Violations of rental law;

3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances; chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea,

G.R. Nos. 165510-33 July 28, 2006

BENJAMIN ("KOKOY") T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner,

Crim. Cases Nos. 13406-13429–PEO. vs. BENJAMIN T. ROMUALDEZ

In effect, we upheld in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan9 petitioner’s Motion to Quash and directed the

In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,29 petitioner averred that PCGG acted without jurisdiction and/or

Mr. Justice Carpio argues that –

With all due respect, we beg to disagree.

Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

We take exception to the foregoing proposition.

In the case of People v. Pacificador,46 we ruled that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. Criminal

Quisumbing, Carpio, Azcuna, J.J., concur.

SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 151258 December 1, 2014

G.R. No. 154954

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 155101

G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080

In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)

1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)

2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)

3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)

4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)

5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)

6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)

7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)

8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)

9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)

10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)

11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)

12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)

13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)

14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)

15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)

16. Antonio General (General)

17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)

18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)

19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)

20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)