SURVEY OF CASES IN CIVIL PROCEDURE

By Atty. Caesar S. Europa

REPUBLIC, vs. PILAR ESTIPULAR
G.R. No. 136588. July 20, 2000

JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER IS NOT WAIVABLE

“Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action is conferred only by the
Constitution or by law. It cannot be

(1) granted by the agreement of the parties;

(2) acquired, waived, enlarged or diminished by any act or omission of the parties; or
(3) conferred by the acquiescence of the courts.”

Patricio Villena vs. Patricio Payoyo

G.R. No. 163021, April 27, 2007

-Even if a complaint is denominated as one for recovery of sum of money and damages,
it can still be an action incapable of pecuniary estimation

“A case for breach of contract is a cause of action either for specific performance or
rescission of contracts. An action for rescission of contract, as a counterpart of an action for
specific performance, is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore falls under the
jurisdiction of the RTC. In the present case, the averments in the complaint show that
Payoyo sought the cancellation of the contracts and refund of the downpayments since
Villena failed to comply with the obligation to deliver the appliances and install the
kitchen cabinets subject of the contracts. The court then must examine the facts and the
applicable law to determine whether there is in fact substantial breach that would warrant
rescission or cancellation of the contracts and entitle the respondent for a refund. While the
respondent prayed for the refund, this is just incidental to the main action, which is the
rescission or cancellation of the contracts.

*SPOUSES TEODORO and ROSATIO SARAZA, ET AL vs. WILLIAM FRANCISCO.

G.R. No. 198718, November 27, 2013

An action to enforce an agreement whereby the defendant is being compelled to execute a

Deed of Sale over a parcel of land in accordance with the Agreement is one for specific
performance and is considered a personal action and not a real one, thus the applicable rule on
venue is Section 2 of Rule 4 which provides that personal actions "may be commenced and
tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of
the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be
found, at the election of the plaintiff."

Thus, the filing of the complaint in Imus, Cavite where the plaintiffs reside is proper even if the
property is located in Makati.

Baby Arlene Larano vs. Spouses Alfredo Candelacion Et Al

G.R. No. 158231, June 19, 2007

- When the complaint does not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of a valid
cause for unlawful detainer, the MTC does not have jurisdiction to hear the case

“It is clear from the foregoing that the allegations in the Complaint failed to constitute a
case of unlawful detainer. What is clear is that in the Complaint, petitioner alleged that
respondents had violated the terms of the Contract to Sell. However, the Complaint failed to
state that petitioner made demands upon respondents to comply with the conditions of
the contract – the payment of the installments and the accounting and delivery of the
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harvests from the subject riceland. The 10-day period granted respondents to vacate even
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fell short of the 15-day period mandated by law.

 An allegation of a violation of a contract or agreement in a detainer suit may be proved
by the presentation of competent evidence, upon which an MTC judge might make a finding to
that effect, but certainly, that court cannot declare and hold that the contract is rescinded. The
rescission of contract is a power vested in the RTC. The rescission of the contract is the basis
of, and therefore a condition precedent for, the illegality of a party's possession of a piece of
realty. Without judicial intervention and determination, even a stipulation entitling one party to
take possession of the land and building, in case the other party violates the contract, cannot
confer upon the former the right to take possession thereof, if that move is objected to.

Clearly, the basic issue raised in the complaint of petitioner is not of possession
but interpretation, enforcement and/or rescission of the contract, a matter that is beyond
the jurisdiction of the MTC to hear and determine.”

Flordeliza Mendoza vs. Mutya Soriano, Et Al

G.R. No. 164012, June 8, 2007

The issues are simple: (1) Did the Regional Trial Court have jurisdiction to try the
case? and (2) Was there sufficient legal basis to award damages?

Petitioner argues that the amount claimed by respondents is within the jurisdiction
of the Metropolitan Trial Court. She posits that to determine the jurisdictional amount,
what should only be considered are the following: P22,250 for funeral services; P45,000
for burial lot; P15,150 for interment and lapida; P8,066 for hospitalization and
transportation; P28,540 for food and drinks during the wake; and P60,000 indemnity for
Soriano’s death. She maintains that the sum of these amounts, P179,006, is below the
jurisdictional amount of the Regional Trial Court. She states that under Section 19(8) of
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the following claims of respondents must be
excluded: P200,000 moral damages, P500,000 for lost income; P50,000 exemplary
damages; P25,000 attorney’s fees plus P500 per court appearance. Petitioner thus
prays that the decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed, and the dismissal of the
case by the trial court be affirmed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts, as in this case, are primarily and
effectively actions for the recovery of a sum of money for the damages for tortious
acts. In this case, respondents’ claim of P929,006 in damages and P25,000
attorney’s fees plus P500 per court appearance represents the monetary
equivalent for compensation of the alleged injury. These money claims are the
principal reliefs sought by respondents in their complaint for damages.
Consequently then, we hold that the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City
possessed and properly exercised jurisdiction over the case.

Eugenio Bautista, Et Al vs. Susana Mag-Isa Vda de Villena

G.R. No. 152564. September 13, 2004

The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

An action for ejectment cannot prosper against a defendant when it is established that
there is a tenancy relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff’s predecessor’s in
interest because the right to a tenant to a homelot is intimately connected with the tenancy
relationship of the landowner and the agricultural lessee, any dispute regarding its transfer,
removal or retention falls within the jurisdiction of the DARAB — the quasi-judicial body specially
tasked to hear and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, matters or incidents involved in or related to
the implementation of agrarian laws.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a controversy
over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an administrative body of special
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competence.
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The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies to cases which were once

administrative in nature but which have been taken over by special courts

Vincent E. Omictin vs. Court of Appeals, Et Al

G.R. No.148004, January 22, 2007

While the above doctrine refers specifically to an administrative tribunal, the Court
believes that the circumstances in the instant case do not proscribe the application of the
doctrine, as the role of an administrative tribunal such as the SEC in determining technical and
intricate matters of special competence has been taken on by specially designated RTCs by
virtue of Republic Act No. 8799. Hence, the RTC of Mandaluyong where the intra-corporate
case is pending has the primary jurisdiction to determine the issues under contention relating to
the status of the domestic corporation, Saag Phils., Inc., vis-à-vis Saag Pte. Ltd.; and the
authority of petitioner to act on behalf of the domestic corporation, the determination of which
will have a direct bearing on the criminal case. The law recognizes that, in place of the SEC,
the regular courts now have the legal competence to decide intra-corporate disputes.

Arbitration Clauses

LM Power Engineering Corp. vs. Capitol Industrial Construction Groups, Inc. G.R. No.
141833. March 26, 2003

The Sub-Contract agreement between the parties contained the provision: “The Parties
hereto agree that any dispute or conflict as regards to interpretation and implementation
of this Agreement which cannot be settled between [respondent] and [petitioner]
amicably shall be settled by means of arbitration . . .."

Upon completing its task under the Contract, LM Power billed Capitol in the
amount of P6,711,813.90. Contesting the accuracy of the amount of advances and billable
accomplishments listed by the former, the latter refused to pay. Capitol also took refuge in the
termination clause of the Agreement. That clause allowed it to set off the cost of the work that
petitioner had failed to undertake — due to termination or take-over — against the amount it
owed the latter.

LM Power filed a case in the RTC and Capitol filed a Motion to Dismiss citing LM
Power’s failure to undergo arbitration. The RTC denied the motion and proceeded to try the
case.

On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC and ruled that the case should be dismissed for
having failed to go through arbitration first. Hence LM Power’s appeal to the Supreme Court
arguing that the case did not involve interpretation and implementation thus arbitration is not
necessary.

HELD: The arbitration clause should be enforced before going to court.

“Essentially, the dispute arose from the parties' incongruent positions on whether certain
provisions of their Agreement could be applied to the facts. The instant case involves technical
discrepancies that are better left to an arbitral body that has expertise in those areas. In any
event, the inclusion of an arbitration clause in a contract does not ipso facto divest the courts of
jurisdiction to pass upon the findings of arbitral bodies, because the awards are still judicially
reviewable under certain conditions.

Being an inexpensive, speedy and amicable method of settling disputes, arbitration —

along with mediation, conciliation and negotiation — is encouraged by the Supreme Court.
Aside from unclogging judicial dockets, arbitration also hastens the resolution of disputes,
especially of the commercial kind. It is thus regarded as the "wave of the future" in international
civil and commercial disputes. Brushing aside a contractual agreement calling for arbitration
between the parties would be a step backward.
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Consistent with the above-mentioned policy of encouraging alternative dispute

resolution methods, courts should liberally construe arbitration clauses. Provided such clause is
susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute, an order to arbitrate should be
granted. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of arbitration.

RESORT TO ARBITRATION BECAME A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO FILING A CASE IN

COURT.

The allegations in the complaint and NOT the defenses

raised in the Answer will determine jurisdiction over the subject matter

REY CARLO and GLADYS RIVERA vs. VIRGILIO RIVERA

G.R. No. 154203. July 8, 2003

“Although petitioners impugned the validity of respondent's title over the property as they
claimed to have the right to occupy it as co-owner, this allegation did not divest the MeTC of
jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer suit. It is settled that the sole issue in an ejectment case is
physical or material possession. Neither a claim of juridical possession nor an assertion of
ownership by the defendant can deprive the court of jurisdiction over the disputed property.
Courts in ejectment cases are mandated to decide questions of ownership whenever it is
necessary to decide the question of possession. They cannot be divested of jurisdiction over
ejectment cases just because the defendants assert ownership over the litigated property.

Francisco Alonso vs. Cebu Country Club

January 31, 2002

“Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly speaking, in
personam, but being against the person in respect of the res, these proceedings are
characterized as quasi in rem”

SO WHAT?

IMPORTANCE OF KNOWING THE DISTINCTIONS

Margarita Romualdez Licaros vs. Abelardo B. Licaros

G.R. No. 150656. April 29, 2003

“As a rule, when the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines,
Philippine courts cannot try any case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring
jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in court. But when the case is one of
actions in rem or quasi in rem enumerated in Section 15, 10 Rule 14 of the Rules of Court,
Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. In such instances, Philippine
courts have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident
defendant is not essential”

BUT TAKE NOTE OF

Pedro T. Santos, Jr. vs. PNOC Exploration Corporation

G.R. No. 170943, September 23, 2008

In cases where the identity or whereabouts of the defendant are unknown (Sec. 14, Rule
14)

Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite diligent efforts to
locate his whereabouts, respondent sought and was granted leave of court to effect service of
summons upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, petitioner was
properly served with summons by publication.

“Petitioner invokes the distinction between an action in rem and an action in personam
and claims that substituted service may be availed of only in an action in rem. Petitioner is
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wrong. The in rem/in personam distinction was significant under the old rule because it was
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silent as to the kind of action to which the rule was applicable. Because of this silence, the Court
limited the application of the old rule to in rem actions only.
  This has been changed. The present rule expressly states that it applies “[i]n any action
where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his
whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.” Thus, it now applies
to any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi in rem.

THE RULE: If the defendant is unknown or his whereabouts are unknown follow Section
14, otherwise follow the general rule that extraterritorial service of summons is allowed
only in the cases covered by Section 15

Example:

***NM Rothschilds and Sons (Australia) Limited vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company
G.R. No. 175799, November 28, 2011*

Lepanto filed a case against NM Rothchilds, and Australian company to declare the loan and
Hedging Contracts between the parties void with a prayer for damages.

Summons was served to the and summons was served in Australia to NM Rothschilds through
the DFA by the conveyance of the summons to the Philippine Consulate General in Sydney,
Australia

1. Was the service of summons valid?

Section 15, Rule 14, however, is the specific provision dealing precisely with the
service of summons on a defendant which does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, while Rule 135 (which is in Part V of the Rules of Court entitled Legal
Ethics) concerns the general powers and duties of courts and judicial officers.

Breaking down Section 15, Rule 14, it is apparent that there are only four
instances wherein a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the country
may be served with summons by extraterritorial service, to wit: (1) when the action
affects the personal status of the plaintiffs; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject
of which is property, within the Philippines, in which the defendant claims a lien or an
interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded in such action consists,
wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the
Philippines; and (4) when the defendant non-resident's property has been attached
within the Philippines. In these instances, service of summons may be effected by (a)
personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave of
court; or (c) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.

Proceeding from this enumeration, we held in Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd. v.
Dakila Trading Corporation[33] that:

Undoubtedly, extraterritorial service of summons applies only where the action is

in rem or quasi in rem, but not if an action is in personam.

When the case instituted is an action in rem or quasi in rem, Philippine courts
already have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because, in actions in rem and
quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer
jurisdiction on the court, provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Thus,
in such instance, extraterritorial service of summons can be made upon the defendant.
The said extraterritorial service of summons is not for the purpose of vesting the court
with jurisdiction, but for complying with the requirements of fair play or due process, so
that the defendant will be informed of the pendency of the action against him and the
possibility that property in the Philippines belonging to him or in which he has an interest
may be subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and he can thereby take steps to
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protect his interest if he is so minded. On the other hand, when the defendant or
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respondent does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action
involved is in personam, Philippine courts cannot try any case against him
 because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he
voluntarily appears in court.[

2. Will the fact that Rothschild moved for and was granted availment of various
modes of discovery cure the defective service of summons?

petitioner, by seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, is deemed to have
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of said court. A party cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining
or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.

3. Does not the La Naval Doctrine, which allows the inclusion of other grounds for
dismissal in addition to the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, without having the effect of a waiver of such jurisdiction, contrast with
this ruling?

A close reading of La Naval reveals that the Court intended a distinction between
the raising of affirmative defenses in an Answer (which would not amount to acceptance
of the jurisdiction of the court) and the prayer for affirmative reliefs (which would be
considered acquiescence to the jurisdiction of the court):

Xxx
1
In view of the above, we therefore rule that petitioner, by seeking affirmative
reliefs from the trial court, is deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of
said court. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief
against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction

***If the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant/improper service of
summons is raised only in a Second Supplemental Motion to Dismiss, will the La Naval
Doctrine still apply?

Spouses German Anuncacion , Et Al vs. Perpetua Bocanegra, Et Al

G.R. No. 152496, July 30, 2009

Section 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (the Rules) states:

Sec. 20. Voluntary Appearance The defendants voluntary appearance in the

action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of
other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not
be deemed a voluntary appearance. (Underscoring ours)

The filing of the above-mentioned Motion to Dismiss, without invoking the lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the respondents, is deemed a voluntary appearance on the part
of the respondents under the aforequoted provision of the Rules. The same conclusion can be
drawn from the filing of the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Reply to the Comment on the
Motion to Dismiss dated November 13, 2000 which alleged, as an additional ground for the
dismissal of petitioners complaint, the failure of plaintiffs to pay the required filing fee again but
failed to raise the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the court over the person of the respondents.

It was only in respondents Second Supplemental Motion to Dismiss dated November 27,
2000 that respondents for the first time raised the courts lack of jurisdiction over their person as
defendants on the ground that summons were allegedly not properly served upon them. The
filing of the said Second Supplemental Motion to Dismiss did not divest the court of its
jurisdiction over the person of the respondents who had earlier voluntarily appeared before the
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trial court by filing their motion to dismiss and the supplemental motion to dismiss. The
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dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
respondents after they had voluntarily appeared before the trial court clearly constitutes
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the RTC.

On docket fees

When should the ruling in Sun Insurance apply and when should the one in Manchester
apply?

United Overseas Bank vs. Hon. Judge Reynaldo Ros

G.R. No. 171532, August 7, 2007

“in Sun Insurance, we modified our ruling in Manchester and decreed that where the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the docket fee, the court may allow
payment of the fee within reasonable period of time, but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period. The aforesaid ruling was made on the justification that,
unlike in Manchester, the private respondent in Sun Insurance demonstrated his willingness to
abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees required.”

“In case where the party does not deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment of
docket fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by paying additional docket fees
when required by the court, the liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun Insurance and not the strict
regulations set in Manchester will apply.”

When is liberal construction of the rules allowed?

Sea Power Shipping Enterprise vs. Court of Appeals

June 28, 2001

Liberal construction of this rule has been allowed in the following cases:

(1) where a rigid application will result in manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, especially
if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and
executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein;

(2) where the interest of substantial justice will be served;

(3) where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious
discretion of the court; and

(4) where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed."

When are the rules strictly enforced:

Generally, the rules are liberally construed. Examples of cases where the rules are
strictly enforced are:

1. Compliance with the reglementary periods to appeal (Manila Memorial Park Cementery
vs. CA Nov. 15, 2000) as well as the performance of certain acts within periods given.

2. The inclusion of an explanation when service by registered mail is resorted to (Solar

Team Entertainment, Inc. vs. Ricafort 293 SCRA 661)

3. Cases where the party praying for liberal construction has already shown a penchant for
disregarding the rules.
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A “group of companies” that has not been organized into a corporation has NO LEGAL
PERSONALITY TO SUE.

Lintonjua Group of Companies Et. Al, vs. Teresita Vigan

June 28, 2001

“Only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties to a civil
action and every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real parties in
interest.

A “GROUP OF COMPANIES” that is NOT a juridical person CANNOT SUE OR BE

SUED for lack of personality to do so.

VSC Commercial Enterprises, Inc. vs. CA

G.R. No. 121159. December 16, 2002

- A private person cannot institute an action for the cancellation of another person’s title on the
ground that the said title is void because the real party in interest in such a case is the State as
it is the State that would be entitled to the property if indeed the existing title is proven to be
void.

Metrobank vs. Floro T. Alejo

G.R. No. 141970. September 10, 2001

In a suit to nullify an existing Torrens Certificate of Title (TCT) in which a real estate
mortgage is annotated, the mortgagee is an indispensable party. In such suit, a decision
canceli,ng the TCT and the mortgage annotation is subject to a petition for annulment of
judgment, because the non-joinder of the mortgagee deprived the court of jurisdiction to pass
upon the controversy.

REMEMBER: Class Suit AKA THE DOCTRINE OF VIRTUAL REPRESENTATION

REQUISITES

1. The subject matter of the controversy is one of

common or general interest to many persons; and

2. They are so numerous that it is impracticable to join all

as parties.

New Case: In Opposa vs. Factoran, the petitioners were authorized, among others, to
represent future generations under the principle of Inter-Generational Responsibility.

***RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TANON STRAIT, ET

AL VS. SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, ET AL
G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015

Can the petitioners, who are marine mammals, represented by natural persons claiming
to be their Stewards, have locus standi to file a case despite the fact that they are not
natural persons? Can the Oposa case apply considering that the petitioners therein were
human beings albeit some were unborn?

The primary reason animal rights advocates and environmentalists seek to give animals
and inanimate objects standing is due to the need to comply with the strict requirements in
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bringing a suit to court. Our own 1997 Rules of Court demand that parties to a suit be either
natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law. It further necessitates the action to be
brought in the name of the real party-in-interest, even if filed by a representative, viz.:

It had been suggested by animal rights advocates and environmentalists that not only
natural and juridical persons should be given legal standing because of the difficulty for persons,
who cannot show that they by themselves are real parties-in-interests, to bring actions in
representation of these animals or inanimate objects. For this reason, many environmental
cases have been dismissed for failure of the petitioner to show that he/she would be directly
injured or affected by the outcome of the case. However, in our jurisdiction, locus standi in
environmental cases has been given a more liberalized approach. While developments in
Philippine legal theory and jurisprudence have not progressed as far as Justice Douglas's
paradigm of legal standing for inanimate objects, the current trend moves towards simplification
of procedures and facilitating court access in environmental cases.

Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases,51 which allow for a "citizen suit," and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before
our courts for violations of our environmental laws:

SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including

minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations
under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order
which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for,
requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within
fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a
newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays
copies of said order.

Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by their
respective provisions.52 (Emphasis ours.)

Explaining the rationale for this rule, the Court, in the Annotations to the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, commented:

Citizen suit. To further encourage the protection of the environment, the Rules
enable litigants enforcing environmental rights to file their cases as citizen suits. This
provision liberalizes standing for all cases filed enforcing environmental laws and
collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that
humans are stewards of nature. The terminology of the text reflects the doctrine first
enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn.53
(Emphasis supplied, citation omitted.)

Although this petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of procedure "may
be retroactively applied to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and
will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as
there is no vested rights in rules of procedure."54

Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became
effective, this Court had already taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in
environmental cases. In Oposa, we allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations
yet unborn "based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned."56 Furthermore, we said that the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology, a right that does not even need to be stated in our Constitution
as it is assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment.57

In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal
standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward
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of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that
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the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the
named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their
petition that there may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the
Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file
this petition.

Davao Light and Power Co. vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 111685. August 20, 2001

-Will contracts and pleadings filed in other cases and with or against other people estop
a corporation against filing a case in the place of business stated in the corporation’s
Articles of Incorporation?

“Private respondent is not a party to any of the contracts presented before us. He is a complete
stranger to the covenants executed between petitioner and NAPOCOR, despite his
protestations that he is privy thereto, on the rather flimsy ground that he is a member of the
public for whose benefit the electric generating equipment subject of the contracts were leased
or acquired. We are likewise not persuaded by his argument that the allegation or
representation made by petitioner in either the complaints or answers it filed in several civil
cases that its residence is in Davao City should estop it from filing the damage suit before the
Cebu courts. Besides there is no showing that private respondent is a party in those civil cases
or that he relied on such representation by petitioner.”

Fidel M. Bañares II, Et Al vs. Elizabeth Balising, Et. Al

G.R. No. 132624. March 13, 2000

-A CASE DISMISSED by reason of failure to refer to the Lupon CANNOT be revived by

MOTION after conciliation proceedings have failed. The judgment of DISMISSAL becomes final
after the lapse of the period to appeal (Doctrine of Finality)

What kind of Motion for Reconsideration is prohibited under the Rules on Summary
Procedure?

Gloria Lucas vs. Judge Amelia A. Fabros

A.M. No. MTJ-99-1226. January 31, 2000.

-An order of dismissal due to the failure of parties to appear during preliminary conference can
be the subject of a motion for reconsideration because it is not a judgment on the merits.

a judgment CANNOT grant a relief that was not prayed for in the pleadings

G.R. No. 143781. February 27, 2002.]

JOSE CLAVANO, INC., petitioner, vs. HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD
and SPS. ENRIQUE and VENUS TENAZAS, respondents.

It is elementary that a judgment must conform to, and be supported by, both the
pleadings and the evidence, and be in accordance with the theory of the action on which the
pleadings are framed and the case was tried. The judgment must be secundum allegata et
probata. In Falcon v. Manzano where the trial court rendered judgment allowing plaintiff to
recover from the defendant the unpaid portion of the purchase price of a parcel of land when the
plaintiff only asked for the nullification of the contract of sale of the realty and the return of the
property to her, we set aside the judgment of the trial court in conceding to her a remedy which
was not prayed for in the complaint

If there was Certification of Non-Forum shopping but there was no board resolution or
secretary’s certificate authorizing the person who signed it for the plaintiff corporation, is
10

this fatal? Can the subsequent submission of a secretary’s certificate cure the defect?
Page

General Milling Corp. vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 153199. December 17, 2002.
 Unlike the case of Melo vs. Court of Appeals (318 SCRA 94.), where there was a
complete failure to attach a Certification of Non-forum Shopping, in this instance, however,
petitioner complied with this procedural requirement except that it was not accompanied by a
board resolution or a secretary's certificate that the person who signed it was duly authorized by
petitioner to represent it in the case. It would appear that the signatory of the certification was,
in fact, duly authorized as so evidenced by a board resolution attached to petitioner's motion for
reconsideration before the appellate court. It could thus be said that there was at least
substantial compliance with, and that there was no attempt to ignore, the prescribed procedural
requirements.

Can an “in-house” counsel execute the certification of non-forum shopping?

Levi Strauss (Phils), Inc. vs. Vogue Traders Clothing Co.

G.R. No. 132993. June 29, 2005

The requirement of certification against forum shopping under the Rules is to be

executed by the petitioner, or in the case of a corporation, its duly authorized director or officer,
but not petitioner's counsel whose professional services have been engaged to handle the
subject case. The reason is that it is the petitioner who has personal knowledge whether there
are cases of similar nature pending with the other courts, tribunals, or agencies. Thus, in the
present case, the Court of Appeals should have outrightly dismissed the petition for certiorari
filed by the respondent (as therein petitioner in the appeals court) due to the defective
certification of non-forum shopping. The certification made by Atty. Soriano, counsel for the
respondent, who is not one of its duly authorized directors or officers, is defective. Even if Atty.
Soriano was the "in-house counsel," the fact remains that no board resolution, or even a
Secretary's Certificate containing the board resolution, was submitted to show that he
was indeed authorized to file the said petition in the Court of Appeals.

Can a court deny a previously defaulted party the right to cross-examine a witness who
was presented before the order of default was set aside?

Philippine Banking Corp. vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 127469. January 15, 2004

“There was no violation of the BANK's right to procedural due process when the trial
court denied the BANK's motion to cross-examine Marcos. Prior to the denial of the motion, the
trial court had properly declared the BANK in default. Since the BANK was in default, Marcos
was able to present his evidence ex parte including his own testimony. When the trial court
lifted the order of default, the BANK was restored to its standing and rights in the action.
However, as a rule, the proceedings already taken should not be disturbed. Nevertheless, it is
within the trial court's discretion to reopen the evidence submitted by the plaintiff and
allow the defendant to challenge the same, by cross-examining the plaintiff's witnesses
or introducing countervailing evidence. The 1964 Rules of Court, the rules then in effect at
the time of the hearing of this case, recognized the trial court's exercise of this discretion. The
1997 Rules of Court retained this discretion.”

Phil Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp.

vs. Phil Infrastructures, Et Al
G.R. No. 120384. January 13, 2004

Even if originally the complaint failed to state a cause of action, the presentation of
evidence without objection on the part of the defendant can cure the defect even if the
defendant raised the failure to state a cause of action as an affirmative defense.

Requirement of an Explanation in availing of service by registered mail is STRICTLY

11

CONSTRUED
Page
Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. vs. Ricafort
293 SCRA 661 (1998). reiterated in FILCON MANUFACTURING CORP. vs. LMF-LMLC G.R.
No. 150166. July 26, 2004

Exceptional Case:

Noli Alfonso, Et. Al vs. Spouses Henry and Liwanag Andres

G.R. No. 139611. October 4, 2002

Where the notice of appeal was filed by the parties themselves without assistance of
counsel, the Supreme Court relaxed the Solar Entertainment Ruling.

Fortunato Gomez, Et Al vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 127692. March 10, 2004

To validly acquire jurisdiction over his person, summons must be served on him
personally, or through substituted service, upon showing of impossibility of personal service. 
Such impossibility, and why efforts exerted towards personal service failed, should be
explained in the proof of service.  The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the
service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return.  Failure to
do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.

The person who receives the summons MUST be living in the SAME dwelling house or
residence

Isagani Miranda Et Al vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 114243. February 23, 2000

“Ernesto Elizondo emphatically testified under oath, however, that at the time he
allegedly signed for the summons, he was not living in the same house as his parents-in-law,
"although I am living within the compound of my father-in-law." 18 Rule 14, Section 8 of the
Rules of Court specifically provides that substituted service must be effected by "(a) leaving
copies of the summons at the defendant's dwelling house or residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein." Since Ernesto Elizondo admitted that he was
not living with the spouses Java, the requirement that the summons be left with a person of
suitable age residing in the same dwelling house or residence as the defendant, for substituted
service to be valid, has not been complied” with.

ON THE MANDATORY NATURE OF THE REQUIREMENTS IN A NOTICE OF HEARING IN A

WRITTEN MOTION

Cleofe Norris vs. Hon. Jose J. Parentela, Jr

G.R. No. 143216. February 27, 2003

“Undoubtedly, said petition was covered by the circular. Secondly, petitioner failed to put
a notice of hearing addressed to the parties in her motion for reconsideration of the order
denying her petition for relief. This is again procedurally flawed because Section 5 of Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court clearly provides that notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties
concerned. Notice addressed to the clerk of court and not to the parties does not suffice as
notice to all. A motion that does not contain a notice of hearing to the adverse party is nothing
but a mere scrap of paper and the clerk. of court does not have the duty to accept it, much less
to bring it to the attention of the presiding judge.

Octavio Alvarez vs. Augustus Diaz

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1283. March 3, 2004

“Which must not be later than ten days…….”

12
Page

Now, this phrase which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion
is a new phrase inserted only in the 1997 Rules to prevent dilatory tactics.
Serena T. Bacelonia vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 143440. February 11, 2003

“Significantly, the above provision of Rule 15, Section 5 uses the mandatory term "must"
in fixing the period within which the motion shall be scheduled for hearing. A motion that fails to
religiously comply with the mandatory provision of Rule 15, Section 5 is pro forma and presents
no question which merits the attention and consideration of the court”.

BUT TAKE NOTE OF THE RULING IN

Jehan Shipping Corp., vs. NFA, G.R. No. 159750

December 14, 2005

The general rule is that the three-day notice requirement in motions under Sections 4
and 5 of the Rules of Court is mandatory. It is an integral component of procedural due
process. But when the adverse party has actually had the opportunity to be heard, and has
indeed been heard through pleadings filed in opposition to the motion, the purpose behind the
rule is deemed duly served. The requirements of due process are substantially complied with.

Setting the affirmative defenses for hearing AS IF A MOTION TO DISMISS WAS FILED is
DISCRETIONARY on the part of the judge.

TEODORA REOFERIO vs.Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 129008. January 13, 2004.

“Certainly, the incorporation of the word "may" in the provision is clearly indicative of the
optional character of the preliminary hearing. The word denotes discretion and cannot be
construed as having a mandatory effect. 23 Subsequently, the electivity of the proceeding was
firmed up beyond cavil by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with the inclusion of the phrase "in
the discretion of the Court", apart from the retention of the word "may" in Section 6, 24 in Rule
16 thereof.”

SEC. 6 RULE 17

Sec. 6. Pleading grounds as affirmative defense. - If no motion to

dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal provided
for in this Rule may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the
answer and, in the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing
may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.
(5a)

The dismissal of the complaint under this section shall be

without prejudice to the prosecution in the same or
separate action of a counterclaim pleaded in the answer. (n)

-Under the second paragraph, it is ALLOWED for a counterclaim pleaded in an answer

with affirmative defenses to be prosecuted in the same action EVEN IF the complaint is
DISMISSED.

ON DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS UPON NOTICE BY PLAINTIFF

Relationship between Section 1 of Rule 17 to forum shopping

When is the case deemed dismissed, upon the filing of the notice or upon the issuance
of the Order of the court affirming the dismissal?
13

Ma. Carminia C. Roxas vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 139337. August 15, 2001
Page
-FINALITY retroacts to the date of filing of the notice of dismissal. Thus, even if a new case is
filed within fifteen days from the dismissal of the first case, THERE IS NO LITIS PENDENTIA.

EFFECT OF FAILURE TO APPEAR DURING PRE-TRIAL

Sec. 5. Effect of failure to appear. - The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so
required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the
action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A
similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present
his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.

PRE-TRIAL ORDER CONTROLS

[G.R. No. 143286. April 14, 2004.]

PROCOPIO VILLANUEVA, NICOLAS RETUYA and PACITA VILLANUEVA, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF EUSEBIA NAPISA RETUYA, respondents.
The determination of issues during the pre-trial conference bars the consideration of
other questions, whether during trial or on appeal. 6 Section 1 of Rule 9 covers situations where
a defense or objection is not raised in a motion to dismiss or an answer. What we have before
us is the exact opposite. Here, petitioners in fact raised in their answer the defense of
prescription and laches. However, despite raising the defense of prescription and laches in
their answer, petitioners failed to include this defense among the issues for
consideration during the trial. The non-inclusion of this defense in the pre-trial order
barred its consideration during the trial. Clearly, Section 1 of Rule 9 does not apply to the
present case.

DEPOSITION TAKING BEFORE A CONSULAR REP OF THE PHIL. NULLIFIED

Northwest Airlines vs. Camille T. Cruz

G.R. No. 137136. November 3, 1999

Section 11 of Rule 24 provides: "In a foreign state or country, depositions shall be taken
(a) on notice before a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul or
consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, or (b) before such person or officer as may be
appointed by commission or under letters rogatory." The deposition document clearly indicates
that while the consul swore in the witness and the stenographer, it was another officer in
the Philippine Consulate who undertook the entire proceedings thereafter. Respondent
Northwest argues on the presumption of regularity of official functions and even obtained a
certification to this effect plus an assertion that none of the participants in the Consulate were in
any way related to the respondent or their counsel. But presumptions should fail when the
record itself bears out the irregularity

FISHING EXPEDITIONS IN DEPOSITION TAKING ALLOWED

Elena Ong vs. Francisco V. Mazo, Et. Al

G.R. No. 145542. June 4, 2004

Thus, to deny a party the liberty to have his written interrogatories answered by his
opponent, as what the trial court did, on the premise that the interrogatories were a "fishing
expedition," is to disregard the categorical pronouncement in aforementioned case of Republic
vs. Sandiganbayan that the time-honored cry of 'fishing expedition' can no longer provide a
reason to prevent a party from inquiring into the facts underlying the opposing party's case
through the discovery procedures.
14

May the counsel of a party to whom a written request for admission is addressed under
Page

Section 1, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, answer such request for his client?
Rey Lañada vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 102390. February 1, 2002

Section 23 of Rule 138 provides that "(a)ttorneys have authority to bind

their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing,
and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure . . . ."
Thus, when Rule 26 states that a party shall respond to the request for admission, it should
not be restrictively construed to mean that a party may not engage the services of counsel to
make the response in his behalf. Indeed, the theory of petitioner must not be taken seriously;
otherwise, it will negate the principles on agency in the Civil Code, as well as Sec. 23, Rule 138,
of the Rules of Court.

Security Bank Corp. vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 135874. January 25, 2000

-Even documents NOT indispensable to the preparation of the defendant’s Answer can be the
subject of a Motion for Production or Inspection of Documents or things.

Vernette Umali-Paco vs. Reinato G. Quilala, Et Al

A.M. No. RTJ-02-1699. October 15, 2003.

-JUDGE CANNOT delegate reception of evidence to his assistant clerk of court even if he was
there at the beginning. THIS IS NOT CURABLE EVEN IF THERE IS NO OBJECTION FROM
THE PARTIES

If old age and infirmity is a good reason, can a corporation cite financial distress as a
good reason for execution pending appeal?

Diesel Construction Co. vs. Jollibee Foods Corp

G.R. No. 136805. January 28, 2000.

Petitioner's allegedly precarious financial condition, however, is not by itself a

jurisprudentially compelling circumstance warranting immediate execution. The financial
distress of a juridical entity is not comparable to a case involving a natural person — such as a
very old and sickly one without any means of livelihood, an heir seeking an order for support
and monthly allowance for subsistence, or one who dies.

Can a trial court grant execution pending appeal on the ground that the appeal is
frivolous and dilatory?

International School vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 131109. June 29, 1999

"where the reason given is that an appeal is frivolous and dilatory, execution pending appeal
cannot be justified. It is not proper for the trial court to find that an appeal is frivolous and
consequently to disapprove it since the disallowance of an appeal by said court constitutes a
deprivation of the right to appeal. The authority to disapprove an appeal rightfully pertains to the
appellate court” . . (citing Ong vs. Court of Appeals “203 SCRA 38.”)

EXCEPTION:
15

City of Iligan vs. Principal Management Group

Page

G.R. No. 145260. July 31, 2003.

 In this case the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of the execution pending
appeal on the argument that the appeal was dilatory because the judgment was based on
UNDISPUTED FACTS:

“Normally, the trial court is not allowed to assess its own judgment and to hold that an
appeal may not prosper, or that it would merely be dilatory. In the present case, however, there
are circumstances that undisputedly serve as cogent bases for arriving at such a conclusion.

First, it is not seriously disputed that the judgment is anchored upon the material facts as
follows: (1) there is a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) for the site development of Sports
Complex Project No. 1 signed by the parties; (2) petitioner failed to pay the occupants of the
project site on time, thereby preventing respondent from fully complying with its obligation under
the MOA; (3) respondent admitted that the work accomplished was 52.89 percent, which was
equivalent to P6,958,861.59. Obviously, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact on this
point.

Second, Article 1191 of the Civil Code states:

"The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the
obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.

"The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the
obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. . . .."

By failing to pay the occupants of the project site within the time required for the
completion of the project, petitioner did not comply with what was incumbent upon it. Applying
the law to the undisputed facts, the trial court had prima facie bases for rendering its partial
summary judgment holding that respondent was entitled to rescission and to the payment of
P6,958,861.59.”

If the losing party IMMEDIATELY FILES a Notice of Appeal, will this divest the court of
the authority to act on a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal?

Carlos D. Villamor vs. NAPOCOR

G.R. No. 146735. October 25, 2004

As long as any of the parties may still file his, her, or its appeal, the court does not lose
jurisdiction over the case.

The plaintiff or plaintiffs may not deprive the defendants or co-plaintiffs and neither may
the defendant or defendants deprive the plaintiff or co-defendants of the right to file a motion for
reconsideration or to move for a new trial or an execution pending appeal by immediately filing
a notice of appeal. The filing of an appeal by a losing party does not automatically divest the
party favored by a decision of the right to move for a more favorable decision or to ask for
execution pending appeal. It is only after all the parties' respective periods to appeal have
lapsed that the court loses jurisdiction over the case.
16

What is the effect if the lower court grants the Motion for Execution pending appeal but
fails to issue a Writ of Execution before losing jurisdiction over the case?
Page
Diesel Construction Co. vs. Jollibee Foods Corp
G.R. No. 136805. January 28, 2000.

“xxxx after the perfection of the appeal and the transmittal of the records, the trial court loses
jurisdiction over the case. Henceforth, it may no longer grant a motion for, or issue a writ of
immediate execution; to do so would be an abuse of discretion.

While it is true that the trial court granted the Motion of the petitioner for execution
pending appeal, it did not actually issue a writ of execution, because the latter had failed to
comply with the Special Order proviso requiring the posting of a bond. Eventually, two separate
appeals filed by both parties were perfected, and the records of the case were transmitted by
the RTC to the CA. From then on, the trial court lost jurisdiction to issue the said writ. When the
petitioner asked the CA for the issuance of the writ at the time, it thereby invoked the original
discretionary jurisdiction of the latter to grant execution pending appeal.”

Writ of Execution issued after the five year period is void

Leoncio and Enriquieta Barrera vs. CA
G.R. No. 123935. December 14, 2001

The rule is that the court could issue a writ of execution by motion within five (5) years
from finality of the decision.
A writ of execution issued after the expiration of that period is null and void. There is a
need for the interested party to file an independent action for revival of judgment. The judgment
may be enforced after the lapse of this period and before the same is barred by the statute of
limitations, by instituting an ordinary civil action. "The reason is that after the lapse of the five-
year period, the judgment is reduced to a mere right of action, which judgment must be
enforced, as all other ordinary actions, by the institution of a complaint in the regular form. Such
action must be filed within ten (10) years from the date the judgment became final."
The decision having become stale, "any action to enforce or revive it has prescribed."

Devorah E. Bardillon vs. Barangay Masili

G.R. No. 146886. April 30, 2003

-DECISION of an MTC in an expropriation case CANNOT have the effect of res judicata
because an MTC does not have jurisdiction over such cases

When does the 15 day period to appeal begin to run?

Domingo Neypes, Et Al vs. Court of Appeals, Et Al

G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all

courts.[26] It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish
new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the
speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to
the Court

. Reyes, the Court explained that:

The verification of the petition and certification on non-forum shopping before the Court
of Appeals were signed only by Jimenez. There is no showing that he was authorized to sign
the same by Athena, his co-petitioner.
17

Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules states that a pleading is verified by an affidavit that the
Page

affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his
knowledge and belief. Consequently, the verification should have been signed not only by
Jimenez but also by Athena’s duly authorized representative.

In Docena v. Lapesura, we ruled that the certificate of non-forum shopping should be

signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case, and that the signing by only one of them is
insufficient. The attestation on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party
executing the same, and the lone signing petitioner cannot be presumed to have personal
knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his co-petitioners of any action or claim the same as
similar to the current petition.

The certification against forum shopping in CA-G.R. SP No. 72284 is fatally defective,
not having been duly signed by both petitioners and thus warrants the dismissal of the petition
for certiorari. We have consistently held that the certification against forum shopping must be
signed by the principal parties. With respect to a corporation, the certification against forum
shopping may be signed for and on its behalf, by a specifically authorized lawyer who has
personal knowledge of the facts required to be disclosed in such document.

While the Rules of Court may be relaxed for persuasive and weighty reasons to relieve a
litigant from an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed
procedures, nevertheless they must be faithfully followed. In the instant case, petitioners have
not shown any reason which justifies relaxation of the Rules. We have held that procedural
rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have
prejudiced a party’s substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except for
the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed. Not one of these persuasive
reasons is present here.

In fine, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for
certiorari in view of the procedural lapses committed by petitioners. [Emphases supplied]

Special instances were leniency was applied: (same case)

Indeed, liberality and leniency were accorded in some cases.[13] In these cases,
however, those who did not sign were relatives of the lone signatory, so unlike in this case,
where Malcaba is not a relative who is similarly situated with the other petitioners and who
cannot speak for them. In the case of Heirs of Domingo Hernandez, Sr. v. Plaridel Mingoa, Sr.,
[14] it was written:

In the instant case, petitioners share a common interest and defense inasmuch as they
collectively claim a right not to be dispossessed of the subject lot by virtue of their and their
deceased parents’ construction of a family home and occupation thereof for more than 10 years.
The commonality of their stance to defend their alleged right over the controverted lot thus gave
petitioners xxx authority to inform the Court of Appeals in behalf of the other petitioners that they
have not commenced any action or claim involving the same issues in another court or tribunal,
and that there is no other pending action or claim in another court or tribunal involving the same
issues.

Here, all the petitioners are immediate relatives who share a common interest in the land
sought to be reconveyed and a common cause of action raising the same arguments in support
thereof. There was sufficient basis, therefore, for Domingo Hernandez, Jr. to speak for and in
behalf of his co-petitioners when he certified that they had not filed any action or claim in
another court or tribunal involving the same issues. Thus, the Verification/Certification that
Hernandez, Jr. executed constitutes substantial compliance under the Rules. [Emphasis
supplied]

The same leniency was accorded to the petitioner in the case of Oldarico S. Traveno v.
Bobongon Banana Growers Multi-Purpose Cooperative,[15] where it was stated:
18

The same leniency was applied by the Court in Cavile v. Heirs of Cavile, because the
Page

lone petitioner who executed the certification of non-forum shopping was a relative and co-
owner of the other petitioners with whom he shares a common interest. xxx
STIPULATIONS ON VENUE AS APPLIED TO REAL ESTATE MORTGAGES AND A
SUBSEQUENT RESTRUCTURING AGREEMENT

Paglaum Management & Development Corp., Et Al vs. Union Bank of the

Phils, Et Al
G.R. No. 179018, June 18, 2012
Bn bn bbbz
FACTS: This involves a case for Annullment of Sale and Titles filed by the petitioners in
Makati City in relation to the foreclosure of properties that are located in Cebu City. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the case stating that the proper venue of action, this being
a real action, should have been in Cebu City.

HELD: According to the Rules, real actions shall be commenced and tried in the court
that has jurisdiction over the area where the property is situated. In this case, all the mortgaged
properties are located in the Province of Cebu. Thus, following the general rule, PAGLAUM
and HealthTech should have filed their case in Cebu, and not in Makati.

However, the Rules provide an exception, in that real actions can be commenced and
tried in a court other than where the property is situated in instances where the parties have
previously and validly agreed in writing on the exclusive venue thereof. In the case at bar, the
parties claim that such an agreement exists. The only dispute is whether the venue that should
be followed is that contained in the Real Estate Mortgages, as contended by Union Bank, or
that in the Restructuring Agreement, as posited by PAGLAUM and HealthTech. This Court
rules that the venue stipulation in the Restructuring Agreement should be controlling.

XXXXX

Section 20 of the Restructuring Agreement as regards the venue of actions state:

20. Venue – Venue of any action or proceeding arising out of or connected with
this Restructuring Agreement, the Note, the Collateral and any and all related
documents shall be in Makati City, [HealthTech] and [Union Bank] hereby waiving any
other venue. (Emphasis supplied.)

These quoted provisions of the Real Estate Mortgages and the later Restructuring
Agreement clearly reveal the intention of the parties to implement a restrictive venue
stipulation, which applies not only to the principal obligation, but also to the mortgages. The
phrase “waiving any other venue” plainly shows that the choice of Makati City as the venue for
actions arising out of or in connection with the Restructuring Agreement and the Collateral,
with the Real Estate Mortgages being explicitly defined as such, is exclusive.

Even if this Court were to consider the venue stipulations under the Real Estate
Mortgages, it must be underscored that those provisions did not contain words showing
exclusivity or restrictiveness. In fact, in the Real Estate Mortgages dated 11 February 1994, the
phrase “parties hereto waiving” – from the entire phrase “the parties hereto waiving any other
venue” – was stricken from the final executed contract. Following the ruling in Sps. Lantin as
earlier quoted, in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the venue stipulation should
only be deemed as an agreement on an additional forum, and not as a restriction on a
specified place.

Considering that Makati City was agreed upon by the parties to be the venue for all
actions arising out of or in connection with the loan obligation incurred by HealthTech, as well
as the Real Estate Mortgages executed by PAGLAUM, the CA committed reversible error in
affirming the dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-1567 by RTC Br. 134 on the ground of improper
venue.
19
Page