1. Idolor v.

CA 351 SCRA

FACTS

In order to secure a loan of P520,000.00, petitioner Teresita Idolor executed in favor of private
respondent Gumersindo De Guzman a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage with right of extra-judicial foreclosure
upon failure to redeem the mortgage on or before September 20, 1994. Private respondent Iluminada de
Guzman, wife of Gumersindo de Guzman, filed a complaint against petitioner before the Office of the
Barangay Captain of Barangay Ramon Magsaysay, Quezon City, which resulted in a "Kasunduang Pag-aayos"
which noted that the petitioner shall pay within 90 days and her failure would warrant the foreclosure of the
property with the right to repurchase within one year without interest. Petitioner failed to comply with her
undertaking; thus private respondent Gumersindo filed a motion for execution before the Office of the
Barangay captain who subsequently issued a certification to file action. Respondent Gumersindo De Guzman
filed an extra judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage pursuant to the parties agreement and the
mortgaged property was sold in a public auction to respondent Gumersindo, as the highest bidder and
consequently, the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City.

After more than a year, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 220, a
complaint for annulment of Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and a writ of
preliminary injunction.Trial court subsequently issued the TRO and the writ however the Court of Appeals
annulled the writ.

ISSUE

WON Preliminary Injunction may be issued

RULING

NO. Petitioner had one year redemption period from the registration of the sheriff’s sale to redeem
the property but she failed to exercise this right. Hence, the right no longer exists. When petitioner filed her
complaint for annulment of sheriffs sale against private respondents with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction on June 25, 1998, she failed to show sufficient interest or title in the property sought
to be protected as her right of redemption had already expired on June 23, 1998, i.e. two (2) days before the
filing of the complaint.

Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. Before an
injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: 1) there must be a right in
esse or the existence of a right to be protected; 2) the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a
violation of such right. Hence the existence of a right violated, is a prerequisite to the granting of an
injunction. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Failure to establish either the
existence of a clear and positive right which should be judicially protected through the writ of injunction or
that the defendant has committed or has attempted to commit any act which has endangered or tends to
endanger the existence of said right, is a sufficient ground for denying the injunction
 2. Gustilo v. Real 353 SCRA

FACTS

Complainant avers that he was a candidate for punong barangay of Barangay Punta Mesa, Manapla,
Negros Occidental in the May 12, 1997 elections and his lone opponent was Weddy C. Libo-on, then the
incumbent punong barangay. There was a tie between the two. The breaking of the tie by the Board of
Canvassers was in complainants favor and he was proclaimed duly elected punong barangay. Opponent filed
an election protest case before the MCTC of Victorias-Manapla, Negros Occidental. Libo-on sought the
recounting of ballots in two precincts, preliminary prohibitory injunction, and damages. MCTC Judge issued a
TRO without sending a notice of hearing to the complainant. On May 30, 1997, complainant took his oath of
office as punong barangay. That same day, he also filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial
Court of Silay City, Negros Occidental however the RTC lifted the TRO issued by respondent and declared as
null and void the order nullifying complainants proclamation as duly elected punong barangay. On June 11,
1997, respondent denied complainants motion for inhibition and after hearing Libo-ons motion for
permanent injunction, issued a second TRO to maintain the status quo between the contending parties.

Complainant argues that by issuing the second TRO, respondent reversed the order of the RTC. In his
Comment, respondent denied the allegations. With respect to his Order of June 11, 1997, respondent
explains that it was never meant to reverse the Order of the RTC of Silay City dated June 5, 1997. He points
out that both parties in Civil Case No. 703-M were present during the hearing after due notice. After receiving
their evidence, he found that unless a TRO was issued, Libo-on would suffer a grave injustice and irreparable
injury. He submits that absent fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, his acts, even if erroneous, are not the
subject of disciplinary action.

ISSUE

WOM injunction may be issued without hearing

RULING

No. Before an injunctive writ can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: (1)
there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act against which
injunction to be directed is a violation of such right. The onus probandi is on movant to show that there exists
a right to be protected, which is directly threatened by the act sought to be enjoined. Further, there must be
a showing that the invasion of the right is material and substantial and that there is an urgent and paramount
necessity for the writ to prevent a serious damage.

Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 20-95 provides:

2. The application for a TRO shall be acted upon only after all parties are heard in a summary
hearing conducted within twenty-four (24) hours after the records are transmitted to the branch
selected by raffle. The records shall be transmitted immediately after raffle (Emphasis supplied).

The foregoing clearly show that whenever an application for a TRO is filed, the court may act on the
application only after all parties have been notified and heard in a summary hearing. In other words, a
summary hearing may not be dispensed with. 9 In the instant case, respondent admits that he issued the
injunctive writ sought on May 29, 1997 after receiving the applicants evidence ex parte. His failure to abide
by Administrative Circular No. 20-95 in issuing the first TRO is grave abuse of authority, misconduct, and
conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice.
 3. Lagrosas vs. Bristo-Myers 565 SCRA

FACTS

Michael J. Lagrosas was employed by Bristol-Myers Squibb (Phil.), Inc./Mead Johnson Phil. from
January 6, 1997 until March 23, 2000 as Territory Manager in its Medical Sales Force Divisio n. Ma. Dulcinea S.
Lim, also a Territory Manager and Lagrosas’ former girlfriend, attended a district meeting of territory
managers at McDonald’s Alabang Town Center. There was an incident happened between Lagrosa and Lim
and upon learning of the incident, Bristol-Myers required Lagrosas to explain in writing why he should not be
dismissed for assaulting a co-employee outside of business hours. In the disciplinary hearing that followed, it
was established that Lagrosas and Lim had physical confrontations prior to the incident. But Lagrosas denied
saying that he might not be able to control himself and hurt Lim and her boyfriend if he sees them together.

Bristol-Myers dismissed Lagrosas effective immediately. Lagrosas then filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal, non-payment of vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th month pay, attorney’s fees, damages and fair
market value of his Team Share Stock Option Grant. Labor Arbiter Renaldo O. Hernandez rendered a Decision ,
declaring the dismissal illegal. Bristol-Myers moved to quash the writ of execution contending that it timely
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court gave due course to Bristol-Myers’
petition and issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining the enforcement of the writ of execution
and notices of garnishment. Upon the expiration of the TRO, the appellate court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction dated September 17, 2004. Bristol-Myers then moved to discharge and release the TRO cash bond.
It argued that since it has posted an injunction cash bond, the TRO cash bond should be legally discharged
and released. CA denied the motion as premature since the decision is not yet final and executory due to
Lagrosas’ appeal to this Court.

ISSUE

WON the Court of Appeals err in disallowing the discharge and release of the injunction cash bond

RULING

YES, the appellate court erred in disallowing the discharge and release of the injunction cash bond. It
is settled that the purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable
injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. The injunction
bond is intended as a security for damages in case it is finally decided that the injunction ought not to have
been granted, to protect the enjoined party against loss or damage by reason of the injunction, and the bond
is usually conditioned accordingly.

In this case, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
implementation of the writ of execution and notices of garnishment "pending final resolution of this case or
unless the writ is sooner lifted by the Court." Notably, the appellate court ruled that Lagrosas had no right to
the monetary awards granted by the labor arbiter and the NLRC, and that the implementation of the writ of
execution and notices of garnishment was properly enjoined. This in effect amounted to a finding that
Lagrosas did not sustain any damage by reason of the injunction. To reiterate, the injunction bond is intended
to protect Lagrosas against loss or damage by reason of the injunction only. Contrary to Lagrosas’ claim, it is
not a security for the judgment award by the labor arbiter.
 4. Jenosa vs. Deliarte 630 SCRA

FACTS

Some students of the University of San Agustin, among them petitioners Niño Carlo Jenosa, Patrick
Canto, Cyndy Apalisok, Clint Eduard Vargas, and Nonell Gregory Duro (petitioner students), were caught
engaging in hazing outside the school premises. Thereafter, dialogues and consultations were conducted
among the school authorities, the apprehended students and their parents. During the 28 November 2002
meeting, the parties agreed that, instead of the possibility of being charged and found guilty of hazing, the
students who participated in the hazing incident as initiators, including petitioner students, would just
transfer to another school, while those who participated as neophytes would be suspended for one month.
The parents of the apprehended students, including petitioners, affixed their signatures to the minutes of the
meeting to signify their conformity. In view of the agreement, the University did not anymore convene the
Committee on Student Discipline (COSD) to investigate the hazing incident.

On 5 December 2002, the parents of petitioner students (petitioner parents) sent a letter to the
University President urging him not to implement the 28 November 2002 agreement. According to petitioner
parents, the Principal, without convening the COSD, decided to order the immediate transfer of petitioner
students. Petitioners filed a complaint for injunction and damages with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29,
Iloilo City (trial court) docketed as Civil Case No. 03-27460. Petitioners assailed the Principal’s decision to
order the immediate transfer of petitioner students as a violation of their right to due process because the
COSD was not convened. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction and directed respondents to
admit petitioner students during the pendency of the case. The University filed a motion for reconsideration
but was denied then filed petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals which in turn reversed the decision of
the Regional Trial Court citing non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

WON the a writ of preliminary injuction may be issued

RULING

NO. Since injunction is the strong arm of equity, he who must apply for it must come with equity or
with clean hands. This is so because among the maxims of equity are (1) he who seeks equity must do equity,
and (2) he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. The latter is a frequently stated maxim which
is also expressed in the principle that he who has done inequity shall not have equity. It signifies that a
litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair
and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue.

Here, petitioners, having reneged on their agreement without any justifiable reason, come to court
with unclean hands. This Court may deny a litigant relief if his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and
dishonest as to the controversy in issue.
 5. Solid Builders v. China Bank 695 SCRA 04.03.13

FACTS

China Banking Corporation (CBC) granted several loans to Solid Builders, Inc. (SBI), which amounted
to ₱139,999,234.34, exclusive of interests and other charges. To secure the loans, Medina Foods Industries,
Inc. (MFII) executed in CBC’s favor several surety agreements and contracts of real estate mortgage over
parcels of land in the Loyola Grand Villas in Quezon City and New Cubao Central in Cainta, Rizal.
Subsequently, SBI proposed to CBC a scheme through which SBI would sell the mortgaged properties and
share the proceeds with CBC on a 50-50 basis until such time that the whole obligation would be fully paid.
SBI also proposed that there be partial releases of the certificates of title of the mortgaged properties
without the burden of updating interests on all loans. In a letter dated March 20, 2000 addressed to CBC, SBI
requested the restructuring of its loans, a reduction of interests and penalties and the implementation of a
dacion en pago of the New Cubao Central property.

On October 5, 2000, claiming that the interests, penalties and charges imposed by CBC were
iniquitous and unconscionable and to enjoin CBC from initiating foreclosure proceedings, SBI and MFII filed a
Complaint "To Compel Execution of Contract and for Performance and Damages, With Prayer for Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Ex-Parte Temporary Restraining Order." Trial Court issued an order granting the
application for writ of preliminary injunction. After hearing the parties, the trial court issued an Order dated
December 14, 2000 granting the application of SBI and MFII for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. The trial court held that SBI and MFII were able to sufficiently comply with the requisites for the
issuance of an injunctive writ. Aggrieved, CBC filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals where it
claimed that the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction were all issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. SBI and MFII file MR but then CA denied it in a resolution.

ISSUE

WON plaintiffs have the right to ask for an injunctive writ in order to prevent defendant bank from
taking over their properties.

RULING

NO. A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to judgment of final
order, requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It is a preservative
remedy to ensure the protection of a party’s substantive rights or interests pending the final judgment in the
principal action. A plea for an injunctive writ lies upon the existence of a claimed emergency or extraordinary
situation which should be avoided for otherwise, the outcome of a litigation would be useless as far as the
party applying for the writ is concerned

Neither has there been a showing of irreparable injury. An injury is considered irreparable if it is of
such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of
law, or where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy, that is,
it is not susceptible of mathematical computation. The provisional remedy of preliminary injunction may only
be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied
under any standard of compensation. In this case, foreclosure of mortgaged property is not an irreparable
damage that will merit for the debtor-mortgagor the extraordinary provisional remedy of preliminary
injunction.
 6. Plaza v. Lustiva 718 SCRA 03.05.14

FACTS

Vidal’s son and daughter-in-law, the petitioners, filed a Complaint for Injunction, Damages, Attorney’s
Fees with Prayer for the Issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order
against the respondents and the City Government of Butuan. They prayed that the respondents be enjoined
from unlawfully and illegally threatening to take possession of the subject property. According to the
petitioners, they acquired the land from Virginia Tuazon in 1997; Tuazon was the sole bidder and winner in a
tax delinquency sale conducted by the City of Butuan on December 27, 1996. In their answer, the
respondents pointed out that they were never delinquent in paying the land taxes and were in fact not aware
that their property had been offered for public auction. Moreover, Tuazon, being a government employee,
was disqualified to bid in the public auction, as stated in Section 89 of the Local Government Code of 1991.5
As Tuazon’s participation in the sale was void, she could have not transferred ownership to the petitioners.
Equally important, the petitioners merely falsified the property tax declaration by inserting the name of the
petitioners’ father, making him appear as a co-owner of the auctioned land. Armed with the falsified tax
declaration, the petitioners, as heirs of their father, fraudulently redeemed the land from Tuazon.
Nonetheless, there was nothing to redeem as the land was not sold. For these irregularities, the petitioners
had no right to the Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order prayed for against
them.

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan City, Branch 5, reconsidered its earlier order, denied the prayer
for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and ordered that the possession and occupation of the land be returned
to the respondents. Through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 65, the petitioners challenged the
RTC’s order before the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling and rejected the motion for reconsideration of
the petitioner. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

WON a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued

RULING

No. A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of an actual existing right
to be protected during the pendency of the principal action. Upon the dismissal of the main action, the
question of the non-issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction automatically died with it. A writ of
preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy; it is auxiliary, an adjunct of, and subject to the determination
of the main action. It is deemed lifted upon the dismissal of the main case, any appeal therefrom
notwithstanding.

As the lower courts correctly found, Tuazon had no ownership to confer to the petitioners despite
the latters reimbursement of Tuazons purchase expenses. Because they were never owners of the property,
the petitioners failed to establish entitlement to the writ of preliminary injunction.When the complainants
right or title is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of
injunctive relief is not proper. Likewise, upon the dismissal of the main case by the RTC on August 8, 2013,
the question of issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction has become moot and academic.
 7. Carpio -Morales vs. CA Binay, November 10,2015. G.R. No. 21726-27

FACTS

A complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before the
Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of the City Government
of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al), accusing them of Plunder and violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise
known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in connection with the five (5) phases of the
procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking Building). The
Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a fact-finding investigation, submit an
investigation report, and file the necessary complaint, if warranted (1st Special Panel). Pursuant to the
Ombudsman's directive, on March 5, 2015, the 1st Special Panel filed a complaint (OMB Complaint) against
Binay, Jr., et al, charging them with six (6) administrative case 17] for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty,
and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and six (6) criminal cases[18] for violation of
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases).

The Ombudsman’s argument against the CA’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main
petition, and her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is based on her interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or
the Ombudsman Act, which reads in full:

Section 14. Restrictions. – No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation
being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the
subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

The Ombudsman’s maintains that the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 textually prohibits courts
from extending provisional injunctive relief to delay any investigation conducted by her office. Despite the
usage of the general phrase “[n]o writ of injunction shall be issued by any court,” the Ombudsman herself
concedes that the prohibition does not cover the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

WON the CA gravely abused its jurisdiction in issuing the TRO and WPI in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453
against the preventive suspension order is a persisting objection to the validity of said injunctive writs

RULING

The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is a prohibition against any court (except the Supreme
Court) from issuing a writ of injunction to delay an investigation being conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman. Generally speaking, “[i]njunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is
ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy
for and as an incident in the main action.” Considering the textual qualifier “to delay,” which connotes a
suspension of an action while the main case remains pending, the “writ of injunction” mentioned in this
paragraph could only refer to injunctions of the provisional kind, consistent with the nature of a provisional
injunctive relief. The exception to the no injunction policy is when there is prima facie evidence that the
subject matter of the investigation is outside the office’s jurisdiction. The Office of the Ombudsman has
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies, with the exception only of impeachable officers, Members of Congress, and
the Judiciary. Nonetheless, the Ombudsman retains the power to investigate any serious misconduct in office
allegedly committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for
impeachment, if warranted. Note that the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over certain adminis
trative cases which are within the jurisdiction of the regular courts or administrative agencies, but has
primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or employee who is under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
 8. Noveco v. Lim 754 SCRA 111

FACTS

Respondents Maria Carmen J. Tuazon and Manuel V. Nieto, represented by their attorney-in-fact,
Lope Durotan (the respondents), filed complaints for forcible entry with damages against petitioners
Satumino Novecio, Gavino Novecio, Anastacio Golez, et al. (the petitioners). The respondents alleged that on
February 15, 2004, the petitioners, by force, intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth, unlawfully squatted
and took possession of several portions of land. The petitioners allegedly planted crops, erected makeshift
shelters, and continue to plant and /or improve the shelters as of the filing of the complaints for forcible
entry, all without the consent and/or against the will of the respondents.

The petitioners, on the other hand, contended that they have already been in possession of the land
for more than two years when the complaints were filed.1âwphi1 They maintained that they have planted
the land with com, durian, coconut, mango, jackfruit, rambutan, etc. for their livelihood. They also alleged
that they were harassed by some men armed with shotguns and pistols on February 12, 2004. The petitioners
further maintained that Manuel V. Nieto, father of Maria Carmen J. Tuazon, had previous landholding in the
area but the same was covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and so it was
subdivided in favor of the tenants.

The MTC resolved the forcible entry case in favor of Novecio et al but the RTC, upon Tuazon and
Nieto’s appeal, reversed the decision of the lower court. Novecio at al then filed a Petition for Review with
the Court of Appeals and filed an Extremely Urgent Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order against the execution of RTC’s order for ejectment. TRO
was issued for 60 days but the CA, without necessarily resolving the petition on the merits, held that the
Novecio et al werenot entitled to the relief for preliminary injunction. When their motion for reconsideration
was denied, Novecio et al imputed grave abuse of discretion on the CA in denying their prayer for injunction
pending resolution of the Petition for Review. They argued that there was pressing need for the CA to
prevent grave and irreparable injury to them considering that they have been in possession of the lot for
years and that the same has been their home as well as source of livelihood

ISSUE

WON the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it
denied the petitioners' prayer for preliminary injunction

RULING

YES. We find that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the injunctive relief
prayed for by the petitioners. A review of the records, however, shows that the CA ignored relevant facts that
would have justified the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Contrary to established jurisprudence, the CA
also denied the prayer for preliminary injunction without giving the factual and legal bases for such denial. In
a prayer for preliminary injunction, the plaintiff is not required to submit conclusive and complete evidence.
He is only required to show that he has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his complaint.25

In this case, the petitioners have adequately shown their entitlement to a preliminary injunction.
First, the relief demanded consists in restraining the execution of the RTC decision ordering their ejectment
from the disputed land. Second, their ejectment from the land from which they derive their source of
livelihood would work injustice to the petitioners. Finally, the execution of the RTC decision is probably in
violation of the rights of the petitioners, tending to render the MTC judgment dismissing the forcible cases
entry ineffectual.

Moreover, the court in granting or dismissing an application for a writ of preliminary injunction based
on the pleadings of the parties and their respective evidence must state in its order the findings and
conclusions based on the evidence and the law. This is to enable the appellate court to determine whether
the trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in resolving,
one way or the other, the plea for injunctive relief.
 9. Liberty Broadcasting Network vs Atlocom 760 SCRA 625

FACTS

Atlocom Wireless System, Inc. (Atlocom) is a grantee of a legislative franchise under R.A. No. 8605.4
On October 8, 2003, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued an Order in NTC for a
Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC), granting ATLOCOM WIRELESS SYSTEM, INC. a Provisional Authority
(PA) to install, operate and maintain a Multi-Point Multi-Channel Distribution System [MMDS] in METRO
MANILA, subject to the assignment of frequency by the Frequency Management Division of NTC. The PA shall
be valid for a period of eighteen (18)months, or until April 8, 2005. On April 5, 2004, Atlocom thru its counsel
requested for "an extension of the PA. On August 23, 2005, NTC issued Memorandum Circular No. (MC) 06-
08-200511 re-allocating the bands for broadband wireless access for fixed, nomadic and mobile networks

On December 9, 2010, the RTC, after due hearing, issued an Order denying Atlocom's application for
a writ of preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction. In a petition for certiorari filed before the CA,
Atlocom questioned the validity of the aforesaid orders of the RTC. The CA ruled in favor of Atlocom and
reversed the RTC's denial of application for preliminary injunction

On December 9, 2010, the RTC, after due hearing, issued an Order denying Atlocom's application for
a writ of preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction.In a petition for certiorari filed before the CA,
Atlocom questioned the validity of the aforesaid orders of the RTC. The CA ruled in favor of Atlocom and
reversed the RTC's denial of application for preliminary injunction

ISSUE

WON Atlocom complied with the requisites for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction

RULING

YES. The following requisites must be proved before a writ of preliminary injunction will issue: (1) The
applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is, a right in esse; (2) There is a
material and substantial invasion of such right; (3) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable
injury to the applicant; and ( 4) No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the
infliction of irreparable injury

In deciding whether to grant an injunction, a court must consider established principles of equity and
all the circumstances of the test for issuing an injunction is whether the facts show a necessity for the
intervention of equity in order to protect rights cognizable in equity. Here, there are factual and legal
justification for issuance of the writ of injunction. To reiterate to the point of being pedantic, petitioner's right
to its frequencies is covered by a provisional authority. The provisional authority was withdrawn by MC No.
06-08-2005 without the Respondent NTC acting on petitioner's plea for previous extensions. The propriety
for the issuance of MC No. 06-08-2005 is placed in issue on the ground of fairness. Petitioner as the rightful
grantee thereof has the right, in the meantime, to enjoin its implementation.

From the evidence on record, no clear, actual and existing right to the subject frequencies or to the
extension of PA had been shown by Atlocom. Accordingly, no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the
RTC in denying Atlocom's application for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the implementation of
MC 06-08-2005 insofar as the use of the re-allocated frequencies claimed by Atlocom. The CA thus seriously
erred in reversing the RTC and holding that Atlocom was entitled to injunctive relief due to alleged violation
of its right by the NTC
 10. Republic v. Cortez 769 SCRA 267

FACTS

Respondent Rev. Claudio R. Cortez, Sr. (Rev. Cortez), a missionary by vocation engaged in
humanitarian and charitable activities, established an orphanage and school in Punta Verde, Palaui Island,
San Vicente, Sta. Ana, Cagayan. He claimed that since 1962, he has been in peaceful possession of about 50
hectares of land located in the western portion of Palaui Island in Sitio Siwangag, Sta. Ana, Cagayan which he,
with the help of Aetas and other people under his care, cleared and developed for agricultural purposes in
order to support his charitable, humanitarian and missionary works.

Proclamation No. 201 was issued by President Marcos reserving for military purposes a parcel of the
public domain situated in Palaui Island. Pursuant thereto, 2,000 hectares of the southern half portion of the
Palaui Island were withdrawn from sale or settlement and reserved for the use of the Philippine Navy,
subject, however, to private rights if there be any. More than two decades later, President Ramos issued
Proc. 447 declaring Palaui Island and the surrounding waters situated in the Municipality of Sta. Ana, Cagayan
as marine reserve. Again subject to any private rights, the entire Palaui Island consisting of an aggregate area
of 7,415.48 hectares was accordingly reserved as a marine protected area.

Rev. Cortez filed a Petition for Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction against Rogelio C. Biñas. According to him, some members of the Philippine Navy, upon
orders of Biñas, disturbed his peaceful and lawful possession of the said 50-hectare portion of Palaui Island.
After the conduct of hearing on the application for preliminary mandatory injunction6 and the parties’
submission of their respective memoranda, the RTC issued an Order8 dated February 21, 2002 granting the
application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. However, the same pertained to five hectares
(subject area) only, not to the whole 50 hectares claimed to have been occupied by Rev. Cortez

ISSUE

WON Rev. Cortez is entitled to a final writ of mandatory injunction.

RULING

NO. Rev. Cortez is not entitled to a final writ of mandatory injunction. The Court finds that Rev.
Cortex failed to conclusively establish his claimed right over the subject portion of Palaui Island as would
entitle him to the issuance of a final injunction.

Two requisites must concur for injunction to issue: (1) there must be a right to be protected and (2)
the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right.” Thus, it is necessary that the
Court initially determine whether the right asserted by Rev. Cortez indeed exists. As earlier stressed, it is
necessary that such right must have been established by him with absolute certainty.

Here, the Court notes that while Rev. Cortez relies heavily on his asserted right of possession, he,
nevertheless, failed to show that the subject area over which he has a claim is not part of the public domain
and therefore can be the proper object of possession.
G.R. No. 135706             October 1, 2004

SPS. CESAR A. LARROBIS, JR. and VIRGINIA S. LARROBIS, petitioners,

vs.
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, respondent.

FACTS: petitioner spouses contracted a monetary loan with respondent Philippine Veterans Bank evidenced by a
promissory note and secured by a Real Estate Mortgage executed on their lot together with the improvements thereon.

The respondent bank went bankrupt and was placed under receivership/liquidation by the Central Bank from April 25, 1985
until August 1992.

On August 23, 1985, the bank, through Francisco Go, sent the spouses a demand letter for "accounts receivable. More than
fourteen years from the time the loan became due and demandable, respondent bank filed a petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage of petitioners’ property. the property was sold in a public auction

petitioners filed a complaint with the RTC, Cebu City, to declare the extra-judicial foreclosure and the subsequent sale
thereof to respondent bank null and void.

Respondent for its part asserts that: the period within which it was placed under receivership and liquidation was a
fortuitous event that interrupted the running of the prescriptive period for the foreclosure of petitioners’ mortgaged
property; within such period, it was specifically restrained and immobilized from doing business which includes foreclosure
proceedings

ISSUE: whether or not the period within which the bank was placed under receivership and liquidation was a fortuitous
event which suspended the running of the ten-year prescriptive period in bringing actions

RULING:No.Respondent’s claims are without merit.

While it is true that foreclosure falls within the broad definition of "doing business,"

it should not be considered included, however, in the acts prohibited whenever banks are "prohibited from doing business"
during receivership and liquidation proceedings

This is consistent with the purpose of receivership proceedings,  i.e., to receive collectibles and preserve the assets of the
bank in substitution of its former management, and prevent the dissipation of its assets to the detriment of the creditors of
the bank

When a bank is prohibited from continuing to do business by the Central Bank and a receiver is appointed for such bank,
that bank would not be able to do new business, i.e., to grant new  loans or to accept new  deposits. However, the receiver
of the bank is in fact obliged to collect debts owing to the bank, which debts form part of the assets of the bank.
The receiver must assemble the assets and pay the obligation of the bank under receivership, and take steps to
prevent dissipation of such assets. Accordingly, the receiver of the bank is obliged to collect pre-existing debts due
to the bank, and in connection therewith, to foreclose mortgages securing such debts
G.R. No. 203585               July 29, 2013

MILA CABOVERDE TANTANO and ROSELLER CABOVERDE, Petitioners,

vs.
DOMINALDA ESPINA-CABOVERDE, EVE CABOVERDE-YU, FE CABOVERDE-LABRADOR, and JOSEPHINE E.
CABOVERDE, Respondents.

FACTS: Petitioners and their siblings, are the registered owners and in possession of certain parcels of land, identified as
Lots 2, 3 and 4 located in Zamboanga del Norte, having purchased them from their parents, Maximo and Dominalda
Caboverde.

The present controversy started when respondents Eve and Fe filed a complaint before the RTC of Sindangan, Zamboanga
del Norte where they prayed for the annulment of the Deed of Sale purportedly transferring Lots 2, 3 and 4 from their
parents Maximo and Dominalda in favor of petitioners Mila and Roseller and their other siblings.

Fearing that the contested properties would be squandered, Dominalda filed with the a Verified Urgent Petition/Application
to place the controverted Lots 2, 3 and 4 under receivership . Mainly, she claimed that while she had a legal interest in the
controverted properties and their produce, she could not enjoy them, since the income derived was solely appropriated by
petitioner Mila in connivance with her selected kin.

The trial court issued a Resolution granting Dominalda’s application for receivership over Lot Nos. 2, 3 and 4

Petitioners filed an Urgent Precautionary Motion to Stay Assumption of Receivers expressing the view that the grant of
receivership is not warranted under the circumstances and is not consistent with applicable rules and jurisprudence

ISSUE: WON there is lack of factual or legal basis to place the properties under receivership because the applicant
presented support and medication as grounds in her application which are not valid grounds for receivership under the
rules.

RULING: Yes. There is lack of factual or legal basis to place the properties under receivership.

in granting applications for receivership on the basis of this section, courts must remain mindful of the basic principle that
receivership may be granted only when the circumstances so demand, either because the property sought to be placed in
the hands of a receiver is in danger of being lost or because they run the risk of being impaired, 17 and that being a drastic
and harsh remedy, receivership must be granted only when there is a clear showing of necessity for it in order to save the
plaintiff from grave and immediate loss or damage.

Before appointing a receiver, courts should consider: (1) whether or not the injury resulting from such appointment would
probably be greater than the injury ensuing if the status quo is left undisturbed; and (2) whether or not the appointment
will imperil the interest of others whose rights deserve as much a consideration from the court as those of the person
requesting for receivership.19

Dominalda’s alleged need for income to defray her medical expenses and support is not a valid justification for the
appointment of a receiver. The approval of an application for receivership merely on this ground is not only unwarranted
but also an arbitrary exercise of discretion because financial need and like reasons are not found in Sec. 1 of Rule 59 which
prescribes specific grounds or reasons for granting receivership. The RTC’s insistence that the approval of the receivership is
justified under Sec. 1(d) of Rule 59, which seems to be a catch-all provision, is far from convincing. To be clear, even in
cases falling under such provision, it is essential that there is a clear showing that there is imminent danger that the
properties sought to be placed under receivership will be lost, wasted or injured.there is no clear showing that the disputed
properties are in danger of being lost or materially impaired and that placing them under receivership is most convenient
and feasible means to preserve, administer or dispose of them.
G.R. No. 168332               June 19, 2009

ANA MARIA A. KORUGA, Petitioner,

vs.
TEODORO O. ARCENAS, JR., ALBERT C. AGUIRRE, CESAR S. PAGUIO, FRANCISCO A. RIVERA, and THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 169053               June 19, 2009

TEODORO O. ARCENAS, JR., ALBERT C. AGUIRRE, CESAR S. PAGUIO, and FRANCISCO A. RIVERA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR., Presiding Judge, Branch 138, Regional Trial Court of Makati City, and ANA MARIA A.
KORUGA, Respondents.

FACTS: Koruga is a minority stockholder of Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank. she filed a complaint before the
Makati RTC. Koruga’s Complaint charged defendants with violation of Sections 31 to 34 of the Corporation Code,
prohibiting self-dealing and conflict of interest of directors and officers; invoked her right to inspect the corporation’s
records under Sections 74 and 75 of the Corporation Code; and prayed for Receivership and Creation of a Management
Committee, pursuant to Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the Securities Regulation Code, the Interim Rules of
Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies, the General Banking Law of 2000, and the New Central Bank Act. She
accused the directors and officers of Banco Filipino of engaging in unsafe, unsound, and fraudulent banking practices, more
particularly, acts that violate the prohibition on self-dealing.

Arcenas, et al. filed their Answer raising, among others, the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case;
that there is another case involving the same parties for the same cause pending before the Monetary Board of the BSP,
and this constituted forum-shopping; and that jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is vested by law in the BSP.

ISSUE:WON the RTC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case.

RULING:No. it is the BSP that has jurisdiction over the case

It is clear that the acts complained of pertain to the conduct of Banco Filipino’s banking business

The New Central Bank Act vests in the BSP the supervision over operations and activities of banks. It is well-settled in both
law and jurisprudence that the Central Monetary Authority, through the Monetary Board, is vested with exclusive authority
to assess, evaluate and determine the condition of any bank, and finding such condition to be one of insolvency, or that its
continuance in business would involve a probable loss to its depositors or creditors, forbid bank or non-bank financial
institution to do business in the Philippines; and shall designate an official of the BSP or other competent person as receiver
to immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities.

It is the Monetary Board that exercises exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings for receivership of banks . Crystal clear in
Section 30 is the provision that says the "appointment of a receiver under this section shall be vested exclusively with the
Monetary Board." The term "exclusively" connotes that only the Monetary Board can resolve the issue of whether a bank is
to be placed under receivership and, upon an affirmative finding, it also has authority to appoint a receiver. This is further
affirmed by the fact that the law allows the Monetary Board to take action "summarily and without need for prior hearing."
G.R. No. 174356               January 20, 2010

EVELINA G. CHAVEZ and AIDA CHAVEZ-DELES, Petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ATTY. FIDELA Y. VARGAS, Respondents.

FACTS: Respondent Fidela owned a five-hectare land in Sorsogon. Petitioner Evelina had been staying in a remote portion
of the land with her family, planting and supervising the harvest of coconut and palay. Fidela and Evelina agreed to divide
the gross sales of all products from the land between themselves. Since Fidela was busy with her law practice, Evelina
undertook to hold in trust for Fidela her half of the profits.

But Fidela claimed that Evelina had failed to remit her share of the profits and, despite demand to turn over the
administration of the property to Fidela, had refused to do so. Consequently, Fidela filed a complaint against Evelina for
recovery of possession, rent, and damages with prayer for the immediate appointment of a receiver before the RTC of
Bulan, Sorsogon. In their answer, Evelina and Aida claimed that the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case since it actually involved an agrarian dispute.

After hearing, the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

Fidela appealed to the CA. She also filed with that court a motion for the appointment of a receiver . the CA granted the
motion and ordained receivership of the land, Fidela also filed three estafa cases with the RTC of Olongapo City and a
complaint for dispossession with the DARAB against Evelina and Aida. In all these cases, Fidela asked for the immediate
appointment of a receiver for the property

ISSUE:1 Whether or not respondent Fidela is guilty of forum shopping considering that she had earlier filed identical
applications for receivership over the subject properties in the criminal cases

2.Whether or not the CA erred in granting respondent Fidela’s application for receivership.

RULING:1. No. respondent Fidela is not guilty of forum shopping

The various suits Fidela initiated against Evelina and Aida involved different causes of action and sought different reliefs .
The above cases are similar only in that they involved the same parties and Fidela sought the placing of the properties
under receivership in all of them. But receivership is not an action. It is but an auxiliary remedy, a mere incident of the suit
to help achieve its purpose. Consequently, it cannot be said that the grant of receivership in one case will amount
to res judicata on the merits of the other cases. The grant or denial of this provisional remedy will still depend on the need
for it in the particular action.

2.Yes. the CA erred in granting receivership over the property in dispute in this case. For one thing, a petition for
receivership under Section 1(b), Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the property or fund subject of the
action is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured, necessitating its protection or preservation. Its object is the
prevention of imminent danger to the property. If the action does not require such protection or preservation, the remedy
is not receivership
G.R. No. 111080             April 5, 2000

JOSE S. OROSA and MARTHA P. OROSA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FCP CREDIT CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS: FCP Credit Corporation filed a complaint for replevin and damages in the Regional Trial Court of Manila against
petitioner Jose S. Orosa and one John Doe to recover possession of a 1983 Ford Laser 1.5 Sedan., FCP Credit Corporation
demanded from petitioner payment and to surrender the vehicle.

The lower court dismissed private respondent's complaint ordering private respondent's surety, Stronghold Insurance Co.,
Inc. to jointly and severally return to petitioner the 1983 Ford Laser 1.5 Sedan or its, equivalent in kind or in cash and to pay
the damages.

The trial court ruled that private respondent FCP had no reason to file the present action since petitioner already paid the
installments for the months of July to November 1984, which are the sole bases of the complaint

The surety company filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari to annul the Order of the trial court.CA ruled
that the trial court erred when it ordered private respondent to return the subject car or its equivalent

ISSUE:WON the RTC erred when it ordered private respondent to return the subject car or its equivalent

RULING: Yes. The RTC erred.

The SC aggreed with the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred when it ordered private respondent to return the
subject car or its equivalent considering that petitioner had not yet fully paid the purchase price. Verily, to sustain the trial
court's decision would amount to unjust enrichment. The Court of Appeals was correct when it instead ordered private
respondent to return, not the car itself, but only the amount equivalent to the fourteen installments actually paid with
interest. 
.R. No. 148132             January 28, 2008

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
REGINA M. ASTORGA, respondent.

x---------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 151079             January 28, 2008

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
REGINA M. ASTORGA, respondent.

x---------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 151372             January 28, 2008

REGINA M. ASTORGA, petitioner,
vs.
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. and ANN MARGARET V. SANTIAGO, respondents.

FACTS: Astorga was employed by respondent SMART. As District Sales Manager, Astorga enjoyed additional benefits which
includes, among others, a car plan. SMART launched an organizational realignment to achieve more efficient operations, as
a result, Corporate Sales Marketing Group/ Fixed Services Division (CSMG/FSD) where Astorga worked was abolished.
Despite the abolition of the CSMG/FSD, Astorga continued reporting for work. SMART issued a memorandum advising
Astorga of the termination of her employment on ground of redundancy

SMART sent a letter to Astorga demanding that she pay the current market value of the Honda Civic Sedan which was
given to her under the company’s car plan program, or to surrender the same to the company for proper disposition.
Astorga, however, failed and refused to do either, thus prompting SMART to file a suit for replevin with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati (RTC).

Astorga moved to dismiss the complaint and posited that the regular courts have no jurisdiction over the complaint
because the subject thereof pertains to a benefit arising from an employment contract; hence, jurisdiction over the same is
vested in the labor tribunal and not in regular courts.

ISSUE:WON RTC has jurisdiction over the replevin suit

RULING:Yes. The RTC has jurisdiction

The RTC rightfully assumed jurisdiction over the suit and acted well within its discretion in denying Astorga’s motion to
dismiss. SMART’s demand for payment of the market value of the car or, in the alternative, the surrender of the car, is not a
labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves the relationship of debtor and creditor rather than employee-employer relations. As
such, the dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts

Replevin is a possessory action, the gist of which is the right of possession in the plaintiff. The primary relief sought therein
is the return of the property in specie wrongfully detained by another person. It is an ordinary statutory proceeding to
adjudicate rights to the title or possession of personal property. The question of whether or not a party has the right of
possession over the property involved and if so, whether or not the adverse party has wrongfully taken and detained said
property as to require its return to plaintiff, is outside the pale of competence of a labor tribunal and beyond the field of
specialization of Labor Arbiters
A.M. No. P-07-2384             June 18, 2008

KENNETH HAO, complainant,
vs.
ABE C. ANDRES, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Davao City, respondent.

FACTS: Complainant Hao is one of the defendants in a civil case for replevin  entitled "Zenaida Silver, doing trade and
business under the name and style ZHS Commercial v. Loreto Hao, Atty. Amado Cantos, Kenneth Hao and John Does,"
pending before the RTC of Davao City,

Judge Fuentes3 issued an Order of Seizure against 22 motor vehicles allegedly owned by the complainant. On the strength
of the said order, Andres was able to seize a total of nine motor vehicles.

In his Affidavit-Complaint against Andres before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Hao alleged that Andres gave
undue advantage to Zenaida Silver in the implementation of the order and that Andres seized the nine motor vehicles in an
oppressive manner.

in view of the approval of the complainant’s counter-replevin bond, Judge Emmanuel C. Carpio  ordered Andres to
immediately cease and desist from further implementing the order of seizure, and to return the seized motor vehicles
including its accessories to their lawful owners.

However, eight of the nine seized motor vehicles were reported missing

ISSUE:WON Sheriff Andres is guilty of gross negligence for the improper execution of the writ of replevin

RULING: yes. Andres failed to live up to the standards required of his position

The rules provide that property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered immediately to the plaintiff.  In
accordance with the said rules, Andres should have waited no less than five days in order to give the complainant an
opportunity to object to the sufficiency of the bond or of the surety or sureties thereon, or require the return of the seized
motor vehicles by filing a counter-bond. This, he failed to do. there is no question that Silver was already in possession of
the nine seized vehicles immediately after seizure, or no more than three days after the taking of the vehicles. Thus, Andres
committed a clear violation of Section 6, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court with regard to the proper disposal of the property.

The rule is clear that the property seized should not be immediately delivered to the plaintiff, and the sheriff must retain
custody of the seized property for at least five days. Hence, the act of Andres in delivering the seized vehicles immediately
after seizure to Silver for whatever purpose, without observing the five-day requirement finds no legal justification.

the purpose of the five (5) days is to give a chance to the defendant to object to the sufficiency of the bond or the
surety or sureties thereon or require the return of the property by filing a counterbond.
G.R. No. 153788               November 27, 2009

ROGER V. NAVARRO, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City, and KAREN T. GO, doing business
under the name KARGO ENTERPRISES, Respondents.

FACTS: respondent Karen T. Go filed two complaints, dbefore the RTC for replevin and/or sum of money with damages
against Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go prayed that the RTC issue writs of replevin for the seizure of two (2) motor
vehicles in Navarro’s possession. The motor vehicles were leased by Navarro from Go.

Even assuming the complaints stated a cause of action against him, Navarro maintains that the complaints were premature
because no prior demand was made on him to comply with the provisions of the lease agreements before the complaints
for replevin were filed.

Navarro posits that since the two writs of replevin were issued based on flawed complaints, the vehicles were illegally
seized from his possession and should be returned to him immediately.

ISSUE:WON the applicant has to make a prior demand on the possessor of the property before he can file an action for a
writ of replevin

RULING:No. prior demand is not required.

For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must do is to file an affidavit and bond, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 60 of
the Rules, which states:

Sec. 2. Affidavit and bond.

The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows the facts:

(a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the
possession thereof;

(b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party, alleging the cause of detention thereof
according to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief;

(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or seized
under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed under custodia legis, or if so seized, that it
is exempt from such seizure or custody; and

(d) The actual market value of the property.

There is nothing in these provisions which requires the applicant to make a prior demand on the possessor of the property
before he can file an action for a writ of replevin. Thus, prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of
replevin.
G.R. No. 182963               June 3, 2013

SPOUSES DEO AGNER and MARICON AGNER, Petitioners,

vs.
BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC., Respondent.

FACTS: spouses Agner executed a Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage in favor of Citimotors, Inc. The contract provides,
among others, that the loan is secured by a 2001 Mitsubishi Adventure Super Sport.

On the same day, Citimotors, Inc. assigned all its rights, title and interests in the Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage to
ABN AMRO Savings Bank, Inc. (ABN AMRO), which, likewise assigned the same to respondent BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. 5

For failure to pay four successive installments, respondent, through counsel, sent to petitioners a demand letter declaring
the entire obligation as due and demandable and requiring to pay Php576,664.04, or surrender the mortgaged vehicle
immediately upon receiving the letter As the demand was left unheeded, respondent filed on October 4, 2002 an action for
Replevin and Damages before the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC).

A writ of replevin was issued. Despite this, the subject vehicle was not seized. 8 Trial on the merits ensued. The Manila RTC
ruled for the respondent and ordered petitioners to jointly and severally pay

petitioners argue that: 1) petitioners cannot be considered to have defaulted in payment for lack of competent proof that
they received the demand letter; and (2) respondent’s remedy of resorting to both actions of replevin and collection of sum
of money is contrary to the provision of Article 1484 of the Civil Code and the Elisco Tool Manufacturing Corporation v.
Court of Appealsruling.

ISSUE:1. WON prior demand is required. 2.WON there is violation of Article 1484 of the Civil Code and the Court’s decision
in Elisco Tool Manufacturing Corporation v. Court of Appeals. 26

RULING:

1. the Court ruled in Navarro v. Escobido 15 that prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin,
since there is nothing in Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court that requires the applicant to make a demand on the
possessor of the property before an action for a writ of replevin could be filed.

2. there is no violation of Article 1484 of the Civil Code and the Court’s decision in Elisco Tool Manufacturing Corporation v.
Court of Appeals.26

The remedies provided for in Art. 1484 are alternative, not cumulative. The exercise of one bars the exercise of the others.
This limitation applies to contracts purporting to be leases of personal property with option to buy by virtue of Art. 1485.
The condition that the lessor has deprived the lessee of possession or enjoyment of the thing for the purpose of applying
Art. 1485 was fulfilled in this case by the filing by petitioner of the complaint for replevin to recover possession of movable
property

Compared with Elisco, the vehicle subject matter of this case was never recovered and delivered to respondent despite the
issuance of a writ of replevin. As there was no seizure that transpired, it cannot be said that petitioners were deprived of the
use and enjoyment of the mortgaged vehicle or that respondent pursued, commenced or concluded its actual foreclosure.
The trial court, therefore, rightfully granted the alternative prayer for sum of money, which is equivalent to the remedy of
"exacting fulfillment of the obligation." Certainly, there is no double recovery or unjust enrichmentto speak of
 DE ASIS V. CA

FACTS:

Vircel D. Andres, (the herein private respondent) in her capacity as the legal guardian of the
minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action for maintenance and support against Manuel de
Asis, alleging that the defendant Manuel de Asis (the petitioner here) is the father of subject minor
Glen Camil Andres de Asis, and the former refused and/or failed to provide for the maintenance of
the latter, despite repeated demands.Petitioner denied the paternity of the minor. Therafter, Vircel
Andres sent in a manifestation withdrawing the complaint filed against petitioner. By virtue of the
said manifestation, both the plaintiff and the defendant agreed to move for the dismissal of the case.

Another complaint was filed in the name of Glen Camil Andres De Asis against petitioner.
The latter moved to dismiss the case on the ground of res judicata. However, the trial court. Petitioner
further filed a petition for certiorari which was also denied.

ISSUE:

WON the trial court is correct in denying the motion to dismiss.

RULING:

The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person. Article 301 of
the Civil Code, the law in point, reads:

Art. 301. The right to receive support cannot be renounced, nor can it be transmitted to a third person.
Neither can it be compensated with what the recipient owes the obligor. . . .

Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject of a compromise.

The raison d' etre behind the proscription against renunciation, transmission and/or compromise of

the right to support is stated, thus:

The right to support being founded upon the need of the recipient to maintain his existence, he is not
entitled to renounce or transfer the right for this would mean sanctioning the voluntary giving up of
life itself. The right to life cannot be renounce; hence, support which is the means to attain the former,
cannot be renounced.
 PP vs. MANAHAN

FACTS;

Complainant Teresita Tibigar, 16 years old, Teresita filed a criminal complaint accusing
Manuel Manahan alias Maning of rape. Teresita worked at the Espiritu Canteen where the accused
together with his family was temporarily residing. Teresita alleged that Manahan raped her and gave
birth to a healthy baby girl

Manuel Manahan was found guilty of rape and sentenced to death by the court a quo. He was also
ordered to indemnify the victim P50,000.00 as moral damages, pay the costs, and acknowledge and
support the offspring of his indiscretion.

ISSUE: WON the order of acknowledgment and support is poper?

RULING:

On the matter of acknowledgment and support of the child, a correction of the view of the
court a quo is in order. Article 345 of The Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of rape
shall also be sentenced to "acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from doing
so," and "in every case to support the offspring." In the case before us, compulsory acknowledgment
of the child Melanie Tibigar is not proper there being a legal impediment in doing so as it appears that
the accused is a married man. As pronounced by this Court in People v. Guerrero, "the rule is that if
the rapist is a married man, he cannot be compelled to recognize the offspring of the crime, should
there be any, as his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate." Consequently, that portion of the
judgment under review is accordingly deleted. In any case, we sustain that part ordering the accused
to support the child as it is in accordance with law.||| 
 LIM V. LIM

FACTS:

Spouses Cheryl S. Lim and Edward Lim together with their three children resided at the house of
edward’s ailing grandmother and her husband Mariano Lim. Cheryl abandoned the said residence,
bringing the children with her, adter violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-
house midwife in ‘a very compromising situation”

Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano (defendants)
in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140 (trial court) for support.||| The RTC ordered
Edward and petitioners to support the respondents.

Petitioners appealed to the CA which affirmed the trial court.

ISSUE:

WON trial is correct in ordering petitioners jointly liable with Edward?

RULING:

While parental authority under Title IX (and the correlative parental rights) pertains to parents,
passing to ascendants only upon its termination or suspension, the obligation to provide legal support
passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the parents but also for the latter's inability to
provide sufficient support.

Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation to provide sufficient legal
support to her children, then all school-bound. It is also undisputed that the amount of support
Edward is able to give to respondents, P6,000 a month, is insufficient to meet respondents' basic
needs. This inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts a portion of
their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and
maternal 19 lines, following the ordering in Article 199. To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to
petitioners' theory, is to sanction the anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme material deprivation of
children because of parental inability to give adequate support even if ascendants one degree removed
are more than able to fill the void.||| 
 GOTARDO v. BULING

FACTS:

Respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, for

compulsory recognition and support pendente lite, claiming that the petitioner is the
father of her child Gliffze Evidence showed that Divina met Gotardo at the PCIB and they
||.

became sweethearts. Thereafter the petitioner started intimate sexual relations with the respondent
and then the latter got pregnant. They were already planning their wedding however petitioner did
not show up and failed to provide support to Gliffze. During the pendency of the case, the RTC, on
the respondent’s motion, granted P2,000 monthly child support

The RTC dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence proving Gliffze’s filiation. Respondent
appealed to the CA which departed from the RTC’s appreciation and ordered the reinstitution of the
monthly child support. When the CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the petitioner
filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA committed a reversible error when it set aside the RTC's findings and ordered the
petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to his minor son Gliffze.

RULING:

Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to
support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. 45 Support consists of everything indispensable
for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with
the financial capacity of the family. 46 Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for this reason, no
final judgment on the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to the resources
or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased
proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the
resources or means of the person obliged to support.
 LIM LUA V LUA

FACTS:

Petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with
respondent Danilo Y. Lua||| with a prayer for support pendent lite for herself and her two children.
Petitioner sought the amount of P500,000.00 as monthly support, citing respondent's huge earnings
from salaries and dividends in several companies and businesses here and abroad.|||

The trial court ordered the amount Two Hundred Fifty (P250,000.00) Thousand Pesos would be
sufficient to take care of the needs of the plaintiff. This amount excludes the One hundred thirty-five
(P135,000.00) Thousand Pesos for medical attendance expenses needed by plaintiff. Danilo filed a
motion for reconsideration but the trial court ruled that the order had become final and executory.The
resppndent was given 10 days to show cause why he should not be held in contempt.

Thereafter, Danilo filed a petition for certiorari in the CA which decreed to pay Susan a monthly
support pendent lite of P115,000.00.Neither the parties appealed the said decision.

Respondent attached a copy of a check he issued in the amount of P162,651.90 payable to petitioner.
Respondent explained that, as decreed in the CA decision, he deducted from the amount of support in
arrears the advances given by him to his children and petitioner in the sum of P2,482,348.16

Since respondent still failed and refused to pay the support in arrears pendente lite, petitioner filed in
the CA a Petition for Contempt of Court with Damages which was dismissed.

ISSUE:

Whether certain expenses already incurred by the respondent may be deducted from the total support
in arrears owing to petitioner and her children

RULING:

The general rule is to the effect that when a father is required by a divorce decree to pay to the mother
money for the support of their dependent children and the unpaid and accrued installments become
judgments in her favor, he cannot, as a matter of law, claim credit on account of payments voluntarily
made directly to the children.||| 

Here, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by respondent to be credited against
the accrued support pendente lite. As earlier mentioned, the monthly support pendente lite granted by
the trial court was intended primarily for food, household expenses such as salaries of drivers and
house helpers, and also petitioner's scoliosis therapy sessions. Hence, the value of two expensive cars
bought by respondent for his children plus their maintenance cost, travel expenses of petitioner and
Angelli, purchases through credit card of items other than groceries and dry goods (clothing) should
have been disallowed, as these bear no relation to the judgment awarding support pendente lite.||| 
 REPUBLIC V. YAHON

FACTS:

Daisy R. Yahon (respondent) filed a petition for the issuance of protection order under the provisions
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, 3 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act of 2004," against her husband, S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon (S/Sgt. Yahon), an
enlisted personnel of the Philippine Army who retired in January 2006.

The RTC issued the TPO and ordered Charles to provide Daisy a reasonable financial spousal
support. The RTC directed the agencies to withhold any retirement pension and other benefits of
Charles. Because of the failure of Charles to comply with the said TPO, the RTC granted the petition
and directed Charles to give to Daisy 50% of whatever retirement benefits and other claims.

Petitioner, AFPFC, argues that it cannot comply with the RTC's directive for the automatic deduction
of 50% from S/Sgt. Yahon's retirement benefits and pension to be given directly to respondent, as it
contravenes an explicit mandate under the law governing the retirement and separation of military
personnel.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner military institution may be ordered to automatically deduct a percentage from the
retirement benefits of its enlisted personnel, and to give the same directly to the latter's lawful wife as
spousal support in compliance with a protection order issued by the RTC pursuant to R.A. No.
9262||| 

RULING:

It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later
enactment must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative will.  Statutes must be so
construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. However,
if several laws cannot be harmonized, the earlier statute must yield to the later enactment. The later
law is the latest expression of the legislative will.

The court ruled that Section 8 (g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later enactment, should be construed as
laying down an exception to the general rule above-stated that retirement benefits are exempt from
execution. The law itself declares that the court shall order the withholding of a percentage of the
income or salary of the respondent by the employer, which shall be automatically remitted directly to
the woman "[n]otwithstanding other laws to the contrary."
 SALAS V. MATUSALEM

FACTS:

Annabelle Matusalem (respondent) filed a complaint  for Support/Damages against

Narciso Salas (petitioner) in the Regional Trial Court. Respondent claimed that petitioner is the father
of her son Christian Paulo Salas. Respondent thus prayed for support pendente lite and monthly
support in the amount of P20,000.00. Petitioner denied paternity of the child Christian Paulo; he was
motivated by no other reason except genuine altruism when he agreed to shoulder the expenses for
the delivery of said child, unaware of respondent's chicanery and deceit designed to "scandalize" him
in exchange for financial favor. At the trial, respondent and her witness Grace Murillo testified.
Petitioner was declared to have waived his right to present evidence and the case was considered
submitted for decision based on respondent's evidence. Murillo corroborated respondent's testimony
as to the payment by petitioner of apartment rental, his weekly visits to respondent and financial
support to her. the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent. Petitioner appealed to the
CA but it was dismissed.

ISSUE:

WON the CA is correct in dismissing the case

RULING:

In sum, we hold that the testimonies of respondent and Murillo, by themselves are not competent
proof of paternity and the totality of respondent's evidence failed to establish Christian Paulo's
filiation to petitioner.

Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity
and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an
irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is
established by clear and convincing evidence. 
 DEL SOCORRO V. VAN WILSEM

FACTS:

Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted

marriage in Holland and were blessed with a son. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July
19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. According to
petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support but failed to do so. Petitioner,
through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from respondent. However, respondent
refused to receive the letter. Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint
affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5,
paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with
petitioner. The RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order, dismissing the instant criminal case
against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense
with respect to the respondent who is an alien. Hence, the present petition

ISSUE:

Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law

RULING:

Foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the
citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law,
or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of
Laws.

Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent's obligation to
support his child nor penalize the non-compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable
in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support
when the latter is entitled thereto.

We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support his
former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis