UNIVERSITY OF CEBU- COLLEGE OF LAW

BANILAD, CEBU CITY

BASIC LEGAL ETHICS

CASE DISGEST AND SYNTHESIS ON ADMINISTRATIVE CASES INVOLVING

JUDGES

Submitted by:
LORENZ MOISES ENRICK BINGHAY

Submitted to:
ATTY. CARLO VINCENT GIMENA
CASE LIST:
1. Madeline Yap v. Hon. Hannibal R. Patrick
2. Bernadita Antirapoda v. Francisco A. Ante, Jr.
3. Office of the Court Administrator v. Presiding Judge Norman Pamintuan
4. Alfredo Favor v. Judge Cesar O. Untulan
5. Zenaida Silver and Nelson Salcedo v. Judge Trabajo Daray
CASE DIGEST
1. MADELINE TAN-YAP, COMPLAINANT, v. HON. HANNIBAL R.
PATRICK), PRESIDING JUDGE, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT
(MCTC), PRESIDENT ROXAS-PILAR, CAPIZ, RESPONDENT.
A.M. No. MTJ-19-1925, June 03, 2019
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 17-2937-MTJ)

FACTS:
This administrative complaint stemmed from a Complaint for Recovery of
Possession and Damages filed by Nemesio Tan (Tan), father of complainant
Madeline Tan-Yap (complainant), against Robenson Benigla (Benigla), father-in-
law of respondent Judge Hannibal R. Patricio, docketed as Civil Case No. V-09-
11 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Capiz.
Complainant alleged that, pursuant to the said court-approved
compromise agreement, the trial court issued an order directing a private
surveying company to conduct a relocation survey on Lot Nos. 703 and 706.
After the survey was done, it was found that the cockpit lay inside Lot No. 706.
Benigla, however, questioned this finding claiming that the private surveyor who
conducted the survey was not a licensed geodetic engineer. He, thus, asked the
trial court to designate a surveyor from the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources. This motion was, however, denied, as well as the motion for
reconsideration. Aggrieved, Benigla filed a certiorari petition before the Court of
Appeals (CA). However, the CA did not grant Benigla's prayer for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order; thus, complainant filed a Motion for Execution of
the Judgment which was granted by the trial court. Accordingly, a Writ of
Execution was issued on February 6, 2015 and, together with a Demand for
Compliance/Delivery of Possession, the same was served upon Benigla on
February 26, 2015.

In his Report of March 13, 2015, Sheriff Alvarez mentioned that during the
confrontation with respondent judge, a host of motorcycle-riding men started
going back and forth in the premises. This fact, coupled by respondent judge's
statement that "kung padayonon nyo, basi maghinagamo" (if you continue with
the implementation, something untoward might happen), impressed upon Sheriff
Alvarez and his companions that their security was at risk; hence, they decided
to just leave the place.

After this, respondent judge's wife, Ruby, filed with the RTC a Motion to Intervene
and Opposition to the Implementation of the Writ of Execution and Issuance of
Writ of Demolition3 dated March 16, 2015. In the filing of this motion, Ruby was
assisted by respondent judge himself, who affixed his signature above the
printed name "JUDGE HANNIBAL R. PATRICIO" on page three of the said
motion.

Complainant contended that respondent judge violated the New Code of

Judicial Conduct: (1) when he unduly intervened in the implementation of the writ
of execution; (2) when he threatened Sheriff Alvarez and the latter's companions
and stopped them from carrying out the writ of execution; (3) when he assisted
his wife Ruby in filing a motion to intervene in Civil Case No. V-09-11; and (4)
when he abandoned his work station on the day of the supposed implementation
of the writ of execution.

In the respondent Judge defense, he denied that he threatened to stop

Sheriff Alvarez from implementing the writ of execution; that all he did was to
engage Sheriff Alvarez in a conversation, that is, by "telling, arguing, and asking
the sheriff to afford him and his wife the time (until Friday or March 13, 2015) for
him and his wife to be able to file the proper manifestation in court with respect to
their rights over Lot No. 707, Pilar Cadastre, that would be affected or
encroached upon by the relocation and fencing of Lot Nos. 706 and 703 x x
x".6 Respondent judge claimed that Sheriff Alvarez in fact did not mention in his
report that he (respondent judge) threatened Sheriff Alvarez or would have
inflicted bodily harm upon him; that he even assured Sheriff Alvarez that, should
it be confirmed that no encroachment would result from the fencing of Lot Nos.
703 and 706, he himself (respondent judge) would help in putting up said fence;
that his statement that "trouble might ensue should Sheriff Alvarez proceed with
the implementation'' was not synonymous with the use of brute force. In fine,
respondent judge insisted that he was only trying to protect his and his wife's
proprietary rights, and that he never acted beyond the bounds of the law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Presiding Judge violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct

RULING:

Yes. The Respondent Judge violated Canon 2, Sections 1 and 2, and

Canon 4, Sections 1 and 2, of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary.

While it may be true that respondent judge did not employ actual force in
its literal sense when he stopped the implementation of the writ of execution, the
threats he uttered (that something untoward might happen if the writ of execution
were carried out) effectively prevented or stopped the carrying out of the writ of
execution. It has been held that: "Such threat of violence is absolutely
unbecoming [of] a judge who is expected to display proper decorum."It bears
stressing that a judge "must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost
sobriety and self-restraint. He should choose his words and exercise more
caution and control in expressing himself. In other words, a judge should possess
the virtue of gravitas which means that a magistrate should not descend to the
level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide
remarks and sarcastic comments. He is required to always be temperate, patient
and courteous, both in conduct and in language." Likewise, as a holder of a
judicial office that commands respect, respondent judge should accord respect to
another officer of the court, a sheriff who is implementing a writ of execution.
 Certainly, a judge who falls short of the ethics of the judicial office tends to
diminish the people's respect for the law and legal processes. He also fails to
observe and maintain the esteem due to the courts and to judicial officers.

2. BERNARDITA F. ANTIPORDA, Complainant, v. FRANCISCO A. ANTE,

JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES,
VIGAN, CITY, ILOCOS SUR, Respondent

A.M. No. MTJ-18-1908, January 16, 2018

(Formerly OCA IPI No. 14-2674-MTJ)

FACTS:

This administrative case arose from a verified complaint for grave

misconduct filed by complainant Bernardita F. Antiporda (complainant) against
respondent Judge Francisco A. Ante, Jr.

Complainant alleged that between 7:30 and 8:00 in the morning of March
2, 2014, she was in the backyard of a house located at Rizal St., Barangay III,
Vigan City, Ilocos Sur, when respondent, who was in the adjacent lot attending to
his fighting cocks, suddenly confronted her by saying, "Apay nga agkuskusilap
ka? (Why are you glaring/pouting at me?)" Then, he approached her, slapped her
face several times, and whipped her with a dog chain. He also pointed a .45
caliber pistol at complainant, as well as her boarders and workers Clarinda Ridao
(Ridao), Rosario Rabe (Rabe), and Pedro Alquiza (Alquiza), who witnessed the
incident.

In defense, respondent claimed that it was complainant who attempted to

kill him by ordering Alquiza and two (2) others to attack him with bolos. He
denied that he slapped and whipped her with a dog chain, averring instead that it
was she who struck him with a steel chain. He also maintained that complainant
harbored a grudge against him for having reported her illegal house renovation to
the Engineering Department of the City Hall of Vigan. Although complainant
indeed secured a building permit therefor, she did so only after the renovation
was completed. To support the respondent’s claim he attached an affidavit.

Later on November 11, 2014, complainant sought dismissal of the

administrative complaint against the respondent in order to “restore the good
relationship existing” between the complainant and the respondent.

However, on a memorandum dated May 15, 2019, The OCA denied

complainant’s request as mere desistance or recantation of a complaint in an
administrative complaint against any member of the bench does not necessarily
mean the dismissal thereof.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Judge is administratively liable.

RULING:

A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve

the dignity, independence and respect for himself/herself, the Court, and the
Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of
utmost sobriety and self-restraint. He should choose his words and exercise
more caution and control in expressing himself. In other words, a judge should
possess the virtue of gravitas. Judges are required to always be temperate,
patient, and courteous, both in conduct and in language.
In this case, it is found that the respondent’s behaviour towards the
complainant amounted to a conduct that the Court cannot countenance.
Respondent's acts, therefore, constitute grave misconduct, which the Court
defines as "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Francisco A. Ante, Jr. is
found GUILTY of Grave Misconduct. Accordingly, considering respondent's
retirement on November 7, 2017, his retirement benefits are
hereby FORFEITED, except accrued leave credits. He is
further DISQUALIFIED from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.

3. EN BANC PRESIDING JUDGES TOMAS EDUARDO B. MADDELA III

AND MERINNISA O. LIGAYA, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES,
BRANCHES 5 AND 1, RESPECTIVELY, OLONGAPO CITY,
ZAMBALES, COMPLAINANTS, v. PRESIDING JUDGE NORMAN V.
PAMINTUAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 73, OLONGAPO
CITY, ZAMBALES, RESPONDENT.

A.M. No. RTJ-19-2559, August 14, 2019

(Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-3810-RTJ)

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANT, v.

PRESIDING JUDGE NORMAN V. PAMINTUAN, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 73, OLONGAPO CITY, ZAMBALES, RESPONDENT

A.M. No. RTJ-19-2561, August 12, 2019

(Formerly A.M. No. 15-02-49-RTC)

FACTS:
This administrative case stemmed from a Letter-Complaint dated October
4, 2011 filed by Hon. Tomas Eduardo B. Maddela III (Judge Maddela) and Hon.
Merinnisa O. Ligaya (Judge Ligaya), Presiding Judges of Branches 5 and 1,
respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Olongapo City,
Zambales, addressed to Hon. Richard A. Paradeza (Exec. Judge Paradeza),
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City. The subject
of the complaint is the alleged failure and neglect of Judge Norman V. Pamintuan
(respondent), Presiding Judge of Branch 73, Regional Trial Court of Olongapo
City, Zambales, to perform the solemnization of marriage of applicants after their
requests had been raffled to him.
In their joint letter-complaint, Judge Maddela and Judge Ligaya alleged
that the Office of the Clerk of Court-RTC referred and endorsed the requests for
solemnization of marriage to other judges because respondent was, on the
scheduled dates, either absent or unavailable due to either high blood pressure,
flu, loose bowel movement, or fever. They further averred that, being among the
judges to whom said requests were consequently referred, they were confronted
with verbal complaints from the couples intending to get married and from their
parents and relatives who found themselves being ushered out of the courtroom
after being told that respondent was absent. Judge Maddela and Judge Ligaya
contended that respondent's alleged failure to solemnize the marriages raffled to
him constitutes "shirking from judicial duty." In its October 13, 2014 Resolution,
the Court reminded respondent of his duty to dispose of the court's business
promptly and to be mindful of his absences.
On the other docketed case against the respondent, A.M. No. RTJ-19-
2561, Exec. Judge Paradeza, Presiding Judge of the RTC of Olongapo City,
Zambales, Branch 72, executed an Affidavit-Complaint against respondent in
which he narrated the circumstances of the latter's attempt to bribe him in
exchange for a verdict against the accused in a criminal case. He also stated that
he intends to file an administrative case for grave misconduct against
respondent.
In addition to the allegation of bribery, the other judges present at the
meeting divulged that respondent engaged in other activities which presented a
conflict-of-interest situation on his part.
On a later date, respondent replied a comment in compliance to the
Court’s resolution, he argued and summarized the allegations and denied such.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Judge erred.

RULING:
Yes. Respondent Judge erred by shirking from his judicial duties by failing
to solemnize marriages raffled to him and is administratively liable of grave
misconduct for attempting to bribe Exec. Judge Paradeza. Furthermore Judge
Violated Canons 1, 2 and 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
The Court is clear about when unless for valid reasons, the refusal to
judge to participate in the raffle for solemnization of marriage shall be construed
as shirking from judicial duties.
In the face of Exec. Judge Paradeza’s straightforward account on the
incident, “Suffice it is to say that denial is an intrinsically weak defense. To merit
credibility it must be buttressed with a strong evidence, it is negative and self-
serving, deserving no greater testimony of credible witnesses who testified on
affirmative matter”.
 Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an
official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or
character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to
duty and the rights of others.
WHEREFORE, respondent JUDGE NORMAN V. PAMINTUAN, Presiding
Judge of Branch 73, Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Zambales, is hereby
found GUILTY of gross misconduct, undue delay in rendering decisions, and
violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars

4. ALFREDO FAVOR, Complainant, v. JUDGE CESAR O. UNTALAN,

Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati City, Respondent
A.M. RTJ-08-2158, July 30, 2009
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 04-2018-RTJ)

FACTS:
Alfredo Favor, complainant, along with the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), charging respondent Judge Cesar Untalan 2 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) Branch 39, of Quezon City with: (1) illegal
trespass to dwelling; (2) taking advantage of his office and position to act as
an agent to sell real property; (3) assisting a private individual to settle a case;
(4) harassment/coercion; and (5) violation of Rule 3.09 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
In his Complaint, complainant alleged that respondent Judge pushed open
the door of the house and placed his right foot inside so complainant could
not close the door. Respondent Judge inquired if complainant was Alfredo
Favor, to which complainant replied yes. Respondent Judge then told him,
"Mr. Favor, mali ang tinitirahan niyo (you are living at the wrong
address)." Complainant averred that respondent Judge asked him to sit
beside him, then told him to vacate the house because Sheriff Doblada and
Lozada made a mistake in ejecting complainant and his family from their
former residence. Complainant told him that it was no longer their fault,
because they were made to transfer to their present house after the
enforcement of the writ in the ejectment case. Respondent Judge said that he
was only doing Lozada a favor, and asked complainant to talk to his in-laws
about leaving the house, even writing his name and telephone number on a
piece of paper. Respondent Judge pointed out that, if the claim of trespassing
and violation of domicile were true, complainant should have reported it to the
barangay or to the police authorities. He reasoned that the complaint had
been filed only on July 7, 2003, almost two years after the incident occurred.
Thus the reason behind the complaint for alleging the respondent for
harassment and coercion. However, respondent judge himself admitted that
he only was there in the residence to help.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge is administratively liable
RULING:
By using his position to help private persons settle a legal dispute,
respondent Judge is administratively liable under Rule 2.03 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. His intentions may have been noble as he sought to make
complainant realize that he had been occupying by mistake the property subject
of the dispute, but respondent Judge should be mindful to conduct himself in a
manner that gives no ground for reproach. The Court held in Miranda v. Judge
Mangrobang, that a judge's private life cannot be dissociated from his public life
and it is, thus, important that his behavior both on and off the bench be free from
any appearance of impropriety.
While there was no categorical finding of bad faith or malice on the part of
respondent Judge, who was motivated by the noble intention of settling the
property dispute between Lozada and Abando, however, he must bear in mind
that his office demands an exacting standard of decorum to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Respondent Judge
should be more prudent in the observance of his dealings with the public to
obviate the mistaken impression of impropriety in that he is probably using his
position as a judge to impose improper pressure or exert undue influence so as
to obtain the desired result in a given situation.

5. ZENAIDA E. SILVER AND NELSON SALCEDO, PETITIONERS, v.

JUDGE MARIVIC TRABAJO DARAY, IN HER CAPACITY AS JUDGE
DESIGNATE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, 11TH JUDICIAL REGION,
BRANCH 11, DAVAO CITY, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, LORETO
HAO, KENNETH HAO, ATTY. AMADO L. CANTOS, ZENAIDA
TALATTAD AND MAUREEN ELLA M. MACASINDIL, RESPONDENTS
G.R. No. 219157, August 14, 2019

FACTS:
Petitioner Zenaida Silver was engaged in "buy and sell" of motor vehicles
under the business name "ZSH Commercial." On February 10, 2005, she
participated in the auction sale of several units of vehicles and assorted surplus
parts and accessories held at the Bureau of Customs (BOC), General Santos City.
She entered a bid of P5,790,100.00 and ended up as the winning bidder for all
the items. She loaned the amount from private respondent Loreto Hao. She also
agreed to give Loreto Hao access to the Honasan compound where the vehicles
were parked. For this purpose, she authorized Loreto Hao's nephew, private
respondent Kenneth Hao, to sell the items and act as her liaison officer. This
authority was covered by a corresponding special power of attorney. Then,
things went wrong between Zenaida Silver and Kenneth Hao. Zenaida Silver
claimed Kenneth Hao allegedly disposed of sixty-four (64) items without her
knowledge or any accounting coming from Kenneth Hao's end. The total sales
had already reached P10,094,000.00 or more than the amount she owed Loreto
Hao, including interest. Further complicating things, Loreto Hao and Kenneth Hao
had caused several motor vehicles to be registered in the names of third
persons, inch ding private respondents Zenaida Talattad and Maureen Ella
Macasindil. She later on confronted them about these things and thereafter
rescinded the SPA she issued in Kenneth Hao's favor. But Loreto Hao and
Kenneth Hao and their cohorts continued to pull out, and dispose of, the
remaining motor vehicles. By reason thereof, private respondents and their
cohorts committed grave coercion, qualified theft, and carnapping. Loreto Hao on
the other hand filed for a counter-affidavit and counter charges against the
petitioner.

Petitioner Zenaida Silver filed before different branches of the Regional

Trial Court in Davao City complaints for recovery of possession of the vehicles.
One such complaint was raffled to RTC-Branch 16, which issued Order 17 dated
October 17, 2005, commanding Sheriff Abe Andres to seize twenty-two (22)
motor vehicles subject of the complaint and place them under custodia legis.
Sheriff Andres was able to seize nine (9) motor vehicles from several individuals.
He moved them to a compound at Diversion Road, Buhangin, Davao City.
Zenaida Silver, and companions, however, later on caused eight (8) vehicles to
be moved out of the compound, sans permission from the court. For what
Zenaida Silver et al. did, Loreto Hao once again filed countercharges of
carnapping against Zenaida Silvh, Sheriff Andres, and five (5) others, including
co-petitioner SPO4 Nelson Salcedo. SPO4 Salcedo was among the police
officers who accompanied Sheriff Andres in moving out the motor vehicles from
the Buhangin compound. Loreto Hao asserted he was the real owner of the
vehicles by virtue of a deed of absolute sale and assignment of rights, which
Zenaida Silver allegedly executed, in his favor.
By Joint resolution dated on November 17, 2005, the Office of the City
Prosecutor dismissed the complaints. The parties then went up to DOJ via their
respective petitions for review. The eight (8) Informations were raffled to RTC-
Branch 14, Davao City and warrants of arrest were issued. The prosecution,
though, subsequently withdrew the Informations in view of its subsequent
findings on reinvestigation that no probable cause existed against the accused.
Branch 14 granted the motion to withdraw and dismissed the case.

However, in the ruling of RTC, it ordered for the directed warrant of arrest
to be issued on the accused except Sheriff Abe Andes. Petitioners Silver and
SPO4 Salcedo sought for reconsideration but was denied under Join order dated
September 14, 2011. The case was brought up to CA via special action for
certiorari, They essentially argued that Judge Danilo Belo who issued the
warrant, and Judge Marivic Trabajo-Daray who denied their subsequent motion
for reconsideration—did not properly determine the existence of probable cause
to justify the warrants of arrest issued on them .

In the present case, the petitioners find fault on the CA Judge for
sustaining the warrants of arrest issued on them.

ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in sustaining the Trial Court’s decision

RULING:
No. The petition utterly lacks merit. The extent of the Judge’s personal
examination and its annexes depends on the circumstances of, each case. The
Court cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge’s
examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion for, after all,
the personal determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. It can be
as brief or as detailed as the circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the
Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor’s certification and investigation report
whenever, necessary. He should call for the complainant and witnesses
themselves to answer the court's probing questions when the circumstances of
the case so require. Accordingly the petition is denied.
SYNTHESIS:
Being a Judge is a legal profession which is imbued with public interest, it
demands that Judges observe and adhere to the highest ethical and professional
standards. This notion can be found in the embodiment of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct. However, some of the Judges err to a certain degree on the
rules annexed to it.
The continuous conflict and claims with respect to some Judges who
contrary to their oath that they voluntarily impose upon themselves as Judges at
best of their knowledge, to be competent, independent, and impartial judiciary
caused the Supreme Court to adjudicate and reiterate the importance of the
Canons in the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
This synthesis would like to elucidate the relevant cases relating to the
scope of the Supreme Court’s Jurisdiction over the lawyers who erred against the
rules in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

First, in the case of Madeline Yap v. Hon. Hannibal R. Patrick, the Court
ruled that, While it may be true that respondent judge did not employ actual force
in its literal sense when he stopped the implementation of the writ of execution,
the threats he uttered (that something untoward might happen if the writ of
execution were carried out) effectively prevented or stopped the carrying out of
the writ of execution. It has been held that: "Such threat of violence is absolutely
unbecoming [of] a judge who is expected to display proper decorum."It bears
stressing that a judge "must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost
sobriety and self-restraint. He should choose his words and exercise more
caution and control in expressing himself. In other words, a judge should possess
the virtue of gravitas which means that a magistrate should not descend to the
level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide
remarks and sarcastic comments. He is required to always be temperate, patient
and courteous, both in conduct and in language." Likewise, as a holder of a
judicial office that commands respect, respondent judge should accord respect to
another officer of the court, a sheriff who is implementing a writ of execution.

Canon 2 provides that, Integrity is essential not only to the proper

discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
Canon 4 on the other hand provides that propriety and the appearance of
propriety is essential to the performance of all activities of the judges. As a
subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely
and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is
consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

Certainly, a judge who falls short of the ethics of the judicial office tends to
diminish the people's respect for the law and legal processes. He also fails to
observe and maintain the esteem due to the courts and to judicial officers.
Second, in the case of Bernadita Antirapoda v. Francisco A. Ante, Jr., Court’s
ruling on the matter stated that, a judge should always conduct himself in a
manner that would preserve the dignity, independence and respect for
himself/herself, the Court, and the Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit the
hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint. He should
choose his words and exercise more caution and control in expressing himself. In
other words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas. Judges are required
to always be temperate, patient, and courteous, both in conduct and in language.
In this case, it is found that the respondent’s behaviour towards the
complainant amounted to a conduct that the Court cannot countenance.
Respondent's acts, therefore, constitute grave misconduct, which the Court
defines as "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.
Third, in the case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Presiding
Judge Norman Pamintuan, The Court is clear about when unless for valid
reasons, the refusal to judge to participate in the raffle for solemnization of
marriage shall be construed as shirking from judicial duties.
In the face of Exec. Judge Paradeza’s straightforward account on the
incident, “Suffice it is to say that denial is an intrinsically weak defense. To merit
credibility it must be buttressed with a strong evidence, it is negative and self-
serving, deserving no greater testimony of credible witnesses who testified on
affirmative matter”.
Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official
or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to
procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the
rights of others.
Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct stated that judicial
independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee
of a fair trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence
in both its individual and institutional aspects. Which was however, not present in
this case and was contrary to the act of bribery by the respondent Judge.
Fourth, in the case of Alfredo Favor v. Judge Cesar O. Untalan,
complainant filed for charges against invading his dwelling, harassment and
coercion against the respondent judge. The judge defended himself that he was
just there in the residence to help the individual who wish to settle the legalities
with the complainant.
However, the Court ruled that by using his position to help private persons
settle a legal dispute, respondent Judge is administratively liable under Rule 2.03
of the Code of Judicial Conduct. His intentions may have been noble as he
sought to make complainant realize that he had been occupying by mistake the
property subject of the dispute, but respondent Judge should be mindful to
conduct himself in a manner that gives no ground for reproach. The Court held in
Miranda v. Judge Mangrobang, that a judge's private life cannot be dissociated
from his public life and it is, thus, important that his behavior both on and off the
bench be free from any appearance of impropriety.
While there was no categorical finding of bad faith or malice on the part of
respondent Judge, who was motivated by the noble intention of settling the
property dispute between Lozada and Abando, however, he must bear in mind
that his office demands an exacting standard of decorum to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Respondent Judge
should be more prudent in the observance of his dealings with the public to
obviate the mistaken impression of impropriety in that he is probably using his
position as a judge to impose improper pressure or exert undue influence so as
to obtain the desired result in a given situation.
Lastly, in the case of Zenaida Silver and Nelson Salcedo v. Judge
Trabajo Daray, The Court reiterated that the extent of the Judge’s personal
examination and its annexes depends on the circumstances of, each case. The
Court cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge’s
examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion for, after all,
the personal determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. It can be
as brief or as detailed as the circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the
Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor’s certification and investigation report
whenever, necessary. He should call for the complainant and witnesses
themselves to answer the court's probing questions when the circumstances of
the case so require.