Batch 2 Case Digest

CASE 1

G.R. No. 133064 September 16, 1999

JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, MANUEL H. AFIADO, MARIANO V. BABARAN

and ANDRES R. CABUYADAO, petitioners,

vs.

HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, In his capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. EPIMACO

VELASCO, in his capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in
his capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, HON. BENJAMIN G. DY, in his capacity as Governor of Isabela, THE
HONORABLE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF ISABELA, ATTY. BALTAZAR PICIO,
in his capacity as Provincial Administrator, and MR. ANTONIO CHUA, in his capacity as
Provincial Treasurer, respondents, GIORGIDI B. AGGABAO, intervenor.

FACTS:

On 5 May 1994, Republic Act No. 7720 which converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an
independent component city was signed into law. On July 4, 1994, the people of Santiago ratified R.A.
No. 7720 in a plebiscite. On February 14, 1998, Republic Act No. 8528 was enacted. It amended R.A.
No. 7720, it changed the status of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city.
Petitioner, Jose Miranda, mayor of Santiago assailed the constitutionality of RA 8528 due to lack of
ratification through plebiscite pursuant to Section 10 Article 10 of the Constitution. Respondents also
contend the petition raises a political question over which the Court lacks jurisdiction.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction on justiciable and political question.

2. Whether or not Republic Act No. 8528 is unconstitutional.

HELD:

1. Yes. The plea that the court back off from assuming jurisdiction over the petition at bar on the ground
that it involves a political question has to be brushed aside. This plea has long lost its appeal especially in
light of Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which defines judicial power as including the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. To be sure,
the cut between a political and justiciable issue has been made by this Court in many cases.
2. Yes. R.A. No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. When an amendment of the law involves creation,
merger, division, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected is mandatory. Petitioners are directly affected in the implementation of
RA No. 8528. Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City, Afiado was the President of the Sangguniang
Liga, and together with 3 other petitioners were all residents and voters in the City of Santiago. It is their
right to be heard in the conversion of their city through a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC.
Thus, denial of their right in RA No. 8528 gives them proper standing to strike down the law as
unconstitutional.

=======

CASE 2

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, Petitioner Vs.

Jancom Environmental Corporation and Jancom International Development Projects PTY. Limited of
Australia, respondents

G.R. No. 147465, January 30 2002

Facts:

President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Memorandum Order No. 202 creating the Executive
Committee (EXECOM) to oversee the BOT implementation of solid waste management projects, headed
by the Chairman of the MMDA and the Cabinet Officer for Regional Development-National Capital
Region (CORD-NCR). While eleven (11) proponents submitted their pre-qualification documents, most
failed to comply with the requirements under Section 5.4 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) of Republic Act No. 6957, otherwise known as the Build-Operate-Transfer Law. On July 21, 1995,
the Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) recommended the pre-qualification of three
proponents, namely: i) JANCOM International Pty. Ltd.; ii) First Philippine International W-E Managers;
and iii) PACTECH Development Corporation. On July 26, 1995, the EXECOM approved the
recommendation of the PBAC. On July 27, 1995, MMDA forwarded to the Investment Coordinating
Committee (ICC) Secretariat the pre-feasibility study on the privatization of the Carmona and San Mateo
landfill sites. The project was later presented to the ICC-Technical Board (ICC-TB) and then endorsed to
the ICC-Cabinet Committee (ICC-CC).After Bidding for a waste management project with the MMDA,
Jancom won a contract for the MMDA’s San Mateo waste Project. A BOT Contract for the waste was
signed on December 19 1997 between Jancom and the Philippine Government, Represented by the
Presidental Task force on Solid Waste Management through DENR Secretary Ramos, CORD-NCR chair
dela Serna and MMDA chair Oreta. The contract, however, was never signed by President Ramos as it
was too close to the end of his term. He endorsed it to President Estrada, but Estrada refused to sign it, for
two reasons: the passage of RA 8749, or the Clean Air Act of 1999 and the clamour of San Mateo
residents for the closure of the dumpsite.
When the MMDA published another call for proposals for solid waste management projects for Metro
Manila, Jancom filed a petition with the Pasig RTC asking the court to declare as void the resolution of
the Greater Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste Management Committee disregarding the BOT contract
with Jancom, and the call for bids for a new waste management contract.

On May 29, 2000, the lower court decided in favor of Jancom. Instead of appealing, the MMDA filed
with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and a TRO. Instead of appealing the decision, MMDA
filed a special civil action for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order with the Court of
Appeals which was later docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 59021. When the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition, the MMDA went to the Supreme Court, arguing that the contract with Jancom was
not binding because it was not signed by the President, the conditions precedent to the contract were not
complied with, and there was no valid notice of award.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of appeals erred in its dismissal of CA-G.R. SP. No. 59021

Whether or not the proper choice of the remedy is filing a certiorari

Held:

No. We, therefore, hold that the Court of Appeals did not err when it declared the existence of a valid and
perfected contract between the Republic of the Philippines and JANCOM. There being a perfected
contract, MMDA cannot revoke or renounce the same without the consent of the other. From the moment
of perfection, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but
also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage,
and law (Article 1315, Civil Code). The contract has the force of law between the parties and they are
expected to abide in good faith by their respective contractual commitments, not weasel out of them. Just
as nobody can be forced to enter into a contract, in the same manner, once a contract is entered into, no
party can renounce it unilaterally or without the consent of the other. It is a general principle of law that
no one may be permitted to change his mind or disavow and go back upon his own acts, or to proceed
contrary thereto, to the prejudice of the other party. Nonetheless, it has to be repeated that although the
contract is a perfected one, it is still ineffective or unimplementable until and unless it is approved by the
President.

No. The Supreme Court ruled that MMDA should have filed a motion for appeal instead of for certiorari,
because a certiorari would only apply in cases where there was grave abuse of jurisdiction, something
which the petition did not allege. Correction may be obtained only by an appeal from the final decision.
Since the decision was not appeal, the Court said it has become final and “gone beyond the reach of any
court to modify in any substantive aspect.”

Though saying it was unnecessary to discuss the substantive issues, the court took it up just the same, “if
only to put the petitioner’s mind to rest.”

The contract with Jancom is valid: citing Article 1305, 1315 and 1319 of the Civil Code.
In asserting that there was no valid and binding contract, MMDA can only allege that there was no valid
notice of award; the contract does not bear the signature of the President; the conditions precedent
specified in the contract were not complied with.

But the Court said that the lack of notice was the government’s fault; though the President did not sign,
his alter-ego did; and anyway his signature was only necessary for the effectivity of the contract, not its
perfection; and that the two-month period within which Jancom should comply with the conditions had
not yet started to run because the contract had not yet taken effect, precisely because of the absence of the
President’s signature.

=========

CASE 3

SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF TAGUIG VS. ESTRELLA

A.M. No. 01-1608-RTJ January 16, 2001

Facts:

At bar is a sworn letter-complaint dated October 20, 1997 filed by 10 members of the Sangguniang Bayan
of Taguig, Metro Manila charging Judge Santiago G. Estrella of Branch 68 of the Regional Trial Court of
the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Pasig City with serious misconduct relative to Election
Protest No. 144, entitled Ricardo D. Papa, Jr. vs. Isidro B. Garcia.

In the May 8, 1995 elections, Garcia was proclaimed the mayor of Taguig, Metro Manila. Papa then filed
an election protest impugning the results from all 713 precints in the municipality, which was docketed to
the sala of herein respondent..

On April 10, 1996, a final revision report was submitted to respondent judge by Atty. Katherine A. Go,
the over-all chairperson of the Revision Committee. The report stated that Papa actually objected to a
total of 11,290 ballots for Garcia, over 5,000 of which were objected to by reason of the same having
been written by one person (WBO) or written by two (WBT). The said report also mentioned that Garcia
had 3,049 plain Garcia votes.

Thereafter, both parties offered their respective exhibits, which were all admitted by respondent judge.

On February 11, 1997, respondent issued an order directing the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
examine the contested ballots in the presence of a representative of both parties. After the NBI finished its
examination of the contested ballots and upon the determination by respondent that he had no further
need of the ballot boxes, he issued an order dated May 19, 1997 directing the removal of the ballot boxes
and election paraphernalia from his courtroom. On May 27, 1997, respondent ordered the immediate
transfer of all the ballot boxes and election paraphernalia to the sala of Judge Vivencio Baclig, Branch
157 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, so that Judge Baclig may proceed with the trial of the vice-
mayoralty election protest of the same municipality. On June 26, 1997, the NBI Report was submitted to
respondent.

On July 22, 1997, Garcia filed a motion praying that an order be issued to the Branch Clerk of Court to be
furnished a copy of the NBI Reports and/or allow him to copy or review or at least to read said reports.
Respondent judge denied the motion on the same day, proclaiming that the examination of contested
ballots by the NBI was ordered, upon the instance of the court, and not by the parties, hence, only the
court was given copies of the NBI Reports. On the same day that Garcias motion was denied, respondent
also set the date of promulgation of judgment for July 31, 1997. Garcia then filed a Manifestation and
Most Urgent Motion to Defer and/or Cancel Scheduled Promulgation of Judgment premised on
respondents refusal to furnish him a copy of the NBI Reports.

On July 30, 1997, the COMELEC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining respondent
judge from proceeding with the scheduled promulgation of judgment set on July 31, 1997.

On August 21, 1997, after the expiration of the TRO, Papa filed a Motion for Immediate Promulgation of
Judgment, requesting that the same be heard on August 25, 1997. This was, however, granted by
respondent judge the very next day, three days ahead of the date set for hearing of the motion, with
respondent setting August 27, 1997 as the promulgation date.

One day before the scheduled promulgation of judgment, or on August 26, 1997, the COMELEC issued
an order directing respondent to allow both parties or their counsel to have access to the NBI reports and
to give the parties copies thereof before the promulgation of the decision.

On the day of the promulgation of judgment (August 27, 1997), respondent gave Garcias counsel 5
minutes to go over Questioned Documents Report No. 152-297 which consisted of 53 pages, and
Questioned Document Report No. 152-297(A), which consisted of 17 page. Respondent then sustained
Papa’s protest and declared him the mayor of Taguig.

Complainants now allege that respondent judge, together with Papa and the NBI officials concerned,
violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which provides
that:

Sec. 3. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officers and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(e) Causing undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. . . .

ISSUE: W/N Estrella violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act and gravely abused his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.

HELD:

Respondent was remiss in examining the questioned ballots despite the wrong figures, computations, and
typographical errors and mistakes present in the NBI Reports. Notwithstanding these errors, respondent
based his decision solely on the conclusions and findings of the NBI.
Respondents obvious partiality for Papa is further bolstered by his acts during the promulgation of
judgment on August 27, 1997. The facts show that respondent did not set the NBI Reports for hearing,
nor was Garcia allowed to confront the NBI officials concerned. He did not even allow Garcia to get
copies of the reports until after the promulgation of the decision on August 27, 1997, and this, only after
the COMELEC had ordered respondent to do so on August 26, 1997. In fact, the only time Garcias
counsel was able to study the two reports of the NBI consisting of 53 and 17 pages, respectively, was five
minutes before the promulgation of judgment. Respondents justification that he alone should have copies
of the reports since these were court-sponsored and the request did not emanate from either of the parties,
is an explanation which this Court finds hard to accept.

Judge Estrellas obvious bias became even more apparent when he granted the motion for execution
pending appeal filed by Papa on the day of promulgation of judgment, August 27, 1997. What is
disturbing is that said motion was dated August 26, 1997, a day before the scheduled promulgation,
indicating that Papa had prior knowledge of a decision favorable to him.

In the recent case of Evelyn Agpalasin vs. Judge Ernesto M. Agcaoili, (A.M. No. RTJ-95-1308, April 12,
2000), that:

A judge should, in pending or prospective litigation before him, be scrupulously careful to avoid such
action as may reasonably tend to waken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships
constitute an element in determining his judicial course. He must not only render a just, correct and
impartial decision but should do so in such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to his fairness,
impartiality and integrity. A decision which correctly applies the law and jurisprudence will nevertheless
be subject to questions of impropriety when rendered by a magistrate or tribunal believed to be less than
impartial and honest.

WHEREFORE, Judge Santiago G. Estrella is hereby found guilty of serious misconduct, partiality, and
inexcusable negligence, and is ordered to pay a fine in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00), with the stern warning that any similar misconduct on his part in the future will be dealt
with more severely.

==========

CASE 4

4. G.R. No. L-37878 November 25, 1932 MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. PASAY
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., ET AL., respondents.

FACTS:

Sec. 11 of Act 1446 provides that for every franchise granted, terms as to the usage and compensation to
be paid to the grantee shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme Court sitting as board of arbitrators, a
majority vote is required and this is final. Pursuant to said Act, MERALCO filed a petition before the
court requesting the members of the Supreme Court sitting as board of arbitrators to fix the terms upon
which certain transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the MERALCO.
Copies were sent to affected transpo company (one of which is the Pasay Transpo) and to Atty-Gen which
disclaimed any interest.

ISSUES: Whether or not the members of the Supreme Court can sit as arbitrators and fix the terms and
compensation as is asked of them in this case

HELD:No. The Supreme Court represents one of the three divisions of power in our government. It is
judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme
Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of
the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by
implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. The Supreme Court and its members should not and
cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to
or connected with the administering of judicial functions. The Organic Act provides that the Supreme
Court of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such
additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by law (sec. 26). When the Organic Act speaks of
the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court, it could not only mean the exercise of "jurisdiction"
by the Supreme Court acting as a court, and could hardly mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the
members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators. A board of arbitrators is not a "court" in
any proper sense of the term, and possesses none of the jurisdiction which the Organic Act contemplates
shall be exercised by the Supreme Court. The power conferred on this court is exclusively judicial, and it
cannot be required or authorized to exercise any other. . . . Its jurisdiction and powers and duties being
defined in the organic law of the government, and being all strictly judicial, Congress cannot require or
authorize the court to exercise any other jurisdiction or power, or perform any other duty. Section 11 of
Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a democratic government
constitutionally established, and that it would be improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme
Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act on the
petition of the Manila Electric Company.

========

CASE 5

In Re: Raul M. Gonzalez

Adm. Matter No. 88-4-5433

160 SCRA 771

Facts: Gonzales was the Tanodbayan or Special Prosecutor. He forwarded to Mr. Justice Marcelo B.
Fernan a letter-complaint. The letter was said to be from concerned employees of the SC (an anonymous
letter).
The letter was originally addressed to Gonzales referring to the charges for disbarment sought by Mr.
Miguel Cuenco against Justice Fernan, and asking him (Gonzales) to do something about it.

Issue:

Whether or not a Supreme Court justice can be disbarred during his term of office.

Ruling:

A public officer (such as Justice Fernan) who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the
Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by
impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. Further,
such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan, or
any other court, with any offense which carries with it the penalty of removal from office.

The court is not saying that its Members or other constitutional officers are entitled to immunity from
liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other
supposed misbehavior. What the court is saying is that there is a fundamental procedural requirement that
must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced.

A member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office, via the constitutional route of
impeachment, and then only may he be held liable either criminally or administratively (that is,
disbarment), for any wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings.

Members of the SC may be removed only by impeachment (Art XI Sec 2). The above provision
proscribes removal from office by any other method. Otherwise, to allow such public officer who may be
removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his office with an office that
carries the penalty of removal from office, would be violative of the clear mandate of the Constitution.

The effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of position and disqualification to hold any office of
honor, trust or profit under the Republic. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than
removal from office and disqualification to hold any office. But the party convicted shall nevertheless be
held liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law (Sec 3 Par. 7, Art XI).

========

CASE 7

SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES

[G.R. No. 141496.October 3, 2001]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LUCIO TENG

Facts:

On November 6, 1992, appellant Lucio Teng was charged in Criminal Case No. Q-92-38304 for
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, and in Criminal Case No. Q-92-38305 for estafa, before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 104, Quezon City. The cases stemmed from appellant's issuance to Daniel
Pe of Metrobank check No. 793666 dated November 20, 1991 for P35,000.00.

The trial court rendered the decision finding the accused Lucio Teng guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and estafa as charged in the information. The accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer the imprisonment of one year, and a fine of P200,000.00 and the imprisonment
of eight (8) years & one (1) day to twelve (12) years of Prision Mayor in its maximum period for estafa.

In both cases, the said accused is hereby ordered to pay the complainant the amount of P35,000.00 as the
amount indicated in the check in question.

Upon appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification, and "certified" the
estafa case to this Court. the conviction of appellant Lucio Teng for violation of B.P. 22 is affirmed but
the penalty should be imprisonment of One (1) year and a fine of Thrity-Five Thousand (P35,000.00)
Pesos. The court of appeals also certified the case of estafa to the supreme court for final determination
and appropriate action.

The court issued a resolution dated March 1, 2000 requiring both parties to file supplemental
briefs. Considering that the case was "certified" by the Court of Appeals to this Court, we directed the
trial court to order the bondsman/surety of appellant to surrender him and cause his transfer to the Bureau
of Corrections, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, through the Philippine National Police. The bond posted by
the appellant was cancelled, the trial court ordered his arrest and commitment due to the forfeiture of the
bailbond. Later on he was arrested by the NBI and was committed to the bureau of corrections.

Upon examination of the records, the supreme court found that the appellate court did not
properly certify the instant case to this Court by failing to render judgment.

Issue: Whether or not the supreme court has jurisdiction over the case certified by the court of appeals.

Held: No because there was no judgement rendered by the court of appeals and it was therefore not
properly certified, the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals immediately. According to Section 13,
Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, Whenever the Court of Appeals finds that the penalty
of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment should be imposed in a case, the court, after discussion
of the evidence and the law involved, shall render judgment imposing the penalty of death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment as the circumstances warrant. However, it shall refrain from entering the
judgment and forthwith certify the case and elevate the entire record thereof to the Supreme Court for
review. The supreme court orders the court of appeals to render a judgement in the appeal of Lucio Teng
from the trial courts.

=======

CASE 9
ISAGANI v DENR

GR No. 135385 Dec. 6, 2000.

FACTS: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa assailed the constitutionality of certain provisions of
RA No. 8371 otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA Law) on yhe ground
that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State's ownership over lands of the public domain as
well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in validation of the regalian doctrine embodied in
Sec 2 Art XII of the constitution.

Petitioners also argued that by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domain" and
"ancestral lands" which might include private lands found within said areas, Sec 3(a) and 3(b) violate the
rights of private land owners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA Law is unconstitutional.

RULING: After due deliberation as the votes were equally divided(7 to7) and the necessary majority was
not obtained, the case eas redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the
same. Pursuant to rule 56, Sec 7 on the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition was dismissed.

=========

CASE 12

Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad vs Court of Appeals

361 SCRA 489 – Conflict of Laws – Private International Law – Foreign Judgments – How Assailed

In 1985, the High Court of Malaysia ordered the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) to
pay $5.1 million to Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad. This was the result of a recovery suit filed by
Asiavest against PNCC in Malaysia for PNCC’s failure to complete a construction project there despite
due payment from Asiavest. Despite demand, PNCC failed to comply with the judgment in Malaysia
hence Asiavest filed a complaint for the enforcement of the Malaysian ruling against PNCC in the
Philippines. The case was filed with the Pasig RTC which eventually denied the complaint. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Asiavest appealed. In its defense, PNCC alleged that the foreign judgment cannot be enforced here
because of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to PNCC, collusion and/or fraud, and there is a clear
mistake of law or fact. Asiavest assailed the arguments of PNCC on the ground that PNCC’s counsel
participated in all the proceedings in the Malaysian Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Malaysian Court judgment should be enforced against PNCC in the
Philippines.
HELD: Yes. PNCC failed to prove and substantiate its bare allegations of want of jurisdiction, want of
notice, collusion and/or fraud, and mistake of fact. On the contrary, Asiavest was able to present evidence
as to the validity of the proceedings that took place in Malaysia. Asiavest presented the certified and
authenticated copies of the judgment and the order issued by the Malaysian Court. It also presented
correspondences between Asiavest’s lawyers and PNCC’s lawyers in and out of court which belied
PNCC’s allegation that the Malaysian court never acquired jurisdiction over it. PNCC’s allegation of
fraud is not sufficient too, further, it never invoked the same in the Malaysian Court.

The Supreme Court notes, to assail a foreign judgment the party must present evidence of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Otherwise, the
judgment enjoys the presumption of validity so long as it was duly certified and authenticated. In this
case, PNCC failed to present the required evidence.

==========

CASE 14

Patria Maquiran, complainant

vs

JUDGE LILIA LOPEZ, of RegionalTrial Court, Branch109 Pasay City, respondent

AM No. RTJ-00-1606 June 20, 2001

FACTS:

- Patria Maquiran filed an administrative complaint against respondent judge Lopez of Regional Trial
Court for gross negligence of the suit for damages filed by the complainant on August 31, 1990. This was
docketed as civil case no. 7548 which was assigned to the respondent judge. The case was submitted for
decision in August 1994, after the parties had submitted their memoranda. On March 25, 1996, counsel
for complainant moved for the resolution of the case, however no decision had been rendered since the
complaint in this case was filed.

- On January 2000, respondent judge claimed that she had rendered her decision in the case and had given
copies of the decision to the parties. She contended that during the five years pending of the case, many
things had happened to her including her health and family issues. And also, as Executive Judge, she was
given additional administrative duties and had to conduct hearings in her court designated as Special
Criminal Court.

ISSUE
Whether or not respondent judge Lopez was administratively liable for failure to render decision within
the required period, considering her reasons for not doing so.

HELD:

Yes. The Court Administrator found respondent judgd administratively liable for failure to render
decision. It is stated under Art VIII, Sec 15(1) of the Constitution that all cases filed must be decided
within three months for all other lower courts. Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
enjoins judges to dispose of their business promptly and decide cases within the required period.

This is not the first time the respondent judge is being sanctioned for failure to decide. But considering
her reasons in the case Dizon vs Lopez, which was occassioned by the death of her parents, financial
reverses of the family and her health issues, she was simply given a reprimand and a warning. She was
also sanctioned in the case Ricafranca Jr vs Lopez for similar offense. However, in the case at bar, the
reasons adduced by respondent was unsatisfactory. While she claimed that she had rendered decision and
given copies of it, she did not state when she decided on the case. It would appear that respondent judge
had decided shortly before she filed her comment on January 2000.

A fine in the amount of 5,000 php is imposed on respondent Judge Lilia Lopez with warning that
repitition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

====================

CASE 15

Judge Jose Caoibes, JR. vs. The Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 132177, July 19, 2001,

(2nd Division), J. Buena

Facts: Private Respondent Florentin Alumbres, a Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas
City, filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, a Criminal Complaint against Peitioner, Judge Caoibes.
The former alleged that at the hallway on the third floor of the Hall of Justice, Las Pinas City, after
requesting that petitioner return the executive table he borrowed from him and reiterating said request
upon the latter’s lack of answer, petitioner called him Tarantado, and punched him and that respondent
reported it before the Las Pinas Police Station. He prayed that criminal charges be filed before the
Sandiganbayan against the petitioner.

The private respondent then filed an administrative case against petitioner with the Supreme Court
praying for the latter’s dismissal from the judiciary on the ground of grave misconduct or conduct
unbecoming a judicial officer. Petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Referral to the Honorable Supreme
Court, praying that the Office of the Ombudsman hold its investigation of the case in abeyance, and refer
the same to the Supreme Court contending that it is the Supreme Court that has the authority to make a
preliminary determination of the respective culpability of petitioner and respondent Judge who, both
being members of the bench, are under its exclusive supervision and control. The Ombudsman denied
both this motion and the subsequent motion for reconsideration made.

Hence, petitioner filed this petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman’s refusal to defer action on a criminal complaint against the
petitioner to the Supreme Court violates the Constitution.

Held: Yes. As provided by Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is
vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. With this premise, the
Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or
court employee, involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases
against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to
whether and administrative aspect is involved therein.

It is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court personnels’ compliance with all laws,
and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other
branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of
powers.

Thus, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is directed to dismiss the
complaint filed by respondent Judge Florentino M. Alumbres and to refer the same to this Court for
appropriate action.

========

CASE 17

Zaldivar vs gonzales

Facts: the ff are the subject of this relation filed by the petitioner a motion dater 9 feb 1988 to cite in
contempt filed by the petitioner enrique a. Zaldivar against pblc respondent special prosecutor (formerly
tanod bayan) raul m gonzales. In connection with gr nos 79690-707 and gr no 80578 and a resolution of
this court dated 2 may 1988 requiring respondent hon.raul gonzales to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt and/or sbjected to adminstrative sanctions for making crtain public statemnt.

The motion cited as basis the acts of respondent gonzales in (1) having caused the filing of the
information against petitioner in crimnal case no. 12570 bfre the sandigan bayan and (2) issuing certain
allegedly contemptous statmnt to the media in relation to the proceedings in gr no 80578 in respct of the
latter petitioner annexed to his motion a photocopy of a news article which appeared in 30 nov 1987
issue of the "philippine daily globe".

Issue: are lawyer entitled to the dame degree of latitude of freedom of speech towards the court?

Ruling: no. The court begins by refering to the authorty to discplne officers of the court and members of
the bar. The authorty to dscplne lawyers stems from the court constitutional mandate to regulate
admission to the practice of law which includes as well authorty to regulate admission to the practice
itself of law. Moreover the supreme court has inherent power to punish for contempt to control in the
furthe rance of justce the conduct of ministreal officers of the court including lawyers and all othr persons
connect3d in any manner wth a case bfre the court.

Only slightly (if at all) less importnt is the public interest in the capacity of the court effectvly to prevent
and control professional misconduct on the part of the lawyers who are first and foremost, indispensable
participants in the task of rendering justce to everyman some courts have held persuasively it appears to
us and that a lawyer right of free expression may have to be more limited than that of a layman.

=====

CASE 20

Cayetano v. Monsod

G. R. No. 100113

September 3, 1991

FACTS:

In 1991, Christian Monsod was appointed as the Chairman of the Commission on Elections. His
appointment was affirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Monsod’s appointment was opposed by
Renato Cayetano on the ground that he does not qualify for he failed to meet the Constitutional
requirement which provides that the chairman of the COMELEC should have been engaged in the
practice law for at least ten years.

Monsod’s track record as a lawyer:

1. Passed the bar in 1960 with a rating of 86.55%.

2. Immediately after passing, worked in his father’s law firm for one year.

3. Thereafter, until 1970, he went abroad where he had a degree in economics and held various
positions in various foreign corporations.

4. In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and held executive jobs for various local corporations until
1986.

5. In 1986, he became a member of the Constitutional Commission.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent Monsod, a lawyer, was qualified for appointment as Chair of the
Commission on Elections.

HELD:

Yes. Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-

entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the
poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years.
 Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. ‘To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind
of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.

=======

CASE 21

GAMINDE vs COA

G.R. No. 140335 December 13, 2000

Petitioner: Thelma P. Gaminde

Respondent: Commission on Audit et al

FACTS:

On June 11, 1993, the President of the Philippines appointed petitioner Thelma P. Gaminde, ad interim,
Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. She assumed office on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of
office. On September 07, 1993, the Commission on Appointment, Congress of the Philippines confirmed
the appointment. However, on February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the
President as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply to her request, the Chief Presidential Legal
Counsel, in a letter dated April 07, 1998 opined that petitioner’s term of office would expire on February
02, 2000, not on February 02, 1999. She remained in office after February 02, 1999. Commision on Audit
chairman requested opinion on whether or now Commissioner Gaminde and her staff may still be paid
their salaries even after February 02, 1999. CSC resident auditor issued notice of disallowance dismissing
the petitioner’s appeal. The Commission on Audit affirmed the propriety of the disallowance, holding that
the issue of petitioner’s term of office may be properly addressed by mere reference to her appointment
paper which set the expiration date on February 02, 1999. Petitioner moved for reconsideration which was
later denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Commissioner Gaminde and her staff may still be paid their salaries even after the
expiration of her appointment on February 2 1999
RULING:

YES. Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde’s appointment expired on February 2 1999 as stated by her
appointment papers. However, she served as de facto officer in good faith until February 02, 2000, and
thus entitled to receive her salary and other emoluments for actual service rendered. Consequently, the
Commission on Audit erred in disallowing in audit such salary and other emoluments, including that of
her co-terminous staff. The term of office of the Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission
is prescribed in the 1987Constitution, as follows:

"SECTION 1 (2). Without reappointment of hose first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven
years, a Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any
Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity."The Chairman and the
Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments
for a term of seven years.

============

CASE 23

Civil Service Commission v. DBM

G.R. No. 158791 July 22, 2005

FACTS:

The total funds appropriated by General Appropriations Act of 2002 (GAA) for Civil Service
Commission (CSC) was P285,660,790.44. CSC complains that the total funds released by Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) was only P279,853,398.14, thereby leaving an unreleased balance of
P5,807,392.30. CSC contends that the funds were intentionally withheld by DBM on the ground of their
―no report, no release‖ policy. Respondent proffers at any rate that the delay in releasing the balance of
petitioner’s budget was not on account of any failure on petitioner’s part to submit the required reports;
rather, it was due to a shortfall in revenues. CSC petition for mandamus seeks to compel the department
of budget and management to release the balance of its budget.

ISSUE:

WON withholding the subject funds from Civil service commission by DBM due to revenue shortfall is
Constitutional

HELD:
NO. Respondents act of withholding the subject funds from petitioner due to revenue shortfall is hereby
declared unconstitutional. Under Article 9 section 5 states “The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Their approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.” Even assuming that
there was a revenue shortfall as respondent claimed, it could not withhold full release of petitioner’s funds
without violating not only the Constitution but also Section 64 of the General Provisions of the Year 2002
GAA as section 64 exempts agencies with fiscal autonomy to reduction and retention of appropriates
when there is unmanageably budget deficit.

Sec. 64. Appropriations of Agencies Vested with Fiscal Autonomy. Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, the appropriations authorized in this Act for the Judiciary, Congress of the Philippines,
the Commission on Human Rights, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Audit and the Commission onElections shall be automatically and regularly released.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

=========

CASE 25

Ambil v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 143398 (October 25, 2000)

FACTS:

- Petitioner Ruperto Ambil Jr. and respondent Jose Ramirez both candidates for the position of governor,
easter samar.

-Ruperto won the election against Ramirez by a vote of 46,547 vs 45,934.

- respondent challenged the results in an election protest with the COMELEC.

-Commissioner Guiani prepared and signed a proposed resolution in the case.

-Commissioner Desamito dissented.

-While Commissioner Tancangco wanted to see both positions first before giving her decision.
-On 2/15/00, Commissioner Guiani retired and was replaced.

-On 2/24/00, petitioner and respondent received a purported resolution in favor of private respondent
promulgated on 2/14/00 and signed by Commissioners Guiani, Desamito, and Tancangco.

-The First Division later declared that the parties should ignore the resolution since it was not yet
promulgated.

-The Division later set a date for promulgation of a resolution of the case, and said that the aggrieved
party could then challenge it through a Motion for Reconsideration before the Commission en banc or
through a certiorari case before the SC.

-The petitioner filed this case to annul the order for the promulgation of the resolution and to direct the
First Division to deliberate anew on the case.

ISSUE:Whether Comelec, First Division, in scheduling the promulgation of the resolution in the case
(EPCCase No. 98-29) acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction

HELD: The SC dismissed the case for prematurity. It ruled that it has no power to review via certiorari,
an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections. “The
instant case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions to the rule in certiorari cases dispensing
with a motion for reconsideration prior to the filing of a petition. In truth, the exceptions do not apply to
election cases where a motion for reconsideration is mandatory by Constitutional fiat to elevate the case
to the Comelec en banc, whose final decision is what is reviewable via certiorari before the Supreme
Court.

The SC declared the resolution signed by Commissioner Guiani as void for various reasons. First, one
who is no longer a member of the Commission at the time the final decision or resolution is promulgated
cannot validly take part in that resolution or decision. Second, the Clerk of the 1st Division denied the
release or promulgation of the resolution on 2/14/00 resolution. Third, the 1st Division even later said that
the parties should ignore the resolution since it was not yet promulgated. Lastly, Commissioner Z could
not have affixed her signature on the resolution, since on the same date an order was issued where she
said that she still wanted to see both positions before making her decision.
==============

CASE 26

[G.R. No. 143366. January 29, 2001]

LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL, petitioner, vs. RAMON S. ROCO, respondent.

Facts: Respondent Ramon S. Roco was appointed by then President Fidel V. Ramos on August 26, 1996
as Regional Director of the Land Transportation Office (LTO) in Region V, a position equivalent to CES
rank level V. Subsequently, then President Joseph E. Estrada re-appointed him to the same position on
February 8, 1999. At the time of respondents appointment in 1996 and 1999, he was not a CES eligible.
However, during his incumbency, or on August 13, 1999, he was conferred CES eligibility by the Career
Executive Service Board.

On September 7, 1999, petitioner Luis Mario General, who is not a CES eligible, [1] was appointed by
President Estrada as Regional Director of the LTO in Region V, the same position being occupied by
respondent. Pursuant thereto, DOTC Undersecretary Herminio B. Coloma, Jr., as Officer-in-Charge of the
Department, issued a Memorandum directing petitioner General to assume the said office
immediately.Accordingly, petitioner General assumed office on September 16, 1999.

Aggrieved, respondent Roco filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for quo warranto with prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. The Court of Appeals
issued a TRO enabling respondent Roco to re-assume the disputed office. After the lapse of 60 days, there
being no writ of preliminary injunction issued, petitioner General again assumed the said office. On
March 10, 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the appointment of respondent Roco
to the Office of Regional Director of the LTO, Region V, nullified the appointment of petitioner General
and ordered him to vacate the subject post in favor of respondent Roco. [2] Upon motion of respondent
Roco, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of execution pending appeal. [3]

Issue: Whether or not a President's appointee should be CES eligible on the time of his/her appointment.

Held: No, because according to Part III, Chapter I, Article IV, paragraph 5(c), of the Integrated
Reorganization Plan - "...the President may, in exceptional cases, appoint any person who is not a Career
Executive Service eligible; provided that such appointee shall subsequently take the required Career
Executive Service examination and that he shall not be promoted to a higher class until he qualified in
such examination."

Evidently, the law allows appointment of those who are not CES eligible, subject to the obtention of said
eligibility, in the same manner that the appointment of respondent who does not possess the required CES
rank (CES rank level V) for the position of Regional Director of the LTO, is permitted in a temporary
capacity.

===========

CASE 27
MANUEL M. LEYSON JR., petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, TIRSO
ANTIPORDA, Chairman, UCPB and CIIF Oil Mills, and OSCAR A. TORRALBA, President,
CIIF Oil Mills, respondents. ALEX

FACTS:

International Towage and Transport Corporation (ITTC), a domestic corporation engaged in the
lighterage or shipping business, entered into a one (1)-year contract with Legaspi Oil Company, Inc.
(LEGASPI OIL), Granexport Manufacturing Corporation (GRANEXPORT) and United Coconut
Chemicals, Inc. (UNITED COCONUT), comprising the Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF)
companies, for the transport of coconut oil in bulk through MT Transasia. Under the terms of the contract,
either party could terminate the agreement provided a three (3)-month advance notice was given to the
other party. However, prior to the expiration of the contract, the CIIF companies terminated the contract
without the requisite advance notice with ITTC. And the CIIF companies engaged the services of another
vessel, MT Marilag, operated by Southwest Maritime Corporation.

Petitioner Manuel M. Leyson Jr., Executive Vice President of ITTC, filed with public respondent Office
of the Ombudsman a grievance case against respondent Oscar A. Torralba, committing breach of contract,
bad faith, manipulation, unreasonable denial of requirement imposed, double standards and inconsistent
in favor of MT Marilag, and engaged and entered into a contract with Southwest Maritime Corp. which is
not the owner of MT Marilag

Petitioner also charged respondent Tirso Antiporda, Chairman of UCPB and CIIF Oil Mills, and
respondent Oscar A. Torralba with violation of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act also before the
Ombudsman. But public respondent, Ombudsman dismissed the complaint on the ground that the case is
a simple case of breach of contract with damages which should have been filed in the regular court. The
Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to determine the legality or validity of the termination of the contract
entered into by CIIF and ITTC since the entities involved are private corporations.

Reconsideration of the dismissal of the complaint was denied since petitioner had already filed a
collection case before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Moreover, the Ombudsman found that the
filing of the motion for reconsideration was beyond the inextendible period of five (5) days from notice of
the assailed resolution.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not CIFF is government owned and/or controlled corporations which are subject to the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman?

• Whether or not Ombudsman commits grave abuse of discretion on public respondent indismissing his
complaint

RULING:
The court finds no grave abuse of discretion committed by the Ombudsman and thus concludes that the
CIIF companies are, as found by public respondent, private corporations not within the scope of its
jurisdiction.

The coconut levy funds have four (4) general classes: (a) the Coconut Investment Fund created under R.
A. No. 6260; (b) the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund created under P. D. No. 276 (c) the Coconut
Industry Development Fund created under P. D. No. 582, and, (d) the Coconut Industry Stabilization
Fund created under P. D. No. 1841.

The various laws relating to the coconut industry were codified in 1976. On 21 October of that year, P. D.
No. 961[12] was promulgated. On 11 June 1978 it was amended by P. D. No. 1468[13] by inserting a
new provision authorizing the use of the balance of the Coconut Industry Development Fund for the
acquisition of "shares of stocks in corporations organized for the purpose of engaging in the establishment
and operation of industries x x x commercial activities and other allied business undertakings relating to
coconut and other palm oil indust(ries)."[14]From this fund thus created, or the CIIF, shares of stock in
what have come to be known as the "CIIF companies" were purchased.

The court then stated in COCOFED that the coconut levy funds were raised by the State's police and
taxing powers such that the utilization and proper management thereof were certainly the concern of the
Government. These funds have a public character and are clearly affected with public interest.

These jurisprudential rules invoked by petitioner in support of his claim that the CIIF companies are
government owned and/or controlled corporations are incomplete without resorting to the definition of
"government owned or controlled corporation" contained in par. (13), Sec. 2, Introductory Provisions of
the Administrative Code of 1987, i. e., any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation vested
with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the
Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of
stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock. The definition
mentions three (3) requisites, namely, first, any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation;
second, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature; and,
third, owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where
applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital
stock.

In the present case, all three (3) corporations comprising the CIIF companies were organized as stock
corporations. The UCPB-CIIF owns 44.10% of the shares of LEGASPI OIL, 91.24% of the shares of
GRANEXPORT, and 92.85% of the shares of UNITED COCONUT.[15] Obviously, the below 51%
shares of stock in LEGASPI OIL removes this firm from the definition of a government owned or
controlled corporation. Our concern has thus been limited to GRANEXPORT and UNITED COCONUT
as we go back to the second requisite. Unfortunately, it is in this regard that petitioner failed to
substantiate his contentions. There is no showing that GRANEXPORT and/ or UNITED COCONUT was
vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature unlike
PETROPHIL in Quimpo. The Court thus concludes that the CIIF companies are, as found by public
respondent, private corporations not within the scope of its jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolution of public respondent Office of the
Ombudsman of 30 January 1998 which dismissed the complaint of petitioner Manuel M. Leyson Jr., as
well as its Order of 4 June 1998 denying his motion for reconsideration, is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.

=====

CASE 30

Case 30. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) vs. CARLOS
P. RILLORAZA

G.R. No. 141141 June 25, 2001

(The Civil Service Commission/ Terms and condition of employment in Civil Service)

FACTS: Respondent Rilloraza, a casino operations manager recalled to the branch for only three weeks,
was administratively charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service and loss of confidence. Petitioner PAGCOR alleged that respondent failed to stop a top-
ranking officer from playing in the big tables and allowed, without authority, the exchange of checks for
gambling chips, in violation of PAGCOR's rules and regulations. Disclosed from the evidence presented
was that respondent allowed the exchange of check after verification and confirmation from COM Carlos
Gonzales, his immediate superior, who told him that the check was good and even guaranteed by BM
Syhongpan and was not even objected to SBM Advincula and BMO Cordero who was informed of the
transaction by phone and that respondent tried to stop BM Syhongpan from playing the game but the
latter told him that he was playing for a customer, Ms. Corazon Castillo, who was seated also at the table.
Being a subordinate, respondent accorded respect and credence on his word.

The PAGCOR Board ordered his dismissal for loss of confidence. The Civil Service Commission (CSC)
and later, Court of Appeals rules in favor of Rilloraza for reinstatement, but the former, imposed upon
him a month and one day suspension.

PAGCOR contends that the Court of Appeal gravely erred when it affirmed the CSC resolutions
modifying the penalty meted out in respondent from dismissal to suspension, despite the gravity or
seriousness of the offenses committed by the latter on account of the extraordinary responsibilities and
duties reposed in the respondent by virtue of his position.
ISSUE: Did the Court of Appeals err in ordering the reinstatement of private respondent?

HELD: No. The wellspring of stability in government service is the constitutional guarantee of entrance
according to merit and fitness and security of tenure, namely, Art. IX-B, Section 2, paragraph 2 and 3.

(2) Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined,
as far as practicable, and, except to positions which are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or
highly technical, by competitive examination.

(3) No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided
by law.

Being an ordinary employee, respondent cannot be dismissed for lack of trust and confidence and the
failure of respondent superiors to object or complain about the exchange of checks for chips negates the
conclusion that respondent is guilty of misconduct or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. The CSC correctly attributed good faith on the part of respondent and the penalty imposed was
proper under the premises. There is no evidence to sustain a charge of dishonesty. More importantly, the
PAGCOR Adjudication Committee concluded that respondent actually attempted to stop the game where
Syhongpan was playing which was even utilized as basis by the PAGCOR Board in dismissing
respondent.

Lastly, if only to consummate respondent’s alleged dishonesty and grave misconduct by corruptly
profiting from said incident, he could have easily pocketed the ‘balato’ given by Syhongpan, but he never
did, and in fact, returned the money.

========

CASE 31

VISTAN V. NICOLAS

201 SCRA 524 (1991)

Facts:

Consolidated cases were brought by Leonila A. Vistan against respondent Judge Ruben T. Nicolas for
gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority and immorality.

Complainant alleged that the respondent:

a. has rendered a decision in Criminal Case No-3073 entitled "People versus Narciso Paloma" for
Forcible Abduction with Consent, acquitting the accused there in even though respondent had not yet
ruled on the accused's written offer of evidence; and

b. is immoral for maintaining an illicit relationship with a woman not his wife whom he has a child.

He was also charged in violation of election laws docketed as Administrative Case No. 3040 when the
respondent started circulating handbills/letters addressed to electoral constituents in the second district of
Bulacan indicating his intention to run for a congressional seat as early as 10 February 1987, prior to 24
March 1987, or the date set by the Commission on Election (COMELEC) to be the start of the campaign
period, and while he is still an MTC Judge of Guiguinto, Bulacan.

The complaint for gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion and authority was resolved by
the Court in a Resolution, dated 4 December 1990, holding the respondent guilty for deciding the case
prematurely and exhibiting gross ignorance of the law imposing a fine of P3,000.00, payable within 30
days from notice and was subsequently reduced to P2,000 upon respondent's motion for reconsideration.

The immorality issue was separately held and under investigation due to the mysterious death of his
alleged paramour.

The Administrative Case No. 3040 was then held in the Supreme Court pursuant to a resolution dated
Nov.29, 1989 mandating all complaints against justices and judges of the lower court filed should be
promptly be referred to them for appropriate actions.

Issue:

1. Whether the respondent judge's behavior and conduct constitute to disbarment and enough ground for
removal when he violated the election law

Held:

1. Yes. The Court finds that the respondent had acted improperly upon his admission of electioneering
acts which violated Section 45 of Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Law) which clearly states:
Section 45. No officer or employee in the Civil Service including members of the Armed Forces, shall
engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote
nor shall be use his official authority or influence to coerce the political activity of any other person or
body. Nothing herein provided shall be understood to prevent any officer or employee from expressing
his views on current political problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of candidates for public
office whom he supports.

In addition, Rule 5.10, Canon 5, of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that:

Rule 5.10. A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political questions. But to avoid suspicion of
political partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches, contribute to party funds publicly endorse
candidates for political office or participate in other partisan political activities.

For having held himself out as a congressional candidate while still a member of the Bench, Respondent
took advantage of his position to boost his candidacy, demeaned the stature of his office, and must be
pronounced guilty of gross misconduct.

The prayer for disbarment is DENIED but respondent Municipal Trial Court Judge Nicolas is
SEVERELY CENSURED for his gross misconduct in holding himself out as a candidate for an elective
office while still a member of the Bench and respondent Judge is hereby DISMISSED from the service
with prejudice to re-employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government including
government-owned or controlled corporations and with forfeiture of his accrued retirement benefits and
leave credits.

========

CASE 32

2. 32 Central Bank Employees Association v. BSP (2004)

Doctrine:

Class Legislation & Equal Protection Clause

Facts:

The new Central Bank Act took effect and gave way for the creation of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.

Other Governmental Financial Institutions (GFIs) also amended their charters.

After almost 8 years following the amendment of the GFIs’ charters, BSP’s employees, through
petitioner, filed a petition for prohibition against the BSP and the Executive Secretary to restrain the
respondents from further implementing the last proviso in Sec. 15, Art. II of the New Central Bank Act
(i.e., the exemption from the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) of all employees with salary grade of 19
and the non-exemption of those having a salary grade under 19). They alleged its constitutionality for
being an invalid “class legislation”.

Petitioner’s Contentions:

The said proviso violates equal protection clause because only the officers of the BSP (those holding the
salary grade of 19 and up) are exempted from the SSL.Those belonging from 19 and up and those 19
below do not really differ from one other in terms of the nature of work and expertise.Other GFIs, which
are the same as the BSP, exempt all their rank-and-file personnel from SSL without any distinction.

BSP’s contention:

The proviso is not unconstitutional as it can stand the constitutional test, provided it is construed in
harmony with other provisions of the same law, such as the mandate of the Monetary Board to “establish
professionalism and excellence at all levels in accordance with sound principles of management.”Solicitor
General, on behalf of respondent Executive Secretary:The proviso is not unconstitutional as the
classification is based on actual and real differentiation, even as it adheres to the enunciated policy of the
new SB Act to establish professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and
policies of the national government.

Issue:
WON the proviso is unconstitutional for being violative of equal protection clause.

Held:

Yes, the proviso is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause.

Equal protection clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or
objects upon which different rules shall operate – so long as the classification is not unreasonable.
Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons themselves, but on
persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights.

In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of officers (SG 20 and
above) from the SSL was intended to address the BSP’s lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting
competent officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file and the
resulting discrimination or distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely
arbitrary in the legislative sense. However, in the subsequent passages of the amendment on the charters
of other GFI, the surrounding circumstances of the case changed.

The subsequent amendments of the other GFIs’ charter (i.e., express authorization to determine and
institute its own compensation and wage structure, and explicit exemption – without distinction as to
salary grade or position – all employees of the GFI from the SSL) resulted to the oppressive results of
Congress’ inconsistent and unequal policy towards the BSP rank-and-file and those of the seven other
GFI. In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the exemption from the SSL, there are no
characteristics peculiar only to the seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so as to justify the exemption which
BSP rank-and-file employees were denied (not to mention the anomaly of the SEC getting one). The
distinction made by the law is not only superficial, but also arbitrary. It is not based on substantial
distinctions that make real differences between the BSP rank-and-file and the seven other GFIs.

The subsequent grant to the rank-and-file of the seven other GFIs and continued denial to the BSP rank-
and-file employees of the exemption from SSL breached the latter’s right to equal protection.
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced.

========

CASE 33

Vistan vs. Nicholas

Facts:

Respondent judge was charged for a violation of election laws which was brought up in AC
No.3040. complainant narrated that as early as 10 February 1987, prior to 24 March 1987, or the date set
by the commssion on Elections to be the start of the campaing period, and while still an MTJ Judge of
Guiguinto, Bulacan, Respondent started circulating handbills/letters addressed to electoral constituents in
the second district of Bulacan indicating his intention to run for a congressional seat.

AM No. MTJ-87-79 was alson filed. Charging Respondent Judge with gorss ignorance of the law
and grave abuse of authority and immorality, after having acquitted an accused in a criminal case without
having ruled on the accused’s written offfer of evidence.

Issue:

Did Respondent judge acted improperly when he handed out letters manifesting his intention to
run as a conressional candidate?

Ruling:

Yes. Because under section 45 of PD No. 807 (civil service law) clearly states that: “no officer or
employee in the civil service including members of the Armed Forces, shall engage directly or indirectly
in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote nor shall he use his official
authority or influence to coerce the political activity of any other person or body. Nothing herein provided
shall be understood to preventany officer or employee from expessing his views on current political
problems or issue as from mentioning the names of candidates for public office whom he supports.”
 In addtion, rule 5.10, Canon 5, of the Code of Judiciary Conduct provides; “A judge is entitled to
entertain personal views on politcal questions. But to avoid suspicion of political partisanship, a judge
shall not make political speeches, contribute to partyfun, public endore candidates for political office or
participate inn other partisan political activities.”

For having held himself out as a congressional candidate while still a member of the Bench,
respondent took advantage of his position to boost his candidacy. Demeaned the stature of his office, and
must be pronounce guilty of gross misconduct.

=======

CASE 34

PASTOR vs. CITY OF PASIG

G.R. No. 146873.

May 9, 2002.

ARTICLE 9, Section 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution

B. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Power & Functions

Section 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall
establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity,
responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and
rewards system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and
institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the
President and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.

Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, 26(7) of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as

The Administrative Code of 1987, provides:

Reassignment — an employee may be reassigned from one organizational unit to another in the
same agency: Provided, that such reassignment shall not involve a reduction in rank, status, or
salary.

FACTS:

Petitioner Remedios Pastor is Budget Officer of the City of Pasig. In 1992, she was reassigned to the
Office of the Municipal Administrator pending investigation of reports against her concerning the
issuance of Advice of Allotments by her.

In 1995, after three years with no case filed against her, she asked for reinstatement to her former
position. But she was instead reassigned to another unit of the now city government. Upon her complaint,
the Civil Service Commission ordered her reinstatement as Budget Officer of the City of Pasig.

However, on appeal of the city government, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the Civil
Service Commission (CSC). Hence petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the decision of Court of Appeals (CA) should be set aside and that of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) reinstated.

HELD:

YES. It has been held that a reassignment that is indefinite and results in a reduction in rank, status, and
salary is in effect a constructive removal from the service. In this case, contrary to the ruling of the Court
of Appeals, petitioner’s reassignment to different offices in the local government of Pasig City is
indefinite. Petitioner has been on virtual floating assignments, which cannot but amount to a diminution
of her rank, hence impermissible under the law. As already noted, her reassignment began in 1992 with
her detail to the Office of the (now) City Administrator pending investigation of reports that she had
issued Advice of Allotments without sufficient cash collections. However, no investigation appears to
have ever been conducted on the said charge. To justify her continuing reassignment, respondent City
Mayor claimed that the same was “due to petitioner’s long years of experience in finance” which
especially fitted her for studies regarding the city’s revenues.

The Supreme Court (SC) with the CSC that petitioner should now be returned to her original position for
her indefinite detail to other positions would amount to her removal without cause from the position to
which she has been permanently appointed. There is no question that we recognize the validity and
indispensable necessity of the well-established rule that for the good of public service and whenever
public interest demands, [a] public official may be temporarily assigned or detailed to other duties even
over his objection without necessarily violating his fundamental and legal rights to security of tenure in
the civil service. But as we have already stated, “such cannot be undertaken when the transfer of the
employee is with a view to his removal” and “if the transfer is resorted to as a scheme to lure the
employee away from his permanent position” because “such attitude is improper as it would in effect
result in a circumvention of the prohibition which safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the
civil service.”
Petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. Respondent
City of Pasig is ordered to forthwith REINSTATE petitioner Remedios Pastor to her original position as
Budget Officer of the City of Pasig.

WHEREFORE, the appeal of Remedios Pastor is hereby found meritorious. She should already be
returned to her former position or assigned to an office where she can perform as head of a department.

=======

CASE 35

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, petitioner,

vs.

NITA P. BUENAOBRA, respondent.

G.R. No. 170021 September 8, 2006

FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman's Special Prosecution Officer filed an information against
respondent Buenaobra, Chairman of the Komisyon sa Wikang Pilipino before the Sandiganbayan for
allegedly causing undue injury to the government through gross inexcusable negligence in connection
with the unauthorized reprinting of the Diksyunaryo ng Wikang Pilipino.

While reinvestigation of the Sandiganbayan case was on-going, the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission
(PAGC) conducted a parallel administrative investigation ("the PAGC case") against respondent charging
her for the same act and for giving unwarranted benefits to Merylvin Publishing House, Inc. Respondent
moved to dismiss the administrative case on grounds of litis pendentia and forum shopping in view of the
pending Sandiganbayan case. The PAGC denied Respondent’s Motion and recommended her dismissal
from the service, forfeiture of financial benefits, and disqualification from joining the government.

Petitioner adopted this recommendation and dismissed Buenaobra and thereafter denied her Motion for
Reconsideration. Respondent then brought the matter to the Court of Appeals where it ruled in her favor
since PAGC did not give her the opportunity to present evidence. Instead, it proceeded to rule on the
merits of the case. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied and a petition for review was filed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent, presidential appointee and a holder of a non-career service
position, be removed from the service at the pleasure of the President.

HELD: No. The Court ruled that non-career service personnel such as Respondent’s position as defined
by the law enjoys security of tenure and removal from such office is not at the pleasure of the appointing
authority. It is well settled in the Court that regardless of classification of the position held by a
government employee by civil service rules, be it career or non-career position, such employee is duly
protected from removal or suspension without just cause and non-observance of due process. The
constitutional and statutory guarantee of security of tenure is extended to both those in the career and non-
career service positions, and the cause under which an employee may be removed or suspended must
naturally have some relation to the character or fitness of the officer or employee, for the discharge of the
functions of his office, or expiration of the project for which the employment was extended.

The aforesaid just cause is absent in this case thus, the petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court
of Appeals AFFIRMED.

=====

CASE 36

University of the Philippines and UP School of economics Vs. Teodoro Regino, Angel Pamplina and
Civil Service Commission

FACTS:

Private respondent Angel Pamplina, a mimeograph operator at the UP school of economics, was
dismissed on June 22, 1982, after she was found guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct for causing
the leakage of final exam question in Economics 106 under Prof. SOlita Monsod. Her appeal was denied
by the UP board of Regents, prompting her to seek relief from the Merit System Board created under PD
No. 1409. The MSB has the power to hear and decide administration cases involving officers and
employees of the Civil Service.The UP filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
MSB. The motion was denied. The MSB exonerated Pamplina and ordered her reinstatement with back
wages. UP moved for reconsideration, but this was denied.

The petition for certiorari was filed to seek the annulment of the decision of the trial court and the orders
of the commission directing reinstatement of Pamplina.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the administrative matters involving the discipline of UP employees fall under the sole
jurisdiction of the state university and the UP board of regents.

HELD:

The supreme court held in the negative. The civil service law PD 807 expressly rests in the commission
appellate jurisdiction in administrative disciplinary cases involving members of the civil services, section
9 (j) mandates that the commission shall have the power to hear and decide administrative cases instituted
directly with it in accordance with section 37 brought to it on appeal.

Pamplina had every right to seek mandamus to compel their assertion. Respondent Judge Region was
correct when he issued the questioned writ. The instant petition for certiorari is dismissed, and the
assailed decision of respondent Judge Teodoro P. Regino and the order of the civil service commission
were affirmed.

============

CASE 37

Sixto S. Brilllantes, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 163193 June 15, 2004

Callejo, Sr., J.:

FACTS:

On October 29, 2002, the COMELEC adopted, in its Resolution No. 02-0170, a modernization program
for the 2004 elections consisting of three (3) phases, to wit: (1) PHASE I – Computerized system of
registration and voters validation or the so-called "biometrics" system of registration; (2) PHASE II –
Computerized voting and counting of votes; and (3) PHASE III – Electronic transmission of results.
Phase I apparently encountered a problem in its implementation and Phase II nullified by the court’s
decision. COMELEC nevertheless ventured to implement Phase III of the AES through an electronic
transmission of advanced "unofficial" results of the 2004 elections for national, provincial and municipal
positions, also dubbed as an "unofficial quick count."
COMELEC promulgated on April 28, 20014, the assailed Resolution 6712, which provides for the
electronic transmission of advanced result of “unofficial count”.

The respondent COMELEC invokes the general grant to it of the power to enforce and administer all laws
relative to the conduct of elections and to promulgate rules and regulations to ensure free, orderly and
honest elections. COMELEC opines that it cannot, therefore, be considered as preempting or usurping the
exclusive power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President.

ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution No. 6712 should be declared void as it is unconstitutional.

RULING: Yes. The petition is granted. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed Resolution 6712. The assailed resolution
usurps, under the guise of an "unofficial" tabulation of election results based on a copy of the election
returns, the sole and exclusive authority of Congress under Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution to
canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice-President. The contention of the COMELEC that
its tabulation of votes is not prohibited by the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 8436 as such tabulation is
"unofficial," is puerile and totally unacceptable.

The assailed COMELEC resolution also contravenes the constitutional provision that "no money shall be
paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." Any disbursement of
public funds to implement this project is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and Rep. Act No.
9206, which is the 2003 General Appropriations Act.

The assailed resolution disregards existing laws which authorize solely the duly-accredited citizens’ arm
to conduct the "unofficial" counting of votes. Under Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by
Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, the accredited citizen’s arm - in
this case, NAMFREL - is exclusively authorized to use a copy of the election returns in the conduct of an
"unofficial" counting of the votes, whether for the national or the local elections. However, in
contravention of the law, the assailed Resolution authorizes the so-called Reception Officers (RO), to
open the second or third copy intended for the respondent COMELEC as basis for the encoding and
transmission of advanced "unofficial" precinct results. This not only violates the exclusive prerogative of
NAMFREL to conduct an "unofficial" count, but also taints the integrity of the envelopes containing the
election returns, as well as the returns themselves, by creating a gap in its chain of custody from the
Board of Election Inspectors to the COMELEC

==========

CASE 38

G.R. No. 155717 October 23, 2003

ALBERTO JARAMILLA, petitioner,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ANTONIO SUYAT

Facts:

[Respondent] Antonio Suyat and [petitioner] Alberto J. Jaramilla both ran for the position of Member of
the Sangguniang Bayan in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur in the May 14, 2001 elections.

On May 16, 2001, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Sta. Cruz, proclaimed the winning candidates
for the eight (8) members of the Sangguniang Bayan. JARAMILLA, Alberto Jimeno gathered a vote of
4,815 and was 7th place in the position. While the respondent herein Antonio Suyat obtained a vote of
Four thousand seven hundred seventy nine (4,779) votes and was ranked no. 9.

Upon review by [respondent Suyat], he discovered that [petitioner] was credited with only twenty three
(23) votes per Election Return from Precinct No. 34A1. However, when the figures were forwarded to the
Statement of Votes by Precinct, [petitioner] was credited with seventy three (73) votes for Precinct No.
34A1 or fifty (50) votes more than what he actually obtained.

On June 13, 2001, respondent Suyat filed before the COMELEC (public respondent herein) en banc an
Urgent Motion for Issuance of Order to Reconvene; COMELEC en banc issued the assailed resolution.
The Motion/Petition was granted. The proclamation of Respondent ALBERTO J. JARAMILLA [herein
petitioner] was annuled.

Issue(s):

Whether or not the COMELEC en banc can directly act on the correction of a manifest mistake in the
addition of votes or an erroneous tabulation in the statement of votes.

Decision:
Yes. The petition is dsimissed. Sec. 3 Article IX-C of the Constitution states that The Commission on
Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to
expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases
shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc.

Accordingly, when the case demands only the exercise by the COMELEC of its administrative functions,
such as the correction of a manifest mistake in the addition of votes or an erroneous tabulation in the
statement of votes, the COMELEC en banc can directly act on it in the exercise of its constitutional
function to decide questions affecting elections.

============

CASE 41

Baytan vs Comelec

FACTS:

Reynato, Reynaldo, and Adrian Baytan were on their way to register for the May 1998 elections when
newly elected Barangay Captain of Barangay 18 Zone II of Cavite City, Roberto Ignacio, led them to
register in Precinct No. 83-A. Later on they realized that their residence is situated within the jurisdiction
of Barangay 28 and not 18, so they registered anew in Precinct 129-A. The petitioners' voters registration
records were forwarded to the provincial election supervisor, who then recommended filing information
of double registration in violation of the Election Code. The petitioners filed with the Supreme Court a
petition for certiorari on the grounds that there was no probable cause and that election cases must first be
heard and decided by a Division before the COMELEC can assume jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not COMELEC has original jurisdiction over the case

HELD:

YES, the Constitution has granted COMELEC the duty to enforce and administer all election laws. The
finding of probable cause in the prosecution of election offenses rests in the sound discretion of the
COMELEC. Generally, the Court will not interfere with such finding of the COMELEC, absent a clear
showing of grave abuse of discretion. This principle emanates from the exclusive power of the
COMELEC to conduct preliminary investigation of all election investigation of all election offenses and
to prosecute the same.

=======

CASE 42

[G.R. Nos. 83938-40 November 6, 1989]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,

Vs.

HON. HENRY B. BASILLA, SALVACION COLAMBOT, SPOUSES JAIME AND ADORACION

TAYONG and MELCHOR YANSON,

Respondents.

ARTICLE 9, Section 2 Paragraph 4 and 8 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution

“C. The Commission on Election”

Power & Functions

Art IX, Sec 2 Paragraph 4;

Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of
the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of
ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

Art IX, Sec 2 Paragraph 8;

Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the
imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to, its
directive, order, or decision.

FACTS:
After May 1987 congressional elections in Masbate, complaints for violations of Section 261 of the
Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg.881) were filed with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Masbate
against the private respondents, Jolly Fernandez, then Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Governor,
against the spouses Jaime and Adoracion Tayong — for vote-buying

Ladislao Bataliran against Salvacion Colambot — for vote buying; and PC/Sgt Arturo Rebaya against
Melchor Yanson, for carrying of deadly weapon, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

Respondent Judge Henry Basilla “Motu Proprio” dismissed the three (3) informations filed by the
Provincial Fiscal, giving the following justification:

The record shows that the complainant filed the complaint with the fiscal and not with the COMELEC.
The COMELEC did not investigate the case. The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines says:

"Sec. 2(6) of Art. IX (1987 C) The Commission on Election shall exercise the following powers and
functions: Investigate and, when appropriate prosecute cases of violation of election laws, including acts
or omissions, constituting election frauds offenses, malpractices.”

The Omnibus Election Election Code of the Philippines (BP Blg, 881) says:

ARTICLE XXII.

ELECTION OFFENSES

Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. - The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. -

(1) Any person who gives, offers or promises money or anything of value, gives or promises any office or
employment, franchise or grant, public or private, or makes or offers to make an expenditure, directly or
indirectly, or cause an expenditure to be made to any person, association, corporation, entity, or
community in order to induce anyone or the public in general to vote for or against any candidate or
withhold his vote in the election, or to vote for or against any aspirant for the nomination or choice of a
candidate in a convention or similar selection process of a political party.

(2) Any person, association, corporation, group or community who solicits or receives, directly or
indirectly, any expenditure or promise of any office or employment, public or private, for any of the
foregoing considerations.

(b) Conspiracy to bribe voters. - Two or more persons, whether candidates or not, who come to an
agreement concerning the commission of any violation of paragraph (a) of this section and decide to
commit it.

(c) Wagering upon result of election. - Any person who bets or wagers upon the outcome of, or any
contingency connected with an election. Any money or thing of value or deposit of money or thing of
value situated anywhere in the Philippines put as such bet or wager shall be forfeited to the government.

Sec. 265. Prosecution. — The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the
exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code,
and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the
government; Provided, however, that in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint
within four months from his filing, the complaint may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or
with the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted. (Sec. 182, 1978, EC;
and Sec. 66. BP 697)

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, inasmuch as the election offense was not investigated and
prosecuted by the COMELEC. The case is motu proprio dismissed.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the Commission on Elections has authority to deputize the chief state prosecutors,
provincial and city fiscals and their assistants, under Sections 2 (4) and (8), Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution?
2. Whether or not the Comelec did deputize such prosecution officers to conduct preliminary
investigation of complaints for alleged violation of election laws and to institute criminal informations
therefor?

HELD:

1. YES, the Petition must be granted. Commission on Elections ("Comelec") has authority to deputize the
chief state prosecutors, provincial and city fiscals and their assistants, under Sections 2 (4) and (8), Article
IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, and that the Comelec did deputize such prosecution officers to conduct
preliminary investigation of complaints for alleged violation of election laws and to institute criminal
informations therefor.

There is no dispute that the Comelec is vested with power and authority to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under the Omnibus Election Code and to prosecute such
offenses in court under Section 265

2.YES, We note that while Section 265 of the Code vests "exclusive power" to conduct preliminary
investigation of election offenses and to prosecute the same upon the Comelec, it at the same time
authorizes the Comelec to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the Government.
Section 2 of Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution clearly envisage that the Comelec would not be
compelled to carry out all its functions directly and by itself alone.

========

CASE 44

JUNE GENEVIEVE R. SEBASTIAN, and DARIO ROMANO, petitioners,

vs.

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF STO.

TOMAS, DAVAO DEL NORTE (Jandelie B. Española, Liza D. Baco, and Valentin Gador),
SALVADOR ROYO, and ERIC ESTELA, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 139573-75 March 7, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioner June Genevieve Sebastian was the mayoralty candidate of the Reporma Party in Sto. Tomas,
Davao del Norte, during the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Dario Romano was her running mate.
Private respondent Salvador Royo was the mayoralty candidate of the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP, while
private respondent Eric Estela was his candidate for vice mayor.On election day, as the Municipal Board
of Canvassers was preparing to canvass the election returns, petitioners sought the exclusion from the
canvass of several election returns from certain precincts in barangays Kimamon, New Katipunan, Lunga-
og, Balagunan, Pantaron, and Tibal-og. Petitioners claimed that the election returns from these areas were
prepared under "extreme duress, threat, intimidation and political pressure and influence." Petitioners
also manifested that four election returns were missing.The Municipal Board of Canvassers denied the
petition, prompting petitioners to file three separate appeals with the COMELEC, docketed as SPC No.
98-129, SPC No. 98-142, and SPC No. 98-169.

The COMELEC First Division dismissed the appeal docketed as SPC No. 98-129 on July 15, 1998. No
motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners as appellants therein, thus, the dismissal became final
and executory on July 30, 1998.

Meanwhile, the COMELEC Second Division, ruling on the remaining consolidated appeals in a decision
promulgated on August 14, 1998, ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered the exclusion of 25 election
returns from the canvass of votes in Sto. Tomas.

On August 18, 1998, private respondent Royo filed a motion for reconsideration of said resolution. The
COMELEC en banc, as earlier stated, reversed the ruling of the COMELEC Second Division.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC has committed grave of abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction

HELD:

This petition stemmed from a pre-proclamation controversy. In a long line of cases, we have consistently
held that a pre-proclamation controversy is limited to an examination of the election returns on their face.
The COMELEC as a general rule need not go beyond the face of the returns and investigate alleged
election irregularities. To require the COMELEC to examine the circumstances surrounding the
preparation of election returns would run counter to the rule that a pre-proclamation controversy should
be summarily decided. Nor could we fault public respondents herein for grave abuse of discretion in
refusing petitioners’ call to exclude election returns they claim as the product of coercion and
falsification, even if they appear clean on their face. For respondent COMELEC had conducted hearings
on the matter, where petitioners and other parties concerned had submitted affidavits and presented
witnesses. The COMELEC found, however, that the evidence presented by petitioners failed to prove
convincingly that the assailed returns were tainted by duress. Contrary to petitioners’ claim, NAMFREL
volunteers and the Poll Watchers in the area attested that the election activities therein were generally
peaceful. Even the Board of Election Inspectors themselves swore nobody threatened or coerced them in
the performance of their duties, and that the elections in their area were peaceful, honest and orderly.
Given these factual circumstances, which could not be deemed evidently self-serving on its part,
respondent COMELEC could not have prudently and fairly excluded the assailed returns. The better part
of discretion in so delicate a matter is to await the filing of the appropriate action, like a regular election
protest, if the petitioners were so minded to pursue the proper remedy, rather than delay the determination
of the popular will.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, and the resolution of the COMELEC en banc in SPC No. 98-
129, SPC No. 98-142, and SPC No. 98-169 is hereby AFFIRMED.1âwphi1.nêt

=======

CASE 45

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, JESUS P. ESTANISLAO, DOLORES A.

SANTIAGO, LYNN H. CATUNCAN, NORMA O. TERREL, MA. ANTONIA G. REBUENO,
petitioners,

vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

G.R. No. 88435 January 16, 2002

CARPIO, J.:

Facts

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 of the letter-decision of the Chairman of the Commission on
Audit, and the letter-decision of the COA en banc3, prohibiting the Development Bank of the Philippines
from hiring a private external auditor.

1. In 1986, the Philippine government, under the administration of then President Corazon C. Aquino,
obtained from the World Bank an Economic Recovery Loan in the amount of US$310 million. The ERL
was intended to support the recovery of the Philippine economy, at that time suffering severely from the
financial crisis that hit the country during the latter part of the Marcos regime.

2. As a condition for granting the loan, the World Bank required the Philippine government to rehabilitate
the DBP which was then saddled with huge non-performing loans. The DBP was expected to continue
"providing principally medium and long-term financing to projects with risks higher than the private
sector may be willing to accept under reasonable terms." The government's commitment was embodied in
the Policy Statement for the Development Bank of the Philippines which stated in part: "4. Furthermore,
like all financial institutions under Central Bank supervision, DBP will now be required to have a private
external audit.”

3. Thus, on December 5, 1986, the Central Bank Governor issued Central Bank Circular No. 1124,
providing that:"SECTION 1. Subsection 1165.5 (Book I) is amended to read as follows:
➢ 1165.5 Financial Audit. - Each Bank, whether Government-owned or controlled or private, shall cause
an annual financial audit to be conducted by an external independent auditor not later than thirty (30) days
after the close of the calendar year or the fiscal year adopted by the bank. The Audit of a Government-
owned or controlled bank by an external independent auditor shall be in addition to and without prejudice
to that conducted by the Commission on Audit in the discharge of its mandate under existing law.

4. However, On April 27, 1987, the new COA Chairman, Eufemio Domingo, wrote the Central Bank
Governor protesting the Central Bank's issuance of Circular No. 1124 which allegedly encroached upon
the COA's constitutional and statutory power to audit government agencies.

Issue:

Whether or not the constitutional power of the COA to examine and audit the DBP is exclusive and
precludes a concurrent audit of the DBP by a private external auditor.

Held:

No. The resolution of the primordial issue of whether or not the COA has the sole and exclusive power to
examine and audit government banks involves an interpretation of Section 2, Article IX-D of the 1987
Constitution. This Section provides as follows:

"Sec. 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and
settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and
property, owned and held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters, x xx.

"(2) The Commission shall have the exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define
the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefore, and
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of
government funds and properties." (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.

Thus, the first paragraph of Section 2 must be read the way it appears, without the word "exclusive",
signifying that non-COA auditors can also examine and audit government agencies. Besides, the framers
of the Constitution intentionally omitted the word "exclusive" in the first paragraph of Section 2 precisely
to allow concurrent audit by private external auditors. The clear and unmistakable conclusion from a
reading of the entire Section 2 is that the COA's power to examine and audit is non-exclusive. On the
other hand, the COA's authority to define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and regulations,
and disallow unnecessary expenditures is exclusive.

=============
CASE 46

Sandiganbayan - Article XI, Section 4

Nunez v. Sandiganbayan

G.R. Nos. L-50581-5061, January 30, 1982

FACTS:

Petitioner assails the validity of the PD 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as amended by PD 1606. The
petitioner was accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of public and commercial
documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. It is
the claim of the petitioner that PD1486, as amended, is violative of the due process, equal protection, and
ex post facto clauses of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection insofar as appeals would be
concerned.

HELD:

The SC ruled against the petitioner. The 1973 Constitution had provided for the creation of a special court
that shall have original jurisdiction over cases involving public officials charged with graft and
corruption. The constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the
Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely,
dishonesty in the public service.

=====

CASE 47

Rufino V. Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-50581-50617January 30, 1982

Fernando, C.J.:

Facts:

Rufino V. Nunez was accused for estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents
committed in connivance with his others co-accused and are all public officials.
On May 15, 1979, upon being arraigned, Nunez filed a motion to quash on constitutional and
jurisdictional grounds, a week later, respondent court denied such motion. He filed a motion for
reconsideration the next day but the same is also denied.

Nunez filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition and he claims that Presidential Decree No. 1486,
creating the Sandiganbayan, as amended, creating the respondent court is violative of due process, equal
protection, and ex post facto clauses of the constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not the creation of a special court like the Sandiganbayan violates due process, equal
protection and ex post facto clauses of the constitution.

Ruling:

NO.

The Supreme Court held that P.D. 1606 did not discriminate against persons convicted by the
Sandiganbayan in giving them only the remedy for certiorari with the Supreme Court as distinguished
from those convicted by other trial courts, who could appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court and even
the Supreme Court and so who have more prospects of reversal of the decision agains them. Trial in the
Sandiganbayan is conducted by the three justices constituting each division, and their unanimous vote is
needed for a decision, which conceivably will be more carefully reached than that of the other trial courts.

Where a law amending R.A. 3019 provided for the suspension pendent lite of any public officer or
employee accused of offenses involving fraudulent use of public funds or property, including those
charged earlier, it was held in Bayot v. Sandiganbayan that the amendment was not ex post facto even if
applied retroactively because the suspension was not punitive but merely preventive. P.D. No. 1606 itself,
creating the Sandiganbayan, was held to be not a penal law and therefore not ex post facto.

====================================

CASE 49

ATTY. RONALDO P. LEDESMA, Petitioners,

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in

his capacity as Ombudsman, HON. ABELARDO L. APORTADERA, in his capacity as Assistant
Ombudsman, and Ombudsman’s Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau, represented by Director
AGAPITO ROSALES,Respondents.

G.R. No. 161629 July 29, 2005

FACTS: Petitioner Atty. Ronaldo P. Ledesma is the Chairman of the First Division of the Board of
Special Inquiry(BSI) of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID). In a letter-complaint filed by
Augusto Somalio with the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FIIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman,
an investigation was requested on alleged anomalies surrounding the extension of the Temporary
Resident Visas (TRVs) of two (2) foreign nationals. The FIIB investigation further revealed seven (7)
other cases of TRV extensions tainted with similar irregularities.

As a result, the FIIB, as nominal complainant, filed before the Administrative Adjudication Bureau
(AAB) of the Office of the Ombudsman a formal complaint against herein petitioner. Also charged
administratively were Atty. Arthel Caronongan and Ma. Elena P. Ang, Board Member and Executive
Assistant, respectively, in petitioner’s division. With respect to petitioner, the complaint was treated as
both a criminal and an administrative charge and docketed as OMB-0-98-0214 (criminal aspect), for nine
(9) counts of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and for falsification of public
documents, and OMB-ADM-0-98-0038 (administrative aspect), for nine (9) counts of Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, Falsification of Public Documents and Gross Neglect of Duty.

The complaint against petitioner, Caronongan and Ang alleged the following illegal acts: (a) irregularly
granting TRVs beyond the prescribed period; and (b) using "recycled" or photocopied applications for a
TRV extension without the applicants affixing their signatures anew to validate the correctness and
truthfulness of the information previously stated therein. Specifically, petitioner and Caronongan
allegedly signed the Memorandum of Transmittal to the Board of Commission (BOC) of the BID,
forwarding the applications for TRV extension of several aliens whose papers were questionable.

In a Joint Resolution , Graft Investigation Officer Marlyn M. Reyes resolved the administrative cases
filed against petitioner, Caronongan and Ang, recommended the following:

1. Respondent ATTY. RONALDO P. LEDESMA be SUSPENDED from the service for one (1) year for
Conduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Service;

2. The instant case against ATTY. ARTHEL B. CARONONGAN be DISMISSED, the same having been
rendered moot and academic; and

3. The instant case against respondent MA. ELENA P. ANG be DISMISSED for lack of sufficient
evidence.

Respondent Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr. reviewed the Joint Resolution which was
approved by respondent Ombudsman Desierto .

Ombudsman approved a Resolution of Graft Investigation Officer Marilou B. Ancheta-Mejica, dismissing

the criminal charges against petitioner for insufficiency of evidence.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration in the administrative case alleging that the BOC which
reviews all applications for TRVs extension, approved the TRVs in question, hence, petitioner argued that
it effectively declared the applications for extension regular and in order and waived any infirmity
thereon.

Graft Officer Reyes recommended the denial of the motion for reconsideration which was approved by
respondent Ombudsman but reduced the period of suspension from one (1) year to nine (9) months
without pay.

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which included a prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary prohibitory mandatory injunction and/or temporary restraining order to enjoin
public respondents from implementing the order of suspension. The Court of Appeals issued the TRO.

The Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner’s suspension but reduced the period from nine (9) months to six
(6) months and one (1) day without pay.

With the denial of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on the
grounds that (1)Court of Appeals overlooked relevant facts if properly considered, would have justified a
different conclusion in favor of Petitioner.

(2)Court of Appeals pronouncement of the finding of the Ombudsman is not merely advisory on the
Bureau of Immigration (BI) is contrary to the pertinent provision of the 1987 Constitution and applicable
decisions of the court.

Lastly, Court of Appeal also failed to consider that Ombudsman’s resolution finding Petitioner
administratively liable constitutes an indirect encroachment into the power of the Bureau of Immigration
over Immigration matters.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not petitioner committed any misconduct, nonfeasance, misfeasance or malfeasance in the
performance of his duties.

2. Whether or not Court of Appeals pronouncement of the finding of the Ombudsman is not merely
advisory on the Bureau of Immigration and is contrary to the provision of the 1987 Constitution.

3. Whether or not Ombudsman’s findings regarding the TRV applications were illegal constitutes an
indirect encroachment into the power of the Bureau of Immigration over Immigration matters.

RULING:

1. Yes. Petitioner insists that it was the BOC which approved the questioned applications for the
extension of the TRVs. He denies that he misled or deceived the BOC into approving these applications
and argues that the BOC effectively ratified his actions and sanctioned his conduct when it approved the
subject applications. Petitioner adds that he acted in good faith and the government did not suffer any
damage as a result of his alleged administrative lapse.
The court is not persuaded. In his attempt to escape liability, petitioner undermines his position in the BID
and his role in the processing of the subject applications. But by his own admission, it appears that the
BSI not only transmits the applications for TRV extension and its supporting documents, but more
importantly, it interviews the applicants and evaluates their papers before making a recommendation to
the BOC. The BSI reviews the applications and when it finds them in order, it executes a Memorandum
of Transmittal to the BOC certifying to the regularity and propriety of the applications.

In Arias v. Sandiganbayan, we stated that all heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their
subordinates. Practicality and efficiency in the conduct of government business dictate that the gritty
details be sifted and reviewed by the time it reaches the final approving authority. In the case at bar, it is
not unreasonable for the BOC to rely on the evaluation and recommendation of the BSI as it cannot be
expected to review every detail of each application transmitted for its approval. Petitioner being the
Chairman of the First Division of the BSI has direct supervision over its proceedings. Thus, he cannot
feign ignorance or good faith when the irregularities in the TRV extension applications are so patently
clear on its face. He is principally accountable for certifying the regularity and propriety of the
applications which he knew were defective.

Petitioner could not validly claim that he was singled out for prosecution. It is of record that
administrative cases were also filed against Caronongan and Ang, but extraneous circumstances rendered
the case against Caronongan moot while the case against Ang was dismissed because it was proven that
she merely implemented the approved decision of the BOC.

2. No. The point of contention is the binding power of any decision or order that emanates from the
Office of the Ombudsman after it has conducted its investigation. Under Section 13(3) of Article XI of
the 1987 Constitution, it is provided:

Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault,
and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance
therewith.

Petitioner insists that the word "recommend" be given its literal meaning; that is, that the Ombudsman’s
action is only advisory in nature rather than one having any binding effect, citing Tapiador v. Office of
the Ombudsman,thus:
For the sake of argument, that petitioner were administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no authority to
directly dismiss the petitioner from the government service, more particularly from his position in the
BID. Under Section 13, subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can
only "recommend" the removal of the public official or employee found to be at fault, to the public
official concerned.

However, the Ombudsman’s "recommendation" is not merely advisory in nature but is actually
mandatory within the bounds of law.

3. No. This should not be interpreted as usurpation by the Ombudsman of the authority of the head of
office or any officer concerned. It has long been settled that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate
and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an exclusive authority but a shared
or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged.

By stating therefore that the Ombudsman "recommends" the action to be taken against an erring officer or
employee, the provisions in the Constitution and in RA 6770 intended that the implementation of the
order be coursed through the proper officer, which in this case would be the head of the BID.

It is likewise apparent that under RA 6770, the lawmakers intended to provide the Office of the
Ombudsman with sufficient muscle to ensure that it can effectively carry out its mandate as protector of
the people against inept and corrupt government officers and employees. The Office was granted the
power to punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. It was given disciplinary authority
over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and
agencies (with the exception only of impeachable officers, members of Congress and the Judiciary). Also,
it can preventively suspend any officer under its authority pending an investigation when the case so
warrants.

It is thus clear that the framers of our Constitution intended to create a stronger and more effective
Ombudsman, independent and beyond the reach of political influences and vested with powers that are
not merely persuasive in character. The Constitutional Commission left to Congress to empower the
Ombudsman with prosecutorial functions which it did when RA 6770 was enacted.

In light of the foregoing, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not commit any error in finding the
petitioner guilty of conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service and reducing petitioner’s period of
suspension to six (6) months and one (1) day without pay, taking into account the education and length of
service of petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED due to lack of merit. The Decision dated August 28, 2003
and the Resolution dated January 15, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58264 are
AFFIRMED.

=========

CASE 50

Tichangco vs Enriquez

GR No 150629 June 30, 2004

FACTS: Petitioners assailed the August 8 2001 decision and the October 29, 2002 resolution of the Court
of Appeals affirming the findings of the Land Registration Authority administrator that there were no
legal grounds to initiate proceedings to nullify Original Certificate of Title Nos. 820 and 7477 and the
subsequent titles are derived therefrom Transfer Certificate of Titles Nos. 128240 to 128248, inlusive, and
TCT No. 128270 all covering parcels of land in Tondo, Manila, registered in the names of the private
respondents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA complied with Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD: Yes. There is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement when a collegiate
appellate court, after deliberation, decides to deny a motion; states that the questions raised are factural or
have already been passed upon; or cites some other legal basis. The CA decision contain the necessary
antecedents to warrant its conclusions, the appelate court cannot be said to have withheld "any specific
finding of facts". What the law insists on is that a decision states the "essential ultimate facts". Indeed, the
"mere failure to specify the contentions of the petitioner and the reasons for refusing to believe them is
not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the provision of law and the Constitution.

=========

CASE 51

G.R. No. 164316 September 27, 2006

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner,

vs.

GERTRUDES MADRIAGA and ANA MARIE BERNARDO, respondents.

Facts:

By letter-complaint of September 8, 2000 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, the San Juan School
Club (the Club), through its president Teresa Nuque (Teresa), charged respondents with violation of
Section 1 of Rule IV2 and Section 1 of Rule VI3 of the Rules Implementing Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.

Graft Investigation Officer Helen M. Acuña, by Decision of May 28, 2001, found respondents guilty of
violation of Section 5(a) of R.A. No. 6713. By Memorandum Order dated June 28, 2001, however, Graft
Investigation Officer Julita Calderon "set aside" Helen Acuña's decision, the former finding that
respondents were guilty also of conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and
accordingly penalizing them with six months suspension. Thus Julita Calderon's order disposed:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises being considered and there being substantial evidence to establish the
guilt of respondent GERTRUDES MADRIAGA for violation of Section 5 (a) of RA 6713 for not
promptly responding to the letter request of the complainant for copies of the school canteen's financial
statements for the period from February to August 2000 and against respondents GERTRUDES
MADRIAGA and ANA MARIE BERNARDO for [C]onduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service under Section 22(t) of Rule XIV, of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO No.
292, the penalty of six (6) months suspension is hereby imposed as against both these respondents.

Respondents' motion for reconsideration and/or reinvestigation having been denied by Order of July 26,
2001, they elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari.

The Court of Appeals having declared, by Decision of May 28, 2004, that the six-month suspension
meted out by the Office of the Ombudsman to respondent Gertrudes Madriaga (Gertrudes), school
principal of San Juan Elementary School, San Juan, Metro Manila, and her co-respondent Ana Marie
Bernardo (Ana Marie), a classroom teacher who was designated as Canteen Manager of the same school,
is merely recommendatory to the Department of Education, the Office of the Ombudsman filed the
present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issue(s):

Whether or not the six month suspension meted out by the Ombudsman against the respondents herein are
merely recomendatory to the Department of Education.

Decision:
No. The challenged Court of Appeals Decision of May 28, 2004 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) have conferred on it full disciplinary
authority over public officials and employees including the power to enforce its duly-issued judgments,
and jurisprudence has upheld such authority; and under Section 21 of R.A. No. 6770, with the exception
of impeachable officials, Members of Congress and the Judiciary, it has been given full administrative
disciplinary jurisdiction over all public officials and employees who commit any kind of malfeasance,
misfeasance or non-feasance.

Article XI, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution13 grants petitioner administrative disciplinary power to

(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient, [and]

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault,
and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance
therewith.

Section 15(3) of R.A. No. 6770 echoes the constitutional grant to petitioner of the power to "recommend"
the imposition of penalty on erring public officials and employees and ensure compliance therewith. The
Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties: (3) Direct the officer
concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at fault or who neglects to
perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion,
fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its disciplinary authority as
provided in Section 2114 of this Act: Provided, that the refusal by an officer without just cause to comply
with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or
employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law shall be a
ground for disciplinary action against said officer.

Akin to the questioned issuances in the case at bar. That the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to
comply with such an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for
disciplinary action, is a strong indication that the Ombudsman's "recommendation" is not merely advisory
in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law.

In fine, petitioner's authority to impose administrative penalty and enforce compliance therewith is not
merely recommendatory. It is mandatory within the bounds of the law. The implementation of the order
imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed through the proper officer.