PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY | Soy Abeto
Castillo v. Republic G.R. No. 214064 February 6, 2017
Psychological Incapacity, Art. 36, FC
ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of evidence presented warrants, as
the RTC determined, the declaration of nullity of the marriage
of Mirasol and Felipe on the ground of the latter’s
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
RULING:
Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not
by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’s
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological
incapacity, the respondent’s unfaithfulness must be
established as a manifestation of a disordered personality,
completely preventing the respondent from discharging the
essential obligations of the marital state; there must be proof
of a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively
incapacitated him from complying with the obligation to be
faithful to his spouse.
It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical
or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
As discussed, the findings on Felipe’s personality profile did
not emanate from a personal interview with the subject
himself. Apart from the psychologist’s opinion and petitioner’s
allegations, no other reliable evidence was cited to prove that
Felipe’s sexual infidelity was a manifestation of his alleged
personality disorder, which is grave, deeply rooted, and
incurable.
The Court is not persuaded that the natal or supervening
disabling factor which effectively incapacitated him from
complying with his obligation to be faithful to his wife was
medically or clinically established.
Basic is the rule that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by
evidence, are not equivalent to proof, i.e., mere allegations are
not evidence.
The petition for review was denied.
KALAW vs. FERNANDEZ G.R. No. 166357 September 19,
2011 Psychological Incapacity Art. 36 Family Code
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent
suffers from psychological incapacity.
RULING:
The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible
error in setting aside the trial courts Decision for lack of legal
and factual basis.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is governed by
Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise

be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability
to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations. The burden of proving psychological incapacity is
on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated
party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a
serious psychological disorder that completely disables him or
her from understanding and discharging the essential
obligations of the marital state. The psychological problem
must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and
must be incurable.
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife
(respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He
presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses
who concluded that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were
premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which
had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioners experts heavily
relied on petitioners allegations of respondents constant
mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with
friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioners
experts opined that respondents alleged habits, when
performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of
time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a
psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually
engaged in the behaviors described as constitutive of NPD,
there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed
psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the
evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair assessment
of the facts would show that respondent was not totally remiss
and incapable of appreciating and performing her marital and
parental duties.
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY | Soy Abeto
The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve
as bases for its legal conclusion of psychological incapacity.
Republic vs. Molina and CA, G.R. No. 108763 February 13,
1997 Psychological Incapacity
ISSUE:
Whether or not “opposing and conflicting personalities” is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
RULING:
NO.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals this Court, speaking
thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that “psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical)
incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated.” Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, Justice Vitug wrote that “the
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.”
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear
showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a “difficulty,” if not
outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some

marital obligations. Mere showing of “irreconciliable
differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove
that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties
as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor
physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she
and her husband could nor get along with each other. There
had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its
juridical antecedence nor its incurability.
Mendoza vs. Republic G.R. 157649, Nov. 12, 2012
Psychological Incapacity
ISSUES:
Is OSG appeal no longer required under A.M. No. 02-11-10?
Whether or not the totality of evidence presented was enough
to support a finding of respondent’s psychological incapacity.
RULING:
The contention is grossly erroneous and unfounded. The
Resolution nowhere stated that appeals by the OSG were no
longer required. On the contrary, the Resolution explicitly
required the OSG to actively participate in all stages of the
proceedings. The obvious intent of the Resolution was to
require the OSG to appear as counsel for the State in the
capacity of a defensor vinculi (i.e., defender of the marital
bond) to oppose petitions for, and to appeal judgments in favor
of declarations of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, thereby ensuring that only the meritorious cases
for the declaration of nullity of marriages based on
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY | Soy Abeto
psychological incapacity-those sufficiently evidenced by
gravity, incurability and juridical antecedence-would succeed.
2. We consider the CA’s refusal to accord credence and
weight to the psychiatric report to be well taken and warranted.
The CA correctly indicated that the ill-feelings that she
harbored towards Dominic, which she admitted during her
consultation with Dr. Samson, furnished the basis to doubt the
findings of her expert witness; that such findings were one-
sided, because Dominic was not himself subjected to an actual
psychiatric evaluation by petitioner’s expert; and that he also
did not participate in the proceedings; and that the findings
and conclusions on his psychological profile by her expert
were solely based on the self-serving testimonial descriptions
and characterizations of him rendered by petitioner and her
witnesses.
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article
36, it is logical and understandable to give weight to the expert
opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the
psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the
root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of
the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while
highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts
must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable
evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if
the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or
psychological examination of the person concerned need not
be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case
presented before it, must always base its decision not solely
on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the
totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.

Capili vs. People G.R. No. 183805, July 03, 2013
Bigamy
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the
second marriage is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case
for bigamy.
RULING:
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes
the crime of bigamy as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be
imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the
offender has been legally married; (2) the marriage has not
been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according
to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has
all the essential requisites for validity.9
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the
crime of bigamy were present when the Information was filed
on June 28, 2004.
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY | Soy Abeto
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and
private respondent was contracted on December 8, 1999
during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between
petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September
3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the
bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner
and private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial
declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in
nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime
of bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused
may still be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is
a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage,
so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the
second marriage was celebrated.
UNSON III vs. HON. PEDRO C. NAVARRO AND EDITA N.
ARANETA
G.R. No. L-52242 November 17, 1980 Child Custody
(Habeas Corpus)
ISSUE: To whom shall the custody of Teresa be granted?
RULING:
In controversies regarding the custody of minors the sole and
foremost consideration is the physical, education, social and
moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the
respective resources and social and moral situations of the
contending parents. Never has this Court diverted from that
criterion.
With this premise in view, the Court finds no difficulty in this
case in seeing that it is in the best interest of the child Teresa

to be freed from the obviously unwholesome, not to say
immoral influence, that the situation in which private
respondent has placed herself, as admitted by her, might
create in the moral and social outlook of Teresa who is now in
her formative and most impressionable stage in her life. The
fact that petitioner might have been tolerant about her stay
with her mother in the past when she was still too young to
distinguish between right and wrong and have her own correct
impressions or notions about the unusual and peculiar
relationship of her mother with her own uncle-in-law, the
husband of her sister’s mother, is hardly of any consequence
now that she has reached a perilous stage in her life.
Under the circumstances thus shown in the record, the Court
finds no alternative than to grant private respondent no more
than visitorial rights over the child in question. Anyway,
decisions even of this Supreme Court on the custody of minor
children are always open to adjustment as the circumstances
relevant to the matter may demand in the light of the inflexible
criterion.
PEREZ-FERRARIS vs. FERRARIS G.R. No. 162368 July 17,
2006 Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Psychological
Incapacity, Article 36 of the Civil Code
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage of petitioner and respondent is
void ab initio on the ground of respondent’s psychological
incapacity.
RULING:
It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial
court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on
this Court, save for the most compelling and cogent reasons,
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY | Soy Abeto
like when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the
issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the
parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts
which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion;
or when there is a misappreciation of facts, which are
unavailing in the instant case.
The term “psychological incapacity” to be a ground for the
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers
to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before
the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume.
As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or
isolated characteristics associated with certain personality
disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological
incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.
It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on
psychological experts for its understanding of the human
personality. However, the root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully
explained, which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.
Indeed, the evidence on record did not convincingly establish
that respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity.
There is absolutely no showing that his “defects” were already
present at the inception of the marriage, or that those are
incurable.

We find respondent’s alleged mixed personality disorder, the
“leaving-the-house” attitude whenever they quarreled, the
violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity,
the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to
spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not
rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, where therein respondent
preferred to spend more time with his friends than his family
on whom he squandered his money, depended on his parents
for aid and assistance, and was dishonest to his wife regarding
his finances, the Court held that the psychological defects
spoken of were more of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or
“neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations and
that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological
incapacity; it is not enough to prove that the parties failed to
meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is
essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so,
due to some psychological, not physical, illness.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void
marriage. No less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity
of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as
legally “inviolable” and protects it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
“protected” by the state.
Republic vs. Encelan, G.R. No. 170022, Jan. 9, 2013 Art.
36 of the Family Code, Psychologically incapacity
ISSUE:
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY | Soy Abeto
How should “psychologically incapacity” under Art. 36 of the
Family Code be interpreted?
How should the doubt be resolved in voiding of marriage
cases?
RULING:
1) In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed
that psychological incapacity contemplates “downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the
basic marital obligations”; not merely the refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.
The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical
antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration
of marriage), gravity and incurability of the condition of the
errant spouse.
2) The Court stresses that marriage is an inviolable social
institution protected by the State. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of its existence its existence and continuation
and against its dissolution and nullity. It cannot be dissolved at
the whim of the parties nor by transgressions made by one
party to the other during the marriage.
QUIAO vs. QUIAO, et. al. G.R. No 176556 July 4, 2012 due
process, Family Code, vested right
ISSUE:
What is “vested right” from the perspective of the due process
clause? Was petitioner’s “vested right” over half of the
common properties of the conjugal partnership violated when
the trial court forfeited them in favor of his children pursuant to
Article 63 (2) and 129 of the Family Code?
RULING:

No.
In the en banc Resolution dated October 18, 2005 for
ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer Samson S. Alcantara, et al.
v. The Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita,it was held
that:
The concept of “vested right” is a consequence of the
constitutional guaranty of due process that expresses a
present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice
is protected against arbitrary state action; it includes not only
legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also
exemptions from new obligations created after the right has
become vested.
Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a
present interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed
and irrefutable. From the foregoing, it is clear that while one
may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose the
same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded
in law and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to
due process.
First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her
complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her.
Second, when the Decision was promulgated, the petitioner
never questioned the trial court’s ruling forfeiting what the trial
court termed as “net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7) of the
Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived
of his right to due process.
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY | Soy Abeto
DONATO vs. LUNA G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988
BIGAMY, Prejudicial Question
ISSUE:
Whether or not a pending criminal case for bigamy should be
suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage on
the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question.
RULING:
A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises
in a case, the resolution of which question is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is one
based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal
action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined. A prejudicial
question usually comes into play in a situation where a civil
action and a criminal action may proceed, because howsoever
the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in a criminal case.
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the
case at bar. It must be noted that the issue touching upon the
nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner
Donato’s guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy.
Furthermore, it was petitioner’s second wife, the herein private
respondent Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of

the second marriage on the ground that her consent was
obtained through deceit.
The doctrine elucidated upon by the case of Landicho vs.
Relova may be applied to the present case. Said case states
that:
The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages
entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean
that “prejudicial questions” are automatically raised in civil
actions as to warrant the suspension of the case. In order that
the case of annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial
question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be
shown that the petitioner’s consent to such marriage must be
the one that was obtained by means of duress, force and
intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must
be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the
crime of bigamy.
The situation in the present case is markedly different. At the
time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February 27,
1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been
contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it was the second
spouse, not the petitioner who filed the action for nullity on the
ground of force, threats and intimidation.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of
the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long
as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the
marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY | Soy Abeto
Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova,
petitioner Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial
questions since a case for annulment of marriage can be
considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case
against the accused only if it is proved that the petitioner’s
consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress,
violence and intimidation in order to establish that his act in the
subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such the
same cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding
elements do not exist in the case at bar.
Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial
question to evade the prosecution of the criminal case.
Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit
the order of denial issued by the respondent judge dated April
14, 1980 should be sustained.
8. Is there a need for that the party alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated has been personally examined
by a physician or psychologist?
The Supreme Court held that, although there is no
requirement that a party to be declared psychologically
incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist, there is a need to prove the psychological
incapacity through independent evidence adduced by the
person alleging such disorder. (Bier v. Bier, G.R. No. 173294,
27 February 2008)
Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that there is no
requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage
based psychological incapacity. What matters is whether the
totality of evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding

of psychological incapacity. (Marcos v. Marcos, G.R. No.
136490, October 19 2000)
Correspondingly, the presentation of expert proof presupposes
a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave,
severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
(Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, G.R. No. 161793, 13 February 2009)
9. When does the action or defense for declaration of
nullity prescribe?
The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage does not prescribe, regardless of whether or not the
marriage was celebrated before or after the effectivity of the
Family Code.
10. My husband wouldn’t help me in the chores around
the house, saying those are a woman’s job. Can I use the
ground of psychological incapacity in my petition for
annulment against him?
No. It bears stressing that psychological incapacity must be
more than just a “difficulty,” “refusal” or “neglect” in the
performance of some marital obligations. Rather, it is essential
that the concerned party was incapable of doing so, due to
some psychological illness existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. (Marable v. Marable, G.R. No.
178741, January 17, 2011)
The intention of the law is to confine the meaning of
“psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY | Soy Abeto
marriage. (Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019,
January 04, 1995)
Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or her responsibility
and duty as a married person is not enough; it is essential that
he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to
some psychological illness.
(Yambao v. Republic, G.R. No. 184063, January 24, 2011)
11. My husband started showing signs of being
psychologically incapacitated about 4 years ago.
However, we had been married for 15 years, and all that
time, he was the perfect husband. Can I use the ground of
psychological incapacity in my petition for nullity of my
marriage?
No. The psychological incapacity must be proved to have been
existing before the marriage. If after the marriage, the ground
of psychological incapacity cannot be used. The Supreme
Court had repeatedly pronounced that the root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological
illness, with its incapacitating nature fully explained and
established by the totality of the evidence presented during the
trial.
12. I have not been getting along with my wife for quite a
while now. Can I allege psychological incapacity as a
ground for filing an annulment case against her?
No you cannot. What the law requires to render a marriage
void on the ground of psychological incapacity is downright
incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty much less ill will.
The mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and
“conflicting personalities” does not constitute psychological
 PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY | Soy Abeto
incapacity. (Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108763, 13
February 1997)

13. If there is any doubt in my case for nullity of my

marriage, how would the court resolve the case?

The Supreme Court held that the Constitution sets out a policy
of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.
Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by the State,
cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for
the declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to
show the nullity of marriage lies on the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation
of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
(Republic v. Cabantug-Baguio, G.R.No. 171042, 30 June
2008)

14. What will happen to the children if the petition for

nullity of marriage has been granted on the ground of
psychological incapacity?

The children will still be considered legitimate. Children of

marriages void under Article 36 (psychological incapacity) and
under Article 53 (second marriage without delivery of legitime
to children of the first marriage) are considered legitimate, as
an exception to the general rule.