Kant, History, Universality – Jorg Meurkes

Introduction

In this paper I will examine what Kant means with the term ‘universal’ in his text “Idea for a
Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective” (ref). Kant's use of the term evokes the
traditional ‘problem of universals’ in philosophy. Since Kant claims that compiling such a universal
history is a task for a philosopher, understanding Kant’s position with regard to universals may help
us to clarify what Kant means with ‘universal history’.

We can get at the problem via a basic example. Say we see a cube of sugar over here, and a cube of
sugar over there. On the one hand we have two particular things in front of us: this-cube and that-
cube. We can point them out. On the other hand, if we compare them, we are also aware that they
share something that we could call their ‘cubeness.’ This quality is definitely there, for otherwise
they would not be cubes. The problem, however, is that we can’t point to this shared quality in the
same way we can point to particulars: we can point to ‘this-cube’ and ‘that-cube,’ but we can’t point
to ‘this-cubeness.’ Cubeness is not exactly the same kind of thing as a particular cube. Traditionally,
the former entities have been referred to as ‘universals.’ The problem of universals is thus: they
must somehow exist, but we cannot point them out like we point out particulars, so what are they?
Since the answer is not obvious, the problem elicits a philosophical explanation of how such qualities
exist.

If we take the problem of universals as a given, we can interpret all kinds of philosophers as taking a
position with regard to the existence of universals. In this debate, Plato would hold the position that
universals are real, non-sensible entities that exist in a separate intelligible world, a supersensible
form in which particulars participate to a greater or lesser extent. According to Plato then, the
human mind comes to understand universals by contemplating these form (e.g. by understanding
the mathematical properties of cubes). Aristotle, by contrast, although he would agree with Plato
that universals exist, argues that they do not exist in any separate intelligible realm, but rather
within particulars as their very form. For Aristotle, Universals are precisely what gives particulars
their concrete form (e.g. for a sugar cube, cubeness is the form, sugar is the matter). According to
Aristotle then, the human mind acquires understanding of universals by abstraction from particulars
– where the form impresses itself on the mind like a seal impresses itself on wax - and universals
exist only in that secondary sense as separate from particulars. Insofar both take universals to be
really existing entities, Plato and Aristotle have been classified as ‘realists’ with regard to universals
(Plato as ‘transcendentist’ and Aristotle as ‘immanentist’) as opposed to ‘nominalists’ who reject the
existence of universal entities (Klima, "The Medieval Problem of Universals").

In a similar way, Michael Oberst argues that Kant can be interpreted as having “a settled position on
universals” (Oberst, “Kant on Universals.” 335). By universals Oberst refers to “metaphysical entities
that are instantiated in multiple substances.” According to Oberst, most interpreters contend that
Kant rejects such universal entities: Jules Vuillemin argues that “Kant’s claim that the universality of
concepts is always made by the understanding shows that he rejects universals”; Houston Smit
claims that for Kant “only forms of judgments are universal, similar to ‘Aristotelian abstractionism’”; 
whereas Beatrice Longueness holds that “while Kant is an antirealist about universals, he is at the
same time an ‘immanentist.’” (Oberst 335). Oberst himself argues that “Kant rejects universals, but
at the same time situates himself between traditional nominalism and realism about universals”
(Oberst 335).

However, for, as Oberst himself admits “Kant says very little about universals.” Oberst has a hard
time finding passages where Kant mentions something about universals, and even the one he finds
present Kant’s position “extremely sketchy and anything but transparent” (Oberst 336). If that is the
case, however, does it make sense to force Kant all too quickly into the traditional debate?
Moreover, even if we could establish that Kant has a settled position on universals - whether he is a
realist, immanentist or nominalist – we would nonetheless still face the problem how this applies to
the History text. For Kant’s use of the term ‘universal’ in the context of this text seems different from
how he uses it his practical and theoretical philosophy (the latter is the context on which Oberst
focuses). Establishing Kant’s position with regard to universals by forcing him directly in the
traditional debate might thus not be the best method to understand what Kant means by
universality in the History text.

In order to understand what Kant means by the term universal in the History text, I will therefore not
begin by establishing what Kant’s position was with regard to universals as Oberst does. Rather, I will
first retrace the history of the problem of universals as it was passed down from the Scholastics (who
articulated it most recognisably in the traditional form sketched out above), to the early modern
philosophers who modified it under the aegis of the ‘new way of ideas’, to Kant who modified the
problem again. Second, I will argue that Kant’s meaning of the term ‘universality’ turns on his theory
of judgment, which depends on his strict distinction between concepts and intuitions, and in that
way differs fundamentally from the Scholastics and the Early Modern philosophers. Third, I will
argue that, although the text on History can be interpreted as Kant judging the humans species in
terms of a reflective judgment, there is also a sense in which the object that Kant judges, namely
‘freely willed human actions taken broadly’, points toward a theory of action that goes beyond mere
judgment, which is akin to the ambiguity between action and judgment in Kant’s practical
philosophy.

  

Pre-Kantian context

For most Scholastic philosophers, the basic question was roughly the same as laid out above: if we
have a particular ‘this-cube’ in front of us, and if we understand that the ‘cube’ part of a ‘this-cube’
(it’s cubeness) is predicable to more than one particular, then what is the status of the cube-part?
But the problem is different from the earlier debate insofar virtually all scholastics agree that
universals (cubeness, triangularity, horseness) exist in the mind of God (they are seldomly seen as
isolated individual universals in the platonic sense) (Klima). Most Scholastics also acknowledge that,
next to universals existing in the mind of God, universals exist in three other ways: as universal
concepts, universal terms, and as universals insofar they are embodied within particular things
(Guyla Klima).

The debate in this period turns not so much on which of these are the true universals (for almost all
agree these exist in the mind of God), but rather which of these universals is primary – particularly in
the way we as humans get to understand them. First, Scholastics that take the universals in rem  (‘in
the thing’) as primary hold that universal forms like ‘cubeness’ (which exist in the mind of God) also
exist in particular things, a position akin to Aristotelian immanentism. Second, those who take the
universals ante rem (‘before the thing’) to be primary, hold that universal forms do not primarily
exist in things, but rather in the mind of God, and that the encountered particulars are better or
worse copies of universal forms, a position akin to Platonic transcendentism. Third, Scholastics who
take the universals post rem (‘after the thing’) to be primary, hold that universal forms like
‘cubeness’ primarily exist as concepts in the human mind, without thereby denying that they exist in
the mind of God as well. Fourth, those that take universal terms as primary, hold that universals like
‘cubeness’ are primarily universal terms with which human beings categorise particulars, without
thereby denying that universal forms exist in the mind of God. There are thus four basic positions.
The first and second position are customarily classified as realist positions, the third as conceptualist,
and the fourth as nominalist.

This shows that, before we classify a philosopher as a realist, nominalist, conceptualist or immantist,
we need to be clear about the metaphysical context in which a philosopher operates. Scholastic
philosophers differ from many later philosophers in that they take particulars like ‘this-cube’ simply
to be there and assume that we comprehend them by direct acquaintance. This is precisely why the
problem is not a ‘problem of particulars’ (since these are simply given) but of universals (whose
mode of existence is not so evident). The real problem is: given that basic particulars exist, what is
the ontological and epistemological status of the universal qualities they share? Do universals exist
in the mind of God alone or do they exist in particulars as well? Do we comprehend universal forms
via universal concepts in our minds? Or do we merely have universal terms with which we categorize
particulars? What is never questioned is that particulars (the rem or ‘the thing’) are simply there as
basic, indivisible entities, i.e. individual substances, and that we comprehend them as such.

This is quite different in the context of a metaphysics in which, under the aegis of developing natural
science and mechanical philosophy, it is possible to think about cubes and pieces of wax as (divisible)
systems of mechanical relations. For if that is the case, the simple ontological unity of particulars is
put very much in doubt. Descartes, then, we need a different starting point. For him, the basic
elements of thought with which we have direct acquaintance are our ideas, rather than particular
individual substances like ‘this-cube’ (Sellars, p. ?): we can at least be that our ideas do have such a
basic unity. For Descartes then, the task is to get at those ideas that have such a basic unity, the clear
and distinct ideas, i.e., the rationally intuited “simple natures” (like ‘extension,’ ‘point’ and ‘line,’)
and the composite conceptions deduced from them (like mathematical cubes and triangles) (Garber
33). According to Descartes, only the content of rationally intuited, e.g. the mathematical properties
of cubes, have a true universally valid counterpart in reality (in contrast to such unstable ideas of
particulars like sugar cubes and pieces of wax) (Sellars). The contents of ideas – as ‘objects of
thought’ all have ‘objective reality,’ whereas those idea (like cubes) that also exist in themselves
have ‘formal reality.’

We could therefore classify Descartes as a realist with regard to universals (‘Descartes on

Universals.’), but only in a qualified way, with regard to his metaphysical starting point. In In a sense,
what Scholastics called particulars are for Descartes confused ideas, and what Scholastics called
universals are for Descartes the clearly and distinctly (rationally) intuited ideas that have a
counterpart in formal reality (i.e., ‘real reality,’ existing independently of ideas, which for Descartes
is a kind of bare system of mechanical relations). Since Descartes method (and the ‘way of ideas’ in
general) is more concerned with clarifying the nature of ideas, rather than with clarifying the nature
of substantial ‘this-suches’ (like sugar cubes), the ‘problem of universals’ Descartes realism is thus
very different from Scholastic realism. A parallel can be drawn with Hume, who in many ways is
Descartes opposite. For Hume, for example, empirical intuitions are always intuitions of particulars,
then even our general concepts (like cubeness, and extension) are just more particular (empirical)
intuitions. Hume could therefore be classified as a nominalist. But like Descartes, he also assumes
that ideas – not particular ‘this-suches’ – that are the basic entities that thought deals with. He only
differs from Descartes in that he thinks that concepts are empirically rather than rationally intuited
ideas. His nominalism should thus be qualified with regard to the same metaphysical context in
which Descartes operates.

This is the context, the in which Kant works, and to understand what Kant means with the term
universality, we need to see in what way Kant intervenes. So if the Scholastics do not question
substantial individuals as elementary things that thought deals with, Descartes and Hume do not
question that intuited ideas are the basic elements of thought. In some sense Kant builds upon
certain insights of this ‘way of ideas.’ Kant differs, however, in at least two fundamental ways. First,
in that he draws a sharp contrast between intuitions and concepts as two types of fundamentally
different representations. As I will show in greater detail below, Descartes does not question that
intuited ideas are the basic elements of thought. Ffor example, when ‘a pure and attentive mind’
conceives of something (for it to ‘have a concept' of something, say of cubeness), the element or
object it grasps is not a really existing this-such ‘out there,’ but rather the idea ‘cubeness’ that intuits
in a clear and distinct manner. In that sense, for Descartes, the concept of cubeness is the same a
clear and distinct intuition of cubeness): concepts and intuitions are of the same sort (idea). In
showing that intuitions are not the same as concepts, Kant breaks with Descartes. Second, which is
related to the first, Kant differs in that he thinks the basic elements of thought are not ideas but
judgments, in which the two different representations - concepts and intuitions – are combined
(synthesized) by the understanding. As we shall see, this means that he modifies the problem of
universals again. I will focus on how Kant differs from Descartes, although similar accounts are
possible for Hume, Locke, Berkeley and Leibniz insofar ideas are their metaphysical starting point.

Idealism

There is ontological theme in idealism -> new way of ideas -> the new point is that minds do not
exist for minds, things do exist for minds, minds do not exist for minds.. In Descartes view, when the
human mind becomes aware of a particular (say a sugar cube) it becomes aware of an idea, rather
than a substantial individual ‘out there.’ For in becoming aware of an idea, the mind becomes aware
of the object ‘sugar cube,’ not as independently existing individual, but as the content of an idea.
Therefore, becoming aware of an idea of a sugar cube does not necessarily imply the existence of
that sugar cube (a sugar cube is most likely a confused idea without a counterpart in formal reality).
The object ‘sugar cube’, insofar as it is the content of an idea, exist only insofar there is a mind that
is aware of the object: had there been no mind representing the object ‘sugar cube,’ it would not
exist as the content of the idea of which a mind is aware. For there to be ideas, in other words, there
must be minds that represent them. This is very different from the Scholastic view, where a sugar
cube does not depend for its being on a human mind that represents it (it may depend on God’s
creation, but it does not depend on human minds representing them). By contrast, insofar the
confused idea sugar cube is an ‘object of thought,’ i.e., a content of an idea, it is an object that
depends for its being on a human mind that represents it. To be aware of such an idea does not
imply that the content of the idea really exist (it could be a delusion). This is how Descartes shows
why things like sugar cubes seem to have a unity: for although their counterparts in formal reality
they may consist in a system of divisible mechanical relations, insofar sugar cubes are ideas, they do
have a basic unity.
For Descartes there are therefore are two types of beings. On the one hand their things that exist as
objects for minds, things that are the content of an idea of which a mind becomes aware (things that
have ‘objective reality’). On the other hand there are things that do not exist for minds, but exist in
themselves (which have ‘formal reality’). The first kinds of things only exist insofar they are
represented by a mind. They exist, one could say, insofar they are ‘in representation’ (they are in an
idea, as the content of an act of mind representing them, i.e., as the content of an idea). The second
kind of things, which have formal reality, differ from the first, precisely insofar they do not depend
for their existence on them being ‘in representation’ (they do not depend on an act of mind
representing them). The latter exist not for minds, but exist in themselves. For example, both the
confused idea ‘sugar cube’ and its mathematical properties ‘cubeness’, for example, have objective
reality, as they exist as ‘in representation,’ as contents of a mind. But since they are contents of
ideas, we cannot be sure if these contents exist independently of our ideas. For Descartes, only the
clearly and distinctly intuited idea of ‘cubeness’ also exist in itself, and thus exist both in objective
reality (as the content of an idea) and in formal reality. The idea of a cube, in other words, has a real
counterpart to which it corresponds. By contrast, the idea of a piece of wax, as a particular piece of
wax (as a with all its qualities, its unity, its colours, smell), does not have a real counterpart in formal
reality to which it corresponds. What Descartes shows is that, on the one hand, there are things
called ‘objects,’ which are contents of ideas, and they exist ‘for us’ so to speak (they would not have
existed had there been no minds); on the other hand, there are things that exist ‘in-themselves,’
independently of us (they would have existed anyway, with or without minds).

Mind enters the picture. This has consequences. There are two modes of being shape can have.
mode of being depending on act of representing (a so-called ‘immanent object,’ an object that
depends for its being on the act of representing), and mode of being independent of act of
representing (a so-called ‘transcendent object,’ an object that does not depend for its being the act
of representing). It is important to stress here that for Descartes, although to be aware of an object
as content of an idea (to be aware of an immanent object) does not necessarily imply that this object
exist in formal reality, it does not follow that it is not an object. That is to say, it is not a merely a
private, subjective non-objective state of sensing, like ‘having a sensation of pain’ or ‘feeling happy.’
For on the one hand, there is is an act of representing of the mind, and on the other hand, there is
something represented, namely the object of the representation. The awareness of the
mathematical properties of a cube in an idea entails that there is a mind and that the mind is aware
of something, of an object. This differs from the state of ‘feeling happy’ which is not about
something. Since ideas have an object as their content, these objects are not mere descriptions of
solipsistic states of mind. For Descartes, apart from non-objective sensations, there are two kind of
objects. A cube, for example, exists in two ways. On the one hand, when we do mathematics, we
fumble around with ideas of simple natures (points, lines) and we can clearly and distinctly represent
a cube (via deduction). Such a triangle is an immanent object, for it depends for its being on the act
of representing it (it exists as represented). On the other hand, there is the cube in formal reality,
that transcendent object, that exist independently of an act of representation) and to which a clear
and distinct representation of a cube corresponds. Both exist, but in different ways.

To see how Kant takes up and modifies the cartesian distinctions between the acts of representation
(the ‘representing’), the objects of the representation (the ‘represented’) and the thing as it exist in
itself, we can best look at the representation (or the idea) of space. For Descartes, space exist in
itself (it has formal reality), but at the same time, there are minds with ideas in which space is also
represented. If minds represent space, they represent it as represented (an object immanent to the
act of representation). Space is represented by a mind as an object, as such it is the content of an
(clear and distinct) idea. For Descartes, mind is directly aware of space as represented, which his to
say that space is intuited (mind is directly aware of the idea of space). So in Descartes’ world, we
have space as intuited and which has objective reality, and real space which has formal reality.
Within the first space as represented (represented as a kind of coordinate system) we represented
triangles. In the second real space real triangles exist. Descartes thus sets up the modern
philosophical problem of the correspondence between immanent objects of representation and
transcendent objects that exist in themselves. For how can we be sure these correspond?

Kant takes up this ‘idealist’ theme, and agrees that space can be represented, i.e., it can exist as the
immanent ‘object’ of an act of representation (it has objective reality) in which other things, like
cubes, can be represented. He denies, however, that apart from that, space has formal reality, a
reality in-itself. For Kant there is only one space. We are left with space as representation and the
objects represented within it:

We must give full credence to this paradoxical but correct proposition, that there is nothing
in space save what is represented in it. For space is itself nothing but representation and
whatever is in it must therefore be contained in the representation (A375)

For Kant, space itself is nothing but representation, which is to say that space is essentially
representation. It is important to stress that Kant does not mean that space exists merely in a
private act of representation, however. For Kant, space neither has formal reality (it does not exist in
itself) nor is it merely a private, subjective representation. Along the lines of Descartes, Kant
understands space to be an ‘objective’ content of an act of representing, in a similar way as a sugar
cube can be the immanent-object of a representation. In that sense space, like a sugar cube, is mind-
dependent. Space and mathematical objects differ, however, in an important sense from physical
immanent objects like sugar cubes. Since for Kant space is nothing but representation, it does not
have being apart from being represented, apart from being the content of acts of representations
(For Kant, we could say, space is thus essentially mind-dependent: it ‘comes into being’ through acts
of representation). Physical objects are also representations, but unlike space they are not
essentially representations: a sugar cube may nonetheless exist as a thing in itself, that is to say, it
may have being apart from being represented, it may have being independently of being
represented.

What is most important, however, is that for Kant, whatever a physical object is in itself, it is not
spatial. [We cannot think a sugar cube without its spatial characteristics. To imagine an object as
spatial outside of representation, is a contradiction, for we would again represent it a spatial. That is
not to say that the object is an image internal to a mind, for without it being given to a mind it would
not appear. But insofar it is presented to a mind, it must be spatial, and thus content of an act of
representing in space.] In Kant’s view, nothing that is spatial has a counterpart in some kind of other,
more primary ‘formal space,’ as in Descartes. 1 That is what it means to say that space is essentially
representation. Physical objects, insofar they are spatial, insofar they appear in space exist only in
one way: as the content of (acts of) representation. 2

Nothing whatsoever is in space, save in so far as it is actually represented in it. It is a

proposition which must indeed sound strange, that a thing can exist only in the

1
Precisely insofar physical objects are spatial, they are not things in themselves (they have no formal being),
but representations.
2
Another way of putting it is that space necessarily consist in relations, and if something is depends for its
being on being related to something else, it does not exist in itself. Since Kant is here concerned within things
that have spatial relations, it is obvious that these cannot be things in themselves.
 representation of it, but in this case the objection falls, inasmuch as the things with which
we are here concerned are not things in themselves, but appearances only, that is
representations (A375)

Kant’s phrase that physical objects are ‘appearances only’ may mislead us to think that space is a
mere private mere mental state. In some sense, Kant remains very close to the insights of ‘the way
of ideas,’3 but precisely because Kant denies that we represent things in themselves, he imbues
spatial appearances with ‘much more reality,’ so to speak, as he rejects that there is a separate
realm of ‘real’ space behind the appearances to which the ‘objects in representation’ may or may
not correspond. In a way, with Kant, what see (in space) is what you get. 4 If I represent a cube, and
you represent a cube, not as mere concept but as cube, we both cannot but represent them in
space. We can even draw the cube on a piece of paper and thus represent it in the same space.
Nonetheless, the piece of paper with the cube is not ‘in the mind,’ nor does it exist in a separate
formal space of some kind ‘outside the mind’. Rather, it is the immanent-object of both our acts of
representation: had we not represent them, the cube and the piece of paper would not have spatial
being. By drawing the cube on the piece of paper, it appears ‘in representation’ (as if it had entered
a stage in front of an audience). This is the sense in which space and the physical objects
represented in it, are the objective ‘representeds’ (the immanent-objects) of acts of representation:
they are both ‘out there’ and mind-dependent. The difference between them, however, is that space
is that special ‘represented,’ the special immanent ‘object’ – which is not really an object, since it is
representation that is the condition of all objects represented in it – that only ‘represented’ which is
essentially representation, and that conditions the (spatial) being of all spatial objects, both physical
and mathematical (it is the stage on which the actors appear, without which no actors could appear;
a stage not in the sense of a physical stage constructed out of wood of course, but only in the sense
of an ‘empty’ space where an audience anticipates its actors, a space without which no actors could
appear). Kant’s claim that space is essentially representation, and therefore that it is conditioned by
minds representing it, is the very reason why space is not a private idea of a solipsistic mind, but
rather the shared ‘represented,’ the ‘immanent-object’ that is the present in all acts of
representation as its conditions (all representers – God, humans, aliens – whatever they are and
whatever they represent, represent in space).

For Kant, although space depends on our acts of representation, we represent space necessarily as
something ‘out there.’ According to Kant, as space is essentially representation and not a thing in
itself, it is essentially relational. Consequently, if there is an act of representing space, it cannot be in
the same location as the act itself (as seems to be the case with space represented in cartesian
ideas). Space (and all objects represented in it) is necessarily represented as ‘out there,’ not despite,
but because it depends for its entire being on an act of representation. Kant calls object represented
in space also the representation of ‘outer sense:’ insofar we are aware (or sense) objects in space,
we are aware of objects in relation to our act of representation, and thus are aware of them outside
us. For Kant, since space in no way a thing in itself, but rather mere relation, what is given to us as
objects through ‘outer sense’ are nothing but mere relations.

Now through mere relations no thing in itself is cognized; it is therefore right to judge that
since nothing is given to us through outer sense except representations of mere relations,
3

4
Here we can also mark Kant’s difference from Leibniz. For Leibniz, reality consist essentially of a multiplicity of
monads, and all monads are representers that represent space in more or less confused ways. For Leibniz,
there is nonetheless a kind of ‘formal space’ outside of the representations of the monads: the very spatial
relations between the monads themselves, another more real space represented by God in a fully transparent
clear and distinct way. Kant denies this. He denies that ‘true’ space is only represented by God.
 outer sense can also contain in its representation only the relation of an object to the
subject, and not that which is internal to the object in itself.

For Kant, nothing is given to us through outer sense except representations of mere relations, that is
relations without anything that pertains to the object in itself, which contrast to how we must think
physical objects, that is, as both given and – precisely because they are given and not mere mental
states - as also having being in itself. Such a thing in itself is not given in outer sense, for any object
in outer sense must always be relational, at the very least because an object in outer sense depends
for being on the act of representation (i.e., it is related to the subject, as something given to it, as an
immanent-object).

To a representation of an object, which must be spatial and appear in space and consist of mere
relations, contrasts a representation of a mere concept, which does not have to be spatial, and thus
not appear in space, and does not necessarily consist of relations. Kant gives the example of the
concept of right.

The difference between an indistinct and a distinct representation is merely logical, and does
not concern the content. Without doubt the concept of right that is used by the healthy
understanding contains the very same things that the most subtle speculation can evolve
out of it, only in common and practical use one is not conscious of these manifold
representations in these thoughts.

Thus one cannot say that the common concept is sensible and contains a mere appearance,
for right cannot appear at all; rather its concept lies in the understanding and represents a
constitution (the moral constitution) of actions that pertains to them in themselves. The
representation of a body, on the contrary, contains nothing at all that could pertain to an
object in itself, but merely the appearance of something and the way in which we are
affected by it; and this receptivity of our cognitive capacity is called sensibility and remains
worlds apart from the cognition of the object in itself even if one might see through to the
very bottom of it (the appearance) (A43/44)

We can understand the distinctions between ‘concept,’ ‘object of appearance’ ‘objects given in
outer sense’ and ‘space’ by considering a geometrical concept. According to Kant geometrical
objects as geometrical objects must be represented as an object in space. Contrary to physical
objects, geometrical objects are essentially spatial, and thus have no in-itself, they are essentially
appearances. A cube, not as mere concept, but as cube (as spatial cube), depends for its being
represented in space. In other words, given Kant’s view on space, the concept of a cube in the form
of a statement (e.g. ‘three-dimensional solid object bounded by six square faces, facets or sides,
with three meeting at each vertex”), is not a cube represented as cube. In order to represent it as
cube, we must represent it in space. If we represent it in space, we represent it as spatial, i.e., as
something other than a statement. That is to say, if we have the concept in mind, we can then
construct it in space by drawing its lines and angles in the appropriate manner (you can draw it on a
piece of paper or draw it in thought with your imagination). You can even draw a second cube of a
smaller shape within the first cube, and having a very basic concept of the shape of a man, you can
even draw a little straw man within the space of the second cube in turn. The same does not hold for
the representation of space itself, however. Even if you have a clear and distinct concept of space,
you cannot construct a representation of space as space within another space. According to Kant, we
do not represent space as space by constructing in space. This is because you do not construct space
out of certain elements (like cubes are constructed with lines and angles). Space is the
representation that ‘comes before’ or ‘together with’ every act of representation, as its necessary
condition. Space is non-optional: whereas you can represent space without strawmen but you
cannot represent strawmen (or any other spatial object) without space (ref Kant).

Kant’s view of the nature of space has consequences for what he thinks is an intuition.

Now that which, as representation, can precede any act of thinking something is intuition
and, if it contains nothing but relations, it is the form of intuition, which, since it does not
represent anything except insofar as something is posited in the mind, can be nothing
other than the way in which the mind is affected by its own activity, namely this positing of
its representation, thus the way it is affected through itself, i.e., it is an inner sense as far as
regards its form. (b67)

For confirmation of this theory of the ideality of outer, thus of all objects of the senses, as
mere appearances, this comment is especially useful: that everything in our cognition that
belongs to intuition (with the exception, therefore, of the feeling of pleasure sure and
displeasure and the will, which are not cognitions at all) contains nothing but mere relations.

, since it does not represent anything except insofar as something is posited in the mind, can
be nothing other than the way in which the mind is affected by its own activity, namely this
positing of its representation, thus the way it is affected through itself, i.e., it is an inner
sense as far as regards its form.
 “now a thing in itself cannot be known through mere relations; and we may therefore
conclude that since outer sense gives us nothing but mere relations.

If, therefore, space (and time as well) were not a mere form
of your intuition that contains a priori conditions under which alone
things could be outer objects for you, which are nothing in themselves
without these subjective conditions, then you could make out absolutely
nothing synthetic and apriori about outer objects.

space is essentially representation, it depends on our acts of representation, and thus does not exist
in itself, it cannot but represented as ‘out there’

“now a thing in itself cannot be known through mere relations; and we may therefore conclude that
since outer sense gives us nothing but mere relations.

We can get at the unique nature of space by comparing it to a geometrical object that according to
Kant is represented in it. Contrary to physical objects, geometrical objects are essentially spatial, an
thus have no in-itself, they are essentially appearances. A cube, not as mere concept, but as cube (as
spatial cube), depends for its being represented in space. Given Kant’s view on space, the concept of
a cube in the form of a statement (e.g. ‘three-dimensional solid object bounded by six square faces,
facets or sides, with three meeting at each vertex”), is not a cube represented as cube. In order to
represent it as cube, we must represent it in space. If we represent it in space, we represent it as
spatial, i.e., a something other than a statement. That is to say, if we have the concept in mind, we
can then construct it in space by drawing its lines and angles in the appropriate manner (you can
draw it on a piece of paper or draw it in thought with your imagination). You can even draw a second
cube of a smaller shape within the first cube, and having a very basic concept of the shape of a man,
you can even draw a little straw man within the space of the second cube in turn. The same does not
hold for space itself. Even if you have a clear and distinct concept of space, you cannot construct
space as space within another space. That is to say, although we do represent the cube as cube by
constructing it in space, we do not represent space as space by constructing in space. This is because
you do not construct space out of certain elements (like cubes are constructed with lines and
angles). Space is the representation that ‘comes before’ or ‘together with’ every act of
representation, as its necessary condition.

Still, even though we do represent it by constructing it, space cannot but be represented together
all three of the above constructions. For they could only be represented in space. Space is the non-
optional condition of every representation. Although we can draw the cube without representing
the second cube or the straw man, we cannot draw any of them without representing space.
For Kant it is obvious that spatial objects cannot be things in themselves, for they in that case they
would have an independent being. But since space consist of relations, it cannot have independent
being, and thus does not exist in itself.

“now a thing in itself cannot be known through mere relations; and we may therefore conclude that
since outer sense gives us nothing but mere relations. Now that which as representation, can be
antecedent to any and every act of thinking anything, can be antecedent to any and every act of
[using general concepts] is intuition; and if it contains nothing but relations, is the form of intuition.
(b67)

Space must always comes ‘before’ or rather ‘together with’ any other specific spatial thing as its
necessary condition.

1. Intuition of a ‘this-cube’
2. Everything in space (objects) exist as something whose being depends on being represented
3. The ‘this,’ encountered, the object of representation, depends for its being on being
represented IN intuition (space)
4. The particular is only a represented insofar it represented in space, it is spatial (cf. Allison
arguments,)
5. The particular intuition of something (this, with certain geometrical-spatial characteristics,
since it is represented, and anything represented essentially represented in space, it must
have the form of space, where space as represented depends on the act of representation)
<------ this is a cube (judgment) ----> general concept (cubeness)
6. A ‘this-cube’ is a judgment of the understanding, which subsumes a particular intuited
representation (‘this’ , a particular given) under a general concept (‘this is a cube’).
7. In a judgment, the understanding connects given intuitions with general concepts
8. (other way round: we can also construct from the general concept ‘cubeness’ a represented
cube, a cube constructed as represented cube, represented in intuition)
a. Particular ‘this-cube’
i. Not a substantial individual, for depends for its being on being represented
ii. Not a cartesian idea with which we are directly acquainted, for it depends
on a judgment
iii. Not a (blind) sense impression, since it is an awareness of something AS
something, as something with a kind of unity
9. Basic elements are not ideas but judgments -> encountered objects like ‘this-cube’ are
judgments in which intuitions and general concepts are connected
a. Not an explicit judgment! -> cf. sellars
b. Subjective unity of apperception, unaffirmed “I am aware that I who thinks of this
object am the same as I who thinks it is a cube”
c. Knowledge p. 44 sellars , not achievement word -> but a thing, a given, is given as
being of a certain sort, prior to explicit objective judgment
 d. Intuition is also not pain or pleasure, of sensation
i. “In confirmation of this theory of the ideality of both outer and inner sense,
and therefore of all objects of the senses, as mere appearances, it is
especially relevant to observe that everything in our knowledge which
belongs to intuition [‘this’ of ‘this-cube’] – feeling of pleasure and pain, and
the will, not being knowledge, are excluded – contains nothing but mere
relations” (B66)
1. Relations =/= In-itself
ii. So the subjective sensation, like colour, does not belong to intuition, it IS
NOT knowledge, although it ‘colours’ the object as judgment, it is not part
of the object as judgment (your qualitative experience of colour it is not
‘mere relation’) / in contrast to the ‘the light wave’ (which does consist in
mere relations) that causes the sensation of colour, and is what you aim at
when you say ‘the cube is white.’
iii. What we represent in intuition can consist only of mere relations. Nothing
which consist of mere relations can exist in itself.
iv. Space and everything in it consist of mere relations. Nothing that consist of
relations (and relations exclusively) can exist an sich, can exist in itself.
Therefor, all space must be mind dependent.
v. “now a thing in itself cannot be known through mere relations; and we may
therefore conclude that since outer sense gives us nothing but mere
relations. Now that which as representation, can be antecedent to any and
every act of thinking anything, can be antecedent to any and every act of
[using general concepts] is intuition; and if it contains nothing but relations,
is the form of intuition. (b67)
vi. Further, no one can have a priori a representation of a color or of any
taste; whereas, since space concerns only the pure form of intuition, and
therefore involves no sensation whatsoever, and nothing empirical, all
kinds and determinations of space can and must be represented a priori,
if concepts of figures and of their relations are to arise. (A29)
vii. Singular TIME singular SPACE = system of relations
viii. Why is it an intuition, not a concept? Because they represent and individual
or a singular (no connections), This is prior to any general concepts.
ix. Intuition is singular = prior to any act whereby a general concept is used
x. Concept = not singular, it is connection
xi. Judgment is intuition + concept
10. Allison + intension, extension? Cf sellars p. 38
11. Discursive = concept + intuition
12. Not objective unity of apperception…. Not yet universal, just a state of association
For Kant, space (and the physical objects that appear in it) are of course mind-dependent, but they
are also objective.

The same goes for mathematical objects, and insofar they are essentially spatial, like the objects of
geometry (such as cubes), they have no in-itself, they are essentially appearances, i.e., objects who
for their being depend on being represented in space.

independent of a mind representing them.

But since

Yet insofar they are in space - insofar they depend for their very spatial being on an act of
representation, that is, on being represented in space – they have no independent being, and thus
cannot be things in themselves.

(B66) intuition

Anti-tr. Realism: intuition =/= substance ?

(B67)

Form of Intuition is given, but not as something? No…

It is non optional.
Another way of putting it is that space necessarily consist in relations, and if something is related to
something else, it does not exist in itself (independently).

[domain of representables / god --> anthropocentric / further desubstantialization, anti-

metaphysics]

intuition

In contrast to Descartes, Space is ideal, but exist ONLY as a represented, and all appearance exist
in representation

For there is no other subjective representation from which we can derive

a priori synthetic propositions, as we can from intuition in space (§3)
Strictly speaking, therefore, these other repesentations have no ideality
although they agree with the representation of space in this respect, tha
they belong merely to the subjective constitution of our manner of sensi
bility, for instance, ofsight, hearing, touch, as in the case ofthe sensation,
ofcolors, sounds, and heat, which, since they are mere sensations and no
intuitions, do not ofthemselves yield knowledge of a any object, least of all any a priori knowledge.
(B44)

Particular this-such
 Space is the form of all other representations with which we are directly acquainted by virtue of the
fact that without it we would not have any representations.

For Kant, just like Descartes, we intuited space. But contrary to Descartes, this does not mean that
space is a concept.

In contrast to Descartes, Space is ideal, but exist ONLY as a represented, and all appearance exist
in representation

Kant takes up this ‘idealist’ theme, and agrees that space can be represented, i.e., it can exist as the
immanent ‘object’ of an act of representation (it has objective reality). He denies, however, that
space has formal reality, a reality in-itself. For Kant, space itself is nothing but representation, which
is to say that space is essentially representation.

an object of the kind that depends for its being on the act of being represented in space, and on the
other hand, may also have a being independently of the act of being represented, that is, it may also
exist in-itself, but considered as such it has no spatial characteristics, for it is not (represented) in
space. Thus, whereas most ordinary things, insofar we are aware of them, are representations, that
is, appearances, and then they may exist in themselves.

In the same way a represented triangle have a certain objectivity, represented space has a certain
objectivity. It has the same status as an immanent-object. It is something the being of which
depends on being represented.

Space is thus not something that exist in-itself, independently of act of representation. In other
words, Consequently, everything that is in space – all things insofar they have spatial characteristics,
like cubes, horses and human beings – are ‘in representation.’
but only insofar it is the immanent-object of a representation.

Since space is nothing but representation, all objects that are spatial are representations: insofar
they are spatial, they depend for their being on being in space, that is in a representation of space.

Kant’s point is that

Space is thus is different from most other immanent objects, for these may also have an in-itself (or
formal reality).

For Kant, anything that is has spatial characteristics is on the one hand, an object of the kind that
depends for its being on the act of being represented in space, and on the other hand, may also have
a being independently of the act of being represented, that is, it may also exist in-itself, but
considered as such it has no spatial characteristics, for it is not (represented) in space. Thus, whereas
most ordinary things, insofar we are aware of them, are representations, that is, appearances, and
then they may exist in themselves.

Space itself, by contrast, since is nothing but representation, something we get only as the content
of an act of representation.

Consequently, everything insofar it is in space – all things with spatial characteristics, like cubes,
horses and human beings – do therefore not exist in itself, but as something represented.
What is important is to stress the sense of ‘representation of space.’ Yet what is special of space as
immanent-object, is that space is nothing but representation.

Nothing whatsoever is in space, save in so far as it is actually represented in it. It is a

proposition which must indeed sound strange, that a thing can exist only in the
representation of it, but in this case the objection falls, inasmuch as the things with which
we are here concerned are not things in themselves, but appearances only, that is
representations (A375)

A horse or a human being, by contrast, may also exist in themselves. Space itself is nothing but
representation.

For Kant, anything that is has spatial characteristics (sugar cubes, horses, human beings, viruses etc,)
is therefore, on the one hand, an object of the kind that depends for its being on the act of being
represented in space, and on the other hand, may also have a being independently of the act of
being represented, that is, it may also exist in-itself, but considered as such it has no spatial
characteristics, for it is not (represented) in space. Thus, most ordinary things, insofar we are aware
of them, are representations, that is, appearances.

Nothing whatsoever is in space, save in so far as it is actually represented in it. It is a

proposition which must indeed sound strange, that a thing can exist only in the
representation of it, but in this case the objection falls, inasmuch as the things with which
we are here concerned are not things in themselves, but appearances only, that is
representations (A375)

What is important is that space has the same kind of status as an immanent object. Although it is not
something that exist in itself, it is also not merely a subjective state of mind, it is not the private act
of representing itself. Rather it is akin to a represented object, that is, something immanent to the
act of representing.
A cube is an immanent-object (a represented) that is represented in another immanent-object
(another represented), namely space.

Consequently, If something exist in space, say a cube, it exist in an representation. If space is

essentially a represented, all things that are in space are also ‘in representation.’ They are
represented in space.

Not only does he claim that we cannot represent immanent-objects like triangles and cubes without
representing them in space (Descartes would agree with this); in denying that space has formal
reality, Kant also claims that space is nothing but representation. For Kant, space it only exist insofar
it is represented.

then anything, insofar it is spatial is in space only insofar as it is represented in it

As things in themselves, that is, insofar they exist independently, insofar their being does not
depend on being represented (insofar they have formal reality) they are not in space. In Cartesians
terms, as spatial, a cube merely have objective reality, no formal reality.

Kant also claims that immanent objects are the only things that are in space.

There is nothing in space, except for what is represented in space.

Anything that is an immanent-object with spatial characteristics, whose being depends on being
represented, is
But if space itself depends for its being on being represented, any object that is represented in
space, is thus something that is ‘in’ a representation of space.

In Kant’s view, you cannot think of a sugar cube or a triangle without thinking it as spatial. The very
moment I try to think it, I think it in space.

Space does not exist in itself (it has no formal reality). For Kant, insofar it exists in space, it is
contained in a representation of space.

Things in themselves are precisely defined as things whose being does not depend on being
represented.

One can of course postulate that a cube also exist in the space of ‘formal reality,’ but For Kant, since
space is essentially representation, anything that is in space, is represented in space: you cannot
think of sugar cubes, triangles and cubes without spatial characteristics.

Since Kant argues that space is essentially representation, then

It follows that all objects that are represented in space (immanent objects like triangles and sugar
cubes, which have spatial characteristics) do not exist as things in themselves, but as objects ‘in
representation.’

Things in themselves, by contrast, are precisely defined as things whose being does not depend on
being represented (and thus as things who do not appear in space). But a cube cannot be a cube if it
is not represented in space. One can postulate that a cube also exist in the space of ‘formal reality,’
but for Kant, insofar it exists in space, it is represented in space.

As Kant writes:
 We must give full credence to this paradoxical but correct proposition, that there is nothing
in space save what is represented in it. For space is itself nothing but representation and
whatever is in it must therefore be contained in the representation.

Nothing whatsoever is in space, save in so far as it is actually represented in it. It is a

proposition which must indeed sound strange, that a thing can exist only in the
representation of it, but in this case the objection falls, inasmuch as the things with which
we are here concerned are not things in themselves, but appearances only, that is
representations (A375)

What is important is that space has the same kind of status as an immanent object. Although it is not
something that exist in itself, it is also not merely a subjective state of mind, it is not the private act
of representing itself. Rather it is akin to a represented object, that is, something immanent to the
act of representing.

Same status as immanent object

[something REPRESENTED, space is not an act of represesenting, but something we only get as
immanent object of representing, and whatever is in space, is contained in that immanent object of
representing, must itself be an immanent object of representing]

1. Transcendental realism --> transcendental idealism

2. Space is ideal, but exist ONLY as a represented, and all appearance exist in representation

“Conditions of this sort [psychological] are not epistemic in the relevant sense, because they have no
objective validity or objectivating function. On the contrary, as with the Humean psychological
conditions, an appeal to them presupposes the existence of an objective spatiotemporal world, the
representation of which is supposedly to be explained.” (Allison 12)

3. Although, no existential implication, Yet Act-content IS NOT mere state (state of sensing)
4. Relational --> OF something, yet not transcendent, but immanent object
5. Two modes of being a shape can have: mode of being depending on act of representing
(immanent object), and mode of being independent of act of representing (transcendent
object)

6. Kick kicker kickee / Chesire Cat model

7. Real triangle is not in the mind, triangle is immanent object of representation
8. Second class reality / ‘different senses’ (frege) are a kind of different ‘ways of representing’
9. Objective representable

10. Domain of representables (cubes, triangles) AS representables

11. Objective Domain of repr. --> Independent of particular act --> Leibniz
12. Triangle exist immanent object, as represented of a representation (objective being)
13. Triangle exist independently of mind in space time (actual, formal being)

14. Problem: correspondence between immanent object and transcendent objects

15. “in the tradition, the space that is represented is construed as an object, an object of
intuition, we intuit space” -> depends on act of representing // and then there is real space
16. Kant: space ONLY exist as something that is represented, it is essentially a represented [*]
17. Transcendental realism --> transcendental idealism
18. Space is ideal, but exist ONLY as a represented, and all appearance exist in representation

“We must give full credence to this paradoxical but correct proposition, that there is nothing in
space save what is represented in it. For space is itself nothing but representation [something
REPRESENTED, space is not an act of represesenting, but something we only get as immanent object
of representing, and whatever is in space, is contained in that immanent object of representing,
must itself be an immanent object of representing] and whatever is in it must therefore be
contained in the representation. Nothing whatsoever is in space, save in so far as it is actually
represented in it. It is a proposition which must indeed sound strange, that a thing can exist only in
the representation of it, but in this case the objection falls, inasmuch as the things with which we are
here concerned are not things in themselves, but appearances only, that is representations (A375)
themselves do not necessarily imply existence. The content of an idea

For thought to have a proper (universal) concept of cubeness is thus the same as to have a clear and
distinct intuition of cubeness. Concepts, in other words, are a subset of ideas: concepts the clearly
and distinctly intuited ideas as opposed to confused ideas.

n that sense, for Descartes, concepts are (universally valid) intuitions.

Since Kant strictly distinguishes between concepts and intuitions, the sense in which he can be
regarded as taking a position with regard to universals will therefore differ as well.

We can first

This the context in which Kant works, and to understand what Kant means with the term
universality, we need to see in what way Kant intervenes. In some sense Kant builds upon certain
insights of the ‘way of ideas.’ Kant differs, however, in two fundamental ways. First, in that he draws
a sharp contrast between intuitions and concepts as two types of fundamentally different
representations. Second, which is related to the first, in that the basic elements of thought are not
ideas but rather judgments, in which the two different representations - concepts and intuitions –
are combined (synthesized) by the understanding. In that way, he modifies the problem of universals
again.

He only differs from Descartes in that he thinks that concepts are empirically rather than rationally
intuited ideas. His nominalism should thus be qualified with regard to the same metaphysical
context in which Descartes operates. If the scholastics do not question that substantial individuals
are certain elementary things that thought deals with, Descartes and Hume do not question that
intuited ideas are the basic elements of thought. For Descartes, for example, when ‘a pure and
attentive mind’ conceives of something (for it to ‘have a concept' of something, say of cubeness), the
element or object it grasps is not a really existing this-such ‘out there,’ but rather the idea ‘cubeness’
that intuits in a clear and distinct manner; the concept of cubeness is the same a clear and distinct
intuition of cubeness).
What is never questioned is that intuited ideas are the basic elements of thought.

[more on way of ideas]

This is the context in which Kant works, and to understand what Kant means with the term
universality, we need to see in what way Kant intervenes

For instance, an idea is an act of representation by a mind. Such an act of representation has a
content. The content of a representation does not exist in itself, but depends for its being on the act
of representation.

19. Although, no existential implication, Yet Act-content IS NOT mere state (state of sensing)
20. Relational --> OF something, yet not transcendent, but immanent object
21. Two modes of being a shape can have: mode of being depending on act of representing
(immanent object), and mode of being independent of act of representing (transcendent
object)
22. Kick kicker kickee / Chesire Cat model
23. Real triangle is not in the mind, triangle is immanent object of representation
24. Second class reality / ‘different senses’ (frege) are a kind of different ‘ways of representing’
25. Objective representable
26. Domain of representables (cubes, triangles) AS representables
27. Objective Domain of repr. --> Independent of particular act --> Leibniz
28. Triangle exist immanent object, as represented of a representation (objective being)
29. Triangle exist independently of mind in space time (actual, formal being)
30. Problem: correspondence between immanent object and transcendent objects
31. “in the tradition, the space that is represented is construed as an object, an object of
intuition, we intuit space” -> depends on act of representing // and then there is real space
32. Kant: space ONLY exist as something that is represented, it is essentially a represented [*]
33. Transcendental realism --> transcendental idealism
34. Space is ideal, but exist ONLY as a represented, and all appearance exist in representation

“We must give full credence to this paradoxical but correct proposition, that there is nothing in
space save what is represented in it. For space is itself nothing but representation
[something REPRESENTED, space is not an act of represesenting, but something we only get as
immanent object of representing, and whatever is in space, is contained in that immanent object of
representing, must itself be an immanent object of representing]

and whatever is in it must therefore be contained in the representation. Nothing whatsoever is in

space, save in so far as it is actually represented in it.”

It is a proposition which must indeed sound strange, that a thing can exist only in the representation
of it, but in this case the objection falls, inasmuch as the things with which we are here concerned
are not things in themselves, but appearances only, that is representations (A375)

13. Intuition of a ‘this-cube’

14. Everything in space (objects) exist as something whose being depends on being represented
15. The ‘this,’ encountered, the object of representation, depends for its being on being
represented IN intuition (space)
16. The particular is only a represented insofar it represented in space, it is spatial (cf. Allison
arguments,)
17. The particular intuition of something (this, with certain geometrical-spatial characteristics,
since it is represented, and anything represented essentially represented in space, it must
have the form of space, where space as represented depends on the act of representation)
<------ this is a cube (judgment) ----> general concept (cubeness)
18. A ‘this-cube’ is a judgment of the understanding, which subsumes a particular intuited
representation (‘this’ , a particular given) under a general concept (‘this is a cube’).
19. In a judgment, the understanding connects given intuitions with general concepts
20. (other way round: we can also construct from the general concept ‘cubeness’ a represented
cube, a cube constructed as represented cube, represented in intuition)
a. Particular ‘this-cube’
i. Not a substantial individual, for depends for its being on being represented
ii. Not a cartesian idea with which we are directly acquainted, for it depends
on a judgment
iii. Not a (blind) sense impression, since it is an awareness of something AS
something, as something with a kind of unity
21. Basic elements are not ideas but judgments -> encountered objects like ‘this-cube’ are
judgments in which intuitions and general concepts are connected
a. Not an explicit judgment! -> cf. sellars
b. Subjective unity of apperception, unaffirmed “I am aware that I who thinks of this
object am the same as I who thinks it is a cube”
c. Knowledge p. 44 sellars , not achievement word -> but a thing, a given, is given as
being of a certain sort, prior to explicit objective judgment
d. Intuition is also not pain or pleasure, of sensation
 i. “In confirmation of this theory of the ideality of both outer and inner sense,
and therefore of all objects of the senses, as mere appearances, it is
especially relevant to observe that everything in our knowledge which
belongs to intuition [‘this’ of ‘this-cube’] – feeling of pleasure and pain, and
the will, not being knowledge, are excluded – contains nothing but mere
relations” (B66)
1. Relations =/= In-itself
ii. So the subjective sensation, like colour, does not belong to intuition, it IS
NOT knowledge, although it ‘colours’ the object as judgment, it is not part
of the object as judgment (your qualitative experience of colour it is not
‘mere relation’) / in contrast to the ‘the light wave’ (which does consist in
mere relations) that causes the sensation of colour, and is what you aim at
when you say ‘the cube is white.’
iii. What we represent in intuition can consist only of mere relations. Nothing
which consist of mere relations can exist in itself.
iv. Space and everything in it consist of mere relations. Nothing that consist of
relations (and relations exclusively) can exist an sich, can exist in itself.
Therefor, all space must be mind dependent.
v. “now a thing in itself cannot be known through mere relations; and we may
therefore conclude that since outer sense gives us nothing but mere
relations. Now that which as representation, can be antecedent to any and
every act of thinking anything, can be antecedent to any and every act of
[using general concepts] is intuition; and if it contains nothing but relations,
is the form of intuition. (b67)
vi. Further, no one can have a priori a representation of a color or of any
taste; whereas, since space concerns only the pure form of intuition, and
therefore involves no sensation whatsoever, and nothing empirical, all
kinds and determinations of space can and must be represented a priori,
if concepts of figures and of their relations are to arise. (A29)
vii. Singular TIME singular SPACE = system of relations
viii. Why is it an intuition, not a concept? Because they represent and individual
or a singular (no connections), This is prior to any general concepts.
ix. Intuition is singular = prior to any act whereby a general concept is used
x. Concept = not singular, it is connection
xi. Judgment is intuition + concept
22. Allison + intension, extension? Cf sellars p. 38
23. Discursive = concept + intuition
24. Not objective unity of apperception…. Not yet universal, just a state of association

1. Understanding, law, categories: [unity+productive imagination]

2. Plate/cube example
3. “a manifold, contained in an intuition which I call mine, is represented, by means of
synthesis of the understanding, as belonging to the necessary unity of self-
consciousness; and this is effected by means of the category. This [requirement of a]
category therefore shows that the empirical consciousness of a given manifold in a
single intuition [unity!] is subject to a pure self-consciousness a priori (B144)
4. Manifold of intuition vs unitary intuition of a manifold (a manifold as of something, like a
cube)
5. Due to understanding, affected through productive imagination -->
6. which he characterizes as the understanding at working in consciousness
7. Imagination = representation of singular object -> “ we imagine not ‘cubeness’ but a
cube” So imagination is concerned with SINGULARS and the understanding is concerned
with singulars; that is, as synthesizing singulars, the understanding is called the
imagination
8. “I must abstract from the mode in which the manifold for an empirical intuition is given,
and must direct attention solely to the UNITY
9. [the unity] which, in terms of the CATEGORY, and by MEANS OF the understanding [as
imagination] ENTERS INTO the intuition “ (B144)
10. Contrast between
a. That which is PUT INTO the intuition (space time, system of relations)
[understanding, as imagination, puts unity in intuition (= pre-concept unity
which has the form of judgment ‘unity,’ i.e., which is a category)
b. The judgment which can have the intuition as its subject [this thing IS one,
prescribe by the category (as a rule, i.e. a form of judgment)]
11. “In what follows it will be shown, from the mode in which the empirical intuition is
given, [it is given in a mode which is] no other than that which the category prescribes
to the manifold of a given intuition in general.”
12. Pure-pure category => apply to any subject matter (logic) / abstracto
13. Pure-category -> ordered in relation towards a possible world / concreto
14. Schematized category -> “the forms of judgment as specified, as specialized, to a
spatiotemporal world
a. In all subsumptions of an object under a concept the representation of the
object must be homogenous with the concept; in other words, the concept
must contain something which is represented in the object that is to be
subsumed under it. This fact, is what is meant by the expression ‘an object is
contained under a concept’. Thus the empirical concept of a plate is
homogenous witht the pure geometrical concept of a circle. The roundness
which is thought in the latter can be intuited in the former.
b. But pure concepts of understanding being quite heterogenous from empirical
intuitions, and indeed from all sensible intuitions, can never be met with in any
intuition. For no one will say that a category, such as that of causality, can be
intuited through sense and is itself contained in appearance. How, then, is the
subsumptions of intuitions under pure concepts, the application of a category to
appearances, possible
15. Intuition of unity =/= sense impression, sheer manifold
16. The representation is ‘already’ synthesized, the unity depends on a synthesis
a. The same function which gives unity to the various representations in a
judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an
intuition; and this unity, in its most general expression, we entitle the pure
concept of the understanding. The same understanding, through the same
operations by which in concepts, by means of analytical unity, it produced the
logical form of a judgment, also INTRODUCES a transcendental content
[element: ‘unity’] into its representations, [this it establishes] by means of the
SYNTHETIC unity of the manifold in intuition in general
17. The pure categories are categories that are involved in thoughts about concreta –
objects which exist in the world – as contrasted with abstract entities. Concreta are
 items in space and time, or something like space and time; (that is what the word
‘concrete’ carries with it
18. “The classical notion of definition is in terms of genus, difference, and species. And you
get a good grip on what Kant has in mind in the SCHEMATISM by thinking of the pure
categories as very abstract modes of synthesis of objects: objects must be singularized,
having a complexiy which is unified, and so on; any object you think of must have some
kind of internal structure by means of which it is a whole of parts which are related and
so on. So the pure categories do involve this notion of the UNITY of a Many (but not
necc. Spatiotemporal)
19. “you should think of the schematized categories as specifications of the pure categories;
they are to be thought fo as ways in which we think of spatiotemporal manifolds,
“unities” consisting of spatiotemporal manifolds constituting a world
20. “Remember, Kant is not proving that there is a world. He is analysing what is involved in
the thought of a world. The schematized categories are in thoughts of spatiotemporal
concreta making up a world. So you might think of the schemata as the differntia. We
have the general idea of species = genus [ways of thinking of concreta belonging to a
world) + differntia [schema]. Well, the schemata can be regarded as the differntia which
bring in the specific sptiotemporal context. The schematized categories are simply the
ways in which we think of concreta belonginging to a world which is a spatiotemporal
world.
21. They key always is that we become AWARE of a unified manifold by virtue of
constructing it [same goes for ACT in history text]
22. Objects are constructables for Kant
23. If something is a constructable, then, essentially, we can only know it by constructing a
representation of it
24. “Kant: “I entitle a magnitude extensive when the representation of the parts makes
possible, and therefore necessarily precedes, the representation of the whole. I cannot
represent to myself a line, however small, without drawing it in thought ,that is,
generating from a point [and this contains a promissory note as I pointed out] all its
parts one after another (A12-3/B203)
25. The pure category itself involves the notion of an activity of synthesis
26. In tis involved in it [the category] qua intellectual because even the representation of a
number involves synthesis, or even the representation of an angel involves synthesis
27. We can abstract these interesting philosophical ideas [categories: unity, substance etc]
from objects as we experience them because objects as we experience them have been
constructed in terms of the schematized categories
28. Chesire: we can abstract the categories (like unity) from our cognitive representations,
because (via imagination => a cube = unity, act-content = unity // a representation
contains all this already, therefore you can abstract from representation the categories,
but not from sheer sense impression) the understanding puts unity into intuition of
space time. Substance is IN the representation of a chair because we put it there just as
circularity is in our representation of a plate because we put it there. But you need ‘a
chair, a cube’ to be there (receptivity), for there to be a category.
29. The intuition to which the predicate is applied in the judgment already involves the
categorial content because being a chair is a wy of being a substance. So, abstractly
considered, the intuition has, as one aspect, the form “this substance” and the judgment
has the form “this substance is a substance.”
 30. “the concepts which thus contain a priori the pure though involved in every experience,
we find in the categories” (a96)
31. “If we can prove by their means alone an object can be thought, this will be a sufficient
deduction of them, and will justify their objective validity.”
32. Categories are ‘concepts of an object’ the pure concept of an object [the universal
characteristics of all particulars]
33. “Just in the case in which the concept of the circle applies to the representation of a
plate, so the concept of substance applies to the representation of any object” (sellars)
34. Pre-objective apperception-judgment Knowledge includes general conceptual
representations of objects, and also intuitions which are SINGULAR.
35. My point is that to the question of the transcendental deduction, "How do categories
apply to our representation of thises?", Kant's answer is, of course, they apply to them
because they are principles in terms of which we construct our representations of those
objects.

1. Judging, objective unity of apperception

2. Two senses of concept
a. -> pre-obj-judge. Begreifen [unitary intuition of sheer manifold -> prod. Imag. =
already a synthesis. / particular ‘concept’ particular ‘grabbing’]
b. -> {general} concept as essential term in judgment [claim to knowledge => objective
unity of apperception]
3. Not mere association

36. Nominalist? No.. p 58 Sellars, he knows things about in itself

37. Nominalist/conceptualist/immanentest/abstractionist qua universals as appearances
38. Realist qua universal in-itself (realist qua universal in the act) = kingdom of ends [yet
very new sense] [universal in-itself appears as antagonism]
39. Sellars, in itself = persons, p. 61
40. Representing / represented (represented do not exist in themselves (content), but
representings EXIST in themselves) p. 64
41. Unrepresented representing
42. “we have to realize that once we accept the notion of act and content, of representing
and represented, then it becomes an analytic truth that there is being other than being
for thought”
43. Object of representation = content (= not something that exist in itself)
44. Object of the will = content
45. Yet -> receptivity + spontaneity
46. Only in-itself (independent, freedom = the in-itselfness, of the individual, its
independence -> subject is not an entity, not a noumenon in the sense of a ‘thought
 object’ that I am allowed to assume (how I think of the subject), not the phenomenon,
but the counterpart of the thinking/acting activity itself, between noumenal ‘entity’ and
the phenomenon, or the noumenon as indeterminate, as nothing more than a pure
abstraction) we know something about is that there is an ‘activity of representing’ or
mind
47. Space an time are principles of individuation, we cant individuate in-itself becase it is not
spatial and temporal
48. [things are indeterminate, so Platonic!] “Kant starts out by talking as if there were a
lectern in itself, and he always thinks that there is a lectern in itself, but what he denies
is that metaphysics can tell us the ultimate status of the lectern in itself: whether it is
dependent or independent, whether it is a pluarilty or a singular item, whether it is a
feature of God, or what. That’s all he wants to say”

35. Universality: objective unity of apperception

36. What is domain of representables?
37. Domain of representables in itself = System of relations (Leibniz)
38. Complete representation = mind of god
39. Space -> system of relations -> exist only as represented, every monad represents spacs
40. And the actual system of relation, independent, represented by God

1. The understanding subsumes a particular ‘this-cube’ under a logical form of judgment

2.

i. “a judgment is nothing but the manner in which given modes of knowledge

are brought to the objective unity of apperception” (b141)
25.
26.
27. What is an intuition? “representation of a singular unmediated by a general concept”
28. Space is form of representation of a singular unmediated by a general concept, i.e., intuition
29. Concept? Is a judgment..
30. Space

41. What is domain of representables?

42. Domain of representables in itself = System of relations (Leibniz)
43. Complete representation = mind of god
44. Break up, analyse ideas, get to intuitions, “a conception of a pure and attentive mind, so
easy and distinct that concerning that which we understand no further doubt remains” clear
and distinct simple intuitions, like lines and points, those are the rationally intuited ideas,
out which you can construct further rational concepts
45. A sugar cube is a confused idea, but a line and appoint is an clear idea, a concept of a cube,
not merely as ideas but precisely as the object they represent, have real counterpart in
formal reality,
46. From those intuitive concepts one can constructed further rational concepts
47. Points and lines are clear and distinct concepts, can construct concept of space (?)

Kants starting point: space is essentially representation ?

Intuitions are

1. [*]The only kind of being that anything spatiotemporal has is second-class being, which
consist in either being actually represented or being representable AS representable
2. Kant denies that anything IN space and time – space, time anything it it – has any OTHER
being than as content or as a potential content of a mental act of representation
3. “We must give full credence to this paradoxical but correct proposition, that there is nothing
in space save what is represented in it. For space is itself nothing but representation
[something REPRESENTED, space is not an act of represesenting, but something we only get
as immanent object of representing, and whatever is in space, is contained in that immanent
object of representing, must itself be an immanent object of representing] and whatever is
in it must therefore be contained in the representation. Nothing whatsoever is in space,
save in so far as it is actually represented in it. It is a proposition which must indeed sound
strange, that a thing can exist only in the representation of it, but in this case the objection
falls, inasmuch as the things with which we are here concerned are not things in themselves,
but appearances only, that is representations (A375)
4. 1. Space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from outer
experiences. For in order that certain sensations be referred to something
outside me (that is, to something in another region of space from that in
which I find myself) [outside my body, ws], and similarly in order that I
may be able to represent them as outside and alongside one another, and
 accordingly as not only different but as in different places, the representation of space must be
presupposed. (A23/B38)
5. Space+time = exist only AS represented
6. As oppose to: there is real space, and then someone can represent a space
7. Space does not have “formal reality,” being independent of thought, it does not exist
independently
8. Space that we represent is for Kant not an actually existing individual in the classical sense. It
is something that has being for thought: you destroy the mind, you destroy that act, and you
destroy space.
9. Intuition is essentially representation
10. Space represented is construed as an object, an object of intuition ( not a concept, why?)
11. Thing can exist only in representation, in space
12. If two people are representing space as represented, they have the same content
13. Content of act (space) transcends the particular act
14. God represents all things -> intellectual intuition
15. [..]
16. No God (?)
17. Anti-transcendental realism => no formal being
18. can’t know things inthemselves / space time =/= concept?
19. Not domain of representables in mind god
20. Do not start with god, representer

1. This such?
2. Space is represented as infinite: there is always a ‘more’
3. “when I representd person as physical object, I do not represent all kinds of parts, outsides,
tops, bottoms, and so on. I am perceptually representing them as physical objects, but not
every part of them.. but I can always represent more of you .. When I represent Jones, I
represent his face, but I also represent him as a whole physical object.
4. One can represent something as a physical object – as a whole – without representing all of
its parts: one doesn’t simply represent parts, one represents them as a parts of an infinite
whole
5.

1. Judgments = discursive

1. Kant distinguishes between things that exist for minds from thing in themselves. A thing in
itself is something that doesn’t depend for its existence upon being thought of.
2. A thing that depends for its being on being known =/= causal dependence

1. Adverbial
Kant
What remains to be done:

1. Intuition =/= concept -> judgment

2. Determining judgment -> particular intuition is subsumed under a given universal concept ->
doesn’t work for history text
3. Reflective judgment -> particular laws are subsumed under a universal concept that is not
yet given -> does work for history text
4. What about relation between moral judgment and moral act?

By intuition [intuitus] I understand, not the fluctuating faith in the senses, no r the deceitful ju d g m
en t o f a poorlv com posed im agination; b u t a conception of a pure and attentive m ind [mens/, so
easy and distinct that concerning that which we understand [intelligere] no fu rth er doubt rem ains;
or, wlrat is the sam e, the un do ub ted conception of a pure and attentive m ind, which arises from
the light of reason alone. (AT X 368) D eduction is characterized as a chain o f successive intuitions.
Descartes writes: Many things are known with certainty, even though they are not themselves
evident, only because they are deduced from true and known principles through a continuous and u
n in terru p ted movem ent of thought, perspicuously intuiting each individual th in g .. . . We can
therefore distinguish an intuition of the m ind from a certain deduction, bv the fact that in the one,
we conceive a certain m otion or succession, but not in the other. (AT X 369-70)