10

On the Psychology of
Islamist Terrorism

Religion and terrorism have a long common history. Some ofthe words
used in English language to characterize a terrorist are either closely con‘
nected with religion or are derived from the names of religious groups. A
fanatic, for example, derives from fimum, the Latin for temple, someone
who suffered from temple madness. A zealot refers to a Jewish sect that
Fought against the Romans in Israel in the first century. Using a primit-
ive form of chemical warfare, they poisoned wells and granaries used by
the Romans. The zealots even sabotaged Ierusalem’s water supply be-
sides indulging in individual acts of assassination. Which brings us to
assassin, literally ‘hashish-eater’, a radical Muslim Shia sect, which fought
the Christian crusaders between the 1 1‘h and 13‘h centuries. The assassins
looked upon murder as a sacred duty that would hasten the coming of
a new millennium. If he would die in the course of committing his act,
the assassin was promised an entry into a glorious heaven. His was an ethos
ofself-sacrifice and martyrdom that is still present in Islamist terror move—
ments today.
Until the advent of nationalism, anarchism, and Marxism, religion
provided the only justification for terror. Even today, the violence com-
mitted by relatively more secular terror groups such as the Irish Republican
Army, the Sri Lankan LTTE, the Basque ETA, the Shining Path in Peru,
and the now defunct Bader-Meinhof group in Germany and the Red
Brigade in Italy pales in comparison with the horrors that become possible
when the terrorists are religious fundamentalists or when a nationalist-
separatist terrorist movement also becomes imbued with religious fervour.
The London blasts are the most recent but I am sure that none of us have

First published in German in Die Zeir, the English version appeared in The
Arirm Age.
 | 5.’. / (In/lure andPsJ/che On the Psychology oflilamz'st Terrorism / I33
which
forgotten the horrors ofMadrid train bombings or the school massacre in The disease is caused by the process ofmodernity and globalization,
. There is no differen ce today betwee n
Chechnya. Holy terrorists, as we shall see later, although sharing some ol the Muslim body has not resisted
Hindu, or Christia n. The remedy ,
the terrorist psychology with their secular counterparts, have nevertheless the home ofa Muslim and that ofalew,
entals of the faith as con-
completely different value systems, concepts of morality, and ways in then, is a return to the Shariat and the fundam
which they justify and legitimize their terrorist acts. tained in the Koran.
dark and
A terrorist does not enter the world as a finished terrorist. He, and This constant depiction of a despised present as something
shining. and
increasingly she, arises from a large minority ofMuslims all over the world degenerate, Whereas the past and a hoped-for future are‘
s readiness
who have made the Fundamentalist message ofa radical Islam their own. glorious, is one ofthe ideological underpinnings ofthe terrorist
his classic
Let us listen closely t0 this message because I believe it is generally mis to embrace death in carrying out his mission. As Erich Hoffer in
it, ‘To lose one’s life is but to lose the present
understood in the West. This message, which I have described in detail in The True BelieverQOOZ) put
my book The Colours os'o/ehee (I996), is preached by fundamentalist and, clearly, to lose a defiled, worthless present is not to lose much.
preachers in some mosques and traditional Koranic schools, the madrasas. Psychologically, then, fundamentalism is a theory ofsuffering and cure
emporary
It generally begins with a lament for the lost glories ofIslam, as the preacher which has replaced the economic, political, social accounts ofcont
s accoun t, com-
compares the sorry plight of Muslims today with their earlier exalted Muslim suffering in some parts ofthe world with a religiou
‘for. the suf-
status. Look at the sorry fate ofIraq, a land made sacred by the blood ol' plete in itself, on the symptoms, causes, origins, and remedy
insider Por
.
the Prophets grandsons, says one mullah. At one time Sultan Saladin com“ fering. Illness to the outsider, fundamentalism is a cure for the
looming
manding a force of thirteen thousand in the battle for Jerusalem faced many Muslims with an inchoate sense of oppression and the
with fracture d self-est eem 1n wake of hist—
Richards army of seven hundred thousand and killed three hundred shadow of a menacing future,
is an attemp t, howeve r flawed, to revive the
Christians on a single day. Once in the battle for Mecca, the Prophet with orical change, fundamentalism
attemp t to give politics a spiritua l
a ragtag force ofthree hundred and thirteen, including women and child— sacred in social and cultural life. It is an
s truths a bulWar k against
ren, defeated the one thousand warriors ofAbu Jahl, many of them on dimension, and to recover in their religiou
horseback. Today, with all the oil, dollars, and weapons in the world, collective identity fragmentation.
root word
Muslims are slaves to Western Christian powers even in lands where they One of the prime elements of the cure is effort orjihadflthe
are supposed to be the rulers. ofjihad in Arabic means utmost effort. Jihad is the effort or struggle against
life, of
After listing the symptoms ofMuslim distress, the mullahs proceed to the obstacles that prevent a believer from living the perfect Islamic
the
diagnose the disease. The bad condition ofMuslims, they aver, is due to living life in the faith. jihad, then, is both a peaceful struggle against
e against the
a glaring internal fault: the weakening or loss of religious faith. Muslims temptations ofone’s own lower nature and an armed struggl
outer forces of unbelief, kufi', that preven t one living in belief.
have lost everything-political authority, respect, the wealth ofboth faith
that these
(deen) and the world (dum'ya)—~because they did not keep their pact with The m0tor ofthe jihad, then, is not in its lack ofvalues. Only
modern sensibi lity. In a
Mohammed. At one time Allah gave Muslims the kingdom of the world values are different from the ones that govern
y life, funda-
only in order to test them whether they would continue to remain His globalizing world that calls for making choices in everyda
of increas mg
slaves. It was their religious zeal which made a small group ofMuslims suc- mentalism would have nothing to do with the desirability
ic Terror ism ,
ceed against overwhelming odds. The Arabs, in spite oftheir wealth, a ter» human choice. In his essay ‘The Psychological Sources ofIslam
a modern
ritory 650 times larger, and a population fifty times greater, are humiliated Michael Mazarr (2004) puts it succinctly when he says that in
tradition that
by Israel because they are only fighting for land even ifit is there own land. world that asks for reasons, fundamentalism is a beleaguered
nal way, by referen ce to a reveale d truth
They are not fighting for Islam. They are not fighting for the Prophet. defends tradition in a traditio
Presi—
Sultan Saladin fought for Islam, and won Palestine. On the eve ofhis battle beyond human enquiry. We can go badly wrong ifwe see iihadis as
g With free-
with Richard, he said to his soldiers, ‘Paradise is near, Egypt is far’. dent Bush does, as thugs, as people who hate freedom clashin
of one attributed
After listing the symptoms and making the diagnosis, the fundamentalist dom~loving Americans. His statement reminds me
ce the ev1ldoer,
doctor proceeds to the third step ofhis clinical investigation: pathogenesis. to Dostoevsky: ‘While nothing is easier than to denoun
 134 / Culture and Psyche
On the Psychology ofIslamist Terrorism / 135
nothin g is mo re diffic
' ult than to understand hlm.
' ’ It is
' not the hatc nl '
Western democracy but the fear of contagion no rest, kills all feelings of empathy for those who are perceived to belong
by Western cultures im-
purztzes that fuel jihad. The jihad’s dread is to the enemy—whether women or children—that is equated with Satan.
not of political freedom but
of moral pollution. This becomes crystal clear The jihadi, then, is psychologically organized around a cold rage and
ifwe look at the essenti'll
charter of the jihad movement, its Mein Kam revenge becomes the purpose of his being. This is as terrifying as it is
pf This is a text called
lesroner. It was penned by Sayyid Qutb, the tragic. Tragic, because he sees in terrorism, in what appear as totally evil
founder of the militant
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Sayyid Qutb acts, an arena for heroism and idealism. He becomes even more frighten~
wrote down his thou yhrs
after his travels in the USA between 1948
and 1950, shortly before Nais ing in view of the fact that he is neither mad nor crazed with drugs
cl'
executed him in 1966. In his essay ‘My Holy
Warrior’, Jonathan Rahal! as many would like to believe. His reasoning capacity, while totally un-
(2002) tells us that according to Qutb, drink der the domination and in the service of the overriding emotion, a total
ing, fornication, shoppin 1
and vulgar entertainment were the chief purs commitment to hatred, is often not only intact but even sharpened and
uits of a spirituall an:
morally bankrupt societysunk in ja/mlz'yrz (rem more focused.
ember the Prophets defeat
of Abu JahalP), the condition of ignorance,
barbarism, from which the There are many factors that contribute to this difference between the
Arabs were rescued by the gift ofKoran. The
twentieth century, dominated psychologies of the fundamentalist and the jihadi. Let me begin with the
by ‘Western cultural forms, is a new jahaliya
and the great project of 't role the religious group plays on the stage of their inner worlds. All of us
revrved Islam is to restore the rule 0f Allah globa are members of many groups——family, profession, co~workers, region,
lly, by force of arms ff
necessary. Ironically, Sayyid Qutb echoes nation, religion. Each ofthese groups influences our beliefs, attitudes, and
President Bush even as ‘he
reverses the American president’s classification
of who are the lovers and behaviour at different times and in different proportions. In case of a
haters offreedom. ‘. . . this religion [Islam] is
reallya universal declaration threat, challenge, or even insult to one ofthese groups, the particular iden-
of the freedom of man from servitude to othe tity associated with this group comes to the forefront in our consciousness.
r and from servitude to his
own desrres. It is a declaration that sovereign The attitude and behaviour associated with this identity recedes again
ty belongs to God alone and
that he is the Lord of all the worlds.’ Whereve once the crisis is over. In case ofthe jihadi, there is a permanent switchover
r Allah’s sovereignty is not
acknowledged is a place ripe for spurning, if to the religious group identity and a rejection of the salience of all other
not burning. ‘There is onl
one place on earth which can be called the groups. Radical Islam becomes the dominant or even the sole mode of
house of peace, and it is tha>tl
place Where an Islamic state is established and
the Shariah [Koranic law]
experiencing his group identity. The jihadi is not a person who wears his
lS the authority and Gods laws are observed
. . . The rest of the world ' religious group identity lightly; for him it is an armour that is rarely, ifever,
the place of war.’ taken off. His behaviour, whether in time ofpeace or heightened conflict,
Let me sayhere that although the terrorist arises ls
is dictated by his particular puritan, fundamentalist religious commitment
from the fundamentalist
most fundamentalists are not terrorists. Altho that enjoins kindness and compassion to those he considers his own and
ugh many may s m a:
thize wrth the outer, armed jihad of the terro an implacable hatred toward those who are outside the fold.
rist, their own energies Iire
concentrated on the inner jihad of leading What are the differences between the religious and the secular terrorist?
the pious life ofa believer
The fundamentalist, too, feels the humiliatio As compared to the secular terroristwhose aims are limited to achievement
n ofthe nation oflslam Bur
unlike the terrorist, his anger is directed inwa of circumscribed political objectives, the goal of the religious terrorist is
rd in a collective self—recrimi—
nation. His feelings are more of a victim, ofhe more encompassing. His is a Holy War, which can only end when total
lplessness, and, in the elite
sadness in mourning the lost glories of Islam victory over the world of kufr has been achieved
ic civilization. i
. The reaction to feelings of humiliation takes The religious inspiration for terrorist acts takes away any guilt associated
a profound and fateful]
different turn in the terrorist—the muja/adem
(holy warrior) or 'ihad with the taking of innocent lives. The religious inspiration, with its por-
iy
as he would call himself. His need for revenge, trayal of conflict as being between the forces of God and Satan, good and
for righting a wrofi fof
undoing a hurt by whatever means is a deep evil, enables the religious terrorist to contemplate far more deadly operations
ly anchored unreletin
compulsion in the pursuit of these aims. His than the secular terrorist and a larger, much less circumscribed category of
vengeful attitude, gives hingil
enemy for attack. His goals, sacred by definition, are exempt from all forms
 | Hi / (.'/1/!!1rr'mldPr)/c/9e'
On the Psyrhvlogy ofIslamist Terrarism / 137
nl lniina n enquiry. He sees his violence as that
ofa soldier in defense ofhis to those at the cutting edge ofglobalization . . . This reality is painful, and
Ln‘! ll, 4i higher calling than that ofa soldier mere
ly defending his country the pain often is felt most keenly not by the poorest, but by those who have
l lis violence, which is sacred in that it is abso
lute, beyond appeal un: progressed a little and are frustrated in their aspirations to go further.’
answerable to human reason, is a violence that
exalts rather than dimi- These educated and materially better-offMuslims are more likely to be
nishes him.
The exaltation is especially true ofthe ‘suicide-b aware oftheir history. They resonate more to accounts ofpast Islamic glory
omber’. He is not like and the present marginal state ofmost Islamic nations, and are thus more
the ‘normal’ suicidal person who acts out of desp
air and feelings of utter prone to the feelings of collective humiliation. More than their other
helplessness. The suicide-bomber would lose the
religious validation even coreligionists, they are extremely sensitive to Western triumphalist rhetoric
elevation, ofhis action ifhe ever did so. For acco
rding to his theology 1 on the backwardness ofMuslim societies and a crowing about the achieve-
suicide who kills himselffor personal reasons is
committing a heinous arid ments and superiority ofWestern civilization. For them, killing oflVIuslim
blasphemous action. In ‘Mishandling Suicide
Terrorism’, the anthropo‘ men in armed clashes or even bombing and missile attacks that kill
logist Scott Atran quotes Sheikh al-Kardawi,
the most important Sunni civilians, are not as bad as a continuing occupation oflands Muslims con-
religious authority for martyr actions: ‘. . . he
who commits martyrdom sider their own. Acts that shame Muslims, such as the events in the Iraqi
sacrifices himselffor the sake ofhis religion
and nation [nation in the sense prison of Abu Gharib, are the worst.
ofnation offaith, ofIslam] .’ In contrast to
the hopelessness ofthe ordinary
suicide, ‘. . . the Mujhaid is full ofhope. They are His education and class background also makes the terrorist more
youth at the peak ofthei r sensitive to the oppressive structures ofhis own society, and ofthe modern
blooming who at a certain moment decide to turn
their bodies into body world. His consciousness is thus marked by an inner sense of oppression.
parts . . . flowers.’ (Atran, 2002, p. 76)
One reason for the terrorist’s donning of the He is thus more likely to find tyranny wherever he settles down in the
religious armor is the world. Living in a liberal Britain, France or Germany or Spain does not
demo graphic background ofmost terrorists. Whe
n Colin Powell (2002 ) make the potential terrorist more liberal. On the contrary, believing to be
tells the World Economic Forum that ‘terrorism
really flourishes in areas surrounded by kufr—unbelief~—the budding terrorist lives in exile in a
of poverty, despair and hopelessness’, he is mista
ken. Atran (2004) anal chronic state of persecution and a horror of pollution by the Western
lyses the relevant studies to show terrorists
to be more educated and world that surrounds him, making his adherence to his radical theology
economically better offthan the population to whic
h they belong. A majo- even stronger.
rity of Palestinian suicide bombers have a colleg
e education (as compared Let me note here that the response to humiliation, which has been
to 15 per cent ofthe population of the same age
group) and less than l 5 advanced as the main motivation of the terrorist, does not mean that there
per cent come from poor families. The interroga
tion of Saudi Arabian are no other subsidiary motivations that come into play. As Jessica Stern
detainees concludes that a surprising number have
graduate degrees and (2003), a terrorism expert at Harvard has observed, terrorism also holds
come from high status families. The Singapore
Parliamentary report on a promise of adventure and glamour that can be attractive to many young
prisoners from Jemaah Islamiya, an ally ofAl-Qaed
a, similarly reaches the males (p. 44). Others may be attracted by the material rewards of terro-
conc lusion that these men were not ignorant, desti
tute, or disenfranchised rism, which pays better than conventional employment in an impoverished
but held normal, respectable jobs. (Atran, 2004
, p. 20). i country. Also, although feelings of humiliation and its avenging is the
In his book [slam in a Globalizing World
(2003), Thomas Simons a main psychological motor ofIslamist terror, this motivation is not ofequal
longtime, sympathetic student of the Islamic
world and a former HS strength across all Muslim populations. Arab societies, with their much
ambassador to Pakistan, compares the terrorists
of revolutionary Russia greater sensitivity to the calculus ofshame and honour, are more vulnerable
With those of the Islamic world today. ‘The
young of both times and to perceived humiliations and injuries to narcissism, the feeling of grand-
places—the Russian world after 1870 and the Arab
world around 1970*’ iosity, than other Muslim societies where the honour-shame calculus—
were scarred by the frustration ofalways living seco
nd-rate lives in relation the gaining oflost honour by avenging shame—is not quite as pronounced.
138 / Culture and Psyche

REFERENCES

Atran, S. (2004), ‘Mishandling Suicide Terrorism’, Wushingmn Quarterly, 27(3):

67—90.
— (2004), ‘Soft Power and the Psychology of Suicide Bombing’, Terrorism
Monitor, 2: 11.
Hoffer, E. (2002), The True Believer, New York: Perrenial Classics.
Kakar, S. (1996), The Colour: ofViolenee, Delhi: Penguin-Viking.
Mazarr, ].M. (2004), ‘The Psychological Sources of Islamic Terrorism’, Policy
Review, 126.
Powell, C. (2002), ‘World Economic Forum’, New York Times, 2 February 2002.
Raban, I. (2002), ‘My Holy War‘, The New Yorker, 4 February 2002.
Simons, T. (2003), Islam in a Globalizing World, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Stern, J. (2003), Terrorism in the Name ofGorL New York: HarperCollins.