PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.

FRANCISCO MANLANGIT y TRESBALLES,

Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC) Cluster 4 office received information from an informant that a
certain "Negro" was selling prohibited drugs along Col. Santos Street at Brgy. South Cembo, Makati City.

Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency to conduct a joint MADAC-police buy-bust operation. A team was
assembled composed of several members of the different offices, among which Police Officer 2 Virginio
Costa was designated as the team leader, with MADAC operative Wilfredo Serrano as the poseur-buyer
and Roberto Bayona as his back-up. The team prepared buy-bust money for the operation, marking two
(2) one hundred peso (PhP 100) bills with the initials "AAM." Chanrobles

Thus, the rest of the team approached Manlangit and proceeded to arrest him while informing him of
constitutional rights and the reason for his arrest.

In his Brief, accused-appellant Manlangit claimed that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

To support such contention, accused-appellant claimed that there was no buy-bust operation
conducted. He pointed out that he was not in the list of suspected drug pushers of MADAC or of the
AIDSTOF.

He further emphasized that the buy-bust operation was conducted without first conducting a
surveillance or test buy to determine the veracity of the report made by the informant.

He assailed the fact that despite knowledge of his identity and location, the buy-bust team failed to
secure even a search warrant.

Accused-appellant also raised the issue that the buy-bust team failed to comply with the procedure for
the custody and control of seized prohibited drugs under Sec. 21 of RA 9165. He argued that the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official function was overturned by the officers' failure
to follow the required procedure in the conduct of a buy-bust operation, as well as the procedure in the
proper disposition, custody, and control of the subject specimen

Contrary to accused-appellant's challenge to the validity of the buy-bust operation, the Court
categorically stated in Quinicot v. People that a prior surveillance or test buy is not required for a valid
buy-bust operation, as long as the operatives are accompanied by their informant, thus

Settled is the rule that the absence of a prior surveillance or test buy does not affect the legality of the
buy-bust operation

In the instant case, having been accompanied by the informant to the person who was peddling the
dangerous drugs, the policemen need not have conducted any prior surveillance before they
undertook the buy-bust operation.

We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless arrests
are allowed in three instances

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been accepted as a valid and
effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime
originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. If
carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust operation deserves
judicial sanction.

EFRAIM C. GENUINO, ERWIN F. GENUINO and SHERYL G. SEE, Petitioners

vs
HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA

De Lima issued DOJ WLO No. 2011-422 dated August 9, 2011 against GMA pursuant to her authority
under DOJ Circular No. 41. She also ordered for the inclusion of GMA's name in the Bureau of
Immigration (BI) watchlist.10 Thereafter, the Bl issued WLO No. ASM-11-237,11 implementing De Lima's
order.

After the expiration of GMA's term as President of the Republic of the Philippines and her subsequent
election as Pampanga representative, criminal complaints were filed against her before the DOJ,
particularly for plunder

e Lima issued DOJ WLO No. 2011-422 dated August 9, 2011 against GMA pursuant to her authority
under DOJ Circular No. 41. She also ordered for the inclusion of GMA's name in the Bureau of
Immigration (BI) watchlist.10 Thereafter, the Bl issued WLO No. ASM-11-237,11 implementing De Lima's
order.

In three separate letters dated October 20, 2011, October 21, 2011, and October 24, 2011, GMA
requested for the issuance of an ADO, pursuant to Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 41, so that she may be
able to seek medical attention from medical specialists abroad for her hypoparathyroidism and
metabolic bone mineral disorder. She mentioned six different countries where she intends to undergo
consultations

Also, on November 8, 2011, De Lima issued an Order,27 denying GMA's application

At around 8:00 p.m. on the same day, the petitioners proceeded to the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport (NAIA), with an aide-de-camp and a private nurse, to take their flights to Singapore. However,
the BI officials at NAIA refused to process their travel documents which ultimately resulted to them not
being able to join their flight

The right to travel and its limitations

The right to travel is part of the "liberty" of which a citizen cannot be deprived without due
process of law.75 It is part and parcel of the guarantee of freedom of movement that the
Constitution affords its citizen. Pertinently, Section 6, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as maybe
provided by law
It is apparent, however, that the right to travel is not absolute. There are constitutional, statutory and
inherent limitations regulating the right to travel. Section 6 itself provides that the right to travel may be
impaired only in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by
law

The issuance of DOJ Circular No. 41

has no legal basis

To be clear, DOJ Circular No. 41 is not a law. It is not a legislative enactment which underwent the
scrutiny and concurrence of lawmakers, and submitted to the President for approval. It is a mere
administrative issuance apparently designed to carry out the provisions of an enabling law which the
former DOJ Secretary believed to be Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292, otherwise known as the
"Administrative Code of 1987." She opined that DOJ Circular No. 41 was validly issued pursuant to the
agency's rulemaking powers provided in Sections 1 and 3, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 1 of E.O. No. 292 and
Section 50, Chapter 11, Book IV of the mentioned Code.

It is, however, important to stress that before there can even be a valid administrative issuance, there
must first be a showing that the delegation of legislative power is itself valid. It is valid only if there is a
law that (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate
and determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions

In the same way, Section 3 does not authorize the DOJ to issue WLOS and HDOs to restrict the
constitutional right to travel. There is even no mention of the exigencies stated in the Constitution that
will justify the impairment

The DOJ cannot also rely on Section 50, Chapter 11, Book IV of E.O. No. 292, which simply provides for
the types of issuances that administrative agencies, in general, may issue. It does not speak of any
authority or power but rather a mere clarification on the nature of the issuances that may be issued by a
secretary or head of agency. The innocuous provision reads as follows

The questioned circular does not come under the inherent power of the executive department to adopt
rules and regulations as clearly the issuance of HDO and WLO is not the DOJ's business. As such, it is a
compulsory requirement that there be an existing law, complete and sufficient in itself, conferring the
expressed authority to the concerned agency to promulgate rules. On its own, the DOJ cannot make
rules, its authority being confined to execution of laws.

The DOJ would however insist that the resulting infringement of liberty is merely incidental, together
with the consequent inconvenience, hardship or loss to the person being subjected to the restriction
and that the ultimate objective is to preserve the investigative powers of the DOJ and public order.100 It
posits that the issuance ensures the presence within the country of the respondents during the
preliminary investigation

That there is a risk of flight does not authorize the DOJ to take the situation upon itself and draft an
administrative issuance to keep the individual within the Philippine jurisdiction so that he may not be
able to evade criminal prosecution and consequent liability. It is an arrogation of power it does not have;
it is a usurpation of function that properly belongs to the legislature.
The DOJ cannot issue DOJ Circular
No. 41 under the guise of police
power

The DOJ's reliance on the police power of the state cannot also be countenanced. Police power pertains
to the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order
to promote the general welfare

It bears noting, however, that police power may only be validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b)
the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

On its own, the DOJ cannot wield police power since the authority pertains to Congress. Even if
it claims to be exercising the same as the alter ego of the President, it must first establish the
presence of a definite legislative enactment evidencing the delegation of power from its
principal. This, the DOJ failed to do. There is likewise no showing that the curtailment of the
right to travel imposed by DOJ Circular No. 41 was reasonably necessary in order for it to
perform its investigatory duties.

In any case, the exercise of police power, to be valid, must be reasonable and not repugnant to
the Constitution

DOJ Circular No. 41 transcends

constitutional limitations

hus, the circular permits the intrusion on the right to travel only when the criminal case filed against the
individual is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, or those that pertains to more serious crimes or
offenses that are punishable with imprisonment of more than six years. The exclusion of criminal cases
within the jurisdiction of the MTC is justified by the fact that they pertain to less serious offenses which
is not commensurate with the curtailment of a fundamental right. Much less is the reason to impose
restraint on the right to travel of respondents of criminal cases still pending investigation since at that
stage no information has yet been filed in court against them. It is for these reasons that Circular No.
3997 mandated that HDO may only be issued in criminal cases filed with the RTC and withheld the same
power from the MTC.

This is precisely the situation that the 1987 Constitution seeks to avoid for an executive officer to impose
restriction or exercise discretion that unreasonably impair an individual's right to travel-- thus, the
addition of the phrase, "as maybe provided by law

By requiring an ADO before the subject of a HDO or WLO is allowed to leave the country, the
only plausible conclusion that can be made is that its mere issuance operates as a restraint on the
right to travel. To make it even more difficult, the individual will need to cite an exceptional
reason to justify the granting of an ADO.

The WLO also does not bear a significant distinction from a HDO, thereby giving the impression
that they are one and the same or, at the very least, complementary such that whatever is not
covered in Section 1,131 which pertains to the issuance of HDO, can conveniently fall under
Section 2,132 which calls for the issuance of WLO. In any case, there is an identical provision in
DOJ Circular No. 41 which authorizes the Secretary of Justice to issue a HDO or WLO against
anyone, motu proprio, in the interest of national security, public safety or public health. With this
all-encompassing provision, there is nothing that can prevent the Secretary of Justice to prevent
anyone from leaving the country under the guise of national security, public safety or public
health.

The key is legislative enactment

The Court recognizes the predicament which compelled the DOJ to issue the questioned circular
but the solution does not lie in taking constitutional shortcuts. Remember that the Constitution
"is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights are determined and all public authority
administered."142 Any law or issuance, therefore, must not contradict the language of the
fundamental law of the land; otherwise, it shall be struck down for being unconstitutional.

it bears stressing that the government is not completely powerless or incapable of preventing their
departure or having them answer charges that may be subsequently filed against them. In his Separate
Concurring Opinion, Mr. Justice Carpio, pointed out that Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8239, otherwise known
as the Philippine Passport Act of 1996, explicitly grants the Secretary of Foreign Affairs or any of the
authorized consular officers the authority to issue verify, restrict, cancel or refuse the issuance of a
passport to a citizen under the circumstances mentioned in Section 4144 thereof. Mr. Justice Tijam, on
the other hand, mentioned Memorandum Circular No. 036, which was issued pursuant to R.A. No. 9208
or the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003, as amended by R.A. No. 10364 or the Expanded Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Acts of 2012, which authorizes the BI to hold the departure of suspected
traffickers or trafficked individuals. He also noted that the Commissioner of BI has the authority to issue
a HDO against a foreigner subject of deportation proceedings in order to ensure his appearance therein.
Similarly, the proposal of Mr. Justice Velasco for the adoption of new set of rules which will allow the
issuance of a precautionary warrant of arrest offers a promising solution to this quandary. This, the
Court can do in recognition of the fact that laws and rules of procedure should evolve as the present
circumstances require.

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION

On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder in the
Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of
appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).4 On June 10, 2014 and June 16,
2014, Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus Motion5 and Supplemental Opposition,6 praying, among
others, that he be allowed to post bail should probable cause be found against him. The motions were
heard by the Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution filed its Consolidated Opposition
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbaya n issued its resolution denying Enrile’s motion, particularly on the
matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily
surrendered or been placed under the custody of the law

On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered (CIDG) in
Camp Crame Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital ,11 and his
Motion to Fix Bai

e Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary as he is charged with a capital offense;
that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to determine whether there is
strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that entitlement to bail considers the imposable
penalty, regardless of the attendant circumstances

Bail protects the right of the accused to

due process and to be presumed innocent

Bail may be granted as a

matter of right or of discretion

Admission to bail in offenses punished

by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion

For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in
criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in Concerned
Citizens v. Elma ,30 "such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the
degree of guilt of the accused

Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail

We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two mitigating
circumstances that should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was already over 70 years
at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, and that he voluntarily surrendered

Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier mentioned
principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever
so required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the
international community arising from the national commitment under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights

This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and
dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal
proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1 ) that the detainee will not
be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2 ) that there exist special, humanitarian and
compelling circumstance
n our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities
upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly
unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has
demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an
earlier time many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal processes

Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or collectively, could pose significant
risk s to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1) uncontrolled hypertension, because it could lead to brain or heart
complications, including recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia, because it could lead to fatal or non-fatal
cardiovascular events, especially under stressful conditions; (3) coronary calcifications

independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the humanity of the law makes it a
consideration which should, regardless of the charge and the stage of the proceeding, influence the
court to exercise its discretion to admit the prisoner to bail

Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the
appearance of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the
fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
denying Enrile’s Motion To Fix Bail.

JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71,

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by
respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor
C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in
both cases

n 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted
out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in
Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of
reckless imprudence.

Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner
sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing

Petitioner laments the RTC’s failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking
jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having been
previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless imprudence charged in
Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple consequences of such crime are material
only to determine his penalty.
2) if in the negative, whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.

Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367

Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366

The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense"13 protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same
offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid
information.14 It is not disputed that petitioner’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the
question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same
offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same
offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional
fact which the other does not."15

We find for petitioner.

Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,

its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods;
if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period
shall be imposed.

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which
material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent
variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at
arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave
felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor to
death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no
relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes

Prior Conviction or Acquittal of

Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not
merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars
subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts,

The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double
Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in
barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless
imprudence" because of the accused’s prior acquittal of "slight physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained

And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several
persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different
crimes and prosecutions

Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized

Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code

Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under
either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies); and (2) when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the
accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty
for the most serious crime.

In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but the
mental attitude behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, a single
mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one
quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of
quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.

Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually

impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less
grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing another.

Prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or
severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the
penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no
splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first
level court.

ATTY. BERTENI C. CAUSING and PERCIVAL CARAG MABASA, complainants,

vs. PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE LORENZO R. DELA ROSA, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 4, Manil
Atty. Causing and his client, Mabasa (Complainants), charged respondent
Judge Dela Rosa with gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct and gross
incompetence for reversing 2 the dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 09-268685-86
 entitled People v. Eleazar, et al. (Libel Cases), wherein Mabasa was one of the
accused.
Complainants alleged that the Libel Cases were dismissed by former Acting
Presiding Judge Gamor B. Disalo (Judge Disalo) in an Order 3 dated April 13, 2015
on the ground that the right of the accused to speedy trial had been violated. The
prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the April 13, 2015 Order before the
RTC Br. 4 Manila, now presided by respondent Judge Dela Rosa. Respondent Judge
Dela Rosa granted the prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration in the assailed
Resolution

Complainants questioned respondent Judge Dela Rosa's November 23, 2015 Resolution
granting the prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration because, according to them, it was
elementary for respondent Judge Dela Rosa to know that the prior dismissal of a criminal
case due to a violation of the accused's right to speedy trial is equivalent to a dismissal on
the merits of the case and, as such, granting the prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration
was tantamount to a violation of the constitutional right against double jeopardy
warrant of arrest for Mabasa was issued on May 28, 2009, it was only one (1) year and
four (4) months after or on September 28, 2010 that Mabasa was detained
Respondent Judge Dela Rosa emphasized that the day the Libel Cases were
dismissed, i.e., on April 13, 2015, was actually the date set for the first actual trial of
the cases. He stressed that the delay of almost five (5) years in the subject cases was
attributable more to Mabasa than anyone else. 29
Respondent Judge Dela Rosa claimed that the November 23, 2015 Resolution was issued
in good faith and after evaluation of the evidence submitted by each party. He denied that
the same was motivated by bad faith, ill will, fraud, dishonesty, corruption or caprice. In
fact, Respondent Judge issued this as a matter of fairness — that is, to give the private
complainants in the Libel Cases an opportunity to pursue against Mabasa and his co-
accused the civil aspect of the Libel Cases (mabasa resets a lot)
Finally, respondent Judge Dela Rosa stressed how the filing of this administrative
complaint against him — on January 6, 2017, or after he had already reversed the
November 23, 2015 Resolution through his June 20, 2016 Resolution — is pure
harassment
Respondent Judge has already admitted that he made a mistake in issuing the said order as
this would have constituted a violation of the right of the accused against double jeopardy.
To rectify his error, he granted the motion for reconsideration filed by the accused.
The OCA found that the records of the case show that respondent Judge Dela Rosa
admitted that he had erred in issuing the November 23, 2015 Order, but that he had
rectified such mistake
As to the referral by respondent Judge Dela Rosa to the IBP of Atty. Causing's act of
posting matters pertaining to the pending criminal case on the internet

The Court's Ruling

In view of the foregoing, the Court hereby adopts and approves the findings of
facts and conclusions of law in the above-mentioned OCA Report and
Recommendation.
The Court however has also ruled that "not every error or mistake of a judge in the
performance of his official duties renders him liable
The Court agrees with the OCA that it would be absurd to hold respondent
Judge Dela Rosa liable for his November 23, 2015 Order when he had himself
rectified this in his subsequent June 20, 2016 Order. To rule otherwise would be to
render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the
law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. 44 To
hold otherwise "would be nothing short of harassing judges to take the fantastic and
impossible oath of rendering infallible judgments." 45
Furthermore, nothing in the records of the case suggests that respondent Judge Dela Rosa
was motivated by bad faith, fraud, corruption, dishonesty or egregious error in rendering
his decision

CESAR MATAS CAGANG, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIFTH DIVISION,

QUEZON CITY; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN; and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
This Court finds that there is no violation of the accused's right to speedy
disposition of cases considering that there was a waiver of the delay of a complex
case. Definitely, granting the present Petitions and finding grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Sandiganbayan will only prejudice the due process rights of the
State.

G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458 are Petitions for Certiorari with an urgent prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction 1 assailing
the Resolutions dated September 12, 2012 2 and January 15, 2013 3 of the
Sandiganbayan
The assailed Resolutions denied Cesar Matas Cagang's (Cagang) Motion to
Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of Arrest in Criminal Case Nos.
SB-11-CRM-0456 and SB-11-CRM-0457
G.R. Nos. 210141-42, on the other hand, refer to a Petition for Certiorari with an urgent
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction 4 assailing the June 18, 2013 Order 5 and September 10, 2013 Resolution 6 of
the Sandiganbayan. The assailed Resolutions denied Cagang's Motion to Quash Order of
Arrest in Criminal Case No
Both Petitions question the Sandiganbayan's denial to quash the Informations
and Order of Arrest against Cagang despite the Office of the Ombudsman's alleged
inordinate delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation.
On February 10, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman received an anonymous complaint
alleging that Amelia May Constantino, Mary Ann Gadian, and Joy Tangan of the Vice
Governor's Office, Sarangani Province committed graft and corruption by diverting
public funds given as grants or aid using barangay officials and cooperatives as
"dummies."
On December 31, 2002, the Commission on Audit submitted its audit report finding that
the officials and employees of the Provincial Government of Sarangani appear to have
embezzled millions in public funds by sourcing out the funds from grants, aid, and the
Countrywide Development Fund of Representative Erwin Chiongbian using dummy
cooperatives
On September 30, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Joint Order terminating
Case Nos. CPL-M-03-0163 and CPL-M-03-0729. It concurred with the findings of the
Commission on Audit and recommended that a criminal case for Malversation of Public
Funds through Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019
In a Joint Order dated October 29, 2003, the accused were directed to file their counter-
affidavits and submit controverting evidence. The complainants were also given time to
file their replies to the counter-affidavits. There was delay in the release of the order since
the reproduction of the voluminous
On June 17, 2010, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision 25 in Crim. Case No. 28331
acquitting Escobar, Maglinte, and Cagang for insufficiency of evidence. Maglinte,
however, was ordered to return P100,000.00 with legal interest to the Province of
Sarangani. The cases against Rudes and Camanay were archived until the Sandiganbayan
could acquire jurisdiction over their persons
Ombudsman Carpio Morales approved the recommendation on October 20, 2011. 31
Thus, on November 17, 2011, Informations 32 for Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic
Act No. 3019 and Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public
Documents were filed against Cagang, Camanay, Amelia Carmela Constantino Zoleta
(Zoleta), Macagcalat, and Mangalen. The Informations for willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously cause the disbursement of the amount of Three Hundred and Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P350,000.00)
Cagang filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of
Arrest while Macagcalat and Mangalen separately filed their own Motion to
Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of Arrest. Cagang argued that
there was an inordinate delay of seven (7) years in the filing of the Informations.
On September 10, 2012, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution 38 denying the Motions
to Quash/Dismiss. It found that Cagang, Macagcalat, and Mangalen voluntarily submitted
to the jurisdiction of the court by the filing of the motions
Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed his Motion to Quash/Dismiss since the Informations filed against him violated
his constitutional rights to due process and to speedy disposition of cases. Citing Tatad v.
Sandiganbayan, 58 he argues that the Office of the Ombudsman lost its jurisdiction to file
the cases in view of its inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation
almost seven (7) years after the filing of the complaint
Petitioner further avers that the dismissal of cases due to inordinate delay is not because
the revival of the cases was politically motivated, as in Tatad, but because it violates
Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution 60 and Rule 112, Section 3 (f) 61 of the Rules
of Court. 62 He points out that the Sandiganbayan overlooked two (2) instances of delay
by the Office of the Ombudsman: the first was from the filing of the complaint on
February 10, 2003 to the filing of the Informations on November 17, 2011, and the
second was from the conclusion of the preliminary investigation in 2005 to the filing of
the Informations on November 17, 2011.

To give full resolution to this case, this Court must first briefly pass upon the
procedural issues raised by the parties.
Contrary to petitioner's arguments, the pendency of a petition for certiorari before this
Court will not prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceeding to trial absent the issuance of
a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction. Under Rule 65, Section 7
71 of the Rules of Court

The Constitution guarantees the right to speedy disposition of cases. Under

Article III, Section 16:
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
The right to speedy disposition of cases should not be confused with the right
to a speedy trial, a right guaranteed under Article III, Section 14 (2) of the
Constitution:
Section 14.
xxx xxx xxx
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,
and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
EcTCAD

The right to a speedy trial is invoked against the courts in a criminal prosecution. The
right to speedy disposition of cases, however, is invoked even against quasi-judicial or
administrative bodies in civil, criminal, or administrative cases before them
Both rights, nonetheless, have the same rationale: to prevent delay in the administration
of justice
While the right to speedy trial is invoked against courts of law, the right to speedy
disposition of cases may be invoked before quasi-judicial or administrative tribunals in
proceedings that are adversarial and may result in possible criminal liability.

The right to speedy disposition of cases is most commonly invoked in fact-finding

investigations and preliminary investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman since
neither of these proceedings form part of the actual criminal prosecution. The
Constitution itself mandates the Office of the Ombudsman to "act promptly" on
complaints filed before
The concept of inordinate delay was introduced in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 81 where this
Court was constrained to apply the "radical relief" of dismissing the criminal complaint
against an accused due to the delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation.
This Court, however, emphasized that "[a] mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved is not sufficient" 101 to rule that there was inordinate delay. Thus, it qualified
the application of the Tatad doctrine in cases where certain circumstances do not merit
the application of the "radical relief" sought
The Barker balancing test provides that courts must consider the following
factors when determining the existence of inordinate delay: first, the length of delay;
second, the reason for delay; third, the defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his or
her right; and fourth, the prejudice to the defendant as a result of the delay.
For a period of time, this balancing test appeared to be the best way to determine the
existence of inordinate delay.
Under Republic Act No. 8493, or the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, the entire trial period
must not exceed 180 days, except as otherwise provided for by this Court. 110 The law
likewise provides for a time limit of 30 days from the filing of the information to conduct
the arraignment, and 30 days after arraignment for trial to commence. 111 In order to
implement the law, this Court issued Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98 112 reiterating
the periods for the conduct of trial
Considering that fact-finding investigations are not yet adversarial proceedings against
the accused, the period of investigation will not be counted in the determination of
whether the right to speedy disposition of cases was violated. Thus, this Court now holds
that for the purpose of determining whether inordinate delay exists, a case is deemed to
have commenced from the filing of the formal complaint and the subsequent conduct of
the preliminary investigation
With respect to fact-finding at the level of the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman
must provide for reasonable periods based upon its experience with specific types of
cases, compounded with the number of accused and the complexity of the evidence
required. He or she must likewise make clear when cases are deemed submitted for
decision. The Ombudsman has the power to provide for these rules and it is
recommended that he or she amend these rules at the soonest possible time. cSaATC

The defense must also prove that it exerted meaningful efforts to protect accused's
constitutional rights
This concept of acquiescence, however, is premised on the presumption that the accused
was fully aware that the preliminary investigation has not yet been terminated despite a
considerable length of time
The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, is invoked by a respondent
to any type of proceeding once delay has already become prejudicial to the
respondent. The invocation of the constitutional right does not require a threat to the
 right to liberty. Loss of employment or compensation may already be considered as
sufficient to invoke the right. Thus, waiver of the right does not necessarily require
that the respondent has already been subjected to the rigors of criminal prosecution.
The failure of the respondent to invoke the right even when or she has already
suffered or will suffer the consequences of delay constitutes a valid waiver of that
right.
Institutional delay, in the proper context, should not be taken against the State.
Most cases handled by the Office of the Ombudsman involve individuals who have
the resources and who engage private counsel with the means and resources to fully
dedicate themselves to their client's case. More often than not, the accused only
invoke the right to speedy disposition of cases when the Ombudsman has already
rendered an unfavorable decision. The prosecution should not be prejudiced by
private counsels' failure to protect the interests of their clients or the accused's lack of
interest in the prosecution of their case.
If it has been alleged that there was delay beyond the given time periods, the burden of
proof shifts. The prosecution will now have the burden to prove that there was no
violation of the right to speedy trial or the right to speedy disposition of cases.
To summarize, inordinate delay in the resolution and termination of a
preliminary investigation violates the accused's right to due process and the speedy
disposition of cases, and may result in the dismissal of the case against the accused.
The burden of proving delay depends on whether delay is alleged within the periods
provided by law or procedural rules. If the delay is alleged to have occurred during
the given periods, the burden is on the respondent or the accused to prove that the
delay was inordinate. If the delay is alleged to have occurred beyond the given
periods, the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove that the delay was reasonable
under the circumstances and that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result
of the delay.
The determination of whether the delay was inordinate is not through mere
mathematical reckoning but through the examination of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the case. Courts should appraise a reasonable period from the point of
view of how much time a competent and independent public officer would need in
relation to the complexity of a given case. If there has been delay, the prosecution
must be able to satisfactorily explain the reasons for such delay and that no prejudice
was suffered by the accused as a result. The timely invocation of the accused's
constitutional rights must also be examined on a case-to-case basis.
This Court proceeds to determine whether respondent committed inordinate
delay in the resolution and termination of the preliminary investigation against
petitioner.
 There is no showing that this case was attended by malice. There is no
evidence that it was politically motivated. Neither party alleges this fact. Thus, this
Court must analyze the existence and cause of delay.
The criminal complaint against petitioner was filed on February 10, 2003. On
August 11, 2004, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding probable
cause against petitioner. This Resolution, however, was modified by the Resolution
dated October 18, 2004, which ordered the conduct of further fact-finding
investigation against some of the other respondents in the case. This further fact-
finding was resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman on April 12, 2005. On August
8, 2011, or six (6) years after the recommendation to file informations against
petitioner was approved by Tanodbayan. Informations against petitioner were filed on
November 17, 2011.
Six (6) years is beyond the reasonable period of fact-finding of ninety (90)
days. The burden of proving the justification of the delay, therefore, is on the
prosecution, or in this case, respondent.
This Court finds, however, that despite the pendency of the case since 2003,
petitioner only invoked his right to speedy disposition of cases when the informations
were filed on November 17, 2011. Unlike in Duterte and Coscolluela, petitioner was
aware that the preliminary investigation was not yet terminated.
Admittedly, while there was delay, petitioner has not shown that he asserted
his rights during this period, choosing instead to wait until the information was filed
against him with the Sandiganbayan.
Furthermore, the case before the Sandiganbayan involves the alleged malversation of
millions in public money. The Sandiganbayan has yet to determine the guilt or innocence
of petitioner
The records of the case show that the transactions investigated are complex and
numerous. As respondent points out, there were over a hundred individuals investigated,
and eventually, 40 of them were determined to have been involved in 81 different
anomalous transaction
Delays in the investigation and review would have been inevitable in the hands
of a competent and independent Ombudsman.
The dismissal of the complaints, while favorable to petitioner, would undoubtedly be
prejudicial to the State. "[T]he State should not be prejudiced and deprived of its right to
prosecute the criminal cases simply because of the ineptitude or nonchalance of the
Office of the Ombudsman." 168 The State is as much entitled to due process as the
accused
This Court finds that there is no violation of the accused's right to speedy
disposition of cases considering that there was a waiver of the delay of a complex
case. Definitely, granting the present Petitions and finding grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Sandiganbayan will only prejudice the due process rights of the
State.
First, the right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to
speedy trial. While the rationale for both rights is the same, the right to speedy trial
may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions against courts of law. The right to
speedy disposition of cases, however, may be invoked before any tribunal, whether
judicial or quasi-judicial. What is important is that the accused may already be
prejudiced by the proceeding for the right to speedy disposition of cases to be
invoked.
Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior
to a conduct of a preliminary investigation. This Court acknowledges, however, that
the Ombudsman should set reasonable periods for preliminary investigation, with due
regard to the complexities and nuances of each case. Delays beyond this period will
be taken against the prosecution. The period taken for fact-finding investigations prior
to the filing of the formal complaint shall not be included in the determination of
whether there has been inordinate delay.
Third, courts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof. If
the right is invoked within the given time periods contained in current Supreme Court
resolutions and circulars, 171 and the time periods that will be promulgated by the
Office of the Ombudsman, the defense has the burden of proving that the right was
justifiably invoked. If the delay occurs beyond the given time period and the right is
invoked, the prosecution has the burden of justifying the delay.
If the defense has the burden of proof, it must prove first, whether the case is
motivated by malice or clearly only politically motivated and is attended by utter lack
of evidence, and second, that the defense did not contribute to the delay.
Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution must prove
first, that it followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary
investigation and in the prosecution of the case; second, that the complexity of the
issues and the volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; and third, that no
prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.
Fourth, determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts must
consider the entire context of the case, from the amount of evidence to be weighed to
the simplicity or complexity of the issues raised.DcHSEa

An exception to this rule is if there is an allegation that the prosecution of the

case was solely motivated by malice, such as when the case is politically motivated or
when there is continued prosecution despite utter lack of evidence. Malicious intent
may be gauged from the behavior of the prosecution throughout the proceedings. If
malicious prosecution is properly alleged and substantially proven, the case would
automatically be dismissed without need of further analysis of the delay.
 Another exception would be the waiver of the accused to the right to speedy
disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial. If it can be proven that the accused
acquiesced to the delay, the constitutional right can no longer be invoked.
In all cases of dismissals due to inordinate delay, the causes of the delays must
be properly laid out and discussed by the relevant court.
Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial must
be timely raised. The respondent or the accused must file the appropriate motion upon
the lapse of the statutory or procedural periods. Otherwise, they are deemed to have
waived their right to speedy disposition of cases.