This case stemmed from a criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.

22 (BP 22)
filed by petitioner Nissan Gallery-Ortigas (Nissan), an entity engaged in the business of car
dealership, against respondent Purificacion F. Felipe (Purificacion)... with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City. The said office found probable cause to indict Purificacion and filed
an Information before the Metropolitan Trial Court... or her issuance of a postdated check in the
amount... of P1,020,000.00, which was subsequently dishonored upon presentment due to
"STOP PAYMENT.

Purificacion issued the said check because her son, Frederick Felipe (Frederick), attracted by a
huge discount of P220,000.00, purchased a Nissan Terrano 4x4 sports and utility vehicle (SUV)
from Nissan.

The SUV was delivered on May 14, 1997, but Frederick failed to pay upon delivery. Despite
non-payment, Frederick took possession of the vehicle.

Since then, Frederick had used and enjoyed the SUV for more than four (4) months without
paying even a single centavo of the purchase price. This constrained Nissan to send him two (2)
demand letters, on different dates, but he still refused to pay.

Nissan, through its retained... counsel, was prompted to send a final demand letter. Reacting to
the final demand, Frederick went to Nissan's office and asked for a grace period until October 30,
1997 within which to pay his full outstanding obligation amounting to P1,026,750.00.

Frederick reneged on his promise and again failed to pay.

he asked his mother, Purificacion, to issue the subject check as payment for his obligation.

Purificacion acceded to his request. Frederick then tendered her postdated check in the amount of

P1,020,000.00. The check, however, was dishonored upon presentment due to "STOP
PAYMENT."

A demand letter was served upon Purificacion, through Frederick, who lived with her.

Purificacion refused to replace the check giving the reason that she was not the one who
purchased the vehicle. On January 6, 1998, Nissan filed a criminal case for violation of BP 22
against her.

During the preliminary investigation before the Assistant City Prosecutor, Purificacion gave
P200,000.00 as partial payment to amicably settle the civil aspect of the case. Thereafter,
however, no additional payment had been made.

After trial, the MeTC rendered its judgment acquitting Purificacion of the charge, but holding her
civilly liable to Nissan.

Purificacion appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

Branch 105 thereof affirmed the MeTC decision

Purificacion moved for a reconsideration, but her motion was denied.

The CA,... granted the petition... the CA reasoned out that there was no privity of contract
between Nissan and Purificacion. No civil liability could be adjudged against her because of
her... acquittal from the criminal charge. It was Frederick who was civilly liable to Nissan.

Issues:

whether or not Purificacion is civilly liable for the issuance of a worthless check despite her
acquittal from the criminal charge.

Ruling:

Well-settled is the rule that a civil action is deemed instituted upon the filing of a criminal action,
subject to certain exceptions. Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court specifically provides
that:

The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

As can be gleaned from the foregoing, with respect to criminal actions for violation of BP 22, it
is explicitly clear that the corresponding civil action is deemed included and that a reservation to
file such separately is not allowed.

The rule is that every act or omission punishable by law has its accompanying civil liability. The
civil aspect of every criminal case is based on the principle that every person criminally liable is
also civilly liable.[16] If the accused, however, is not... found to be criminally liable, it does not
necessarily mean that he will not likewise be held civilly liable because extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.

This rule more specifically applies when (a)... the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is
only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the
crime of which the accused... was acquitted.[18] The civil action based on the delict is
extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not
commit... the acts or omission imputed to him.

Purificacion was charged with violation of BP 22 for allegedly issuing a worthless check.

Purificacion was acquitted because the element of notice of dishonor was not sufficiently
established. Nevertheless, the act or omission from which her civil liability arose, which was the
making or the issuing of the subject worthless check, clearly existed. Her acquittal from... the
criminal charge of BP 22 was based on reasonable doubt and it did not relieve her of the
corresponding civil liability. The Court cannot agree more when the MeTC ruled that:

If the acquittal is based merely on reasonable doubt, the accused may still be held civilly liable
since this does not mean he did not commit the... act complained of. It may only be that the facts
proved did not constitute the offense charged.

The Court is also one with the CA when it stated that the liability of Purificacion was limited to
her act of issuing a worthless check. The Court, however, does not agree with the CA when it
went to state further that by her acquittal in the criminal charge, there was no... more basis for
her to be held civilly liable to Nissan. The acquittal was just based on reasonable doubt and it did
not change the fact that she issued the subject check which was subsequently dishonored upon its
presentment.

LEE PUE LIONG v. CHUA PUE CHIN LEE, GR No. 181658, 2013-08-07

Facts:

Petitioner Lee Pue Liong, a.k.a. Paul Lee, is the President of Centillion Holdings, Inc. (CHI), a
company affiliated with the CKC Group of Companies (CKC Group) which includes the pioneer
company Clothman Knitting Corporation (CKC). The CKC Group is the subject of... intra-
corporate disputes between petitioner and his siblings, including herein respondent Chua Pue
Chin Lee, a majority stockholder and Treasurer of CHI.

On July 19, 1999, petitioner's siblings including respondent and some unidentified persons took
over and barricaded themselves inside the premises of a factory owned by CKC. Petitioner and
other factory employees were unable to enter the factory premises. This incident led to... the
filing of Criminal Case Nos. 971-V-99, 55503 to 55505 against Nixon Lee and 972-V-99 against
Nixon Lee, Andy Lee, Chua Kipsi a.k.a. Jensen Chua and respondent, which are now pending in
different courts in Valenzuela City.[7]... n June 14, 1999, petitioner on behalf of CHI (as per the
Secretary's Certificate[8] issued by Virginia Lee on even date) caused the filing of a verified
Petition[9] for the Issuance of an Owner's Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate... of Title
(TCT) No. 232238[10] which covers a property owned by CHI. The case was docketed as LRC
Record No. 4004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 4. Petitioner submitted
before the said court an Affidavit of Loss[11]... stating that: (1) by virtue of his position as
President of CHI, he had in his custody and possession the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No.
232238 issued by the Register of Deeds for Manila; (2) that said owner's copy of TCT No.
232238 was inadvertently lost or misplaced from... his files and he discovered such loss in May
1999; (3) he exerted diligent efforts in locating the said title but it had not been found and is
already beyond recovery; and (4) said title had not been the subject of mortgage or used as
collateral for the payment of any obligation... with any person, credit or banking institution.
Petitioner likewise testified in support of the foregoing averments during an ex-parte proceeding.
In its Order[12] dated September 17, 1999, the RTC granted the petition and directed the
Register of Deeds of

Manila to issue a new Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 232238 in lieu of the lost one.
Respondent, joined by her brother Nixon Lee, filed an Omnibus Motion praying, among others,
that the September 17, 1999 Order be set aside claiming that petitioner knew fully well that
respondent was in possession of the said Owner's Duplicate Copy, the latter being the

Corporate Treasurer and custodian of vital documents of CHI. Respondent added that petitioner
merely needs to have another copy of the title because he planned to mortgage the same with the
Planters Development Bank. Respondent even produced the Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT
No.

232238 in open court. Thus, on November 12, 1999, the RTC recalled and set aside its
September 17, 1999 Order.[13]

On June 7, 2000, respondent executed a Supplemental Affidavit[16] to clarify that she was
accusing petitioner of perjury allegedly committed on the following occasions: (1) by declaring
in the VERIFICATION the veracity of the contents in his petition filed... with the RTC of
Manila concerning his claim that TCT No. 232238 was in his possession but was lost; (2) by
declaring under oath in his affidavit of loss that said TCT was lost; and (3) by testifying under
oath that the said TCT was inadvertently lost from his files.

presence and intervention of the private prosecutor in the perjury cases are not prohibited by the
rules, stressing that she is, in fact, an aggrieved party, being a stockholder, an officer and the
treasurer of CHI and the private... complainant.

Issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE

ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE RESOLUTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT THAT THERE IS A PRIVATE OFFENDED PARTY IN THE CRIME OF PERJURY,
A CRIME AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST; AND

Ruling:

The petition has no merit.

Accordingly, if there is no waiver or reservation of civil liability, evidence should be allowed to

establish the extent of... injuries suffered.

there was neither a waiver nor a reservation made; nor did the offended party institute a separate
civil action. It follows that evidence should be allowed in the criminal proceedings to establish
the civil liability arising from the offense committed,... and the private offended party has the
right to intervene through the private prosecutors.[5

Principles:
such right to intervene exists even when no civil liability is involved."... she submits that
pursuant to our ruling in Lim Tek Goan she has the right to intervene even if no civil liability
exists in this case.[41]

(1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity, called the State, whose law he has
violated;... the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property
was actually or directly... injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission... the
offended party may also be a private individual whose person, right, house, liberty or property
was actually or directly injured by the same punishable act or omission of the... accused, or that
corporate entity which is damaged or injured by the delictual acts complained of.

Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or proved in the perjury case being tried in the
MeTC, this Court declared in the early case of Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco,[47] cited by both MeTC
and CA, that whether public or private crimes are... involved, it is erroneous for the trial court to
consider the intervention of the offended party by counsel as merely a matter of tolerance. Thus,
where the private prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the proceedings, that right
must be respected. The right... reserved by the Rules to the offended party is that of intervening
for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the criminal act and not of demanding
punishment of the accused. Such intervention, moreover, is always subject to the direction and
control of the... public prosecutor.[48]

Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to institute it
separately, nor institute the civil action for damages arising from the offense charged. Thus, we
find that the private prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the criminal... action

Facts:

The case springs from the statements made by the respondent against the petitioner, Elizalde S.
Co (Co), in several interviews with radio stations in Legaspi City. Muñoz, a contractor, was
charged and arrested for perjury. Suspecting that Co, a wealthy businessman, was... behind the
filing of the suit, Muñoz made the following statements:

(a)

Co influenced the Office of the City Prosecutor of Legaspi City to expedite the issuance of
warrant of arrest against Muñoz in connection with the perjury case;

(b)

Co manipulated the results of the government bidding involving the Masarawag-San Francisco
dredging project, and;

(c)

Co received P2,000,000.00 from Muñoz on the condition that Co will sub-contract the project to
Muñoz, which condition Co did not comply with.
Consequently, Co filed his complaint-affidavit which led to the filing of three criminal
informations for libel before the RTC.[6] Notably, Co did not waive, institute or reserve his right
to file a separate civil action arising from Muñoz's libelous... remarks against him.[7]

Muñoz countered that he revealed the anomalous government bidding as a call of public duty.

In fact, he filed cases against Co before the Ombudsman involving the anomalous dredging
project. Although the Ombudsman dismissed the cases,... Muñoz claimed that the dismissal did
not disprove the truth of his statements.

He also emphasized that the imputations dealt with matters... of public interest and are, thus,
privileged. Applying the rules on privileged communication to libel suits, the prosecution has the
burden of proving the existence of actual malice, which, Muñoz claimed, it failed to do.

RTC found Muñoz guilty of three counts of libel. The RTC ruled that the prosecution established
the elements of libel.

In light of the Ombudsman's dismissal of Muñoz' charges against Co, the RTC also held that
Muñoz' statements were baseless accusations which are not protected as privileged...
communication.

In addition to imprisonment, Muñoz was ordered to pay P5,000,000.00 for each count of libel as
moral damages, P1,200,000.00 for expenses paid for legal services, and P297,699.00 for
litigation expense.[11] Muñoz appealed his conviction with the CA.

he CA held that the subject matter of the interviews was impressed with public interest and
Muñoz' statements were protected as privileged communication under the first paragraph of
Article 354 of the RPC.

As a public figure, Co is subject to criticisms on his acts that are imbued with public interest.[14]
Hence, the CA... reversed the RTC decision and acquitted Muñoz of the libel charges due to the
prosecution's failure to establish the existence of actual malice.

In the present petition, Co acknowledges that he may no longer appeal the criminal aspect of the
libel suits because that would violate Muñoz' right against double jeopardy. Hence, he claims
damages only on the basis of Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court

(ROC), which states that the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of
the civil action.

He avers that this principle applies in general whether the civil action is instituted with or
separately from the criminal action.[15] He also claims that the civil liability of an accused may
be appealed in case of acquittal.[16]

The Respondent's Arguments

Since Co did not reserve his right to separately institute a civil action arising from the offense,
the dismissal of the criminal action bars him from filing the... present petition to enforce the civil
liability.

Issues:

whether a private party may appeal the judgment of acquittal insofar as he seeks to enforce the
accused's civil liability; and... whether the respondent is liable for damages arising from the
libelous remarks despite his acquittal.

Ruling:

We do not find the petition meritorious.

The private party may appeal the judgment of acquittal insofar as he seeks to enforce the
accused's civil liability.

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However,
the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from... which the civil liability may arise
did not exist.

In Ching v. Nicdao and CA,[28] the Court ruled that an appeal is the proper remedy that a party
whether the accused or the offended party may avail with respect to the judgment:

If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil aspect
of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would
place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party,... the offended party or the
accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period
therefor.

From the foregoing, petitioner Ching correctly argued that he, as the offended party, may appeal
the civil aspect of the case notwithstanding respondent Nicdao's acquittal by the CA. The civil
action was impliedly instituted with the criminal action since he did not... reserve his right to
institute it separately nor did he institute the civil action prior to the criminal action.

To reiterate, the extinction of the penal action does not necessarily carry with it the extinction of
the civil action, whether the latter is instituted with or separately from the criminal action. The
offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto if there is... a finding in the final judgment
in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the liability may arise exists.

Jurisprudence has enumerated three instances when, notwithstanding the accused's acquittal, the
offended party may still claim civil liability ex... delicto: (a) if the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) if the court declared that the
liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) if the civil liability of the accused does not arise
from or is not based upon the... crime of which the accused is acquitted.
The respondent is not civilly liable because no libel was committed.

The CA has acquitted Muñoz of libel because his statement is a privileged communication. In
libel, the existence of malice is essential as it is an element of the crime.

The law presumes that every imputation is malicious;[31] this... is referred to as malice in law.
The presumption relieves the prosecution of the burden of proving that the imputations were
made with malice. This presumption is rebutted if the accused proved that the imputation is true
and published with good intention and... justifiable motive.

There are few circumstances wherein malice in law is inapplicable. For instance, Article 354 of
the RPC further states that malice is not presumed when:

(1)... a private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal,
moral or social duty;[33] and

(2)... a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any
statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other... act performed by
public officers in the exercise of their functions.

In the present case, the CA declared that the libelous remarks are privileged. The legal
conclusion was arrived at from the fact that Co is a public figure, the subject matter of the
libelous remarks was of public interest, and the context of Muñoz' statements were fair...
comments.

Consequently, malice is no longer presumed and the prosecution has the burden of proving that
Muñoz acted with malice in fact. The CA found that the prosecution failed in this respect.

In light of the privileged nature of Muñoz' statements and the failure of the prosecution to prove
malice in fact, there was no libel that was committed by Muñoz. Without the crime, no civil
liability ex delicto may be claimed by Co that can be pursued in the present... petition. There is
no act from which civil liability may arise that exists.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 184861. June 30, 2009.]

 DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC., petitioner, vs. CLEOFE S.
JANIOLA and HON. ARTHUR A. FAMINI, respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J : p

The Case
Petitioner Dreamwork Construction, Inc. seeks the reversal of the August 26,
2008 Decision 1 in SCA No. 08-0005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 253
in Las Piñas City. The Decision affirmed the Orders dated October 16, 2007 2 and
March 12, 2008 3 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 issued by the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MTC), Branch 79 in Las Piñas City.
The Facts
On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S. Concepcion,
and Vice-President for Finance and Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a
Complaint Affidavit dated October 5, 2004 4 for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 (BP 22) against private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Las Piñas City. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 04-2526-33.
Correspondingly, petitioner filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22 against
private respondent with the MTC on February 2, 2005 docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 55554-61, entitled People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola.
On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband, instituted a
civil complaint against petitioner by filing a Complaint dated August 2006 5 for the
rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for
damages. The case was filed with the RTC, Branch 197 in Las Piñas City and
docketed as Civil Case No. LP-06-0197. Notably, the checks, subject of the criminal
cases before the MTC, were issued in consideration of the construction agreement.
Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings dated July 24, 2007 6 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging that the
civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or intimately related such
that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined. In other words, private respondent claimed
that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal cases.
cISDHE

Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases in

an undated Comment/Opposition to Accused's Motion to Suspend Proceedings based
on Prejudicial Question 7 on the grounds that: (1) there is no prejudicial question in
this case as the rescission of the contract upon which the bouncing checks were issued
is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private respondent violated
BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the
elements of a prejudicial question is that "the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action"; thus, this element is missing in this case, the criminal case having
preceded the civil case.
Later, the MTC issued its Order dated October 16, 2007, granting the Motion
to Suspend Proceedings, and reasoned that:

Should the trial court declare the rescission of contract and the
nullification of the checks issued as the same are without consideration, then the
instant criminal cases for alleged violation of BP 22 must be dismissed. The
belated filing of the civil case by the herein accused did not detract from the
correctness of her cause, since a motion for suspension of a criminal action may
be filed at any time before the prosecution rests (Section 6, Rule 111, Revised
Rules of Court). 8

In an Order dated March 12, 2008, 9 the MTC denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration dated November 29, 2007.
Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC with a Petition dated May 13, 2008.
Thereafter, the RTC issued the assailed decision dated August 26, 2008, denying the
petition. On the issue of the existence of a prejudicial question, the RTC ruled:

Additionally, it must be stressed that the requirement of a "previously"

filed civil case is intended merely to obviate delays in the conduct of the
criminal proceedings. Incidentally, no clear evidence of any intent to delay by
private respondent was shown. The criminal proceedings are still in their initial
stages when the civil action was instituted. And, the fact that the civil action
was filed after the criminal action was instituted does not render the issues in
the civil action any less prejudicial in character. 10

Hence, we have this petition under Rule 45.

The Issue

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT

PERCEIVING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE
INFERIOR COURT, WHEN THE LATTER RULED TO SUSPEND
PROCEEDINGS IN CRIM. CASE NOS. 55554-61 ON THE BASIS OF
"PREJUDICIAL QUESTION" IN CIVIL CASE NO. LP-06-0197. 11 DTCSHA

The Court's Ruling

This petition must be granted.

 The Civil Action Must Precede the Filing of the
Criminal Action for a Prejudicial Question to Exist
Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by Supreme Court
Resolutions dated June 17, 1988 and July 7, 1988, the elements of a prejudicial
question are contained in Rule 111, Sec. 5, which states:

SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. — The two (2) essential

elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.

Thus, the Court has held in numerous cases 12 that the elements of a
prejudicial question, as stated in the above-quoted provision and in Beltran v. People,
13 are:

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two

conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves
an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action;
and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.

On December 1, 2000, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, however,

became effective and the above provision was amended by Sec. 7 of Rule 111, which
applies here and now provides:

SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. — The elements of a

prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner interprets Sec. 7 (a) to mean that in order for a civil case to create a
prejudicial question and, thus, suspend a criminal case, it must first be established that
the civil case was filed previous to the filing of the criminal case. This, petitioner
argues, is specifically to guard against the situation wherein a party would belatedly
file a civil action that is related to a pending criminal action in order to delay the
proceedings in the latter.
On the other hand, private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code which
provides:

Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any

criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by
 rules of court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not be
in conflict with the provisions of this Code. (Emphasis supplied.) HTASIa

Private respondent argues that the phrase "before any criminal prosecution may
be instituted or may proceed" must be interpreted to mean that a prejudicial question
exists when the civil action is filed either before the institution of the criminal action
or during the pendency of the criminal action. Private respondent concludes that there
is an apparent conflict in the provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in
that the latter considers a civil case to have presented a prejudicial question even if the
criminal case preceded the filing of the civil case.
We cannot agree with private respondent.
First off, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a "change in
phraseology by amendment of a provision of law indicates a legislative intent to
change the meaning of the provision from that it originally had". 14 In the instant
case, the phrase, "previously instituted", was inserted to qualify the nature of the civil
action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal action. This
interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of "subsequent" directly before the
term criminal action. There is no other logical explanation for the amendments except
to qualify the relationship of the civil and criminal actions, that the civil action must
precede the criminal action.
Thus, this Court ruled in Torres v. Garchitorena 15 that:

Even if we ignored petitioners' procedural lapse and resolved their

petition on the merits, we hold that Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying their omnibus motion for
the suspension of the proceedings pending final judgment in Civil Case No.
7160. Section 6, Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended,
reads:

Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. — A

petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency
of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the
prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When
the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to
suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the
prosecution rests.

Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. — The elements of a

prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
 Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law
as that which must precede the criminal action and which requires a
decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action
with which said question is closely connected. The civil action must be
instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action. In this case, the
Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil
Case No. 7160 filed by the State with the RTC in Civil Case No. 7160. Thus, no
prejudicial question exists. (Emphasis supplied.) EDaHAT

Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that "a statute should be

construed not only to be consistent with itself but also to harmonize with other laws
on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system."
16 This principle is consistent with the maxim, interpretare et concordare leges
legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or every statute must be so construed and
harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. 17
In other words, every effort must be made to harmonize seemingly conflicting
laws. It is only when harmonization is impossible that resort must be made to
choosing which law to apply.
In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court are susceptible of an interpretation that would harmonize both
provisions of law. The phrase "previously instituted civil action" in Sec. 7 of Rule 111
is plainly worded and is not susceptible of alternative interpretations. The clause
"before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed" in Art. 36 of the
Civil Code may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend the
criminal action may be filed during the preliminary investigation with the public
prosecutor or court conducting the investigation, or during the trial with the court
hearing the case.
This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of the Civil Code with Sec. 7 of
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court but also with Sec. 6 of Rule 111 of the Civil Code,
which provides for the situations when the motion to suspend the criminal action
during the preliminary investigation or during the trial may be filed. Sec. 6 provides:

SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. — A petition for

suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial
question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court
conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been
filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal
action at any time before the prosecution rests.

Thus, under the principles of statutory construction, it is this interpretation of

Art. 36 of the Civil Code that should govern in order to give effect to all the relevant
provisions of law.
 It bears pointing out that the circumstances present in the instant case indicate
that the filing of the civil action and the subsequent move to suspend the criminal
proceedings by reason of the presence of a prejudicial question were a mere
afterthought and instituted to delay the criminal proceedings.
In Sabandal v. Tongco, 18 we found no prejudicial question existed involving a
civil action for specific performance, overpayment, and damages, and a criminal
complaint for BP 22, as the resolution of the civil action would not determine the guilt
or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In resolving the case, we said: AEScHa

Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case clearly indicate that

the filing of the civil case was a ploy to delay the resolution of the criminal
cases. Petitioner filed the civil case three years after the institution of the
criminal charges against him. Apparently, the civil action was instituted as an
afterthought to delay the proceedings in the criminal cases. 19

Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the institution of the criminal
complaint and from the time that private respondent allegedly withdrew its equipment
from the job site. Also, it is worth noting that the civil case was instituted more than
two and a half (2 1/2) years from the time that private respondent allegedly stopped
construction of the proposed building for no valid reason. More importantly, the civil
case praying for the rescission of the construction agreement for lack of consideration
was filed more than three (3) years from the execution of the construction agreement.
Evidently, as in Sabandal, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the cases
involved here show that the filing of the civil action was a mere afterthought on the
part of private respondent and interposed for delay. And as correctly argued by
petitioner, it is this scenario that Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court seeks to
prevent. Thus, private respondent's positions cannot be left to stand.
The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not
Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action
In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal
action, there is, still, no prejudicial question to speak of that would justify the
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case.
To reiterate, the elements of a prejudicial question under Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court are: (1) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and
(2) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
Petitioner argues that the second element of a prejudicial question, as provided
in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules, is absent in this case. Thus, such rule cannot apply
to the present controversy.
 Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that if the construction agreement
between the parties is declared null and void for want of consideration, the checks
issued in consideration of such contract would become mere scraps of paper and
cannot be the basis of a criminal prosecution.

We find for petitioner.

It must be remembered that the elements of the crime punishable under BP 22

are as follows:

(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account
or for value;AHDaET

(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of

issue there are no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and

(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for

insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. 20

Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support
the issuance of the check/s or that the checks were issued for valuable consideration
does not make up the elements of the crime. Thus, this Court has held in a long line of
cases 21 that the agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is
irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of BP 22. In Mejia v. People, 22 we ruled:

It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is the

issuance of a bad check. The purpose for which the check was issued, the terms
and conditions relating to its issuance, or any agreement surrounding such
issuance are irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of petitioner. To
determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions
for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability
and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring havoc in
trade and in banking communities. The clear intention of the framers of B.P. 22
is to make the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum. DaECST

Lee v. Court of Appeals 23 is even more poignant. In that case, we ruled that
the issue of lack of valuable consideration for the issuance of checks which were later
on dishonored for insufficient funds is immaterial to the success of a prosecution for
violation of BP 22, to wit:

Third issue. Whether or not the check was issued on account or for
value.
 Petitioner's claim is not feasible. We have held that upon issuance of a
check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the same
was issued for valuable consideration. Valuable consideration, in turn, may
consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party who
makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility,
to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the other side. It is
an obligation to do, or not to do in favor of the party who makes the contract,
such as the maker or indorser.

In this case, petitioner himself testified that he signed several checks in

blank, the subject check included, in exchange for 2.5% interest from the
proceeds of loans that will be made from said account. This is a valuable
consideration for which the check was issued. That there was neither a pre-
existing obligation nor an obligation incurred on the part of petitioner when the
subject check was given by Bautista to private complainant on July 24, 1993
because petitioner was no longer connected with Unlad or Bautista starting July
1989, cannot be given merit since, as earlier discussed, petitioner failed to
adequately prove that he has severed his relationship with Bautista or Unlad.

At any rate, we have held that what the law punishes is the mere act
of issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the
terms and conditions relating to its issuance. This is because the thrust of
the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into
circulation. 24 (Emphasis supplied.)

Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction
agreement between the parties is void for lack of consideration, this would not affect
the prosecution of private respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the matter is
that private respondent indeed issued checks which were subsequently dishonored for
insufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of prosecution under BP 22.
Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a
prejudicial question, that the resolution of the issue in the civil action would
determine whether the criminal action may proceed, is absent in the instant case.
Thus, no prejudicial question exists and the rules on it are inapplicable to the case
before us.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT this petition. We hereby REVERSE and SET
ASIDE the August 26, 2008 Decision in SCA No. 08-0005 of the RTC, Branch 253
in Las Piñas City and the Orders dated October 16, 2007 and March 12, 2008 in
Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 of the MTC, Branch 79 in Las Piñas City. We order the
MTC to continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 with dispatch.
cSDIHT

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Ynares-Santiago, Chico-Nazario, Nachura and Peralta, JJ., concur.

(Dreamwork Construction, Inc. v. Janiola, G.R. No. 184861, [June 30, 2009], 609 PHIL
|||

245-259)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 239521. January 28, 2019.]

PRIMO A. MINA, FELIX DE VERA, POMPEYO MAGALI,

BERNADETTE AMOR and PURIFICACION DELA CRUZ,
petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and RODOLFO C.
TANDOC, respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J : p

Assailed in this petition for certiorari 1 are the Resolutions dated May 22,
2017 2 and March 12, 2018 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
150130 which dismissed petitioners Primo A. Mina, Felix De Vera, Pompeyo Magali,
Bernadette Amor, and Purificacion Dela Cruz's (petitioners) petition for certiorari
before it for purportedly availing of a wrong remedy.

The Facts

This case stemmed from an Affidavit-Complaint 4 for Perjury, as defined and

penalized under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), filed by petitioners
against respondent Rodolfo C. Tandoc (Tandoc) before the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Pangasinan (OPP). After the requisite preliminary investigation
proceedings, the OPP dismissed petitioners' criminal complaint against Tandoc for
lack of probable cause. 5 Aggrieved, petitioners appealed before the Office of the
Regional State Prosecutor (ORSP) located in San Fernando City, La Union. However,
the ORSP affirmed the OPP's findings that no probable cause exists to indict Tandoc
for the crime of Perjury. Undaunted, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before
the CA. 6

The CA Ruling
 In a Resolution 7 dated May 22, 2017, the CA dismissed the petition outright
on the ground that petitioners availed of a wrong remedy. It held that under
Department of Justice (DOJ) Department Circular No. 70-A, petitioners should have
first appealed the adverse ORSP ruling to the Secretary of Justice (SOJ) before
elevating the matter to the regular courts. 8
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the same was denied in a Resolution
9 dated March 12, 2018; hence, this petition. 10

The Issue before the Court

Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the
ground of petitioners' supposed availment of a wrong remedy. CAIHTE

The Court's Ruling

To recapitulate, the CA ruled that petitioners should have first elevated the
adverse ORSP ruling to the SOJ before availing of judicial remedies. On the other
hand, petitioners maintain that the ORSP ruling is already final, and as such, it
correctly elevated the matter to the courts by filing a petition for certiorari before the
CA.
The Court finds for petitioners.
DOJ Department Circular No. 70 11 dated July 3, 2000, entitled the "2000 NPS
Rule on Appeal," which governs the appeals process in the National Prosecution
Service (NPS), provides that resolutions of, inter alia, the Regional State Prosecutor,
in cases subject of preliminary investigation/reinvestigation shall be appealed by
filing a verified petition for review before the SOJ. 12 However, this procedure was
immediately amended by DOJ Department Circular No. 70-A 13 dated July 10, 2000,
entitled "Delegation of Authority to Regional State Prosecutors to Resolve Appeals in
Certain Cases," which reads:
DEPARTMENT CIRCULAR NO. 70-A
SUBJECT: Delegation of Authority to Regional State
Prosecutors to Resolve Appeals in Certain Cases
In order to expedite the disposition of appealed cases governed by
Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000 ("2000 NPS RULE ON
APPEAL"), all petitions for review of resolutions of Provincial/City
Prosecutors in cases cognizable by the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, except in the
National Capital Region, shall be filed with the Regional State Prosecutor
concerned who shall resolve such petitions with finality in accordance with
the pertinent rules prescribed in the said Department Circular.
 The foregoing delegation of authority notwithstanding, the Secretary
of Justice may, pursuant to his power of supervision and control over the
entire National Prosecution Service and in the interest of justice, review the
resolutions of the Regional State Prosecutors in appealed cases.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
As may be gleaned above, DOJ Department Circular No. 70-A delegated to the
ORSPs the authority to rule with finality cases subject of preliminary
investigation/reinvestigation appealed before it, provided that: (a) the case is not filed
in the National Capital Region (NCR); and (b) the case, should it proceed to the
courts, is cognizable by the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial
Courts (MTCs) and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) — which includes not
only violations of city or municipal ordinances, but also all offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties attached thereto. 14 This is,
however, without prejudice on the part of the SOJ to review the ORSP ruling, should
the former deem it appropriate to do so in the interest of justice. The foregoing
amendment is further strengthened by a later issuance, namely DOJ Department
Circular No. 018-14 15 dated June 18, 2014, entitled "Revised Delegation of
Authority on Appealed Cases," pertinent portions of which read:
DEPARTMENT CIRCULAR NO. 018-14
SUBJECT: Revised Delegation of
Authority on Appealed Cases
In the interest of service and pursuant to the provisions of existing
laws with the objective of institutionalizing the Department's Zero Backlog
Program on appealed cases, the following guidelines shall be observed and
implemented in the resolution of appealed cases on Petition for Review and
Motions for Reconsideration: DETACa

1. Consistent with Department Circular No. 70-A, all appeals from

resolutions of Provincial or City Prosecutors, except those from the National
Capital Region, in cases cognizable by the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, shall be by way of
a petition for review to the concerned province or city. The Regional
Prosecutor shall resolve the petition for review with finality, in accordance
with the rules prescribed in pertinent rules and circulars of this Department.
Provided, however, that the Secretary of Justice may, pursuant to the power of
control and supervision over the entire National Prosecution Service, review,
modify or reverse, the resolutions of the Regional Prosecutor in these
appealed cases.
2. Appeals from resolutions of Provincial or City Prosecutors, except
those from the National Capital Region, in all other cases shall be by way of a
petition for review to the Office of Secretary of Justice.
 3. Appeals from resolutions of the City Prosecutors in the National
Capital Region in cases cognizable by Metropolitan Trial Courts shall be by
way of a petition for review to the Prosecutor General who shall decide the
same with finality. Provided, however, that the Secretary of Justice may,
pursuant to the power of control and supervision over the entire National
Prosecution Service, review, modify or reverse, the resolutions of the
Prosecutor General in these appealed cases.
4. Appeals from resolutions of the City Prosecutors in the National
Capital Region in all other cases shall be by way of a petition for review to the
Office of the Secretary.
xxx xxx xxx
This Circular supersedes all inconsistent issuances, takes effect on 01
July 2014 and shall remain in force until further orders.
For guidance and compliance.
In Cariaga v. Sapigao, 16 the Court harmonized the foregoing DOJ Circulars,
and accordingly, interpreted the prevailing appeals process of the NPS as follows:
A reading of the foregoing provisions shows that the prevailing
appeals process in the NPS with regard to complaints subject of preliminary
investigation would depend on two factors, namely: where the complaint was
filed, i.e., whether in the NCR or in the provinces; and which court has
original jurisdiction over the case, i.e., whether or not it is cognizable by the
MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs. Thus, the rule shall be as follows:
(a) If the complaint is filed outside the NCR and is cognizable by
the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of the OPP may be appealable by
way of petition for review before the ORSP, which ruling shall be with
finality;
(b) If the complaint is filed outside the NCR and is not cognizable by
the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of the OPP may be appealable by way
of petition for review before SOJ, which ruling shall be with finality;
(c) If the complaint is filed within the NCR and is cognizable by the
MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of the OCP may be appealable by way of
petition for review before the Prosecutor General, whose ruling shall be with
finality;
(d) If the complaint is filed within the NCR and is not cognizable by
the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of the OCP may be appealable by way
of petition for review before the SOJ, whose ruling shall be with finality;
(e) Provided, that in instances covered by (a) and (c), the SOJ may,
pursuant to his power of control and supervision over the entire National
Prosecution Service, review, modify, or reverse the ruling of the ORSP or
the Prosecutor General, as the case may be. 17 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied) aDSIHc
 In this case, records show that petitioners filed a criminal complaint before the
OPP accusing Tandoc of Perjury. The complaint was, however, dismissed by the OPP
and such dismissal was upheld by the ORSP. Since (a) the criminal complaint was
filed outside of the NCR; (b) perjury cases are cognizable by the first-level courts
since the maximum penalty therefor is imprisonment for less than six (6) years; 18
and (c) it appears that the SOJ did not exercise its power of control and supervision
over the entire NPS by reviewing the ORSP ruling, the ORSP's affirmance of the OPP
ruling was with finality. As such, petitioners have already exhausted its administrative
remedies and may now go to the CA via a petition for certiorari.
In this light, the Court concludes that the CA gravely abused its discretion in
dismissing outright the petition for certiorari filed before it by petitioners. On this
note, since the Court recognizes that the dismissal of petitioners' petition for
certiorari filed before the CA was due to a mere technicality, it is only appropriate
that this case be remanded to the said appellate court for its resolution on the merits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated May 22,
2017 and March 12, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 150130 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, this case is REMANDED to the
Court of Appeals for its resolution on the merits.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Caguioa, J.C. Reyes, Jr. and Hernando, * JJ., concur.
 
||| (Mina v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 239521, [January 28, 2019])

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 158236. September 1, 2004.]

LIGAYA V. SANTOS, petitioner, vs. DOMINGO I. ORDA, JR.,

respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J : p

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 72962 granting the petition for certiorari filed by Domingo I. Orda,
Jr. and nullifying the Orders 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 258
dated July 5, 2002 and July 23, 2002 in People v. Ligaya V. Santos, et al., for murder,
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 01-0921 and 01-0425.

The Antecedents

On January 17, 2001, Dale B. Orda, a college student and son of respondent,
Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila Domingo Orda, Jr., was shot by a male person on a
motorcycle at the corner of Ayala Boulevard and San Marcelino Street, Manila. Dale was
then seated at the passenger’s seat at the back of their car, while his father was at the
wheel. Fortunately, Dale survived the shooting. 3

At about 6:20 p.m. on April 2, 2001, another son of the respondent, Francis Orda,
a twenty-year-old senior engineering student of the Mapua Institute of Technology, was
shot to death at Saudi Arabia Street corner Sierra Leone Street, Better Living
Subdivision, Barangay Don Bosco, Parañaque City. Gina Azarcon, a helper at the Bakers
Brew Coffee Shop at the corner of Saudi Arabia and Somalia Streets, Barangay Don
Bosco, gave a sworn statement to the police investigators on April 1, 2001, declaring that
three male persons perpetrated the crime, two of whom shot the victim inside his car. 4

On April 7, 2001, Azarcon gave a supplemental affidavit pointing to and

identifying Rolly Tonion and Jhunrey Soriano as two of the assailants. 5 An Information
was filed in the RTC of Parañaque City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 01-0425 on April
18, 2001, charging Rolly Tonion alias “Komang” and Jhunrey Soriano with murder for
the killing of Francis Orda. 6

The accused filed a petition for bail. The prosecution presented Gina Azarcon as
its witness in opposition to the petition.
DHSEcI

On June 7, 2001, Ernesto M. Regala and his son, Dennis C. Regala, a barangay
tanod of Barangay 659, Arroceros, Ermita, Manila, executed separate affidavits before
the Assistant City Prosecutor of Parañaque City. Ernesto narrated that at about 10:00 p.m.
on April 1, 2001, he sent his son, Dennis, to deliver collections from the public toilet at
Arroceros to Barangay Chairman Ligaya Santos. When Dennis had not yet arrived by
11:00 p.m., he decided to fetch his son. While they were in Santos’ office, Dennis and
Ernesto heard Santos saying, “Gusto ko malinis na trabaho at walang bulilyaso, baka
makaligtas na naman si Orda.” They saw Santos give a gun to Rolly Tonion, who was
then with Edna Cortez, a certain Nognog, Ronnie Ybañez, and another male companion.
Dennis then gave Ernesto’s collection amounting to P400 to Santos. At 11:00 p.m. on
April 2, 2001, Cortez told Ernesto that the son of the assistant city prosecutor was
ambushed at the Better Living Subdivision, and that the latter was fortunate because the
bullet intended for him hit his son instead. 7 For his part, Dennis alleged that at 9:00 a.m.
on April 3, 2001, Tonion asked him to return the gun to Santos for him, but that he
refused to do so. On April 15, 2001, Santos asked him to monitor the activities of the
respondent and his son at the store owned by the latter, located at the LRT Station at
Arroceros.

The respondent executed an affidavit-complaint dated June 7, 2001 and filed the
same in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Parañaque City, charging Santos, Cortez and
Ybañez with murder for the death of his son Francis. 8 The case was docketed as I.S. No.
01-F-2052.

In her counter-affidavit, Santos denied the charge and claimed that the affidavits
executed by Ernesto and Dennis were all lies. She averred that she was in their house in
Cavite City on April 1, 2001 and returned to Manila only in the early morning of April 2,
2001. Her alibi was corroborated by the affidavits of Anthony Alejado, Marianito
Fuentes, Normita Samonte, and Lilian Lemery. She also denied Dennis’ claims that she
asked him to monitor the activities of the respondent and his son on April 15, 2001. She
alleged that the respondent filed the charge and other baseless charges against her to
enable him to gain control over Plaza Lawton where his store was located.

Cortez also denied the charge. She claimed in her affidavit that Santos was not in
her office on April 1, 2001, it being a Sunday. She alleged that the affidavits of Dennis
and Ernesto were lies.

On July 31, 2001, the investigating prosecutor issued a Resolution finding

probable cause against Santos and Cortez for murder. 9 An Information for murder was,
thereafter, filed on August 29, 2001 against Santos and Cortez, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 01-0921. 10

On August 30, 2001, Azarcon executed an affidavit implicating Barangay

Kagawad Christopher Castillo, his brother Girlie Castillo, and Robert Bunda for the
killing of Francis. On the same day, the respondent executed an affidavit-complaint
charging them for the same crime. 11 On September 7, 2001, the trial court issued an
Order requiring the prosecutor to submit additional evidence against Cortez. 12 Sabino M.
Frias, thereafter, executed an affidavit on September 18, 2001, implicating Santos,
Cortez, the Castillo brothers, Bunda, and Pedro Jimenez, the driver of Santos, in the
killing of Francis. 13

Meanwhile, Santos, Cortez, and Ybañez filed a petition for review of the
resolution of the prosecutor in I.S. No. 01-F-2052 in the Department of Justice (DOJ). 14
On their motion, the trial court suspended the proceedings against Santos and Cortez and
the issuance of warrants for their arrest. However, on September 12, 2001, Azarcon
executed an affidavit recanting her statement against the Castillo brothers and Bunda. 15

In the meantime, during the hearing on October 23, 2001, the prosecution
terminated the presentation of its testimonial evidence in Criminal Case No. 01-0425 on
the accused Tonion and Soriano’s petition for bail and offered its documentary evidence.
The accused presented Azarcon as their first witness to prove their innocence of the crime
charged.

On November 12, 2001, the public prosecutor issued a Resolution in I.S. No. 01-
H-3410 finding probable cause for murder against the Castillo brothers and Bunda. On
November 28, 2001, the public prosecutor filed a motion to amend information and to
admit amended information against them as additional accused. 16 The accused,
thereafter, filed a petition for review of the resolution of the public prosecutor before the
DOJ on January 7, 2002. 17 They also filed a motion to suspend proceedings and the
issuance of warrants of arrest in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-0425 and 01-0921 and a motion
to admit newly discovered evidence, namely, Azarcon’s affidavit of recantation. 18 The
public prosecutor opposed the motion and filed a motion to admit second amended
information with Pedro Jimenez as additional accused. 19 On February 5, 2002, the trial
court issued an Order denying the motion of the accused Castillo brothers and Bunda and
ordering the issuance of warrants for the arrest of Santos and Cortez. 20 The court then
issued the said warrants based on its finding of probable cause against them 21 for lack of
probable cause to recall the warrants of arrest, and to examine the witnesses. The court,
however, denied the motion on the ground that it had not yet acquired jurisdiction over
their persons and it had not yet received any resolution from the Secretary of Justice on
their petition for review. On February 20, 2002, the trial court issued an Order denying
the petition for bail by Tonion and Soriano, 22 ruling that the evidence of guilt was
strong. In the meantime, Ernesto and Dennis recanted their affidavits. 23

During the trial on April 23, 2002 in Criminal Case No. 01-0425, accused Tonion
and Soriano presented Dennis as their witness. 24

On April 26, 2002, the trial court issued an Order admitting the second amended
Information against the Castillo brothers, Bunda, and Jimenez and ordering the issuance
of warrants for their arrest. 25 On April 29, 2002, the said warrants were issued by the
court.

On June 11, 2002, Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez issued a Joint

Resolution reversing the assailed resolution of the public prosecutor and directing the
latter to withdraw the Informations against Santos, Cortez, Bunda, the Castillo brothers,
and Jimenez. The Secretary of Justice found Azarcon, Frias, Dennis, and Ernesto
incredible witnesses because of their recantations, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed resolutions

are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The City Prosecutor of Parañaque
City is hereby directed to cause the withdrawal of the criminal Informations for
murder filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 258, Parañaque City,
against respondents LIGAYA SANTOS, EDNA CORTEZ and RONNIE
YBAÑEZ (I.S. No. 01-F-2052) and against respondents CHRISTOPHER and
 GIRLIE CASTILLO and ROBERT BUNDA (I.S. No. 01-H-3410) and to report
to this Department the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
CHEIcS

SO ORDERED. 26

On June 27, 2002, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration thereof.
However, the public prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw the Informations in the two
cases on June 20, 2002 in compliance with the joint resolution of the Secretary of Justice.
On July 2, 2002, the respondent filed a comment/opposition to the motion to withdraw
the Informations filed by the public prosecutor, contending:

I- THAT COMPLAINANT HEREBY ADOPTS ITS POSITION RAISED IN

ITS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED WITH THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (COPY ATTACHED AS ANNEX “A”).
HENCE, THE DETERMINATION OF THE INSTANT MOTION IS
STILL PREMATURE ESPECIALLY SO THAT ALL THE
ACCUSED-MOVANTS ARE STILL AT LARGE, EVADING
SERVICE OF ARREST WARRANT, IN WHICH CASE THEY ARE
NOT ENTITLED TO ANY RELIEF;

II- THAT THE LATE (SIC) FINDINGS OF NO PROBABLE CAUSE FOR

THE ACCUSED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IS NOT
BINDING;

III- THAT THE HONORABLE COURT HAS JUDICIOUSLY AND

SOUNDLY ADJUDGED THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE;
and,

IV- THAT TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE INSTANT MOTION WOULD

ONLY CREATE CHAOS AND INJUSTICE. 27

Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration, the trial court issued an
Order on July 5, 2002 granting the motion of the public prosecutor to withdraw the
Informations in the interest of justice and equity. 28 The trial court ruled that such
withdrawal would not prevent the refiling of the Informations against the accused who
would not be able to invoke double jeopardy, considering that the court had not yet
acquired jurisdiction over their persons. The private complainant filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order which was not opposed by the public prosecutor.
Nonetheless, on July 23, 2002, the trial court issued an Order denying the motion on the
ground that it could not order the refiling of the Informations if the DOJ and the public
prosecutor refused to do so. 29

The respondent forthwith filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
(CA) assailing the orders of the trial court.
 On March 19, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision granting the petition. The
appellate court ruled that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the withdrawal of
the Informations without making an independent evaluation on the merits of the case.
Santos filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision and a supplement to the said
motion, which was opposed by the respondent. On May 6, 2003, Santos and Cortez were
arrested based on the warrants issued by the trial court. On May 22, 2003, the CA issued
a resolution denying the said motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Santos filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court contending as
follows:

A.) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED GRAVELY AND ACTED

ARBITRARILY IN NULLIFYING THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL
COURT GRANTING THE PROSECUTION’S MOTION TO
WITHDRAW THE INFORMATIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES NOS.
01-0921 AND 01-0425 PURSUANT TO DOJ JOINT RESOLUTION
DATED 11 JUNE 2002.

B.) THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN

DIRECTLY REINSTATING THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINTS,
INCLUDING THE WARRANTS OF ARREST, WITHOUT
AFFORDING THE TRIAL COURT THE OPPORTUNITY TO
EXERCISE ITS JUDICIAL PREROGATIVE OF DETERMINING
WHETHER TO PURSUE OR DISMISS THE COMPLAINTS
PURSUANT TO ITS OWN EVALUATION OF THE CASE AND
EVIDENCE IN LIGHT OF THE DOJ JOINT RESOLUTION
FINDING LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE. 30

The threshold issue is whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in granting the public prosecutor’s
motion to withdraw the Informations and in lifting the warrant of arrest against the
petitioner on the Secretary of Justice’s finding that there was no probable cause for the
filing of the said Informations.

The petitioner avers that the trial court did not abuse its judicial discretion when it
granted the motion of the public prosecutor to withdraw the two Informations as ordered
by the Secretary of Justice in his Joint Resolution on the finding that there was no
probable cause against the accused therein to be charged with murder. The petitioner
asserts that, by allowing the withdrawal of the Informations without an independent
assessment of the merit of the evidence and without prejudice to the refiling thereof, the
court did not thereby order the dismissal of the cases for insufficiency of evidence. The
petitioner posits that, after all, the trial court had not yet acquired complete criminal
jurisdiction to resolve the cases because it had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the
persons of all the accused. The petitioner argues that the CA erred in relying on the
rulings of this Court in Crespo v. Mogul 31 and Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc. 32
because the said cases involve the withdrawal of the Informations and the dismissal of the
cases for insufficiency of evidence. In contrast, the public prosecutor filed a motion
merely to withdraw the Informations and not to dismiss the cases due to insufficiency of
evidence. EacHCD

In its comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) avers that
the decision of the CA is in conformity with the rulings of this Court in Balgos, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, 33 Dee v. Court of Appeals, 34 Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 35
Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 36 Jalandoni v. Drilon 37 and Solar Team Entertainment,
Inc. v. How. 38 The OSG asserts that the rulings of this Court apply whether the motion
filed by the public prosecutor was for the withdrawal of the Informations due to lack of
probable cause or insufficiency of evidence. The OSG avers that the trial court had
acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all the accused, either by their respective arrests
or by the filing of pleadings before the court praying for affirmative reliefs.

In her reply to the comment of the OSG, the petitioner insisted that she did not
submit herself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by filing her motion to quash the
Informations for lack of probable cause and to examine the witnesses before the issuance
of the warrant of arrest against her. As the trial court itself held, it had not yet acquired
jurisdiction over her person.

In nullifying the assailed orders of the trial court, the appellate court ratiocinated
as follows:

To support these assigned errors, petitioner contends that the respondent

Judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he granted the Motion to
Withdraw Informations filed by his trial prosecutor based on the Joint
Resolution of the Department of Justice and in denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.

We resolve to grant this petition considering that this contention is

impressed with merit.

The rule, therefore, in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or

information is filed in Court, any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the
conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of
criminal cases even while the case is already in Court, he cannot impose his
opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do
with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal
should be addressed to the Court which has the option to grant or deny the
same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the
accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions
 of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation
(Crespo v. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462).

However, if the trial court has failed to make an independent finding of

the merits of the case or make an independent evaluation or assessment of the
merits of the case, but merely anchored the dismissal of the case on the revised
position of the prosecution, the trial court has relinquished the discretion he was
duty-bound to exercise because, in effect, it is the prosecution through the
Department of Justice which decides what to do and that the trial court was
reduced into a mere rubber stamp, in violation of the ruling in Crespo vs. Mogul
(Martinez vs. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 576, 577), which is the situation
obtaining in this case considering that the dismissal of the criminal cases against
private respondents was based solely on [the] recommendation of the Secretary
of Justice because the reliance of public respondent Judge was based solely on
the prosecutor’s averment that the Secretary of Justice had recommended the
dismissal of the case against private respondent which is an abdication of the
trial court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case, in blatant
violation of the court’s pronouncement in Crespo vs. Mogul (Perez vs. Hagonoy
Rural Bank, 327 SCRA 588).

Moreover, public respondent having already issued the warrants of arrest

on private respondents which, in effect, means that a probable cause exists in
those criminal cases, it was an error to dismiss those cases without making an
independent evaluation especially that the bases of the probable cause are the
same evidence which were made the bases of the Joint Resolution dated June
11, 2002 of the Secretary of Justice.

Consequently, the dismissal order dated July 5, 2002 having been issued
upon an erroneous exercise of judicial discretion, the same must have to be set
aside. 39

We agree with the appellate court.

In Crespo v. Mogul, 40 the Court held that once a criminal complaint or

information is filed in court, any disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or
conviction of the accused rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and
discretion of the trial court. The trial court is the best and sole judge on what to do with
the case before it. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the public prosecutor should be
addressed to the court who has the option to grant or deny the same. Contrary to the
contention of the petitioner, the rule applies to a motion to withdraw the Information or to
dismiss the case even before or after arraignment of the accused. 41 The only
qualification is that the action of the court must not impair the substantial rights of the
accused or the right of the People or the private complainant to due process of law. 42
When the trial court grants a motion of the public prosecutor to dismiss the case, or to
quash the Information, or to withdraw the Information in compliance with the directive of
the Secretary of Justice, or to deny the said motion, it does so not out of subservience to
or defiance of the directive of the Secretary of Justice but in sound exercise of its judicial
prerogative. 43

In resolving a motion to dismiss the case or to withdraw the Information filed by

the public prosecutor on his own initiative or pursuant to the directive of the Secretary of
Justice, either for insufficiency of evidence in the possession of the prosecutor or for lack
of probable cause, the trial court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the
public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice that no crime was committed or that the
evidence in the possession of the public prosecutor is insufficient to support a judgment
of conviction of the accused. As the Court emphasized in Martinez v. Court of Appeals,
44 the trial court must make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the
case and the evidence on record of the prosecution: EScaIT

Secondly, the dismissal was based merely on the findings of the Acting
Secretary of Justice that no libel was committed. The trial judge did not make an
independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case. Reliance was
placed solely on the conclusion of the prosecution that “there is no sufficient
evidence against the said accused to ascertain the allegation in the information”
and on the supposed lack of objection to the motion to dismiss, this last premise
being, however, questionable, the prosecution having failed, as observed, to
give private complainant a copy of the motion to dismiss.

In other words, the grant of the motion to dismiss was based upon
considerations other than the judge’s own personal individual conviction that
there was no case against the accused. Whether to approve or disapprove the
stand taken by the prosecution is not the exercise of discretion required in cases
like this. The trial judge must himself be convinced that there was, indeed, no
sufficient evidence against the accused, and this conclusion can be arrived at
only after an assessment of the evidence in the possession of the prosecution.
What was imperatively required was the trial judge’s own assessment of such
evidence, it not being sufficient for the valid and proper exercise of judicial
discretion merely to accept the prosecution’s word for its supposed
insufficiency.

As aptly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, in failing to

make an independent finding of the merits of the case and merely anchoring the
dismissal on the revised position of the prosecution, the trial judge relinquished
the discretion he was duty bound to exercise. In effect, it was the prosecution,
through the Department of Justice which decided what to do and not the court
which was reduced to a mere rubber stamp in violation of the ruling in Crespo
v. Mogul.
 The dismissal order having been issued in violation of private
complainant’s right to due process as well as upon an erroneous exercise of
judicial discretion, the Court of Appeals did not err in setting aside said
dismissal order and remanding the case to the trial court for arraignment of
petitioner as accused therein and for further proceedings.

Indeed, it bears stressing that the trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of
the Secretary of Justice since it is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits
of the case and it may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary
of Justice. Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice would be an
abdication of the trial court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case. 45

The trial court may make an independent assessment of the merits of the case
based on the affidavits and counter-affidavits, documents, or evidence appended to the
Information; the records of the public prosecutor which the court may order the latter to
produce before the court; 46 or any evidence already adduced before the court by the
accused at the time the motion is filed by the public prosecutor.

In this case, the trial court failed to make an independent assessment of the merits
of the cases and the evidence on record or in the possession of the public prosecutor. In
granting the motion of the public prosecutor to withdraw the Informations, the trial court
relied solely on the joint resolution of the Secretary of Justice, as gleaned from its
assailed order:

For resolution is the Motion to Withdraw Criminal Informations filed on

June 21, 2002 by the Office of the City Prosecutor, this jurisdiction, to which a
Comment/Opposition thereto was filed by private complainant Domingo I.
Orda, Jr. on July 2, 2002.

It appears that the motion is in compliance with the Joint Resolution of

the Department of Justice (DOJ) promulgated on June 11, 2002 directing said
Office to cause the withdrawal of the criminal informations for murder against
the accused, Ligaya V. Santos, Edna Cortez, and Ronnie Ybañez, in Crim. Case
No. 01-0921 (I.S. No. 01-F-2052) and against Christopher Castillo, Girlie
Castillo, and Robert Bunda in Crim. Case No. 01-0425 (I.S. No. 01-H-3410),
copy of which was received by this Court on June 19, 2002.

The Court, after going over the Comment/Opposition filed by the private
complainant, vis-à-vis the Joint Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of
the DOJ, is of the firm belief and honest opinion and so holds that meanwhile
that the Motion for Reconsideration of the private complainant is pending
before the DOJ, justice and equity dictates that this Court has to give due course
to the Motion to Withdraw the Criminal Informations, specially so that warrants
for the arrest of all the accused have been issued. No injustice, prejudice, or
damage will be suffered by the private complainant considering that if ever his
 Motion for Reconsideration will be granted by the DOJ, said criminal
informations may be refiled and the principle of double jeopardy cannot be
invoked by all the accused as the Court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over
the persons. Upon the other hand, the warrants of arrest will serve as swords of
damocles hanging over the heads of the accused if the Court will rule otherwise.
47

In granting the public prosecutor’s motion, the trial court abdicated its judicial
power and acted as a mere surrogate of the Secretary of Justice.

Worse, as gleaned from the above order, the trial court knew that the Joint
Resolution of the Secretary of Justice had not yet become final and executory because the
respondent, the private complainant, had filed a timely motion for the reconsideration
thereof which had not yet been resolved by the Secretary of Justice. It behooved the trial
court to wait for the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on the motion for
reconsideration of the respondent before resolving the motion of the public prosecutor to
withdraw the Informations. In fine, the trial court acted with inordinate haste. acTDCI

Had the trial court bothered to review its records before issuing its assailed order,
it would have recalled that aside from the affidavits of Azarcon, Ernesto and Dennis,
there was also the affidavit of Frias implicating the petitioner and the other accused to the
killing of Francis and that it even gave credence to the testimony and affidavit of Azarcon
when it denied Tonion and Soriano’s petition for bail. Moreover, the trial court found
probable cause against the petitioner and issued a warrant for her arrest despite the
pendency of her petition for review in the Department of Justice, only to make a complete
volte face because of the Joint Resolution of the Secretary of Justice.

The bare fact that the trial court had issued warrants of arrest against Santos,
Cortez, the Castillo brothers, and Bunda, who were the petitioners in the Department of
Justice, did not warrant an outright grant of the public prosecutor’s motion to withdraw
the Informations. The court had already acquired jurisdiction over the cases when the
Informations were filed; hence, it had jurisdiction to resolve the motion of the public
prosecutor, one way or the other, on its merits. While it may be true that the accused
could be incarcerated, as warrants of arrest had already been issued against them pending
the resolution of the respondent’s motion for reconsideration, the same does not justify
ignoring the rules and running roughshod over the rights of the respondent. Justice and
equity is not for the accused alone; the State and the private complainant are entitled
thereto, as well. Moreover, the petitioner had submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the
court when she filed her motion to examine the witnesses, and suspend the proceedings
and the issuance of a warrant for her arrest.

The trial court committed another travesty when it denied the motion for
reconsideration of its July 5, 2002 Order, on its ratiocination that —
 In today’s hearing on the Motion for Reconsideration, considering that
the Public Prosecutor informed the Court that their office will no longer file any
opposition thereto, the said Motion for Reconsideration is denied considering
that the filing and the withdrawal of an Information is purely an executive
function and the Court cannot order the refiling if the Department of Justice or
the Public Prosecutor’s Office refuses to do so. . . 48

This is so because the July 5, 2002 Order of the court had not yet become final and
executory when the private complainant filed her motion for reconsideration of the said
order. 49 Until and unless the July 5, 2002 Order shall have become final and executory,
the Informations filed with the court were not yet considered withdrawn. On the other
hand, if the trial court had granted the motion for reconsideration of the respondent and
set aside its July 5, 2002 Order, there would no longer be a need to refile the
Informations.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE.

The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Austria-Martinez, Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ ., concur.

Puno, J ., is on official leave.

||| (Santos v. Orda, Jr., G.R. No. 158236, [September 1, 2004], 481 PHIL 93-111)

SECOND DIVISION

[A.M. No. RTJ-14-2367. January 13, 2014.]

(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 12-3879-RTJ)

SR. REMY ANGELA JUNIO, SPC and JOSEPHINE D. LORICA,

complainants, vs. JUDGE MARIVIC A. CACATIAN-BELTRAN,
BRANCH 3, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, TUGUEGARAO CITY,
CAGAYAN, respondent.

RESOLUTION

BRION, J : p
 For our resolution is the Report and Recommendation 1 dated August 13, 2013 of
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in OCA I.P.I. No. 12-3879-RTJ.

The Antecedents

Claire Ann Campos, a 17-year old student, filed an affidavit-complaint for

violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 (the Child Abuse Law) and R.A. No. 7277
(the Magna Carta for the Disabled) before the Tuguegarao City Prosecution Office
against Sr. Remy Angela Junio and Dr. Josephine D. Lorica, the President and the Dean
of the School of Health Services, respectively, of St. Paul University of the Philippines
(SPUP).

In her complaint, Claire alleged that she was refused enrolment by SPUP for the
B.S. Nursing course in her sophomore year because of her cleft palate; she alleged that
the refusal was made despite her completion of SPUP's College Freshmen Program
Curriculum.

In its resolution dated August 22, 2008, the prosecutor's office found probable
cause to indict Junio and Lorica of the crimes charged, and recommended the filing of the
corresponding informations against them.

On September 8, 2008, Junio and Lorica appealed the August 22, 2008 resolution
of the prosecutor's office, but Undersecretary Jose Vicente Salazar of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) denied their petition for review in his resolution of February 24, 2011.

On March 31, 2011, the prosecutor's office filed two informations against Junio
and Lorica for violations of Section 10 (a), Article VI, in relation with Article 3 (a) and
(b) of R.A. No. 7610, and Section 12 of R.A. No. 7277 before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 4, Tuguegarao City, presided by Judge Lyliha Aquino.

On April 27, 2011, the cases were assigned to Judge Marivic A. Cacatian-Beltran
of the RTC, Branch 3, Tuguegarao City, due to the inhibition of Judge Aquino.

On April 4, 2011, Junio and Lorica sought a reconsideration of the DOJ's February
24, 2011 resolution.

On May 5, 2011, the RTC found probable cause to issue warrants of arrest against
Junio and Lorica. Accordingly, it issued the warrants of arrest against them.cCaEDA

On May 24, 2011, Lorica posted bail for her provisional liberty.

On May 25, 2011, Junio and Lorica filed an urgent motion to hold in abeyance
further proceedings and to recall warrants of arrest. Junio posted bail on the same day.
 In its order dated June 14, 2011, the RTC denied Junio and Lorica's urgent motion
to hold in abeyance further proceedings and to recall warrants of arrest.

Meanwhile, DOJ Secretary Leila de Lima granted Junio and Lorica's motion for
reconsideration and set aside the February 24, 2011 resolution of Undersecretary Salazar.
Accordingly, in her resolution dated August 8, 2011, she directed the Cagayan Provincial
Prosecutor to immediately cause the withdrawal of the informations for violations of R.A.
Nos. 7610 and 7277 against Junio and Lorica for lack of probable cause.

On August 12, 2011, Junio and Lorica filed a manifestation and motion before the
RTC, praying for the cancellation of their scheduled arraignment, and for the dismissal of
the cases against them.

On September 5, 2011, the City Prosecutor, Junio and Lorica filed a joint motion
to withdraw informations in view of Secretary De Lima's August 8, 2011 resolution.

On September 14, 2011, Judge Cacatian-Beltran issued an order stating that "the
motion relative to the resolution of the Department of Justice is deemed submitted for
resolution." 2

On December 20, 2011, Junio, Lorica and the City Prosecutor filed a joint motion
for resolution.

In its order of January 6, 2012, the RTC denied the joint motion to withdraw
informations for lack of merit.

The City Prosecutor, Junio and Lorica moved to reconsider this order, but the RTC
denied their motion in its order dated April 10, 2012.

The Administrative Complaint

Junio and Lorica filed an affidavit-complaint against Judge Cacatian-Beltran for

violation of Rules 1.02, 3.01, 3.02, and 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. They
alleged that Judge Cacatian-Beltran only resolved the joint motion to withdraw
informations after almost four months from the time it was submitted for resolution. They
claimed that four months was beyond the period prescribed by existing rules for the
resolution of simple motions.

Junio and Lorica further alleged that Judge Cacatian-Beltran "arrogated unto
herself the role of a prosecutor and a judge" 3 when she insisted that they stand for trial
although she did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of Justice Secretary De
Lima. aETAHD
 In her comment, Judge Cacatian-Beltran explained that Junio and Lorica might
have conducted a follow-up of the motions to dismiss at Branch 4 where the records of
the criminal cases had been retained, and that the staff of Branch 4 failed to inform her of
any follow-up by Junio and Lorica and/or by their counsel. She maintained that she "lost
no time in finishing the draft" 4 of her January 6, 2012 order when the joint motion for
resolution was brought to her attention.

Judge Cacatian-Beltran maintained that the RTC was not bound by the findings of
the Secretary of Justice since her court had already acquired jurisdiction over the case.
She added that she made an independent assessment of the evidence before denying the
motion. She further stated that she acted promptly on all other incidents in the case.

The OCA's Report and Recommendation

In its Report and Recommendation dated August 13, 2013, the OCA
recommended that: (1) the administrative complaint against Judge Cacatian-Beltran be
dismissed for being judicial in nature; and (2) Judge Cacatian-Beltran be admonished to
strictly comply with the reglementary periods to act on pending motions and other
incidents in her court.

The OCA held that errors committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative
functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings. It explained that the
aberrant acts allegedly committed by Judge Cacatian-Beltran relate to the exercise of her
judicial functions, and added that only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross
ignorance, bad faith or deliberate intent to do an injustice should be administratively
sanctioned.

The OCA, nonetheless, ruled that Judge Cacatian-Beltran should be admonished to

be more mindful of the reglementary periods to resolve pending motions.

Our Ruling

After due consideration, we approve and adopt the OCA's recommendations as

our own ruling.

Delay in resolving a motion

Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution requires lower court judges to
decide a case within the period of ninety (90) days. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct likewise holds that judges should administer justice without delay and
directs every judge to dispose of the courts' business promptly within the period
prescribed by law. Rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are
indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases.
Thus, the ninety (90) day period is mandatory. This mandate applies even to motions or
interlocutory matters or incidents pending before a magistrate. 5

In the present case, the City Prosecutor's joint motion to withdraw informations
was deemed submitted for resolution on September 14, 2011. Judge Cacatian-Beltran,
however, did not act on the motion within the prescribed three (3) month period (or up to
December 13, 2011), and instead ruled on it only on January 6, 2012.

In her defense, Judge Cacatian-Beltran explained that Junio and Lorica might have
conducted a follow-up of the motions to dismiss at Branch 4 where the records of the
criminal cases were retained, and that the staff of Branch 4 failed to inform her of any
follow-up by Junio and Lorica and/or their counsel. We note, however, that Branch 4 is
paired with Judge Cacatian-Beltran's Branch 3 per Circular No. 7-74, as amended by SC
Circular No. 19-98. Since Criminal Case Nos. 14053-54 had been assigned to Judge
Cacatian-Beltran, it was incumbent upon her to update herself on the developments in
these consolidated cases; she should have kept her own record of cases and noted therein
the status of each case to ensure prompt and effective action. To do this, Judge Cacatian-
Beltran should have adopted a record management system and organized her docket —
an approach that she appears not to have done. IDSETA

Sections 9 and 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-
10-SC, classifies undue delay in rendering a decision or order as a less serious charge,
with the following administrative sanctions: (a) suspension from office without salary
and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or (b) a fine
of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.

However, the records are bereft of any evidence showing that there had been
undue delay (as shown by the records), any attendant bad faith, any intent to prejudice a
party to the case, or some other ulterior ends. The OCA, in fact, pointedly ruled that the
inaction was not attended with malice: Judge Cacatian-Beltran resolved the joint motion
to withdraw informations two (2) days after she learned of its existence on January 4,
2012.

To our mind, these circumstances are sufficient to mitigate the liability of Judge
Cacatian-Beltran and keep us from imposing a fine or suspension from office.
Accordingly, we find sufficient and warranted the OCA's recommended penalty of
admonition.

Denial of the joint motion to withdraw informations

The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice
since it is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case; in the
exercise of its discretion, it may agree or disagree with the recommendation of the
Secretary of Justice. Reliance on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice alone would be
an abdication of the trial court's duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case. 6
We stress that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition
of the case (whether it be a dismissal, an acquittal or a conviction of the accused) rests
within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court; it is the
best and sole judge of what to do with the case before it. 7

In resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw the information filed by the

public prosecutor (on his own initiative or pursuant to the directive of the Secretary of
Justice), either for insufficiency of evidence in the possession of the prosecutor or for
lack of probable cause, the trial court should not merely rely on the findings of the public
prosecutor or of the Secretary of Justice that no crime had been committed or that the
evidence in the possession of the public prosecutor is insufficient to support a judgment
of conviction of the accused. 8 To do so is to surrender a power constitutionally vested in
the Judiciary to the Executive.

In the present case, Judge Cacatian-Beltran does not appear to have arbitrarily
denied the joint motion to withdraw informations. The records show that she evaluated
and assessed the informations, the resolution of the City Prosecutor, the affidavit and
reply-affidavit of the complainants, the counter-affidavit and rejoinder and the appeal
memorandum of Junio and Lorica, and the supporting documents attached to them.

In her January 6, 2012 order, Judge Cacatian-Beltran notably explained the basis
for her denial. No proof whatsoever exists in all these, showing that bad faith, malice or
any corrupt purpose attended the issuance of her order. It is also important to note in this
regard that the issue of whether Judge Cacatian-Beltran correctly denied the joint motion
to withdraw informations, despite the finding of Secretary De Lima of lack of probable
cause, is judicial in nature: Junio and Lorica's remedy under the circumstances should
have been made with the proper court for the appropriate judicial action, not with the
OCA by means of an administrative complaint.

We also find unmeritorious Junio and Lorica's argument that Judge Cacatian-
Beltran "arrogated unto herself the role of a prosecutor and a judge" 9 when she insisted
that the accused stand trial although she did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the
part of Justice Secretary de Lima. When a court acts, whether its action is consistent or
inconsistent with a prosecutor's recommendation, it rules on the prosecutor's action and
does not thereby assume the role of a prosecutor. The case of Hipos, Sr. v. Bay 10 best
explains why we so rule: CAIaHS

To clarify, we never stated in Ledesma that a judge is allowed to deny a

Motion to Withdraw Information from the prosecution only when there is grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors moving for such withdrawal.
Neither did we rule therein that where there is no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the prosecutors, the denial of the Motion to Withdraw Information is
 void. What we held therein is that a trial judge commits grave abuse of
discretion if he denies a Motion to Withdraw Information without an
independent and complete assessment of the issues presented in such
Motion.

With the independent and thorough assessment and evaluation of the merits of the
joint motion to withdraw information that Judge Cacatian-Beltran undertook before
dismissing it, she acted as a judge should and can in no way be said to have assumed the
role of a prosecutor. The parties, for their part, are not without any remedy as the Rules of
Court amply provide for the remedy against a judicial action believed to be grossly
abusive when the remedy of direct appeal is not available. We cannot rule on this point in
the present case, however, as this is a matter not before us in this administrative recourse
against Judge Cacatian-Beltran.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we APPROVE AND ADOPT as our own

the August 13, 2013 Report and Recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator. Judge Marivic A. Cacatian-Beltran is hereby ADMONISHED and
REMINDED that she should dispose of her cases within the period required by law.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Del Castillo, Perez and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

 
(Junio v. Cacatian-Beltran, A.M. No. RTJ-14-2367, [January 13, 2014], 724 PHIL 1-
|||

12)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 178947. June 26, 2013.]

VIRGINIA DE LOS SANTOS-DIO, as authorized representative of

H.S. EQUITIES, LTD., and WESTDALE ASSETS, LTD., petitioner,
vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE RAMON S.
CAGUIOA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 74, Regional
Trial Court, Olongapo City, and TIMOTHY J. DESMOND,
respondents.

[G.R. No. 179079. June 26, 2013.]

 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. TIMOTHY J.
DESMOND, respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J : p

Before the Court are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari 1 assailing the
November 8, 2006 Decision 2 and July 19, 2007 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 88285, upholding the validity of the trial court's dismissal of
separate criminal informations for estafa against private respondent Timothy J. Desmond
(Desmond) due to lack of probable cause.

The Facts

In 2001, petitioner Virginia De Los Santos-Dio (Dio), the majority stockholder of

H.S. Equities, Ltd. (HS Equities) and authorized representative of Westdale Assets, Ltd.
(Westdale), 4 was introduced to Desmond, the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
(CEO) of the Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, Inc. (SBMEI), and the authorized
representative of Active Environments, Inc. and JV China, Inc. (JV China), the majority
shareholder of SBMEI. 5 After some discussion on possible business ventures, Dio, on
behalf of HS Equities, decided to invest a total of US $1,150,000.00 6 in SBMEI's Ocean
Adventure Marine Park (Ocean Adventure), a theme park to be constructed at the Subic
Bay Freeport Zone which, when operational, would showcase live performances of false-
killer whales and sea lions. In this relation, Dio claimed that Desmond led her to believe
that SBMEI had a capital of US$5,500,000.00, inclusive of the value of the marine
mammals to be used in Ocean Adventure, 7 and also guaranteed substantial returns on
investment. 8 Desmond even presented a Business Plan, indicating that: (a) Ocean
Adventure's "attendance will rise from 271,192 in 2001 to just over 386,728 in 2006, with
revenues rising from US$4,420,000.00 million to US$7,290,000.00 million in the same
time frame"; (b) "[e]arly investors are expected to reap an annual return of 23% in 2001,
rising to 51% in 2006"; and (c) "[f]ully priced shares [would yield a 19% return] in 2001,
rising to 42% in 2006." 9 Thus, on January 18, 2002, a Subscription Agreement 10 was
executed by Desmond, as representative of SBMEI and JV China, and Dio, as
representative of HS Equities.

While no Certificate of Stock was issued either to HS Equities or to Dio, HS

Equities was expressly granted minority protection rights in a subsequent Subscription
and Shareholders Agreement 11 dated March 12, 2002, stating that there shall be "a
nominee of [the] Subscriber to be elected as Treasurer/Chief Financial Officer, who may
not be removed by the Board of Directors without the affirmative vote of the Subscriber."
12 Accordingly, Dio was elected as a member of SBMEI's Board of Directors and further
appointed as its Treasurer. 13 The parties later executed two (2) Investor's Convertible
Promissory Notes — one dated April 4, 2001 14 and another dated May 8, 2001 15 —
covering HS Equities' infusion of a total of US $1,000,000.00 for the purpose of
purchasing machinery, equipment, accessories, and materials to be used for the
construction of Ocean Adventure.

In June 2002, Dio, this time on behalf of Westdale, invested another US

$1,000,000.00 16 in a separate business venture, called the Miracle Beach Hotel Project
(Miracle Beach), which involved the development of a resort owned by Desmond
adjoining Ocean Adventure. They agreed that the said investment would be used to settle
SBMEI's P40,000,000.00 loan obligation to First Metro Investment Corporation and for
the construction of 48 lodging units/cabanas. 17 However, when the corresponding
subscription agreement was presented to Dio by SBMEI for approval, it contained a
clause stating that the "funds in the Subscription Bank Account" were also to be used for
the "[f]unding of Ocean Adventure's Negative Cash Flow not exceeding
[US$200,000.00]." 18 This was in conflict with the exclusive purpose and intent of
Westdale's investment in Miracle Beach and as such, Dio refused to sign the subscription
agreement. cIDHSC

Dio further claimed that she found out that, contrary to Desmond's representations,
SBMEI actually had no capacity to deliver on its guarantees, and that in fact, as of 2001,
it was incurring losses amounting to P62,595,216.00. 19 She likewise claimed to have
discovered false entries in the company's books and financial statements — specifically,
its overvaluation of the marine animals and its non-disclosure of the true amount of JV
China's investment 20 — which prompted her to call for an audit investigation.
Consequently, Dio discovered that, without her knowledge and consent, Desmond made
certain disbursements from Westdale's special account, meant only for Miracle Beach
expenditures (special account), and diverted a total of US$72,362.78 therein for the
operating expenses of Ocean Adventure. 21 When Desmond refused to execute an
undertaking to return the diverted funds, Dio, in her capacity as Treasurer of SBMEI,
suspended the release of the remaining funds in the aforesaid special account. 22

Eventually, after Dio was ousted as Director and Treasurer of SBMEI, 23 she
filed, on April 19, 2004, two (2) criminal complaints 24 (subject criminal complaints) for
estafa (a) through false pretenses under Article 315 (1) (b) 25 of the Revised Penal Code
26 (RPC); and (b) with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence through misappropriation or
conversion under Article 315 (2) (a) 27 of the RPC, both against Desmond before the
Olongapo City Prosecutor's Office (City Prosecutor's Office), docketed as IS Nos. 04-M-
992 and 04-M-993.

In defense, Desmond maintained that his representation of himself as Chairman

and CEO of SBMEI was not a sham and that Dio has not even proven that he did not
have the expertise and qualifications to double her investment. Among others, he also
denied having been fired from Beijing Landa Aquarium Co. Ltd. for his supposed
incompetence and mismanagement. He further asserted that it was not deceitful to value
the marine mammals at US$3,720,000.00 as equity contribution of JV China in SBMEI,
notwithstanding the fact that two (2) false killer whales had already perished before the
company could start operations. This is because the said valuation, in any case, would be
based on the collective income-earning capacity of the entire animal operating system
derived from revenues generated by marine park attendance and admission fees. 28

In reply, Dio insisted that SBMEI, at the outset, never had sufficient assets or
resources of its own because, contrary to Desmond's claims, the total amount of
US$2,300,000.00 it purportedly invested in buildings and equipment actually came from
the investments Dio's company made in SBMEI. 29

After the preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution 30

dated August 26, 2004, finding probable cause against Desmond for the abovementioned
crimes, to wit:
HCSEcI

The foregoing clearly applies in the instant two (2) cases as borne out by
the following facts, to with [sic]: (1) Desmond, as the Chairman and Chief
Executive Office of SBMEI and in order to persuade Dio to invest, represented
that he possessed the necessary influence, expertise and resources (in terms of
credit and property) for the project knowing the same to be false as he never had
the capital for the project as borne out by his correspondences with Dio; and (2)
Dio fell for these misrepresentations and the lure of profit offered by Desmond,
thereby being induced to invest the amounts of $1,150,000.00 and
$1,000,000.00 to the damage and prejudice of her company.

The elements of the crimes charged were thus established in these cases,
namely Dio parted with her money upon the prodding and enticement of
respondent on the false pretense that he had the capacity and resources for the
proposed project. In the end, Dio was not able to get her money back, thus
causing her damage and prejudice. Moreover, such defraudation or
misappropriation having been committed by Desmond through his company
SBMEI involving funds solicited from Dio as a member of the general public in
contravention of the public interest, the probable cause clearly exists to indict
Desmond for the crime of Estafa under Article 315 (1)(b) and (2)(a) of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to PD No. 1689. 31

In view of the foregoing, corresponding criminal informations 32 (subject

informations) were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 74
(RTC), docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 516-2004 and 515-2004. The accusatory portions
thereof read as follows: TADIHE

Criminal Case No. 516-2004 33

 That in or about and sometime in early 2001, in Olongapo City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being the officer of Subic Bay Marine Exploration, Inc.
(SBMEI), acting as a syndicate and by means of deceit, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud H.S. EQUITIES LIMITED,
represented in this case by Virginia S. Delos Santos-Dio in the following
manner, to wit: the said accused by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representations which he made to said Virginia S. Delos Santos-Dio to the effect
that he had the expertise and qualifications, as well as the resources, influence,
credit and business transaction with the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
(SBMA) and other financing institutions to ensure the viability of the Subic Bay
Marine Exploration Ocean Adventure Project (SBMEOA), which he
represented to be a qualified and legally existing investment enterprise with
capacity to solicit investment from the general public, by submitting documents
for the purpose, which representations he knew to be false and fraudulent and
the supporting documents are similarly spurious and were only made in order to
induce said Virginia S. Delos Santos-Dio to invest and deliver as in fact she
invested and delivered a total amount of One Million One Hundred Fifty
Thousand US Dollars ($1,150,000.00) to the said accused on the strength of said
manifestations and representations and supporting documents, and said accused,
once in possession of the said amount, misapplied, converted and
misappropriated the same to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage
and prejudice of H.S. Equities Limited in the amount of US $1,150,000.00 or
Php57,500,000.00 Pesos, the dollar computed at the rate of Php50.00 to [US]
$1.00 which was the prevailing rate of exchange of a dollar to peso at the time
of the commission of the offense.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 515-2004 34

That in or about and sometime during the period from June 2002 to July
2002, in Olongapo City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud Westdale Assets, Limited represented in this
case by Virginia S. Delos Santos-Dio in the following manner to wit: the said
accused received in trust and for administration from the said Virginia S. Delos
Santos-Dio the amount of One Million US Dollars ($1,000,000.00) under the
express obligation of using the same to pay the loan facility of the Subic Bay
Marine Exploration, Inc. (SBMEI) with First Metro Investment Corporation and
to fund the construction and development of the Miracle Beach Project but the
said accused, once in possession of the said amount, with grave abuse of
confidence and with intent to defraud, misapplied, misappropriated and
converted the same for his own use and benefit by devoting it to a purpose or
use different from that agreed upon and despite repeated demands made upon
him to account for and to return the said amount, he failed and refused and still
 fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the said Westdale
Assets, Limited in the amount of US $1,000,000.00 or its equivalent to FIFTY
MILLION (Php50,000,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, the dollar being
computed at the rate of Php50.00 to $1.00 which was the prevailing rate of
exchange at the commission of the offense, to the damage and prejudice of the
latter in the aforementioned amount.aTEScI

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Aggrieved, Desmond filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 35 as well as a Motion

to Withdraw Filed Informations. 36 He also filed before the RTC a Motion to Defer
Further Proceedings and to Defer Issuance of Warrant of Arrest 37 but subsequently
withdrew the same and filed, instead, a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause. 38

The RTC Ruling

In an Order 39 dated October 21, 2004, the RTC ruled in favor of Desmond and
declared that no probable cause exists for the crimes charged against him since the
elements of estafa were not all present, to wit:

First, the element of misrepresentation or deceit found in par. 2 (a)

Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is absent. It must be emphasized that the
promises allegedly made to the complainant by the accused that her company's
investment will significantly increase, clearly appeared in the Subic Bay Marine
Exploration, Inc.'s ("SBMEI", for brevity) printed business plan dated January
12, 2001 (Annex "A", Complaint-Affidavit dated 19 April 2004). Verily, this is
SBMEI's representation or "come on" to would-be investors and not a personal
assurance of the accused. The fact that accused was the company's Chief
Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board of Directors is of no moment in
the absence of any evidence to show that accused personally prepared the
business plan thereby making the alleged "rosy picture" his own personal
enticements to the complainant. Therefore, there being a dearth of evidence
pointing to the accused as author of the SBMEI's business plan, any
misrepresentation or deceit committed cannot be personally attributed to him.

Furthermore, the court cannot find any sufficient evidence that the
accused personally assured the complainant about his so-called power, influence
and credit with the SBMA and other financial institutions that would supposedly
insure the viability and profitability of the project. Note that nowhere in the
Complaint-Affidavit of the private complainant are there specific factual
allegations that would show that the accused had personal business meetings
with the SBMA and said financial institutions. As to how and in what manner
and scope accused exercised such alleged power, influence and credit over these
juridical entities remain a bare and self-serving averment in the absence of any
factual detail or account.
 Finally, it cannot be gainsaid [sic] that accused was the one who
personally valuated the marine mammals contributed by JV China, Incorporated
to the Subic Bay Marine Exploration, Inc. as capital amounting to US$3.724
Million. Evidence clearly point to an independent valuation done by a third
party namely Beijing Landa Aquarium that valued the marine mammals under
the Buy-Out Agreement dated September 9, 1998. Needless to state, the onus is
on complainant to controvert this valuation. Again, however, no adequate proof
was adduced along this line. HSIaAT

Second, the element of personal misappropriation by the accused under

par. 1(b) Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is likewise not present. While it
may be conceded that there was money utilized to pay salaries of expatriates
and staff as well as the cost of utilities amounting to US$72,272.00 complainant
failed to show that said money was taken from her companies' investments in
SBMEI. It must be pointed out that other than complainant's bare allegation,
there was no document presented categorically stating that the investment of
complainant's companies were earmark for a particular payment or project.
Hence, when the investment entered SBMEI's financial coffers, the same
presumably were co-mingled with other monies of the corporation.

Moreover and more revealing, is the fact that again there was no
showing that it was accused who personally caused the payment of these
expenses allegedly in violation of the objective of the investment. It must be
noted that SBMEI is a corporation and not a single proprietorship. Being a
corporation, expenses paid of such a kind as utilities and salaries are not
authorized personally and solely by the President nor the Chief Executive
Officer nor even by the Chairman of the Board for that matter. These are
corporate acts that are passed through board resolutions. Hence, these corporate
acts can in no way be considered personal acts of the accused. Yet, he was
singled out among all 5 members of the Board of Directors who presumably, in
the ordinary course of business, approved by resolution the payments of such
utilities and salaries. Consequently, there is again insufficiency of evidence that
the accused alone caused the payment of these salaries and utilities for the sole
purpose of pocketing the money thereby using the same for personal gain. 40

Consequently, the RTC denied the issuance of a warrant of arrest and hold
departure order against Desmond and ordered the dismissal of the cases against him:

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the subject motion for judicial

determination of probable cause is favorably granted. There being no probable
cause, the cases against the accused must be dismissed as they are hereby
DISMISSED. The motions to issue warrant of arrest and Hold Departure Order
as well as the prayer for provisional remedy are necessarily DENIED.

SO ORDERED. 41
 Given the RTC's dismissal of the foregoing criminal cases, the City Prosecutor's
Office filed motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied. As such, it filed a
petition for certiorari and mandamus 42 before the CA on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion. Relatedly, Dio also filed a petition-in-intervention 43 before the CA, praying
for the reinstatement of the subject criminal complaints.

The CA Ruling

In its November 8, 2006 Decision, 44 the CA upheld the RTC's authority to

dismiss a criminal case if in the process of determining probable cause for issuing a
warrant of arrest, it also finds the evidence on record insufficient to establish probable
cause. It explained that such dismissal is an exercise of judicial discretion sanctioned
under Section 6 (a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this score,
the CA evaluated the evidence presented and agreed with the RTC's conclusions that
there was no sufficient basis showing that Desmond committed estafa by means of false
pretenses. Neither was it established that the money sourced from petitioner Dio was
converted by respondent Desmond for some other purpose other than that for which it
was intended. Pertinent portions of the CA Decision restated the RTC's observations in
this wise:cSIHCA

In the instant case, the alleged false representations by Desmond which

allegedly induced private complainants H.S. Equities, Ltd. ("H.S. Equities") and
Dio, to part with their money are not supported by the facts on record. First, the
alleged false representation employed by Desmond with respect to his expertise
and qualifications in the form of influence, credit and business transactions with
the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) and financial institutions and
such resources to enable private complainants to double its investment with
SBMEI has not been shown to be false.

Indeed, nowhere in the documentary evidence presented by private

complainants that allegedly contained the above false representations does it
show that it was private respondent himself who made such representation.
Notably, the SBMEI's Business Plan dated January 12, 2001 to which private
complainants anchor such allegation does not indicate that the representations
made therein came personally from Desmond. In addition, neither does it appear
from such document that the statements therein were used as a form of a
personal assurance coming from Desmond that private complainants would
indeed double the amount they had invested with SBMEI. If at all, we agree
with the trial court that statements made in the said business plan were merely a
form of enticement to encourage would-be investors from [sic] investing in
such kind of business undertaking.

Moreover, we likewise agree with the trial court that no factual

allegations were made by private complainants as to how such false pretense of
power and influence was made upon them by Desmond and which convinced
private complainants to part with their money. It bears stressing that the
allegations of false pretense of power and influence in a case of estafa are mere
conclusions of law which must be substantiated at the very least by
circumstances which would show that the person accused of committing estafa
did indeed commit acts of false representations. As the records show, there was
no misrepresentation on the part of Desmond that he is the Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of SBMEI which is a corporation engaged in the business of
developing marine parks. Significantly, the records likewise show that SBMEI
did indeed build and develop a marine park in Subic Bay (Ocean Adventure) for
the purposes stated in its business plan and had entered into a long-term lease
agreement with SBMA. Documentary evidence in the form of the Report of
Independent Auditors to SBMEI shows the amount of investment the
corporation had invested in the said business undertaking. For instance, the
corporation had invested the amount of P106,788,219.00 in buildings and
equipment alone. It has also assets consisting of marine mammals which are
necessary for the operation of the marine park. In this respect, we cannot
subscribe to private complainants' contention that there was misrepresentation
on the part of private respondent that he had overvalued the worth of the marine
mammals it had purchased from Beijing Landa Aquarium Co., Ltd. of the
Republic of China. This claim of private complainants of the deceitful acts
employed by Desmond in overpricing the value of the marine animals for
US$3.724 Million when in fact the sea animals were only valued for one U.S.
dollar was not corroborated by the evidence on hand. EaIcAS

xxx xxx xxx

In the same manner, the facts in the case at bar that would allegedly
constitute a criminal charge of estafa under par. 1(b) are wanting. Be it noted
that under the said paragraph, estafa with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence
through misappropriation or conversion of the money, goods or any other
personal property must be received in trust, on commission, for administration,
or under any other obligation which involves the duty to make delivery thereof
or to return the same. It is not amiss to note that a perusal of private
complainants' Complaint-Affidavit shows that subject money in the amount of
US$ 1,000,000.00 to be used for the Miracle Beach Project was placed in a
special account with Equitable-PCI Bank. As the records show, the said funds
were placed by Dio under the control of Fatima Paglicawan, an employee of
Westdale, such that, no money can be withdrawn from the special account
without the signature of the said employee, Desmond and a certain John
Corcoran. Therefore, at such time, it cannot be said that the funds were received
for administration or already under the juridical possession of Desmond.
Meanwhile, we would like to emphasize that to constitute conversion, it
presupposes that the thing has been devoted to a purpose or use different from
that agreed upon. Verily, a facial examination of the Journal Voucher and
Check Voucher pertaining to the withdrawals made on such account clearly
shows that the disbursements were not only authorized by Paglicawan but
 likewise indicated that the purpose for such withdrawals was to cover payments
for BIR taxes and the salaries of local employees and expatriates.

To repeat, these withdrawals as well as the purpose thereof were known

to Paglicawan when [sic] she authorized the disbursements. Paglicawan, who
was designated by private complainant Dio to control the release of the said
funds is presumed to have acted under the latter's authority. Such
miscommunication between Dio and Paglicawan with respect to the purpose of
the funds does not make out a case of estafa there being no abuse of confidence
or conversion to speak of taking into account that the said funds were released
under the presumed authority of private complainants through Paglicawan, and
which were indeed used for the purpose for which it was withdrawn. That being
the case, there can be no damage or prejudice to Westdale and Dio as there was
no disturbance in the property rights of Westdale and Dio in the said funds since
the same were used for the purpose for which it was disbursed.

Then again, we agree with the trial court that there is no sufficient
evidence adduced to support the criminal charges of estafa against Desmond. As
pointed out by the trial court, while private respondent is the Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer of SBMEI, there is no showing that he had personally
and solely authorized the application of the above funds for the payment of
expenses not directly connected with the Miracle Beach Project. Nor does it
appear that as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Desmond has been
appointed to execute, on his own, such corporate acts. 45 (Citations omitted)

The City Prosecutor and Dio filed their respective motions for reconsideration
which were both denied in a Resolution 46 dated July 19, 2007.

Hence, the instant petitions. IDCScA

The Issue Before the Court

The primordial issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in finding no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it dismissed the subject
informations for lack of probable cause.

The Court's Ruling

The petitions are meritorious.

Determination of probable cause may be either executive or judicial.

The first is made by the public prosecutor, during a preliminary investigation,

where he is given broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists for the
purpose of filing a criminal information in court. Whether or not that function has been
correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct
ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court
itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon. 47

The second is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued against the accused. In this respect, the judge must satisfy himself that,
on the basis of the evidence submitted, there is a necessity for placing the accused under
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge, therefore, finds no
probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant. 48 Notably, since
the judge is already duty-bound to determine the existence or non-existence of probable
cause for the arrest of the accused immediately upon the filing of the information, the
filing of a motion for judicial determination of probable cause becomes a mere
superfluity, 49 if not a deliberate attempt to cut short the process by asking the judge to
weigh in on the evidence without a full-blown trial.

In the case of Co v. Republic, 50 the Court emphasized the settled distinction

between an executive and a judicial determination of probable cause, viz.: 51

We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to

whether it is an investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for the
filing of the information or it is an investigation for the determination of a
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of
preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecution's
job. The second kind of preliminary investigation which is more properly called
preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge. DHIETc

On this score, it bears to stress that a judge is not bound by the resolution of the
public prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation and must himself
ascertain from the latter's findings and supporting documents whether probable cause
exists for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest. This prerogative is granted by no less
than the Constitution which provides that "no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce." 52

While a judge's determination of probable cause is generally confined to the

limited purpose of issuing arrest warrants, Section 5 (a), 53 Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly states that a judge may immediately dismiss a
case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause, 54 viz.:

SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. — (a) By the Regional Trial
Court. — Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information,
the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on
record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he
 shall issue a warrant of arrest, or acommitment order if the accused had already
been arrested, pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted
preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed
pursuant to Section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable
cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within
five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within
thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

In this regard, so as not to transgress the public prosecutor's authority, it must be

stressed that the judge's dismissal of a case must be done only in clear-cut cases when
the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause — that is when the
records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably
negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged. On the contrary, if the
evidence on record shows that, more likely than not, the crime charged has been
committed and that respondent is probably guilty of the same, the judge should not
dismiss the case and thereon, order the parties to proceed to trial. In doubtful cases,
however, the appropriate course of action would be to order the presentation of additional
evidence. 55

In other words, once the information is filed with the court and the judge proceeds
with his primordial task of evaluating the evidence on record, he may either: (a) issue a
warrant of arrest, if he finds probable cause; (b) immediately dismiss the case, if the
evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause; and (c) order the prosecutor
to submit additional evidence, in case he doubts the existence of probable cause. 56

Applying these principles, the Court finds that the RTC's immediate dismissal, as
affirmed by the CA, was improper as the standard of clear lack of probable cause was not
observed. In this case, records show that certain essential facts — namely, (a) whether or
not Desmond committed false representations that induced Dio to invest in Ocean
Adventure; and (b) whether or not Desmond utilized the funds invested by Dio solely for
the Miracle Beach Project for purposes different from what was agreed upon — remain
controverted. As such, it cannot be said that the absence of the elements of the crime of
estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) 57 and 315 (1) (b) 58 of the RPC had already been
established, thereby rendering the RTC's immediate dismissal of the case highly
improper.

Lest it be misconceived, trial judges will do well to remember that when a

perceived gap in the evidence leads to a "neither this nor that" conclusion, a purposeful
resolution of the ambiguity is preferable over a doubtful dismissal of the case. Verily, a
judge's discretion to dismiss a case immediately after the filing of the information in court
is appropriate only when the failure to establish probable cause can be clearly inferred
from the evidence presented and not when its existence is simply doubtful. After all, it
cannot be expected that upon the filing of the information in court the prosecutor would
have already presented all the evidence necessary to secure a conviction of the accused,
the objective of a previously-conducted preliminary investigation being merely to
determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should
be held for trial. 59 In this light, given that the lack of probable cause had not been
clearly established in this case, the CA erred, and the RTC gravely abused its discretion,
by ruling to dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 515-2004 and 516-2004. Indeed, these cases
must stand the muster of a full-blown trial where the parties could be given, as they
should be given, the opportunity to ventilate their respective claims and defenses, on the
basis of which the court a quo can properly resolve the factual disputes therein.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The November 8, 2006 Decision

and July 19, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88285 which
affin-ned the October 21, 2004 Order of Dismissal issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City, Branch 74 are SET ASIDE. The two (2) criminal informations for estafa
against respondents Timothy J. Desmond in Criminal Case Nos. 515-2004 and 516-2004
are hereby REINSTATED. Accordingly, the trial court is directed to proceed with the
arraignment of the accused and the trial of the case with dispatch.
TESICD

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Brion, Del Castillo and Perez, JJ., concur.

(De Los Santos-Dio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 178947 & 179079, [June 26, 2013],
|||

712 PHIL 288-310)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 180661. December 11, 2013.]

GEORGE ANTIQUERA y CODES, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

ABAD, J : p

This case is about a supposed warrantless arrest and a subsequent search prompted
by the police officers' chance sighting through an ajar door of the accused engaged in pot
session.
 The Facts and the Case

On January 13, 2004 the second Assistant City Prosecutor of Pasay City charged
the accused George Codes Antiquera * and Corazon Olivenza Cruz with illegal
possession of paraphernalia for dangerous drugs 1 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasay City in Criminal Case 04-0100-CFM. 2 Since the accused Cruz jumped bail, the
court tried her in absentia. 3

The prosecution evidence shows that at around 4:45 a.m. of February 11, 2004,
PO1 Gregorio Recio, PO1 Laurence Cabutihan, P/Insp. Eric Ibon, PO1 Rodelio Rania,
and two civilian operatives on board a patrol car and a tricycle were conducting a police
visibility patrol on David Street, Pasay City, when they saw two unidentified men rush
out of house number 107-C and immediately boarded a jeep. DcSACE

Suspecting that a crime had been committed, the police officers approached the
house from where the men came and peeked through the partially opened door. PO1
Recio and PO1 Cabutihan saw accused Antiquera holding an improvised tooter and a
pink lighter. Beside him was his live-in partner, Cruz, who was holding an aluminum foil
and an improvised burner. They sat facing each other at the living room. This prompted
the police officers to enter the house, introduce themselves, and arrest Antiquera and
Cruz. 4

While inspecting the immediate surroundings, PO1 Cabutihan saw a wooden

jewelry box atop a table. It contained an improvised burner, wok, scissors, 10 small
transparent plastic sachets with traces of white crystalline substance, improvised scoop,
and seven unused strips of aluminum foil. The police officers confiscated all these and
brought Antiquera and Cruz to the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Philippine National
Police in Pasay City for further investigation and testing. 5

A forensic chemical officer examined the confiscated drug paraphernalia and

found them positive for traces of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu." 6

Accused Antiquera gave a different story. He said that on the date and time in
question, he and Cruz were asleep in their house when he was roused by knocking on the
door. When he went to open it, three armed police officers forced themselves into the
house. One of them shoved him and said, "D'yan ka lang, pusher ka." He was handcuffed
and someone instructed two of the officers to go to his room. The police later brought
accused Antiquera and Cruz to the police station and there informed them of the charges
against them. They were shown a box that the police said had been recovered from his
house. 7

On July 30, 2004 the RTC rendered a Decision 8 that found accused Antiquera
and Cruz guilty of the crime charged and sentenced them to a prison term ranging from
six months and one day to two years and four months, and to pay a fine of P10,000.00
each and the costs of the suit.
DTCSHA

The RTC said that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the police
caught accused Antiquera and Cruz in the act of using shabu and having drug
paraphernalia in their possession. Since no ill motive could be attributed to PO1 Recio
and PO1 Cabutihan, the court accorded full faith and credit to their testimony and
rejected the self-serving claim of Antiquera.

The trial court gave no weight to accused Antiquera's claim of illegal arrest, given
PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihan's credible testimony that, prior to their arrest, they saw
Antiquera and Cruz in a pot session at their living room and in possession of drug
paraphernalia. The police officers were thus justified in arresting the two without a
warrant pursuant to Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. 9 IHDCcT

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered a Decision 10 on September 21,

2007 affirming in full the decision of the trial court. The accused moved for
reconsideration but the CA denied it. 11 The accused is now before this Court seeking
acquittal.

The Issue Presented

The issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in finding accused Antiquera
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia based on the
evidence of the police officers that they saw him and Cruz in the act of possessing drug
paraphernalia.

Ruling of the Court

The prosecution's theory, upheld by both the RTC and the CA, is that it was a case
of valid warrantless arrest in that the police officers saw accused Antiquera and Cruz
through the door of their house, in the act of having a pot session. That valid warrantless
arrest gave the officers the right as well to search the living room for objects relating to
the crime and thus seize the paraphernalia they found there.

The prosecution contends that, since the seized paraphernalia tested positive for
shabu, they were no doubt used for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting,
ingesting, or introducing dangerous drug into the body in violation of Section 12 of
Republic Act 9165. That the accused tested negative for shabu, said the prosecution, had
no bearing on the crime charged which was for illegal possession of drug paraphernalia,
not for illegal use of dangerous drugs. The prosecution added that even assuming that the
arrest of the accused was irregular, he is already considered to have waived his right to
question the validity of his arrest when he voluntarily submitted himself to the court's
jurisdiction by entering a plea of not guilty. 12
aDcETC

Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a "peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence,
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense." This is an arrest in flagrante delicto. 13 The overt act constituting
the crime is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. 14

But the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante
delicto.

1. The police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two unidentified
men suddenly rush out of 107 David Street, Pasay City. Since they suspected that a crime
had been committed, the natural thing for them to do was to give chase to the jeep that
the two fleeing men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol car and a tricycle.
Running after the fleeing suspects was the more urgent task but the officers instead gave
priority to the house even when they heard no cry for help from it.

2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the
house from the street where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially
opened door, they saw no activity that warranted their entering it. Thus, PO1 Cabutihan
testified:

THE COURT:

Q By the way, Mr. Cabutihan, when you followed your companion towards the
open door, how was the door open? Was it totally open, or was it
partially open?

A It was partially open Your Honor.

Q By how much, 1/3, 1/2? Only by less than one (1) foot?

A More or less 4 to 6 inches, Your Honor.

Q So how were you able to know, to see the interior of the house if the door
was only open by 6 inches? Or did you have to push the door? EHcaAI

A We pushed the door, Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Were you allowed to just go towards the door of the house, push its door and
peeped inside it, as a police officer?
 A Kasi po naghinala po kami baka may. . .

Q Are you not allowed to — Are you not required to get a search warrant before
you can search the interior of the house?

A Yes, Your Honor. cAaDHT

Q What do you mean by yes? Would you first obtain a search warrant before
searching the interior of the house?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q So why did you not a [sic] secure a search warrant first before you tried to
investigate the house, considering your admission that you suspected
that there was something wrong inside the house?

A Because we saw them that they were engaged in pot session, Your Honor.

Q But before you saw them, you just had to push the door wide open to
peep through its opening because you did not know what was
happening inside?

A Yes, Your Honor. 15 (Emphasis supplied) ISCaDH

Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that
authorized the arrest of accused Antiquera without warrant under the above-mentioned
rule. Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted from it
was likewise illegal. 16 Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the police
officers allegedly found in the house and seized are inadmissible, having proceeded from
an invalid search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia is the very corpus
delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to acquit the accused. 17

One final note. The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest
by itself is not enough to sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest
does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal
warrantless arrest. 18

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated
September 21, 2007 and Resolution dated November 16, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR 28937 and ACQUITS the accused George Antiquera y Codes of the crime
of which he is charged for lack of evidence sufficient to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The Court further ORDERS the cancellation and release of the bail
bond he posted for his provisional liberty.

SO ORDERED. TcDIaA
 Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Mendoza and Leonen, JJ., concur.

 
(Antiquera y Codes v. People, G.R. No. 180661, [December 11, 2013], 723 PHIL 425-
|||

432)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 213225. April 4, 2018.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RENANTE

COMPRADO y BRONOLA, accused-appellant.

DECISION

MARTIRES, J : p

This is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated 19 May 2014, of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01156 which affirmed the Decision 2 dated 18
April 2013, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Misamis Oriental (RTC), in
Criminal Case No. 2011-671 finding Renante Comprado y Bronola (accused-
appellant) guilty of illegal possession of marijuana. caITAC

THE FACTS

On 19 July 2011, accused-appellant was charged with violation of Section 11,

Article 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The Information reads:
That on July 15, 2011, at more or less eleven o'clock in the evening,
along the national highway, Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without being authorized by law to possess or use any dangerous drugs, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally have in his possession,
control and custody 3,200 grams of dried fruiting tops of suspected marijuana,
which substance, after qualitative examination conducted by the Regional
Crime Laboratory, Office No. 10, Cagayan de Oro City, tested positive for
marijuana, a dangerous drug, with the said accused, knowing the substance to
be a dangerous drug. 3
Upon his arraignment on 8 August 2011, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty
to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
Version of the Prosecution

On 15 July 2011, at 6:30 in the evening, a confidential informant (CI) sent a

text message to Police Inspector Dominador Orate, Jr. (P/Insp. Orate), then Deputy
Station Commander of Police Station 6, Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, that an alleged
courier of marijuana together with a female companion, was sighted at Cabanglasan,
Bukidnon. The alleged courier had in his possession a backpack containing marijuana
and would be traveling from Bukidnon to Cagayan de Oro City. At 9:30 in the
evening, the CI called P/Insp. Orate to inform him that the alleged drug courier had
boarded a bus with body number 2646 and plate number KVP 988 bound for Cagayan
de Oro City. The CI added that the man would be carrying a backpack in black and
violet colors with the marking "Lowe Alpine." Thus, at about 9:45 in the evening, the
police officers stationed at Police Station 6 put up a checkpoint in front of the station.
4
At 11:00 o'clock in the evening, the policemen stopped the bus bearing the said
body and plate numbers. P/Insp. Orate, Police Officer 3 Teodoro de Oro (PO3 De
Oro), Senior Police Officer 1 Benjamin Jay Reycitez (SPO1 Reycitez), and PO1 Rexie
Tenio (PO1 Tenio) boarded the bus and saw a man matching the description given to
them by the CI. The man was seated at the back of the bus with a backpack placed on
his lap. After P/Insp. Orate asked the man to open the bag, the police officers saw a
transparent cellophane containing dried marijuana leaves. 5
SPO1 Reycitez took photos of accused-appellant and the cellophane bag
containing the dried marijuana leaves. 6 PO3 De Oro, in the presence of accused-
appellant, marked the bag "RCB-2" and the contents of the bag "RCB-1." 7
Thereafter, PO1 Tenio and PO3 De Oro brought accused-appellant and the seized bag
to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. 8 On 16 July 2011, at around 1:40 in
the morning, Police Senior Inspector Charity Caceres (PSI Caceres) of the PNP
Crime Laboratory Office 10, Cagayan de Oro City, received the requests for
examination and the specimen. PSI Caceres, after conducting qualitative examination
of the specimen, issued Chemistry Report No. D-253-2011 9 stating that the dried
leaves seized from accused-appellant were marijuana and which weighed 3,200
grams.

Version of the Defense

Accused-appellant denied ownership of the bag and the marijuana. He

maintains that on 15 July 2011, at around 6:30 in the evening, he and his girlfriend
went to the house of a certain Freddie Nacorda in Aglayan, Bukidnon, to collect the
latter's debt. When they were about to leave, Nacorda requested him to carry a bag to
Cagayan de Oro City.
When they reached Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, their vehicle was stopped by
three (3) police officers. All of the passengers were ordered to alight from the vehicle
for baggage inspection. The bag was opened and they saw a transparent cellophane
bag containing marijuana leaves. At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening, accused-
appellant, his girlfriend, and the police officers who arrested them boarded a bus
bound for Cagayan de Oro City.
When the bus approached Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, the police officers told
the bus driver to stop at the checkpoint. The arresting officers took photos of accused-
appellant and his girlfriend inside the bus. They were then brought to the police
station where they were subjected to custodial investigation without the assistance of
counsel. 10

The RTC Ruling

In its decision, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty of illegal possession of

marijuana. It held that accused-appellant's uncorroborated claim that he was merely
requested to bring the bag to Cagayan de Oro City, did not prove his innocence; mere
possession of the illegal substance already consummated the crime and good faith was
not even a defense. The RTC did not lend credence to accused-appellant's claim that
he was arrested in Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, because it was unbelievable that the
police officers would go out of their jurisdiction in Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, just
to apprehend accused-appellant in Bukidnon. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused
RENANTE COMPRADO y BRONOLA GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime defined and penalized under
Section 11, [7], Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as charged in the Information,
and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT, and to pay the Fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
[P500,000.00], without subsidiary penalty in case of non-payment of fine.
Let the penalty imposed on the accused be a lesson and an example to
all who have criminal propensity, inclination and proclivity to commit the
same forbidden acts, that crime does not pay, and that the pecuniary gain and
benefit which one can derive from possessing drugs, or other illegal
substance, or from committing any other acts penalized under Republic Act
9165, cannot compensate for the penalty which one will suffer if ever he is
prosecuted and penalized to the full extent of the law. 11
ICHDca

Aggrieved, accused-appellant appealed before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its decision, the CA affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant. It opined

that accused-appellant submitted to the jurisdiction of the court because he raised no
objection as to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. The CA reasoned
that the seized items are admissible in evidence because the search and seizure of the
illegal narcotics were made pursuant to a search of a moving vehicle. It added that
while it was admitted by the arresting police officers that no representatives from the
media and other personalities required by law were present during the operation and
during the taking of the inventory, noncompliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165 was not fatal and would not render inadmissible accused-appellant's arrest
or the items seized from him because the prosecution was able to show that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items had been preserved. The CA
disposed the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Judgment dated 18
April 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, 10th Judicial
Region, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 2011-671 is hereby affirmed in toto.
12
Hence, this appeal.

ISSUES

I. Whether accused-appellant's arrest was valid;

II. Whether the seized items are admissible in evidence; and
III. Whether accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged.

OUR RULING

The Court finds for accused-appellant.

I.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 13
The Bill of Rights requires that a search and seizure must be carried out with a
judicial warrant; otherwise, any evidence obtained from such warrantless search is
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 14 This proscription, however,
admits of exceptions, namely: 1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; 2)
Search of evidence in plain view; 3) Search of a moving vehicle; 4) Consented
warrantless search; 5) Customs search; 6) Stop and Frisk; and 7) Exigent and
emergency circumstances. 15
 II.

A stop-and-frisk search is often confused with a warrantless search incidental

to a lawful arrest. However, the distinctions between the two have already been
settled by the Court in Malacat v. CA: 16
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest
determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is
questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was
merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law
requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made —
the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the
arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within
which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize
any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime,
or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which
might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence.
xxx xxx xxx
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a
"stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons,"
as laid down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer
observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity
may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing
may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course
of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing
in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled [to]
the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be
used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search
under the Fourth Amendment.
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to
conduct a "stop and frisk" it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch
will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of
the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the
belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally,
a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of
effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that
a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate
manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of
 safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to
assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
17 (emphases supplied and citations omitted) TCAScE

III.

A valid stop-and-frisk was illustrated in the cases of Posadas v. CA (Posadas),

18 Manalili v. CA (Manalili), 19 and People v. Solayao (Solayao). 20
In Posadas, two policemen were conducting a surveillance within the premises
of the Rizal Memorial Colleges when they spotted the accused carrying a buri bag and
acting suspiciously. They approached the accused and identified themselves as police
officers. The accused attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by
the policemen who then checked the buri bag wherein they found guns, ammunition,
and a grenade. 21
In Manalili, police officers were patrolling the Caloocan City cemetery when
they chanced upon a man who had reddish eyes and was walking in a swaying
manner. When this person tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and
introduced themselves as police officers. The policemen then asked what he was
holding in his hands, but he tried to resist. 22
In Solayao, police operatives were carrying out an intelligence patrol to verify
reports on the presence of armed persons roaming around the barangays of Caibiran,
Biliran. Later on, they met the group of accused-appellant. The police officers became
suspicious when they observed that the men were drunk and that accused-appellant
himself was wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit. Upon seeing the
government agents, accused-appellant's companions fled. Thus, the police officers
found justifiable reason to stop and frisk the accused. 23

IV.

On the other hand, the Court found no sufficient justification in the stop and
frisk committed by the police in People v. Cogaed (Cogaed). 24 In that case, the
police officers received a message from an informant that one Marvin Buya would be
transporting marijuana from Barangay Lun-Oy, San Gabriel, La Union, to the
Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union. A checkpoint was set up and when a passenger
jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at the checkpoint, the jeepney driver
disembarked and signaled to the police officers that the two male passengers were
carrying marijuana.
SPO1 Taracatac approached the two male passengers who were later identified
as Victor Cogaed and Santiago Dayao. SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao
what their bags contained. Cogaed and Dayao told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not
know since they were transporting the bags as a favor for their barrio mate named
Marvin. After this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks of
what looked like marijuana. The Court, in that case, invalidated the search and seizure
ruling that there were no suspicious circumstances that preceded the arrest. Also, in
Cogaed, there was a discussion of various jurisprudence wherein the Court adjudged
that there was no valid stop-and-frisk:
The circumstances of this case are analogous to People v. Aruta. In
that case, an informant told the police that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be
bringing in drugs from Baguio City by bus. At the bus terminal, the police
officers prepared themselves. The informant pointed at a woman crossing the
street and identified her as "Aling Rosa." The police apprehended "Aling
Rosa," and they alleged that she allowed them to look inside her bag. The bag
contained marijuana leaves.
In Aruta, this court found that the search and seizure conducted was
illegal. There were no suspicious circumstances that preceded Aruta's arrest
and the subsequent search and seizure. It was only the informant that
prompted the police to apprehend her. The evidence obtained was not
admissible because of the illegal search. Consequently, Aruta was acquitted.
Aruta is almost identical to this case, except that it was the jeepney
driver, not the police's informant, who informed the police that Cogaed was
"suspicious."
The facts in Aruta are also similar to the facts in People v. Aminnudin.
Here, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) acted upon a tip, naming
Aminnudin as somebody possessing drugs. The NBI waited for the vessel to
arrive and accosted Aminnudin while he was disembarking from a boat. Like
in the case at bar, the NBI inspected Aminnudin's bag and found bundles of
what turned out to be marijuana leaves. The court declared that the search and
seizure was illegal. Aminnudin was acquitted.
xxx xxx xxx
People v. Chua also presents almost the same circumstances. In this
case, the police had been receiving information that the accused was
distributing drugs in "different karaoke bars in Angeles City." One night, the
police received information that this drug dealer would be dealing drugs at the
Thunder Inn Hotel so they conducted a stakeout. A car "arrived and parked" at
the hotel. The informant told the police that the man parked at the hotel was
dealing drugs. The man alighted from his car. He was carrying a juice box.
The police immediately apprehended him and discovered live ammunition and
drugs in his person and in the juice box he was holding.
Like in Aruta, this court did not find anything unusual or suspicious
about Chua's situation when the police apprehended him and ruled that
"[t]here was no valid 'stop-and-frisk.'" 25 (citations omitted)
 The Court finds that the totality of the circumstances in this case is not
sufficient to incite a genuine reason that would justify a stop-and-frisk search on
accused-appellant. An examination of the records reveals that no overt physical act
could be properly attributed to accused-appellant as to rouse suspicion in the minds of
the arresting officers that he had just committed, was committing, or was about to
commit a crime. P/Insp. Orate testified as follows:
[Prosecutor Vicente]:
Q: On that date Mr. Witness, at about 6:30 in the evening, what happened, if
any?
A: At about 6:30 in the evening, I received an information from our
Confidential Informant reporting that an alleged courier of marijuana
were sighted in their place, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
[Court]:
Q: Aside from the sighting of this alleged courier of marijuana, what else was
relayed to you if there were anything else?
A: Our Confidential Informant told me that two persons, a male and a female
were having in their possession a black pack containing marijuana, Sir.
cTDaEH

xxx xxx xxx

[Prosecutor Vicente:]
Q: And then, after you received the information through your cellphone, what
happened next, Mr. Witness?
A: So, I prepared a team to conduct an entrapment operation in order to
intercept these two persons, Sir.
Q: You said that the Informant informed you that the subject was still in
Cabanglasan?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: How did you entrap the subject when he was still in Cabanglasan?
A: I am planning to conduct a check point because according to my Confidential
Informant the subject person is from Gingoog City, Sir.
Q: According to the information, how will he go here?
A: He will be travelling by bus, Sir.
Q: What bus?
A: Bachelor, Sir.
Q: And then, what happened next Mr. Witness?
 A: At about 9:30 in the evening my Confidential Informant again called and
informed me that the subject person is now boarding a bus going to
Cagayan de Oro City, Sir.
Q: What did he say about the bus, if he said anything, Mr. Witness?
A: My agent was able to identify the body number of the bus, Bus No. 2646.
Q: Bearing Plate No.?
A: Bearing Plate No. KVP 988, Sir.
Q: What was he bringing at that time, according to the information?
A: According to my agent, these two persons were bringing along with them a
back pack color black violet with markings LOWE ALPINE.
Q: Then, what happened next, Mr. Witness?
A: We set up a check point in front of our police station and we waited for the
bus to come over, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: About 11 o'clock in the evening, what happened, Mr. Witness?
A: When we sighted the bus we flagged down the bus.
Q: After you flagged down the bus, what happened next?
A: We went on board the said bus, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What happened next?
A: We went to the back of the bus and I saw a man carrying a back pack, a
black violet which was described by the Confidential Informant, the
back pack which was placed on his lap.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: After you saw them, what happened next?
A: We were able to identify the back pack and the description of the courier, so,
we asked him to please open the back pack.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What happened next?
A: When he opened the back pack, we found marijuana leaves, the back pack
containing cellophane which the cellophane containing marijuana
leaves. 26
In his dissent from Esquillo v. People, 27 Justice Lucas P. Bersamin
emphasizes that there should be "presence of more than one seemingly innocent
activity from which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal
activity." This principle was subsequently recognized in the recent cases of Cogaed 28
and Sanchez v. People. 29 In the case at bar, accused-appellant was just a passenger
carrying his bag. There is nothing suspicious much less criminal in said act.
Moreover, such circumstance, by itself, could not have led the arresting officers to
believe that accused-appellant was in possession of marijuana.

V.

As regards search incidental to a lawful arrest, it is worth emphasizing that a

lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings; the process
cannot be reversed. 30 Thus, it becomes imperative to determine whether accused-
appellant's warrantless arrest was valid.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates the
instances wherein a peace officer or a private person may lawfully arrest a person
even without a warrant:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
Paragraph (a) of Section 5 is commonly known as an in flagrante delicto arrest.
For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two
requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officer. 31 On the other hand, the elements of an arrest effected in hot
pursuit under paragraph (b) of Section 5 (arrest effected in hot pursuit) are: first, an
offense has just been committed; and second, the arresting officer has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it. 32 cSaATC

Here, without the tip provided by the confidential informant, accused-appellant

could not be said to have executed any overt act in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officers which would indicate that he was committing the crime of illegal
possession of marijuana. Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge
of facts indicating that accused-appellant had just committed an offense. Again,
without the tipped information, accused-appellant would just have been any other bus
passenger who was minding his own business and eager to reach his destination. It
must be remembered that warrantless arrests are mere exceptions to the constitutional
right of a person against unreasonable searches and seizures, thus, they must be
strictly construed against the government and its agents. While the campaign against
proliferation of illegal drugs is indeed a noble objective, the same must be conducted
in a manner which does not trample upon well-established constitutional rights. Truly,
the end does not justify the means.

VI.

The appellate court, in convicting accused-appellant, reasoned that the search

and seizure is valid because it could be considered as search of a moving vehicle:
Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in
recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said
circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in such cases,
however, are limited to routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is
limited to visual inspection. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an
extensive search, such would be constitutionally permissible only if the
officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising
out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other
vehicle contains [an] item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure
and destruction. 33
The search in this case, however, could not be classified as a search of a
moving vehicle. In this particular type of search, the vehicle is the target and not a
specific person. Further, in search of a moving vehicle, the vehicle was intentionally
used as a means to transport illegal items. It is worthy to note that the information
relayed to the police officers was that a passenger of that particular bus was carrying
marijuana such that when the police officers boarded the bus, they searched the bag of
the person matching the description given by their informant and not the cargo or
contents of the said bus. Moreover, in this case, it just so happened that the alleged
drug courier was a bus passenger. To extend to such breadth the scope of searches on
moving vehicles would open the floodgates to unbridled warrantless searches which
can be conducted by the mere expedient of waiting for the target person to ride a
motor vehicle, setting up a checkpoint along the route of that vehicle, and then
stopping such vehicle when it arrives at the checkpoint in order to search the target
person.

VII.
 Any evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 34 This
exclusionary rule instructs that evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of
such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded
for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained
from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding. 35
Without the confiscated marijuana, no evidence is left to convict accused-
appellant. Thus, an acquittal is warranted, despite accused-appellant's failure to object
to the regularity of his arrest before arraignment. The legality of an arrest affects only
the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal,
warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence
seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. 36
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The 19 May 2014 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01156 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accused-appellant Renante Comprado y Bronola is ACQUITTED and ordered
RELEASED from detention unless he is detained for any other lawful cause. The
Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision
and to report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Bersamin, Leonen and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Comprado y Bronola, G.R. No. 213225, [April 4, 2018])

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-32993. September 28, 1976.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

DOMINGO MANLANGIT, DEMOSTHENES MANLANGIT, and
DEMETRIO MANLANGIT, defendants, DEMOSTHENES
MANLANGIT, and DEMETRIO MANLANGIT, appellants.

Recto Law Office (Counsel de oficio) for appellants.

Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo P.

Pardo and Solicitor Rizalino Cusi for appellee.

DECISION
FERNANDO, J : p

Laureto Urot, in his lifetime endowed with physical strength and prone to make
use of it at the least provocation, having been known to have inflicted violence on his
father in a moment of anger, was stabbed to death. That resulted in the prosecution
and subsequent conviction of three members of the Manlangit family, Demetrio, the
father, and his two sons, Demosthenes and Domingo. They were convicted by the
lower court for the crime of murder, the father, and one of the sons, Demosthenes,
being sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and the last named, Domingo, to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from ten years and one day of prision mayor,
minimum, to seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal, maximum, the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender having been appreciated on his behalf.
Thereafter, an appeal was taken to this Court by the three, but there was a motion for
the withdrawal thereof by Domingo Manlangit on March 20, 1974 which was granted
in a resolution of this Court about a month later after receiving the comment of the
counsel de oficio. The two remaining appellants would seek acquittal based on their
claim raised by them in the lower court that the stabbing of the victim by Domingo
was justifiable as having been in defense of a relative, his own father, who, while
prone on the ground after having been boxed by Urot, could have been knifed to death
by the latter. A careful study of the evidence of record justifies the finding of the
lower court that such a plea is lacking in persuasiveness. At the same time, while
culpability can be imputed to the two appellants, the same intensive scrutiny justifies
the conclusion that the offense committed is merely one of homicide, there being
insufficiency of proof as to the existence of the qualifying circumstance of alevosia
and the extent of their participation merely that of accomplices, taking into
consideration not only the admission of Domingo but the very testimony of the
prosecution witnesses. The judgment, therefore, has to be modified. Cdpr

Why the decision reached by the lower court cannot stand the test of rigorous
scrutiny may be discerned from the version itself of the witnesses, who took the stand
for the prosecution. It was testified to by the first witness, Buenaventura Omania, that
between the hours of 6:00 and 6:30 in the evening of November 17, 1969, Laureto
Urot, who had just bought cigarettes and vetsin from the store owned by the witness,
located at Barrio Mitan-ag, Bonifacio, Misamis Occidental, was "attacked by the three
persons" referring to the father Demetrio and the two sons, Domingo and
Demosthenes Manlangit. 1 It happened, according to him, right in front of his store
but a distance of around seven meters more or less. 2 He then repeated the words of
Laureto Urot to him: "Bay, I am wounded. I was attacked by three persons. Help me
because I am attacked by three persons." 3 He had the Manlangits in mind. 4
Thereafter, Urot was brought by the witness and a certain Clecio Abaquita to the
hospital of a certain Dr. Blancia, who did not want to treat the wounded person as the
wound could prove fatal and therefore advised them that they "may as well go to
Aurora Hospital." 5 That they did; after Urot was admitted to the hospital, the witness
was told that he could go home. 6 He learned later that around 10:00 o'clock that
evening, Urot died. 7 That is according to the direct testimony. On cross-examination,
however, he was reminded of the attack having taken place about seven meters away
from his store and that there was then near it a pile of firewood. 8 Moreover, he did
admit likewise that at the time of the said assault on the deceased, he could not see
very well what really transpired because the time being between 6:00 to 6:30, "it was
already twilight." 9 He admitted, moreover, that he was not able to see as to who of the
three accused "actually inflicted the stab wounds" on the victim. 10 These are his exact
words: "I don't know who of them stabbed the deceased but what I know is that the
three of them were there on the scene." 11 When asked by the court whether he found
any "bladed weapon," he answered: "None." 12 There was none either "in the premises
around [his] store." 13 The next witness, one Clecio Abaquita, could only testify to the
following insofar as the alleged assault was concerned: "At around 6:30 more or less
on that evening, I heard a shout of help on the road. Because of that shout to help, I
went down with a light and I saw Laureto Urot wounded and [he] requested me to
assist and help him brought to the hospital but at that moment also there was also a
truck which passed by and we placed him in the truck and I helped Laureto in putting
him on that truck." 14 As a matter of fact, he admitted that when he saw Urot already
wounded, he did not know who was responsible, such knowledge coming only to him
at the Aurora Hospital. 15 On this point, this is his exact testimony: "At around 9:30
more or less, that evening, Laureto Urot was treated at the Aurora Provincial Hospital
and in that hospital, he said that 'I am still conscious' and that he named Demetrio
Manlangit, Demosthenes Manlangit and Domingo Manlangit as the culprits and he no
longer mentioned any other person and at ten o'clock, he expired." 16 The third witness
called was Romeo Onido. There is this revealing observation by the lower court who,
prior to his direct examination by the fiscal, asked: "Is he an eyewitness?" 17 When the
answer was in the affirmative, the court remarked: "You have no eyewitness, so far
yet." 18 Again, there was reference to the attack by the three accused on the deceased.
19 He stated that at that time, he was "sitting in the store of Buenaventura Omania." 20
He made clear it was on a bench outside the store. 21 The distance was about "three
and a half meters." 22 When asked how the attack was made, there was this
meaningful observation by the interpreter in the transcript: "Witness demonstrated
what he saw: that the three accused surrounded Laureto Urot and [boxed] him." 23
Both the court and the fiscal followed up the question almost simultaneously as to
what happened after that. This is the revealing answer: "After that they went away." 24
Then the Court asked whether the witness saw "anyone of them actually stab Urot." 25
Again, the answer is even more significant as far as the criminal liability of the
defendants are concerned: "I did not see, sir, who stabbed." 26 The lower court did not
stop there. It sought further clarification by asking what happened next after the three
accused did simultaneously box Urot. This was the reply: "What I saw is the
movement of the arms of these three. I did not know what were in their arms." 27
Evidently, the court was not satisfied with the interpretation for according to the
transcript, this is what it said next: "'When Urot feel down, I saw them surround[ing]
the victim. After they left, Urot shouted for help and said that he was wounded and he
went near us and I saw that he has three wounds in his body.' Homicide. Proceed." 28
It is understandable then why, in the light of the above, there was hardly any need for
cross-examination. LLjur

To repeat, the judgment has to be modified. Certainly, the two remaining

appellants are not entitled to acquittal. The evidence of record fails to warrant
acceptance of the stabbing being justified on the plea of defense of a relative. What
was testified to by those in the scene of the tragic occurrence, against whom no
motive for falsifying facts could seriously be imputed, would reveal that Urot was
indeed attacked by the three Manlangits. The very fact that these witnesses were
guarded and cautious in their testimony is a factor conducive to their being considered
quite reliable. So the lower court concluded but misinterpreted the significance of
what was narrated. To that extent, as indicated at the outset, the decision reached is
subject to correction.
1. The first assigned error by counsel de oficio, Anianas C. Ona, who did a
creditable job, is that no conspiracy could be imputed to the Manlangits. That is an
assertion that finds no support from what, as had been set forth above, is the credible
and competent evidence of record. According to People v. Pudpud: 29 "A conspiracy
in the statutory language 'exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.' The objective then
on the part of the conspirators is to perform an act or omission punishable by law.
What is required is assent to the perpetration of such a misdeed. That must be their
intent. There is need, in the language of Justice Mapa in the early leading case of
United States v. Magcomot, a 1909 decision, for 'concurrence of wills' or 'unity of
action and purpose.' The usual phraseology employed in many of the later cases is
'common and joint purpose and design.' At times, reference is made to 'previous
concert of criminal design.' Its manifestation could be shown by 'united and concerted
action.' Thus, a conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence; it may be deduced
from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated. The conditions
attending its commission and the acts executed may be indicative of a common design
to accomplish a criminal purpose and objective. If, to use the apt words of Chief
Justice Bengzon [in People v. Villanueva], there is 'a chain of circumstances' to that
effect, then conspiracy has been established. If such be the case then, the act of one is
the act of all the others involved and each is to be held to the same degree of liability
as the others. So it has been our constant ruling from the 1905 decision of United
States v. Maxa." 30 To paraphrase the opinion of Justice Concepcion, as set forth in
the latest case in point, People v. Pajenado, 31 conspiracy may be inferred from
conduct that makes evident a community of design.
2. The lower court found appellants guilty of murder, having considered the
qualifying circumstance of alevosia as duly proved. That was error. From the
evidence of record, the standard that has to be met to prove the existence of alevosia
cannot be deemed satisfied. As far back as 1905, in the case of United States v.
Perdon, 32 the eminent Justice Mapa stated the doctrine thus: "The circumstances
specifying an offense or aggravating the penalty thereof must be proved as
conclusively as the act itself, mere suppositions or presumptions being insufficient to
establish their presence according to law. No matter how truthful these suppositions
or presumptions may seem, they must not and cannot produce the effect of
aggravating the condition of the defendant." 33 More specifically, this time in United
States v. Rana, 34 also promulgated the same year: "As the [qualifying] circumstance
of treachery (alevosia) is an important one, in considering it, it should by all means be
based on some positive conclusive proof and not merely upon hypothetical facts,
drawn more or less logically, because it is necessary that the existence of this
circumstance in the commission of the crime should be proven as fully as the crime
itself, in order to aggravate the penalty incurred by the guilty party." 35 Since then the
doctrine has been adhered to consistently. 36 Nothing is better settled, therefore, than
that alevosia, to repeat the language of People v. Abril, 37 "is not to be presumed, but
must be proved as conclusively as the act which it qualifies." 38 Such proof is sadly
lacking in this case. The appealed decision did take note of the well-deserved
reputation of the deceased as a town bully with ungovernable temper: "The evidence
for the defense further shows that Laureto Urot during his lifetime, was a tough guy.
At one time, Laureto's father reported to the Chief of Police that he was manhandled
by Laureto and his brother Rodolfo Urot. The father had swelling eyes and one of his
teeth was removed. He was manhandled by his two sons because he (father) reported
to the owners that his sons, Laureto and Rodolfo, were the ones who stole their
chickens. It was further shown that at one time, Laureto Urot had a boxing bout at [a]
basketball game with a player. He was then drunk." 39 Certainly, a man who could do
such a thing to his own father is one who cannot easily be taken advantage of in a
physical encounter. Moreover, Urot had reason to believe that there was bad blood
between him and the Manlangits. Again, the appealed decision was quite explicit on
this point: "Several days before the incident, Demetrio Manlangit had an altercation
with Laureto Urot arising from Demetrio's suspicion that Laureto was the one who
stole Demetrio's goat. Demetrio reported to the Chief of Police that Urot stole his
goat. After this report Urot had been entertaining a grudge against Demetrio." 40 The
language of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in People v. Monroy, 41 is quite appropriate. Only if
the victim were caught "completely unaware and deprived of any chance to ward off
the assault" 42 should the element of alevosia be considered as having attended the
offense. What cannot be denied in this case is that there was indeed a struggle
between Urot and the three Manlangits, and were it not for the use of a knife, the
outcome would have been in doubt. It cannot be truly said, therefore, that no risk was
incurred by appellants. Without the qualifying circumstance of alevosia, the offense
committed is that of homicide, not murder. After all, the trial judge himself was
quoted in the transcript as having observed: "Homicide. Proceed." 43
3. The next question is the criminal liability incurred by the two appellants.
The lower court held that they were principals. If proper weight be accorded to the
narrations set forth earlier, repeating the very words of the witnesses for the
 prosecution present at the scene of the occurrence, such a finding by the lower court
cannot be justified. This is to accord deference to what has been the authoritative
doctrine ever since the leading case of People v. Tamayo, 44 a 1922 decision. In the
language of the ponente, Justice Street: "Now although, as thus demonstrated,
participation on the part of an accomplice in the criminal design of the principal is
essential to the same extent as such participation is necessary on the part of one
charged as co-principal, nevertheless, it is evident, — and the cases above cited
abundantly prove — that, as against an accomplice, a court will sometimes draw the
inference of guilty participation in the criminal design from acts of concert in the
consummation of the criminal act and from the form and manner in which assistance
is rendered, where it would not draw the same inference for the purpose of holding the
same accused in the character of principal. This is because, in case of doubt, the
courts naturally lean to the milder form of responsibility." 45 The Tamayo doctrine has
invariably been cited with approval. 46 With the explicit admission of the son,
Domingo, that it was he who inflicted the fatal wound and with the participation of
the father, Demetrio, and the other son, Demosthenes, being limited merely to using
their fists, certainly, the responsibility, to quote anew from Tamayo, should be "of a
milder form." They ought to be found guilty at the most of being accomplices. prLL

4. In the light of the above, it cannot be said, therefore that there was error on
the part of the lower court in not acquitting the accused. Certainly, this is one case
where the constitutional presumption of innocence 47 cannot apply. There is more
than sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.
What has been established on behalf of the appellants Demetrio and Demosthenes
Manlangit by counsel de oficio is to mitigate their liability, to have them found guilty
as accomplices for the crime of homicide. Insofar as Domingo Manlangit is
concerned, with the withdrawal of his appeal, the judgment as to him cannot be
altered. In view thereof, there is no need to discuss the last error assigned as to such
accused being liable only for homicide. As to him the sentence had become final.
WHEREFORE, appellants Demetrio Manlangit and Demosthenes Manlangit
are adjudged accomplices of the crime of homicide committed against Laureto Urot
and each of them sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six years of prision
correccional as minimum to eight years of prision mayor as maximum, with the
accessory penalties of the law. The decision of the lower court of October 15, 1970
requiring the three accused, including Domingo Manlangit, who in the meanwhile had
been allowed to withdraw his appeal, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of
the deceased Laureto Urot, in the sum of P12,000.00, is affirmed. No costs.
Barredo, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.
Antonio, JJ., took no part.
||| (People v. Manlangit, G.R. No. L-32993, [September 28, 1976], 165 PHIL 49-61)

EFRAIM C. GENUINO v. LEILA M. DE LIMA, GR No. 197930, 2018-04-17

Facts:

then DOJ Secretary Silvestre H. Bello III issued DOJ Circular No. 17, prescribing rules and
regulations governing the issuance of HDOs. The said issuance was intended to restrain the
indiscriminate issuance of HDOs which impinge on the people's right to travel.

then Acting DOJ Secretary Alberto C. Agra issued the assailed DOJ Circular No. 41,
consolidating DOJ Circular Nos. 17 and 18, which will govern the issuance and implementation
of HDOs, WLOs, and ADOs. Section 10 of DOJ Circular No. 41 expressly repealed all rules and
regulations contained in DOJ Circular Nos. 17 and 18, as well as all instructions, issuances or
orders or parts thereof which are inconsistent with its provisions.

In three separate letters dated October 20, 2011, October 21, 2011, and October 24, 2011, GMA
requested for the issuance of an ADO, pursuant to Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 41, so that she
may be able to seek medical attention from medical specialists abroad for her
hypoparathyroidism and metabolic bone mineral disorder.

he mentioned six different countries where she intends to undergo consultations and treatment

GMA filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, docketed as G.R.
No. 199034, to annul and set aside DOJ Circular No. 41 and WLOs issued against her for
allegedly being unconstitutional

While the petitioners anchor their right in esse on the right to travel under Section 6, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution, the said right is not absolute. One of the limitations on the right to
travel is DOJ Circular No. 41, which was issued pursuant to the rule-making powers of the DOJ
in order to keep individuals under preliminary investigation within the jurisdiction of the
Philippine criminal justice system.

Issues:

he petitioners impute the respondents of violating their constitutional right to travel through the
enforcement of DOJ Circular No. 41. They claim that the issuance unnecessarily places a
restraint on the right to travel even in the absence of the grounds provided in the Constitution.

Ruling:

Liberty under the foregoing clause includes the right to choose one's residence, to leave it
whenever he pleases and to travel wherever he wills.

It is apparent, however, that the right to travel is not absolute. There are constitutional, statutory
and inherent limitations regulating the right to travel. Section 6 itself provides that the right to
travel may be impaired only in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as
may be provided by law.
Clearly, under the provision, there are only three considerations that may permit a restriction on
the right to travel: national security, public safety or public health. As a further requirement,
there must be an explicit provision of statutory law or the Rules of Court[80] providing for the
impairment.

It is clear from the foregoing that the liberty of abode may only be impaired by a lawful order of
the court and, on the one hand, the right to travel may only be impaired by a law that concerns
national security, public safety or public health. Therefore, when the exigencies of times call for
a limitation on the right to travel, the Congress must respond to the need by explicitly providing
for the restriction in a law. This is in deference to the primacy of the right to travel, being a
constitutionally-protected right and not simply a statutory right, that it can only be curtailed by a
legislative enactment.

To begin with, there is no law particularly providing for the authority of the secretary of justice
to curtail the exercise of the right to travel, in the interest of national security, public safety or
public health. As it is, the only ground of the former DOJ Secretary in restraining the petitioners,
at that time, was the pendency of the preliminary investigation of the Joint DOJ-COMELEC
Preliminary Investigation Committee on the complaint for electoral sabotage against them.

To be clear, DOJ Circular No. 41 is not a law. It is not a legislative enactment which underwent
the scrutiny and concurrence of lawmakers, and submitted to the President for approval. It is a
mere administrative issuance apparently designed to carry out the provisions of an enabling law
which the former DOJ Secretary believed to be Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292, otherwise
known as the "Administrative Code of 1987." She opined that DOJ Circular No. 41 was validly
issued pursuant to the agency's rule-making powers provided in Sections 1 and 3, Book IV, Title
III, Chapter 1 of E.O. No. 292 and Section 50, Chapter 11, Book IV of the mentioned Code.

It is, however, important to stress that before there can even be a valid administrative issuance,
there must first be a showing that the delegation of legislative power is itself valid. It is valid
only if there is a law that (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate and determinable to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.

A painstaking examination of the provisions being relied upon by the former DOJ Secretary will
disclose that they do not particularly vest the DOJ the authority to issue DOJ Circular No. 41
which effectively restricts the right to travel through the issuance of WLOs and HDOs.

A plain reading of the foregoing provisions shows that they are mere general provisions designed
to lay down the purposes of the enactment and the broad enumeration of the powers and
functions of the DOJ. In no way can they be interpreted as a grant of power to curtail a
fundamental right as the language of the provision itself does not lend to that stretched
construction.
In the same way, Section 3 does not authorize the DOJ to issue WLOs and HDOs to restrict the
constitutional right to travel. There is even no mention of the exigencies stated in the
Constitution that will justify the impairment.

he provision simply grants the DOJ the power to investigate the commission of crimes and
prosecute offenders, which are basically the functions of the agency. However, it does not carry
with it the power to indiscriminately devise all means it deems proper in performing its functions
without regard to constitutionally-protected rights.

It does not speak of any authority or power but rather a mere clarification on the nature of the
issuances that may be issued by a secretary or head of agency.

The questioned circular does not come under the inherent power of the executive department to
adopt rules and regulations as clearly the issuance of HDO and WLO is not the DOJ's business.

As such, it is a compulsory requirement that there be an existing law, complete and sufficient in
itself, conferring the expressed authority to the concerned agency to promulgate rules.

Consistent with the foregoing, there must be an enabling law from which DOJ Circular No. 41
must derive its life. Unfortunately, all of the supposed statutory authorities relied upon by the
DOJ did not pass the completeness test and sufficient standard test. The DOJ miserably failed to
establish the existence of the enabling law that will justify the issuance of the questioned
circular.

Department of Justice Circular No. 41 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Principles:

Enrile v. Sandiganbayan and People, G.R. No. 213847, 18

August 2015.
17 May

En Banc

[BERSAMIN, J.]

FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile, 90 years of age, and several others with
plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and
misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). Upon
voluntary surrender, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital, and his
Motion to Fix Bail. Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to
bail as matter of right; that it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and
conclusively that Enrile comes under the exception and cannot be excluded from enjoying the
right to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is
punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the presence of two mitigating circumstances – his
age and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not come forward with proof showing
that his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and that he should not be considered a flight risk
taking into account that he is already over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his social
standing. In its Comment, the Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary as
he is charged with a capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be
conducted to determine whether there is strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that
entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the attendant circumstances.

ISSUE: Is Enrile entitled to bail? If YES, on what ground(s)?

HELD: YES, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right based on humanitarian grounds.

The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is ultimately an
incident of the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case. The strength of the
Prosecution’s case, albeit a good measure of the accused’s propensity for flight or for causing
harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the
accused appears at trial.

The Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further
mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the international community arising from the
national commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every
person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which
provides: “The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the
right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can
participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality
of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are
under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to
bail.

This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth
and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal
proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee
will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2 ) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances.

In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the
authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this
jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for
plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this
country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been charged
with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal
disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his
trial because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both his public and his
private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he
should be granted bail.

N.B.

Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed
independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown
to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling
his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.

G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010

FACTS: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1)
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries for injuries sustained by respondent
Evangeline L. Ponce; and (2) reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property
for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s
vehicle.

Crimes charged: 1) reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries; and 2) reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property

On September 7, 2004, Ivler pleaded guilty to the charge in reckless imprudence resulting in
slight physical injuries and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this
conviction, Ivler moved to quash the Information of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
and damage to property for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense
of reckless imprudence.

MeTC: denied the motion to quash

RTC: denied Ivler’s Petition for Certiorari in dismissing his Motion to Quash

ISSUE: Whether or not Ivler’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
further proceedings in the information charging him with reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and damage to property (YES)

Defense: Ivler argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and damage to property having been previously convicted in reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries for injuries for the same offense. Ivler submits that the
multiple consequences of such crime are material only to determine his penalty
HELD: The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the RTC. Petitioner’s conviction in the case of
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries bars his prosecution in criminal reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property

1) Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime; its Consequences on Persons and Property are
Material Only to Determine the Penalty

Quasi-offenses penalize “the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible,” unlike willful offenses which
punish the intentional criminal act. These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set
them apart from the mass of intentional crimes.

2) Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence Bars Subsequent Prosecution for

the Same Quasi-offense

Once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be
prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi-offense of criminal negligence
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent
act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the
negligent or careless act, not the result thereof.

The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not
qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious
result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one
and the same, and cannot be split into different crimes and prosecutions.

3) Article 48 Does Not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code

Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under
either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies); and (2) when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the
accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty
for the most serious crime.

In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but the
mental attitude behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, a single
mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one
quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of
quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.

Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually

impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less
grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing another.
Prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or
severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the
penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no
splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first
level court.

SECOND DIVISION

[OCA IPI No. 17-4663-RTJ. March 7, 2018.]

ATTY. BERTENI C. CAUSING and PERCIVAL CARAG

MABASA, complainants, vs. PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE LORENZO
R. DELA ROSA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Manila, respondent.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J : p

Before the Court is the Complaint 1 dated January 6, 2017 filed before the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) by Atty. Berteni C. Causing (Atty. Causing)
and Percival Carag Mabasa a.k.a. Percy Lapid (Mabasa) against respondent Judge
Jose Lorenzo R. Dela Rosa (respondent Judge Dela Rosa), Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch (Br.) 4, Manila. IAETDc

Antecedents

Atty. Causing and his client, Mabasa (Complainants), charged respondent

Judge Dela Rosa with gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct and gross
incompetence for reversing 2 the dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 09-268685-86
entitled People v. Eleazar, et al. (Libel Cases), wherein Mabasa was one of the
accused.
Complainants alleged that the Libel Cases were dismissed by former Acting
Presiding Judge Gamor B. Disalo (Judge Disalo) in an Order 3 dated April 13, 2015
on the ground that the right of the accused to speedy trial had been violated. The
prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the April 13, 2015 Order before the
RTC Br. 4 Manila, now presided by respondent Judge Dela Rosa.
 Respondent Judge Dela Rosa granted the prosecution's Motion for
Reconsideration in the assailed Resolution 4 dated November 23, 2015 (November
23, 2015 Resolution), the pertinent portions of which read:
xxx xxx xxx
In opposition thereto, counsel for the accused cites double jeopardy.
However, several settings of this Court showed that the resetting was on
motion of counsel for the accused and hence with the consent of the accused.
Further, the questioned Order dated April 13, 2015 has not yet attained
finality, so double jeopardy is not yet attached.
Further, the records of this case would show that the accused is not
entirely without blame as to why this case has been pending. Aside from that,
the accused filed a Motion to Quash as well as accused's Motion for
Reconsideration thereto resulting in the conduct of the arraignment only in the
last year of September.
The prosecution should be given its day in court. To deny the Motion
For Reconsideration is a (sic) deny to prosecute on the part of the prosecution.
5
Complainants questioned respondent Judge Dela Rosa's November 23, 2015
Resolution granting the prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration because, according
to them, it was elementary for respondent Judge Dela Rosa to know that the prior
dismissal of a criminal case due to a violation of the accused's right to speedy trial is
equivalent to a dismissal on the merits of the case and, as such, granting the
prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration was tantamount to a violation of the
constitutional right against double jeopardy. 6 Complainants averred further that it
was unacceptable, given respondent Judge Dela Rosa's position and the presumption
of his knowledge of the law, for him to have disregarded a rule as elementary as the
constitutional right of an accused against double jeopardy. 7
Complainants also criticized respondent Judge Dela Rosa's act of referring to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Atty. Causing's two (2) separate posts on
his Facebook and blogspot accounts about the subject criminal cases. They reasoned
that respondent Judge Dela Rosa should have first required Atty. Causing to show
cause why he should not be cited in contempt for publicizing and taking his posts to
social media. Atty. Causing emphasized that the posts were presented using decent
words and thus, it was incorrect for respondent Judge Dela Rosa to refer his actions to
a disciplinary body such as the IBP. Atty. Causing further asserted that he did not
violate the sub judice 8 rule because this rule cannot be used to preserve the
unfairness and errors of respondent Judge Dela Rosa. 9
In a 1st Indorsement 10 dated January 16, 2017, the OCA directed respondent
Judge Dela Rosa to file his Comment within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. 11
In his Comment 12 dated March 13, 2017 (Comment), respondent Judge Dela
Rosa averred that he had already reversed the November 23, 2015 Resolution as early
as June 20, 2016 — or way before the filing of the Complaint on January 6, 2017 —
when he issued a Resolution 13 of even date, which states:
x x x While the records of the cases will show delay also attributable
to the defense and that this court was acting in the spirit of fairness, the April
13, 2015 Order of Hon. Disalo should be upheld to the prejudice of fairness.
Being caught between a rock and a hard place, liberality is afforded to the
accused. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
As the records would show that the Hon. Judge Disalo dismissed these
cases on the right of speedy trial, double jeopardy attaches. Hence, this Court's
Resolution dated November 23, 2015 is recalled and set aside. The dismissal
dated April 13, 2015 as dictated in the Order of Hon. Judge Disalo is
reinstated.
While the right of due process of the State may have been
circumvented, the interest of the private complainants with regard to the civil
aspect of the cases is protected as the dismissal of the subject criminal cases is
without prejudice to the pursuit of civil indemnity. 14
Respondent Judge Dela Rosa explained in his Comment that he had issued the
November 23, 2015 Resolution because, after studying the records, he discovered that
Complainants caused much of the delay in the proceedings. 15
Respondent Judge Dela Rosa then enumerated in his Comment the instances
wherein Complainants caused the delay in the proceedings in the Libel Cases:
1. While the warrant of arrest for Mabasa was issued on May 28, 2009, it was
only one (1) year and four (4) months after or on September 28, 2010
that Mabasa was detained; 16 DcHSEa

2. Mabasa filed a Motion to Dismiss on November 30, 2010; 17

3. The arraignment and pre-trial of the cases were reset after then Presiding
Judge Marcelino L. Sayo, Jr. (Judge Sayo) issued an Order dated April
6, 2011, which indicated that Mabasa, through counsel, moved that the
scheduled arraignment and pre-trial be reset in order "for the parties to
settle the civil aspect of these cases"; 18
4. The counsel of Mabasa filed an Urgent Motion for Deferment dated June 9,
2011 requesting again for the re-scheduling of the arraignment and pre-
trial; 19
5. The pre-trial of the case was again rescheduled in an Order dated August 24,
2011 by the lower court due to the absence of Mabasa's co-accused,
Johnson L. Eleazar; 20
6. Mabasa filed a Motion to Quash dated October 11, 2011, citing the court's
lack of jurisdiction; 21
 7. The lower court, in an Order dated June 27, 2012, rescheduled again the
arraignment and pre-trial, citing the absence of the private prosecutor,
Mabasa and his counsel; 22
8. Judge Sayo thereafter issued an Order dated November 28, 2012, directing
the issuance of warrants of arrest against Mabasa and co-accused Gloria
Galuno due to their continued non-appearance in court; 23
9. In an Order dated December 12, 2012, Judge Sayo lifted the warrants of
arrest against Mabasa and his other co-accused in the Libel Cases after
their counsel admitted that their non-appearance in the previous hearing
was due to the fault of their counsel's law office; 24
10. The hearing of the case on June 30, 2014 was rescheduled after Mabasa
moved for the resetting of the case due to the absence of his counsel; 25
11. In an Order by Judge Disalo dated August 11, 2014, counsel for Mabasa
was absent again. Mabasa was finally arraigned after the court
appointed one of the lawyers from the Public Attorney's Office as
counsel de oficio for Mabasa; 26
12. The Commissioner's Report dated September 23, 2014 stated that the
preliminary conference failed to push through due to the absence of
Mabasa and his counsel; 27 and
13. The initial date of the presentation of the prosecution evidence was set on
April 13, 2015 by the branch clerk of court. Notably, the cases against
Mabasa would be dismissed on the same day. 28
Respondent Judge Dela Rosa emphasized that the day the Libel Cases were
dismissed, i.e., on April 13, 2015, was actually the date set for the first actual trial of
the cases. He stressed that the delay of almost five (5) years in the subject cases was
attributable more to Mabasa than anyone else. 29
Respondent Judge Dela Rosa claimed that the November 23, 2015 Resolution
was issued in good faith and after evaluation of the evidence submitted by each party.
He denied that the same was motivated by bad faith, ill will, fraud, dishonesty,
corruption or caprice. In fact, Respondent Judge issued this as a matter of fairness —
that is, to give the private complainants in the Libel Cases an opportunity to pursue
against Mabasa and his co-accused the civil aspect of the Libel Cases. 30
Finally, respondent Judge Dela Rosa stressed how the filing of this
administrative complaint against him — on January 6, 2017, or after he had already
reversed the November 23, 2015 Resolution through his June 20, 2016 Resolution —
is pure harassment. 31

OCA Report and Recommendation

 In a Report and Recommendation 32 dated June 28, 2017, the OCA
recommended that the administrative complaint against Judge Dela Rosa be dismissed
for lack of merit.
After considering the allegations in the Complaint and respondent Judge Dela
Rosa's Comment, the OCA found that in the absence of any proof that respondent
Judge Dela Rosa was ill-motivated in issuing the November 23, 2015 Order and that
he had, in fact, issued his June 20, 2016 Resolution reversing himself, the charge of
gross ignorance of the law should be dismissed.
The OCA ratiocinated as follows:
The main issue in this administrative complaint is rooted in respondent
Judge's issuance of the Order dated 23 November 201[5], reversing the
previous one dismissing the criminal cases on the ground of violation of the
right of the accused to speedy trial. Respondent Judge has already admitted
that he made a mistake in issuing the said order as this would have
constituted a violation of the right of the accused against double
jeopardy. To rectify his error, he granted the motion for reconsideration
filed by the accused. SCaITA

Although not without exceptions, it is settled that the function of a

motion for reconsideration is to point out to the court the error that it may
have committed and to give it a chance to correct itself. In "Republic of the
Philippines v. Abdulwahab A. Bayao, et al.," 33 the Court explains the general
rule that the purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to grant an opportunity
for the court to rectify any actual or perceived error attributed to it by re-
examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. The wisdom of
this rule is to expedite the resolution of the issues of the case at the level of the
trial court so it can take a harder look at the records to come up with a more
informed decision on the case. 34 (Emphasis supplied)
The OCA found that the records of the case show that respondent Judge Dela
Rosa admitted that he had erred in issuing the November 23, 2015 Order, but that he
had rectified such mistake. 35 The OCA held that this is precisely why our judicial
system has remedies for both the party-litigants and the court to avail of if need be. 36
The OCA asserted that it would be absurd to still hold respondent Judge Dela Rosa
liable despite his rectification through his June 20, 2016 Resolution. 37
As to the referral by respondent Judge Dela Rosa to the IBP of Atty. Causing's
act of posting matters pertaining to the pending criminal case on the internet, the OCA
disagreed with Atty. Causing's argument that respondent Judge Dela Rosa should
have first required him to show cause for having done so. 38 The OCA explained that
respondent Judge Dela Rosa cannot just exercise his contempt powers on a whim, if
not haphazardly, if he believes that he has other remedies to resort to, just like in this
case. 39
 The Court's Ruling

In view of the foregoing, the Court hereby adopts and approves the findings of
facts and conclusions of law in the above-mentioned OCA Report and
Recommendation.
Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of basic rules and settled
jurisprudence. 40 A judge may also be administratively liable if shown to have been
motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption in ignoring, contradicting or
failing to apply settled law and jurisprudence. 41
The Court however has also ruled that "not every error or mistake of a judge in
the performance of his official duties renders him liable." 42
For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or
actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found
erroneous but, most importantly, it must also be established that he was moved by bad
faith, dishonesty, hatred, or some other like motive. As a matter of policy, in the
absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity
are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous. 43
The Court agrees with the OCA that it would be absurd to hold respondent
Judge Dela Rosa liable for his November 23, 2015 Order when he had himself
rectified this in his subsequent June 20, 2016 Order. To rule otherwise would be to
render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the
law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. 44 To
hold otherwise "would be nothing short of harassing judges to take the fantastic and
impossible oath of rendering infallible judgments." 45
Furthermore, nothing in the records of the case suggests that respondent Judge
Dela Rosa was motivated by bad faith, fraud, corruption, dishonesty or egregious
error in rendering his decision. Other than their bare assertions, Complainants failed
to substantiate their allegations with competent proof. Bad faith cannot be presumed
46 and this Court cannot conclude bad faith intervened when none was actually
proven. 47
The Court likewise finds no merit in Complainants' allegation that respondent
Judge Dela Rosa should have first required Atty. Causing to show cause for his act of
posting matters pertaining to the pending criminal case on the internet. The Court
agrees with the OCA that respondent Judge Dela Rosa's act of referring the matter to
the IBP, an independent tribunal who exercises disciplinary powers over lawyers, was
a prudent and proper action to take for a trial court judge. The Court has explained, in
the case of Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v. Distribution Management Association of
the Philippines, 48 that judges' power to punish contempt must be exercised
judiciously and sparingly, not for retaliation or vindictiveness, viz.:
 x x x [T]he power to punish for contempt of court is exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle, and only occasionally should
a court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which
the administration of justice must falter or fail. As judges[,] we ought to
exercise our power to punish contempt judiciously and sparingly, with utmost
restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing the power for the correction and
preservation of the dignity of the Court, not for retaliation or vindictiveness.
49
In fine, the administrative charge against respondent Judge Dela Rosa should
be, as it is hereby, dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint against respondent
Presiding Judge Jose Lorenzo R. Dela Rosa, Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Manila
is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. aTHCSE

SO ORDERED.
Carpio, * Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
 
||| (Causing v. Dela Rosa, OCA IPI No. 17-4663-RTJ, [March 7, 2018])

EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458. July 31, 2018.]

CESAR MATAS CAGANG, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN,

FIFTH DIVISION, QUEZON CITY; OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

[G.R. Nos. 210141-42. July 31, 2018.]

CESAR MATAS CAGANG, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN,

FIFTH DIVISION, QUEZON CITY; OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

*Should not start during fact finding because you do not receive
anything and not adversarial and no proper procedure.

*Make sure that if you are counsel for respondent make sure you
invoke speedy dis by making some follow up by making a motion for
 resolution of case bec if respondent will not make any follow-up then
he cant invoke such right for the 1st time before the court

*The accused in the SDB did not know that there was PI so accused
raised it lng for the 1st time so they filed a MTD on speedy dis of cases
and court can validly dismiss in these instances bec the accused did
not know mn however if he has knowledge and he did not raise and
he waited until the info was filed in SDB and he claimed his right
then he was Johnny coming lately

DECISION

LEONEN, J : p

Every accused has the rights to due process and to speedy disposition of cases.
Inordinate delay in the resolution and termination of a preliminary investigation will
result in the dismissal of the case against the accused. Delay, however, is not
determined through mere mathematical reckoning but through the examination of the
facts and circumstances surrounding each case. Courts should appraise a reasonable
period from the point of view of how much time a competent and independent public
officer would need in relation to the complexity of a given case. Nonetheless, the
accused must invoke his or her constitutional rights in a timely manner. The failure to
do so could be considered by the courts as a waiver of right.
aScITE

G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458 are Petitions for Certiorari with an urgent
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction 1 assailing the Resolutions dated September 12, 2012 2 and January 15,
2013 3 of the Sandiganbayan. The assailed Resolutions denied Cesar Matas Cagang's
(Cagang) Motion to Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of
Arrest in Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0456 and SB-11-CRM-0457.
G.R. Nos. 210141-42, on the other hand, refer to a Petition for Certiorari with
an urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction 4 assailing the June 18, 2013 Order 5 and September 10, 2013
Resolution 6 of the Sandiganbayan. The assailed Resolutions denied Cagang's Motion
to Quash Order of Arrest in Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0456 and SB-11-CRM-
0457.
Both Petitions question the Sandiganbayan's denial to quash the Informations
and Order of Arrest against Cagang despite the Office of the Ombudsman's alleged
inordinate delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation.
 On February 10, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman received an anonymous
complaint alleging that Amelia May Constantino, Mary Ann Gadian, and Joy Tangan
of the Vice Governor's Office, Sarangani Province committed graft and corruption by
diverting public funds given as grants or aid using barangay officials and cooperatives
as "dummies." The complaint was docketed as CPL-M-03-0163 and referred to the
Commission on Audit for audit investigation. A news report of Sun Star Davao dated
August 7, 2003 entitled "P61M from Sarangani coffers unaccounted" was also
docketed as CPL-M-03-0729 for the conduct of a fact-finding investigation. 7
On December 31, 2002, the Commission on Audit submitted its audit report
finding that the officials and employees of the Provincial Government of Sarangani
appear to have embezzled millions in public funds by sourcing out the funds from
grants, aid, and the Countrywide Development Fund of Representative Erwin
Chiongbian using dummy cooperatives and people's organizations. 8 In particular, the
Commission on Audit found that:
(1) There were releases of financial assistance intended for non-governmental
organizations/people's organizations and local government units that
were fraudulently and illegally made through inexistent local
development projects, resulting in a loss of P16,106,613.00;
(2) Financial assistance was granted to cooperatives whose officials and
members were government personnel or relatives of officials of
Sarangani, which resulted in the wastage and misuse of government
funds amounting to P2,456,481.00;
(3) There were fraudulent encashment and payment of checks, and frequent
travels of the employees of the Vice Governor's Office, which resulted
in the incurrence by the province of unnecessary fuel and oil expense
amounting to P83,212.34; and
(4) Inexistent Sagiptaniman projects were set up for farmers affected by
calamities, which resulted in wastage and misuse of government funds
amounting to P4,000,000.00. 9
On September 30, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Joint Order
terminating Case Nos. CPL-M-03-0163 and CPL-M-03-0729. It concurred with the
findings of the Commission on Audit and recommended that a criminal case for
Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents and
Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 be filed against the public
officers named by the Commission on Audit in its Summary of Persons that Could be
Held Liable on the Irregularities. The list involved 180 accused. 10 The case was
docketed as OMB-M-C-0487-J.
After considering the number of accused involved, its limited resources, and
the volumes of case records, the Office of the Ombudsman first had to identify those
accused who appeared to be the most responsible, with the intention to later on file
separate cases for the others. 11
In a Joint Order dated October 29, 2003, the accused were directed to file their
counter-affidavits and submit controverting evidence. The complainants were also
given time to file their replies to the counter-affidavits. There was delay in the release
of the order since the reproduction of the voluminous case record to be furnished to
the parties "was subjected to bidding and request of funds from the Central Office." 12
Only five (5) sets of reproductions were released on November 20, 2003 while the
rest were released only on January 15, 2004. 13 HEITAD

All impleaded elective officials and some of the impleaded appointive officials
filed a Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus, Injunction with Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order with Branch 28, Regional Trial Court of
Alabel, Sarangani. The Regional Trial Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining the Office of the Ombudsman from enforcing its October 29, 2003 Joint
Order. 14
In an Order dated December 19, 2003, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the
Petition on the ground that the officials had filed another similar Petition with this
Court, which this Court had dismissed. 15 Thus, some of the accused filed their
counter-affidavits. 16
After what the Office of the Ombudsman referred to as "a considerable period
of time," it issued another Order directing the accused who had not yet filed their
counter-affidavits to file them within seven (7) days or they will be deemed to have
waived their right to present evidence on their behalf. 17
In a 293-page Resolution 18 dated August 11, 2004 in OMB-M-C-0487-J, the
Ombudsman found probable cause to charge Governor Miguel D. Escobar, Vice
Governor Felipe Constantino, Board Members, and several employees of the Office
of the Vice Governor of Sarangani and the Office of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
with Malversation through Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of
Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. 19 Then Tanodbayan Simeon V. Marcelo
(Tanodbayan Marcelo) approved the Resolution, noting that it was modified by his
Supplemental Order dated October 18, 2004. 20
In the Supplemental Order dated October 18, 2004, Tanodbayan Marcelo
ordered the conduct of further fact-finding investigations on some of the other
accused in the case. Thus, a preliminary investigation docketed as OMB-M-C-0480-K
was conducted on accused Hadji Moner Mangalen (Mangalen) and Umbra
Macagcalat (Macagcalat). 21
In the meantime, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information dated July
12, 2005, charging Miguel Draculan Escobar (Escobar), Margie Purisima Rudes
(Rudes), Perla Cabilin Maglinte (Maglinte), Maria Deposo Camanay (Camanay), and
Cagang of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Public Documents. 22
The Information read:
That on July 17, 2002 or prior subsequent thereto in Sarangani,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Miguel Draculan Escobar, being the Governor of the Province of Sarangani,
Margie Purisima Rudes, Board Member, Perla Cabilin Maglinte, Provincial
Administrator, Maria Deposo Carnanay, Provincial Accountant, and Cesar
Matas Cagang, Provincial Treasurer, and all high-ranking and accountable
public officials of the Provincial Government of Sarangani by reason of their
duties, conspiring and confederating with one another, while committing the
offense in relation to office, taking advantage of their respective positions, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, convert and
misappropriate the amount of THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY[-]FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P375,000.00), Philippine Currency, in public funds
under their custody, and for which they are accountable, by falsifying or
causing to be falsified Disbursement Voucher No. 101-2002-7-10376 and its
supporting documents, making it appear that financial assistance has been
sought by Amon Lacungam, the alleged President of Kalalong Fishermen's
Group of Brgy. Kalaong, Maitum, Sarangani, when in truth and in fact, the
accused knew fully well that no financial assistance had been requested by
Amon Lacungan and his association, nor did said Amon Lacungan and his
association receive the aforementioned amount, thereby facilitating the release
of the above-mentioned public funds in the amount of THREE HUNDRED
SEVENTY[-]FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P375,000.00) through the
encashment by the accused of Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)
Check No. 11521401 dated July 17, 2002, which amount they subsequently
misappropriated to their personal use and benefit, and despite demand, said
accused failed to return the said amount to the damage and prejudice of the
government and the public interest in the aforesaid sum.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 23
The Sandiganbayan docketed the case as Crim. Case No. 28331. Escobar,
Maglinte, and Cagang were arraigned on December 6, 2005 where they pleaded not
guilty. Rudes and Camanay remained at large. 24
On June 17, 2010, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision 25 in Crim. Case
No. 28331 acquitting Escobar, Maglinte, and Cagang for insufficiency of evidence.
Maglinte, however, was ordered to return P100,000.00 with legal interest to the
Province of Sarangani. The cases against Rudes and Camanay were archived until the
Sandiganbayan could acquire jurisdiction over their persons. 26 ATICcS

In a Memorandum 27 dated August 8, 2011 addressed to Ombudsman

Conchita Carpio Morales (Ombudsman Carpio Morales), Assistant Special Prosecutor
III Pilarita T. Lapitan reported that on April 12, 2005, a Resolution 28 was issued in
OMB-M-C-0480-K finding probable cause to charge Mangalen and Macagcalat with
Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification and Violation of Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019. 29 Thus, it prayed for the approval of the attached
Informations:
It should be noted that in a Memorandum dated 10 December 2004
and relative to OMB-M-C-03-0487-J from which OMB-M-C-04-0480-K
originated, Assistant Special Prosecutor Maria Janina Hidalgo recommended
to Ombudsman Marcelo that the status of state witness be conferred upon
Gadian. This recommendation was approved by Ombudsman Marcelo on 20
December 2004. Hence, as may be noted[,] Gadian was no longer included as
respondent and accused in the Resolution dated 12 April 2005 and the
attached information.
Related cases that originated from OMB-M-C-03-0487-J for which no
further preliminary investigation is necessary were filed before the courts.
One of these cases is now docketed as Criminal Case No. 28293 and pending
before the Sandiganbayan, First Division. It is noteworthy that in its Order
dated 14 November 2006 the Sandiganbayan, First Division granted the
Motion to Dismiss of the counsel of Felipe Constantino after having submitted
a duly certified true copy of his client's Death Certificate issued by the
National Statistics Office. Considering the fact therefore, there is a necessity
to drop Constantino as accused in this case and accordingly, revised the
attached Information.
An Information for Malversation through Falsification of Public
Documents is also submitted for your Honor's approval considering that no
such Information is attached to the records of this case.
VIEWED IN THE FOREGOING LIGHT, it is respectfully
recommended that, in view of his death, Felipe Constantino no longer be
considered as accused in this case and that the attached Informations be
approved. 30
Ombudsman Carpio Morales approved the recommendation on October 20,
2011. 31 Thus, on November 17, 2011, Informations 32 for Violation of Section 3 (e)
of Republic Act No. 3019 and Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of
Public Documents were filed against Cagang, Camanay, Amelia Carmela Constantino
Zoleta (Zoleta), Macagcalat, and Mangalen. The Informations read:
[For Violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019]
That on 20 September 2002, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto,
in Sarangani, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Provincial Treasurer CESAR MATAS CAGANG, Provincial
Accountant MARIA DEPOSO CAMANAY, and Executive Assistant to Vice
Governor Felipe Katu Constantino, AMELIA CARMELA CONSTANTINO
ZOLETA, and then Vice-Governor and now deceased Felipe Katu
Constantino, all of the Provincial Government of Sarangani, committing the
offense in relation to the performance of their duties and functions, taking
advantage of their respective official positions, through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, conspiring and
confederating with Barangay Captain UMBRA ADAM MACAGCALAT and
HADJI MONER MANGALEN, the alleged President and Treasurer,
respectively of Kamanga Muslim-Christian Fishermen's Cooperative
("Cooperative"), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
cause the disbursement of the amount of Three Hundred and Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P350,000.00) under SARO No. D-98000987 through Development
Bank of the Philippines Check No. 282398 dated 20 September 2002 and with
HADJI MONER MANGELEN as payee thereof, by falsifying Disbursement
Voucher No. 401-200209-148 dated 20 September 2002 and its supporting
documents to make it appear that financial assistance was requested and given
to the Cooperative, when in truth and in fact, neither was there a request for
financial assistance received by the said Cooperative after the check was
encashed, as herein accused, conspiring and confederating with each other,
did then and there malverse, embezzle, misappropriate and convert to their
own personal use and benefit the said amount of P350,000.00 thereby causing
undue injury to the government in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
[For Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Public Documents]
That on 20 September 2002, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto,
in Sarangani, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Provincial Treasurer CESAR MATAS CAGANG, and now deceased
Felipe Katu Constantino, being then the Provincial Treasurer and Vice-
Governor respectively, of the Province of Sarangani who, by reason of their
public positions, are accountable for and has control of public funds entrusted
and received by them during their incumbency as Provincial Treasurer and
Vice-Governor respectively, of said province, with accused Provincial
Accountant MARIA DEPOSO CAMANAY, and Executive Assistant to Vice
Governor Felipe Katu Constantino, AMELIA CARMELA CONSTANTINO
ZOLETA, and then Vice-Governor and now deceased Felipe Katu
Constantino, all of the Provincial Government of Sarangani, committing the
offense in relation to the performance of their duties and functions, taking
advantage of their respective official positions, conspiring and confederating
with Barangay Captain UMBRA ADAM MACAGCALAT and HADJI
MONER MANGALEN, the alleged President and Treasurer, respectively of
Kamanga Muslim-Christian Fishermen's Cooperative ("Cooperative"), did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify or cause to be
falsified Disbursement Voucher No. 401-200209-148 dated 20 September
2002 and its supporting documents, by making it appear that financial
assistance in the amount of Three Hundred and Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P350,000.00) had been requested by the Cooperative, with CESAR MATAS
CAGANG, despite knowledge that the amount of P350,000.00 is to be
sourced out from SARO No. D-98000987, still certifying that cash is available
for financial assistance when Countrywide Development Funds could not be
disbursed for financial aids and assistance pursuant to DBM Circular No. 444,
and MARIA DEPOSO CAMANAY certifying as to the completeness and
 propriety of the supporting documents despite non-compliance with
Commission on Audit Circular No. 96-003 prescribing the requirements for
disbursements of financial assistance and aids, thus facilitating the issuance of
Development Bank of the Philippines Check No. 282398 dated 20 September
2002 in the amount of P350,000.00 and in the name of HADJI MONER
MANGELEN, the alleged Treasurer of the Cooperative, when in truth and in
fact, neither was there a request for financial assistance received by the said
Cooperative after the check was encashed, as herein accused, conspiring and
confederating with each other, did then and there malverse, embezzle,
misappropriate and convert to their own personal use and benefit the said
amount of P350,000.00 thereby causing undue injury to the government in the
aforesaid amount. TIADCc

CONTRARY TO LAW. 33
The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-0456 and SB-11-0457.
Cagang filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void and Set Aside
Order of Arrest while Macagcalat and Mangalen separately filed their own Motion to
Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of Arrest. Cagang argued
that there was an inordinate delay of seven (7) years in the filing of the Informations.
Citing Tatad v. Sandiganbayan 34 and Roque v. Ombudsman, 35 he argued that the
delay violated his constitutional rights to due process and to speedy disposition of
cases. 36 The Office of the Ombudsman, on the other hand, filed a
Comment/Opposition arguing that the accused have not yet submitted themselves to
the jurisdiction of the court and that there was no showing that delay in the filing was
intentional, capricious, whimsical, or motivated by personal reasons. 37
On September 10, 2012, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution 38 denying the
Motions to Quash/Dismiss. It found that Cagang, Macagcalat, and Mangalen
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by the filing of the motions. 39 It
also found that there was no inordinate delay in the issuance of the information,
considering that 40 different individuals were involved with direct participation in
more or less 81 different transactions. 40 It likewise found Tatad and Roque
inapplicable since the filing of the Informations was not politically motivated. 41 It
pointed out that the accused did not invoke their right to speedy disposition of cases
before the Office of the Ombudsman but only did so after the filing of the
Informations. 42
Cagang filed a Motion for Reconsideration 43 but it was denied in a Resolution
44 dated January 15, 2013. Hence, Cagang filed a Petition for Certiorari 45 with this
Court, docketed as G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458. 46
In an Urgent Motion to Quash Order of Arrest 47 dated June 13, 2013 filed
before the Sandiganbayan, Cagang alleged that an Order of Arrest was issued against
him. 48 He moved for the quashal of the Order on the ground that he had a pending
Petition for Certiorari before this Court. 49
 In an Order 50 dated June 28, 2013, the Sandiganbayan denied the Urgent
Motion to Quash Order of Arrest on the ground that it failed to comply with the three
(3)-day notice rule and that no temporary restraining order was issued by this Court.
Cagang filed a Motion for Reconsideration 51 but it was denied by the
Sandiganbayan in a Resolution 52 dated September 10, 2013. Hence, he filed a
Petition for Certiorari with an urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, 53 essentially seeking to
restrain the implementation of the Order of Arrest against him. This Petition was
docketed as G.R. Nos. 210141-42.
On February 5, 2014, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order 54 in
G.R. Nos. 210141-42 enjoining the Sandiganbayan from continuing with the
proceedings of the case and from implementing the warrant of arrest against Cagang.
This Court likewise consolidated G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458 with G.R. Nos.
210141-42. 55 The Office of the Special Prosecutor submitted its separate Comments
56 to the Petitions on behalf of the People of the Philippines and the Office of the
Ombudsman. 57
Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
when it dismissed his Motion to Quash/Dismiss since the Informations filed against
him violated his constitutional rights to due process and to speedy disposition of
cases. Citing Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 58 he argues that the Office of the Ombudsman
lost its jurisdiction to file the cases in view of its inordinate delay in terminating the
preliminary investigation almost seven (7) years after the filing of the complaint. 59
Petitioner further avers that the dismissal of cases due to inordinate delay is not
because the revival of the cases was politically motivated, as in Tatad, but because it
violates Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution 60 and Rule 112, Section 3 (f) 61 of
the Rules of Court. 62 He points out that the Sandiganbayan overlooked two (2)
instances of delay by the Office of the Ombudsman: the first was from the filing of
the complaint on February 10, 2003 to the filing of the Informations on November 17,
2011, and the second was from the conclusion of the preliminary investigation in
2005 to the filing of the Informations on November 17, 2011. 63 AIDSTE

Petitioner asserts that the alleged anomalous transactions in this case were
already thoroughly investigated by the Commission on Audit in its Audit Report;
thus, the Office of the Ombudsman should not have taken more than seven (7) years
to study the evidence needed to establish probable cause. 64 He contends that "[w]hen
the Constitution enjoins the Office of the Ombudsman to 'act promptly' on any
complaint against any public officer or employee, it has the concomitant duty to
speedily resolve the same." 65
Petitioner likewise emphasizes that the Sandiganbayan should have granted his
Motion to Quash Order of Arrest since there was a pending Petition before this Court
questioning the issuance of the Informations against him. He argues that the case
would become moot if the Order of Arrest is not quashed. 66
The Office of the Special Prosecutor, on the other hand, alleges that petitioner,
along with his co-accused Camanay, Zoleta, Macagcalat, and Magalen have remained
at large and cannot be located by the police, and that they have not yet surrendered or
been arrested. 67 It argues that the parameters necessary to determine whether there
was inordinate delay have been repeatedly explained by the Sandiganbayan in the
assailed Resolutions. It likewise points out that petitioner should have invoked his
right to speedy disposition of cases when the case was still pending before the Office
of the Ombudsman, not when the Information was already filed with the
Sandiganbayan. It argues further that Tatad was inapplicable since there were peculiar
circumstances which prompted this Court to dismiss the information due to inordinate
delay. 68
The Office of the Special Prosecutor argues that the Sandiganbayan already
made a judicial determination of the existence of probable cause pursuant to its duty
under Rule 112, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. 69 It points out that a petition for
certiorari is not the proper remedy to question the denial of a motion to quash and
that the appropriate remedy should be to proceed to trial. 70
Procedurally, the issues before this Court are whether or not the pendency of a
petition for certiorari with this Court suspends the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan, and whether or not the denial of a motion to quash may be the subject
of a petition for certiorari. This Court is also tasked to resolve the sole substantive
issue of whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioner Cesar Matas Cagang's Motion to Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to
Void and Set Aside Order of Arrest and Urgent Motion to Quash Order of Arrest on
the ground of inordinate delay.

To give full resolution to this case, this Court must first briefly pass upon the
procedural issues raised by the parties.
Contrary to petitioner's arguments, the pendency of a petition for certiorari
before this Court will not prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceeding to trial absent
the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction. Under
Rule 65, Section 7 71 of the Rules of Court:
Section 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. — The court in which the
petition is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also
grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the
preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. The petition
shall not interrupt the course of the principal case, unless a temporary
 restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued, enjoining
the public respondent from further proceeding with the case.
The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten
(10) days from the filing of a petition for certiorari with a higher court or
tribunal, absent a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, or
upon its expiration. Failure of the public respondent to proceed with the
principal case may be a ground for an administrative charge.
Since this Court did not issue injunctive relief when the Petition in G.R. Nos.
206438 and 206458 was filed, the Sandiganbayan cannot be faulted from proceeding
with trial. It was only upon the filing of the Petition in G.R. Nos. 210141-42 that this
Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan.
As a general rule, the denial of a motion to quash is not appealable as it is
merely interlocutory. Likewise, it cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari.
The denial of the motion to quash can still be raised in the appeal of a judgment of
conviction. The adequate, plain, and speedy remedy is to proceed to trial and to
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. Thus, in Galzote v. Briones: 72 AaCTcI

. . . In the usual course of procedure, a denial of a motion to quash

filed by the accused results in the continuation of the trial and the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If a judgment of
conviction is rendered and the lower court's decision of conviction is
appealed, the accused can then raise the denial of his motion to quash not only
as an error committed by the trial court but as an added ground to overturn the
latter's ruling.
In this case, the petitioner did not proceed to trial but opted to
immediately question the denial of his motion to quash via a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and
is not appealable; an appeal from an interlocutory order is not allowed under
Section 1 (b), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Neither can it be a proper subject
of a petition for certiorari which can be used only in the absence of an appeal
or any other adequate, plain and speedy remedy. The plain and speedy remedy
upon denial of an interlocutory order is to proceed to trial as discussed above.
73
Ordinarily, the denial of a motion to quash simply signals the commencement
of the process leading to trial. The denial of a motion to quash, therefore, is not
necessarily prejudicial to the accused. During trial, and after arraignment, prosecution
proceeds with the presentation of its evidence for the examination of the accused and
the reception by the court. Thus, in a way, the accused is then immediately given the
opportunity to meet the charges on the merits. Therefore, if the case is intrinsically
without any grounds, the acquittal of the accused and all his suffering due to the
charges can be most speedily acquired.
 The rules and jurisprudence, thus, balance procedural niceties and the
immediate procurement of substantive justice. In our general interpretation, therefore,
the accused is normally invited to meet the prosecution's evidence squarely during
trial rather than skirmish on procedural points.
A party may, however, question the denial in a petition for certiorari if the
party can establish that the denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion:
[A] direct resort to a special civil action for certiorari is an exception rather
than the general rule, and is a recourse that must be firmly grounded on
compelling reasons. In past cases, we have cited the interest of a "more
enlightened and substantial justice;" the promotion of public welfare and
public policy; cases that "have attracted nationwide attention, making it
essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof;" or judgments
on order attended by grave abuse of discretion, as compelling reasons to
justify a petition for certiorari.
In grave abuse of discretion cases, certiorari is appropriate if the
petitioner can establish that the lower court issued the judgment or order
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and the
remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief. The
petitioner carries the burden of showing that the attendant facts and
circumstances fall within any of the cited instances. 74
Petitioner alleges that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
when it denied his Motion to Quash/Dismiss, insisting that the denial transgressed
upon his constitutional rights to due process and to speedy disposition of cases. A
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is consistent with this theory.

II

The Constitution guarantees the right to speedy disposition of cases. Under

Article III, Section 16:
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
The right to speedy disposition of cases should not be confused with the right
to a speedy trial, a right guaranteed under Article III, Section 14 (2) of the
Constitution:
Section 14.
xxx xxx xxx
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,
 and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
EcTCAD

The right to a speedy trial is invoked against the courts in a criminal

prosecution. The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, is invoked even
against quasi-judicial or administrative bodies in civil, criminal, or administrative
cases before them. As Abadia v. Court of Appeals 75 noted:
The Bill of Rights provisions of the 1987 Constitution were precisely crafted
to expand substantive fair trial rights and to protect citizens from procedural
machinations which tend to nullify those rights. Moreover, Section 16, Article
III of the Constitution extends the right to a speedy disposition of cases to
cases "before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies." This
protection extends to all citizens, including those in the military and covers
the periods before, during and after the trial, affording broader protection than
Section 14(2) which guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial. 76
Both rights, nonetheless, have the same rationale: to prevent delay in the
administration of justice. In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan: 77
The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of
the case against him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by
holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to
prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to
proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a
speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The
inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such right is not
susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a
relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.
While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is
orderly, expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot be definitely said how long
is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It
is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to
the accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must
be borne in mind that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and
the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give meaning
to that intent. 78
While the right to speedy trial is invoked against courts of law, the right to
speedy disposition of cases may be invoked before quasi-judicial or administrative
tribunals in proceedings that are adversarial and may result in possible criminal
liability. The right to speedy disposition of cases is most commonly invoked in fact-
finding investigations and preliminary investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman
since neither of these proceedings form part of the actual criminal prosecution. The
Constitution itself mandates the Office of the Ombudsman to "act promptly" on
complaints filed before it:
Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people,
shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public
officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the
action taken and the result thereof. 79
As if to underscore the importance of its mandate, this constitutional command
is repeated in Republic Act No. 6770, 80 which provides:
Section 13. Mandate. — The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of
the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner
against officers or employees of the government, or of any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in
every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service
by the Government to the people.
Neither the Constitution nor Republic Act No. 6770 provide for a specific
period within which to measure promptness. Neither do they provide for criteria
within which to determine what could already be considered as delay in the
disposition of complaints. Thus, judicial interpretation became necessary to determine
what could be considered "prompt" and what length of time could amount to
unreasonable or "inordinate delay."
The concept of inordinate delay was introduced in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 81
where this Court was constrained to apply the "radical relief" of dismissing the
criminal complaint against an accused due to the delay in the termination of the
preliminary investigation. HSAcaE

In Tatad, a report was submitted to the Legal Panel, Presidential Security

Command sometime in October 1974, charging Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad) with graft
and corruption during his stint as Minister of Public Information. In October 1979,
Tatad submitted his resignation. It was only on December 29, 1979 that a criminal
complaint was filed against him. Then President Ferdinand Marcos accepted his
resignation on January 26, 1980. On April 1, 1980, the Tanodbayan 82 referred the
complaint to the Criminal Investigation Service, Presidential Security Command for
fact-finding. On June 16, 1980, the Investigation Report was submitted finding Tatad
liable for violation of Republic Act No. 3019.
Tatad moved for the dismissal of the case but this was denied on July 26, 1982.
His motion for reconsideration was denied on October 5, 1982. Affidavits and
counter-affidavits were submitted on October 25, 1982. On July 5, 1985, the
Tanodbayan issued a resolution approving the filing of informations against Tatad.
Tatad filed a motion to quash on July 22, 1985. The motion to quash was denied by
the Sandiganbayan on August 9, 1985. The Sandiganbayan, however, ordered the
filing of an amended information to change the date of the alleged commission of the
offense. In compliance, the Tanodbayan submitted its amended information on
August 10, 1985. Tatad filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the
Sandiganbayan on September 17, 1985. Hence, he filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with this Court, questioning the filing of the cases with the
Sandiganbayan.
On April 10, 1986, this Court required the parties to move in the premises
considering the change in administration brought about by the EDSA Revolution and
the overthrow of the Marcos regime. On June 20, 1986, the new Tanodbayan
manifested that as the charges were not political in nature, the State would still pursue
the charges against Tatad.
In resolving the issue of whether Tatad's constitutional rights to due process
and to speedy disposition of cases were violated, this Court took note that the finding
of inordinate delay applies in a case-to-case basis:
In a number of cases, this Court has not hesitated to grant the so-called
"radical relief" and to spare the accused from undergoing the rigors and
expense of a full-blown trial where it is clear that he has been deprived of due
process of law or other constitutionally guaranteed rights. Of course, it goes
without saying that in the application of the doctrine enunciated in those
cases, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar
to each case. 83
This Court found that there were peculiar circumstances which attended the
preliminary investigation of the complaint, the most blatant of which was that the
1974 report against Tatad was only acted upon by the Tanodbayan when Tatad had a
falling out with President Marcos in 1979:
A painstaking review of the facts cannot but leave the impression that
political motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the
prosecutorial process in this case. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it
were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos.
Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for
preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and
counter-affidavits by the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the
Presidential Security Command for fact-finding investigation and report.
We find such blatant departure from the established procedure as a
dubious, but revealing attempt to involve an office directly under the President
in the prosecution was politically motivated. We cannot emphasize too
strongly that prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving the
impression that their noble office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or
unwittingly, for political ends or other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the
basic and fundamental objective of serving the interest of justice
evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and all litigants alike, whether rich
 or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only by strict adherence to the
established procedure may the public's perception of the impartiality of the
prosecutor be enhanced. 84
Thus, the delay of three (3) years in the termination of the preliminary
investigation was found to have been inordinate delay, which was violative of
petitioner's constitutional rights:
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the
constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the
requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation,
including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the
law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural
due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only
under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the
constitutionally guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in
Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions),
the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A
delay of close to three (3) years cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in
the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. We are not
impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by
indulging in the speculative assumption that "the delay may be due to a
painstaking and grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the
evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution
of a former high-ranking government official." In the first place, such a
statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be
emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the
petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and
liabilities required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve
complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and
grueling scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating
the preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged
bribery and alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while
presenting more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant
or justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve
the case. 85HESIcT

Political motivation, however, is merely one of the circumstances to be

factored in when determining whether the delay is inordinate. The absence of political
motivation will not prevent this Court from granting the same "radical relief." Thus, in
Angchangco v. Ombudsman, 86 this Court dismissed the criminal complaints even if
the petition filed before this Court was a petition for mandamus to compel the Office
of the Ombudsman to resolve the complaints against him after more than six (6) years
of inaction:
Here, the Office of the Ombudsman, due to its failure to resolve the
criminal charges against petitioner for more than six years, has transgressed
 on the constitutional right of petitioner to due process and to a speedy
disposition of the cases against him, as well as the Ombudsman's own
constitutional duty to act promptly on complaints filed before it. For all these
past 6 years, petitioner has remained under a cloud, and since his retirement in
September 1994, he has been deprived of the fruits of his retirement after
serving the government for over 42 years all because of the inaction of
respondent Ombudsman. If we wait any longer, it may be too late for
petitioner to receive his retirement benefits, not to speak of clearing his name.
This is a case of plain injustice which calls for the issuance of the writ prayed
for. 87
As in Angchangco, this Court has applied the Tatad doctrine in Duterte v.
Sandiganbayan, 88 Roque v. Ombudsman, 89 Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan, 90 Lopez,
Jr. v. Ombudsman, 91 Licaros v. Sandiganbayan, 92 People v. SPO4 Anonas, 93
Enriquez v. Ombudsman, 94 People v. Sandiganbayan, First Division, 95 Inocentes v.
People, 96 Almeda v. Ombudsman, 97 People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, 98
Torres v. Sandiganbayan, 99 and Remulla v. Sandiganbayan. 100
This Court, however, emphasized that "[a] mere mathematical reckoning of the
time involved is not sufficient" 101 to rule that there was inordinate delay. Thus, it
qualified the application of the Tatad doctrine in cases where certain circumstances do
not merit the application of the "radical relief" sought.
Despite the promulgation of Tatad, however, this Court struggled to apply a
standard test within which to determine the presence of inordinate delay. Martin v.
Ver, 102 decided in 1983, attempted to introduce in this jurisdiction the "balancing
test" in the American case of Barker v. Wingo, thus:
[T]he right to a speedy trial is a more vague and generically different concept
than other constitutional rights guaranteed to accused persons and cannot be
quantified into a specified number of days or months, and it is impossible to
pinpoint a precise time in the judicial process when the right must be asserted
or considered waived . . .
[A] claim that a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial is subject
to a balancing test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the
defendant are weighed, and courts should consider such factors as length of
the delay, reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion or non-assertion of
his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, in
determining whether defendant's right to a speedy trial has been denied . . .
103
The Barker balancing test provides that courts must consider the following
factors when determining the existence of inordinate delay: first, the length of delay;
second, the reason for delay; third, the defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his or
her right; and fourth, the prejudice to the defendant as a result of the delay.
For a period of time, this balancing test appeared to be the best way to
determine the existence of inordinate delay. Thus, this Court applied both the Tatad
doctrine and the Barker balancing test in the 1991 case of Gonzales v.
Sandiganbayan: 104
It must be here emphasized that the right to a speedy disposition of a
case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or
when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or
when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the
balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right
to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the
conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and such
factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion or
non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the
delay, are considered. 105 caITAC

The combination of both Tatad and the balancing test was so effective that it
was again applied in Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, 106 where this Court took note that:
[D]elays per se are understandably attendant to all prosecutions and are
constitutionally permissible, with the monition that the attendant delay must
not be oppressive. Withal, it must not be lost sight of that the concept of
speedy disposition of cases is a relative term and must necessarily be a
flexible concept. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of
whether or not that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered
and balanced are the length of delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion
or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the
delay. 107
Determining the length of delay necessarily involves a query on when a case is
deemed to have commenced. In Dansal v. Fernandez, 108 this Court recognized that
the right to speedy disposition of cases does not only include the period from which a
case is submitted for resolution. Rather, it covers the entire period of investigation
even before trial. Thus, the right may be invoked as early as the preliminary
investigation or inquest.
In criminal prosecutions, the investigating prosecutor is given a specific period
within which to resolve the preliminary investigation under Rule 112, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court. 109 Courts are likewise mandated to resolve cases within a specific
time frame. Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution provides:
Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this
Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date
of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme
Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all
other lower courts.
 (2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon
the filing of the last pending, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of
Court or by the court itself.
(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this
effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be
issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and
served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or
resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court,
without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in
consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted
thereto for determination, without further delay.
Under Republic Act No. 8493, or the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, the entire trial
period must not exceed 180 days, except as otherwise provided for by this Court. 110
The law likewise provides for a time limit of 30 days from the filing of the
information to conduct the arraignment, and 30 days after arraignment for trial to
commence. 111 In order to implement the law, this Court issued Supreme Court
Circular No. 38-98 112 reiterating the periods for the conduct of trial. It also provided
for an extended time limit from arraignment to the conduct of trial:
Section 7. Extended Time Limit. — Notwithstanding the provisions of the
preceding Sections 2 and 6 for the first twelve-calendar-month period
following its effectivity, the time limit with respect to the period from
arraignment to trial imposed by said provision shall be one hundred eighty
(180) days. For the second twelve-month period, the time limit shall be one
hundred twenty (120) days, and for the third twelve-month period the time
limit shall be eighty (80) days.
The Circular likewise provides for certain types of delay which may be
excluded in the running of the periods:
Section 9. Exclusions. — The following periods of delay shall be excluded in
computing the time within which trial must commence:
(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the
accused, including but not limited to the following:
(1) delay resulting from an examination of the physical and
mental condition of the accused;
(2) delay resulting from proceedings with respect to other
criminal charges against the accused;
(3) delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against
interlocutory orders;
(4) delay resulting from pre-trial proceedings: Provided, that
the delay does not exceed thirty (30) days;ICHDca
 (5) delay resulting from orders of inhibition or proceedings
relating to change of venue of cases or transfer from other
courts;
(6) delay resulting from a finding of the existence of a valid
prejudicial question; and
(7) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed
thirty (30) days, during which any proceeding concerning the
accused is actually under advisement.
(b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of an
essential witness.
For purposes of this subparagraph, an essential witness shall be
considered absent when his whereabouts are unknown or his whereabouts
cannot be determined by due diligence. An essential witness shall be
considered unavailable whenever his whereabouts are known but his presence
for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence.
(c) Any period of delay resulting from the fact that the accused is mentally
incompetent or physically unable to stand trial.
(d) If the information is dismissed upon motion of the prosecution and
thereafter a charge is filed against the accused for the same offense, any
period of delay from the date the charge was dismissed to the date the time
limitation would commence to run as to the subsequent charge had there been
no previous charge.
(e) A reasonable period of delay when the accused is joined for trial with a co-
accused over whom the court has not acquired jurisdiction, or as to whom the
time for trial has not run and no motion for separate trial has been granted.
(f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any court
motu proprio or on motion of either the accused or his counsel or the
prosecution, if the court granted such continuance on the basis of his findings
set forth in the order that the ends of justice served by taking such action
outweigh the best interest of the public and the accused in a speedy trial.
These provisions have since been incorporated in Rule 119, Sections 1, 113 2,
114 3, 115 and 6 116 of the Rules of Court.
Several laws have also been enacted providing the time periods for disposition
of cases.
In Republic Act No. 6975, as amended by Republic Act No. 8551, resolution
of complaints against members of the Philippine National Police must be done within
ninety (90) days from the arraignment of the accused:
Section 55. Section 47 of Republic Act No. 6975 is hereby amended to read as
follows:
 "Section 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. — Upon the
filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a
member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six
(6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the
accused from office for a period not exceeding ninety (90) days from
arraignment: provided, however, that if it can be shown by evidence that the
accused is harassing the complainant and/or witnesses, the court may order the
preventive suspension of the accused PNP member even if the charge is
punishable by a penalty lower than six (6) years and one (1) day: provided,
further, that the preventive suspension shall not be more than ninety (90) days
except if the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence
or petitions of the respondent: provided, finally, that such preventive
suspension may be sooner lifted by the court in the exigency of the service
upon recommendation of the chief, PNP. Such case shall be subject to
continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from
arraignment of the accused."
Republic Act No. 9165, 117 Section 90 provides that trial for drug-related
offenses should be finished not later than 60 days from the filing of the information:
Section 90. Jurisdiction. —
xxx xxx xxx
Trial of the case under this Section shall be finished by the court not later than
sixty (60) days from the date of the filing of the information. Decision on said
cases shall be rendered within a period of fifteen (15) days from the date of
submission of the case for resolution. TCAScE

Republic Act No. 9372, 118 Section 48 mandates continuous trial on a daily
basis for cases of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism:
Section 48. Continuous Trial. — In cases of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism, the judge shall set the continuous trial on a daily basis from
Monday to Friday or other short-term trial calendar so as to ensure speedy
trial.
Republic Act No. 9516 119 amends Presidential Decree No. 1866 120 to
provide for continuous trial for cases involving illegal or unlawful possession,
manufacture, dealing, acquisition, and disposition of firearms, ammunitions, and
explosives:
Section 4-B. Continuous Trial. — In cases involving violations of this Decree,
the judge shall set the case for continuous trial on a daily basis from Monday
to Friday or other short-term trial calendar so as to ensure speedy trial. Such
case shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the
accused.
Implementing rules and regulations have also provided for the speedy
disposition of cases. The Implementing Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and
Investigation of Child Abuse Cases 121 provide that trial shall commence within three
(3) days from arraignment:
Section 21. Speedy Trial of Child Abuse Cases. — The trial of child abuse
cases shall take precedence over all other cases before the courts, except
election and habeas corpus cases. The trial in said cases shall commence
within three (3) days from the date the accused is arraigned and no
postponement of the initial hearing shall be granted except on account of the
illness of the accused or other grounds beyond his control.
The Revised Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 9208, 122
as amended by Republic Act No. 10364, 123 mandates the speedy disposition of
trafficking cases:
Section 76. Speedy Disposition of [Trafficking in Persons] Cases. — Where
practicable and unless special circumstance require; otherwise, cases
involving violation of R.A. No. 9208 shall be heard contiguously: with
hearing dates spaced not more than two weeks apart. Unnecessary delay
should be avoided, strictly taking into consideration the Speedy Trial Act and
SC Circular No. 38-98 dated 11 August 1998.
Laws and their implementing rules and regulations, however, do not generally
bind courts unless this Court adopts them in procedural rules. 124 In any case, this
Court has already made several issuances setting periods for the conduct of trial.
Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure in Environmental Cases 125
provide that trial must not exceed three (3) months from the issuance of the pre-trial
order:
Section 1. Continuous trial. — The court shall endeavor to conduct continuous
trial which shall not exceed three (3) months from the date of the issuance of
the pre-trial order.
Rule 14, Section 2 of the Rules of Procedure for Intellectual Property Rights
Cases 126 limits the period of presenting evidence to 60 days per party:
Section 2. Conduct of trial. — The court shall conduct hearings expeditiously
so as to ensure speedy trial. Each party shall have a maximum period of sixty
(60) days to present his evidence-in-chief on the trial dates agreed upon during
the pre-trial.
Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 25-2007 127 provides that trial in
cases involving the killings of political activists and members of the media must be
conducted within 60 days from its commencement:
The cases referred to herein shall undergo mandatory continuous trial and
shall be terminated within sixty (60) days from commencement of trial.
Judgment thereon shall be rendered within thirty (30) days from submission
for decision unless a shorter period is provided by law or otherwise directed
by this Court.
 The Guidelines for Decongesting Holding Jails by Enforcing the Right of the
Accused to Bail and to Speedy Trial 128 provide for strict time limits that must be
observed:
Section 8. Observance of time limits. — It shall be the duty of the trial court,
the public or private prosecutor, and the defense counsel to ensure, subject to
the excluded delays specified in Rule 119 of the Rules of Court and the
Speedy Trial Act of 1998, compliance with the following time limits in the
prosecution of the case against a detained accused: cTDaEH

(a) The case of the accused shall be raffled and referred to the trial court to
which it is assigned within three days from the filing of the information;
(b) The court shall arraign the accused within ten (10) days from the date of
the raffle;
(c) The court shall hold the pre-trial conference within thirty (30) days after
arraignment or within ten (10) days if the accused is under preventive
detention; provided, however, that where the direct testimonies of the
witnesses are to be presented through judicial affidavits, the court shall give
the prosecution not more than twenty (20) days from arraignment within
which to prepare and submit their judicial affidavits in time for the pre-trial
conference;
(d) After the pre-trial conference, the court shall set the trial of the case in the
pre-trial order not later than thirty (30) days from the termination of the pre-
trial conference; and
(e) The court shall terminate the regular trial within one hundred eighty (180)
days, or the trial by judicial affidavits within sixty (60) days, reckoned from
the date trial begins, minus the excluded delays or postponements specified in
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court and the Speedy Trial Act of 1998.
A dilemma arises as to whether the period includes proceedings in quasi-
judicial agencies before a formal complaint is actually filed. The Office of the
Ombudsman, for example, has no set periods within which to conduct its fact-finding
investigations. They are only mandated to act promptly. Thus, in People v.
Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, 129 this Court stated that a fact-finding investigation
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman should not be deemed separate from
preliminary investigation for the purposes of determining whether there was a
violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases:
The State further argues that the fact-finding investigation should not
be considered a part of the preliminary investigation because the former was
only preparatory in relation to the latter; and that the period spent in the
former should not be factored in the computation of the period devoted to the
preliminary investigation.
The argument cannot pass fair scrutiny.
 The guarantee of speedy disposition under Section 16 of Article III of
the Constitution applies to all cases pending before all judicial, quasi-judicial
or administrative bodies. The guarantee would be defeated or rendered inutile
if the hair-splitting distinction by the State is accepted. Whether or not the
fact-finding investigation was separate from the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman should not matter for purposes of
determining if the respondents' right to the speedy disposition of their cases
had been violated. 130 (Emphasis supplied)
People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division 131 must be re-examined.
When an anonymous complaint is filed or the Office of the Ombudsman
conducts a motu proprio fact-finding investigation, the proceedings are not yet
adversarial. Even if the accused is invited to attend these investigations, this period
cannot be counted since these are merely preparatory to the filing of a formal
complaint. At this point, the Office of the Ombudsman will not yet determine if there
is probable cause to charge the accused.
This period for case build-up cannot likewise be used by the Office of the
Ombudsman as unbridled license to delay proceedings. If its investigation takes too
long, it can result in the extinction of criminal liability through the prescription of the
offense.
Considering that fact-finding investigations are not yet adversarial proceedings
against the accused, the period of investigation will not be counted in the
determination of whether the right to speedy disposition of cases was violated. Thus,
this Court now holds that for the purpose of determining whether inordinate delay
exists, a case is deemed to have commenced from the filing of the formal complaint
and the subsequent conduct of the preliminary investigation. In People v.
Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, 132 the ruling that fact-finding investigations are
included in the period for determination of inordinate delay is abandoned.
With respect to fact-finding at the level of the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman
must provide for reasonable periods based upon its experience with specific types of
cases, compounded with the number of accused and the complexity of the evidence
required. He or she must likewise make clear when cases are deemed submitted for
decision. The Ombudsman has the power to provide for these rules and it is
recommended that he or she amend these rules at the soonest possible time. cSaATC

These time limits must be strictly complied with. If it has been alleged that
there was delay within the stated time periods, the burden of proof is on the defense to
show that there has been a violation of their right to speedy trial or their right to
speedy disposition of cases. The defense must be able to prove first, that the case took
much longer than was reasonably necessary to resolve, and second, that efforts were
exerted to protect their constitutional rights. 133
What may constitute a reasonable time to resolve a proceeding is not
determined by "mere mathematical reckoning." 134 It requires consideration of a
number of factors, including the time required to investigate the complaint, to file the
information, to conduct an arraignment, the application for bail, pre-trial, trial proper,
and the submission of the case for decision. 135 Unforeseen circumstances, such as
unavoidable postponements or force majeure, must also be taken into account.
The complexity of the issues presented by the case must be considered in
determining whether the period necessary for its resolution is reasonable. In
Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan 136 this Court found that "the long delay in
resolving the preliminary investigation could not be justified on the basis of the
records." 137 In Binay v. Sandiganbayan, 138 this Court considered "the complexity
of the cases (not run-of-the-mill variety) and the conduct of the parties' lawyers" 139
to determine whether the delay is justifiable. When the case is simple and the
evidence is straightforward, it is possible that delay may occur even within the given
periods. Defense, however, still has the burden to prove that the case could have been
resolved even before the lapse of the period before the delay could be considered
inordinate.
The defense must also prove that it exerted meaningful efforts to protect
accused's constitutional rights. In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, 140 the failure of the
accused to timely invoke the right to speedy disposition of cases may work to his or
her disadvantage, since this could indicate his or her acquiescence to the delay:
Petitioner was definitely not unaware of the projected criminal
prosecution posed against him by the indication of this Court as a
complementary sanction in its resolution of his administrative case. He
appears, however, to have been insensitive to the implications and
contingencies thereof by not taking any step whatsoever to accelerate the
disposition of the matter, which inaction conduces to the perception that the
supervening delay seems to have been without his objection hence impliedly
with his acquiescence. 141
In Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan, 142 this Court equated this acquiescence as
one that could amount to laches, which results in the waiver of their rights:
[I]t is worthy to note that it was only on 21 December 1999, after the case was
set for arraignment, that petitioners raised the issue of the delay in the conduct
of the preliminary investigation. As stated by them in their Motion to
Quash/Dismiss, "[o]ther than the counter-affidavits, [they] did nothing." Also,
in their petition, they averred: "Aside from the motion for extension of time to
file counter-affidavits, petitioners in the present case did not file nor send any
letter-queries addressed to the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao which
conducted the preliminary investigation." They slept on their right — a
situation amounting to laches. The matter could have taken a different
dimension if during all those four years, they showed signs of asserting their
right to a speedy disposition of their cases or at least made some overt acts,
like filing a motion for early resolution, to show that they were not waiving
that right. Their silence may, therefore be interpreted as a waiver of such right.
As aptly stated in Alvizo, the petitioner therein was "insensitive to the
 implications and contingencies" of the projected criminal prosecution posed
against him "by not taking any step whatsoever to accelerate the disposition of
the matter, which inaction conduces to the perception that the supervening
delay seems to have been without his objection, [and] hence impliedly with
his acquiescence." 143
This concept of acquiescence, however, is premised on the presumption that
the accused was fully aware that the preliminary investigation has not yet been
terminated despite a considerable length of time. Thus, in Duterte v. Sandiganbayan,
144 this Court stated that Alvizo would not apply if the accused were unaware that the
investigation was still ongoing:
Petitioners in this case, however, could not have urged the speedy
resolution of their case because they were completely unaware that the
investigation against them was still on-going. Peculiar to this case, we
reiterate, is the fact that petitioners were merely asked to comment, and not
file counter-affidavits which is the proper procedure to follow in a preliminary
investigation. After giving their explanation and after four long years of being
in the dark, petitioners, naturally, had reason to assume that the charges
against them had already been dismissed. 145 cHDAIS

Similarly, in Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan: 146

Records show that they could not have urged the speedy resolution of
their case because they were unaware that the investigation against them was
still on-going. They were only informed of the March 27, 2003 Resolution and
Information against them only after the lapse of six (6) long years, or when
they received a copy of the latter after its filing with the SB on June 19, 2009.
In this regard, they could have reasonably assumed that the proceedings
against them have already been terminated. This serves as a plausible reason
as to why petitioners never followed-up on the case altogether . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Being the respondents in the preliminary investigation proceedings, it
was not the petitioners' duty to follow up on the prosecution of their case.
Conversely, it was the Office of the Ombudsman's responsibility to expedite
the same within the bounds of reasonable timeliness in view of its mandate to
promptly act on all complaints lodged before it. As pronounced in the case of
Barker v. Wingo:
A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has
that duty as well as the duty of insuring that the trial is
consistent with due process. 147
Justice Caguioa submits that this Court should depart from Dela Peña. He
explains that the third factor of the Barker balancing test, i.e., waiver by the accused,
was applied within the context of the Sixth Amendment 148 of the American
Constitution in that it presupposes that the accused has already been subjected to
criminal prosecution. He submits that as the right to speedy disposition of cases may
be invoked even before criminal prosecution has commenced, waiver by the accused
should be inapplicable.
The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, is invoked by a respondent
to any type of proceeding once delay has already become prejudicial to the
respondent. The invocation of the constitutional right does not require a threat to the
right to liberty. Loss of employment or compensation may already be considered as
sufficient to invoke the right. Thus, waiver of the right does not necessarily require
that the respondent has already been subjected to the rigors of criminal prosecution.
The failure of the respondent to invoke the right even when or she has already
suffered or will suffer the consequences of delay constitutes a valid waiver of that
right.
While the Barker balancing test has American roots, a catena of cases has
already been decided by this Court, starting from Tatad, which have taken into
account the Philippine experience.
The reality is that institutional delay 149 a reality that the court must address.
The prosecution is staffed by overworked and underpaid government lawyers with
mounting caseloads. The courts' dockets are congested. This Court has already
launched programs to remedy this situation, such as the Judicial Affidavit Rule, 150
Guidelines for Decongesting Holding Jails by Enforcing the Right of the Accused to
Bail and to Speedy Trial, 151 and the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial. 152
These programs, however, are mere stepping stones. The complete eradication of
institutional delay requires these sustained actions.
Institutional delay, in the proper context, should not be taken against the State.
Most cases handled by the Office of the Ombudsman involve individuals who have
the resources and who engage private counsel with the means and resources to fully
dedicate themselves to their client's case. More often than not, the accused only
invoke the right to speedy disposition of cases when the Ombudsman has already
rendered an unfavorable decision. The prosecution should not be prejudiced by
private counsels' failure to protect the interests of their clients or the accused's lack of
interest in the prosecution of their case.
For the court to appreciate a violation of the right to speedy disposition of
cases, delay must not be attributable to the defense. 153 Certain unreasonable actions
by the accused will be taken against them. This includes delaying tactics like failing
to appear despite summons, filing needless motions against interlocutory actions, or
requesting unnecessary postponements that will prevent courts or tribunals to properly
adjudicate the case. When proven, this may constitute a waiver of the right to speedy
trial or the right to speedy disposition of cases.
If it has been alleged that there was delay beyond the given time periods, the
burden of proof shifts. The prosecution will now have the burden to prove that there
was no violation of the right to speedy trial or the right to speedy disposition of cases.
Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan 154 states that "vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays," "unjustified postponements of the trial," or "when without cause or justifiable
motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his [or her]
case tried" 155 are instances that may be considered as violations of the right to
speedy disposition of cases. The prosecution must be able to prove that it followed
established procedure in prosecuting the case. 156 It must also prove that any delay
incurred was justified, such as the complexity of the cases involved or the vast
amount of evidence that must be presented. ISHCcT

The prosecution must likewise prove that no prejudice was suffered by the
accused as a result of the delay. Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan 157 defined prejudice to the
accused as:
Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that
the speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-
trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial;
and to limit the possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the
most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to
prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. There is also
prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of
the distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still
disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of
anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources may be drained,
his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy. 158
In Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan: 159
Lest it be misunderstood, the right to speedy disposition of cases is not
merely hinged towards the objective of spurring dispatch in the administration
of justice but also to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding a
criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time. Akin to the
right to speedy trial, its "salutary objective" is to assure that an innocent
person may be free from the anxiety and expense of litigation or, if otherwise,
of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible
with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he
may interpose. This looming unrest as well as the tactical disadvantages
carried by the passage of time should be weighed against the State and in
favor of the individual. 160
The consequences of delay, however, do not only affect the accused. The
prosecution of the case will also be made difficult the longer the period of time
passes. In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan: 161
Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the government that bears the burden
of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it
difficult or impossible for the government to carry its burden. The
Constitution and the Rules do not require impossibilities or extraordinary
efforts, diligence or exertion from courts or the prosecutor, nor contemplate
that such right shall deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly
 prosecuting criminals. As held in Williams v. United States, for the
government to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must show
two things: (a) that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that
which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay; and (b) that there was
no more delay than is reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of
justice. 162
The consequences of the prosecution's failure to discharge this burden are
severe. Rule 119, Section 9 of the Rules of Court requires that the case against the
accused be dismissed if there has been a violation of the right to speedy trial:
Section 9. Remedy where accused is not brought to trial within the time limit.
— If the accused is not brought to trial within the time limit required by
Section 1(g), Rule 116 and Section 1, as extended by Section 6 of this rule, the
information may be dismissed on motion of the accused on the ground of
denial of his right to speedy trial. The accused shall have the burden of
proving the motion but the prosecution shall have the burden of going forward
with the evidence to establish the exclusion of time under section 3 of this
Rule. The dismissal shall be subject to the rules on double jeopardy.
Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial shall constitute a
waiver of the right to dismiss under this section.
Tatad, as qualified by Angchangco, likewise mandates the dismissal of the case
if there is a violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases. The immediate
dismissal of cases is also warranted if it is proven that there was malicious
prosecution, if the cases were politically motivated, or other similar instances. Once
these circumstances have been proven, there is no need for the defense to discharge its
burden to prove that the delay was inordinate. CAacTH

To summarize, inordinate delay in the resolution and termination of a

preliminary investigation violates the accused's right to due process and the speedy
disposition of cases, and may result in the dismissal of the case against the accused.
The burden of proving delay depends on whether delay is alleged within the periods
provided by law or procedural rules. If the delay is alleged to have occurred during
the given periods, the burden is on the respondent or the accused to prove that the
delay was inordinate. If the delay is alleged to have occurred beyond the given
periods, the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove that the delay was reasonable
under the circumstances and that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result
of the delay.
The determination of whether the delay was inordinate is not through mere
mathematical reckoning but through the examination of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the case. Courts should appraise a reasonable period from the point of
view of how much time a competent and independent public officer would need in
relation to the complexity of a given case. If there has been delay, the prosecution
must be able to satisfactorily explain the reasons for such delay and that no prejudice
was suffered by the accused as a result. The timely invocation of the accused's
constitutional rights must also be examined on a case-to-case basis.

III

This Court proceeds to determine whether respondent committed inordinate

delay in the resolution and termination of the preliminary investigation against
petitioner.
There is no showing that this case was attended by malice. There is no
evidence that it was politically motivated. Neither party alleges this fact. Thus, this
Court must analyze the existence and cause of delay.
The criminal complaint against petitioner was filed on February 10, 2003. On
August 11, 2004, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding probable
cause against petitioner. This Resolution, however, was modified by the Resolution
dated October 18, 2004, which ordered the conduct of further fact-finding
investigation against some of the other respondents in the case. This further fact-
finding was resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman on April 12, 2005. On August
8, 2011, or six (6) years after the recommendation to file informations against
petitioner was approved by Tanodbayan Marcelo, Assistant Special Prosecutor II
Pilarita T. Lapitan submitted the informations for Ombudsman Carpio Morales'
review. Informations against petitioner were filed on November 17, 2011.
Six (6) years is beyond the reasonable period of fact-finding of ninety (90)
days. The burden of proving the justification of the delay, therefore, is on the
prosecution, or in this case, respondent.
Respondent alleged that the delay in the filing of the informations was justified
since it was still determining whether accused Mary Ann Gadian (Gadian) could be
utilized as a state witness and it still had to verify accused Felipe Constantino's death.
The recommendation, however, to utilize Gadian as a state witness was approved by
Tanodbayan Marcelo on December 20, 2004. 163 Felipe Constantino's death was
verified by the Sandiganbayan in its November 14, 2006 Order. 164 There is, thus,
delay from November 14, 2006 to August 8, 2011.
This Court finds, however, that despite the pendency of the case since 2003,
petitioner only invoked his right to speedy disposition of cases when the informations
were filed on November 17, 2011. Unlike in Duterte and Coscolluela, petitioner was
aware that the preliminary investigation was not yet terminated.
Admittedly, while there was delay, petitioner has not shown that he asserted
his rights during this period, choosing instead to wait until the information was filed
against him with the Sandiganbayan.
 Furthermore, the case before the Sandiganbayan involves the alleged
malversation of millions in public money. The Sandiganbayan has yet to determine
the guilt or innocence of petitioner. In the Decision dated June 17, 2010 of the
Sandiganbayan acquitting petitioner in Crim. Case No. 28331:
We wish to iterate our observation gathered from the evidence on record that
the subject transaction is highly suspect. There is a seeming acceptance of the
use of questionable supporting documents to secure the release of public funds
in the province, and the apparent undue haste in the processing and eventual
withdrawal of such funds. However, obvious as the irregularities may be,
which can only lead to distrust in the ability of public officials to safeguard
public funds, we are limited to a review only of the evidence presented vis-à-
vis the charges brought forth before this Court. Thus, We cannot make any
pronouncement in regard to such seeming irregularities. 165 IAETDc

The records of the case show that the transactions investigated are complex and
numerous. As respondent points out, there were over a hundred individuals
investigated, and eventually, 40 of them were determined to have been involved in 81
different anomalous transactions. 166 Even granting that the Commission on Audit's
Audit Report exhaustively investigated each transaction, "the prosecution is not bound
by the findings of the Commission on Audit; it must rely on its own independent
judgment in the determination of probable cause." 167 Delays in the investigation and
review would have been inevitable in the hands of a competent and independent
Ombudsman.
The dismissal of the complaints, while favorable to petitioner, would
undoubtedly be prejudicial to the State. "[T]he State should not be prejudiced and
deprived of its right to prosecute the criminal cases simply because of the ineptitude
or nonchalance of the Office of the Ombudsman." 168 The State is as much entitled to
due process as the accused. In People v. Leviste: 169
[I]t must be emphasized that the state, like any other litigant, is entitled to its
day in court, and to a reasonable opportunity to present its case. A hasty
dismissal such as the one in question, instead of unclogging dockets, has
actually increased the workload of the justice system as a whole and caused
uncalled-for delays in the final resolution of this and other cases. Unwittingly,
the precipitate action of the respondent court, instead of easing the burden of
the accused, merely prolonged the litigation and ironically enough,
unnecessarily delayed the case — in the process, causing the very evil it
apparently sought to avoid. Such action does not inspire public confidence in
the administration of justice. 170
This Court finds that there is no violation of the accused's right to speedy
disposition of cases considering that there was a waiver of the delay of a complex
case. Definitely, granting the present Petitions and finding grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Sandiganbayan will only prejudice the due process rights of the
State.
 IV

This Court now clarifies the mode of analysis in situations where the right to
speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial is invoked.
First, the right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to
speedy trial. While the rationale for both rights is the same, the right to speedy trial
may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions against courts of law. The right to
speedy disposition of cases, however, may be invoked before any tribunal, whether
judicial or quasi-judicial. What is important is that the accused may already be
prejudiced by the proceeding for the right to speedy disposition of cases to be
invoked.
Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior
to a conduct of a preliminary investigation. This Court acknowledges, however, that
the Ombudsman should set reasonable periods for preliminary investigation, with due
regard to the complexities and nuances of each case. Delays beyond this period will
be taken against the prosecution. The period taken for fact-finding investigations prior
to the filing of the formal complaint shall not be included in the determination of
whether there has been inordinate delay.
Third, courts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof. If
the right is invoked within the given time periods contained in current Supreme Court
resolutions and circulars, 171 and the time periods that will be promulgated by the
Office of the Ombudsman, the defense has the burden of proving that the right was
justifiably invoked. If the delay occurs beyond the given time period and the right is
invoked, the prosecution has the burden of justifying the delay.
If the defense has the burden of proof, it must prove first, whether the case is
motivated by malice or clearly only politically motivated and is attended by utter lack
of evidence, and second, that the defense did not contribute to the delay.
Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution must prove
first, that it followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary
investigation and in the prosecution of the case; second, that the complexity of the
issues and the volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; and third, that no
prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.
Fourth, determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts must
consider the entire context of the case, from the amount of evidence to be weighed to
the simplicity or complexity of the issues raised.
DcHSEa

An exception to this rule is if there is an allegation that the prosecution of the

case was solely motivated by malice, such as when the case is politically motivated or
when there is continued prosecution despite utter lack of evidence. Malicious intent
may be gauged from the behavior of the prosecution throughout the proceedings. If
 malicious prosecution is properly alleged and substantially proven, the case would
automatically be dismissed without need of further analysis of the delay.
Another exception would be the waiver of the accused to the right to speedy
disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial. If it can be proven that the accused
acquiesced to the delay, the constitutional right can no longer be invoked.
In all cases of dismissals due to inordinate delay, the causes of the delays must
be properly laid out and discussed by the relevant court.
Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial must
be timely raised. The respondent or the accused must file the appropriate motion upon
the lapse of the statutory or procedural periods. Otherwise, they are deemed to have
waived their right to speedy disposition of cases.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Temporary Restraining
Order dated February 5, 2014 is LIFTED. The Sandiganbayan is DIRECTED to
resolve Case No. SB-11-CRM-0456 and Case No. SB-11-CRM-0457 with due and
deliberate dispatch.
The period for the determination of whether inordinate delay was committed
shall commence from the filing of a formal complaint and the conduct of the
preliminary investigation. The periods for the resolution of the preliminary
investigation shall be that provided in the Rules of Court, Supreme Court Circulars,
and the periods to be established by the Office of the Ombudsman. Failure of the
defendant to file the appropriate motion after the lapse of the statutory or procedural
periods shall be considered a waiver of his or her right to speedy disposition of cases.
The ruling in People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division 172 that fact-finding
investigations are included in the period for determination of inordinate delay is
ABANDONED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Acting C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Del Castillo, Tijam and Reyes, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., please see concurring opinion.
Peralta, * Jardeleza, * Martires * and Gesmundo, * JJ., took no part.
Bersamin, J., I join the dissent of J. Caguioa.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., I join the concurring opinion of J. Velasco.
Caguioa, J., I dissent. See separate dissenting opinion.
(Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, G.R. Nos. 206438, 206458 & 210141-42,
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[July 31, 2018])