Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Second Division: PHILIPPINES, Respondent
Second Division: PHILIPPINES, Respondent
DECISION
BRION, J : p
We decide the appeal filed by petitioner Leticia I. Kummer assailing the April 28,
2006 decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA — G.R. CR No. 27609. The CA
decision affirmed the July 27, 2000 judgment 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 4, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, finding the petitioner and her co-accused
Freiderich Johan I. Kummer guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide in
Criminal Case No. 1130.
The Facts
The prosecution's evidence revealed that on June 19, 1988, between 9:00 and
10:00 p.m., Jesus Mallo, Jr., accompanied by Amiel Malana, went to the house of the
petitioner. Mallo knocked at the front door with a stone and identified himself by saying,
"Auntie, ako si Boy Mallo."
The petitioner opened the door and at this point, her son and co-accused, Johan,
using his left hand, shot Mallo twice using a gun about six (6) inches long. 3 Malana,
who was with Mallo and who witnessed the shooting, immediately ran towards the west,
followed by Mallo. When Malana turned his back, he saw the petitioner leveling and
firing her long gun at Mallo, hitting the latter's back and causing him to fall flat on the
ground. 4 DIETcH
Thereafter, the petitioner went inside the house and came out with a flashlight.
Together with her co-accused, she scoured the pathway up to the place where Mallo was
lying flat. 5 At that point, the petitioner uttered, "Johan, patay na," in a loud voice. 6 The
petitioner and her co-accused put down the guns and the flashlight they were holding,
held Mallo's feet and pulled him to about three (3) to four (4) meters away from the
house. gat, they returned to the house and turned off all the lights. 7
The following morning, policeman Danilo Pelovello went to the petitioner's house
and informed her that Mallo had been found dead in front of her house. Pelovello
conducted an investigation through inquiries among the neighbors, including the
petitioner, who all denied having any knowledge of the incident.
The prosecution filed an information 8 for homicide on January 12, 1989 against
the petitioner and Johan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1130. Both accused were
arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. They waived the pre-trial, and the
trial on the merits accordingly followed.
The petitioner denied the charge and claimed in her defense that she and her
children, Johan, Melanie and Erika, were already asleep in the evening of June 19, 1988.
She claimed that they were awakened by the sound of stones being thrown at their house,
a gun report, and the banging at their door.
Believing that the noise was caused by the members of the New People's Army
prevalent in their area, and sensing the possible harm that might be inflicted on them,
Johan got a .38 cal. gun from the drawer and fired it twice outside to scare the people
causing the disturbance. The noise continued, however, with a stone hitting the window
and breaking the glass; another stone hit Melanie who was then sick. This prompted
Johan to get the shotgun placed beside the door and to fire it. The noise thereafter stopped
and they all went back to sleep.AcSIDE
In its judgment dated July 27, 2000, the RTC found the prosecution's evidence
persuasive based on the testimonies of prosecution eyewitnesses Ramon Cuntapay and
Malana who both testified that the petitioner shot Mallo. The testimonial evidence,
coupled by the positive findings of gunpowder nitrates on the left hand of Johan and on
the petitioner's right hand, as well as the corroborative testimony of the other prosecution
witnesses, led the RTC to find both the petitioner and Johan guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged.
Johan, still a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, was released on the
recognizance of his father, Moises Kummer. Johan subsequently left the country without
notifying the court; hence, only the petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction with
the CA.
She contended before the CA that the RTC committed reversible errors in its
appreciation of the evidence, namely: (1) in giving credence to the testimonial evidence
of Cuntapay and of Malana despite the discrepancies between their sworn statements and
direct testimonies; (2) in not considering the failure of the prosecution to cite the
petitioner's motive in killing the victim; (3) in failing to consider that the writer of the
decision, Judge Lyliha L. Abella-Aquino, was not the judge who heard the testimonies;
and (4) in considering the paraffin test results finding the petitioner positive for
gunpowder residue.
The CA rejected the petitioner's arguments and affirmed the RTC judgment,
holding that the discrepancies between the sworn statement and the direct testimony of
the witnesses do not necessarily discredit them because the contradictions are minimal
and reconcilable. The CA also ruled that the inconsistencies are minor lapses and are
therefore not substantial. The petitioner's positive identification by the eyewitnesses as
one of the assailants remained unrefuted. The CA, moreover, held that proof of motive is
only necessary when a serious doubt arises on the identity of the accused. That the writer
of the decision was not the judge who heard the testimonies of the witnesses does not
necessarily make the decision erroneous. aHICDc
In sum, the CA found Malana and Cuntapay's positive identification and the
corroborative evidence presented by the prosecution more than sufficient to convict the
petitioner of the crime charged.
On further appeal to this Court, the petitioner submits the issue of whether the CA
committed a reversible error in affirming the RTC's decision convicting her of the crime
of homicide.
In essence, the case involves the credibility of the prosecution eyewitnesses and
the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence.
Our Ruling
The petitioner's conviction is anchored on the positive and direct testimonies of the
prosecution eyewitnesses, which testimonies the petitioner submits to be both
inconsistent and illogical. The petitioner essentially impugns the credibility of the
witnesses on these grounds. The petitioner moreover claims that her conviction was
based on doctrinal precepts that should not apply to her case.
We find these claims far from convincing. The Court has consistently held that
inconsistencies between the testimony of a witness in open court, on one hand, and the
statements in his sworn affidavit, on the other hand, referring only to minor and collateral
matters, do not affect his credibility and the veracity and weight of his testimony as they
do not touch upon the commission of the crime itself. Slight contradictions, in fact, even
serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as these may be considered as badges
of truth rather than indicia of bad faith; they tend to prove that their testimonies have not
been rehearsed. Nor are such inconsistencies, and even improbabilities, unusual, for no
person has perfect faculties of senses or recall. 9
A close scrutiny of the records reveals that Malana and Cuntapay positively and
firmly declared in open court that they saw the petitioner and Johan shoot Mallo. The
inconsistencies in their affidavit, they reasoned, were due to the oversight of the
administering official in typing the exact details of their narration.
It is oft repeated that affidavits are usually abbreviated and inaccurate. Oftentimes,
an affidavit is incomplete, resulting in its seeming contradiction with the declarant's
testimony in court. Generally, the affiant is asked standard questions, coupled with ready
suggestions intended to elicit answers, that later turn out not to be wholly descriptive of
the series of events as the affiant knows them. 10 Worse, the process of affidavit-taking
may sometimes amount to putting words into the affiant's mouth, thus allowing the whole
statement to be taken out of context.
The court is not unmindful of these on-the-ground realities. In fact, we have ruled
that the discrepancies between the statements of the affiant in his affidavit and those
made by him on the witness stand do not necessarily discredit him since ex parte
affidavits are generally incomplete. 11 As between the joint affidavit and the testimony
given in open court, the latter prevails because affidavits taken ex parte are generally
considered to be inferior to the testimony given in court. 12 DTcASE
In the present case, we find it undeniable that Malana and Cuntapay positively
identified the petitioner as one of the assailants. This is the critical point, not the
inconsistencies that the petitioner repeatedly refers to, which carry no direct bearing on
the crucial issue of the identity of the perpetrator of the crime. Indeed, the inconsistencies
refer only to minor details that are not critical to the main outcome of the case. Moreover,
the basic rule is that the Supreme Court accords great respect and even finality to the
findings of credibility of the trial court, more so if the same were affirmed by the CA, as
in this case. 13 We find no reason to break this rule and thus find that both the RTC and
the CA were correct in giving credence to the testimonies of Malana and Cuntapay.
The petitioner contends that the CA, in affirming the judgment of the RTC, failed
to recognize that the trial court that heard the testimonies of Malana and Cuntapay was
not the same court that rendered the decision. 14
The rule is settled that the validity of a judgment is not rendered erroneous solely
because the judge who heard the case was not the same judge who rendered the decision.
In fact, it is not necessary for the validity of a judgment that the judge who penned the
decision should actually hear the case in its entirety, for he can merely rely on the
transcribed stenographic notes taken during the trial as the basis for his decision. 15 aITDAE
Thus, the contention — that since Judge Lyliha L. Abella-Aquino was not the one
who heard the evidence and thereby did not have the opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses — must fail. It is sufficient that the judge, in deciding the
case, must base her ruling completely on the records before her, in the way that appellate
courts do when they review the evidence of the case raised on appeal. 16 Thus, a
judgment of conviction penned by a different trial judge is not erroneous if she relied on
the records available to her.
We agree with the CA's ruling that motive gains importance only when the
identity of the assailant is in doubt. As held in a long line of cases, the prosecution does
not need to prove the motive of the accused when the latter has been identified as the
author of the crime. 17
Once again, we point out that the petitioner was positively identified by Malana
and Cuntapay. Thus, the prosecution did not have to identify and prove the motive for the
killing. It is a matter of judicial knowledge that persons have been killed for no apparent
reason at all, and that friendship or even relationship is no deterrent to the commission of
a crime. 18
The petitioner attempts to offer the justification that the witnesses did not really
witness the shooting as their affidavits merely attested that they heard the shooting of
Mallo (and did not state that they actually witnessed it). We find this to be a lame
argument whose merit we cannot recognize.
That Malana and Cuntapay have been eyewitnesses to the crime remains
unrefuted. They both confirmed in their direct testimony before the RTC that they saw
the petitioner fire a gun at Mallo. This was again re-affirmed by the witnesses during
their cross examination. The fact that their respective affidavits merely stated that they
heard the gunshots does not automatically foreclose the possibility that they also saw the
actual shooting as this was in fact what the witnesses claimed truly happened. Besides, it
has been held that the claim that "whenever a witness discloses in his testimony in court
facts which he failed to state in his affidavit taken ante litem motam, then an
inconsistency exists between the testimony and the affidavit" is erroneous. If what were
stated in open court are but details or additional facts that serve to supplement the
declarations made in the affidavit, these statements cannot be ruled out as inconsistent
and may be considered by the court. TSacID
Thus, in light of the direct and positive identification of the petitioner as one of the
perpetrators of the crime by not one but two prosecution eyewitnesses, the failure to cite
the motive of the petitioner is of no moment.
At any rate, we find it noteworthy that the lack or absence of motive for
committing the crime does not preclude conviction where there are reliable witnesses
who fully and satisfactorily identified the petitioner as the perpetrator of the felony, such
as in this case.
She alleged, among others: (1) that it was abnormal and contrary to the ways of
the farmers in the rural areas for Cuntapay to go home from his corral at about 9:00 p.m.,
while everybody else goes home from his farm much earlier, as working late in the farm
(that is, before and after sunset) is taboo to farming; (2) that the act of the petitioner of
putting down her gun in order to pull the victim away does not make any sense because a
criminal would not simply part with his weapon in this manner; (3) that it is highly
incredible that Malana, who accompanied Mallo, was left unharmed and was allowed to
escape if indeed he was just beside the victim; (4) that it is unbelievable that when
Malana heard the cocking of guns and the opening of the door, he did not become scared
at all; (5) that Malana and Cuntapay did not immediately report the incident to the
authorities; (6) that it was highly improbable for Malana to turn his head while running;
and (7) that it was unusual that Cuntapay did not run away when he saw the shooting. SDEITC
We rule, without descending to particulars and going over each and every one of
these claims, that without more and stronger indicators, we cannot accord them credit.
Human nature suggests that people may react differently when confronted with a given
situation. Witnesses to a crime cannot be expected to demonstrate an absolute uniformity
and conformity in action and reaction. People may act contrary to the accepted norm,
react differently and act contrary to the expectation of mankind. There is no standard
human behavioral response when one is confronted with an unusual, strange, startling or
frightful experience. 19
We thus hold that the CA was correct in brushing aside the improbabilities alleged
by the petitioner who, in her present plight, can be overcritical in her attempt to seize
every detail that can favor her case. Unfortunately, if at all, her claims refer only to minor
and even inconsequential details that do not touch on the core of the crime itself.
A public document is defined in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court as
follows:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether
of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
The chemistry report showing a positive result of the paraffin test is a public
document. As a public document, the rule on authentication does not apply. It is
admissible in evidence without further proof of its due execution and genuineness; the
person who made the report need not be presented in court to identify, describe and
testify how the report was conducted. Moreover, documents consisting of entries in
public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. 20
In the present case, notwithstanding the fact that it was Captain Benjamin Rubio
who was presented in court to identify the chemistry report and not the forensic chemist
who actually conducted the paraffin test on the petitioner, the report may still be admitted
because the requirement for authentication does not apply to public documents. In other
words, the forensic chemist does not need to be presented as witness to identify and
authenticate the chemistry report. Furthermore, the entries in the chemistry report are
prima facie evidence of the facts they state, that is, of the presence of gunpowder residue
on the left hand of Johan and on the right hand of the petitioner. As a matter of fact, the
petitioner herself admitted the presence of gunpowder nitrates on her fingers, albeit
ascribing their presence from a match she allegedly lighted. 21 Accordingly, we hold that
the chemistry report is admissible as evidence.
On the issue of the normal process versus the actual process conducted during the
test raised by the petitioner, suffice it to say that in the absence of proof to the contrary, it
is presumed that the forensic chemist who conducted the report observed the regular
procedure. Stated otherwise, the courts will not presume irregularity or negligence in the
performance of one's duties unless facts are shown dictating a contrary conclusion. The
presumption of regularity in favor of the forensic chemist compels us to reject the
petitioner's contention that an explanation has to be given on how the actual process was
conducted. Since the petitioner presented no evidence of fabrication or irregularity, we
presume that the standard operating procedure has been observed.
We note at this point that while the positive finding of gunpowder residue does not
conclusively show that the petitioner indeed fired a gun, the finding nevertheless serves
to corroborate the prosecution eyewitnesses' testimony that the petitioner shot the victim.
Furthermore, while it is true that cigarettes, fertilizers, urine or even a match may leave
traces of nitrates, experts confirm that these traces are minimal and may be washed off
with tap water, unlike the evidence nitrates left behind by gunpowder. ASHaDT
Change in the date of the
commission of the crime, where the
disparity is not great, is merely a
formal amendment, thus, no
arraignment is required
The petitioner claims that she was not arraigned on the amended information for
which she was convicted. The petitioner's argument is founded on the flawed
understanding of the rules on amendment and misconception on the necessity of
arraignment in every case. Thus, we do not see any merit in this claim.
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits a formal amendment of a
complaint even after the plea but only if it is made with leave of court and provided that it
can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. Section 14 provides:
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made
in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or
information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused [would] not be
placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for
their appearance at the trial. [emphasis and underscore ours]HSDCTA
A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the disparity of time
is not great, is more formal than substantial. Such an amendment would not prejudice the
rights of the accused since the proposed amendment would not alter the nature of the
offense.
The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a
complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it
originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made, when any
evidence the accused might have would no longer be available after the amendment is
made, and when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the
complaint or information, as amended. 22
In People, et al. v. Borromeo, et al., 23 we ruled that the change of the date of the
commission of the crime from June 24, 1981 to August 28, 1981 is a formal amendment
and would not prejudice the rights of the accused because the nature of the offense of
grave coercion would not be altered. In that case, the difference in the date was only
about two months and five days, which difference, we ruled, would neither cause
substantial prejudice nor cause surprise on the part of the accused.
It is not even necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at
which the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the
offense. 24 The act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near as to the
actual date at which date the offense was committed, as the information will permit.
Under the circumstances, the precise time is not an essential ingredient of the crime of
homicide.
We further stress that an amendment done after the plea and during trial, in
accordance with the rules, does not call for a second plea since the amendment is only as
to form. The purpose of an arraignment, that is, to inform the accused of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, has already been attained when the accused was
arraigned the first time. The subsequent amendment could not have conceivably come as
a surprise to the accused simply because the amendment did not charge a new offense nor
alter the theory of the prosecution.
Applying these rules and principles to the prevailing case, the records of the case
evidently show that the amendment in the complaint was from July 19, 1988 to June 19,
1988, or a difference of only one month. It is clear that consistent with the rule on
amendments and the jurisprudence cited above, the change in the date of the commission
of the crime of homicide is a formal amendment — it does not change the nature of the
crime, does not affect the essence of the offense nor deprive the accused of an
opportunity to meet the new averment, and is not prejudicial to the accused. Further, the
defense under the complaint is still available after the amendment, as this was, in fact, the
same line of defenses used by the petitioner. This is also true with respect to the pieces of
evidence presented by the petitioner. The effected amendment was of this nature and did
not need a second plea.
To sum up, we are satisfied after a review of the records of the case that the
prosecution has proven the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The
constitutional presumption of innocence has been successfully overcome. IECAaD
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated April 28, 2006,
convicting the petitioner of the crime of homicide, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner Leticia I. Kummer.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Kummer v. People, G.R. No. 174461, [September 11, 2013], 717 PHIL 670-688)
SECOND DIVISION
MENDOZA, J : p
For review before the Court is this administrative case against respondent Judge
Jose S. Jacinto, Jr. (Judge Jacinto, Jr.) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branches 45 1
and 46, 2 San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, filed by Gaspar Bandoy (Bandoy) for Grave
Abuse of Authority in relation to Criminal Case No. 2-1928, 3 entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Gaspar Bandoy, Peter Alfaro and Randolph Ignacio" and Criminal Case
No. Z-1910, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Romulo De Jesus, Jr."
Complainant Bandoy alleged, in his verified complaint, 4 that he was one of the
accused in Criminal Case No. 2-1928, for Serious Illegal Detention filed by Romulo De
Jesus, Jr. (De Jesus, Jr.), which was raffled to Branch 44 of the RTC, Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro (RTC-Br. 44), with Judge Jacinto, Jr. as the Assisting Presiding
Judge. Bandoy claimed that the case was initiated by De Jesus, Jr. to get back at him for
being instrumental in the filing of an earlier criminal complaint against him for Violation
of Article XXII, Section 261, paragraph 7, number 14 of the Omnibus Election Code
(Ballot Switching). The said case was likewise raffled to RTC-Br. 44.
Bandoy also averred that he was an election watcher of former Mayor Joel
Panaligan during the 2007 local elections, while De Jesus, Jr., a teacher of their
municipality's public elementary school, was one of the chairpersons of the Board of
Election Inspectors; that they were both assigned in Precinct 3-A of Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro; that De Jesus, Jr. was rumored to be closely associated with the
rival mayoralty candidate, Voltaire Anthony C. Villarosa (Voltaire), son of House
representative Amelita C. Villarosa (Cong. Villarosa) and Mayor Jose Tapales Villarosa
(Mayor Villarosa) of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; that in the said local elections, De
Jesus, Jr. was caught in the act of ballot switching, which was captured on video by a
member of the media, a certain Randy Bool; that by virtue of a search warrant from the
Commission of Elections (COMELEC), De Jesus, Jr. was caught in possession of some
ballots inside his backpack; and that as a result of this incident, De Jesus, Jr. was
criminally charged with the offense of ballot switching. Accordingly, on August 17,
2007, a warrant of arrest was issued against De Jesus, Jr. 5
Bandoy further claims that Judge Jacinto, Jr. committed grave abuse of his
authority by displaying manifest bias and partiality in favor of De Jesus, Jr. when he
granted several postponements of De Jesus, Jr.'s arraignment, originally scheduled on
April 23, 2008, 8 but was reset for seven times until De Jesus, Jr. entered a plea of not
guilty supposedly inside Judge Jacinto, Jr.'s chambers on July 6, 2011. 9
Bandoy emphasized that many of the said resettings were mostly due to De Jesus,
Jr.'s non-appearance for failure to locate him at his given address. Despite these supposed
obvious court defiance, Judge Jacinto, Jr. remained lenient and seemingly tolerated his
continuous non-appearance in the court's subsequent scheduled hearings. Another
example of Judge Jacinto, Jr.'s supposed unreasonable bias towards Bandoy was his lack
of interest to dispose of the case of serious illegal detention despite De Jesus, Jr.'s
obvious dilatory tactics and unjustified absences when his appearance was necessary. EScIAa
Bandoy, along with his co-accused, moved for reconsideration and filed a petition
for review before the Department of Justice (DOJ) to have the serious illegal detention
case against them dismissed. Meanwhile, co-accused Atty. Lorenzo filed a separate
petition with the Court of Appeals (CA) and won the case. The Court later affirmed the
dismissal of the case against her. At first, the DOJ denied their petition. Upon
reconsideration, however, the DOJ, under the helm of Justice Secretary Leila De Lima,
directed the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Occidental Mindoro, to cause the
withdrawal of the case against Bandoy and his co-accused. 10 Accordingly, the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor filed its Motion to Withdraw Information.
Judge Jacinto, Jr., in an order, 11 dated July 5, 2011, denied the motion to
withdraw information. In the end, Bandoy was only able to regain temporary freedom
when Judge Jacinto, Jr. finally resolved 12 to allow him to post a bail bond of
P100,000.00 each or a total of P300,000.00. 13 Bandoy added that Voltaire was a
principal sponsor in the wedding of Judge Jacinto, Jr.'s child.
Thereafter, Judge Jacinto, Jr. was assigned to another sala, while Judge Wilfredo
De Joya Mayor (Judge Mayor) became the assisting presiding judge of Branch 44. It was
during this time that the case for serious illegal detention was temporarily dismissed, but
upon reconsideration, Judge Mayor decided to reinstate and continue the case against
Bandoy. Meanwhile, the case of ballot switching against De Jesus, Jr. was dismissed on
October 25, 2012, 14 while their bail for the serious illegal detention case was cancelled.
15
According to complainant Bandoy, the compelling force that made him initiate
this present administrative case was because Judge Jacinto, Jr. would take over Judge
Mayor's assignments on account of the latter's compulsory retirement from service on
December 1, 2012, which would include their pending serious illegal detention case. He
claimed that Judge Jacinto, Jr. ordered the police and the CIDG to re-arrest him and his
co-accused even though there was no warrant of arrest against them. 16 He begged the
Court not to let Judge Jacinto, Jr. handle their case of serious illegal detention for fear
that they would have to endure another bout of extreme bias and partiality from him.
In his Comment, 17 Judge Jacinto, Jr. denied being an ally of the Villarosa clan.
18 He also denied having a hand in the order to arrest Bandoy and his co-accused as the
Chief of PNP and the CIDG Chief, both of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, merely
consulted him on how to go about the order of cancellation of bail that Judge Mayor
issued. He explained "wala po akong alam sa Kautusan kaya binasa po sa akin ang
nilalaman nito sa cellphone at pagkatapos ay nagwika po akong parang may kulang sa
Kautusan at kapag nakansela ang piyansa ay babalik sila sa selda dahil wala na po
silang piyansa (as a consequence thereof)." 19 Judge Jacinto, Jr. even refused to issue a
warrant of arrest when he was asked because he was not handling the case anymore. 20
Bandoy, in his Reply, 21 brought to the attention of the Court that Judge Jacinto,
Jr., in order to thwart the enemies of his supposed master, Mayor Villarosa, issued
warrants of arrest against ten individuals. 22 He also divulged that the audit team from
the Court was personally assisted by Judge Jacinto, Jr. and given accommodations in
"Aroma Center," one of the properties of Mayor Villarosa. 23 Bandoy was thankful that
Judge Jacinto, Jr. did not deny the fact that the police officials wanted to arrest them even
without a warrant of arrest. 24 Bandoy showed a timeline of events supposedly depicting
how De Jesus, Jr., through the tolerance and partiality of Judge Jacinto, Jr., evaded
arraignment on numerous occasions effectively delaying the progress of the case for
ballot switching and even actually conducting the arraignment in his chambers. 25 He
further reiterated his plea not to let Judge Jacinto, Jr. preside over the affairs of Branch
44.
In his Rejoinder, 26 Judge Jacinto, Jr. stated that he was again assigned as
Assisting Presiding Judge of Branch 44. 27 He clarified that he indeed issued warrants of
arrest against ten individuals in connection with a serious illegal detention case against
them, but only after a finding of probable cause by the public prosecutor handling it.
Judge Jacinto, Jr. reiterated that he merely affirmed the finding of probable cause, which
justified the issuance of the warrants of arrest as the charge was a non-bailable offense.
28 He likewise denied seeking any favor from Mayor Villarosa to accommodate the audit
team in their property, the Aroma Family Hotel. He explained that the audit team paid
him a "courtesy call" where he assured the team of his cooperation. 29 He again restated
that the police officials merely coordinated with him as was customary because he was
the Executive Judge of the municipality. 30 Judge Jacinto, Jr. believes that Bandoy's
accusations against him were designed to oust him as Presiding Judge of Branches 45 and
46 of San Jose and even as Assisting Presiding Judge of Branch 44, Mamburao, both in
the province of Occidental Mindoro. 31
In its Report, 32 dated June 03, 2014, the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) did not give credence to Bandoy's allegation that Judge Jacinto, Jr. issued an order
for his arrest without a warrant and to the insinuation that the Court's audit team was
conveniently housed in Aroma Family Hotel of the Villarosas for failure to present proof.
33 The OCA observed, however, that Judge Jacinto, Jr. never refuted the allegations of
leniency over the several resettings of the arraignment of De Jesus, Jr. and that the
arraignment was held in his chambers. As such, the OCA equated his silence to
admission. 34 Thus, the OCA recommended that:
Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall be
faithful to the law and maintain professional competence. Indeed, competence and
diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office. 36
Everyone, especially a judge, is presumed to know the law. One who accepts the
exalted position of a judge owes the public and the Court the duty to maintain
professional competence at all times. 37
In this case, Judge Jacinto, Jr. was directly confronted with an allegation that he
arraigned De Jesus, Jr. inside his chambers. He was given the opportunity to answer, but
he chose not to delve into it. Ultimately, Judge Jacinto, Jr. did not squarely face the issues
being imputed against him, which was quite irregular since it was his name and his
capacity as a member of the bench, that was being challenged. As aptly observed by the
OCA, "the natural instinct of man impels him to resist an unfounded claim or imputation
and defend himself. It is against human nature to just remain reticent and say nothing in
the face of false accusations." 38 His silence introduces doubt in the minds of the public,
which is not acceptable.
Given the exacting standards required of magistrates in the application of the law
and procedure, the Court finds Judge Jacinto, Jr. administratively guilty of gross
ignorance of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Court, specifically Section 1 (a) thereof
requiring arraignment of an accused to be made in open court, to wit:
Section 1. Arraignment and plea, how made. — (a) The accused must be
arraigned before the court where the complaint or information was filed or
assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge or
clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or information,
reading the same in the language or dialect known to him, and asking him
whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial
witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information.HDTSCc
(Emphasis supplied)
The procedural steps laid down in Section 1 (a) of Rule 116 are not empty rituals
that a judge can take nonchalantly. Each step constitutes an integral part of that crucial
stage in criminal litigation "where the issues are joined . . . and without which the
proceedings cannot advance further." 39
Thus, anything less than is required by Section 1 (a) of Rule 116 constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. 40 There is gross ignorance of the law when the error committed by
the judge was "gross or patent, deliberate or malicious." 41 It may also be committed
when a judge ignores, contradicts or fails to apply settled law and jurisprudence because
of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. 42 Gross ignorance of the law or
incompetence cannot be excused by a claim of good faith. 43
The Court has impressed upon judges that they owe it to the public and the legal
profession to know the very law that they are supposed to apply in a given controversy.
44 They are called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes
and procedural rules, to be conversant with the basic law, and to maintain the desired
professional competence. 45 When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the
rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. A judge owes the public and
the Court the duty to be proficient in the law and is expected to keep abreast of laws and
prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of
injustice. 46
Here, the Court cannot fathom why the arraignment of De Jesus, Jr. was postponed
from 2007 to 2011 without appropriate action coming from the court. Judge Jacinto, Jr.
should have availed of known legal remedies to compel De Jesus, Jr. to personally appear
for his arraignment, but he did not. The appearance of leniency seemingly exhibited in
favor of De Jesus, Jr. gives an impression of bias and partiality that should be addressed
and corrected.
Consequently, under Section 8 (9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,as amended by
A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious
charge. Section 11 (A) of the same Rule provides that the penalty to be imposed if a
respondent Judge is found guilty of a serious charge is either a fine of more than
P20,000.00 but not more than P40,000.00, suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months, or dismissal from the
service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
The Court is aware of the other pending administrative cases against Judge
Jacinto, Jr., but they cannot be fully considered in the imposition of the penalty in this
case as they are still under review and evaluation. Thus, a fine of P40,000.00 52 is
deemed appropriate under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jose S. Jacinto, Jr. GUILTY of
Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure and of Bias and Partiality. Accordingly, he is
FINED in the amount of Forty Thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
(Bandoy v. Jacinto, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-14-2399, [November 19, 2014], 747 PHIL 156-
|||
169)
EN BANC
DECISION
PERALTA, J : p
I.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHICH
PROHIBITS PLEA BARGAINING IN ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE SAID
LAW, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
II.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT ENCROACHED UPON THE POWER OF
THE SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE RULES OF PROCEDURE.
III.
WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS PRESIDED BY HON.
FRANK E. LOBRIGO, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
REFUSED TO DECLARE SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 AS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 10
We grant the petition.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), contends that the petition should be dismissed outright for being procedurally
defective on the grounds that: (1) the Congress should have been impleaded as an
indispensable party; (2) the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be
attacked collaterally; and (3) the proper recourse should have been a petition for
declaratory relief before this Court or a petition for certiorari before the RTC.
Moreover, the OSG argues that the petition fails to satisfy the requisites of judicial
review because: (1) Estipona lacks legal standing to sue for failure to show direct
injury; (2) there is no actual case or controversy; and (3) the constitutionality of
Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is not the lis mota of the case.
On matters of technicality, some points raised by the OSG may be correct.
Nonetheless, without much further ado, it must be underscored that it is within this
Court's power to make exceptions to the rules of court. Under proper conditions, We
may permit the full and exhaustive ventilation of the parties' arguments and positions
despite the supposed technical infirmities of a petition or its alleged procedural flaws.
In discharging its solemn duty as the final arbiter of constitutional issues, the Court
shall not shirk from its obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first
impression, with far-reaching implications. 11
Likewise, matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a backseat
when issues of substantial and transcendental importance are present. 12 We have
acknowledged that the Philippines' problem on illegal drugs has reached "epidemic,"
"monstrous," and "harrowing" proportions, 13 and that its disastrously harmful social,
economic, and spiritual effects have broken the lives, shattered the hopes, and
destroyed the future of thousands especially our young citizens. 14 At the same time,
We have equally noted that "as urgent as the campaign against the drug problem must
be, so must we as urgently, if not more so, be vigilant in the protection of the rights of
the accused as mandated by the Constitution x x x who, because of excessive zeal on
the part of the law enforcers, may be unjustly accused and convicted." 15 Fully aware
of the gravity of the drug menace that has beset our country and its direct link to
certain crimes, the Court, within its sphere, must do its part to assist in the all-out
effort to lessen, if not totally eradicate, the continued presence of drug lords, pushers
and users. 16
Bearing in mind the very important and pivotal issues raised in this petition,
technical matters should not deter Us from having to make the final and definitive
pronouncement that everyone else depends for enlightenment and guidance. 17 When
public interest requires, the Court may brush aside procedural rules in order to resolve
a constitutional issue. 18
x x x [T]he Court is invested with the power to suspend the application
of the rules of procedure as a necessary complement of its power to
promulgate the same. Barnes v. Hon. Quijano Padilla discussed the rationale
for this tenet, viz.:
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as
mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather
than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of
Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can
be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has
already declared to be final, x x x.
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party
litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his
cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court
has consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to
override substantial justice. 19
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Plea bargaining, as a rule and a practice, has been existing in our jurisdiction
since July 1, 1940, when the 1940 Rules took effect. Section 4, Rule 114 (Pleas) of
which stated:
SEC. 4. Plea of guilty of lesser offense. — The defendant, with the consent of
the court and of the fiscal, may plead guilty of any lesser offense than that
charged which is necessarily included in the offense charged in the complaint
or information.
When the 1964 Rules became effective on January 1, 1964, the same provision
was retained under Rule 118 (Pleas). Subsequently, with the effectivity of the 1985
Rules on January 1, 1985, the provision on plea of guilty to a lesser offense was
amended. Section 2, Rule 116 provided:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — The accused with the consent of
the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead
guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily
included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction
than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or information is
necessary. (4a, R-118)
As well, the term "plea bargaining" was first mentioned and expressly required
during pre-trial. Section 2, Rule 118 mandated:
SEC. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects. — The pre-trial conference shall
consider the following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of facts;
(c) Marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious
trial. (n)
The 1985 Rules was later amended. While the wordings of Section 2, Rule 118
was retained, Section 2, Rule 116 was modified in 1987. A second paragraph was
added, stating that "[a] conviction under this plea shall be equivalent to a conviction
of the offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy."
When R.A. No. 8493 ("Speedy Trial Act of 1998") was enacted, 35 Section 2,
Rule 118 of the Rules was substantially adopted. Section 2 of the law required that
plea bargaining and other matters 36 that will promote a fair and expeditious trial are
to be considered during pre-trial conference in all criminal cases cognizable by the
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Regional Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan.
Currently, the pertinent rules on plea bargaining under the 2000 Rules 37 are
quoted below:
RULE 116 (Arraignment and Plea):
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — At arraignment, the accused, with
the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the
trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in
the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still
be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of
not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (Sec.
4, Cir. 38-98)
RULE 118 (Pre-trial):
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. — In all criminal cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment and within thirty (30)
days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of
the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the
charge but interposes a lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of
the criminal and civil aspects of the case. (Sec. 2 & 3, Cir. 38-
98)
At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No.
9165 is contrary to the constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not
to preempt any future discussion by the Court on the policy considerations behind
Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165. Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the
statutory provision in toto or a qualified version thereof, We deem it proper to declare
as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is
made part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued for
the purpose. ETHIDa
820)
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J : p
The antecedents facts are laid down by Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated
March 25, 2004, as follows:
Said accused, 2 together with accused Benedicto E. Kuizon, were
charged before this Court for three counts of malversation of public funds
involving the sums of P3,293.00, P1,869.00, and P13,528.00, respectively,
which they purportedly tried to conceal by falsifying the time book and
payrolls for given period making it appear that some laborers worked on the
construction of the new municipal hall building of Bato, Leyte and collected
their respective salaries thereon when, in truth and in fact, they did not. Thus,
in addition to the charge for malversation, the accused were also indicted
before this Court for three counts of falsification of public document by a
public officer or employee.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of
"not guilty" and substitute the same with a plea of "guilty", provided, the
mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and voluntary
surrender will be appreciated in their favor. In the alternative, if such proposal
is not acceptable, said accused proposed instead to substitute their plea of "not
guilty" to the crime of falsification of public document by a public officer or
employee with a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of falsification of a
public document by a private individual. On the other hand, in the
malversation cases, the accused offered to substitute their plea of "not guilty"
thereto with a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of failure of an
accountable officer to render accounts.
Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the prosecution found
as acceptable the proposal of the accused to plead "guilty" to the lesser crime
of falsification of public document by a private individual. The prosecution
explained:
The Sandiganbayan, in the herein assailed Resolution, 4 dated March 25, 2004,
denied petitioner's Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable recommendation by the
prosecution, on the main ground that no cogent reason was presented to justify its
approval. 5
The Sandiganbayan likewise denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in
a Resolution dated May 31, 2004.
This compelled petitioner to file the present case for certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
in denying his plea bargaining offer on the following grounds: first, petitioner is not
an accountable officer and he merely affixed his signature on the payrolls on a
"routinary basis," negating any criminal intent; and that the amount involved is only
P18,860.00, which he already restituted. 6
The petition is meritorious.
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court
approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to
only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter
sentence than that for the graver charge. 7
Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, to wit: EaISTD
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon
which plea bargaining may be made, i.e., that it should be with the consent of the
offended party and the prosecutor, 10 and that the plea of guilt should be to a lesser
offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The rules however use
word may in the second sentence of Section 2, denoting an exercise of discretion upon
the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea. 11 Trial courts are
exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually
charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the
convenience of the accused. 12
In People of the Philippines v. Villarama, 13 the Court ruled that the
acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the
accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is addressed entirely to the sound
discretion of the trial court, 14 viz.:
. . . In such situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial court and the
Office of the Prosecutor with a yardstick within which their discretion may be
properly exercised. Thus, in People v. Kayanan (L-39355, May 31, 1978, 83
SCRA 437, 450), We held that the rules allow such a plea only when the
prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the
crime charged. In his concurring opinion in People v. Parohinog (G.R. No. L-
47462, February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 373, 377), then Justice Antonio Barredo
explained clearly and tersely the rationale or the law:
. . . (A)fter the prosecution had already rested, the only basis on
which the fiscal and the court could rightfully act in allowing the appellant to
change his former plea of not guilty to murder to guilty to the lesser crime of
homicide could be nothing more nothing less than the evidence already in the
record. The reason for this being that Section 4 of Rule 118 (now Section 2,
Rule 116) under which a plea for a lesser offense is allowed was not and could
not have been intended as a procedure for compromise, much less bargaining.
15 (Emphasis supplied)
However, Villarama involved plea bargaining after the prosecution had already
rested its case.HcISTE
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, as in the present case, the
trial court's exercise of its discretion should neither be arbitrary nor should it amount
to a capricious and whimsical exercise of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by
reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and it must be so patent or gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law. 16
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's plea offer on the
ground that petitioner and the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the proposal
would redound to the benefit of the public. The Sandiganbayan believes that
approving the proposal would "only serve to trivialize the seriousness of the charges
against them and send the wrong signal to potential grafters in public office that the
penalties they are likely to face would be lighter than what their criminal acts would
have merited or that the economic benefits they are likely to derive from their
criminal activities far outweigh the risks they face in committing them; thus, setting to
naught the deterrent value of the laws intended to curb graft and corruption in
government." 17
Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in rejecting
petitioner's plea offer. However, subsequent events and higher interests of justice and
fair play dictate that petitioner's plea offer should be accepted. The present case calls
for the judicious exercise of this Court's equity jurisdiction —
Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do
complete justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules
and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of
cases, are incompetent so to do. Equity regards the spirit of and not the letter,
the intent and not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is
variously expressed by different courts. 18
and of its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts, 19 in
order to afford equal justice to petitioner.
In People of the Philippines v. Estrada, 20 the Sandiganbayan, in its
Resolution dated March 14, 2007, approved the Plea Bargaining Agreement entered
into by the prosecution and one of the accused, Charlie "Atong" Ang. The agreement
provided that the accused undertakes to assist in the prosecution of the case and
promises to return the amount of P25,000,000.00. In approving the Plea Bargaining
Agreement, the Sandiganbayan took into consideration the timeliness of the plea
bargaining and whether the agreement complied with the requirements of Section 2,
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. The Sandiganbayan noted that the accused had
already withdrawn his earlier plea of "not guilty"; and that the prosecution consented
to the plea of guilt to a lesser offense; and the lesser offense, which is Corruption of
Public Officials in relation to Indirect Bribery, is necessarily included in the offense
charged, which is Plunder. 21 HATEDC
The Court sees no reason why the standards applied by the Sandiganbayan to
Estrada should not be applied to the present case. Records show that there was a
favorable recommendation by the Office of the Special Prosecutor to approve
petitioner's motion to plea bargain. Thus, in its Memorandum dated August 16, 2002,
the Office of the Special Prosecutor rationalized:
In the cases at bar, there is no dispute that JOSELITO RANIERO J.
DAAN has already restituted the total amount of P18,860.00 as per official
receipt issued by the provincial government of Leyte dated February 26, 2002.
In short, the damage caused to the government has already been restituted by
the accused.
There is also no dispute that accused DAAN voluntarily surrendered in
the instant cases. Moreover, the accused is also willing to plead guilty to a
lesser offense which to our mind, merits consideration.
With respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it appears that
the act of the accused in pleading guilty for a lesser offense of falsification by
private individual defined and penalized under Article 172 of the Revised
Penal Code will strengthen our cases against the principal accused, the
Municipal Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who appears to be the master mind of
these criminal acts. After all, the movants herein JOSELITO RANIERO J.
DAAN was merely designated as draftsman detailed as foreman/timekeeper of
the Municipality of Bato, Leyte. 22
Moreover, the lesser offenses of Falsification by Private Individuals and
Failure to Render Account by an Accountable Officer are necessarily included in the
crimes of Falsification of Public Documents and Malversation of Public Funds,
respectively, with which petitioner was originally charged.
Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, for the crime of
Falsification of Public Documents through an untruthful narration of facts to be
established, the following elements must concur: (a) the offender makes in a
document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a legal
obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the
offender are absolutely false; and (d) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts
was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person. 23
On the other hand, Falsification by Private Individuals penalized under Article
172, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code has the following elements: (a) the
offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take
advantage of his official position; (b) the offender committed any of the acts of
falsification enumerated under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code; and (c) the
falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial document. 24 AEIHaS
In this case, the allegations in the Informations filed against petitioner are
sufficient to hold petitioner liable for the lesser offenses. Thus, in the charge for
Falsification of Public Documents, petitioner may plead guilty to the lesser offense of
Falsification by Private Individuals inasmuch as it does not appear that petitioner took
advantage of his official position in allegedly falsifying the timebook and payroll of
the Municipality of Bato, Leyte. In the same vein, with regard to the crime of
Malversation of Public Funds, while the Informations contain allegations which make
out a case for Malversation against petitioner, nevertheless, absent the element of
conversion, theoretically, petitioner may still be held liable for Failure to Render
Account by an Accountable Officer if it is shown that the failure to render account
was in violation of a law or regulation that requires him to render such an accounting
within the prescribed period.
Given, therefore, that some of the essential elements of offenses charged in this
case likewise constitute the lesser offenses, then petitioner may plead guilty to such
lesser offenses.
Finally, as propounded by petitioner, indeed, he is not an accountable officer in
that the nature of his duty as foreman/timekeeper does not permit or require
possession or custody of local government funds, 29 not to mention that petitioner has
already restituted the amount of P18,860.00 involved in this case. Unlike Estrada
which involves a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, 30 and a whopping
P25,000,000.00 taken from the public coffers, this case tremendously pales in
comparison.
Under the peculiar circumstances of the present case, where gross inequity will
result in a discriminatory dispensation of justice, the Court will not hesitate to
intervene in order to equalize the imbalance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated March 25,
2004 and May 31, 2004 are SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is hereby ORDERED
to grant petitioner's Motion to Plea Bargain. Let records of this case be REMANDED
to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision. aTHCSE
SO ORDERED.
Tinga, * Chico-Nazario, Nachura and Reyes, JJ., concur.
||| (Daan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 163972-77, [March 28, 2008], 573 PHIL 368-383)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 122619. August 18, 2006.]
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J : p
For our resolution is the herein petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated October 13, 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 37408.
On December 28, 1990, the trial court issued an Order 2 finding accused Nava
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property and ordering him to pay a fine of P200.00.
During the separate hearing of the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 235 (90), Irish
Gevero testified that at the time of the death of her husband, he was thirty (30) years old,
earning P6,000.00 a month as a T-shirt designer and P2,000.00 as a "freelance" worker.
She incurred P153,222.15 for medical, hospitalization, and burial expenses. 3
Significantly, the accused did not object to the prosecution's formal offer of these
evidence.
On November 12, 1991, the trial court rendered its Decision, 4 the dispositive
portion of which reads:
In view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
complainant and against the accused, ordering the latter to indemnify the
offended party the amount of P153,222.15 for medical, hospitalization, and
burial expenses; and to pay P8,000.00 for loss of earnings in the concept of
actual or compensatory damages; P200,000.00 as moral damages and
P25,000.00 as attorney's fees; P500.00 per court appearance as may be shown
on record; and costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Eventually, the writ of execution was issued by the trial court. However, it was
returned by the sheriff unsatisfied since accused Nava was insolvent. Upon motion of
Irish Gevero and her children, the trial court issued a writ of execution against GADECO,
employer of Nava. Hence, its bank deposit of P157,044.75 was garnished and turned over
by the sheriff to Irish Gevero.
GADECO filed a motion to quash the writ of execution and for the return of its
money. However, the trial court issued an Order 5 dated December 26, 1994 denying
GADECO's motion.
As the full amount of the award was not satisfied, the heirs of Mario Gevero filed
a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution against GADECO. This was
granted by the trial court.
On October 13, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision setting aside the
challenged Orders of the trial court and ordering the heirs of Mario Gevero to return to
GADECO the amount of P157,044.75.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari by the heirs (wife and children)
of Mario Gevero.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the civil liability
of respondent GADECO is only P200.00, the damage caused to the bicycle of the late
Mario Gevero, thus obliterating the fact of his death.
The Court of Appeals, in applying the above provision, ruled that the civil liability
of accused Nava should be for the offense for which he was convicted and sentenced, i.e.,
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property. Pursuant to Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code on criminal negligence, 7 the appellate court imposed upon the
accused only a fine of P200.00, the damage caused to the victim's bicycle.
It is clear from the Rule that an accused in a criminal case may be allowed to plead
guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether it is included or not in the crime charged.
Thus, pursuant to this Rule, Nava, who was charged with reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide, was allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to the lesser offense of reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property.
The Court of Appeals, however, in limiting Nava's civil liability to the cost of the
damage to the bicycle, clearly ignored the fact of death of the victim. The offense of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide necessarily produces death; the offense of
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property does not. Obviously, the fact of
death of the victim cannot be reconciled with the accused's plea of guilty to the lesser
offense of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property.
Significantly, Section 2, Rule 116 is silent on the effect of the plea to a lesser
offense on the civil liability of the accused. On this point, this Court's ruling in Amaton v.
Aujero 8 is relevant, thus:
These are fundamental tenets of law. In the case at bench, the fact of the
victim's death, a clear negation of frustrated or attempted homicide, ought to
have alerted the judge not only to a possibly inconsistent result but to an
injustice. The failure to recognize such principles so cardinal to our body of
laws amounts to ignorance of the law and reflects respondent judge's lack of
prudence, if not competence, in the performance of his duties. While it is true,
as respondent judge contends, that he merely applied the rule to the letter, the
palpably incongruous result ought to have been a "red flag" alerting him of the
possibility of injustice. The death of an identified individual, the gravamen of
the charge against the defendant in the criminal case, cannot and should not be
ignored in favor of a mere expedient plea of either attempted or frustrated
homicide. We have held before that if the law is so elementary, not to know it or
to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of law.
Indeed, the Court of Appeals should have realized outright that a grave injustice
will be committed against the heirs of the victim if the accused will only be fined
P200.00 corresponding to the cost of damage to the victim's bicycle, without awarding
his heirs civil liabilities corresponding to the fact of his death. Common sense dictates
that the civil liability arising from the death of a person cannot be pegged to the cost of
damage to a bicycle.
Moreover, to hold otherwise would lead to the possibility that offended parties
will hesitate to give their consent to a plea of guilty to a lesser offense by the accused for
fear that it would foreclose their chance to recover the appropriate civil liability.
In fine, we hold that the civil liability of the accused for the death of Mario Gevero
awarded by the trial court to his heirs is in order.
SO ORDERED.
(Heirs of Gevero v. Guihing Agricultural & Development Corp., G.R. No. 122619,
|||
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J : p
Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision 1 dated December 17, 1997
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 62, in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 to
97-388 finding appellant Feliciano Ulit y Tampoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
counts of qualified rape. 2 In the same decision, the appellant was convicted of two
counts of acts of lasciviousness. For each count of rape, the trial court sentenced him to
suffer the supreme penalty of death, while for each count of acts of lasciviousness, the
appellant was sentenced to suffer imprisonment "from eight (8) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years,
six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum." The appellant was, likewise, ordered to indemnify the victim Lucelle
Serrano, the amount of P50,000 for each count of rape and P20,000 for each count of acts
of lasciviousness.
The Indictments
Upon the sworn complaint of the victim Lucelle Serrano, four Informations were
filed against her uncle, the appellant. The docket number and the accusatory portion of
each Information reads:
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
That on or about the 2nd day of March 1997, in the City of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design by means of force, violence
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commit acts of lasciviousness upon complainant LUCELLE SERRANO y
ULIT, an eleven (11) year old girl, by then and there dragging her inside a
bathroom and repeatedly kissing her on her checks [sic], without her consent
and against her will, to her damage and prejudice.
ACEIac
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
The appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty during the arraignment. Joint
trial of all the cases ensued.
In the meantime, the trial court ordered that Lucelle be subjected to physical and
psychological examinations at the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH). Dr.
Rochelflume Samson examined Lucelle and submitted her Report dated August 29, 1997
with the following remarks and recommendation:
During the trial on July 14, 1997, Lucelle refused to take the witness stand. The
trial was reset to July 21, 1997.
During the hearing on October 20, 1997, the prosecution presented Lucelle anew
to continue with her testimony on direct examination. She declared that the appellant
raped her in November 1996 and many other times thereafter in her residence at No. 7104
San Maximo Street, Makati City. Instead of asking questions to elicit the facts and
circumstances before and during the commission of the crimes, the prosecutor asked
Lucelle to identify her signature in her sworn statement 9 and to affirm the truth of its
contents. She did so. The public prosecutor then marked the sworn statement in evidence
as Exhibit "H," and then manifested to the court that he had no more questions for the
witness on direct examination.
On clarificatory questions by the court, Lucelle testified that she was born on
February 19, 1986. The appellant mounted her, removed her pants, poked a knife at her
and threatened her. 10
On cross-examination, Lucelle testified that the appellant was her mother's older
brother. In November 1996, she was not enrolled in any school. Her father was working
at a construction firm, the appellant was employed at the Department of Environment and
Sanitation in Makati City, while her grandmother, who lived with her, worked as a maid
in Bel Air Subdivision. Her mother worked for one of her father's cousins. On re-direct
examination, the prosecution elicited from Lucelle that the appellant raped her in
November 1996 at 11:00 p.m. inside the room of her aunt Marina in her grandmother's
house at No. 7104 San Maximo Street, Olympia, Makati City, and that her aunt, Marina,
and her Ate Sharon were inside the room. When asked where her aunt and Ate Sharon
were when she was being raped in her aunt's room, Lucelle did not respond. When asked
why she did not respond to the questions propounded to her during the previous hearings
and why she had been crying in open court, Lucelle replied that she was afraid of her
uncle, the appellant.
In her sworn statement, 11 Lucelle alleged that sometime in November 1996, she
was sleeping in a room in the house. It was about 6 o'clock in the evening. She was
awakened when she felt someone kissing her on the cheek. When she opened her eyes,
she saw her uncle, the appellant, armed with a bladed weapon (balisong). He poked the
weapon on the left side of her neck. He warned her that if she told her parents, he would
kill her. He removed her panties, undressed himself and mounted her. He then inserted
his penis into her vagina. She felt pain in her private part and cried. The appellant,
thereafter, left the room. Also during the month of November 1996, the appellant
continued kissing her whenever her parents were out of the house.
In December 1996, Lucelle was in the room when the appellant entered and kissed
her and mashed her private parts. Sometime in February 1997, the appellant again abused
her (sinalbahe) while she was in the same room. It was about 11 o'clock in the evening.
He again warned her not to divulge to her parents what he did to her. At 9:00 p.m. on
March 2, 1997, Lucelle urinated in the bathroom and when she was about to go out, the
appellant entered, pushed her inside and kissed her on her cheeks several times.
Lourdes Serrano testified that she was Lucelle's mother. Lucelle was born on
February 19, 1986. 12 She and her husband Celso Serrano and their daughter Lucelle
resided with her mother, Guadalupe Ulit, at No. 7104 San Maximo Street, Olympia,
Makati City. Her sister Marina and the appellant, her brother, also resided in the same
house. The family slept together in the evenings in the sala of the house while Marina
slept in her bedroom. At times, Marina allowed her niece Lucelle to sleep in her
bedroom. At 11:00 p.m. on February 19, 1997, Lourdes noticed that Lucelle was not at
her side. The appellant, who usually also slept in the sala, was not there either. Lourdes
went to Marina's bedroom and saw Lucelle in bed (papag), covered with a blanket.
Beside her was the appellant who was wearing a pair of short pants and undershirt. When
the appellant saw Lourdes, he slid down from the bed, went under the papag, and
furtively left the room. When Lourdes removed the blanket, she saw Lucelle lying
sideways with her knees up to her chin (nakabaluktot). Lucelle was trembling with fear.
When Lourdes asked Lucelle what happened, she did not respond. Lourdes left the room
and went back to the sala. She wanted to talk to the appellant but decided against it when
she saw him seated in the sala, playing with his balisong.
Lourdes further testified that at 9:00 p.m. on March 2, 1997, she and her husband
were having dinner when she noticed that Lucelle was nowhere to be found. She looked
for her daughter in the house, but failed to find her. She then asked her cousin Nita if she
had seen Lucelle. Nita replied in the negative. When Lourdes asked Nita if Lucelle was
inside the bathroom, Nita responded that the appellant was using it. Momentarily,
Lourdes saw the appellant emerge from the bathroom. He was in his short pants and his
shirt was on his shoulder. He was perspiring profusely. Lourdes was flabbergasted when
she saw Lucelle come out of the bathroom after the appellant. Lucelle was crying and
looked pale. When Lourdes asked Lucelle why she was crying, she told her mother that
she had just urinated. The appellant later told her sister Lourdes that he did not do
anything to Lucelle.
Believing that the appellant had been abusing their daughter, Celso and Lourdes
brought Lucelle on March 5, 1997, to Barangay Chairman Romeo Medina. On their way,
Lucelle adamantly refused to tell her parents what the appellant did to her. However,
when they reached the barangay headquarters, Lucelle told the barangay chairman that
the appellant sexually abused her. Thereafter, Lourdes filed a complaint with the
barangay chairman against the appellant for sexually molesting Lucelle.
Barangay Tanod Fernando David testified that on March 6, 1997, the barangay
chairman ordered him and Barangay Tanod Antonio Echavez to invite and bring the
appellant to the barangay hall. The barangay chairman asked the appellant if he raped
Lucelle and the latter replied that he did. A Sinumpaang Salaysay was prepared in the
Office of the Barangay Chairman in which the appellant admitted that he raped Lucelle in
February 1997, and on March 2, 1997, despite her resistance, and that he threatened to
kill her and her family if she divulged the incidents to her parents. 13 The appellant signed
his statement in the presence of the barangay chairman and the barangay tanods.
From the barangay headquarters, the appellant was brought to the Makati City
Police Headquarters where Celso, Lourdes and Lucelle filed a complaint against him for
rape and acts of lasciviousness. SPO4 Lilia Hogar of the Women's Desk Unit took the
sworn statements of Lourdes and Lucelle. 14 She conducted a custodial investigation of
the appellant who was without counsel during which the latter admitted having raped the
victim. SPO4 Hogar also prepared a report on her investigation of the victim's complaint.
15
On July 28, 1997, Dr. Armie M. Soreta-Umil, NBI Medico-Legal Officer, testified
that on March 12, 1997, she conducted genital and vaginal examinations on Lucelle and
submitted Living Case Report No. MG-97-355 which contained the following findings:
GENERAL EXAMINATION:
Pubic hair, fully grown, moderate. Labia majora, gaping. Labia minora,
coaptated. Fourchette, lax. Vestibular mucosa, pinkish. Hymen, tall, thick,
intact, distensible. Hymenal orifice, admits a tube 2.5 cms. in diameter. Vaginal
walls, lax. Rugosities, shallow.
CONCLUSIONS
2.) Hymen, intact but distensible, and its orifice wide (2.5 cms. in
diameter) as to allow complete penetration by an average-sized adult Filipino
male organ in full erection without producing any genital injury. 16
After the prosecution had rested its case, the trial court reset the hearing to
November 5, 1997 for the appellant to adduce his evidence. When the case was called for
trial on that date, his counsel manifested to the court that the appellant was changing his
plea in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-387 from "not guilty" to "guilty." He also
manifested that he would no longer adduce any evidence in his defense in Criminal Cases
Nos. 97-386 and 97-388 because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for the crimes charged therein. The trial court suspended the
proceedings and gave the appellant forty-five minutes to confer with him counsel. When
trial resumed, the appellant reiterated his earlier manifestation. When told by the court
that he could be sentenced to death for the rape charges, the appellant stood pat on his
decision to plead guilty in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-387, and to no longer
present any evidence in his defense in the other two cases. The appellant was re-arraigned
in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-387 with the assistance of the same counsel and
entered his plea of guilty to the charges.
On December 15, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the appellant
of all the crimes charged. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
1. In Criminal Case Nos. 97-385 and 97-386, for rape, the prosecution
has proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused, FELICIANO
ULIT Y TAMPOY, as principal in the two counts of statutory rape defined and
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. He is
hereby declare[d] CONVICTED in each of the cases. Accordingly he is
sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty [of] DEATH in each of the two cases;
and indemnify the victim LUCELLE SERRANO, in the amount of P50,000 as
moral damages for each of the cases;
2. In Criminal Case Nos. 97-387 and 97-388, for acts of lasciviousness,
the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused,
FELICIANO ULIT Y TAMPOY, as principal in two counts of acts of
lasciviousness defined under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code and
penalized under Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610. He is hereby declared CONVICTED
in each of the two cases; and, accordingly, he is sentenced to suffer in each of
the cases an indeterminate prison term from eight (8) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to fifteen
(15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal in its
medium period, as maximum; and, indemnify the victim, LUCELLE
SERRANO, in the amount of P20,000 as moral damages for each of the cases.
SO ORDERED. 18
The trial court declared that even prescinding from the appellant's plea of guilty,
the prosecutor adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the appellant for
qualified rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-386. The trial court ruled that
although Lucelle did not testify on the contents of her sworn statement 19 the same were
admissible in evidence as part of the res gestae.
The appellant did not appeal from the decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-387 and
97-388. In view of the trial court's imposition of the death penalty on the appellant in
Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-386, the said cases were brought to this Court on
automatic appeal.
The appellant assails the decision of the trial court with the lone assignment of
error, to wit:
The appellant does not contest his conviction for rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-
385 and 97-386, and the validity of the proceedings in the said cases in the trial court. He
pleads, however, that he be spared the death penalty. He asserts that he was so remorseful
for the crimes he committed and that he pleaded guilty in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385
and 97-387; he no longer presented any evidence in Criminal Case No. 97-388 so that the
proceedings before the court would be shortened and simplified. Nevertheless, the appeal
in a criminal case is a review de novo and the court is not limited to the assigned errors.
21 An appeal thus opens the whole case for review, and the appellate tribunal may
consider and correct errors though unassigned and even reverse the decision of the trial
court on the grounds other than those the parties raised as errors. 22
In Criminal Case No. 97-385, the appellant was charged with qualified rape, i.e.,
the rape of his niece, who was a minor, punishable by death under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. Undoubtedly, the appellant
was charged with a capital offense. When the appellant informed the trial court of his
decision to change his plea of "not guilty" to "guilty," it behooved the trial court to
conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea as mandated by Section 6, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. In People vs. Camay, 23 this Court enumerated the following duties
of the trial court under the rule:
1. The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and
full comprehension [by the accused] of the consequences of his plea;
The raison d'etre for the rule is that the courts must proceed with extreme care
where the imposable penalty is death, considering that the execution of such sentence is
irrevocable. Experience has shown that even innocent persons have at times pleaded
guilty. Improvident pleas of guilty to a capital offense on the part of the accused must be
averted since by admitting his guilt before the trial court, the accused would forfeit his
life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning, significance and the dire
consequences of his plea. 25
There is no hard and fast rule as to how the trial judge may conduct a searching
inquiry. It has been held, however, that the focus of the inquiry must be on the
voluntariness of the plea and the full or complete comprehension by the accused of his
plea of guilty so that it can truly be said that it is based on a free and informed judgment.
In People vs. Aranzado, 26 we formulated the following guidelines as to how the trial
court may conduct its searching inquiry:
(1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody
of the law; (b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel
during the custodial and preliminary investigations; and (c) under what
conditions he was detained and interrogated during the investigations.
These the court shall do in order to rule out the possibility that the
accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by
actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent or avenging
quarters.
(3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his
age, socio-economic status, and educational background, which may
serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed
plea of guilty.
(4) Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty
under the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. Not
infrequently indeed an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient
treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or
parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is
the duty of the judge to see to it that the accused does not labor under
these mistaken impressions.
(5) Require the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges
against him or make him reenact the manner in which he perpetrated the
crime, or cause him to supply missing details or significance. 27
In People vs. Ostia, 28 we held that the trial court is also required to probe
thoroughly into the reasons or motivations, as well as the facts and circumstances for a
change of plea of the accused and his comprehension of his plea; explain to him the
elements of the crime for which he is charged as well as the nature and effect of any
modifying circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense, inclusive of
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, as well as the qualifying and special qualifying
circumstances, and inform him of the imposable penalty and his civil liabilities for the
crime for which he would plead guilty to. 29
In this case, the trial court failed to make a searching inquiry into the appellant's
voluntariness and full comprehension of his plea of guilty. This is evident by the
transcript of stenographic notes taken on November 5, 1998:
ATTY. MANALO
COURT
You better confer with your client and explain to him the consequences of his
intended change of plea from not guilty to that of guilty.
ATTY. MANALO
Is your counsel's manifestation true, that you would like to change your plea
from not guilty to that of guilty and that you are no longer presenting
evidence in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-386 and 97-388?
ACCUSED
COURT
You talk with your lawyer and think twice before asking the court to change
your plea of not guilty to that of guilty. The Court will call your case
again.
COURT
Mr. Ulit, earlier your counsel informed the court that you would like to change
your plea from not guilty to that of guilty, in Criminal Case No. 97-385,
for rape and Criminal Case No. 97-387, for Acts of Lasciviousness, do
you affirm the manifestation of your counsel?
ACCUSED
COURT
(to accused)
Do you know that you are accused here for the crime of rape, a capital offense
which carries with it a capital punishment?
ACCUSED
COURT
(to accused)
Despite your knowledge that you are charged with a capital offense which
carries with it a capital penalty you still insists that you are pleading
guilty?
ACCUSED
Was there anyone who forced you to change your plea of not guilty to that of
guilty?
ACCUSED
COURT
(to accused)
Do you know that by pleading guilty you will be sentenced in accordance with
[what] the law provides?
ACCUSED
COURT
(to accused)
Do you know that the penalty provided for by law is death penalty because the
Information states that the victim is eleven years old and your niece and
that you used a deadly weapon in the commission of the rape?
ACCUSED
COURT
Second. It appears in the Informations filed by the Public Prosecutor that the
appellant opted not to avail himself of his right to a regular preliminary investigation and
refused to execute a waiver under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. The records
also show that the appellant executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay while detained at the
barangay hall where he confessed to having raped the victim in February 1997 and March
2, 1997. However, the trial court did not ask the appellant whether he was assisted by
counsel when he was brought to the Office of the Public Prosecutor for inquest
investigation. Neither did the court a quo inquire about the circumstances and the
appellant's reasons for refusing to execute the said waiver.
The records show that when the prosecution offered the appellant's Sinumpaang
Salaysay in evidence to prove that he confessed to having raped the victim in February
1997 and March 2, 1997, the appellant objected thereto on the ground that he was not
assisted by counsel and that he was coerced into signing the same.
Third. The trial court also failed to ascertain from the appellant whether he was
assisted by counsel when he executed his Sinumpaang Salaysay while detained at the
barangay hall; and, if he was not so assisted by counsel, whether he had waived his right
thereto, before and when he signed his Sinumpaang Salaysay.
Fourth. The trial court failed to ask the appellant why he was pleading guilty to a
rape committed in November 1996, when in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, 31 he confessed to
having raped the victim only in February 1997 and March 2, 1997. The appellant did not
admit having raped her in November 1996 as alleged in the Information in Criminal Case
No. 97-385. The trial court did not even inquire from the appellant who prepared and
typed his Sinumpaang Salaysay and if the contents of his statement were explained to
him before he signed the same.
Fifth. The trial court did not explain the following to the appellant, in plain and
simple terms so as to be understood by him: (a) the elements of the crime of qualified
rape; (b) the circumstances of relationship and the minority of the victim; and (c) that his
plea of guilty to qualified rape would not mitigate the penalty for the crime in light of
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
Sixth. It was not explained to the appellant that if convicted of qualified rape, he
would be civilly liable to the victim in the amount of P50,000 as moral damages and
P75,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto.
Seventh. Neither did the trial court inquire from the appellant's counsel whether
the meaning and the consequences of a guilty plea were explained to the appellant in a
language or dialect known to and understood by him.
Eight. The trial court failed to delve into and ascertain from the appellant his age,
educational attainment and socio-economic status.
Ninth. The trial court failed to ask the appellant to narrate the facts and
circumstances surrounding the incident of qualified rape as charged in Criminal Case No.
97-385.
Tenth. The appellant was not asked if he desired to adduce evidence in Criminal
Case No. 97-385 in spite of his plea of guilty.
As a rule, this Court has set aside convictions based on pleas of guilty in capital
offenses because of the improvidence thereof, and when such plea is the sole basis of the
condemnatory judgment. 32 However, where the trial court receives, independently of his
plea of guilty, evidence to determine whether the accused committed the crimes charged
and the precise degree of his criminal culpability therefor, he may still be convicted if
there is ample proof on record, not contingent on the plea of guilty, on which to predicate
conviction. 33
In this case, the prosecution had already rested its case when the appellant decided
to change his plea. In fact, the trial court granted the prosecution's motion that the
evidence it had presented be considered proof of the degree of culpability of the
appellant. It is, thus, incumbent upon this Court to determine whether the evidence
adduced by the prosecution in Criminal Case No. 97-385 is sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt the appellant's guilt for qualified rape.
In determining the guilt of the accused in rape cases, the Court is guided by the
following considerations: (a) that an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is
difficult to prove, but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove;
(b) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime which usually involves two persons,
the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) that
the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense. 34 It,
likewise, bears stressing that in all criminal prosecutions, without regard to the nature of
the defense which the accused may raise, the burden of proof remains at all times upon
the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 35
The Prosecution Adduced Proof
of the Appellant's Guilt Beyond
Reasonable Doubt of the Crime
of Rape in Criminal Case No. 97-385
We have reviewed the evidence on record and we are convinced that the
prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant raped the victim in
November 1996. The victim declared in her sworn statement, on direct examination and
her testimony on clarificatory questions made by the trial court, that indeed, the appellant
raped her in November 1996. Quoted hereunder is the testimony of Lucelle on direct and
on re-direct examination:
Fiscal
Q So, matapos mong ituro ang tiyuhin mo, ano ang ginawa niya sa iyo?
A Marami po.
A November po.
Q 19?
A 1996, po.
Q Saan ka ginahasa?
Fiscal
A Opo.
COURT
A Opo. 38
In her Sworn Statement, 39 Lucelle narrated in detail how the appellant ravished
her:
In this case, Lucelle testified on and affirmed the truth of the contents of her sworn
statement which she herself had given. As gleaned from the said statement, she narrated
how and when the appellant raped and subjected her to lascivious acts. She was cross-
examined by the appellant's counsel and answered the trial court's clarificatory questions.
The prosecution offered her sworn statement as part of her testimony and the court
admitted the same for the said purpose without objection on the part of the appellant. aIcDCT
The trial court convicted the appellant of rape in Criminal Case No. 97-386 on the
basis of Lucelle's sworn statement, 46 the testimony of her mother, Lourdes Serrano, the
appellant's statement 47 executed in the Barangay Chairman's Office, and the testimony of
Dr. Armie Soreta-Umil. We agree with the trial court's findings and conclusion.
First. In Lucelle's sworn statement, 48 she declared that the appellant subjected her
to sexual abuse.
Second. Lourdes saw Lucelle in bed (papag) in Marina's room, covered with a
blanket beside the appellant who was wearing a pair of short pants and undershirt. He slid
down from the papag, went under the bed and slipped outside. When Lourdes removed
the blanket, she saw Lucelle trembling with fear, lying sidewise, her knees near her chin
(nakabaluktot).
Third. The appellant admitted to the barangay chairman on March 5, 1997, that he
raped Lucelle in February 1997:
Although the appellant was not assisted by counsel at the time he gave his
statement to the barangay chairman and when he signed the same, it is still admissible in
evidence against him because he was not under arrest nor under custodial investigation
when he gave his statement. 50
The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust
into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures
where the potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent.
As intended by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, this covers "investigation conducted
by police authorities which will include investigations conducted by the municipal police,
the PC and the NBI and such other police agencies in our government." 51 The barangay
chairman 52 is not deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section
12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. Under these circumstances, it cannot be
successfully claimed that the appellant's statement before the barangay chairman is
inadmissible.
The appellant's conviction for two counts of rape having been duly established by
the prosecution, we now come to the question of the penalty to be meted upon him.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act
No. 7659, which was the law in effect at the time of the commission of the subject rapes,
provides in part:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by
having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances.
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender
is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
The relationship between the appellant and the victim has been adequately
established. The allegations in both Informations that the appellant is the victim's "uncle,"
"a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree" is specific enough to satisfy the
special qualifying circumstance of relationship.
The prosecution's evidence has also shown that the appellant is the victim's uncle,
being the older brother of the victim's mother, a fact that the appellant himself admitted.
The same cannot, however, be said with respect to the age of the victim. In People
v. Pruna, 57 the Court, after noting the divergent rulings on proof of age of the victim in
rape cases, set out certain guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime
or as qualifying circumstance:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or
certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such
as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth
of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been
lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and
credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the family either by
affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting
pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party
pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought
to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought
to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought
to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the
victim. 58
In the present case, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document was
presented and offered in evidence to prove Lucelle's age. While the victim testified that
she was born on February 19, 1986, therefore 11 years old when the appellant twice
raped her, the same will not suffice as the appellant did not expressly and clearly admit
the same as required by Pruna. The corroboration of Lucelle's mother as to her age is not
sufficient either, as there is no evidence that the said certificate of birth was lost or
destroyed or was unavailable without the fault of the prosecution. The fact that there was
no objection from the defense regarding the victim's age cannot be taken against the
appellant since it is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the same. Moreover,
the trial court did not make a categorical finding of the victim's minority, another
requirement mandated by Pruna.
Another issue that needs to be settled is the third paragraph of Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, which provides that, "[w]henever rape is committed
with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the imposable penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.
The evidence on record shows that the appellant raped Lucelle with the use of a
deadly weapon in both rape incidents as alleged in both informations, and under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, by Republic Act No. 7659, the imposable
penalty for the crime is reclusion perpetua to death.
Hence, for the prosecution's failure to prove the age of the victim by any means set
forth in Pruna, and considering that the relationship of uncle and niece is not covered by
any of the relationships mentioned in Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
the appellant can only be convicted of rape in its aggravated form, the imposable penalty
for which is reclusion perpetua to death.
The victim is entitled to moral damages without need of proof other than the fact
of the rape itself because it is assumed that the victim has suffered moral injuries entitling
her to such an award. 60 We find the trial court's award of P50,000 as moral damages to
the victim in each rape to be in order.
However, the trial court erred in not awarding civil indemnity to the victim in each
case, the same being mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape. 61 Thus, this Court
awards the victim the sum of P50,000 as civil indemnity for each count of rape.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court; of Makati City, Branch
62, in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 to 97-388 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The
appellant Feliciano Ulit y Tampoy is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two
counts of rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-386, and in each case, is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the victim,
Lucelle Serrano, P50,000 as moral damages; P50,000 as civil indemnity; and P25,000 as
exemplary damages. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
(People v. Ulit y Tampoy, G.R. Nos. 131799-801, [February 23, 2004], 467 PHIL 852-
|||
888)
EN BANC
SYNOPSIS
Accused-appellant was charged with two (2) counts of rape committed against his
own daughter. Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded guilty but bargained for a
lesser penalty for each case. Accordingly, he was sentenced to suffer a jail term of ten
(10) years imprisonment for each case. After three months, the cases were revived at the
instance of the complainant on the ground that the penalty imposed was "too light." As a
consequence, accused-appellant was re-arraigned on both Informations where he entered
a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. After trial, accused-appellant
was found guilty by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City of raping his daughter on
two occasions and was sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of death for each case.
Hence, the present automatic review.
Accused-appellant contended that the trial court erred in re-arraigning him and
proceeding into trial despite the fact that he was already convicted per Order of the trial
court dated January 10, 1997 based on his plea of guilt. He also argued that when the
court rendered judgment convicting him, the prosecution did not appeal nor move for
reconsideration or took steps to set aside the order. Consequently, the conviction having
attained finality can no longer be set aside or modified even if the prosecution later
realized that the penalty imposed was too light. Accused-appellant likewise posited that
the re-arraignment and trial on the same information violated his right against double
jeopardy.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court in Criminal Case No.
Q-96-68-119 convicting appellant of rape and sentencing him to the supreme penalty of
death. The Court, however, in Criminal Case No. Q-96-68120 reduced the penalty of
death to reclusion perpetua because at the time the alleged rape was committed, the
complainant was already nineteen (19) years of age and therefore did not fall under the
last paragraph of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA No. 7659,
authorizing the imposition of the death penalty. The Court found appellant's contention
untenable. Appellant did not plead to a lesser offense, but pleaded guilty to the rape
charges and only bargained for a lesser penalty. He did not plea bargain, but made
conditions on the penalty to be imposed, and by pleading guilty to the offense charged,
appellant should be sentenced to the penalty to which he pleaded. Accordingly, the
judgment rendered by the trial court which was based on a void plea bargaining was also
void ab initio and can not be considered to have attained finality, for the simple reason
that a void judgment has no legality from its inception. Thus, since the judgment of
conviction rendered against accused-appellant was void, double jeopardy will not lie. HIaAED
SYLLABUS
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — We have carefully reviewed the record of this
case and are convinced that the trial judge has faithfully discharged his bounden duty as
minister of the law to determine the voluntariness and full understanding of accused-
appellants' plea of guilty. The absence of the transcript of stenographic notes of the
proceedings during the arraignment do not make the procedure flawed. The minutes of
the proceedings indubitably show that the judge read the Informations to the accused-
appellant both in English and Tagalog, asked him questions as to his understanding of the
consequences of his plea, his educational attainment and occupation. Accused-appellant
could have known of the consequence of his plea having pleaded twice to the charges
against him. In fact, in the two (2) letters sent to the trial court judge, accused-appellant
not only admitted his "sins" but also asked for forgiveness and prayed for a chance to
reform.
DECISION
PER CURIAM : p
Before this court for automatic review is the joint decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 103, in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-96-68119 and Q-96-68120,
finding accused-appellant Antonio Magat y Londonio guilty of raping his daughter, Ann
Fideli L. Magat, on two occasions and sentencing him to suffer the extreme penalty of
death for each case, and to pay the sum of P750,000.00 as compensatory, moral and
exemplary damages.
"That on or about the 14th day of August 1994, during the 17th birthday
of Ann Fideli L Magat in Kasunduan, Quezon City and within the jurisdiction
of the Honorable Court, accused ANTONIO MAGAT Y LONDONIO, with
lewd designs, and by means of threat and violence, did then and there,
unlawfully and feloniously, lie and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with
Ann Fideli Limpoco Magat." 1
After three months, the cases were revived at the instance of the complainant on
the ground that the penalty imposed was "too light." 4 As a consequence, accused-
appellant was re-arraigned on both Informations on April 15, 1997 where he entered a
plea of not guilty. 5
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued with the prosecution presenting Dr. Ida
Daniel, medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation and complainant's
mother.
On July 3, 1997 accused-appellant entered anew a plea of guilty. 6 The court read
to him the Informations in English and Tagalog and repeatedly asked whether he
understood his change of plea and propounded questions as to his understanding of the
consequences of his plea. 7
On July 15, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment, the decretal portion of which
reads:
SO ORDERED." 8
The January 10, 1997 order of the trial court convicting the accused-appellant on
his own plea of quilt is void ab initio on the ground that accused-appellant's plea is not
the plea bargaining contemplated and allowed by law and the rules of procedure. The
only instance where a plea bargaining is allowed under the Rules is when an accused
pleads guilty to a lesser offense. Thus, Section 2, Rule 116 of Revised Rules of Court
provides:
Here, the reduction of the penalty is only a consequence of the plea of guilt to a
lesser penalty.
It must be emphasized that accused-appellant did not plead to a lesser offense but
pleaded guilty to the rape charges and only bargained for a lesser penalty. In short, as
aptly observed by the Solicitor General, he did not plea bargain but made conditions on
the penalty to be imposed. This is erroneous because by pleading guilty to the offense
charged, accused-appellant should be sentenced to the penalty to which he pleaded.
It is the essence of a plea of guilty that the accused admits absolutely and
unconditionally his guilt and responsibility for the offense imputed to him. 9 Hence, an
accused may not foist a conditional plea of guilty on the court by admitting his guilt
provided that a certain penalty will be meted unto him. 10
In effect, the judgment rendered by the trial court which was based on a void plea
bargaining is also void ab initio and can not be considered to have attained finality for the
simple reason that a void judgment has no legality from its inception. 12 Thus, since the
judgment of conviction rendered against accused-appellant is void, double jeopardy will
not lie.
prcd
Accused-appellant also maintains that assuming that there was proper basis for
setting aside the Order of January 10, 1997, the trial court erred in not finding that he
made an improvident plea of guilty. He faults the trial court in not complying with the
procedure laid down in the Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Court. 15 He
claims that the record of the case fails to support the trial court's assertion that it
conducted a searching inquiry to determine that the accused-appellant voluntarily entered
his plea of guilty with full understanding of the consequences of his plea. He claims that
there is no evidence that the trial court conducted searching inquiry in accordance with
the rules.
Under the present rule, if the accused pleads guilty to capital offense, trial courts
are now enjoined: (a) to conduct searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea; (b) to require the prosecution to present
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and
(c) to ask the accused if he so desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to
do so if he desires. 16
This Court, in a long line of decisions imposed upon trial judges to comply with
the procedure laid down in the rules of arraignment, particularly the rules governing a
plea of guilty to a capital offense in order to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in
the mind of either the trial court or of this Court, on review, as to the possibility that there
might have been some misunderstanding on the part of the accused as to the nature of the
charges to which he pleaded guilty and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to the
commission of the crime which justify or require the exercise of a greater or lesser degree
of severity in the imposition of the prescribed penalties. 17 Apart from the circumstances
that such procedure may remove any doubt that the accused fully understood the
consequences of his plea is the fact that the evidence taken thereon is essential to the
fulfillment by this Court of its duty of review of automatic appeals from death sentences.
18
We have carefully reviewed the record of this case and are convinced that the trial
judge has faithfully discharged his bounden duty as minister of the law to determine the
voluntariness and full understanding of accused-appellants' plea of guilty. The absence of
the transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings during the arraignment do not
make the procedure flawed. The minutes of the proceedings 19 indubitably show that the
judge read the Informations to the accused-appellant both in English and Tagalog, asked
him questions as to his understanding of the consequences of his plea, his educational
attainment and occupation. Accused-appellant could have known of the consequence of
his plea having pleaded twice to the charges against him. In fact, in the two (2) letters
sent to the trial court judge, accused-appellant not only admitted his "sins" but also asked
for forgiveness and prayed for a chance to reform. 20
Moreover, the prosecution has already presented its evidence. Thus, even
assuming that there was an improvident plea of guilt, the evidence on record can sustain
the conviction of the accused appellant.
"Complainant's . . . parents separated when she was only seven (7) years
old and she and her younger brother David were left with her father, accused-
appellant, while another brother, Jonathan, and sister, Abigail, stayed with their
mother (TSN, July 15, 1997, p. 46; May 22, 1997, pp. 38-41; 49-51).
"On her 9th birthday, her father first raped her and she was beaten when
she resisted, thus, she found it futile to resist every time her father touched her
after that (TSN, supra, pp. 24-25).
"August 14, 1994, was complainant's 17th birthday. That evening, while
sleeping together with accused-appellant and her brother in their rented house at
Kasunduan, Quezon City, she was awakened by the kisses of her father. He then
removed her clothes and, after removing his own clothes, went on top of her and
inserted his penis inside her vagina as he had done to her many times before this
incident. After he had finished, he told her to wash her vagina which she did
(TSN, supra, pp. 12-17).
"On September 1, 1996, complainant who was already 19 years old, was
at home with accused-appellant and her brother after 'selling' when her father
ordered her and her brother to go to sleep. Her brother fell asleep but
complainant could not sleep and was restless that night. Again, accused-
appellant raped her on the same bed where her brother was also sleeping. She
did not resist him anymore because nothing would happen anyway and he
would just beat her if she did (TSN, supra, 21-25).
". . . complainant further revealed that she was not only sexually abused
but also physically abused by accused-appellant who even beat her with a whip
while being tied and struck her with a bag containing tin cans causing head
injuries necessitating her hospitalization. She also confirmed that her father
started raping her on her 9th birthday which was repeated several times after
that. She likewise revealed that she felt some fluid ('katas') coming out of her
father's penis every time he raped her but she did not become pregnant because
her father made her drink the water from boiled guava leaves and a medicine
she identified as 'Gextex' (should be Gestex) if her menstruation was delayed. In
fact, when her menstrual period was delayed for three (3) months, her father
even boxed her stomach after making her drink the water boiled from guava
leaves and Gextex thereby causing her to bleed profusely. She was not able to
report or reveal what her father did to her because she was warned by him that
he would kill her, her brother, her mother and her relatives if ever she would
escape and reveal the rape. Besides, she had nowhere else to go and was further
made to believe by her father that there was nothing wrong with what he was
doing to her because it was not forbidden by the Bible."
While we have in a catena of cases set aside convictions based on pleas of guilty
in capital offenses because of the improvidence of the plea, we did so only when such
plea is the sole basis of the judgment of the condemnatory judgment. Thus, when the trial
court in obedience to this Court's injunction, receives evidence to determine precisely
whether or not the accused has erred in admitting guilt, the manner in which the plea of
guilty is made loses legal significance, for the simple reason that the conviction is
predicated not on the plea but on the evidence proving the commission by the accused of
the offense charged. 22 In such case, it cannot be claimed that defendant was sentenced to
death without having been previously informed of the nature of the charges against him
and of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances recited in the information, as he is
fully apprised not only of the allegations in the information but of the entire evidence of
the prosecution. 23
Accused-appellant further impugns the trial court's imposition of the death penalty
in Criminal Case No. Q-96-68120 contending that the complainant was already nineteen
(19) years old when the alleged rape occurred.
Republic Act No. 7659 which amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender
is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of
the victim." (Emphasis supplied)
Complainant was born on August 14, 1977. 25 On September 1, 1996, when the rape was
committed (Criminal Case No. Q-96-68120), complainant was already nineteen (19)
years of age. Therefore, the same does not fall under the last paragraph of Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA No. 7659. The proper penalty should be
reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 335 of Revised Penal Code.
However, the extreme penalty of death should be imposed in Criminal Case No.
Q-96-68119, complainant being only 17 years of age when accused-appellant, his father,
raped her.
Finally, accused-appellant likewise assails the award of P750,000.00 damages
claiming that the same is excessive.
With regard to the award of compensatory damages, we have ruled in People vs.
Victor, 26 which was later reaffirmed in People vs. Prades, 27 that "if the crime of rape is
committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death
penalty is authorized by the present amended law, the indemnity of the victim shall be in
the increased amount of not less than P75,000.00." 28 Accordingly, in Criminal Case No.
Q-96-68119, the award of compensatory damages should be increased from P50,000.00
to P75,000.00. In Criminal Case No. Q-96-68120 however, while appellant was
sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the compensatory damage should be the same
(P75,000.00). As rightly argued by the Solicitor General, the trauma, ignominy, pain and
shame suffered by the complainant can not be treated or regarded any lesser.
The award of civil indemnity "is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal
perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an
expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against
chastity." 29 More so, if the crime is committed by the father against his own flesh and
blood.
With respect to the award of moral damages, we have in People vs. Prades, 30
held:
". . . The Court has also resolved that in crimes of rape, such as that
under consideration, moral damages may additionally be awarded to the victim
in the criminal proceeding, in such amount as the Court deems just, without the
need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof as has heretofore been the
practice. Indeed, the conventional requirement of allegata et probata in civil
procedure and for essentially civil cases should be dispensed with in criminal
prosecution for rape with the civil aspect included therein, since no appropriate
pleadings are filed wherein such allegations can be made.
"Corollarily, the fact that complainant has suffered the trauma of mental,
physical and psychological sufferings which constitute the bases for moral
damages are too obvious to still require the recital thereof at the trial by the
victim, since the Court itself even assumes and acknowledges such agony on her
part as a gauge of her credibility. What exists by necessary implication as being
ineludibly present in the case need not go through the superfluity of still being
proved through a testimonial charade."
1. In Criminal Case No. Q-96-68119, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court convicting accused-appellant Antonio Magat y Londonio of
rape and sentencing him to the Supreme Penalty of DEATH is
hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the award of
compensatory damages be increased to Seventy-Five Thousand
Pesos (P75,000.00), moral damages is reduced to Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) and exemplary damages deleted.
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-96-68120, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court convicting accused-appellant of rape and sentencing him to
the Supreme Penalty of DEATH is hereby reduced to
RECLUSION PERPETUA. The award of compensatory damages is
increased to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75.000.00), moral
damages is reduced to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and
exemplary damages is deleted.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Acting C.J.), Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Purisima, Pardo,
Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Magat, G.R. No. 130026, [May 31, 2000], 388 PHIL 311-328)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 188314. January 10, 2011.]
DECISION
SERENO, J : p
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated 30 June 2008, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 05-476 and 05-4777 dated 18 October 2005. The
latter Decision convicted the three accused-appellants — namely, Gamal B. Baharan
a.k.a. Tapay, Angelo Trinidad a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu
Jackie or Zaky — of the complex crime of multiple murder and multiple frustrated
murder, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. The CA
modified the sentence to reclusion perpetua as required by Republic Act No. 9346
(Act Abolishing the Imposition of Death Penalty).
Statement of Facts
On 14 February 2005, an RRCG bus was plying its usual southbound route,
from its Navotas bus terminal towards its Alabang bus terminal via Epifanio de los
Santos Avenue (EDSA). Around 6:30 to 7:30 in the evening, while they were about to
move out of the Guadalupe-EDSA southbound bus stop, the bus conductor noticed
two men running after the bus. The two insisted on getting on the bus, so the
conductor obliged and let them in.
According to Elmer Andales, the bus conductor, he immediately became wary
of the two men, because, even if they got on the bus together, the two sat away from
each other — one sat two seats behind the driver, while the other sat at the back of the
bus. At the time, there were only 15 passengers inside the bus. He also noticed that
the eyes of one of the men were reddish. When he approached the person near the
driver and asked him whether he was paying for two passengers, the latter looked
dumb struck by the question. He then stuttered and said he was paying for two and
gave PhP20. Andales grew more concerned when the other man seated at the back
also paid for both passengers. At this point, Andales said he became more certain that
the two were up to no good, and that there might be a holdup.
Afterwards, Andales said he became more suspicious because both men kept
on asking him if the bus was going to stop at Ayala Avenue. The witness also noticed
that the man at the back appeared to be slouching, with his legs stretched out in front
of him and his arms hanging out and hidden from view as if he was tinkering with
something. When Andales would get near the man, the latter would glare at him.
Andales admitted, however, that he did not report the suspicious characters to the
police.
As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala Avenue and
EDSA, the two men insisted on getting off the bus. According to Andales, the bus
driver initially did not want to let them off the bus, because a Makati ordinance
prohibited unloading anywhere except at designated bus stops. Eventually, the bus
driver gave in and allowed the two passengers to alight. The two immediately got off
the bus and ran towards Ayala Avenue. Moments after, Andales felt an explosion. He
then saw fire quickly engulfing the bus. He ran out of the bus towards a nearby mall.
After a while, he went back to where the bus was. He saw their bus passengers either
lying on the ground or looking traumatized. A few hours after, he made a statement
before the Makati Police Station narrating the whole incident.
The prosecution presented documents furnished by the Department of Justice,
confirming that shortly before the explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf
Group — Abu Solaiman — announced over radio station DZBB that the group had a
Valentine's Day "gift" for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. After the
bombing, he again went on radio and warned of more bomb attacks. HETDAC
2.) That all three accused namely alias Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted
knowing one another before February 14, 2005.
3.) All the same three accused likewise admitted that a bomb exploded in the
RRCG bus while the bus was plying the EDSA route fronting the MRT
terminal which is in front of the Makati Commercial Center.
4.) Accused Asali admitted knowing the other accused alias Rohmat whom he
claims taught him how to make explosive devices.
5.) The accused Trinidad also admitted knowing Rohmat before the February 14
bombing incident.
6.) The accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all admitted to causing the bomb
explosion inside the RRCG bus which left four people dead and more or
less forty persons injured.
7.) Both Baharan and Trinidad agreed to stipulate that within the period March
20-24 each gave separate interviews to the ABS-CBN news network
admitting their participation in the commission of the said crimes,
subject of these cases.
9.) Accused Asali likewise admitted that in the middle of March 2005 he gave a
television news interview in which he admitted that he supplied the
explosive devices which resulted in this explosion inside the RRCG bus
and which resulted in the filing of these charges.
10.) Finally, accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted that they are
members of the Abu Sayyaf. 1
In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether accused
Baharan and Trinidad were amenable to changing their "not guilty" pleas to the
charge of multiple frustrated murder, considering that they pled "guilty" to the
heavier charge of multiple murder, creating an apparent inconsistency in their pleas.
Defense counsel conferred with accused Baharan and Trinidad and explained to them
the consequences of the pleas. The two accused acknowledged the inconsistencies and
manifested their readiness for re-arraignment. After the Information was read to them,
Baharan and Trinidad pled guilty to the charge of multiple frustrated murder. 2
After being discharged as state witness, accused Asali testified that while under
training with the Abu Sayyaf in 2004, Rohmat, a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, and two
other persons taught him how to make bombs and explosives. The trainees were told
that they were to wage battles against the government in the city, and that their first
mission was to plant bombs in malls, the Light Railway Transit (LRT), and other parts
of Metro Manila. HTIEaS
As found by the trial court, Asali, after his training, was required by the Abu
Sayyaf leadership, specifically Abu Solaiman and Rohmat, to secure eight kilos of
TNT, a soldering gun, aluminum powder, a tester, and Christmas lights, all of which
he knew would be used to make a bomb. He then recalled that sometime in November
to December 2004, Trinidad asked him for a total of 4 kilos of TNT — that is, 2 kilos
on two separate occasions. Rohmat allegedly called Asali to confirm that Trinidad
would get TNT from Asali and use it for their first mission. The TNT was allegedly
placed in two buses sometime in December 2004, but neither one of them exploded.
Asali then testified that the night before the Valentine's Day bombing, Trinidad
and Baharan got another two kilos of TNT from him. Late in the evening of 14
February, he received a call from Abu Solaiman. The latter told Asali not to leave
home or go to crowded areas, since the TNT taken by Baharan and Trinidad had
already been exploded in Makati. Thirty minutes later, Trinidad called Asali,
repeating the warning of Abu Solaiman. The next day, Asali allegedly received a call
from accused Rohmat, congratulating the former on the success of the mission. 3
According to Asali, Abu Zaky specifically said, "Sa wakas nag success din yung
tinuro ko sayo."
Assignment of Errors
II. The trial court gravely erred in finding that the guilt of accused-appellants for
the crimes charged had been proven beyond reasonable doubt. 4
First Assignment of Error
Accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad argue that the trial court did not
conduct a searching inquiry after they had changed their plea from "not guilty" to
"guilty." The transcript of stenographic notes during the 18 April 2005 re-arraignment
before the Makati Regional Trial Court is reproduced below:
Court:
Anyway, I think what we should have to do, considering the stipulations that
were agreed upon during the last hearing, is to address this matter of
pleas of not guilty entered for the frustrated murder charges by the two
accused, Mr. Trinidad and Mr. Baharan, because if you will recall they
entered pleas of guilty to the multiple murder charges, but then earlier
pleas of not guilty for the frustrated multiple murder charges remain . . .
[I]s that not inconsistent considering the stipulations that were entered
into during the initial pretrial of this case? [If] you will recall, they
admitted to have caused the bomb explosion that led to the death of at
least four people and injury of about forty other persons and so under the
circumstances, Atty Peña, have you discussed this matter with your
clients?
Atty. Peña:
Court:
Okay. So let us proceed now. Atty. Peña, can you assist the two accused
because if they are interested in withdrawing their [pleas], I want to hear
it from your lips.
Atty. Peña:
(At this juncture, Atty. Peña confers with the two accused, namely
Trinidad and Baharan) EIAScH
I have talked to them, your Honor, and I have explained to them the
consequence of their pleas, your Honor, and that the plea of guilt to the
murder case and plea of not guilty to the frustrated multiple murder
actually are inconsistent with their pleas.
Court:
Atty. Peña:
Yes, your Honor. So, they are now, since they already plead guilt to the
murder case, then they are now changing their pleas, your Honor, from
not guilty to the one of guilt. They are now ready, your Honor, for re-
arraignment.
INTERPRETER:
(Read again that portion [of the information] and translated it in Filipino in a
clearer way and asked both accused what their pleas are).
Your Honor, both accused are entering separate pleas of guilt to the crime
charged.
COURT:
All right. So after the information was re-read to the accused, they have
withdrawn their pleas of not guilty and changed it to the pleas of guilty
to the charge of frustrated murder. Thank you. Are there any matters
you need to address at pretrial now? If there are none, then I will
terminate pretrial and accommodate . . . 5
As early as in People v. Apduhan, the Supreme Court has ruled that "all trial
judges . . . must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused's plea of guilty, for
while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra
solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he understands fully the
meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction." 6 Thus, trial court
judges are required to observe the following procedure under Section 3, Rule 116 of
the Rules of Court:
In their second assignment of error, accused-appellants assert that guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt. They pointed out that the testimony of the conductor
was merely circumstantial, while that of Asali as to the conspiracy was insufficient.
Insofar as accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad are concerned, the
evidence for the prosecution, in addition to that which can be drawn from the
stipulation of facts, primarily consisted of the testimonies of the bus conductor, Elmer
Andales, and of the accused-turned-state-witness, Asali. Andales positively identified
accused Baharan and Trinidad as the two men who had acted suspiciously while
inside the bus; who had insisted on getting off the bus in violation of a Makati
ordinance; and who had scampered away from the bus moments before the bomb
exploded. On the other hand, Asali testified that he had given accused Baharan and
Trinidad the TNT used in the bombing incident in Makati City. The guilt of the
accused Baharan and Trinidad was sufficiently established by these corroborating
testimonies, coupled with their respective judicial admissions (pretrial stipulations)
and extrajudicial confessions (exclusive television interviews, as they both stipulated
during pretrial) that they were indeed the perpetrators of the Valentine's Day
bombing. 15 Accordingly, the Court upholds the findings of guilt made by the trial
court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Anent accused Rohmat, the evidence for the prosecution consisted of the
testimony of accused-turned-state-witness Asali. Below is a reproduction of the
transcript of stenographic notes on the state prosecutor's direct examination of state-
witness Asali during the 26 May 2005 trial:
Q: You stated that Zaky trained you and Trinidad. Under what circumstances
did he train you, Mr. Witness, to assemble those explosives, you and
Trinidad?
A: Abu Zaky, Abu Solaiman, Khadaffy Janjalani, the three of them, that Angelo
Trinidad and myself be the one to be trained to make an explosive, sir.
Q: Mr. witness, how long that training, or how long did it take that training?
A: If I am not mistaken, we were thought to make bomb about one month and
two weeks.
A: Our first mission was to plant a bomb in the malls, LRT, and other parts of
Metro Manila, sir. 16
The witness then testified that he kept eight kilos of TNT for accused Baharan and
Trinidad.
Q: Now, going back to the bomb. Mr. witness, did you know what happened to
the 2 kilos of bomb that Trinidad and Tapay took from you sometime in
November 2004?
A: That was the explosive that he planted in the G-liner, which did not explode.
A: He was the one who told me, Mr. Angelo Trinidad, sir.
Q: What happened next, Mr. witness, when the bomb did not explode, as told to
you by Trinidad? cIECTH
A: On December 29, Angelo Trinidad got 2 more kilos of TNT bombs.
Q: Did Trinidad tell you why he needed another amount of explosive on that
date, December 29, 2004? Will you kindly tell us the reason why?
A: He told me that Abu Solaiman instructed me to get the TNT so that he could
detonate a bomb
Q: Were there any other person, besides Abu Solaiman, who called you up, with
respect to the taking of the explosives from you?
Q: Please enlighten the Honorable Court. What is that mission you are referring
to?
A: That is the first mission where we can show our anger towards the
Christians.
Q: The second time that he got a bomb from you, Mr. witness, do you know if
the bomb explode?
A: I did not know what happened to the next 2 kilos taken by Angelo Trinidad
from me until after I was caught, because I was told by the policeman
that interviewed me after I was arrested that the 2 kilos were planted in a
bus, which also did not explode.
Q: So besides these two incidents, were there any other incidents that Angelo
Trinidad and Tapay get an explosive for you, Mr. witness?
Q: How many explosives did they get from you, Mr. witness, at that time?
Q: Did they tell you, Mr. witness, where are they going to use that explosive?
A: No, sir.
Q: Do you know, Mr. witness, what happened to the third batch of explosives,
which were taken from you by Trinidad and Tapay? ETDHaC
Q: Was there any other call during that time, Mr. Witness?
A: I was told by Angelo Trinidad not to leave the house because the explosive
that he took exploded already, sir.
Q: How sure were you, Mr. witness, at that time, that indeed, the bomb
exploded at Makati, beside the call of Abu Solaiman and Trinidad?
A: It was told by Abu Solaiman that the bombing in Makati should coincide
with the bombing in General Santos.
A: He told it to me, sir . . . I cannot remember the date anymore, but I know it
was sometime in February 2005.
Q: Any other call, Mr. witness, from Abu Solaiman and Trinidad after the
bombing exploded in Makati, any other call?
A: He told me that "sa wakas, nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo."
A: Because when we were undergoing training, we were told that the Abu
Sayyaf should not wage war to the forest, but also wage our battles in
the city.
What can be culled from the testimony of Asali is that the Abu Sayyaf Group
was determined to sow terror in Metro Manila, so that they could show their "anger
towards the Christians." 18 It can also be seen that Rohmat, together with Janjalani
and Abu Solaiman, had carefully planned the Valentine's Day bombing incident,
months before it happened. Rohmat had trained Asali and Trinidad to make bombs
and explosives. While in training, Asali and others were told that their mission was to
plant bombs in malls, the LRT, and other parts of Metro Manila. According to Asali,
Rohmat called him on 29 December 2004 to confirm that Trinidad would get two
kilos of TNT from Asali, as they were "about to commence" their "first mission." 19
They made two separate attempts to bomb a bus in Metro Manila, but to no avail. The
day before the Valentine's Day bombing, Trinidad got another two kilos of TNT from
Asali. On Valentine's Day, the Abu Sayyaf Group announced that they had a gift for
the former President, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. On their third try, their plan finally
succeeded. Right after the bomb exploded, the Abu Sayyaf Group declared that there
would be more bombings in the future. Asali then received a call from Rohmat,
praising the former: "Sa wakas nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo." 20 CaDATc
In the light of the foregoing evidence, the Court upholds the finding of guilt
against Rohmat. Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
While said conspiracy involving the four malefactors has not been
expressly admitted by accused Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, and Rohmat, more
specifically with respect to the latter's participation in the commission of the
crimes, nonetheless it has been established by virtue of the aforementioned
evidence, which established the existence of the conspiracy itself and the
indispensable participation of accused Rohmat in seeing to it that the
conspirators' criminal design would be realized.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Baharan, G.R. No. 188314, [January 10, 2011], 654 PHIL 148-169)
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 141129-33. December 14, 2001.]
SYNOPSIS
Accused-appellant Roland J. Molina was charged with attempted rape and four (4)
counts of incestuous rape penalized under RA 8353 amending Art. 266 of The Revised
Penal Code committed against his very own 16-year old daughter Brenda Molina. He
was found guilty by the court a quo in these five (5) crimes for which he was meted a
prison term for the attempted rape and four (4) death sentences for the four (4) counts of
incestuous rape. In his appeal before the Court, appellant, through the Public Attorney's
Office asserted that his plea of guilty was improvidently made.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of origin for rearraignment and
for further proceedings. The Court found merit in the Public Attorney's Office's
observation and ruled that the improvident plea of guilt of appellant and the critical
omissions in the procedure adopted by the trial court in the re-arraignment has affected
the manner by which the prosecution and the defense conducted its presentation of the
evidence, and the trial court in evaluating the evidence on record. The record of the re-
arraignment merely noted that the accused was re-arraigned and entered a plea of guilty
separately in the five cases after the consequences of the change of plea had been duly
explained to him, but it did not state that copies of the five (5) Informations and the list of
witnesses were given to him and that the Informations were read in a language that he
knows. Even the certificate of re-arraignment contradicted the statement therein that
appellant was separately re-arraigned in the five (5) criminal cases. The certificate stated
"complaint" (singular) rather than "complaints" (plural) since there were five (5) criminal
cases to which he was allegedly pleading guilty and thus irregularly attested to his guilty
plea to only one (1) of the five (5) Informations. The trial court did not also conduct a
searching inquiry to establish that the plea of guilty was done voluntarily with full
awareness of its consequences. The fact that the consequences of the plea were explained
to appellant did not mean that there was compliance with the strict parameters of a
searching inquiry since a mere warning that the accused faces the supreme penalty of
death is insufficient. The trial court should have explained to appellant the essential
elements of the five (5) crimes he was charged with and their respective penalties and
civil liabilities, and also should have directed a series of questions to defense counsel to
determine whether he has conferred with his client and has completely explained to him
the meaning of a plea of guilty. The said formula is mandatory and absent any showing
that it was followed, a searching inquiry cannot be said to have been undertaken. CHDaAE
SYLLABUS
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J : p
This case pierces the enduring belief in the family as a peaceful retreat. Here, we
are faced with a father who, it is claimed, attempted to rape his own daughter once and
succeeded in consummating it four (4) times before then, as a result of which he was
sentenced to a prison term and imposed four (4) death penalties. The children, as many
others in the past, are unfortunately the victims of this indecency in an atrophied family,
something that we stress is never about losing virtue or honor but an assault upon their
persons akin to torture or murder. 1 Quite understandably, most crimes of this nature
remain unreported, while the perpetrators in those cases prosecuted and tried, naturally
engender enmity and rage. With sensitivity to this call for justice and healing, we proceed
to review this criminal case.
Roland J. Molina, accused-appellant, was charged with attempted rape and four
(4) counts of incestuous rape penalized under RA 8353 amending Art. 266 of The
Revised Penal Code committed against his very own 16-year old 2 daughter Brenda
Molina. He was found guilty by the court a quo in these five (5) crimes for which he was
meted an indeterminate sentence of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal
as maximum for the attempted rape, and four (4) death sentences for the four (4) counts
of incestuous rape. He was also ordered to pay his victim indemnity and moral damages
each worth P75,000.00. His conviction is now the subject of this automatic review, 3 and
tests our fealty to procedural fairness and the rule of law.
The four (4) cases of incestuous rape were allegedly committed by accused-
appellant Roland Molina sometime in August 1998, 22 September, 29 September and 24
December 1998, while the attempted rape, on 1 March 1999. Upon the verbal complaint
of his daughter Brenda, accused-appellant was arrested on 3 March 1999 and detained at
the municipal jail of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan. There is however nothing on record from
then on to account for his version of the facts.
Despite his immediate arrest and the absence of a waiver under the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, accused-appellant was subjected to a regular preliminary
investigation by the municipal trial judge whose findings 4 were affirmed by the
Provincial Prosecutor. Accused-appellant did not file a counter-affidavit to refute the
charges. The preliminary investigation took about one (1) month to complete, after
which, accused-appellant was transferred from the Sta. Barbara Municipal Jail to the
Pangasinan Provincial Jail. Thereafter, four (4) Informations were filed against accused-
appellant for raping his own daughter who was below eighteen (18) years old 5 and one
(1) Information for attempted rape. 6 The cases were raffled to RTC-Br. 42 in Dagupan
City, Pangasinan.
Roland Molina was arraigned on the four (4) indictments for incestuous rape on 18
May 1999. He pleaded not guilty to each of the four (4) charges. On 20 May 1999 these
cases were consolidated with the attempted rape to which he also pleaded not guilty on 3
June 1999, after which, the pre-trial was conducted for all the five (5) cases. The trial
commenced on 22 July 1999 with the mother of complaining witness Brenda Molina
testifying. Parenthetically, two (2) of the Informations (Crim. Cases Nos. 99-02818-D
and 99-02819-D), both for incestuous rape, were amended to specify the dates of
commission of the crimes
On 30 August 1999 the hearing was cut short when the prosecution "asked for a
deferment to determine whether the proposal of the accused to withdraw his plea of not
guilty and change same (sic) to guilty could have the effect of lowering the penalty
attached to the offense charged to reclusion perpetua." 7 Trial was thus reset to 2
September 1999 on which date the defense counsel manifested the desire of accused-
appellant to change his plea to guilty as regards all the five (5) crimes since he "was
being bothered by his conscience and by way of contrition would like to make amends." 8
Thus he was immediately re-arraigned and entered a plea of guilty "after," as the trial
court noted, "the consequences of the change of plea had been duly explained to him by
his counsel and by 1st Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Eugenio Manaois, the public
prosecutor handling the case for the prosecution." 9 Despite this observation of the trial
court, there is nothing on record to determine what this explanation consisted of. By way
of concession, after accused-appellant was arraigned, the defense counsel prayed for
liberality from the trial court "even only by recommending the accused for executive
clemency.'' 10
The Public Attorneys Office, in its Brief for the Appellant, asserts that accused-
appellant's plea of guilty was improvidently made.
We find merit in this observation. Verily it was incumbent upon the trial court to
observe the provisions of Secs. 1, par. (a), and 3, of Rule 116, 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, when accused appellant manifested his intention to withdraw his earlier plea
of not guilty to re-enter a plea of guilty to the four (4) crimes of incestuous rape and one
(1) attempted rape. In this regard, we find critical omissions in the procedure adopted by
the trial court in the re-arraignment of accused-appellant. For one, Sec. 1, par. (a), of Rule
116 of the Rules of Court, 12 which requires that the accused-appellant must be furnished
a copy of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses to be read to him in the
language or dialect known to him, was not followed by the trial court. Record of the re-
arraignment merely noted that "the accused was re-arraigned and [he] entered a plea of
guilty separately in the five-entitled cases after the consequences of the change of plea
have been duly explained to him . . ." 13 but it does not state that copies of the five (5)
Informations and the list of witnesses were given to him and the Informations read in a
language that he knows. We ruled in People v. Bello 14 that when the death penalty is at
stake, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions does not
apply —
Clearly, it cannot be said that the trial court complied with this rule.
Moreover, the trial court did not conduct a searching inquiry to establish that the
plea of guilty was done voluntarily with full awareness of its consequences. 19 This
procedure is anchored on Sec. 3, of Rule 116, 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure —
When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall
conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full consequences of his
plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of
culpability. The accused may also present evidence on his behalf.
Under established principles, a searching inquiry must not only comply with the
requirements of Sec. 1, par. (a), of Rule 116 but must also expound on the events that
actually took place during the arraignment, the words spoken and the warnings given, 20
with special attention to the age of the accused, his educational attainment and socio-
economic status 21 as well as the manner of his arrest and detention, the provision of
counsel in his behalf during the custodial and preliminary investigations, and the
opportunity of his defense counsel to confer with him. 22 These matters are relevant since
they serve as trustworthy indices of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilt.
23 Lastly, the trial court must explain the essential elements of the five (5) crimes he was
charged with and their respective penalties and civil liabilities, 24 and also direct a series
of questions to defense counsel to determine whether he has conferred with the accused
and has completely explained to him the meaning of a plea of guilty. 25 This formula is
mandatory and absent any showing that it was followed, a searching inquiry cannot be
said to have been undertaken. 26
Nothing on record shows that the foregoing inquiry was complied with, or in any
manner or event answered. Not even the assurance conveyed to us by the Order of the
trial court of 2 September 1999 sketchily alleging compliance with the requirements
satisfies a searching inquiry —
With this Order alone, we have nothing to go by to state for sure that the trial court
followed the steps or asked the questions outlined above or that accused-appellant's own
counsel advised him adequately. As stated above, we do not presume compliance with
the requirements from a silent record. The fact that the consequences of the plea were
explained to accused-appellant does not comply with the strict parameters of a searching
inquiry since "a mere warning that the accused faces the supreme penalty of death is
insufficient." 27 There are therefore clearly no verifiable facts for us to assume that he
completely comprehended the legal significance of a guilty plea and the nature of the
crime or crimes he confessed to.
In view of the foregoing we have no alternative but to set aside the plea of guilty.
30
It is also urged in the Brief for the Appellant that an improvident plea of guilty per
se results in the remand of the criminal case(s) to the trial court for the re-arraignment of
accused-appellant and for further proceedings. We hold that this argument does not
accurately reflect the standing principle. Our jurisdiction does not subscribe to a per se
rule that once a plea of guilty is deemed improvidently made that the accused-appellant is
at once entitled to a remand. To warrant a remand of the criminal case, it must also be
proved that as a result of such irregularity there was inadequate representation of facts by
either the prosecution or the defense during the trial. In People v. Abapo 31 we found that
undue reliance upon an invalid plea of guilty prevented the prosecution from fully
presenting its evidence, and thus remanded the criminal case for further proceedings.
Similarly in People v. Durango 32 where an improvident plea of guilty was followed by
an abbreviated proceeding with practically no role at all being played by the defense, we
ruled that this procedure was "just too meager to accept as being the standard
constitutional due process at work enough to forfeit a human life" and so threw back the
criminal case to the trial court for appropriate action. Verily the relevant matter that
justifies the remand of the criminal case to the trial court is the procedural unfairness or
complete miscarriage of justice in the handling of the proceedings a quo as occasioned by
the improvident plea of guilty, 33 or what People v. Tizon 34 encapsulizes as the
"attendant circumstances."
Where facts are however adequately represented in the criminal case and no
procedural unfairness or irregularity has prejudiced either the prosecution or the defense
as a result of the improvident plea of guilty, the settled rule is that a decision based on an
irregular plea may nevertheless be upheld where the judgment is supported beyond
reasonable doubt by other evidence on record 35 since it would be a useless ritual to
return the case to the trial court for another arraignment and further proceedings. 36
After a careful examination of the records, we find that the improvident plea of
guilt of accused-appellant has affected the manner by which the prosecution and the
defense conducted its presentation of the evidence, and the trial court in carefully
evaluating the evidence on record. Remand of Crim. Cases Nos. 99-02817-D, 99-02818-
D, 99-02819-D, 99-02820-D and 99-02821-D for re-arraignment and further relevant
proceedings is therefore proper. First, the prosecution failed to lay the proper foundation
for the introduction of the alleged handwritten letter of accused-appellant acknowledging
his guilt for the rape of his daughter. This could very well be attributed to the fact that
this letter was introduced only after accused-appellant pleaded guilty to the accusations
for which reason the prosecution no longer endeavored to elicit the proper foundation for
this evidence.
Under Sec. 20 of Rule 132, Rules of Court, proof of the authenticity and due
execution of this letter is done by "anyone who saw the document executed or written" or
"evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker." Brenda's
testimony that the letter was given to her by her father's nephew and grandfather and that
it was signed by accused-appellant does not prove the authorship of the letter. 37 In the
first place, no foundation was laid to ascertain that she knew the signature of her father,
and her reliance upon statements of her father's nephew and grandfather (even if truly
said) would be hearsay and speculative. Furthermore, the contents of the letter are, as it
is, far from damaging. Its relevant parts are ambiguous from which we cannot infer
anything about the alleged cases of rape of Brenda. It states, ". . . please forgive me for
what happened to us . . . so please forgive and I'll promise I will not repeat anymore what
I have done to you." Verily, several conclusions could be deciphered from these
statements that may have nothing to do at all with rape.
It is certainly within the power of the prosecution to compel accused-appellant's
nephew and grandfather to prove the authenticity and due execution of the alleged
damning letter since they were the sources thereof. Or perhaps if accused-appellant was
indeed pleading guilty then, he could very well accommodate the prosecution by owning
authorship of the letter and clarifying its meaning. This the prosecution may undertake in
the course of the proceedings upon remand of the criminal cases.
Second, the presentation of the prosecution's case was lacking in assiduity and was
not characterized with the meticulous attention to details that is necessarily expected in a
prosecution for a capital offense. In his examination of Brenda after accused-appellant
pleaded guilty, the public prosecutor was evidently concerned with abbreviating the
proceedings as shown by his failure to clarify such ambiguous statements as "he repeated
to me what he had done to me" when previously he pursued such ambiguities to their
clear intended meanings. It is clear to our mind that the prosecution did not discharge its
obligation as seriously as it should have had, had there been no plea of guilt on the part of
the accused. The prosecutor's questions and Brenda's answers are as follows — cCEAHT
Q: And after kissing your neck as well as your breast, what else did your father
do?
Q: Was he successful?
A: No sir.
Q: Why do you know that he was inserting his penis into your vagina?
Q: When you said your father was successful in doing what he wanted to do and
that he used you, what do you mean by he used you?
A: He had sexual intercourse with me, sir. (TSN, 16 August 1999, pp. 23-25).
[on 22 September 1998]
Q: What is that which your father does to your mother and which he did to you
on that night of September 22, 1998, tell us in plain language?
Q: While you were sleeping in your house on that same date which is (sic)
approximately one week after September 22, was there anything unusual
that took place?
A: Yes, sir.
A: He repeated to me what he did to me for the first time and second time, sir.
(TSN, 16 September 1999, pp. 7-8).
Q: While you were sleeping on that night of December 24, was there anything
unusual that took place?
A: Yes, sir.
A: He repeated to me (again) what he had done to me, sir. (TSN, 16 September
1999, p. 10).
Third, the prosecution could very well clarify why on 1 March 1999 after accused-
appellant's wife saw him and Brenda sleeping side by side and after she confronted his
husband about it 38 and was told by her daughter that "if I will tell it to you, my father
will kill us," 39 accused-appellant was still allegedly able to attempt a rape on his
daughter on the same date. 40 It is our understanding of the behavior of gutter criminals
that with the confrontation between him and his wife, he would have laid low a while
even for just that day. 41 The prosecution may want to elucidate on this seemingly
unnatural behavior.
Fourth, neither the defense nor the prosecution elicited from the private
complainant whether the accusations for incestuous rape and attempted rape were in a
manner colored by the seething allegations in the transcript of stenographic notes that
accused-appellant was a violent person towards his family, most especially his wife who
is Brenda's mother. 42 This Court would want to know for sure that these criminal cases
under review are not merciless equivalents of the alleged violence done by accused-
appellant. Our endeavor is to try the case on the facts and not upon the supposedly
despicable character of the man.
Fifth, the improvident plea appears to have sent the wrong signal to the defense
that proceedings thereafter would be abbreviated. There was thus a perfunctory
representation of accused-appellant as shown by (a) his counsel's failure to object to and
correct the irregularities during his client's re-arraignment; (b) his failure to question the
offer of the alleged letter wherein accused-appellant acknowledged his authorship of the
dastardly crimes; (c) his failure to present evidence in behalf of accused-appellant or to so
inform the latter of his right to adduce evidence whether in support of the guilty plea or in
deviation therefrom; (d) his failure to object to his client's warrantless arrest and the
designation of the crime in Crim. Case No. 99-02821-D as attempted rape when the
evidence may appear not to warrant the same; and, (e) his failure to file a notice of appeal
as regards Crim. Case No. 99-02821-D to the Court of Appeals for appropriate review.
This Court perceives no reasonable basis for excusing these omissions as counsel's
strategic decision in his handling of the case. Rather, they constitute inadequate
representation that renders the result of the trial suspect or unreliable, and as we
explained in People v. Durango, 43 in violation of the right to counsel of accused-
appellant —
Counsel's failure to insure that the plea colloquy conducted met at least
the minimal standards as set forth in Rule 319 and cases of this Commonwealth
[have] no reasonable legal basis that we can discern. As such, we hold that
appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel.
Considering the other attendant circumstances, with more reason should we so rule
in the instant case.
While no longer material to the merits of the criminal cases now under review, it
appears to us that accused-appellant's warrantless arrest on 3 March 1999 was contrary to
law. We observe with due attention how he was arrested without a warrant and thereafter
subjected to the regular process of preliminary investigation without the benefit of a
waiver as called for in Art. 125, The Revised Penal Code, and Sec. 7 of Rule 112, 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Without belaboring this matter, it is worth stressing that his
warrantless arrest was under no emergency circumstance of flight or risk to law enforcers
and more obviously under none of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5, of Rule 113, 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Unfortunately, the public defender did not bring these facts
to the attention of the trial court for remedial measures.TcDIaA
Still, as regards the conviction for attempted rape, this Court notes the conspicuous
absence of a Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals for proper review. It was
necessary to file such notice since the conviction does not fall under Sec. 17, par. (1), RA
296 (The Judiciary Act of 1948) as amended which outlines our jurisdiction over "[a]ll
criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment; and those involving other offenses which, although not so punished, arose
out of the same occurrence or which may have been committed by the accused on the
same occasion, as that giving rise to the more serious offense . . . ." 48 In the instant case,
it cannot be said that the attempted rape "arose out of the same occurrence or committed
by the accused on the same occasion" as the more severe crimes of incestuous rape. The
two (2) sets of cases involved distinct offenses committed allegedly at an interval of three
(3) months. The prosecution evidence reveals that the last incident of incestuous rape was
committed on Christmas eve of 1998 while the attempted rape was perpetrated on 1
March 1999. As can be deduced further from the same evidence, the circumstances in
both cases are diverse that clearly accused-appellant was animated by separate
circumstances and criminal intent although both crimes were directed against the same
victim. The prosecution evidence for the attempted rape shows that he merely
commenced the foreplay by mimicking the sexual act while he and his daughter had their
clothes on; while in contrast, the four (4) criminal cases of rape involved consummated
lust.
This omission is fatal since ordinarily the conviction for attempted rape would by
now be already final and executory. No doubt this omission was caused by accused-
appellant's improvident plea of guilty that led the public defender to simply shorten the
proceedings. Given that the plea of guilty has been set aside, effective counseling would
have nonetheless dictated the institution of at least a precautionary appeal to the appellate
court if only to assure protection of his client's rights.
Sixth, for whatever reason, accused-appellant had not found a voice in the
proceedings a quo. Oddly from the preliminary investigation to the promulgation of
judgment his version was never heard of even if prior to his re-arraignment he appeared
adamant at denying the crimes charged against him. This situation is lamentable since at
the preliminary investigation of a criminal case the Constitution requires that an accused
be informed of his right to counsel and provided with a lawyer if he cannot afford to hire
one, and that a waiver of these rights requires the assistance of counsel.
Lastly, the idea that in our midst runs a paucity of facts is substantiated by the
assailed Decision of the trial court itself. It bewailed the sloppy pacing of the trial proper,
but in coming up with the judgment of conviction barely summed up the testimony of the
private complainant and other prosecution evidence. No reason is given why the trial
court found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible except for the bare
statement that Brenda wept while on the witness stand and the inadmissible letter
allegedly from accused-appellant admitting the charges against him. The assailed
Judgment fails to state, in short, the factual and legal reasons on which the trial court
based the conviction, contrary to Sec. 2 of Rule 120, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
52 Thus even the Decision lacks the "assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment,
the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning . . . a safeguard against the
impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding by ipse dixit." 53
Given the attendant circumstances in the instant case, we are not therefore about to
order the execution of accused-appellant because of default by both the public defender
and, to a certain degree, the trial court. This Court cannot send him to the death chamber
for no matter how outrageous the crime might be or how depraved the offender would
appear to be, the uncompromising rule of law must still prevail. Truly, there is in the
ethics of judgeship the caution expected of every judge, all the more in this case where
the accused stands to be executed four (4) times. The advocate Hugh P. MacMillan drives
this point poignantly: "There is almost always something to be said either way. And it is
of the greatest importance that something should be said, not only in order that each party
may leave the judgment seat satisfied that, whatever has been the decision, the case has
had a fair hearing, but in order that the Court may not reach its judgment without having
had in view all that could be urged to the contrary effect. In order that the decisions of the
Courts may give satisfaction to the parties and at the same time command respect and
acceptance, they must proceed upon full arguments on both sides." 54
Clearly we are not unmindful that the charges against accused-appellant carry the
punishment that is most severe. The death penalty is irrevocable, and deplorably,
experience has shown that innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty. 55 The
dispossessed of fortune should not be disinherited in law. But neither are we oblivious of
Brenda's claim that she was molested and abused successfully by her father four (4)
times. When truth stands, to no person will we sell, or deny, or delay, right or justice, and
rightly then would the consequent public condemnation and punishment of the
perpetrator reassure the victim that she has public recognition and support. 56
WHEREFORE, the Joint Decision dated 3 November 1999 is SET ASIDE. Crim.
Cases Nos. 99-02817-D, 99-02818-D, 99-02819-D, 99-02820-D and 99-02821-D are
REMANDED to the court of origin for rearraignment of accused-appellant ROLANDO
MOLINA Y JOVERE and for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision. For
this purpose, the appropriate law enforcement officers are directed to TRANSFER
accused-appellant from the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa City where he is
presently detained to the Pangasinan Provincial Jail in Lingayen, Pangasinan, where he
shall be DETAINED for the duration of the proceedings in the trial court.
SO ORDERED.
(People v. Molina y Jovere, G.R. Nos. 141129-33, [December 14, 2001], 423 PHIL 637-
|||
664)
THIRD DIVISION
RESOLUTION
BRION, J : p
The RTC held that the MTCC judge did not err in setting the arraignment of
the petitioners after the lapse of one (1) year and ten (10) months from the filing of the
petition for review with the DOJ. It explained that the cases cited by the petitioners
were decided before the amendment of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
After the amendment of the Rules on December 1, 2000, the Supreme Court applied
the 60-day limit on suspension of arraignment in case of a pendency of a petition for
review with the DOJ.
The petitioners filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari
essentially claiming that the 60-day limit on suspension of arraignment is only a
general rule. They cited several cases to show that the arraignment of an accused
should be deferred until the petition for review with the DOJ is resolved.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for its failure to state the material dates
of receipt of the assailed RTC order and of filing the motion for reconsideration.
The Motion for Reconsideration
In the present motion for reconsideration, the petitioners claim that the date of
receipt of the assailed RTC order was stated in the petition. The petitioners further
state that they filed the motion for reconsideration on January 2, 2010.
The Court's Ruling
We grant the motion for reconsideration and reinstate the petition for review on
certiorari.
A careful examination of the petition reveals that it stated the date when the
petitioners received a copy of the RTC's assailed order. In addition, the petitioners'
failure to state the material date of filing the motion for reconsideration is only a
formal requirement that warrants the relaxation of the rules in accordance with the
liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice.
Nevertheless, we resolve to deny the petition for its failure to show any
reversible error in the challenged RTC order.
The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Section 11,
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
In the present case, the petitioners filed their petition for review with the DOJ
on October 10, 2007. When the RTC set the arraignment of the petitioners on August
10, 2009, 1 year and 10 months had already lapsed. This period was way beyond the
60-day limit provided for by the Rules.
In addition, the cases cited by the petitioners — Solar Team Entertainment,
Inc. v. How, 11 Roberts, Jr. v. CA, 12 and Dimatulac v. Villon 13 — were all decided
prior to the amendment to Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure which took effect on December 1, 2000. At the time these cases were
decided, there was no 60-day limit on the suspension of arraignment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
(1) GRANT the present motion for reconsideration, and REINSTATE
the petition for review on certiorari; and
(2) DENY the said petition for petitioners' failure to show any reversible
error in the challenged RTC order.
SO ORDERED.
(Spouses Trinidad v. Ang, G.R. No. 192898 (Resolution), [January 31, 2011], 656 PHIL
|||
216-222)
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
PERALTA, J : p
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, seeking to nullify and set aside the Decision 1 dated August 11, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) and its December 4, 2006 Resolution 2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 92094.
The CA dismissed for lack of merit the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 filed by
petitioners Felilibeth Aguinaldo and Benjamin Perez, praying for the following reliefs:
(1) the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order
to enjoin the public respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia from implementing the Orders
dated May 16, 2005 and August 23, 2005; (2) the issuance of a Writ of Certiorari to
annul the said Orders, and (3) the dismissal of the estafa case against them for having
been prematurely filed and for lack of cause of action.
On January 15, 2003, Perez filed his Counter-Affidavit, 4 denying the accusation
against him, and claiming that his only participation in the transaction between private
respondents and Aguinaldo was limited to having initially introduced them to each other.
On January 29, 2003, Perez filed his Rejoinder-Affidavit, 6 stating that neither
original nor photocopies of the registration was required by private respondents to be
submitted to them because from the very start, they were informed by Aguinaldo that she
merely leased the vehicles from LEDC Rent-a-Car.
On February 25, 2003, Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) Renato F. Gonzaga issued
a Resolution 7 recommending both petitioners to be indicted in court for estafa under
Article 315, paragraph (2) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). He also noted that
Aguinaldo failed to appear and to submit any controverting evidence despite the
subpoena.
On July 16, 2003, an Information 8 (I.S. No. 02L-51569) charging petitioners with
the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the RPC was filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-216182, entitled
"People of the Philippines v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo and Benjamin Perez," the case was
raffled to the public respondent.
On July 31, 2003, Perez was arrested, so he filed an Urgent Motion for Reduction
of Bail to be Posted in Cash, which the public respondent granted in an Order of even
date. 9TIHCcA
On the same day, petitioners filed through counsel a Very Urgent Motion to Recall
or Quash Warrants of Arrest, 10 alleging that the Resolution dated February 25, 2003 has
not yet attained finality, and that they intended to file a motion for reconsideration.
On August 4, 2003, petitioners jointly filed with the OCP of Manila their "Motion
for Reconsideration and Motion for the Withdrawal of the Information Prematurely Filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, City of Manila." 11 Citing the Counter-Affidavit
and Rejoinder-Affidavit of Perez, Aguinaldo asserted, among others, that no deceit or
false pretenses was committed because private respondents were fully aware that she
does not own the pledged motor vehicles.
On August 6, 2003, the public respondent issued an Order 12 granting the motion
for withdrawal of information, and directing the recall of the arrest warrant only insofar
as Aguinaldo was concerned, pending resolution of her motion for reconsideration with
the OCP.
On December 23, 2003, the public respondent ordered the case archived pending
resolution of petitioners' motion for reconsideration with the OCP of Manila. 15
On January 16, 2004, the OCP of Manila, through ACP Antonio M. Israel, filed a
Motion to Set Case for Trial, 16 considering that petitioners' motions for reconsideration
and for withdrawal of the information have already been denied for lack of merit.
On February 27, 2004, petitioners filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a
petition for review 17 in I.S. No. 02L-51569 for estafa, entitled "Benjamin Perez and
Felilibeth Aguinaldo v. Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo B. Joson."
On March 26, 2004, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Cancel Arraignment and
Suspend Further Proceedings, 19 until their petition for review before the DOJ is
resolved with finality. Petitioners reiterated the same prayer in their Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration 20 of the Order dated March 15, 2004.
On April 16, 2004, the public respondent granted petitioners' urgent motion to
cancel arraignment and suspend proceedings, and motion for reconsideration. 21
On June 23, 2004, Levita De Castro, through the Law Firm of Lapeña and
Associates, filed a Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest. 22 De Castro
alleged that she was the private complainant in the estafa case that had been ordered
archived. Petitioners filed an Opposition with Motion to Expunge, 23 alleging that De
Castro is not a party to the said case, which is in active file, awaiting the resolution of
their petition for review before the DOJ.
On May 16, 2005, the public respondent issued an Order granting the Motion to
Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest, thus:
Pending with this Court are (1) Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue
Warrant of Arrest against accused Aguinaldo filed by private prosecutor with
conformity of the public prosecutor. . . .
SO ORDERED. 26
On May 30, 2005, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to
Quash Warrant of Arrest. 27
On August 23, 2005, the public respondent issued an Order denying petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Quash Warrant of Arrest, and setting
petitioners' arraignment, as the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure (or Rules of Court)
allows only a 60-day period of suspension of arraignment. Citing Crespo v. Mogul, 28 he
also ruled that the issuance of the warrant of arrest is best left to the discretion of the trial
court. He also noted that records do not show that the DOJ has resolved the petition for
review, although photocopies were presented by De Castro.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, attributing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent in issuing the Orders dated May 16, 2005
and August 23, 2005. On August 11, 2006, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of
merit. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it in a Resolution
29 dated December 4, 2006. Hence, this instant petition for review on certiorari.
I.
II.
III.
On the first issue, petitioners argue that the public respondent erred in issuing the
Order dated May 16, 2005 reinstating the case and issuing an arrest warrant against
Aguinaldo. They point out that the Motion to Reinstate the Case and to Issue a Warrant
of Arrest against Aguinaldo was filed by De Castro who is not a party in Criminal Case
No. 03-216182, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo and Benjamin
Perez," instead of private complainants Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo B. Joson. They also
assert that said motion was erroneously granted based on the purported denial of their
petition for review by the DOJ, despite a Certification showing that their actual petition
in I.S. Number 02L-51569, entitled "Reynaldo Ventus, et al. v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo," has
not yet been resolved and is still pending with the DOJ.
On the second issue, petitioners argue that the provision of Section 11, Rule 116 of
the Rules of Court limiting the suspension for arraignment to only sixty (60) days is
merely directory; thus, it cannot deprive petitioners of their procedural right to due
process, as their petition for review has not yet been resolved by the DOJ.
On the third issue, petitioners take exception that even before they could receive a
copy of the DOJ resolution denying their petition for review, and thus move for its
reconsideration, the Information in Criminal Case No. 03-216182 had already been filed
with the RTC on July 16, 2003. They contend that such precipitate filing of the
Information and issuance of a warrant of arrest put petitioners at the risk of incarceration
without the preliminary investigation having been completed because they were not
afforded their right to file a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. In support
of their contention, they raise the following arguments: that the right to preliminary
investigation is a substantive, not merely a procedural right; that an Information filed
without affording the respondent his right to file a motion for reconsideration of an
adverse resolution, is fatally premature; and, that a denial of a complete preliminary
investigation deprives the accused of the full measure of his right to due process and
infringes on his constitutional right to liberty.
On the first issue, petitioners are correct in pointing out that the Motion to
Reinstate the Case and Issue a Warrant of Arrest 31 was filed by one Levita De Castro
who is not a party to Criminal Case No. 03-216182. Records show that De Castro is not
even a private complainant, but a mere witness for being the owner of the vehicles
allegedly used by petitioners in defrauding and convincing private respondents to part
with their P260,000.00. Thus, the public respondent should have granted petitioners'
motion to expunge, and treated De Castro's motion as a mere scrap of paper with no legal
effect, as it was filed by one who is not a party to that case.
Petitioners are also correct in noting that De Castro's motion was granted based on
the purported dismissal of their petition for review with the DOJ. In reinstating the case
and issuing the arrest warrant against Aguinaldo, the public respondent erroneously relied
on the DOJ Resolution dated September 6, 2004 dismissing the petition for review in a
different case, i.e., I.S. Nos. 02G-29349 & 02G-28820, entitled "Levita De Castro v.
Felilibeth Aguinaldo, for two (2) counts of estafa." As correctly noted by petitioners,
however, their petition for review with the DOJ is still pending resolution. In particular,
Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Miguel F. Guido, Jr. certified that based on available
records of the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor, their petition for review filed in I.S.
Number 02L-51569, entitled "Reynaldo Ventus, et al. v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo" for estafa,
is still pending resolution as of May 27, 2005. 32 It bears stressing that their petition
stemmed from Criminal Case No. 03-216812, entitled "People of the Philippines v.
Felilibeth Aguinaldo and Benjamin Perez" wherein the public respondent issued the
interlocutory orders assailed before the CA, and now before the Court.
On the second issue, the Court disagrees with petitioners' contention that the
provision of Section 11 (c), 33 Rule 116 of the Rules of Court limiting the suspension for
arraignment to only sixty (60) days is merely directory; thus, the estafa case against them
cannot proceed until the DOJ resolves their petition for review with finality.
In Samson v. Judge Daway, 34 the Court explained that while the pendency of a
petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision
limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of
the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of
said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer
arraignment. 35
In Diño v. Olivarez, 36 the Court held that it did not sanction an indefinite
suspension of the proceedings in the trial court. Its reliance on the reviewing authority,
the Justice Secretary, to decide the appeal at the soonest possible time was anchored on
the rule provided under Department Memorandum Order No. 12, dated 3 July 2000,
which mandates that the period for the disposition of appeals or petitions for review shall
be seventy-five (75) days. 37
In Heirs of Feraren v. Court of Appeals, 38 the Court ruled that in a long line of
decisions, it has repeatedly held that while rules of procedure are liberally construed, the
provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the
prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of
judicial business. After all, rules of procedure do not exist for the convenience of the
litigants, and they are not to be trifled with lightly or overlooked by the mere expedience
of invoking "substantial justice." Relaxation or suspension of procedural rules, or the
exemption of a case from their operation, is warranted only by compelling reasons or
when the purpose of justice requires it. 39
Consistent with the foregoing jurisprudence, and there being no such reasons
shown to warrant relaxation of procedural rules in this case, the CA correctly ruled, thus:
In the case at bar, the petitioners' petition for review was filed with the
Secretary of Justice on February 27, 2004. As early as April 16, 2004, upon the
petitioners' motion, the arraignment of the petitioners herein was ordered
deferred by the public respondent. We believe that the period of one year and
one month from April 16, 2004 to May 16, 2005 when the public respondent
ordered the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of petitioner Aguinaldo, was
more than ample time to give the petitioners the opportunity to obtain a
resolution of their petition for review from the DOJ. The petitioners though
submitted a Certification from the DOJ dated May 30, 2005 stating that their
petition for review is pending resolution by the Department as of May 27, 2005.
However, such delay in the resolution does not extend the period of 60 days
prescribed under the afore-quoted Section 11(c), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure. Besides, the petitioners may be faulted for the delay in
the resolution of their petition. According to their counsel, she received the
letter dated April 15, 2004 from the DOJ requiring her to submit the pertinent
pleadings relative to petitioners' petition for review; admittedly, however, the
same was complied with only on October 15, 2004. We therefore find that the
trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed
orders. 40
On the third issue, the Court is likewise unconvinced by petitioners' argument that
the precipitate filing of the Information and the issuance of a warrant of arrest put
petitioners at the risk of incarceration without the preliminary investigation having been
completed because they were not afforded their right to file a motion for reconsideration
of the DOJ resolution.
While they are correct in stating that the right to preliminary investigation is a
substantive, not merely a procedural right, petitioners are wrong in arguing that the
Information filed, without affording the respondent his right to file a motion for
reconsideration of an adverse DOJ resolution, is fatally premature. In support of their
argument, petitioners cite Sales v. Sandiganbayan 41 wherein it was held that since filing
of a motion for reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary investigation proper,
an Information filed without first affording the accused his right to a motion for
reconsideration, is tantamount to a denial of the right itself to a preliminary investigation.
cTCADI
The Court finds petitioners' reliance on Sales 42 as misplaced. A closer look into
said case would reveal that the accused therein was denied his right to move for a
reconsideration or a reinvestigation of an adverse resolution in a preliminary
investigation under the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman before the filing of an
Information. In contrast, petitioners in this case were afforded their right to move for
reconsideration of the adverse resolution in a preliminary investigation when they filed
their "Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for the Withdrawal of Information
Prematurely Filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, City of Manila," 43 pursuant
to Section 3 of the 2000 National Prosecution Service (NPS Rule on Appeal) 44 and
Section 56 of the Manual for Prosecutors. 45
With the Information for estafa against petitioners having been filed on July 16,
2003, the public respondent cannot be faulted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the August 23, 2005 Order denying their motion to quash warrant of arrest, and setting
their arraignment, pending the final resolution of their petition for review by the DOJ.
The Court believes that the period of almost one (1) year and seven (7) months from the
time petitioners filed their petition for review with the DOJ on February 27, 2004 to
September 14, 2005 46 when the trial court finally set their arraignment, was more than
ample time to give petitioners the opportunity to obtain a resolution of their petition. In
fact, the public respondent had been very liberal with petitioners in applying Section 11
(c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which limits the suspension of arraignment to a 60-
day period from the filing of such petition. Indeed, with more than eleven (11) years
having elapsed from the filing of the petition for review and petitioners have yet to be
arraigned, it is now high time for the continuation of the trial on the merits in the criminal
case below, as the 60-day period counted from the filing of the petition for review with
the DOJ had long lapsed.
In fine, the Court holds that public respondent erred in issuing the May 16, 2005
Order granting the Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest, as it was
filed by one who is not a party to the case, and it was based on the DOJ's dismissal of a
petition for review in a different case. Nevertheless, the Court upholds the CA ruling that
the public respondent committed no grave abuse of discretion when he issued the August
23, 2005 Order denying petitioners' motion to quash warrant of arrest, and setting their
arraignment, despite the pendency of their petition for review with the DOJ. For one, the
public respondent had been very liberal in applying Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Rules
of Court which allows suspension of arraignment for a period of 60 days only. For
another, records show that petitioners were given opportunity to be heard during the
preliminary investigation of their estafa case.
Considering that this case had been held in abeyance long enough without
petitioners having been arraigned, the Court directs the remand of this case to the trial
court for trial on the merits with strict observance of Circular No. 38-98 dated August 11,
1998, or the "Implementing the Provisions of Republic Act No. 8493, entitled 'An Act to
Ensure a Speedy Trial of All Criminal Cases Before the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court
and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other
Purposes.'" In this regard, suffice it to state that petitioners cannot invoke violation of
their right to speedy trial because Section 9 (3) of Circular No. 38-98 excludes in
computing the time within which trial must commence the delay resulting from
extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders, such as their petitions before the CA
and the Court.
Finally, in order to avoid delay in the proceedings, judges are reminded that the
pendency of a motion for reconsideration, motion for reinvestigation, or petition for
review is not a cause for the quashal of a warrant of arrest previously issued because the
quashal of a warrant of arrest may only take place upon the finding that no probable
cause exists. Moreover, judges should take note of the following: HaIESC
2. If there is a pending petition for review before the DOJ, the court may
suspend the proceedings upon motion by the parties. However, the
court should set the arraignment of the accused and direct the DOJ
to submit the resolution disposing of the petition on or before the
period fixed by the Rules which, in no instance, could be more
than sixty (60) days from the filing of the Petition for Review
before the DOJ, otherwise, the court will proceed with the
arraignment as scheduled and without further delay.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Villarama, Jr., Reyes and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
||| (Aguinaldo v. Ventus, G.R. No. 176033, [March 11, 2015], 755 PHIL 536-553)
IRD DIVISION
DECISION
PERALTA, J : p
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed
by petitioner People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,
against respondent Edgardo V. Odtuhan assailing the Court of Appeals Decision 1 dated
December 17, 2009 and Resolution 2 dated March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108616.
The assailed decision granted the petition for certiorari filed by respondent, and ordered
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 27, to give due course to and receive
evidence on respondent's motion to quash and resolve the case with dispatch, while the
assailed resolution denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. TaCIDS
Contrary to law. 10
On December 17, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
SO ORDERED. 18
The CA applied the conclusion made by the Court in Morigo v. People, 19 and
held that there is cogent basis in looking into the motion to quash filed by respondent, for
if the evidence would establish that his first marriage was indeed void ab initio, one
essential element of the crime of bigamy would be lacking. 20 The appellate court further
held that respondent is even better off than Morigo which thus calls for the application of
such doctrine, considering that respondent contracted the second marriage after filing the
petition for the declaration of nullity of his first marriage and he obtained the favorable
declaration before the complaint for bigamy was filed against him. 21 The CA thus
concluded that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying respondent's motion to
quash the information, considering that the facts alleged in the information do not charge
an offense. 22
With the denial of the motion for reconsideration before the CA, petitioner filed a
petition before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court based on the following grounds:
I.
II.
The issues are not novel and have been squarely ruled upon by this Court in
Montañez v. Cipriano, 24 Teves v. People, 25 and Antone v. Beronilla. 26
In Montañez, respondent Cipriano married Socrates in April 1976, but during the
subsistence of their marriage on January 24, 1983, respondent married Silverio. In 2001,
respondent filed a petition for the annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground
of psychological incapacity which was granted on July 18, 2003. On May 14, 2004,
petitioner filed a complaint for bigamy against respondent. The latter, however, moved
for the quashal of the information and dismissal of the criminal complaint alleging that
her first marriage had already been declared void ab initio prior to the filing of the
bigamy case.
In Teves, petitioner married Thelma on November 26, 1992. During the
subsistence of their marriage on December 10, 2001, he again married Edita. On May 4,
2006, petitioner obtained a declaration of her marriage with Thelma null and void on the
ground that the latter is physically incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations.
On June 8, 2006, an Information for Bigamy was filed against petitioner. The court
eventually convicted petitioner of the crime charged.
The present case stemmed from similar procedural and factual antecedents as in
the above cases. As in Antone and Montañez, respondent moved to quash the information
on the grounds that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy and that his criminal
liability has been extinguished both because of the declaration of nullity of the first
marriage. The RTC refused to quash the information. On petition for certiorari, the CA,
however, reached a different conclusion.
(4) That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity. 33
Here, the information contained the following allegations: (1) that respondent is
legally married to Modina; (2) that without such marriage having been legally dissolved;
(3) that respondent willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously contracted a second marriage
with Alagon; and (4) that the second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
Respondent's evidence showing the court's declaration that his marriage to Modina is null
and void from the beginning because of the absence of a marriage license is only an
evidence that seeks to establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the information that a
first valid marriage was subsisting at the time he contracted the second marriage. This
should not be considered at all, because matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion
to quash. 34 It is not proper, therefore, to resolve the charges at the very outset without
the benefit of a full blown trial. The issues require a fuller examination and it would be
unfair to shut off the prosecution at this stage of the proceedings and to quash the
information on the basis of the document presented by respondent. 35 With the
presentation of the court decree, no facts have been brought out which destroyed the
prima facie truth accorded to the allegations of the information on the hypothetical
admission thereof.
Respondent's motion to quash was founded on the trial court's declaration that his
marriage with Modina is null and void ab initio. He claims that with such declaration,
one of the elements of the crime is wanting. Thus, the allegations in the information do
not charge the offense of bigamy, or at the very least, such court decree extinguished his
criminal liability. Both respondent and the CA heavily relied on the Court's
pronouncement in Morigo v. People 36 where the accused therein was acquitted because
the elements of the crime of bigamy were incomplete. In said case, the first marriage was
declared null and void, because the parties only signed the marriage contract without the
presence of a solemnizing officer. Considering, therefore, that the declaration of nullity
retroacts to the date of the first marriage, the Court held that there was no marriage to
speak of when the accused contracted the second marriage. Logically, the accused was
acquitted.
The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the
matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required
either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. 37 It has been held in a number of
cases that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage
can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and
immoral. 38 IDScTE
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second
or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. 39 Parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage
is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the
presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy. 40 If we allow respondent's line of defense and the CA's
ratiocination, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by
immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope
that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against
him. 41
Respondent, likewise, claims that there are more reasons to quash the information
against him, because he obtained the declaration of nullity of marriage before the filing of
the complaint for bigamy against him. Again, we cannot sustain such contention. In
addition to the discussion above, settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the
offender upon the commission of the offense and from that instant, liability appends to
him until extinguished as provided by law and that the time of filing of the criminal
complaint or information is material only for determining prescription. 42
In view of the foregoing, the CA erred in granting the petition for certiorari filed
by respondent. The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion
to quash and to allow him to present evidence to support his omnibus motion.
||| (People v. Odtuhan, G.R. No. 191566, [July 17, 2013], 714 PHIL 349-360)
EN BANC
DECISION
BRION, J : p
We review in this petition for review on certiorari 1 the September 19, 2005
decision 2 and the July 6, 2006 resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 80223. The petition seeks to revive the case against respondent Joel R. Pedro
(Pedro) for election gun ban violation after the CA declared the case permanently
dismissed pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. DCcIaE
THE ANTECEDENTS
Pedro was charged in court for carrying a loaded firearm without the required
written authorization from the Commission on Elections (Comelec) a day before the
May 14, 2001 national and local elections. The Information reads:
That on or about the 13th day of May 2001 at about 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, in [S]itio Bantauyan, [B]arangay Bantad, Municipality of Boac,
Province of Marinduque, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously carry a Revolver Cal. 357, Magnum Ruger 100
loaded with six (6) ammunitions, with Serial No. 173-56836 outside his
residence during the election period, without authorization in writing from the
Commission on Election[s].
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
The accusation was based on Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 or the Omnibus
Election Code (Code) after the Marinduque Philippine National Police (PNP) caught
Pedro illegally carrying his firearm at a checkpoint at Boac, Marinduque. The Boac
checkpoint team was composed of Police Senior Inspector Victor V. Arevalo, SPO2
Marshal Olympia, SPO1 Rocky Mercene, and PO1 Raul Adlawan. The team stopped
a silver-gray Toyota Hi-Ace with plate number WHT-371 on the national highway,
coming from the Boac town proper. When Pedro (who was seated at the rear portion)
opened the window, Arevalo saw a gun carry case beside him. Pedro could not show
any COMELEC authority to carry a firearm when the checkpoint team asked for one,
but he opened the case when asked to do so. The checkpoint team saw the following
when the case was opened: 1) one Revolver 357 Magnum Ruger GP100, serial
number 173-56836, loaded with six ammunitions; 2) one ammunition box containing
100 bullets; 3) two pieces speed loader with six ammunitions each; and 4) one set ear
protector. Pedro was with three other men. The checkpoint team brought all of them
to the Boac police station for investigation.
The Boac election officer filed a criminal complaint against Pedro for violating
the election gun ban, i.e., for carrying a firearm outside of his residence or place of
business without any authority from the Comelec. After an inquest, the Marinduque
provincial prosecutor filed the above Information against Pedro with the Marinduque
Regional Trial Court (RTC) for violation of the Code's Article XXII, Section 261 (q),
5 in relation to Section 264. 6
Pedro filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which the RTC granted. 7
The preliminary investigation, however, did not materialize. Instead, Pedro filed with
the RTC a Motion to Quash, arguing that the Information "contains averments which,
if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification 8 and/or that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense." 9 Pedro attached to his motion a Comelec Certification
dated September 24, 2001 that he was "exempted" from the gun ban. The provincial
prosecutor opposed the motion.
The RTC quashed the Information and ordered the police and the prosecutors
to return the seized articles to Pedro. 10
IHCSET
The petitioner, private prosecutor Ariel Los Baños (Los Baños), representing
the checkpoint team, moved to reopen the case, as Pedro's Comelec Certification was
a "falsification", and the prosecution was "deprived of due process" when the judge
quashed the information without a hearing. Attached to Los Baños' motion were two
Comelec certifications stating that: (1) Pedro was not exempted from the firearm ban;
and (2) the signatures in the Comelec Certification of September 24, 2001 were
forged.
The RTC reopened the case for further proceedings, as Pedro did not object to
Los Baños' motion. 11 Pedro moved for the reconsideration of the RTC's order
primarily based on Section 8 of Rule 117, 12 arguing that the dismissal had become
permanent. He likewise cited the public prosecutor's lack of express approval of the
motion to reopen the case.
The public prosecutor, however, manifested his express conformity with the
motion to reopen the case. The trial court, for its part, rejected the position that
Section 8, Rule 117 applies, and explained that this provision refers to situations
where both the prosecution and the accused mutually consented to the dismissal of the
case, or where the prosecution or the offended party failed to object to the dismissal of
the case, and not to a situation where the information was quashed upon motion of the
accused and over the objection of the prosecution. The RTC, thus, set Pedro's
arraignment date.
Pedro filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the
RTC's mandated reopening. 13 He argued that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that the dismissal
contemplated under Section 8, Rule 117 refers to situations where either the
prosecution and the accused mutually consented to, or where the prosecution alone
moved for, the provisional dismissal of the case; in rejecting his argument that the
prescriptive periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code 14 or Act No. 3326
15 find no application to his case as the filing of the Information against him stopped
the running of the prescriptive periods so that the prescription mandated by these laws
became irrelevant; and, in setting the case for arraignment and pre-trial conference,
despite being barred under Section 8 of Rule 117.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
The CA initially denied Pedro's petition. For accuracy, we quote the material
portions of its ruling:
The trial court erred in ruling that Section 8, Rule 117 does not apply to
provisional dismissals on motion of the accused. The Rule merely provides that
a case shall not be provisionally dismissed, except with the express consent of
the accused and with notice to the offended party. Nothing in the said rule
proscribes its application to dismissal on motion of the accused.
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case
provisionally;
In the instant, case, the records are bereft of proof as to when the public
prosecutor was served the order of dismissal dated 22 November 2001. Absent
such proof, we cannot declare that the State is barred from reviving the case.IaECcH
In his motion for reconsideration, Pedro manifested the exact date and time of
the Marinduque provincial prosecutor's receipt of the quashal order to be "2:35 p.m.,
December 10, 2001", and argued that based on this date, the provisional dismissal of
the case became "permanent" on December 10, 2002. Based on this information, the
CA reversed itself, ruling as follows:
On the other hand, the petitioner was able to prove that the motion to
reopen the case was filed after the lapse of more than one year from the time the
public prosecutor was served the notice of dismissal. Therefore, the state is
barred from reopening the case.
To summarize this ruling, the appellate court, while initially saying that there
was an error of law but no grave abuse of discretion that would call for the issuance of
a writ, reversed itself on motion for reconsideration; it then ruled that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion because it failed to apply Section 8, Rule 17 and
the time-bar under this provision.
THE PETITION
Los Baños prays in his petition that the case be remanded to the RTC for
arraignment and trial, or that a new charge sheet be filed against Pedro, or that the old
information be re-filed with the RTC. He contends that under Section 6 of Rule 117,
an order sustaining a motion to quash does not bar another prosecution for the same
offense, unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in Section 3 (g) 16 and
(i) 17 of Rule 117. Los Baños argues that the dismissal under Section 8 of Rule 117
covers only situations where both the prosecution and the accused either mutually
consented or agreed to, or where the prosecution alone moved for the provisional
dismissal of the case; it can also apply to instances of failure on the part of the
prosecution or the offended party to object, after having been forewarned or cautioned
that its case will be dismissed. It does not apply where the information was quashed.
He adds that although the trial court granted the motion to quash, it did not
categorically dismiss the case, either provisionally or permanently, as the judge
simply ordered the return of the confiscated arms and ammunition to Pedro. The order
was "open-ended", and did not have the effect of provisionally dismissing the case
under Section 8 of Rule 117. AHCcET
Los Baños also contends that the CA gravely erred when: (1) it ruled in effect
that the Order dated November 22, 2001 granting the motion to quash is considered a
provisional dismissal, which became permanent one year from the prosecutor's receipt
of the order; the order to quash the Information was based on Section 3 of Rule 117,
not on Section 8 of this Rule; (2) it granted Pedro's motion for reconsideration and
denied Los Baños' motion for modification of judgment, when Section 6 of Rule 117
clearly provides that an order granting a motion to quash is not a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense.
He notes that the grounds Pedro relied upon in his motion to quash are not
subsections (g) or (i) of Rule 117, but its subsections (a) — that the facts charged do
not constitute an offense, and (h) — that it contains averments which if true would
constitute a legal justification. Pedro's cited grounds are not the exceptions that would
bar another prosecution for the same offense. 18 The dismissal of a criminal case
upon the express application of the accused (under subsections [a] and [h]) is not a bar
to another prosecution for the same offense, because his application is a waiver of his
constitutional prerogative against double jeopardy.
In response to all these, respondent Pedro insists and fully relies on the
application of Section 8 of Rule 117 to support his position that the RTC should not
have granted Los Baños' motion to reopen the case.
THE ISSUES
The issue is ultimately reduced to whether Section 8, Rule 117 is applicable to
the case, as the CA found. If it applies, then the CA ruling effectively lays the matter
to rest. If it does not, then the revised RTC decision reopening the case should prevail.
OUR RULING
We find the petition meritorious and hold that the case should be
remanded to the trial court for arraignment and trial.
Quashal v. Provisional Dismissal
a. Motion to Quash
A motion to quash is the mode by which an accused assails, before entering his
plea, the validity of the criminal complaint or the criminal information filed against
him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defect apparent on the face of
the Information. 19 The motion, as a rule, hypothetically admits the truth of the facts
spelled out in the complaint or information. The rules governing a motion to quash are
found under Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court. Section 3 of this Rule
enumerates the grounds for the quashal of a complaint or information, as follows: HSAcaE
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the
accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense
charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.
b. Provisional Dismissal
On the other hand, Section 8, Rule 117 that is at the center of the dispute states
that:
1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused, or the accused,
moves for a provisional dismissal (sin perjuicio) of his case; or both the
prosecution and the accused move for its provisional dismissal; TcHDIA
2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the
case;
3) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case
provisionally; and
In People v. Lacson, 21 we ruled that there are sine qua non requirements in
the application of the time-bar rule stated in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule
117. We also ruled that the time-bar under the foregoing provision is a special
procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute, making the time-
bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the
time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused.
c. Their Comparison
An examination of the whole Rule tells us that a dismissal based on a motion
to quash and a provisional dismissal are far different from one another as concepts, in
their features, and legal consequences. While the provision on provisional dismissal is
found within Rule 117 (entitled Motion to Quash), it does not follow that a motion to
quash results in a provisional dismissal to which Section 8, Rule 117 applies.
A first notable feature of Section 8, Rule 117 is that it does not exactly state
what a provisional dismissal is. The modifier "provisional" directly suggests that the
dismissals which Section 8 essentially refers to are those that are temporary in
character (i.e., to dismissals that are without prejudice to the re-filing of the case), and
not the dismissals that are permanent (i.e., those that bar the re-filing of the case).
Based on the law, rules, and jurisprudence, permanent dismissals are those barred by
the principle of double jeopardy, 22 by the previous extinction of criminal liability, 23
by the rule on speedy trial, 24 and the dismissals after plea without the express
consent of the accused. 25 Section 8, by its own terms, cannot cover these dismissals
because they are not provisional.
A second feature is that Section 8 does not state the grounds that lead to a
provisional dismissal. This is in marked contrast with a motion to quash whose
grounds are specified under Section 3. The delimitation of the grounds available in a
motion to quash suggests that a motion to quash is a class in itself, with specific and
closely-defined characteristics under the Rules of Court. A necessary consequence is
that where the grounds cited are those listed under Section 3, then the appropriate
remedy is to file a motion to quash, not any other remedy. Conversely, where a
ground does not appear under Section 3, then a motion to quash is not a proper
remedy. A motion for provisional dismissal may then apply if the conditions required
by Section 8 obtain. AHCcET
The grounds Pedro cited in his motion to quash are that the Information
contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification
[Section 3 (h), Rule 117], and that the facts charged do not constitute an offense
[Section 3 (a), Rule 117]. We find from our examination of the records that the
Information duly charged a specific offense and provides the details on how the
offense was committed. 28 Thus, the cited Section 3 (a) ground has no merit. On the
other hand, we do not see on the face or from the averments of the Information any
legal excuse or justification. The cited basis, in fact, for Pedro's motion to quash was a
Comelec Certification (dated September 24, 2001, issued by Director Jose P.
Balbuena, Sr. of the Law Department, Committee on Firearms and Security Personnel
of the Comelec, granting him an exemption from the ban and a permit to carry
firearms during the election period) 29 that Pedro attached to his motion to quash.
This COMELEC Certification is a matter aliunde that is not an appropriate motion to
raise in, and cannot support, a motion to quash grounded on legal excuse or
justification found on the face of the Information. Significantly, no hearing was ever
called to allow the prosecution to contest the genuineness of the COMELEC
certification. 30
Thus, the RTC grossly erred in its initial ruling that a quashal of the
Information was in order. Pedro, on the other hand, also misappreciated the true
nature, function, and utility of a motion to quash. As a consequence, a valid
Information still stands, on the basis of which Pedro should now be arraigned and
stand trial.
One final observation: the Information was not rendered defective by the fact
that Pedro was charged of violating Section 261 (q) of the Code, instead of Section 32
of R.A. No. 7166, which amended Section 261 (q); these two sections aim to penalize
among others, the carrying of firearms (or other deadly weapons) in public places
during the election period without the authority of the Comelec. The established rule
is that the character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the
information or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated; the crime committed is determined by the recital of the ultimate facts and
circumstances in the complaint or information 31 Further, in Abenes v. Court of
Appeals, 32 we specifically recognized that the amendment under Section 32 of R.A.
No. 7166 does not affect the prosecution of the accused who was charged under
Section 261 (q) of the Code.
WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition and accordingly declare the
assailed September 19, 2005 decision and the July 6, 2006 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 80223 respectively MODIFIED and REVERSED. The
case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque for the
arraignment and trial of respondent Joel R. Pedro, after reflecting in the Information
the amendment introduced on Section 261 (q) of the Code by Section 32 of Republic
Act No. 7166. STaHIC
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio Morales, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-de Castro,
Peralta and Bersamin, JJ., concur.
||| (Los Baños v. Pedro, G.R. No. 173588, [April 22, 2009], 604 PHIL 215-236)
EN BANC
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J : p
CONTRARY TO LAW.
By the end of October 2012, the Sandiganbayan already acquired jurisdiction
over GMA, Valencia, Morato and Aguas. Plaras, on the other hand, was able to secure
a temporary restraining order (TRO) from this Court in Plaras v. Sandiganbayan
docketed as G.R. Nos. 203693-94. Insofar as Roquero is concerned, the
Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction as to him by the early part of 2013. Uriarte and
Valdes remained at large.
Thereafter, several of the accused separately filed their respective petitions for
bail. On June 6, 2013, the Sandiganbayan granted the petitions for bail of Valencia,
Morato and Roquero upon finding that the evidence of guilt against them was not
strong. 4 In the case of petitioners GMA and Aguas, the Sandiganbayan, through the
resolution dated November 5, 2013, denied their petitions for bail on the ground that
the evidence of guilt against them was strong. 5 The motions for reconsideration filed
by GMA and Aguas were denied by the Sandiganbayan on February 19, 2014. 6
Accordingly, GMA assailed the denial of her petition for bail in this Court, but her
challenge has remained pending and unresolved to date.
Personal jurisdiction over Taruc and Villar was acquired by the
Sandiganbayan in 2014. Thereafter, said accused sought to be granted bail, and their
motions were granted on different dates, specifically on March 31, 2014 7 and May 9,
2014, 8 respectively.
The case proceeded to trial, at which the State presented Atty. Aleta Tolentino
as its main witness against all the accused. The Sandiganbayan rendered the
following summary of her testimony and evidence in its resolution dated November 5,
2013 denying the petitions for bail of GMA and Aguas, to wit:
She is a certified public accountant and a lawyer. She is a member of
the Philippine Institute of Certified Public Accountants and the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines. She has been a CPA for 30 years and a lawyer for 20 years.
She has practiced accountancy and law. She became accounting manager of
several companies. She has also taught subjects in University of Santo Tomas,
Manuel L. Quezon University, Adamson University and the Ateneo de Manila
Graduate School. She currently teaches Economics, Taxation and Land
Reform.
Presently, she is a Member of the Board of Directors of the PCSO. The
Board appointed her as Chairman of an Audit Committee. The audit review
proceeded when she reviewed the COA Annual Reports of the PCSO for
2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 (Exhibits "D", "E", "F" and "G", respectively),
and the annual financial statements contained therein for the years 2005 to
2009. The reports were given to them by the COA. These are transmitted to
the PCSO annually after the subject year of audit.
One of her major findings was that the former management of the
PCSO was commingling the charity fund, the prize fund and the operating
fund. By commingling she means that the funds were maintained in only one
main account. This violates Section 6 of Republic Act 1169 (PCSO Charter)
and generally accepted accounting principles. aScITE
The Audit Committee also found out that there was excessive
disbursement of the Confidential and Intelligence Fund (CIF). There were also
excessive disbursements for advertising expenses. The internal audit
department was also merged with the budget and accounting department,
which is a violation of internal audit rules.
There was excessive disbursement of the CIF because the PCSO was
given only P10 million in 2002, i.e., P5 million for the Office of the Chairman
and P5 million for the Office of the General Manager. Such allocation was
based on the letters of then Chairman Lopez (Exh. "I") and then General
Manager Golpeo (Exh. "J"), asking for P5 million intelligence fund each. Both
were dated February 21, 2000, and sent to then President Estrada, who
approved them. This allocation should have been the basis for the original
allocation of the CIF in the PCSO, but there were several subsequent requests
made by the General Manager during the time of, and which were approved
by, former President Arroyo.
The allocation in excess of P10 million was in violation of the PCSO
Charter. PCSO did not have a budget for this. They were working on a deficit
from 2004 to 2009. The charter allows only 15% of the revenue as operating
fund, which was already exceeded. The financial statements indicate that they
were operating on a deficit in the years 2006 to 2009.
It is within the power of the General Manager to ask for additional
funds from the President, but there should be a budget for it. The CIF should
come from the operating fund, such that, when there is no more operating
fund, the other funds cannot be used.
The funds were maintained in a commingled main account and PCSO
did not have a registry of budget utilization. The excess was not taken from
the operating fund, but from the prize fund and the charity fund.
In 2005, the deficit was P916 million; in 2006, P1,000,078,683.23.
One of the causes of the deficit for 2006 was the CIF expense of P215 million,
which was in excess of the approved allocation of P10 million. The net cash
provided by operating expenses in 2006 is negative, which means that there
were more expenses than what was received.
In the 2007 COA report, it was found that there was still no deposit to
the prize and charity funds. The COA made a recommendation regarding the
deposits in one main account. There were also excessive disbursements of CIF
amounting to P77,478,705.
She received a copy of the PCSO corporate operating budget (COB)
for the year 2008 in 2010 because she was already a member of its Board of
Directors. The 2008 approved COB has a comparative analysis of the actual
budget for 2007 (Exh. "K"). It is stated there that the budget for CIF in 2007 is
only P25,480,550. But the financial statements reflect P77 million. The budget
was prepared and signed by then PCSO General Manager Rosario Uriarte. It
had accompanying Board Resolution No. 305, Series of 2008, which was
approved by then Chairperson Valencia, and board members Valdes, Morato,
Domingo, and attested to by Board Secretary Atty. Ronald T. Reyes.
In the 2008 COA report, it was noted that there was still no deposit to
the prize and charity funds, adverted in the 2007 COA report. There was
already a recommendation by the COA to separate the deposits or funds in
2007. But the COA noted that this was not followed. The financial statements
show the Confidential and the Extra-Ordinary Miscellaneous Expenses
account is P38,293,137, which is more than the P10 million that was
approved.
In the Comparative Income Statement (Exh. "K"), the 2008
Confidential/Intelligence Expense budget was approved for P28 million. The
Confidential and Extra-Ordinary Miscellaneous Expenses is the account being
used for confidential and intelligence expenses. The amount in the financial
statements is over the budgeted amount of P28 million. Further, the real
disbursement is more than that, based on a summary of expenditures she had
asked the treasurer to prepare.
In the Comparative Income Statement for 2009 Budget against the
2008 Actual Budget (Exh. "L"), the budget for CIF and expenses was P60
million.
In the 2009 COA report, it was noted that there was still no deposit to
the prize and charity funds, despite the instruction or recommendation of
COA. The funds were still deposited in one account. The COA observation in
2007 states that there is juggling or commingling of funds.
After she had concluded the audit review, she reported her findings to
the Board of Directors in one of their executive meetings. The Board
instructed her to go in-depth in the investigation of the disbursements of CIF.
The Audit Committee also asked Aguas why there were disbursements
in excess of P10 million. He explained that there were board resolutions
confirming additional CIF which were approved by former President Arroyo.
Aguas mentioned this in one of their meetings with the directors and corporate
secretary. The board secretary, Atty. Ed Araullo, gave them the records of
those resolutions.
In the records that Araullo submitted to her, it appears that Uriarte
would ask for additional CIF, by letter and President Arroyo approves it by
affixing her signature on that same letter-request. There were seven letters or
memoranda to then President Arroyo, with the subject "Request for
Intelligence Fund."
She then asked their Treasurer, Mercy Hinayon, to give her a summary
of all the disbursements from CIF from 2007 to 2010. The total of all the
amounts in the summaries for three years is P365,997,915.
After receiving the summaries of the disbursed checks, she asked
Hinayon to give her the checks or copies thereof. She also asked Dorothy
Robles, Budget and Accounting Manager, to give her the corresponding
vouchers. Only two original checks were given to her, as the rest were with
the bank. She asked her to request certified true copies of the checks.
They were then called to the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, which
was then investigating the operation of PCSO, including the CIF. She was
invited as a resource speaker in an invitation from Chairman Teofisto
Guingona III (Exh. "DD"). Before the hearing, the Committee Chairman went
to the PCSO and got some documents regarding the subject matter being
investigated. Araullo was tasked to prepare all the documents needed by the
Committee. These documents included the CIF summary of disbursements,
letters of Uriarte and the approval of the former president.
She attended whenever there were committee hearings. Among those
who also attended were the incoming members if the PCSO Board Directors
and the directors. Accused Valencia and Aguas were also present in some
hearings as resources speakers. They were invited in connection with the past
disbursements of PCSO related to advertising expenses, CIF, vehicles for the
bishops, and the commingling of funds. HEITAD
She was shown the four liquidation reports (Exhibits "M 5", "N5", "O5"
and "P5") attached to the transmittal letter and was asked whether they were
properly and legally accomplished. She replied that they were couched in
general terms and the voucher for which the cash advance was liquidated is
not indicated and only the voucher number is specified. She adds that the form
of the liquidation is correct, but the details are not there and neither are the
supporting papers.
The liquidation report was dated July 24, 2008, but it was submitted
only on August 1, 2008 to COA, and it supposedly covered the cash advances
of Uriarte from January to May 2008. This is stated in her summary of
liquidation that was earlier marked. There were no supporting papers stated on
or attached to the liquidation report.
She identified a set of documents to liquidate the cash advances from
the CIF for the second semester of 2008 by Uriarte. The transmittal letter of
Uriarte was received by the COA on April 2, 2009. Upon inquiry with Aguas,
he said that he did not have any of the supporting papers that he supposedly
had according to the certification. According to him, they are with Uriarte.
Uriarte, on the other hand, said, during the Senate hearing, that she gave them
to President Arroyo.
When Plaras wrote Valencia on December 15, 2008, Aguas wrote back
on behalf of Valencia, who had designated himself as SDO. However, their
designations, or in what capacity they signed the voucher are not stated.
Among the attachments is also a memorandum dated April 2, 2008 (Exhibit
"P5"), containing the signature of Arroyo, indicating her approval to the
utilization of funds. Another memorandum, dated August 13, 2008, indicating
the approval of Arroyo was also attached to the transmittal letter of Aguas on
April 4, 2009. These two memoranda bear the reasons for the cash advances,
couched in general terms. The reasons were donated medicines that were sold
and authorized expenditures on endowment fund. The reasons stated in the
memoranda are practically the same. Uriarte did not submit any
accomplishment reports regarding the intelligence fund. Aguas submitted an
accomplishment report, but the accomplishments were not indicated in
definite fashion or with specificity.
The witness narrated, based on her Summary of Liquidation Reports in
2009, that the total cash advance made by Uriarte was P132,760,096. Arroyo
approved P90 million for release. P10 million in January 2009 and April 27,
2009, and then P50 million in May 6, 2009. In July 2, 2009, P10 million or a
total of P70 million. In October 2009, P20 million or a total of P90 million.
The amount that was cash advanced by Valencia was P5,660,779. Therefore,
the total cash advances by these two officials were P138,420,875, but all of
these were never liquidated in 2009. Uriarte and Valencia only submitted a
liquidation voucher and a report to COA on April 12, 2010. For the January
22, 2009 disbursements, the date of the liquidation voucher was June 30,
2009, but it was submitted to COA on April 12, 2010. Witness identified the
transmittal letter for P28 million by Uriarte, dated October 19, 2009, which
was received by the COA only on April 12, 2010, with an accompanying
certification from Uriarte as to some of the documents from which the
witness's Summary of Liquidation was based.
The cash advances made by Uriarte and Valencia violated par. 1, Sec.
4 and Sec. 84 of P.D. 1445 and par. 2, III, COA Circular No. 92-385.
Since these cash advances were in excess of the appropriation, in
effect, they were disbursed without any appropriation. These cash advances
were also made without any specific project, in violation of par. 2 of COA
Circular No. 92-385. In this case, the cash advances were not for a specific
project. The vouchers only indicate the source of the fund. The vouchers did
not specify specific projects.
The total cash advances for the years 2008, 2009 and 2010 to accused
Uriarte and Valencia is more than P366,000,000. Valencia cash advanced
P13.3 million. The rest was made by Uriarte. TIADCc
(a) Accounts and Explanation: Due to other funds. This means that the
amount of P63,750,000 was credited as confidential expense
from the operating fund. The amount was then removed from the
operating fund, and it was passed on to other funds.
a. While the gravamen, indeed corpus delicti of the offense of plunder under
R.A. No. 7080, and as charged in the Information, is that the public
officer . . . "amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as
described in Section 1(d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total
value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00)", the
Sandiganbayan Resolutions extirpate this vital element of the
offense of plunder;
b. In point of fact, not a single exhibit of the 637 exhibits offered by the
prosecution nor a single testimony of the 21 witnesses of the
prosecution was offered by the prosecution to prove that petitioner
amassed, accumulated or acquired even a single peso of the alleged
ill-gotten wealth amounting to P365,997,915.00 or any part of that
amount alleged in the Information;
c. Implicitly confirming the above, and aggravating its error, on the basis
solely of petitioner Arroyo's authorization of the release of the
Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO's accounts, the
Sandiganbayan ruled that she has committed the offense of plunder
under R.A. No. 7080 for the reason that her release of CIF funds to
the PCSO amount to a violation of Sec. 1(d) [1] of R.A. No. 7080
which reads, as follows:
Second Ground
Worsening the above error of the Sandiganbayan, the Resolutions, with
absolutely no justification in law or in the evidence, purportedly as the
"mastermind" of a conspiracy, and without performing any overt act,
would impute to petitioner Arroyo the "series of withdrawals as cash
advances of the CIF funds from the PCSO coffers" by Uriarte as "raids
on the PCSO coffers, which is part of the public treasury" and "in every
sense, 'pillage' as Uriarte looted government funds and appears to have
not been able to account for it". Parenthetically, Uriarte has not been
arrested, was not arraigned and did not participate in the trial of the
case.
Third Ground
That as an obvious consequence of the above, denial of petitioner
Arroyo's Demurrer to Evidence for the reasons stated in the
Sandiganbayan Resolutions, amounting no less to convicting her on the
basis of a disjointed reading of the crime of plunder as defined in R.A.
No. 7080, aggravated by the extirpation in the process of its "corpus
delicti" — the amassing, accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth,
hence, of a crime that does not exist in law and consequently a blatant
deprivation of liberty without due process of law.
Fourth Ground
The Information alleges that the ten (10) persons accused in Crim. Case
No. SB-12-CRM-0174, namely: Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Rosario C.
Uriarte, Sergio O. Valencia, Manuel L. Morato, Jose R. Taruc V,
Raymundo T. Roquero, [M]a. Fatima A.S. Valdes, Benigno B. Aguas,
Reynaldo A. Villar and Nilda B. Plaras" . . . all public officers committing
the offense in relation to their respective offices and taking undue
advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships,
connections or influence, conniving, conspiring and confederating with
one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
amass, accumulate and/or acquire, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth
in the aggregate amount or total value of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY
FIVE MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND
NINE HUNDRED FIFTEEN PESOS (PHP365,997,915.00), more or less,
through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or
similar schemes or means, described as follows . . ." or each of them,
P36,599,791.50 which would not qualify the offense charged as "plunder"
under R.A. No. 7080 against all ten (10) accused together, for which
reason the Information does not charge the offense of plunder and, as a
consequence, all proceedings thereafter held under the Information are
void. 13
On his part, Aguas contends that:
A. In light of the factual setting described above and the evidence offered
and admitted, does proof beyond reasonable doubt exist to warrant
a holding that Prosecution proved the guilt of the accused such that
there is legal reason to deny Petitioner's Demurrer?
On the other hand, the Prosecution insists that the petitions for certiorari
should be dismissed upon the following grounds, namely:
Based on the submissions of the parties, the Court synthesizes the decisive
issues to be considered and resolved, as follows:
Procedural Issue:
1. Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari is proper to assail the
denial of the demurrers to evidence.
Substantive Issues:
1. Whether or not the State sufficiently established the existence of conspiracy
among GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte;
2. Whether or not the State sufficiently established all the elements of the
crime of plunder:
a. Was there evidence of amassing, accumulating or acquiring ill-gotten
wealth in the total amount of not less than P50,000,000.00?
b. Was the predicate act of raiding the public treasury alleged in the
information proved by the Prosecution?
Ruling of the Court
The consolidated petitions for certiorari are meritorious.
I.
The Court cannot be deprived of its jurisdiction
to correct grave abuse of discretion
The Prosecution insists that the petition for certiorari of GMA was improper to
challenge the denial of her demurrer to evidence; that she also thereby failed to show
that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan in denying
her demurrer to evidence; and that, on the contrary, the Sandiganbayan only
interpreted what constituted plunder under the law and jurisprudence in light of the
established facts, and did not legislate a new offense, by extensively discussing how
she had connived with her co-accused to commit plunder. 16 AScHCD
The Court holds that it should take cognizance of the petitions for certiorari
because the Sandiganbayan, as shall shortly be demonstrated, gravely abused its
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an
interlocutory order issued by the trial court because of the availability of another
remedy in the ordinary course of law. 17 Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules
of Court expressly provides that "the order denying the motion for leave of court to
file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or
by certiorari before judgment." It is not an insuperable obstacle to this action,
however, that the denial of the demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an
interlocutory order that did not terminate the proceedings, and the proper recourse of
the demurring accused was to go to trial, and that in case of their conviction they may
then appeal the conviction, and assign the denial as among the errors to be reviewed.
18 Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in which the writ of certiorari may issue
should not be limited, 19 because to do so —
. . . would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide
is the discretion of the court that authority is not wanting to show that
certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus. In the
exercise of our superintending control over other courts, we are to be
guided by all the circumstances of each particular case 'as the ends of
justice may require.' So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary
to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice. 20
The Constitution itself has imposed upon the Court and the other courts of
justice the duty to correct errors of jurisdiction as a result of capricious, arbitrary,
whimsical and despotic exercise of discretion by expressly incorporating in Section 1
of Article VIII the following provision:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure to the contrary or for the sake
of the convenience of one side. This is because the Court has the bounden
constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of discretion whenever and wherever it
is committed. Thus, notwithstanding the interlocutory character and effect of the
denial of the demurrers to evidence, the petitioners as the accused could avail
themselves of the remedy of certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave abuse
of discretion. 21 As we shall soon show, the Sandiganbayan as the trial court was
guilty of grave abuse of discretion when it capriciously denied the demurrers to
evidence despite the absence of competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the
indictment for plunder, and despite the absence of the factual bases to expect a guilty
verdict. 22
II.
The Prosecution did not properly allege and prove
the existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony, and decide to commit it. 23 In this jurisdiction, conspiracy
is either a crime in itself or a mere means to commit a crime.
As a rule, conspiracy is not a crime unless the law considers it a crime, and
prescribes a penalty for it. 24 The exception is exemplified in Article 115 (conspiracy
and proposal to commit treason), Article 136 (conspiracy and proposal to commit
coup d'etat, rebellion or insurrection) and Article 141 (conspiracy to commit
sedition) of the Revised Penal Code. When conspiracy is a means to commit a crime,
it is indispensable that the agreement to commit the crime among all the conspirators,
or their community of criminal design must be alleged and competently shown.
We also stress that the community of design to commit an offense must be a
conscious one. 25 Conspiracy transcends mere companionship, and mere presence at
the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge of, or
acquiescence in, or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a
conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view
to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. 26 Hence, conspiracy must be
established, not by conjecture, but by positive and conclusive evidence.
In terms of proving its existence, conspiracy takes two forms. The first is the
express form, which requires proof of an actual agreement among all the co-
conspirators to commit the crime. However, conspiracies are not always shown to
have been expressly agreed upon. Thus, we have the second form, the implied
conspiracy. An implied conspiracy exists when two or more persons are shown to
have aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object,
each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in
fact connected and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment. 27 Implied conspiracy is proved through the mode and
manner of the commission of the offense, or from the acts of the accused before,
during and after the commission of the crime indubitably pointing to a joint purpose, a
concert of action and a community of interest. 28
But to be considered a part of the conspiracy, each of the accused must be
shown to have performed at least an overt act in pursuance or in furtherance of the
conspiracy, for without being shown to do so none of them will be liable as a co-
conspirator, and each may only be held responsible for the results of his own acts. In
this connection, the character of the overt act has been explained in People v. Lizada:
29
6. Other fraudulent schemes and activities which put the PCSO in bad
light. 43
A reading of the requests also reveals that the additional CIFs requested were
to be used to protect PCSO's image and the integrity of its operations. The Court thus
cannot share the Prosecution's dismissiveness of the requests for not being compliant
with LOI No. 1282. According to its terms, LOI No. 1282 did not detail any
qualification as to how specific the requests should be made. Hence, we should not
make any other pronouncement than to rule that Uriarte's requests were compliant
with LOI No. 1282.
COA Circular No. 92-385 required that additional request for CIFs would be
approved only when there was available budget. In this regard, the Prosecution
suggests that there was no longer any budget when GMA approved Uriarte's requests
because the budget had earmarked intelligence funds that had already been maxed out
and used. The suggestion is not acceptable, however, considering that the funds of the
PCSO were co-mingled into one account as early as 2007. Consequently, although
only 15% of PCSO's revenues was appropriated to an operation fund from which the
CIF could be sourced, the remaining 85% of PCSO's revenues, already co-mingled
with the operating fund, could still sustain the additional requests. In short, there was
available budget from which to draw the additional requests for CIFs.
It is notable that the COA, although frowning upon PCSO's co-mingling of
funds, did not rule such co-mingling as illegal. As such, sourcing the requested
additional CIFs from one account was far from illegal. TCAScE
Lastly, the Prosecution's effort to show irregularities as badges of bad faith has
led it to claim that GMA had known that Uriarte would raid the public treasury, and
would misuse the amounts disbursed. This knowledge was imputed to GMA by virtue
of her power of control over PCSO.
The Prosecution seems to be relying on the doctrine of command responsibility
to impute the actions of subordinate officers to GMA as the superior officer. The
reliance is misplaced, for incriminating GMA under those terms was legally
unacceptable and incomprehensible. The application of the doctrine of command
responsibility is limited, and cannot be true for all litigations. The Court ruled in
Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo 44 that command responsibility pertains to the
responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the
armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic
conflict. The doctrine has also found application in civil actions for human rights
abuses. But this case involves neither a probe of GMA's actions as the Commander-
in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, nor of a human rights issue. As such,
it is legally improper to impute the actions of Uriarte to GMA in the absence of any
conspiracy between them.
On the part of Aguas, the Sandiganbayan pronounced him to be as much a
member of the implied conspiracy as GMA was, and detailed his participation in this
manner:
In all of the disbursement vouchers covering the cash
advances/releases to Uriarte of the CIF funds, Aguas certified that:
CERTIFIED: Adequate available funds/budgetary allotment in
the amount of P___________; expenditure properly certified;
supported by documents marked (X) per checklist and back
hereof; account codes proper; previous cash advance
liquidated/accounted for.
These certifications, after close scrutiny, were not true because: 1.)
there were no documents which lent support to the cash advances on a per
project basis. The particulars of payment simply read: "To draw cash advance
form the CIF Fund of the Office of the Vice-Chairman and General Manager".
No particular purpose or project was specified contrary to the requirement
under COA Circular 2003-002 that cash advances must be on a per project
basis. Without specifics on the project covered by each cash advance. Aguas
could not certify that supporting documents existed simply because he would
not know what project was being funded by the cash advances; and 2.) There
were no previous liquidations made of prior cash advances when Aguas made
the certifications. COA circular 2003-002 required that cash advances be
liquidated within one (1) month from the date the purpose of the cash advance
was accomplished. If the completion of the projects mentioned were for more
than one month, a monthly progress liquidation report was necessary. In the
case of Uriarte's cash advances certified to by Aguas, the liquidation made
was wholesale, i.e., these were done on a semi-annual basis without a monthly
liquidation or at least a monthly liquidation progress report. How then could
Aguas correctly certify that previous liquidations were accounted for? Aguas's
certification also violated Sec. 89 of P.D. 1445 which states:
Limitations on cash advance. No cash advance shall be
given unless for a legally authorized specific purpose. A cash
advance shall be reported on and liquidated as soon as the
purpose for which it was given has been served. No additional
cash advance shall be allowed to any official or employee
unless the previous cash advance given to him is first settled or
a proper accounting thereof is made.
There is a great presumption of guilt against Aguas, as his action aided
and abetted Uriarte's being able to draw these irregular CIF funds in
contravention of the rules on CIF funds. Without Aguas's certification, the
disbursement vouchers could not have been processed for payment.
Accordingly, the certification that there were supporting documents and prior
liquidation paved the way for Uriarte to acquire ill-gotten wealth by raiding
the public coffers of the PCSO.
By just taking cognizance of the series and number of cash advances
and the staggering amounts involved, Aguas should have been alerted that
something was greatly amiss and that Uriarte was up to something. If Aguas
was not into the scheme, it would have been easy for him to refuse to sign the
certification, but he did not. The conspiracy "gravamen" is therefore present in
the case of Aguas. Moreover, Aguas's attempt to cover-up Uriarte's misuse of
these CIF funds in his accomplishment report only contributed to unmasking
the actual activities for which these funds were utilized. Aguas's
accomplishment report, which was conformed to by Uriarte, made it self-
evidence that the bulk of the CIF funds in 2009 and 2010 were allegedly
spend for non-PCSO related activities, e.g., bomb threats, kidnapping,
terrorism, and others. 45
Thus, the Sandiganbayan concluded that Aguas became a part of the implied
conspiracy when he signed the disbursement vouchers despite the absence of certain
legal requirements, and issued certain certifications to the effect that the budgetary
allotment/funds for cash advance to be withdrawn were available; that the
expenditures were supported by documents; and that the previous cash advances had
been liquidated or accounted for.
We opine and declare, however, that Aguas' certifications and signatures on the
disbursement vouchers were insufficient bases to conclude that he was into any
conspiracy to commit plunder or any other crime. Without GMA's participation, he
could not release any money because there was then no budget available for the
additional CIFs. Whatever irregularities he might have committed did not amount to
plunder, or to any implied conspiracy to commit plunder.
Under the circumstances, the Sandiganbayan's finding on the existence of the
conspiracy to commit plunder was unsustainable. It then becomes unavoidable for the
Court to rule that because the Prosecution failed to properly allege the elements of the
crime, as well as to prove that any implied conspiracy to commit plunder or any other
crime existed among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte there was no conspiracy to commit
plunder among them. As a result, GMA and Aguas could be criminally responsible
only for their own respective actions, if any.
III.
No proof of amassing, or accumulating, or acquiring
ill-gotten wealth of at least P50 Million
was adduced against GMA and Aguas
The Sandiganbayan sustained the sufficiency of the evidence to convict the
petitioners for plunder on the basis that the Prosecution established all the elements of
plunder.
After a review of the records, we find and rule that the Prosecution had no case
for plunder against the petitioners.
cTDaEH
To successfully mount a criminal prosecution for plunder, the State must allege
and establish the following elements, namely:
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by herself or in connivance
with members of her family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates or other persons;
2. That the offender amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through
a combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts: (a)
through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public
funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or
indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any
other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in
connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the
office or position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent
conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of
Government owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries; (d)
by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of
stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the
promise of future employment in any business enterprise or
undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial
monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and
orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or (f)
by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed,
accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00. 46
The corpus delicti of plunder is the amassment, accumulation or acquisition of
ill-gotten wealth valued at not less than P50,000,000.00. The failure to establish the
corpus delicti should lead to the dismissal of the criminal prosecution.
As regards the element that the public officer must have amassed, accumulated
or acquired ill-gotten wealth worth at least P50,000,000.00, the Prosecution adduced
no evidence showing that either GMA or Aguas or even Uriarte, for that matter, had
amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth of any amount. There was also no
evidence, testimonial or otherwise, presented by the Prosecution showing even the
remotest possibility that the CIFs of the PCSO had been diverted to either GMA or
Aguas, or Uriarte.
The absolute lack of evidence on this material but defining and decisive aspect
of the criminal prosecution was explicitly noted in the concurring and partial
dissenting opinion of Justice Rodolfo A. Ponferrada of the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
Here the evidence of the prosecution failed to show the existence of
the crime of plunder as no evidence was presented that any of the accused,
accumulated and/or acquired ill-gotten wealth. In fact, the principal witness of
the prosecution when asked, said that she does not know the existence or
whereabouts of the alleged ill-gotten wealth, to wit:
Q: Of course, you don't know where is this ill-gotten wealth are (sic)
now?
A: Yes, Your Honors. We don't know whether they saved it,
squandered it or what? We don't know, Your Honor. 47 [bold
emphasis supplied]
After Atty. Tolentino, as the Prosecution's main witness, conceded lack of any
knowledge of the amassing, accumulating or acquiring of ill-gotten wealth of at least
P50,000,000.00, nothing more remained of the criminal prosecution for plunder.
Hence, the Sandiganbayan should have granted the demurrers of GMA and Aguas,
and dismissed the criminal action against them.
IV.
The Prosecution failed to prove the
predicate act of raiding the public treasury
The Sandiganbayan observed that the Prosecution established the predicate act
of raiding the public treasury, to wit:
Secondly, the terms "unjust enrichment," "benefit," and "pecuniary
benefit" are only mentioned in the predicate acts mentioned in par. 2, 5 and 6
of Section 1 (d) of the Plunder Law. Paragraph 1 of the same section where
"raids on the public treasury" is mentioned did not mention "unjust
enrichment" or "personal benefit". Lastly, the predicate act covering "raids on
the public treasury" is lumped up with the phrases misappropriation,
conversion, misuse and malversation of public funds. Thus, once public funds,
as in the case of CIF funds, are illegally accumulated, amassed or acquired. To
the tune of P50 Million or more, there will be no need to establish any motive
to gain, or much more establish where the money eventually ended up. As
stated in Our Resolution dated November 5, 2013:
It should be noted that in both R.A. No. 7080 and the PCGG rules, the
enumeration of the possible predicate acts in the commission of plunder did
not associate or require the concept of personal gain/benefit or unjust
enrichment with respect to raids on the public treasury, as a means to commit
plunder. It would, therefore, appear that a "raid on the public treasury" is
consummated where all the acts necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present. Thus a "raid on the public treasury" can be said
to have been achieved thru the pillaging or looting of public coffers either
through misuse, misappropriation or conversion, without need of establishing
gain or profit to the "raider" gets material possession of a government asset
through improper means and has free disposal of the same, the raid or pillage
is completed.
xxx xxx xxx
Clearly, the improper acquisition and illegal use of CIF funds, which is
obviously a government asset, will amount to a raid on the public treasury,
and therefore fall into the category of ill-gotten wealth.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . It is not disputed that Uriarte asked for and was granted authority
by Arroyo to use additional CIF funds during the period 2008-2010. Uriarte
was able to accumulate during that period CIF funds in the total amount of
P352,681,646. This was through a series of withdrawals as cash advances of
the CIF funds from the PCSO coffers, as evidenced by the disbursement
vouchers and checks issued and encashed by her, through her authorized
representatives.
These flagrant violations of the rules on the use of CIF funds evidently
characterize the series of withdrawals by and releases to Uriarte as "raids" on
the PCSO coffers, which is part of the public treasury. These were, in every
sense, "pillage," as Uriarte looted government funds and appears to have not
been able to account for it. The monies came into her possession and,
admittedly, she disbursed it for purposes other than what these were intended
for, thus amounting to "misuse" of the same. . . .
In this case, to require proof that monies went to a plunderer's bank
account or was used to acquire real or personal properties or used for any
other purpose to personally benefit the plunderer, is absurd. Suppose a
plunderer had already amassed, acquired or accumulated P50 Million or more
of government funds and just decide to keep it in his vault and never used
such funds for any purpose to benefit him, would that not be plunder? Or, if
immediately right after such amassing, the monies went up in flames or
recovered by the police, negating any opportunity for the purpose to actually
benefit, would that not still be plunder? Surely, in such cases, a plunder charge
could still prosper and the argument that the fact of personal benefit should
still be evidence-based must fail. 48
CHTAIc
The Sandiganbayan contended that in order to prove the predicate act of raids
of the public treasury, the Prosecution need not establish that the public officer had
benefited from such act; and that what was necessary was proving that the public
officer had raided the public coffers. In support of this, it referred to the records of the
deliberations of Congress to buttress its observation.
We do not share the Sandiganbayan's contention.
The phrase raids on the public treasury is found in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No.
7080, which provides:
Section 1. Definition of Terms. — . . .
xxx xxx xxx
d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise or
material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2)
hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees,
agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series
of the following means or similar schemes:
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or
malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
xxx xxx xxx
To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key
is to look at the accompanying words: misappropriation, conversion, misuse or
malversation of public funds. This process is conformable with the maxim of statutory
construction noscitur a sociis, by which the correct construction of a particular word
or phrase that is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings may
be made by considering the company of the words in which the word or phrase is
found or with which it is associated. Verily, a word or phrase in a statute is always
used in association with other words or phrases, and its meaning may, therefore, be
modified or restricted by the latter. 49
To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it
were one's own; to misappropriate means to own, to take something for one's own
benefit; 50 misuse means "a good, substance, privilege, or right used improperly,
unforeseeably, or not as intended;" 51 and malversation occurs when "any public
officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or
property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent,
through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public
funds, or property, wholly or partially." 52 The common thread that binds all the four
terms together is that the public officer used the property taken. Considering that
raids on the public treasury is in the company of the four other terms that require the
use of the property taken, the phrase raids on the public treasury similarly requires
such use of the property taken. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in
contending that the mere accumulation and gathering constituted the forbidden act of
raids on the public treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a sociis, raids on the
public treasury requires the raider to use the property taken impliedly for his personal
benefit.
The Prosecution asserts that the Senate deliberations removed personal benefit
as a requirement for plunder. In not requiring personal benefit, the Sandiganbayan
quoted the following exchanges between Senator Enrile and Senator Tañada, viz.:
Senator Enrile. The word here, Mr. President, "such public officer or
person who conspired or knowingly benefited". One does not have to
conspire or rescheme. The only element needed is that he "knowingly
benefited". A candidate for the Senate for instance, who received a political
contribution from a plunderer, knowing that the contributor is a plunderer and
therefore, he knowingly benefited from the plunder, would he also suffer the
penalty, Mr. President, for life imprisonment?
Senator Tañada. In the committee amendments, Mr. President, we
have deleted these lines 1 to 4 and part of line 5, on page 3. But, in a way, Mr.
President, it is good that the Gentleman is bringing out these questions, I
believe that under the examples he has given, the Court will have to. . .
Senator Enrile. How about the wife, Mr. President, he may not agree
with the plunderer to plunder the country but because she is a dutiful wife or a
faithful husband, she has to keep her or his vow of fidelity to the spouse. And,
of course, she enjoys the benefits out of the plunder. Would the Gentleman
now impute to her or him the crime of plunder simply because she or he
knowingly benefited out of the fruits of the plunder and, therefore, he must
suffer or he must suffer the penalty of life imprisonment?
The President. That was stricken out already in the Committee
amendment.
Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President. Lines 1 to 4 and part of line 5
were stricken out in the Committee amendment. But, as I said, the examples
of the Minority Floor Leader are still worth spreading the Record. And, I
believe that in those examples, the Court will have just to take into
consideration all the other circumstances prevailing in the case and the
evidence that will be submitted.
The President. In any event, 'knowingly benefited' has already been
stricken off." 53
The exchanges between Senator Enrile and Senator Tañada reveal, therefore,
that what was removed from the coverage of the bill and the final version that
eventually became the law was a person who was not the main plunderer or a co-
conspirator, but one who personally benefited from the plunderers' action. The
requirement of personal benefit on the part of the main plunderer or his co-
conspirators by virtue of their plunder was not removed. EATCcI
As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money went
but, more importantly, that GMA and Aguas had personally benefited from the same.
Hence, the Prosecution did not prove the predicate act of raids on the public treasury
beyond reasonable doubt.
V.
Summation
In view of the foregoing, the Court inevitably concludes that the
Sandiganbayan completely ignored the failure of the information to sufficiently
charge conspiracy to commit plunder against the petitioners; and ignored the lack of
evidence establishing the corpus delicti of amassing, accumulation and acquisition of
ill-gotten wealth in the total amount of at least P50,000,000.00 through any or all of
the predicate crimes. The Sandiganbayan thereby acted capriciously, thus gravely
abusing its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 54 To justify the issuance of the
writ of certiorari, the abuse of discretion must be grave, as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility,
and the abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in
contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction. 55
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions for certiorari; ANNULS
and SETS ASIDE the resolutions issued in Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by
the Sandiganbayan on April 6, 2015 and September 10, 2015; GRANTS the
petitioners' respective demurrers to evidence; DISMISSES Criminal Case No. SB-12-
CRM-0174 as to the petitioners GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO and
BENIGNO AGUAS for insufficiency of evidence; ORDERS the immediate release
from detention of said petitioners; and MAKES no pronouncements on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Peralta, Del Castillo, Perez,
Mendoza, Reyes and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J., I join the Dissent of J. Leonen and attach my separate Dissent.
Carpio, J., I join the Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., Please see my separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
Leonen, J., I dissent. See separate opinion.
Caguioa, J., I join the dissent of J. Leonen.
(Macapagal-Arroyo v. People, G.R. Nos. 220598 & 220953, [July 19, 2016], 790 PHIL
|||
367-556)
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J : p
The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over the criminal action
involving petitioner notwithstanding that he is a private individual considering that his
criminal prosecution is intimately related to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses, their immediate family, subordinates and close associates.
The Case
Petitioner Herminio T. Disini assails via petition for certiorari the resolutions
promulgated by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case
No. 28002, both entitled People v. Herminio T. Disini, on January 17, 2005 (denying
his motion to quash the informations) 1 and August 10, 2005 (denying his motion for
reconsideration of the denial of his motion to quash), 2 alleging that the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) thereby committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Antecedents
The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations dated June 30, 2004
charging Disini in the Sandiganbayan with corruption of public officials, penalized
under Article 212 in relation to Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code (Criminal Case
No. 28001), and with a violation of Section 4 (a) of Republic Act 3019 (R.A. No.
3019), also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Criminal Case No.
28002).
The accusatory portions of the informations read as follows:
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
On August 2, 2004, Disini filed a motion to quash, 5 alleging that the criminal
actions had been extinguished by prescription, and that the informations did not
conform to the prescribed form. The Prosecution opposed the motion to quash. 6
On September 16, 2004, Disini voluntarily submitted himself for arraignment
to obtain the Sandiganbayan's favorable action on his motion for permission to travel
abroad. 7 He then entered a plea of not guilty to both informations.
As stated, on January 17, 2005, the Sandiganbayan (First Division)
promulgated its first assailed resolution denying the motion to quash. 8
Disini moved for the reconsideration of the resolution dated January 17, 2005,
9 but the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied his motion on August 10, 2005
through the second assailed resolution. 10
Issues
Undaunted, Disini commenced this special civil action for certiorari, alleging
that:
Ruling
1.
Preliminary Considerations
To properly resolve this case, reference is made to the ruling of the Court in
G.R. No. 175730 entitled Herminio Disini v. Sandiganbayan, 12 which involved the
civil action for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages (Civil
Case No. 0013 entitled Republic v. Herminio T. Disini, et al.) filed by the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) against Disini and others. 13 The amended
complaint in Civil Case No. 0013 alleged that Disini had acted in unlawful concert
with his co-defendants in acquiring and accumulating ill-gotten wealth through the
misappropriation of public funds, plunder of the nation's wealth, extortion,
embezzlement, and other acts of corruption, 14 as follows:
4. Defendant HERMINIO T. DISINI is a close associate of defendant
Ferdinand E. Marcos and the husband of the first cousin of Defendant Imelda R.
Marcos. By reason of this relationship . . . defendant Herminio Disini obtained
staggering commissions from the Westinghouse in exchange for securing the
nuclear power plant contract from the Philippine government.
Through its letter dated April 8, 1991, 16 the PCGG transmitted the records of
Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 to then Ombudsman Conrado
M. Vasquez for appropriate action, to wit:
In line with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Eduardo
M. Cojuangco, Jr. versus the PCGG (G.R. Nos. 92319-92320) dated October 2,
1990, we are hereby transmitting to your Office for appropriate action the
records of the attached criminal case which we believe is similar to the said
Cojuangco case in certain aspects, such as: (i) some parts or elements are also
parts of the causes of action in the civil complaints[-] filed with the
Sandiganbayan; (ii) some properties or assets of the respondents have been
sequestered; (iii) some of the respondents are also party defendants in the civil
cases.
Although the authority of the PCGG has been upheld by the Supreme
Court, we are constrained to refer to you for proper action the herein-attached
case in view of the suspicion that the PCGG cannot conduct an impartial
investigation in cases similar to that of the Cojuangco case. . . .
. . . [T]he PCGG and the Solicitor General finding a pima facie basis
filed a civil complaint against petitioner and intervenors alleging substantially
the same illegal or criminal acts subject of the subsequent criminal complaints
the Solicitor General filed with the PCGG for preliminary investigation. . . . .
Moreover, when the PCGG issued the sequestration and freeze orders
against petitioner's properties, it was on the basis of a prima facie finding that
the same were ill-gotten and/or were acquired in relation to the illegal
disposition of coconut levy funds. Thus, the Court finds that the PCGG
cannot possibly conduct the preliminary investigation of said criminal
complaints with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," as it has
prejudged the matter. . . . 18
The Court finds that under the circumstances of the case, the PCGG
cannot inspire belief that it could be impartial in the conduct of the
preliminary investigation of the aforesaid complaints against petitioner and
intervenors. It cannot possibly preside in the said preliminary investigation
with an even hand.
The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice can be
promoted if the PCGG would be prohibited from conducting the
preliminary investigation of the complaints subject of this petition and the
petition for intervention and that the records of the same should be
forwarded to the Ombudsman, who as an independent constitutional
officer has primary jurisdiction over cases of this nature, to conduct such
preliminary investigation and take appropriate action. 19 (Bold emphasis
supplied) SETAcC
It appears that the resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman, following its
conduct of the preliminary investigation on the criminal complaints thus transmitted
by the PCGG, were reversed and set aside by the Court in Presidential Commission
on Good Government v. Desierto, 20 with the Court requiring the Office of the
Ombudsman to file the informations that became the subject of Disini's motion to
quash in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.
2.
Sandiganbayan has exclusive and
original jurisdiction over the offenses charged
It is underscored that it was the PCGG that had initially filed the criminal
complaints in the Sandiganbayan, with the Office of the Ombudsman taking over the
investigation of Disini only after the Court issued in Cojuangco, Jr. the directive to
the PCGG to refer the criminal cases to the Office of the Ombudsman on the ground
that the PCGG would not be an impartial office following its finding of a prima facie
case being established against Disini to sustain the institution of Civil Case No. 0013.
Also underscored is that the complaint in Civil Case No. 0013 and the
informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 involved the
same transaction, specifically the contracts awarded through the intervention of Disini
and President Marcos in favor of Burns & Roe to do the engineering and architectural
design, and Westinghouse to do the construction of the Philippine Nuclear Power
Plant Project (PNPPP). Given their sameness in subject matter, to still expressly aver
in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 that the charges involved
the recovery of ill-gotten wealth was no longer necessary. 21 With Criminal Case No.
28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 being intertwined with Civil Case No. 0013, the
PCGG had the authority to institute the criminal prosecutions against Disini pursuant
to E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
That Disini was a private individual did not remove the offenses charged from
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Section 2 of E.O. No. 1, which tasked the
PCGG with assisting the President in "[t]he recovery of all ill-gotten wealth
accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or
abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities
owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees,
by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority,
influence, connections or relationship," expressly granted the authority of the PCGG
to recover ill-gotten wealth covered President Marcos' immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates, without distinction as to their private or public
status.
Contrary to Disini's argument, too, the qualifying clause found in Section 4 of
R.A. No. 8249 22 applied only to the cases listed in Subsection 4a and Subsection 4b
of R.A. No. 8249, the full text of which follows:
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned
or -controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade '27' and
higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
3.
As for Criminal Case No. 28002, Disini was charged with a violation of
Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 3019. By express provision of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019,
as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, the offenses committed under R.A. No.
3019 shall prescribe in 15 years. Prior to the amendment, the prescriptive period was
only 10 years. It became settled in People v. Pacificador, 28 however, that the longer
prescriptive period of 15 years would not apply to crimes committed prior to the
effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which was approved on March 16, 1982,
because the longer period could not be given retroactive effect for not being favorable
to the accused. With the information alleging the period from 1974 to February 1986
as the time of the commission of the crime charged, the applicable prescriptive period
is 10 years in order to accord with People v. Pacificador.
For crimes punishable by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof provides
that prescription starts to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents. As to offenses punishable by R.A. No.
3019, Section 2 of Act No. 3326 n 29 states:
Corollary, it is safe to conclude that the prescriptive period for the crime
which is the subject herein, commenced from the date of its discovery in 1992
after the Committee made an exhaustive investigation. When the complaint was
filed in 1997, only five years have elapsed, and, hence, prescription has not yet
set in. The rationale for this was succinctly discussed in the 1999 Presidential
Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, that "it was well-high
impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known these crimes
committed prior to the 1986 EDSA Revolution, because of the alleged
connivance and conspiracy among involved public officials and the
beneficiaries of the loans." In yet another pronouncement, in the 2001
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto
(G.R. No. 130817), the Court held that during the Marcos regime, no person
would have dared to question the legality of these transactions. (Citations
omitted) 31
Accordingly, we are not persuaded to hold here that the prescriptive period
began to run from 1974, the time when the contracts for the PNPP Project were
awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse. Although the criminal cases were the
offshoot of the sequestration case to recover ill-gotten wealth instead of behest loans
like in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, the
connivance and conspiracy among the public officials involved and the beneficiaries
of the favors illegally extended rendered it similarly well-nigh impossible for the
State, as the aggrieved party, to have known of the commission of the crimes charged
prior to the EDSA Revolution in 1986. Notwithstanding the highly publicized and
widely-known nature of the PNPPP, the unlawful acts or transactions in relation to it
were discovered only through the PCGG's exhaustive investigation, resulting in the
establishment of a prima facie case sufficient for the PCGG to institute Civil Case No.
0013 against Disini. Before the discovery, the PNPPP contracts, which partook of a
public character, enjoyed the presumption of their execution having been regularly
done in the course of official functions. 32 Considering further that during the Marcos
regime, no person would have dared to assail the legality of the transactions, it would
be unreasonable to expect that the discovery of the unlawful transactions was possible
prior to 1986.ECISAD
We note, too, that the criminal complaints were filed and their records
transmitted by the PCGG to the Office of the Ombudsman on April 8, 1991 for the
conduct n the preliminary investigation. 33 In accordance with Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code 34 and the ruling in Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, 35
the filing of the criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman effectively
interrupted the running of the period of prescription. According to Panaguiton: 36
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to
obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control.
The prevailing rule is, therefore, that irrespective of whether the offense
charged is punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by a special law, it is the filing of
the complaint or information in the office of the public prosecutor for purposes of the
preliminary investigation that interrupts the period of prescription. Consequently,
prescription did not yet set in because only five years elapsed from 1986, the time of
the discovery of the offenses charged, up to April 1991, the time of the filing of the
criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman.
4.
When the offense is committed by more than one person, all of them
shall be included in the complaint or information.
2. That the offers or promises are made or the gifts or presents are given
to a public officer under circumstances that will make the public
officer liable for direct bribery or indirect bribery.
1. That the offender has family or close personal relation with a public
official;
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
PERALTA, J : p
Before us is a special civil action for certiorari 1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, dated April 21, 2014 filed by Roberta S. Saldariega (petitioner), through
counsel, assailing the Order dated June 14, 2013 issued by respondent Presiding Judge
Elvira D.C. Panganiban, which granted the motion to reopen Criminal Case Nos. Q-
11-173055 and Q-11-173056, for allegedly having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On November 8, 2011, the Office of the City Prosecutor, Quezon City filed
two (2) Informations against petitioner Roberta S. Saldariega for violation of Sections
5 and 11, Article 2, Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-11-173055 and Q-
11-173056, respectively. 2 Said cases were raffled to Branch 227, Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City, presided by herein respondent Judge Elvira D.C. Panganiban.
Court hearings were set for the subject cases, however, the prosecution's
principal witness PO2 Nelson Villas (PO2 Villas), one of the arresting officers, failed
to attend said scheduled hearings, specifically on October 22, 2012 and October 25,
2012. 3 Thus, during the May 16, 2013 hearing, respondent judge issued an Order
provisionally dismissing the cases with the express consent of the accused-petitioner,
4 the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
V
WHETHER OR NOT THE ABSENCE OF PROSECUTION'S PRINCIPAL
WITNESS PO2 NELSON VILLAS FOR FOUR (4) CONSECUTIVE
HEARINGS HAD BEEN CONSIDERED WAIVER PURSUANT TO A.M.
NO. 11-6-10-SC.
RULING
We deny the petition.
The Court notes that the instant case suffers from procedural infirmities which
this Court cannot ignore. While this petition is to be treated as one for certiorari under
Rule 65, it is still dismissible for violation of the hierarchy of courts. Although the
Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA to issue writs of
certiorari, this should not be taken as granting parties the absolute and unrestrained
freedom of choice of the court to which an application will be directed. Direct resort
to this Court is allowed only if there are special, important and compelling reasons
clearly and specifically spelled out in the petition, which are not present in this case.
13
Moreover, this being a petition on certiorari under Rule 65, the issues raised
herein should be confined solely to questions of jurisdiction. Thus, while in the course
of the discussion, it may be necessary to thresh out pertinent factual issues, the same
is limited for the purpose of resolving the issue on jurisdiction, that is, whether the
trial court committed grave abuse of discretion resulting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction.
When a criminal case is provisionally
dismissed with the express consent of
the accused, the case may be revived by
the State within the periods provided
under the 2nd paragraph of Section 8,
Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of
the accused and with notice to the offended party. Here, a perusal of the Order, dated
May 16, 2013, stresses in no uncertain terms that the dismissal of the case was
provisional, i.e., the case could be revived at some future time. If petitioner believed
that the case against her should be dismissed with prejudice, she should not have
agreed to a provisional dismissal. She should have moved for a dismissal with
prejudice so that the court would have no alternative but to require the prosecution to
present its evidence. There was nothing in the records showing the accused's
opposition to the provisional dismissal nor was there any after the Order of
provisional dismissal was issued. She cannot claim now that the dismissal was with
prejudice. Thus, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent
of the accused, as in this case, the case may be revived by the State within the periods
provided under the 2nd paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure. There is no violation of due process as long as the revival of a
provisionally dismissed complaint was made within the time-bar provided under the
law.
Generally, the prosecutor should have been the one who filed the motion to
revive because it is the prosecutor who controls the trial. But in this particular case,
the defect, if there was any, was cured when the public prosecutor later actively
participated in the denial of the accused's motion for reconsideration when she filed
her Comment/Objection thereto. In the Order denying the motion, the trial court stated
that "in her Comment/Objection, the Public Prosecutor begged to disagree primarily
on the ground that double jeopardy has not set in, because the provisional dismissal
of the case was with the express consent of the accused." 14 The court even went
further when it stated that "although the Motion to Re-open the case was filed by the
witness without securing the conformity of the Public Prosecutor, in effect, the
prosecutor has conformed to the re-opening of the case because she (the prosecutor)
finds that the failure of the witness to appear on two (2) hearings was due to the death
of the father in law on March 23, 2013 and the death of his aunt on May 12, 2013, as
substantiated by the respective Certificates of Death of the said relatives." 15
Moreover, in the case at bar, it must be noted that the accused is charged with a
public crime, hence, it is a victim-less crime. Unlike in private crimes where the
participation of the private offended party is generally required for the recovery of
civil liability, in the instant case, there is no particular private offended party who can
actually file the motion to revive. Hence, in some instances, as in this case, it is the
arresting officer, PO2 Villas, who filed the motion to revive the case out of his sense
of duty as a police officer and compelled by his sense of obligation considering that
he knew his absence was the cause why the complaint was provisionally dismissed.
We could not entirely blame PO2 Villas in filing the motion to revive since we
are aware that in drug-related cases, the arresting officers are usually required to
explain by their superiors when a case is provisionally dismissed due to their failure to
appear during trial. Thus, in order to exonerate themselves from a possible
administrative and criminal liability, the arresting officers would then opt instead to
file the motion to revive on their own.
The provisional dismissal of the case does
not operate as an acquittal since its
dismissal was made with the express consent
of the accused, thus, there is no double
jeopardy.
Further, the proscription against double jeopardy presupposes that an accused
has been previously charged with an offense, and the case against him is terminated
either by his acquittal or conviction, or dismissed in any other manner without his
consent. As a general rule, the following requisites must be present for double
jeopardy to attach: (1) a valid indictment, (2) before a court of competent jurisdiction,
(3) the arraignment of the accused, (4) a valid plea entered by him, and (5) the
acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or termination of the case
against him without his express consent. However, there are two (2) exceptions to the
foregoing rule, and double jeopardy may attach even if the dismissal of the case was
with the consent of the accused: first, when there is insufficiency of evidence to
support the charge against him; and second, where there has been an unreasonable
delay in the proceedings, in violation of the accused's right to speedy trial. 16
In the instant case, while the first four requisites are present, the last requisite is
lacking, considering that here the dismissal was merely provisional and it was done
with the express consent of the accused-petitioner. Petitioner is not in danger of being
twice put in jeopardy with the reopening of the case against her as it is clear that the
case was only provisionally dismissed by the trial court. The requirement that the
dismissal of the case must be without the consent of the accused is not present in this
case. Neither does the case fall under any of the aforementioned exceptions because,
in fact, the prosecution had failed to continue the presentation of evidence due to the
absence of the witnesses, thus, the fact of insufficiency of evidence cannot be
established. Likewise, we find no unreasonable delay in the proceedings that would be
tantamount to violation of the accused's right to speedy trial.
This Court has emphasized that "'speedy trial' is a relative term and necessarily
a flexible concept." In determining whether the accused's right to speedy trial was
violated, the delay should be considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings.
The factors to balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor;
(c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay.
In the instant case, petitioner failed to show any evidence that the alleged delay in the
trial was attended with malice or that the same was made without good cause or
justifiable motive on the part of the prosecution. Mere mathematical reckoning of the
time involved would not suffice as the realities of everyday life must be regarded in
judicial proceedings. 17
Here, the delay in the proceedings, which ran from October 25, 2012 until the
provisional dismissal of the case on May 13, 2013, is not the kind of delay
contemplated under the law as to violate the accused's right to speedy trial. More so,
when the cause of the delay is valid, as in the instant case. Likewise, a perusal of the
Order dated May 16, 2013 would show that the order was categorical in stating that
the dismissal of the complaint was provisional with the express consent of the accused
and her counsel. The court merely stated in the Order as to what transpired during the
proceedings of the case and not that the dismissal was based on the accused's right to
speedy trial.
While the Court recognizes the accused's right to speedy trial and adheres to a
policy of speedy administration of justice, we cannot, however, deprive the State of a
reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals. We reiterate that unjustified
postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what
offend the right of the accused to speedy trial. 18
In a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
petitioner should establish that the court or
tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise
of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction.
In view of the foregoing, we, thus, find no basis for issuing the extraordinary
writs of certiorari with injunction, as there was no showing that the alleged error in
judgment was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Nowhere in the petition did
petitioner show that the issuance of the assailed orders was patent and gross that
would warrant striking it down through a petition for certiorari. No argument was
shown that the trial court exercised its judgment capriciously, whimsically, arbitrarily
or despotically by reason of passion and hostility.
It is well settled that a petition for certiorari against a court which has
jurisdiction over a case will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is manifested.
The burden is on the part of the petitioner to prove not merely reversible error, but
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
public respondent issuing the impugned order. Mere abuse of discretion is not
enough; it must be grave. The term grave abuse of discretion is defined as a capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility.
19 Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, and not errors or mistakes
in the findings and conclusions of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Orders dated
June 14, 2013 and February 18, 2014 in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-11-173055 and Q-11-
173056 entitled People of the Philippines v. Roberta Saldariega are AFFIRMED.
Let the case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Mendoza, * Reyes and Leonen, ** JJ., concur.
||| (Saldariega v. Panganiban, G.R. Nos. 211933 & 211960, [April 15, 2015])
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 196508. September 24, 2014.]
DECISION
BRION, J : p
We review in this petition for review on certiorari 1 the July 30, 2010 decision 2
and April 8, 2011 resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 93807.
The CA annulled and set aside the March 3, 2006 resolution 4 and September 5, 2006
order 5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 74, Antipolo City, which disallowed
the private offended party's counsel from participating in the prosecution of the
petitioners for bigamy and dismissed the bigamy case filed against the petitioners,
respectively.
Factual Antecedents
On May 6, 1954, the respondent Amelia Chan married Leon Basilio Chua in a
civil ceremony solemnized by then Judge Cancio C. Garcia of the City Court of
Caloocan. The respondent claimed that her husband Leon Basilio Chua and the present
petitioner, Leonardo A. Villalon, are one and the same person.
During the subsistence of his marriage to Amelia, Leon Basilio Chua, this time
under the name of Leonardo A. Villalon, allegedly contracted a second marriage with
Erlinda Talde that took place on June 2, 1993. This marriage was solemnized by Judge
Ruth C. Santos of the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal.
Amelia, who was then living in the United States and could not personally file a
case for bigamy in the Philippines, requested Benito Yao Chua and Wilson Go to
commence the criminal proceedings against the petitioners. On September 13, 2003, a
verified complaint-affidavit 6 alleging the commission of the crime of bigamy was filed
with the Office of the City Prosecutor in Antipolo. Consequently, an Information 7 was
filed with the RTC, docketed as Criminal Case No. 05-30485. On arraignment, the
petitioners pleaded not guilty.
During the pre-trial (or on February 6, 2006), Atty. Apollo V. Atencia appeared in
behalf of Amelia, the private offended party. On February 20, 2006, Atty. Atencia
formally filed his entry of appearance 8 as private prosecutor, with the conformity and
under the control and supervision of Assistant City Prosecutor Gerardo P. Barot.
Leonardo filed an omnibus motion 9 with the RTC seeking to disqualify Atty.
Atencia. He argued that Amelia could not be represented in the bigamy case because she
was not a party to the case, as she did not file the complaint-affidavit. He also argued that
Amelia had already waived her right to file a civil and criminal case against him and his
co-defendant Erlinda. Amelia opposed the omnibus motion, 10 while the public
prosecutor joined the petitioners in disqualifying Atty. Atencia from appearing in the
case. 11 DHECac
On March 27, 2006, Amelia filed a petition 13 for certiorari and prohibition, with
prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, with the CA. In a resolution 14 dated April 19, 2006, the CA
issued a TRO enjoining further proceedings on the case.
Despite the TRO issued by the CA, trial of the bigamy case proceeded with the
presentation of the prosecution's evidence, to which Leonardo filed a demurrer to
evidence. In an order 15 dated September 5, 2006, the RTC dismissed the bigamy case
for failure of the prosecution to prove the petitioners' guilt.
In her petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA, Amelia alleged grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it issued its March 3, 2006 resolution
and proceeded with the bigamy case without permitting the participation of Atty. Atencia
as private prosecutor.
In a decision 16 dated July 30, 2010, the CA granted Amelia's petition and
annulled the RTC's March 3, 2006 resolution disqualifying Atty. Atencia from
participation in the case, and its September 5, 2006 order that dismissed the bigamy case
against the petitioners. The CA ruled that the crime of bigamy, being public in nature, can
be denounced by anyone, not only by the offended party, before the prosecuting
authorities without the offended party losing her right to recover damages. Thus, the CA
concluded that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it did not allow
Atty. Atencia to intervene and represent Amelia in the bigamy case and that the trial court
denied Amelia her right to due process.
Also, the CA ruled that the offended party could be deprived of the right to
intervene in the criminal case only when he or she expressly waives the civil action or
reserves the right to institute one. The CA found no such waiver from Amelia and held
that Atty. Atencia's appearance as private prosecutor was proof enough of Amelia's
determination to enforce her claim for damages in the bigamy case.
The CA disposed of the certiorari petition under these terms: HCaIDS
SO ORDERED. 17
With the denial of their motion for reconsideration 18 before the CA, the
petitioners filed the present petition for review on certiorari before this Court and raised
the following arguments:
B. The Court of Appeals grossly erred in granting the petition for certiorari
insofar as the Resolution, dated 3 March 2006, of therein respondent
Judge was concerned.
Our Ruling
First, the petitioners argue that the RTC's September 5, 2006 order dismissing the
bigamy case against them had already become final because it was not assailed by the
respondent in her petition for certiorari before the CA. The petitioners point out that the
respondent only particularly assailed the RTC's March 3, 2006 resolution and failed to
file a separate or amended petition for certiorari to include the September 5, 2006 order
as one of the assailed orders of the RTC. Based on this assertion, the petitioners contend
that the CA, in ordering the remand and re-raffle of the bigamy case to another RTC
branch, violates their right against double jeopardy.aSACED
The petitioners are mistaken. The review by the CA on whether the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion encompassed, not only the issuance of the March 3,
2006 resolution, but all proceedings in the bigamy case thereafter. This is apparent from
the words used by the respondent in her certiorari petition before the CA where she
raised the following supporting grounds:
Evidently, the CA's review is not limited to the RTC's March 3, 2006 resolution
but also included the September 5, 2006 order that was issued by the RTC in the course
of the proceedings on the bigamy case. Thus, the RTC's September 5, 2006 order, which
is still the subject of review by this Court, has not attained finality and the CA's assailed
order of remanding and re-raffling the bigamy case to another trial court would not
violate the petitioners' right against double jeopardy.
Also, we emphasize that the RTC issued its September 5, 2006 order in defiance
of the TRO issued by the CA. The records show that the CA had issued a TRO on April
19, 2006, which should have prohibited the RTC from further proceeding on the case.
But the RTC, instead, continued with the presentation of the prosecution's evidence and
issued the assailed September 5, 2006 order.
Under this circumstance, the RTC's September 5, 2006 order was actually without
force and effect and would not serve as basis for the petitioners to claim that their right
against double jeopardy had been violated. The RTC, clearly, acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing its September 5, 2006 order in view of the earlier TRO issued by the
CA.
Second, the petitioners argue that the CA gravely erred when it ruled that: the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its March 3, 2006 resolution disqualifying
Atty. Atencia as private prosecutor, and that Atty. Atencia's disqualification violated the
respondent's rights to intervene and be heard in the bigamy case. They contend that, even
with Atty. Atencia's disqualification, the respondent was never denied her right to
participate in the proceedings and was even called to stand as a witness but the
respondent never appeared before the court because she was out of the country during the
whole proceedings on the bigamy case.
In this case, the CA found no such waiver from or reservation made by the
respondent. The fact that the respondent, who was already based abroad, had secured the
services of an attorney in the Philippines reveals her willingness and interest to
participate in the prosecution of the bigamy case and to recover civil liability from the
petitioners. Thus, the RTC should have allowed, and should not have disqualified, Atty.
Atencia from intervening in the bigamy case as the respondent, being the offended party,
is afforded by law the right to participate through counsel in the prosecution of the
offense with respect to the civil aspect of the case.
Lastly, the petitioners argue that the respondent's certiorari petition before the CA
should have been dismissed outright because it failed to implead the "People of the
Philippines" as a party-respondent.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Villalon v. Chan, G.R. No. 196508, [September 24, 2014], 744 PHIL 147-156)
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J : p
This is an appeal from the July 23, 2009 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02925, which modified the December 5, 2006 Decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Manila, Branch 27 in Criminal Case No. 02-200171. The
RTC found appellant Bobby Torres @ Roberto Torres y Nava (appellant) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder but on appeal, the CA found appellant guilty of
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
Factual Antecedents
On January 28, 2004, an Amended Information 3 was filed before the RTC,
charging siblings Reynaldo Torres (Reynaldo), Jay Torres (Jay), Ronnie Torres (Ronnie)
and appellant with the special complex crime of robbery with homicide committed
against Jaime M. Espino (Espino). The Amended Information contained the following
accusatory allegations:
Contrary to law. 4
Only appellant was arrested. Reynaldo, Jay and Ronnie remain at-large to date.
During arraignment, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty". 5 After the termination of
the pre-trial conference, trial ensued. 6
At around 10:00 p.m. of September 21, 2001, Espino was driving his car along
C.M. Recto Avenue in Divisoria, Manila when Ronnie suddenly blocked his path. Espino
alighted from his vehicle and approached Ronnie, who tried to grab his belt-bag. Espino
resisted and struggled with Ronnie for the possession of his belt-bag but the latter's
brothers, Jay, Rey, appellant, and an unidentified companion suddenly appeared. With all
of them brandishing bladed weapons, appellant and his brothers took turns in stabbing
Espino in different parts of his body while the unidentified companion held him by the
neck. When Espino was already sprawled on the ground, they took his belt-bag, wallet
and jewelries and immediately fled. ICDcEA
Espino was rushed to the hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival. In his
Medico-Legal Report No. W-658-2001, 8 Dr. Salen concluded that Espino died of
multiple stab wounds caused by sharp bladed instruments. The back portion of his head
bore two stab wounds while his body suffered four stab wounds which proved fatal.
Considering the number and varying measurements of the wounds, Dr. Salen opined that
there were more than one assailant.
To prove the civil aspect of the case, Espino's daughter, Winnie Espino-Fajardo
(Winnie) testified that the pieces of jewelry stolen from her father consisted of a necklace
worth P35,000.00, bracelet worth P15,000.00, wristwatch worth P10,000.00 and two
rings worth P10,000.00 each. As for their expenses, Winnie said that P25,000.00 was
spent for the burial lot and P37,000.00 for the funeral services. She stated further that
Espino was 51 years old at the time of his death and was earning P3,000.00 a day as a
meat vendor. 9
Appellant denied any participation in the crime. He testified that at around 10:00
p.m. of September 21, 2001, he was with his girlfriend, Merlita Hilario (Merlita). They
proceeded to the house of their friend, Marilou Garcia (Marilou), in Villaruel, Tayuman,
Manila where they had a drinking session which lasted until they fell asleep. They did not
leave their friend's house until the following morning when they went home. Thereupon,
he was told that policemen were looking for him because his brothers got involved in an
altercation that resulted in the death of someone. 10 Merlita and Marilou corroborated
appellant's alibi in their respective testimonies. 11
From the testimony of another defense witness, Jorna Yabut-Torres (Jorna), wife
of Ronnie, the defense's version of the incident emerged as follows:
In the evening of September 21, 2001, Jorna and Ronnie were sharing jokes with
other vendors in Divisoria when a car stopped a few meters from their stall. The driver
alighted and asked why they were laughing. Ronnie replied that it had nothing to do with
him. The driver seemed drunk since he walked back to his vehicle in an unsteady manner.
Moments later, the driver returned and stabbed Ronnie on the wrist with a knife. Jay saw
the assault on his brother, Ronnie, and got a bolo which he used to hack the driver
repeatedly. Thereafter, Ronnie and Jay fled. 12
Even granting that the element of taking is present, still, accused cannot
be held liable for the complex crime of robbery with homicide for the reason
that it was not indubitably shown that the main purpose of the accused was to
rob the victim. To the mind of the Court, this is precisely the reason why the
prosecution skipped the utterances made by the protagonist[s] during the attack.
To sustain a [conviction] for the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, the original criminal design of the culprit must be robbery and the
homicide is perpetrated with a view to the consummation of the robbery, or by
reason or on the occasion of the robbery (People vs. Ponciano, 204 SCRA 627).
The RTC thus concluded that appellant can only be liable for the killing of Espino.
It held him guilty of murder after it found the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength, which was alleged in the Information and duly established by the
prosecution. Moreover, the RTC ruled that conspiracy among the accused attended the
crime.SEACTH
Anent the civil aspect of the case, the RTC granted civil indemnity, actual and
moral damages to the heirs of Espino, but denied the claim for loss of earning capacity
for lack of documentary evidence.
Let alias warrant of arrest issue against accused Reynaldo Torres, Jay
Torres and Ronnie Torres.
SO ORDERED. 16
In modifying the ruling of the RTC, i.e., finding appellant guilty of robbery with
homicide instead of murder, the CA found that the primary intention of appellant and his
co-accused was to rob Espino and his killing was only incidental to the robbery. The
blocking of Espino's car and the struggle for possession of his belt-bag after he alighted
are clear manifestations of the intent to commit robbery. The dispositive portion of the
July 23, 2009 Decision 20 of the CA reads as follows:
SO ORDERED. 21
Appellant imputes upon the CA the following errors in his Supplemental Brief. 22
The appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it reviewed the entire
case despite the fact that the accused-appellant only appealed his conviction for
murder. 24
Our Ruling
Appellant maintains that the CA erred in finding him liable for robbery with
homicide as charged in the Amended Information. He argues that his appeal to the CA
was limited to his conviction for murder and excluded his acquittal for robbery. And by
appealing his conviction for murder, he does not waive his constitutional right not to be
subject to double jeopardy for the crime of robbery. He claims that even assuming that
the RTC erred in acquitting him of the robbery charge, such error can no longer be
questioned on appeal.
In this case, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the
primary intention of appellant and his companions was to rob Espino. Umali and
Macapar, the eyewitnesses presented by the prosecution, testified that at around 10:00
p.m. of September 21, 2001, appellant's brother and co-accused, Ronnie, blocked
Espino's car at the corner of C.M. Recto Avenue and Ylaya Street. When Espino alighted
from his vehicle, Ronnie attempted to grab his belt-bag. A struggle for possession of the
belt-bag ensued. It was at this juncture that appellant and the other co-accused joined the
fray and stabbed Espino several times in the head and body. When Espino fell to the
pavement from his stab wounds, appellant, Ronnie and their cohorts got hold of the
victim's wallet, belt-bag, wristwatch and jewelry then fled together. 29
From the foregoing, it is clear that the primordial intention of appellant and his
companions was to rob Espino. Had they primarily intended to kill Espino, they would
have immediately stabbed him to death. However, the fact that Ronnie initially wrestled
with appellant for possession of the belt-bag clearly shows that the central aim was to
commit robbery against Espino. This intention was confirmed by the accused's taking of
Espino's belt-bag, wallet, wrist-watch and jewelries after he was stabbed to death. The
killing was therefore merely incidental, resulting by reason or on occasion of the robbery.
Appellant attempts to discredit Umali and Macapar by asserting that there are
glaring contradictions in their testimonies. He calls attention to the RTC's observation
that Macapar gave conflicting testimonies on whether he actually witnessed who among
appellant and his cohorts took Espino's valuables after he fell to the ground. Appellant
asserts further that Umali's testimony that an altercation did not precede the commission
of the crime contradicts the testimony of Macapar that a heated exchange of words
occurred prior to the incident. He also claims that it is contrary to human nature for
Espino to alight from his car at 10:00 p.m. while in possession of a large amount of
money without fear of an impending hold-up.
Moreover, it is unlikely that Espino feared alighting from his vehicle at a late hour
while in possession of a huge amount of money since he was a vendor doing business in
the vicinity where the incident occurred. He was familiar with the people and their
activities in the premises.
In view of the above, the Court finds that the CA properly lent full credence to the
testimonies of Umali and Macapar.
Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient for his conviction since the
weapons used in the stabbing of Espino were not presented. In other words, he asserts
that it was improper to convict him because the corpus delicti had not been established.
We disagree. "'[C]orpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime
charged or to the body or substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer to the
ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom or to the body of the person
murdered' or, in this case, [the weapons used in the commission of robbery with
homicide]. 'Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this Court
has ruled that even a single witness' uncorroborated testimony, if credible may suffice to
prove it and warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus delicti may even be established by
circumstantial evidence.'" 32 HTcDEa
In this case, the corpus delicti was established by the evidence on record. The
prosecution eyewitnesses testified that appellant and his cohorts used knives to perpetrate
the crime. Their testimonies on the existence and use of weapons in committing the
offense was supported by the medical findings of Dr. Salen who conducted the post-
mortem examination. Dr. Salen found that Espino sustained several stab wounds with
varying measurements which were caused by sharp bladed instruments. Appellant is
therefore mistaken in arguing that the failure to present the weapons used in killing
Espino was fatal to the cause of the prosecution.
We are in complete agreement with the RTC and the CA in finding lack of merit
in appellant's defenses of denial and alibi.
The fact that appellant presented witnesses to corroborate his alibi deserves scant
consideration. Their testimonies are viewed with skepticism due to the very nature of
alibi the witnesses affirm. 35 Appellant can easily fabricate an alibi and ask relatives and
friends to corroborate it. 36
We have always ruled that alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and must
be brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the
identity of the accused. Moreover, it is only axiomatic that positive testimony prevails
over negative testimony. 37 aECTcA
Appellant argues that mere superiority in numbers does not indicate the presence
of abuse of superior strength. In the same manner, appellant claims that the number of
wounds inflicted on the victim is not the criterion for the appreciation of this
circumstance.
"There is abuse of superior strength when the offenders took advantage of their
combined strength in order to consummate the offense." 38 Here, appellant and his four
companions not only took advantage of their numerical superiority, they were also armed
with knives. Espino, on the other hand, was unarmed and defenseless. While Ronnie was
wrestling with Espino, appellant and his co-accused simultaneously assaulted the latter.
The unidentified companion locked his arm around the neck of Espino while appellant
and his co-accused stabbed and hacked him several times. While Espino was lying
defenseless on the ground, they divested him of all his valuables. Thereafter, they
immediately fled the scene of the crime. 39 It is clear that they executed the criminal act
by employing physical superiority over Espino.
In robbery with homicide, civil indemnity and moral damages are awarded
automatically without need of allegation and evidence other than the death of the victim
owing to the commission of the crime. 43 Here, the RTC and CA granted civil indemnity
and moral damages to Espino's heirs in the amount of P50,000.00 each. These courts
were correct in granting the awards, but the awards should have been P100,000.00 each.
Recent jurisprudence 44 declares that when the imposable penalty is death, the awards of
civil indemnity and moral damages shall be P100,000.00 each.
In granting compensatory damages, the prosecution must "prove the actual amount
of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and the best
evidence obtainable to the injured party." 45 "'Receipts should support claims of actual
damages.' Thus, as correctly held by the [RTC] and affirmed by the CA, the amount of
[P62,000.00] incurred as funeral expenses can be sustained since these are expenditures
supported by receipts." 46
The existence of one aggravating circumstance also merits the grant of exemplary
damages under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code. Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence,
we likewise award P100,000.00 as exemplary damages to the victim's heirs. 47 An
interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on all awards of damages from the finality of
this judgment until fully paid should likewise be granted to the heirs of Espino. 48
Lastly, the RTC did not err in refusing to award indemnity for loss of earning
capacity of Espino despite the testimony of his daughter that he earned P3,000.00 a day
as a meat dealer. "Such indemnity is not awarded in the absence of documentary evidence
except where the victim was either self-employed or was a daily wage worker earning
less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. Since it was neither alleged nor
proved that the victim was either self-employed or was a daily wage earner, indemnity
for loss of earning capacity cannot be awarded to the heirs of the victim." 49
WHEREFORE, the July 23, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 02925 that affirmed with modifications the December 5, 2006 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 02-200171 is
AFFIRMED with further MODIFICATIONS. Appellant Bobby Torres @ Roberto
Torres y Nava is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Jaime M. Espino, P100,000.00 as
civil indemnity; P100,000.00 as moral damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The interest rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all damages awarded from the finality
of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, * Acting C.J., Velasco, Jr., ** Brion and Leonen, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Torres y Nava, G.R. No. 189850, [September 22, 2014], 743 PHIL 553-570)
SECOND DIVISION
DEL CASTILLO, J : p
This is an appeal from the July 23, 2009 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02925, which modified the December 5, 2006 Decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Manila, Branch 27 in Criminal Case No. 02-200171. The
RTC found appellant Bobby Torres @ Roberto Torres y Nava (appellant) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder but on appeal, the CA found appellant guilty of
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
Factual Antecedents
On January 28, 2004, an Amended Information 3 was filed before the RTC,
charging siblings Reynaldo Torres (Reynaldo), Jay Torres (Jay), Ronnie Torres (Ronnie)
and appellant with the special complex crime of robbery with homicide committed
against Jaime M. Espino (Espino). The Amended Information contained the following
accusatory allegations:
Contrary to law. 4
Only appellant was arrested. Reynaldo, Jay and Ronnie remain at-large to date.
During arraignment, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty". 5 After the termination of
the pre-trial conference, trial ensued. 6
At around 10:00 p.m. of September 21, 2001, Espino was driving his car along
C.M. Recto Avenue in Divisoria, Manila when Ronnie suddenly blocked his path. Espino
alighted from his vehicle and approached Ronnie, who tried to grab his belt-bag. Espino
resisted and struggled with Ronnie for the possession of his belt-bag but the latter's
brothers, Jay, Rey, appellant, and an unidentified companion suddenly appeared. With all
of them brandishing bladed weapons, appellant and his brothers took turns in stabbing
Espino in different parts of his body while the unidentified companion held him by the
neck. When Espino was already sprawled on the ground, they took his belt-bag, wallet
and jewelries and immediately fled. ICDcEA
Espino was rushed to the hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival. In his
Medico-Legal Report No. W-658-2001, 8 Dr. Salen concluded that Espino died of
multiple stab wounds caused by sharp bladed instruments. The back portion of his head
bore two stab wounds while his body suffered four stab wounds which proved fatal.
Considering the number and varying measurements of the wounds, Dr. Salen opined that
there were more than one assailant.
To prove the civil aspect of the case, Espino's daughter, Winnie Espino-Fajardo
(Winnie) testified that the pieces of jewelry stolen from her father consisted of a necklace
worth P35,000.00, bracelet worth P15,000.00, wristwatch worth P10,000.00 and two
rings worth P10,000.00 each. As for their expenses, Winnie said that P25,000.00 was
spent for the burial lot and P37,000.00 for the funeral services. She stated further that
Espino was 51 years old at the time of his death and was earning P3,000.00 a day as a
meat vendor. 9
Appellant denied any participation in the crime. He testified that at around 10:00
p.m. of September 21, 2001, he was with his girlfriend, Merlita Hilario (Merlita). They
proceeded to the house of their friend, Marilou Garcia (Marilou), in Villaruel, Tayuman,
Manila where they had a drinking session which lasted until they fell asleep. They did not
leave their friend's house until the following morning when they went home. Thereupon,
he was told that policemen were looking for him because his brothers got involved in an
altercation that resulted in the death of someone. 10 Merlita and Marilou corroborated
appellant's alibi in their respective testimonies. 11
From the testimony of another defense witness, Jorna Yabut-Torres (Jorna), wife
of Ronnie, the defense's version of the incident emerged as follows:
In the evening of September 21, 2001, Jorna and Ronnie were sharing jokes with
other vendors in Divisoria when a car stopped a few meters from their stall. The driver
alighted and asked why they were laughing. Ronnie replied that it had nothing to do with
him. The driver seemed drunk since he walked back to his vehicle in an unsteady manner.
Moments later, the driver returned and stabbed Ronnie on the wrist with a knife. Jay saw
the assault on his brother, Ronnie, and got a bolo which he used to hack the driver
repeatedly. Thereafter, Ronnie and Jay fled. 12
In its December 5, 2006 Decision, 14 the RTC held that appellant could not have
committed robbery. It ratiocinated, viz.:
Even granting that the element of taking is present, still, accused cannot
be held liable for the complex crime of robbery with homicide for the reason
that it was not indubitably shown that the main purpose of the accused was to
rob the victim. To the mind of the Court, this is precisely the reason why the
prosecution skipped the utterances made by the protagonist[s] during the attack.
To sustain a [conviction] for the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, the original criminal design of the culprit must be robbery and the
homicide is perpetrated with a view to the consummation of the robbery, or by
reason or on the occasion of the robbery (People vs. Ponciano, 204 SCRA 627).
The RTC thus concluded that appellant can only be liable for the killing of Espino.
It held him guilty of murder after it found the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength, which was alleged in the Information and duly established by the
prosecution. Moreover, the RTC ruled that conspiracy among the accused attended the
crime.SEACTH
Anent the civil aspect of the case, the RTC granted civil indemnity, actual and
moral damages to the heirs of Espino, but denied the claim for loss of earning capacity
for lack of documentary evidence.
Let alias warrant of arrest issue against accused Reynaldo Torres, Jay
Torres and Ronnie Torres.
SO ORDERED. 16
In modifying the ruling of the RTC, i.e., finding appellant guilty of robbery with
homicide instead of murder, the CA found that the primary intention of appellant and his
co-accused was to rob Espino and his killing was only incidental to the robbery. The
blocking of Espino's car and the struggle for possession of his belt-bag after he alighted
are clear manifestations of the intent to commit robbery. The dispositive portion of the
July 23, 2009 Decision 20 of the CA reads as follows:
SO ORDERED. 21
Assignment of Errors
Appellant imputes upon the CA the following errors in his Supplemental Brief. 22
The appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it reviewed the entire
case despite the fact that the accused-appellant only appealed his conviction for
murder. 24
Our Ruling
Appellant maintains that the CA erred in finding him liable for robbery with
homicide as charged in the Amended Information. He argues that his appeal to the CA
was limited to his conviction for murder and excluded his acquittal for robbery. And by
appealing his conviction for murder, he does not waive his constitutional right not to be
subject to double jeopardy for the crime of robbery. He claims that even assuming that
the RTC erred in acquitting him of the robbery charge, such error can no longer be
questioned on appeal.
In this case, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the
primary intention of appellant and his companions was to rob Espino. Umali and
Macapar, the eyewitnesses presented by the prosecution, testified that at around 10:00
p.m. of September 21, 2001, appellant's brother and co-accused, Ronnie, blocked
Espino's car at the corner of C.M. Recto Avenue and Ylaya Street. When Espino alighted
from his vehicle, Ronnie attempted to grab his belt-bag. A struggle for possession of the
belt-bag ensued. It was at this juncture that appellant and the other co-accused joined the
fray and stabbed Espino several times in the head and body. When Espino fell to the
pavement from his stab wounds, appellant, Ronnie and their cohorts got hold of the
victim's wallet, belt-bag, wristwatch and jewelry then fled together. 29
From the foregoing, it is clear that the primordial intention of appellant and his
companions was to rob Espino. Had they primarily intended to kill Espino, they would
have immediately stabbed him to death. However, the fact that Ronnie initially wrestled
with appellant for possession of the belt-bag clearly shows that the central aim was to
commit robbery against Espino. This intention was confirmed by the accused's taking of
Espino's belt-bag, wallet, wrist-watch and jewelries after he was stabbed to death. The
killing was therefore merely incidental, resulting by reason or on occasion of the robbery.
Appellant attempts to discredit Umali and Macapar by asserting that there are
glaring contradictions in their testimonies. He calls attention to the RTC's observation
that Macapar gave conflicting testimonies on whether he actually witnessed who among
appellant and his cohorts took Espino's valuables after he fell to the ground. Appellant
asserts further that Umali's testimony that an altercation did not precede the commission
of the crime contradicts the testimony of Macapar that a heated exchange of words
occurred prior to the incident. He also claims that it is contrary to human nature for
Espino to alight from his car at 10:00 p.m. while in possession of a large amount of
money without fear of an impending hold-up.
Moreover, it is unlikely that Espino feared alighting from his vehicle at a late hour
while in possession of a huge amount of money since he was a vendor doing business in
the vicinity where the incident occurred. He was familiar with the people and their
activities in the premises.
In view of the above, the Court finds that the CA properly lent full credence to the
testimonies of Umali and Macapar.
Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient for his conviction since the
weapons used in the stabbing of Espino were not presented. In other words, he asserts
that it was improper to convict him because the corpus delicti had not been established.
We disagree. "'[C]orpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime
charged or to the body or substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer to the
ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom or to the body of the person
murdered' or, in this case, [the weapons used in the commission of robbery with
homicide]. 'Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this Court
has ruled that even a single witness' uncorroborated testimony, if credible may suffice to
prove it and warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus delicti may even be established by
circumstantial evidence.'" 32 HTcDEa
In this case, the corpus delicti was established by the evidence on record. The
prosecution eyewitnesses testified that appellant and his cohorts used knives to perpetrate
the crime. Their testimonies on the existence and use of weapons in committing the
offense was supported by the medical findings of Dr. Salen who conducted the post-
mortem examination. Dr. Salen found that Espino sustained several stab wounds with
varying measurements which were caused by sharp bladed instruments. Appellant is
therefore mistaken in arguing that the failure to present the weapons used in killing
Espino was fatal to the cause of the prosecution.
We are in complete agreement with the RTC and the CA in finding lack of merit
in appellant's defenses of denial and alibi.
The fact that appellant presented witnesses to corroborate his alibi deserves scant
consideration. Their testimonies are viewed with skepticism due to the very nature of
alibi the witnesses affirm. 35 Appellant can easily fabricate an alibi and ask relatives and
friends to corroborate it. 36
We have always ruled that alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and must
be brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the
identity of the accused. Moreover, it is only axiomatic that positive testimony prevails
over negative testimony. 37 aECTcA
Appellant argues that mere superiority in numbers does not indicate the presence
of abuse of superior strength. In the same manner, appellant claims that the number of
wounds inflicted on the victim is not the criterion for the appreciation of this
circumstance.
"There is abuse of superior strength when the offenders took advantage of their
combined strength in order to consummate the offense." 38 Here, appellant and his four
companions not only took advantage of their numerical superiority, they were also armed
with knives. Espino, on the other hand, was unarmed and defenseless. While Ronnie was
wrestling with Espino, appellant and his co-accused simultaneously assaulted the latter.
The unidentified companion locked his arm around the neck of Espino while appellant
and his co-accused stabbed and hacked him several times. While Espino was lying
defenseless on the ground, they divested him of all his valuables. Thereafter, they
immediately fled the scene of the crime. 39 It is clear that they executed the criminal act
by employing physical superiority over Espino.
In robbery with homicide, civil indemnity and moral damages are awarded
automatically without need of allegation and evidence other than the death of the victim
owing to the commission of the crime. 43 Here, the RTC and CA granted civil indemnity
and moral damages to Espino's heirs in the amount of P50,000.00 each. These courts
were correct in granting the awards, but the awards should have been P100,000.00 each.
Recent jurisprudence 44 declares that when the imposable penalty is death, the awards of
civil indemnity and moral damages shall be P100,000.00 each.
In granting compensatory damages, the prosecution must "prove the actual amount
of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and the best
evidence obtainable to the injured party." 45 "'Receipts should support claims of actual
damages.' Thus, as correctly held by the [RTC] and affirmed by the CA, the amount of
[P62,000.00] incurred as funeral expenses can be sustained since these are expenditures
supported by receipts." 46
The existence of one aggravating circumstance also merits the grant of exemplary
damages under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code. Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence,
we likewise award P100,000.00 as exemplary damages to the victim's heirs. 47 An
interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on all awards of damages from the finality of
this judgment until fully paid should likewise be granted to the heirs of Espino. 48
Lastly, the RTC did not err in refusing to award indemnity for loss of earning
capacity of Espino despite the testimony of his daughter that he earned P3,000.00 a day
as a meat dealer. "Such indemnity is not awarded in the absence of documentary evidence
except where the victim was either self-employed or was a daily wage worker earning
less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. Since it was neither alleged nor
proved that the victim was either self-employed or was a daily wage earner, indemnity
for loss of earning capacity cannot be awarded to the heirs of the victim." 49
WHEREFORE, the July 23, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 02925 that affirmed with modifications the December 5, 2006 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 02-200171 is
AFFIRMED with further MODIFICATIONS. Appellant Bobby Torres @ Roberto
Torres y Nava is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Jaime M. Espino, P100,000.00 as
civil indemnity; P100,000.00 as moral damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The interest rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all damages awarded from the finality
of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, * Acting C.J., Velasco, Jr., ** Brion and Leonen, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Torres y Nava, G.R. No. 189850, [September 22, 2014], 743 PHIL 553-570)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 183994. June 30, 2014.]
DECISION
PERALTA, * J : p
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Revised Rules on Civil Procedure (Rules) are the April 30, 2008 2 and August 1, 2008 3
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 102975, which dismissed
the petition and denied the motion for reconsideration, respectively. In effect, the CA
affirmed the January 28, 2008 Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 121
of Caloocan City, which annulled and set aside the Orders dated September 4, 2006 5 and
November 16, 2006 6 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 50 of Caloocan
City, permanently dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634.
Before the MeTC Branch 50 where Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77
and 209634 were re-raffled after the inhibition of Judge Ortiz, Co filed a "Motion for
Permanent Dismissal" on July 13, 2006. 18 Uy opposed the motion, contending that the
motion raised the same issues already resolved with finality by this Court in G.R. No.
171096. 19 In spite of this, Judge Esteban V. Gonzaga issued an Order dated September
4, 2006 granting Co's motion. 20 When the court subsequently denied Uy's motion for
reconsideration on November 16, 2006, 21 Uy filed a petition for certiorari before the
RTC of Caloocan City. On January 28, 2008, Hon. Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of the
RTC Branch 121 acted favorably on the petition, annulling and setting aside the Orders
dated September 4, 2006 and November 16, 2006 and directing the MeTC Branch 50 to
proceed with the trial of the criminal cases. 22 Co then filed a petition for certiorari
before the CA, which, as aforesaid, dismissed the petition and denied his motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this present petition with prayer for TRO/WPI.
Assuming that the criminal cases were only provisionally dismissed, Co further
posits that such dismissal became permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9,
2003 Order, not after notice to the offended party. He also insists that both the filing of
the motion to revive and the trial court's issuance of the order granting the revival must be
within the one-year period. Lastly, even assuming that the one-year period to revive the
criminal cases started on July 2, 2003 when Uy received the June 9, 2003 Order, Co
asserts that the motion was filed one day late since year 2004 was a leap year.
At the outset, it must be noted that the issues raised in this petition were also the
meat of the controversy in Co's previous petition in G.R. No. 171096, which We
dismissed per Resolution dated February 13, 2006. Such dismissal became final and
executory on March 20, 2006. While the first petition was dismissed mainly due to
procedural infirmities, this Court nonetheless stated therein that "[i]n any event, the
petition lacks sufficient showing that respondent court had committed any reversible
error in the questioned judgment to warrant the exercise by this Court of its
discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case." Hence, upon the finality of Our
February 13, 2006 Resolution in G.R. No. 171096, the same already constitutes as res
judicata between the parties. On this ground alone, this petition should have been
dismissed outright.
Even if We are to squarely resolve the issues repeatedly raised in the present
petition, Co's arguments are nonetheless untenable on the grounds as follows:
First, Co's charge that his right to a speedy trial was violated is baseless.
Obviously, he failed to show any evidence that the alleged "vexatious, capricious and
oppressive" delay in the trial was attended with malice or that the same was made without
good cause or justifiable motive on the part of the prosecution. This Court has
emphasized that "'speedy trial' is a relative term and necessarily a flexible concept." 26 In
determining whether the accused's right to speedy trial was violated, the delay should be
considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings. 27 The factors to balance are the
following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or
failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay. 28 Surely, mere mathematical
reckoning of the time involved would not suffice as the realities of everyday life must be
regarded in judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum, and that
particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. 29
"While the Court recognizes the accused's right to speedy trial and adheres to a policy of
speedy administration of justice, we cannot deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity
to fairly prosecute criminals. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an
unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial." 30
AEIDTc
Third, there is evident want of jurisprudential support on Co's supposition that the
dismissal of the cases became permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003
Order and not after notice to the offended party. When the Rules states that the
provisional dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance of the order
temporarily dismissing the case, it should not be literally interpreted as such. Of course,
there is a vital need to satisfy the basic requirements of due process; thus, said in one
case:
Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of
dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance thereof without
the case having been revived, the provision should be construed to mean that the
order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order of
dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without
the criminal case having been revived. The public prosecutor cannot be
expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the
order of dismissal. 36
Fourth, the contention that both the filing of the motion to revive the case and the
court order reviving it must be made prior to the expiration of the one-year period is
unsustainable. Such interpretation is not found in the Rules. Moreover, to permit
otherwise would definitely put the offended party at the mercy of the trial court, which
may wittingly or unwittingly not comply. Judicial notice must be taken of the fact that
most, if not all, of our trial court judges have to deal with clogged dockets in addition to
their administrative duties and functions. Hence, they could not be expected to act at all
times on all pending decisions, incidents, and related matters within the prescribed period
of time. It is likewise possible that some of them, motivated by ill-will or malice, may
simply exercise their whims and caprices in not issuing the order of revival on time.
Fifth, the fact that year 2004 was a leap year is inconsequential to determine the
timeliness of Uy's motion to revive the criminal cases. What is material instead is Co's
categorical admission that Uy is represented by a private counsel who only received a
copy of the June 9, 2003 Order on July 3, 2003. Therefore, the motion was not belatedly
filed on July 2, 2004. Since the period for filing a motion to revive is reckoned from the
private counsel's receipt of the order of provisional dismissal, it necessarily follows that
the reckoning period for the permanent dismissal is likewise the private counsel's date of
receipt of the order of provisional dismissal. HEcTAI
And Sixth, granting for the sake of argument that this Court should take into
account 2004 as a leap year and that the one-year period to revive the case should be
reckoned from the date of receipt of the order of provisional dismissal by Uy, We still
hold that the motion to revive the criminal cases against Co was timely filed. A year is
equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year. 39 Equally
so, under the Administrative Code of 1987, a year is composed of 12 calendar months.
The number of days is irrelevant. This was our ruling in Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc., 40 which was subsequently reiterated in
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., 41 thus:
. . . [In] 1987, EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section
31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides:
A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without regard to the
number of days it may contain." It is the "period of time running from the
beginning of a certain numbered day up to, but not including, the
corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a sufficient
number of days in the next month, then up to and including the last day of that
month." To illustrate, one calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be
from January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar month from January
31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008 until February 29, 2008. 42
Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to
this case, the one-year period reckoned from the time Uy received the order of dismissal
on July 2, 2003 consisted of 24 calendar months, computed as follows:
In the end, We find it hard to disregard the thought that the instant petition was
filed as a dilatory tactic to prosecute Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and
209634. As correctly pointed out by Uy since the time when the "Motion for Permanent
Dismissal" was filed, the issues raised herein were already resolved with finality by this
Court in G.R. No. 171096. Verily, Co, acting through the guidance and advice of his
counsel, Atty. Oscar C. Maglaque, adopted a worthless and vexatious legal maneuver for
no purpose other than to delay the trial court proceedings. It appears that Atty.
Maglaque's conduct contravened the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins
lawyers to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of
justice (Rule 10.03, Canon 10) as well as not to unduly delay a case or misuse court
processes (Rule 12.04, Canon 12). The Lawyer's Oath also upholds in particular:
This Court has repeatedly impressed upon counsels that the need for the prompt
termination of litigation is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice.
In Spouses Aguilar v. Manila Banking Corporation, 43 We said:
SO ORDERED.
(Co v. New Prosperity Plastic Products, G.R. No. 183994, [June 30, 2014], 737 PHIL 334-
|||
349)
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
PERALTA, J : p
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 and Resolution 2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), dated October 18, 2007 and January 22, 2008, respectively, in CA-G.R.
CV No. 78676. TaCDcE
Respondents, in their complaint before the Regional Trial Court, alleged that they
are the registered owners of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Balugo, Tagkawayan,
Quezon, with an area of 1,056,275 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-43927. For several years, petitioners have been in actual possession of the
western portion of the said property with a total area of 620,000 square meters which they
tried to develop into fishponds. In the years 1993 and 1994, respondents informed
petitioners, through Gustavo C. Tolentino, Sr. (Gustavo) who was then representing
them, that the area they are occupying was inside the respondents' property and,
therefore, they should vacate and leave the same. Gustavo, however, asked for time to
verify respondents' claim. If found to be true, then the petitioners were willing to discuss
with respondents the improvements that they have introduced on the subject area.
Respondents have waited for almost a year for the outcome of the intended verification,
but they waited in vain until Gustavo died. Petitioners continued to develop the area they
were occupying into fishponds, thereby manifesting their unwillingness to vacate the
premises and restore the possession thereof in favor of respondents. Hence, respondents
filed a suit against petitioners to recover the property and demand payment of unearned
income, attorney's fees and costs of suit.
Petitioners, as defendants in the trial court, averred in their Answer that the subject
property is owned by the Republic and they are occupying the same by virtue of a
Fishpond Lease Agreement entered with the Department of Agriculture. Thus, their stay
over the property is lawful.
On August 27, 1996, petitioners were declared in default, for failure to appear at
the pre-trial conference. However, the trial court set aside the default order and reset the
pre-trial conference. Despite several resetting of the pre-trial conference of which
petitioners were notified, petitioners failed to appear. Hence, on March 21, 2000, the trial
court issued an Order allowing respondents to present their evidence ex parte, instead of
declaring petitioners in default. 3
After the ex parte hearing for the reception of evidence, the RTC ruled in favor of
respondents, thus:
SO ORDERED. 4
Aggrieved, petitioners challenged the trial court's decision before the CA. The CA
dismissed petitioners' appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the petitioners, but was denied by the CA for lack of merit.
Petitioners then filed this present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45,
raising the following issues:
Petitioners maintain that they were denied their day in court, because they were
not allowed to present their evidence before the trial court which resulted in the denial of
their right to due process.
We perused the records of the case and failed to see the lack of due process
claimed by petitioners. On the contrary, petitioners were given more than ample
opportunity to be heard through counsel. Lest it be forgotten, petitioners were first
declared in default on August 27, 1996, for their failure to appear at the pre-trial
conference. However, the trial court set aside the default order and the pre-trial
conference was set and reset for several times. Nonetheless, petitioners failed to appear
on January 9, 1998, 5 March 2, 1998, 6 May 18, 1999, 7 and March 21, 2000, 8
prompting the trial court to allow the respondents to present their evidence ex parte.
Thereafter, judgment was rendered. DISHEA
From the foregoing, the failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has adverse
consequences. If the absent party is the plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed. If it is
the defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff is allowed to present his evidence ex
parte and the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof. Thus, the plaintiff is given
the privilege to present his evidence without objection from the defendant, the likelihood
being that the court will decide in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant having forfeited the
opportunity to rebut or present its own evidence. 9
In the case at bar, the trial court gave petitioners every chance to air their side and
even reconsidered its first order declaring petitioners in default. Notwithstanding,
petitioners and their counsel failed to take advantage of such opportunity and disregarded
the legal processes, by continuously failing to appear during the pre-trial of the case
without any valid cause. Clearly, when the trial court allowed the respondents to present
evidence ex parte due to the continued failure of the petitioners to attend the pre-trial
conference, it did so in accordance with Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and
with due regard to the constitutional guarantee of due process. Plainly, petitioners cannot
complain that they were denied due process. What the fundamental law prohibits is total
absence of opportunity to be heard. When a party has been afforded opportunity to
present his side, he cannot feign denial of due process. 10
In The Philippine American Life & General Insurance Company v. Enario, 11 the
Court held that pre-trial cannot be taken for granted. It is not a mere technicality in court
proceedings for it serves a vital objective: the simplification, abbreviation and expedition
of the trial, if not indeed its dispensation. The Court said that:
Petitioners' assertion that it was necessary to include the government, through the
Department of Agriculture, as a party to the case, in order to have a complete
determination of the case, is specious, as the same was never raised before the RTC and
the CA. It is settled that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the
attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a
reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic
considerations of due process impel this rule. 13 IcHTCS
In the same manner, the Court cannot consider petitioners' allegation that
respondents' failure to exhaust administrative remedies is fatal to the cause of the
respondents, as this was not raised before the trial court.
In substance, the appeal of petitioners hinges on their possession over the subject
lot by virtue of an alleged Fishpond Lease Agreement with the Department of
Agriculture. They questioned the validity of the respondents' title by claiming that since
the property is owned by the government, it is part of the public domain and, therefore,
cannot be privately owned by the respondents. The petitioners' submission is not
meritorious.
Petitioners' attack on the legality of TCT No. T-43927, issued in the name of
respondents, is incidental to their quest to defend their possession of the property in an
accion publiciana, not in a direct action whose main objective is to impugn the validity of
the judgment granting the title. 14 To permit a collateral attack on the title, such as what
petitioners attempt, would reduce the vaunted legal indefeasibility of a Torrens title to
meaningless verbiage. 15
It must be pointed out that notwithstanding petitioners' submission that the subject
property is owned by the Republic, there is no showing that the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) or its representatives initiated an action for reversion of the subject
property to become part of the public domain. All actions for the reversion to the
Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by
the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines. 16 Unless and until the land is reverted to the State by
virtue of a judgment of a court of law in a direct proceeding for reversion, the Torrens
certificate of title thereto remains valid and binding against the whole world. 17
Besides, it must be emphasized that the action filed before the trial court is an
accion publiciana, which is a plenary action for recovery of possession in an ordinary
civil proceeding in order to determine the better and legal right to possess, independently
of title. 18 The objective of the plaintiffs in an accion publiciana is to recover possession
only, not ownership. However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts
may pass upon the issue to determine who between the parties has the right to possess the
property. This adjudication, however, is not a final and binding determination of the issue
of ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the
issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The adjudication of
the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same
parties involving title to the property. 19cdasia2005
Respondents' title over the subject property is evidence of their ownership thereof.
It is a fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as
evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the
person whose name appears therein. 20 It is conclusive evidence with respect to the
ownership of the land described therein. 21 It is also settled that the titleholder is entitled
to all the attributes of ownership of the property, including possession. 22 Thus, the Court
held that the age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled
to possession thereof. 23
Petitioners' argument that an accion publiciana is not the proper remedy available
for the respondents, because more than ten (10) years had already elapsed since the
dispossession of the respondents' property, does not hold water. As the registered owners,
respondents' right to evict any person illegally occupying their property is
imprescriptible. In the case of Labrador v. Perlas, 24 the Court held that:
As a final note, the Court finds no factual and legal basis for the award of
attorney's fees and litigation expenses. The settled rule is that the matter of attorney's fees
cannot be mentioned only in the dispositive portion of the decision. The same goes for the
award of litigation expenses. 26 The reasons or grounds for the award thereof must be set
forth in the decision of the court. 27 The discretion of the court to award attorney's fees
under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable justification,
without which the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left
to speculation and conjecture. 28
In the present case, the award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses was
mentioned only in the dispositive portion of the RTC decision without any prior
explanation and justification in its body, hence, the same is baseless and must be deleted.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Tolentino v. Laurel, G.R. No. 181368, [February 22, 2012], 682 PHIL 527-542)
EN BANC
DECISION
BRION, J : p
This is an appeal filed by Jerry Pepino (Pepino) and Preciosa Gomez (Gomez)
assailing the June 16, 2006 decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 02026. HEITAD
ANTECEDENTS
The prosecution evidence showed that at 1:00 p.m., on June 28, 1997, two men
and a woman entered the office of Edward Tan at Kilton Motors Corporation in Sucat,
Parañaque City, and pretended to be customers. When Edward was about to receive
them, one of the men, eventually identified as Pepino pulled out a gun. Thinking that
it was a holdup, Edward told Pepino that the money was inside the cashier's box.
Pepino and the other man looted the cashier's box, handcuffed Edward, and forced
him to go with them. 2 From the hallway, Jocelyn Tan (mentioned as "Joselyn" in
some parts of the record), Edward's wife, saw Pepino take her husband. She went to
the adjoining room upon Edward's instructions. 3
Pepino brought Edward to a metallic green Toyota Corolla where three other
men were waiting inside. The woman (later identified as Gomez) sat on the front
passenger seat. 4 The abductors then placed surgical tape over Edward's eyes and
made him wear sunglasses. After travelling for two and a half hours, they arrived at
an apartment in Quezon City. The abductors removed the tape from Edward's eyes,
placed him in a room, and then chained his legs. Pepino approached Edward and
asked for the phone number of his father so that he could ask for ransom for his
(Edward's) liberty. Edward told Pepino to negotiate with his wife, but the latter
insisted on talking to his father. 5
At around 5:00 p.m. of the same day, the kidnappers called Edward's father and
demanded a P40 million ransom for his release. Edward's father told the kidnappers
that he did not have that amount. The abductors negotiated with Jocelyn who
eventually agreed to a P700,000.00 ransom. The kidnappers told Jocelyn to pack the
money into two packages and to drop these at a convenience store in front of
McDonald's at Mindanao Avenue. They further demanded that Edward's vehicle be
used to bring the money. 6
After four days, or on July 1, 1997, Antonio Gepiga (the family driver) brought
the agreed amount to the 7-Eleven convenience store at Mindanao Avenue as
instructed. 7 That evening, three men and Gomez blindfolded Edward, made him
board a car, and drove around for 30 minutes. Upon stopping, they told Edward that
he could remove his blindfold after five minutes. When Edward removed his
blindfold, he found himself inside his own car parked at the UP Diliman Campus. He
drove home and reported his kidnapping to Teresita Ang See, a known anti-crime
crusader. 8
After five months, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) informed
Edward that they had apprehended some suspects, and invited him to identify them
from a lineup consisting of seven persons: five males and two females. Edward
positively identified Pepino, Gomez, and one Mario Galgo. 9 Jocelyn likewise
identified Pepino. 10
Pepino and Gomez did not testify for their defense. The defense instead
presented Zeny Pepino, Reynaldo Pepino, NBI Special Investigator Marcelo Jadloc
and P/Sr. Insp. Narciso Quano (mentioned as "Qano" in some parts of the record). aDSIHc
Zeny testified that she and her husband, Jerry Pepino, were inside their house
in Cebu City on December 7, 1997, when about 20 heavily armed men entered their
house looking for Jerry. When Jerry asked them if they had a warrant of arrest, one of
the men pointed a gun at him and handcuffed him; the armed men then hit him with
the butt of an armalite and punched him. The men also took Pepino's wristwatch and
wallet, as well as Zeny's bag and watch. Some of the armed men searched the second
floor of the house, and found a .45 caliber gun. The armed men brought Zeny and
Pepino outside their house where Zeny saw Renato Pepino and Larex Pepino already
handcuffed. The armed men brought them to the Cebu City Police Headquarters
before bringing them to the NBI Headquarters in Manila. The following day, Jerry,
Renato, and Larex were brought to the Department of Justice (DOJ). Zeny, on the
other hand, was released after being detained at the NBI for three (3) days. 11
Reynaldo's testimony was summarized by the CA as follows:
. . . On December 6, 1997, he accompanied accused-appellant Gomez
to his brother's sister-in-law who happens to work in a recruitment agency.
While they were inside the latter's house at Lot 2, Block 15, Marikina Heights,
Marikina City, they heard a noise at the gate. When he peeped through the
window, he saw two (2) motorcycles and two (2) Vannette vans. Shortly
thereafter, someone kicked the back door and several armed men emerged
therefrom and announced their arrest. When he asked them if they had any
warrant, they replied: "Walang warrant, warrant. Walang search, search."
They were then hogtied and made to lie face down. Five (5) of them then went
upstairs and seized his personal belongings together with his briefcase which
contained P45,000.00, documents of accused-appellant Gomez, and his .45
caliber pistol as well as his license and permit to carry the same. No receipts
were issued for their personal effects which were confiscated. They were
subsequently brought to Camp Crame and subjected to torture. The following
day, they were brought to the Department of Justice and a case for kidnapping
was filed against him. Upon reinvestigation, however, he was discharged from
the Information and the court dismissed the case against him. 12
SI Jadloc and Police Senior Inspector Quano, Jr. were presented as hostile
witnesses.
Jadloc declared on the witness stand that NBI Assistant Director Edmundo
Arugay dispatched a team to Cebu City to investigate a kidnap-for-ransom case. The
team immediately conducted surveillance operations when they arrived at Calle Rojo,
Lahug, Cebu City. One of the team members saw Renato and Larex Pepino with guns
tucked in their waists. When the team approached them, the two men ran inside their
house. The team went after them and on entering the house, they saw Jerry in
possession of a .45 caliber gun. The team arrested Jerry, Renato and Larex, and then
brought them to the NBI Headquarters in Manila. 13
Quano testified that he was designated as the leader of a team tasked to arrest
members of a kidnap-for-ransom group at their safe house in Lot 2, Block 50,
Marikina Heights, Marikina City. When they arrived there, they introduced
themselves as police officers. The police forcibly opened the door after the occupants
of the house refused to open the ground floor door. During their search at the second
floor, the operatives found an armalite and a .45 caliber gun. The members of the
team handcuffed Gomez and Reynaldo, and then brought them to Camp Crame. 14
The prosecution charged Preciosa Gomez, Jerry Pepino, Reynaldo Pepino,
Jessie Pepino, George Curvera, Boy Lanyujan, Luisito "Tata" Adulfo, Henriso Batijon
(a.k.a. Dodoy Batijon), Nerio Alameda, and an alias Wilan Tan with kidnapping for
ransom and serious illegal detention before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
259, Parañaque City. 15 Reynaldo was subsequently discharged after reinvestigation.
Only Pepino, Gomez, and Batijon were arraigned; their other co-accused remained at
large.
In its May 15, 2000 decision, the RTC convicted Pepino and Gomez of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
(as amended) and sentenced them to suffer the death penalty. The RTC also ordered
them to pay Edward P700,000.00 representing the amount extorted from him;
P50,000.00 as moral damages; and P50,000 as exemplary damages. The trial court
acquitted Batijon for insufficiency of evidence.
The RTC held that Edward positively identified Pepino and Gomez as two of
the persons who forcibly abducted him at gunpoint inside Kilton Motors, and who
consequently detained him somewhere in Quezon City for four (4) days until he was
released inside the UP Diliman Campus after the payment of ransom. The RTC added
that Jocelyn corroborated Edward's testimony on material points. It also pointed out
that Edward identified both Pepino and Gomez at the lineup conducted inside the NBI
compound, although Jocelyn only recognized Gomez.
The RTC further ruled that the accused were already estopped from
questioning the validity of their arrest after they entered their respective pleas.
The case was automatically elevated to this Court in view of the death penalty
that the RTC imposed. We referred the case to the CA for intermediate review
pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo. 16
In its decision dated June 16, 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC
decision with the modification that the amounts of moral and exemplary damages
were increased from P300,000.00 and P100,000.00, respectively.
The CA held that Pepino and Gomez were deemed to have waived any
objection to the illegality of their arrests when they did not move to quash the
information before entering their plea, and when they participated at the trial.
The CA further ruled that Pepino and Gomez conspired with each other to
attain a common objective, i.e., to kidnap Edward in exchange for ransom.
While the case was under review by the Supreme Court, Pepino filed an urgent
motion to withdraw his appeal, which the Court granted. 17 Only Gomez's appeal is
now pending before us.
In her brief 18 and supplemental brief, 19 Gomez maintained that it was
impossible for Edward to have seen her in the front seat of the getaway car because he
(Edward) was blindfolded. She also alleged that the prosecution failed to prove that
she had conspired with the other accused.
Gomez further claimed that Edward's identification of her during trial "may
have been preconditioned . . . by suggestive identification" 20 made at the police
lineup. She further argued that the death penalty imposed on her is no longer proper
due to the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346.
THE COURT'S RULING
We affirm Gomez's conviction, but we modify the penalty imposed and the
awarded indemnities.
Illegality of the Arrest
We point out at the outset that Gomez did not question before arraignment the
legality of her warrantless arrest or the acquisition of RTC's jurisdiction over her
person. Thus, Gomez is deemed to have waived any objection to her warrantless
arrest.
It is settled that [a]ny objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the
acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be
opportunely raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed
waived. 21 As we held in People v. Samson: 22
[A]ppellant is now estopped from questioning any defect in the
manner of his arrest as he failed to move for the quashing of the information
before the trial court. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest
was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial
court by entering a plea of "not guilty" and by participating in the trial. 23
At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting
aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from
error. Simply put, the illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of its
right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability. It
is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid
information had been filed, the accused had been arraigned, the trial had commenced
and had been completed, and a judgment of conviction had been rendered against her.
24
Edward also saw Gomez seated at the front seat of the getaway metallic green
Toyota Corolla vehicle. In addition, the abductors removed the tape from Edward's
eyes when they arrived at the apartment, and among those whom he saw there was
Gomez. According to Edward, he was able to take a good look at the occupants of the
car when he was about to be released.
On the part of Jocelyn, she was firm and unyielding in her identification of
Pepino as the person who pointed a gun at her husband while going down the stairs,
and who brought him outside the premises of Kilton Motors. She maintained that she
was very near when Pepino was taking away her husband; and that she could not
forget Pepino's face. For accuracy, we quote from the records:
ATTY. CORONEL:
Q: You stated that you were able to see one of the persons who kidnapped your
husband, if you see this person again, would you be able to identify him?
JOCELYN SY TAN:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you look around the courtroom and see if the person you are referring to
is here today?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you point to him?
A: (WITNESS POINTED TO A MALE PERSON INSIDE THE
COURTROOM WHO WHEN ASKED HIS NAME ANSWERED AS
JERRY PEPINO).
Q: Ms. Witness, what role did this person whom you identified and gave his
name as Jerry Pepino, what role did he play in the kidnapping of your
husband?
A: Siya po bale 'yong nakayakap sa husband ko tapos nakatutok ng baril.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. ESTRUCO:
Q: When Jerry Pepino was at Kilton Motors, he embraced your husband?
JOCELYN SY TAN:
A: Yes, sir. And pointed a gun at my husband.
Q: And he was not blindfolded at that time?
A: No, he was not blindfolded, he was only wearing a cap.
Q: You are very sure that he is Jerry Pepino?
A: Yes, I am very, very sure. I could not forget his face.
Q: You are very sure?
A: Yes, sir. Kahit sa nightmare ko, kasama siya.
xxx xxx xxx 36
We add that no competing event took place to draw Edward's and Jocelyn's
attention from the incident. Nothing in the records shows the presence of any
distraction that could have disrupted the witnesses' attention at the time of the
incident. 37
Jurisprudence holds that the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is
to strive to see the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime
was committed. As the Court held in People v. Esoy: 38
It is known that the most natural reaction of a witness to a crime is to
strive to look at the appearance of the perpetrator and to observe the manner in
which the offense is perpetrated. Most often the face of the assailant and body
movements thereof, create a lasting impression which cannot be easily erased
from a witness's memory. Experience dictates that precisely because of the
unusual acts of violence committed right before their eyes, eyewitnesses can
remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of criminals at any
given time. 39
While this pronouncement should be applied with great caution, there is no
compelling circumstance in this case that would warrant its non-application.
Contrary to what Gomez claimed, the police lineup conducted at the NBI was
not suggestive. We note that there were seven people in the lineup; Edward was not
compelled to focus his attention on any specific person or persons. While it might
have been ideal if there had been more women included in the lineup instead of only
two, or if there had been a separate lineup for Pepino and for Gomez, the fact alone
that there were five males and two females in the lineup did not render the procedure
irregular. There was no evidence that the police had supplied or even suggested to
Edward that the appellants were the suspected perpetrators.
The following exchanges at the trial during Edward's cross-examination prove
this point:
ATTY. ESTURCO:
Q: When they were lined up at the NBI, where were they placed, in a certain
room?
EDWARD TAN:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: With a glass window? One way?
A: No, sir.
Q: You mean to say you were face to face with the alleged kidnappers?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And before you were asked to pinpoint the persons who allegedly kidnapped
you, you conferred with the NBI agents?
A: The NBI agents told me not to be afraid.
Q: No, my question is, you conferred with the NBI agents?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What is the name of the NBI agent?
A: I cannot remember, sir.
Q: And how many were lined up?
A: Seven, sir.
Q: And the NBI agent gave the names of each of the seven?
A: No, sir. 40
We also note that Jocelyn's and Edward's out-of-court identifications were
made on the same day. While Jocelyn only identified Pepino, the circumstances
surrounding this out-of-court identification showed that the whole identification
process at the NBI was not suggestive. To directly quote from the records:
ATTY. ESTURCO:
Q: How about the alleged kidnappers, where were they placed during that time?
JOCELYN TAN:
A: They were in front of us.
Q: Without any cover?
A: None, sir.
Q: Without any glass cover?
A: See-through glass window.
Q: One-way mirror?
A: Not one way, see-through.
Q: And before you were asked to pinpoint the alleged kidnappers, you were
already instructed by the NBI what to do and was told who are the
persons to be lined up?
A: No, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And between the alleged length of time, you were still very positive that
it was Gerry (sic) Pepino inside the NBI cell?
A: At first, I did not know that he was Jerry Pepino but we know his face.
Q: At first, you did not know that it was Jerry Pepino?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: It was the NBI officer who told you that the person is Jerry Pepino, am I
correct?
A: They identified that the person we identified was Jerry Pepino. We first
pinpointed na heto ang mukha at saka sinabi na 'yan si Jerry
Pepino.
xxx xxx xxx 41
These exchanges show that the lineup had not been attended by any
suggestiveness on the part of the police or the NBI agents; there was no evidence that
they had supplied or even suggested to either Edward or Jocelyn that the appellants
were the kidnappers.
We are not unaware that the Court, in several instances, has acquitted an
accused when the out-of-court identification is fatally flawed. In these cases, however,
it had been clearly shown that the identification procedure was suggestive.
In People v. Pineda, 42 the Court acquitted Rolando Pineda because the police
suggested the identity of the accused by showing only the photographs of Pineda and
his co-accused Celso Sison to witnesses Canilo Ferrer and Jimmy Ramos. According
to the Court, "there was impermissible suggestion because the photographs were only
of appellant and Sison, focusing attention on the two accused." 43
Similarly, the Court in People v. Rodrigo 44 acquitted appellant Lee Rodrigo
since only a lone photograph was shown to the witness at the police station. We thus
held that the appellant's in-court identification proceeded from, and was influenced
by, impermissible suggestions in the earlier photographic identification.
The lack of a prior description of the kidnappers in the present case should not
lead to a conclusion that witnesses' identification was erroneous. The lack of a prior
description of the kidnappers was due to the fact that Jocelyn (together with other
members of Edward's family), for reasons not made known in the records, opted to
negotiate with the kidnappers, instead of immediately seeking police assistance. If
members of Edward's family had refused to cooperate with the police, their refusal
could have been due to their desire not to compromise Edward's safety. 45 In the same
manner, Edward, after he was freed, chose to report the matter to Teresita Ang See,
and not to the police.SDAaTC
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
PEREZ, J : p
On appeal is the September 25, 2009 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31285 which affirmed with modifications the July 17, 2007
Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 255 of Las Piñas City,
convicting Ronald Ibañez (Ronald), Emilio Ibañez (Emilio) and Daniel "Bobot"
Ibañez (Bobot) (collectively, petitioners) of the crime of frustrated homicide.
The Facts
For allegedly stoning, hitting and stabbing Rodolfo M. Lebria (Rodolfo), the
petitioners together with their co-accused, Boyet Ibañez (Boyet) and David Ibañez
(David), who have remained at large, were charged with the crime of frustrated
homicide in an Information 3 dated October 11, 2001. The accusatory portion thereof
reads:
"That on or about 15th day of July, 2001, in the City of Las Piñas,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating together, acting in common
accord and mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill and
without justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, stone, hit with an spade and stab with bladed
weapons one RODOLFO M. LEBRIA, thereby inflicting upon him physical
injuries, thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the
crime of Homicide as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce
it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused, that is, by the
timely and able medical assistance rendered to said RODOLFO M. LEBRIA,
which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
After posting their bail bond at P24,000.00 each, Ronald, Bobot and Emilio
were released on bail. 4 Arraignment of Ronald and Bobot was held on May 9, 2002.
Emilio was, in turn, arraigned on December 10, 2002. All the petitioners entered a
plea of not guilty to the crime charged. 5 After termination of pre-trial on April 23,
2003, 6 trial on the merits immediately followed. In the course of trial, two versions of
what transpired on the early morning of July 15, 2001 surfaced. These conflicting
versions of the incident, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Version of the Prosecution
In his narration, Rodolfo claimed that Ronald and his sons Emilio, Bobot,
Boyet and David were his neighbors in CAA, Las Piñas City. Rodolfo recalled that he
had visitors on the day of the incident. When his guests left at around 1:00 a.m. of
July 15, 2001, Rodolfo accompanied them outside his house. After about thirty
minutes and as he was about to go inside, Rodolfo noticed some garbage in front of
his house. Addressing nobody in particular, Rodolfo uttered in the vernacular "bakit
dito tinambak ang basura sa harap ng aking bahay na malawak naman ang
pagtataponan ng basura?" 7 Emilio and Boyet, who was then present and angered by
what they heard, threw stones at the private complainant hitting him twice on the
forehead. With blood oozing from his forehead, Rodolfo went inside his house to
cleanse his face obscured by blood and emerged again, this time, carrying a 2" x 2"
(dos por dos) piece of wood. Rodolfo was caught off guard when he was hit on the
head with a shovel by another accused, David. 8 Then, Ronald held Rodolfo,
rendering him helpless, as Boyet and Bobot simultaneously stabbed him in the
abdomen. 9 At this point, Rodolfo fell to the ground, lying flat and eventually lost
consciousness. When he regained consciousness, Rodolfo found himself at the Las
Piñas District Hospital (LPDH) but was later on transferred to the Philippine General
Hospital (PGH) for the much-needed surgical procedure. At the PGH, Rodolfo was
operated on, confined for nine days and incurred hospital expenses amounting to
P30,000.00. 10
PO2 Sulit testified that he was the investigating police officer who took the
statements of Rodolfo's daughter Ruth Ann Lebria (Ruth) and Rodolfo's wife,
Salvacion Lebria (Salvacion) when they went to the police station to complain about
the incident. PO2 Sulit disclosed that when he asked Ruth and Salvacion why Rodolfo
was not with them, he was informed that Rodolfo was still undergoing medication and
treatment for the injuries suffered from the petitioners. PO2 Sulit also testified that he
endorsed the complaint against the petitioners to the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Las Piñas for proper disposition. 11
To corroborate Rodolfo's testimony, the prosecution presented Ruth and
Salvacion as witnesses.
Ruth testified that she actually witnessed the entire incident which she admitted
was preceded by the utterance made by his father. 12 Her testimony on how Ronald,
Emilio, Bobot, Boyet and David ganged up on her father and who among them
stoned, hit, held and stabbed Rodolfo perfectly matched the latter's sworn
declarations. 13
Salvacion, who was also home on that fateful morning, confirmed the beating
and stabbing her husband endured in the hands of the petitioners and their co-accused.
Salvacion also submitted receipts in the total amount of P2,174.80, representing the
medical expenses incurred for the treatment of Rodolfo's injuries resulting from the
incident. 14CAIHTE
Per the trial court's Order 23 dated February 10, 2004, Atty. Ma. Teresita C.
Pantua (Atty. Pantua), of the Public Attorney's Office, was designated as the
petitioners' counsel de oficio. However, Atty. Pantua's designation was recalled upon
her manifestation that she had previously assisted Rodolfo in initiating the present
case. In her stead, the trial court appointed the petitioners' current counsel de oficio,
Atty. Juan Sindingan (Atty. Sindingan).
Since then, Atty. Sindingan has been representing the petitioners. With his
help, all three petitioners finally appeared before the trial court on May 5, 2005. Atty.
Sindingan handled the cross-examination of another prosecution witness, Salvacion,
as well as the presentation of evidence for the defense.
After both parties had rested their case, they were required to submit their
respective memoranda in thirty (30) days. Atty. Sindingan submitted the
Memorandum for the petitioners while no memorandum was ever filed by the
prosecution. Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted for decision.
The RTC's Ruling
The RTC accorded more weight to the positive testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses over the declarations of the defense, thus, the dispositive portion of its
judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the Court finds accused
Ronald Ibañez, Emilio Ibañez and Daniel "Bobot" Ibañez GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide and hereby sentences
them to each suffer the penalty of imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS AND
ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, up to EIGHT (8) YEARS of
prision mayor, as maximum, as well as to suffer the accessory penalties
provided for by law.
Also, accused Ronald Ibañez, Emilio Ibañez and Daniel "Bobot"
Ibañez are ordered to pay to private complainant or victim Rodolfo Lebria the
sum of P2,174.80 representing his actual medical expenses.
With costs de officio.
SO ORDERED. 24
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTC Decision but this
was denied in an Order 25 dated October 11, 2007. Undaunted, the petitioners elevated
their case to the CA. They faulted the trial court for totally disregarding their claim
that Rodolfo was the aggressor and for not recognizing that Bobot was merely acting
in self-defense when Rodolfo was stabbed. The petitioners also asserted that they
were deprived of their constitutional right to counsel.
The CA's Ruling
The CA agreed with the trial court's judgment of conviction but modified the
penalty imposed. The appellate court sentenced the petitioners to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. The CA also found it proper
to award P15,000.00 as temperate damages and P30,000.00 as moral damages to
Rodolfo. The petitioners sought a reconsideration of the CA's decision. Still, their
motion was denied in the Resolution 26 of December 28, 2009.
The Issue
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari raising the lone issue of
whether the petitioners were deprived of their constitutionally guaranteed right to
counsel.
The Court's Ruling
The Court sustains the conviction of the petitioners with modification.
No Deprivation of Right to Counsel
The right invoked by the petitioners is premised upon Article III, Section 14 of
the Constitution which states that:
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, . . . .
Guided by the constitutionally guaranteed right of an accused to counsel and
pursuant to its rule-making authority, the Court, in promulgating the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, adopted the following provisions:
Rule 115, SEC. 1. Rights of accused at the trial. — In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of
the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 116 of the same Rules makes it mandatory for the trial court to
designate a counsel de oficio for the accused in the absence of private
representation. It provides:
aDSIHc
||| (Ibañez v. People, G.R. No. 190798, [January 27, 2016], 779 PHIL 436-462)
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
PERALTA, J : p
This is a petition for review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to annul and set aside the Resolutions 1 dated January 25, 2005 and April 5,
2005, issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 88160.
The antecedents are as follows:
On November 28, 1991, an Information for murder committed against
Emmanuel Mendoza was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6,
Tanauan, Batangas, against Joven de Grano (Joven), Armando de Grano (Armando),
and Estanislao Lacaba (Estanislao), together with their co-accused Leonides Landicho
(Leonides), Domingo Landicho (Domingo), and Leonardo Genil (Leonardo), who
were at-large. 2 It was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2730, the pertinent portion of
which reads:
That on April 21, 1991, between 9:00 o'clock and 10:00 o'clock in the
evening, in Barangay Balakilong, [M]unicipality of Laurel, [P]rovince of
Batangas, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, all the above
named accused, conspiring, confederating, and helping one another, motivated
by common design and intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously, and by means of treachery and with evident premeditation,
shoot EMMANUEL MENDOZA with firearms, inflicting upon him eight
gunshot wounds and causing his death thereby, thus committing the crime of
MURDER to the damage and prejudice of his heirs in the amount as the
Honorable Court shall determine. 3
Duly arraigned, Joven, Armando, and Estanislao pleaded "not guilty" to the
crime as charged; while their co-accused Leonides, Leonardo, and Domingo remained
at-large. Thereafter, respondents filed a motion for bail contending that the
prosecution's evidence was not strong. 4
Meanwhile, considering that one of the accused was the incumbent Mayor of
Laurel, Batangas at the time when the crime was committed, Senior State Prosecutor
Hernani T. Barrios moved that the venue be transferred from the RTC, Branch 6,
Tanauan, Batangas to any RTC in Manila. Consequently, the case was transferred to
the RTC Manila for re-raffling amongst its Branches. The case was re-docketed as
Criminal Case No. 93-129988 and was initially re-raffled to Branches 6, 9, and 11
before being finally raffled to Branch 27, RTC, Manila. 5EDCTIa
Before transferring the case to the RTC, Branch 27, Manila, the trial court
deferred the resolution of respondents' motion for bail and allowed the prosecution to
present evidence. Thereafter, the hearing of the application for bail ensued, wherein
the prosecution presented Teresita and Dr. Leonardo Salvador. After finding that the
prosecution's evidence to prove treachery and evident premeditation was not strong,
the RTC, Branch 11, Manila, granted respondents' motion for bail. A motion for
reconsideration was filed, but it was denied. 6
The prosecution then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 41110, which was denied. Aggrieved, they sought recourse before
this Court in G.R. No. 129604. In a Resolution dated July 12, 1999, this Court granted
the petition and set aside the decision of the CA together with the Order of the RTC
granting bail to the respondents. The RTC was also ordered to immediately issue a
warrant of arrest against the accused. The resolution was also qualified to be
immediately executory. 7 As a result, Estanislao was re-arrested, but Joven and
Armando were not. 8
However, upon respondents' motion for reconsideration, this Court, in a
Resolution dated September 4, 2001, resolved to remand the case to the RTC. We
noted that, in view of the transmittal of the records of the case to this Court in
connection with the petition, the trial court deferred the rendition of its decision.
Consequently, the case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings, including
the rendition of its decision on the merits.
After the presentation of the parties' respective sets of evidence, the RTC
rendered a Decision 9 dated April 25, 2002, finding several accused guilty of the
offense as charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Only Estanislao was present at the promulgation despite due notice to the other
respondents.
Respondents, thru counsel, then filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration dated
May 8, 2002, praying that the Decision dated April 25, 2002 be reconsidered and set
aside and a new one be entered acquitting them based on the following grounds, to
wit:
3. The Honorable Court erred in not finding that the failure of the
prosecution to present rebuttal evidence renders the position of the defense
unrebutted;
In its Opposition, the prosecution pointed out that while the accused jointly
moved for the reconsideration of the decision, all of them, except Estanislao, were at-
large. Having opted to become fugitives and be beyond the judicial ambit, they lost
their right to file such motion for reconsideration and to ask for whatever relief from
the court. 11
Acting on respondents' motion for reconsideration, the RTC issued an Order 12
dated April 15, 2004 modifying its earlier decision by acquitting Joven and Armando,
and downgrading the conviction of Domingo and Estanislao from murder to
homicide. The decretal portion of the Order reads:
To the extent herein altered or modified, the Decision dated April 25,
2002 stands.
SO ORDERED. 13 DSAEIT
1. There was absolutely no basis for this Court to have taken cognizance of the
"Joint Motion for Reconsideration" dated May 8, 2002, citing Sec. 6,
Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.
2. The testimony of Teresita Duran deserves credence. The delay in the taking
of Ms. Duran's written statement of the events she witnessed is
understandable considering that Joven de Grano was the mayor of the
municipality where the crime was committed and that another accused,
Estanislao Lacaba, was a policeman in the same municipality.
On September 28, 2004, the RTC issued an Order 14 denying the motion and
giving due course to Estanislao's notice of appeal.
Petitioner, thru Assistant City Prosecutor Cesar Glorioso of the Office of the
Manila City Prosecutor, with the assistance of private prosecutor Atty. Michael E.
David, filed a Petition 15 for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the
CA arguing that:
(a) the private respondents, having deliberately evaded arrest after being denied
bail and deliberately failing to attend the promulgation of the Decision
despite due notice, lost the right to move for reconsideration of their
conviction; and
(b) the grounds relied upon by respondent RTC in modifying its Decision are
utterly erroneous. 16
Petitioner alleged that it had no other plain, adequate, and speedy remedy,
considering that the State could not appeal a judgment of acquittal. However, by way
of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon a showing by the petitioner
that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not only reversible errors of
judgment, but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.
Consequently, the accused cannot be considered at risk of double jeopardy. 17
Respondent de Grano filed a Motion to Dismiss, 18 arguing that the
verification and certification portion of the petition was flawed, since it was signed
only by counsel and not by the aggrieved party. Also, the petition did not contain the
conformity of the Solicitor General. 19
In denying the motion, the CA opined that the rule on double jeopardy
prohibits the state from appealing or filing a petition for review of a judgment of
acquittal that was based on the merits of the case. If there is an acquittal, an appeal
therefrom, if it will not put the accused in double jeopardy, on the criminal aspect,
may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. It added that a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be filed by
the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private
offended party or complainant. Moreover, the records reveal that the petition was not
filed in the name of the offended party; and worse, the verification and certification of
non-forum shopping attached to the petition was signed not by the private offended
party, but by her counsel. Notwithstanding the efforts exerted by the petitioner to
secure the confirmation of the OSG and the endorsement of the DOJ, there is no
showing of any subsequent participation of the OSG in the case. IcHSCT
Petitioner, through the Solicitor General, argues that, except for Estanislao,
none of the respondents appeared at the promulgation of the Decision. Neither did
they surrender after promulgation of the judgment of conviction, nor filed a motion
for leave to avail themselves of the judicial remedies against the decision, stating the
reasons for their absence. The trial court thus had no authority to take cognizance of
the joint motion for reconsideration filed by the respondents as stated in Section 6,
Rule 120 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. As such, the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Having been issued without jurisdiction, the Order dated April 15, 2004 is void.
Consequently, no double jeopardy attached to such void Order. The CA, therefore,
committed reversible error when it dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground
of double jeopardy. 31
Petitioner also contends that, with the endorsement of the DOJ and the letter of
the OSG manifesting its intention to pursue the petition, the OSG had in fact
conformed to the filing of the petition and agreed to pursue the same. Had the CA
given the OSG ample time to file the necessary pleading, the petition would not have
been dismissed for the reason that it was filed by the said office. 32
With respect to the verification and certification of non-forum shopping,
petitioner invokes a liberal application of the Rules for private complainant's failure to
personally sign it. Petitioner maintains that out of extreme fear arising from the
unexpected acquittal of Joven, private complainant was reluctant to travel to Manila.
After she was taken out of the witness protection program, she took refuge in the
Visayas and she was there at the time her signature was required. Since the period for
filing the petition for certiorari was about to lapse, and it could not be filed without
the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, the private prosecutor was
left with no option but so * sign it, instead of allowing the deadline to pass without
filing the petition. 33
Moreover, petitioner maintains that the OSG has the authority to sign the
verification and certification of the present petition, because the real party-in-interest
is the OSG itself as the representative of the State. 34
On their part, respondents contend that the petition for certiorari questioning
the order of acquittal is not allowed and is contrary to the principle of double
jeopardy. Respondents argue that, contrary to the OSG's contention, respondents
Joven and Domingo's absence during the promulgation of the Decision dated April
25, 2002 did not deprive the trial court of its authority to resolve their Joint Motion
for Reconsideration, considering that one of the accused, Estanislao, was present
during the promulgation. 35
Joven, Armando, and Domingo maintain that while they were not present
during the promulgation of the RTC Decision, Estanislao, who was under police
custody, attended the promulgation of the said Decision. Thus, when they filed their
Joint Motion for Reconsideration, which included that of Estanislao, the RTC was not
deprived of its authority to resolve the joint motion. 36
Respondents insist that the CA properly dismissed the petition for certiorari, as
it was not instituted by the OSG on behalf of the People of the Philippines, and that
the verification and certification portion thereof was not signed by private
complainant Teresita. 37
Respondents also argue that the petition for certiorari before this Court should
be dismissed, since the verification and certification thereof were signed by a solicitor
of the OSG, not private complainant.
The petition is meritorious.
Before considering the merits of the petition, we will first address the technical
objections raised by respondents.
As regards the issue of the signatory of the verification and certification of
non-forum shopping, a liberal application of the Rules should be applied to the
present case.
The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the
allegations in the petition have been made in good faith; or are true and correct, not
merely speculative. This requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of
pleadings, and noncompliance therewith does not necessarily render it fatally
defective. 38 Truly, verification is only a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement.
Hence, it was sufficient that the private prosecutor signed the verification. SDAaTC
With respect to the certification of non-forum shopping, it has been held that
the certification requirement is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant shall not be
allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora, as this practice is
detrimental to an orderly judicial procedure. 39 However, this Court has relaxed,
under justifiable circumstances, the rule requiring the submission of such certification
considering that although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional. 40 Not being
jurisdictional, it can be relaxed under the rule of substantial compliance.
In Donato v. Court of Appeals 41 and Wee v. Galvez, 42 the Court noted that
the petitioners were already in the United States; thus, the signing of the certification
by their authorized representatives was deemed sufficient compliance with the Rules.
In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals, 43 the Court upheld substantial justice and ruled that
the failure of the parties to sign the certification may be overlooked, as the parties'
case was meritorious. In Torres v. Specialized Packaging Development Corporation,
44 the Court also found, among other reasons, that the extreme difficulty to secure all
the required signatures and the apparent merits of the substantive aspects of the case
constitute compelling reasons for allowing the petition.
In Ortiz v. Court of Appeals 45 and similar rulings, the following has always
been pointed out:
Thus, petitioners need only show that there was reasonable cause for the failure
to sign the certification against forum shopping, and that the outright dismissal of the
petition would defeat the administration of justice. 46
We find that the particular circumstances of this case advance valid reasons for
private complainant's failure to sign the certification. As pointed out in the petition, it
was out of extreme fear that private complainant failed to personally sign the
certification. It is to be noted that when Armando and Joven were acquitted, Teresita
was already out of the witness protection program and was in hiding in the Visayas.
As such, she could not travel to Manila to personally sign the petition. Moreover, as
maintained by the petitioner, since the period for filing the petition for certiorari was
about to lapse, the private prosecutor was left with no option but to sign the
verification and certification, instead of allowing the period to file the petition to pass
without it being filed. A relaxation of the procedural rules, considering the particular
circumstances, is justified. The requirement was thus substantially complied with.
As summarized in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, 47 when
a strict and literal application of the rules on non-forum shopping and verification
would result in a patent denial of substantial justice, they may be liberally construed.
An unforgiving application of the pertinent provisions of the Rules will not be given
premium if it would impede rather than serve the best interests of justice in the light
of the prevailing circumstances in the case under consideration.
We reiterate our holding in City Warden of the Manila City Jail v. Estrella, 48
that the signature of the Solicitor General on the verification and certification of non-
forum shopping in a petition before the CA or with this Court is substantial
compliance with the requirement under the Rules, considering that the OSG is the
legal representative of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and its
agencies and instrumentalities; more so, in a criminal case where the People or the
State is the real party-in-interest and is the aggrieved party. 49
Also, respondents' contention that there is no showing of any subsequent
participation of the OSG in the petition before the CA does not hold water. In the
letter dated January 18, 2004, the OSG instructed the private prosecutor to secure the
necessary endorsement from the DOJ for it to pursue the case. In its 1st Indorsement
dated March 15, 2005, DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez, endorsed the petition to the
Solicitor General for his conformity. When the CA denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration for its outright dismissal of the petition, the OSG filed motions 50 for
extension of time to file the present petition. Moreover, the OSG filed a Comment 51
on respondents' Motion for Reconsideration. 52 Thus, any doubt regarding the
endorsement, conformity, and participation of the OSG in the petitions is dispelled.
Now on the substantive aspect.
A peculiar situation exists in the instant case. Petitioner has sought recourse
before the CA, via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, from an Order of the trial
court drastically modifying its earlier findings convicting the respondents of the crime
of murder, by acquitting Joven and Armando, and downgrading the convictions of
their co-accused from murder to homicide; this, notwithstanding that all the accused,
except Estanislao Lacaba, failed to personally appear at the promulgation of the
Decision despite due notice thereof.
Petitioner contends that its petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with the CA was the proper remedy, since the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it entertained the Joint
Motion for Reconsideration with respect to Armando and Joven despite the fact that
they had not regained their standing in court.
Petitioner's recourse to the CA was correct. ISTECA
A writ of certiorari is warranted when (1) any tribunal, board or officer has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 53 An act of a court or
tribunal may be considered as grave abuse of discretion when the same was
performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion
or hostility. 54
By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be
assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, but only upon
a clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused,
committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or to a denial of due process, thus
rendering the assailed judgment void. 55 In which event, the accused cannot be
considered at risk of double jeopardy — the revered constitutional safeguard against
exposing the accused to the risk of answering twice for the same offense.
Double jeopardy has the following essential elements: (1) the accused is
charged under a complaint or an information sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned
and he has pleaded; and (4) he is convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed
without his express consent. 56
Although this Court does not absolutely preclude the availment of the remedy
of certiorari to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner must clearly and
convincingly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point
so grave and so severe as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. 57
Under English common law, exceptions to the pleas of prior conviction or
acquittal existed where the trial court lacked jurisdiction, the theory being that a
defendant before such a court was not actually placed in jeopardy. 58 Hence, any
acquittal or conviction before a court having no jurisdiction would not violate the
principle of double jeopardy since it failed to attach in the first place.
Section 14 (2), 59 Article III of the Constitution, authorizing trials in absentia,
allows the accused to be absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings,
to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt; (b) during trial,
whenever necessary for identification purposes; and (c) at the promulgation of
sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case, the accused may appear by
counsel or representative. At such stages of the proceedings,his presence is required
and cannot be waived. 60
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Rules
applicable at the time the Decision was promulgated, provides:
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused, personally or
through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the
promulgation of the decision. If the accused was tried in absentia because he
jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be served at his last
known address.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear
was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these
Rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen
(15) days from promulgation of judgment however, the accused may surrender
and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the
reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his
absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said
remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice. 61
Thus, the accused who failed to appear without justifiable cause shall lose the
remedies available in the Rules against the judgment. However, within 15 days from
promulgation of judgment, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of
court to avail of these remedies. He shall state in his motion the reasons for his
absence at the scheduled promulgation, and if he proves that his absence was for a
justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within 15 days from
notice. 62
When the Decision dated April 25, 2002 was promulgated, only Estanislao
Lacaba was present. Subsequently thereafter, without surrendering and explaining the
reasons for their absence, Joven, Armando, and Domingo joined Estanislao in their
Joint Motion for Reconsideration. In blatant disregard of the Rules, the RTC not only
failed to cause the arrest of the respondents who were at large, it also took cognizance
of the joint motion. cdtai
The RTC clearly exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the joint Motion
for Reconsideration with respect to the respondents who were at large. It should have
considered the joint motion as a motion for reconsideration that was solely filed by
Estanislao. Being at large, Joven and Domingo have not regained their standing in
court. Once an accused jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, or escapes from
prison or confinement, he loses his standing in court; and unless he surrenders or
submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek
relief from the court. 63
Thus, Joven, Armando, and Domingo, were not placed in double jeopardy
because, from the very beginning, the lower tribunal had acted without jurisdiction.
Verily, any ruling issued without jurisdiction is, in legal contemplation, necessarily
null and void and does not exist. In criminal cases, it cannot be the source of an
acquittal. 64
However, with respect to Estanislao, the RTC committed no reversible error
when it entertained the Motion for Reconsideration. He was in custody and was
present at the promulgation of the judgment. Hence, the RTC never lost jurisdiction
over his person. Consequently, the RTC's ruling downgrading his conviction from
murder to homicide stands. For Estanislao, and for him alone, the proscription against
double jeopardy applies.
Factual matters cannot be inquired into by this Court in a certiorari
proceeding. We can no longer be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties
and analyze, assess and weigh them again to ascertain if the trial court was correct in
according superior credit to this or that piece of evidence of one party or the other. 65
The sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction,
including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, and does not include a review of the RTC's evaluation of the evidence
and the factual findings based thereon. 66
True, were it not for the procedural lapses of the RTC and its blatant disregard
of the Rules, the finality of respondents' acquittal and their co-accused's conviction of
homicide instead of murder would have been barred by the rule on double jeopardy.
We may tolerate an erroneous acquittal borne from an attempt to protect the
innocent or from an attempt to uphold the accused's treasured right to a fair trial, but
when these concerns are not evident, an erroneous acquittal is a source of substantial
dismay and warrants this Court's corrective action via a special writ of error.
Moreover, although the CA dismissed the appeal filed before it, the RTC Judge
cannot hide behind such fact considering that the dismissal of the appeal was not
based on the validity of the assailed Order of the RTC, but was based on technical
rules and the rule against double jeopardy.
It is to be stressed that judges are dutybound to have more than a cursory
acquaintance with laws and jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic legal commands
constitutes gross ignorance of the law from which no one may be excused, not even a
judge. 67 The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that "a judge shall be faithful to the
law and maintain professional competence". 68 It bears stressing that competence is
one of the marks of a good judge. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity
with the Rules, he erodes the public's confidence in the competence of our courts.
Such is gross ignorance of the law. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge,
he/she owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law. 69
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated January
25, 2005 and April 5, 2005, issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
88160, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The pertinent portions of the Order dated
April 15, 2004 issued by the Regional Trial Court, convicting Domingo Landicho of
the crime of Homicide and acquitting Armando de Grano and Joven de Grano, are
ANNULLED and DELETED. In all other aspects, the Order stands.
To the extent herein altered or modified, the pertinent portions of the Decision
dated April 25, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court are REINSTATED.
The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to INVESTIGATE
Judge Teresa P. Soriaso for possible violation/s of the law and/or the Code of Judicial
Conduct in issuing the Order dated April 15, 2004 in Criminal Case No. 93-129988.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., * Ynares-Santiago, Carpio ** and Corona, *** JJ., concur.
||| (People v. De Grano, G.R. No. 167710, [June 5, 2009], 606 PHIL 547-572)
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
SERENO, C.J : p
This is a Petition for Review an Certiorari, filed by petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz,
from the Decision 1 dated 22 June 2011 issued by the Twentieth Division of the Court of
Appeals (CA) and Resolution 2 dated 2 February 2012 issued by the Former Twentieth
Division of the CA in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 00670.
Petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz was charged with violation of Section 15, Article II
of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,
by the Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman —
Visayas, in an Information 3 dated 14 February 2006, which reads:
That on or about the 31st day of January 2006, at Cebu City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
JAIME D. DE LA CRUZ, a public officer, having been duly appointed and
qualified to such public position as Police Officer 2 of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) assigned in the Security Service Group of the Cebu City Police
Office, after having been arrested by agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) in an entrapment operation, was found positive for use of
METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE commonly known as
"Shabu", the dangerous drug after a confirmatory test conducted on said
accused.TAIaHE
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the
charge. The records do not reveal whether De la Cruz was likewise charged for extortion.
The evidence of the prosecution reveals that at 8:00 a.m. of 31 January 2006, the
agents and special investigators of the National Bureau of Investigation, Central Visayas
Regional Office (NBI-CEVRO) or simply NBI, received a Complaint from Corazon
Absin (Corazon) and Charito Escobido (Charito). The complainants claimed that at 1:00
a.m. of that same day, Ariel Escobido (Ariel), the live-in partner of Corazon and son of
Charito, was picked up by several unknown male persons believed to be police officers
for allegedly selling drugs. An errand boy gave a number to the complainants, and when
the latter gave the number a ring, they were instructed to proceed to the Gorordo Police
Office located along Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. In the said police office, they met
"James" who demanded from them PhP100,000, later lowered to PhP40,000, in exchange
for the release of Ariel. After the meeting, the complainants proceeded to the NBI-
CEVRO to file a complaint and narrate the circumstances of the meeting to the
authorities. While at the NBI-CEVRO, Charito even received calls supposedly from
"James" instructing her to bring the money as soon as possible.
The special investigators at the NBI-CEVRO verified the text messages received
by the complainants. A team was immediately formed to implement an entrapment
operation, which took place inside a Jollibee branch at the corner of Gen. Maxilom and
Gorordo Avenues, Cebu City. The officers were able to nab Jaime dela Cruz by using a
pre-marked PhP500 bill dusted with fluorescent powder, which was made part of the
amount demanded by "James" and handed by Corazon. Petitioner was later brought to the
forensic laboratory of the NBI-CEVRO where forensic examination was done by forensic
chemist Rommel Paglinawan. Petitioner was required to submit his urine for drug testing.
It later yielded a positive result for presence of dangerous drugs as indicated in the
confirmatory test result labeled as Toxicology (Dangerous Drugs) Report No. 2006-
TDD-2402 dated 16 February 2006.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 58 of Cebu City, in its Decision 4 dated 6
June 2007, found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 15,
Article II of R.A. 9165 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of compulsory
rehabilitation for a period of not less than six (6) months at the Cebu Center for the
Ultimate Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents located at Salinas, Lahug, Cebu City. 5
Petitioner filed an appeal assigning as error the RTC's validation of the result of
the urine test despite its dubiousness having been admitted in spite of the lack of legal
basis for its admission. First, he alleges that the forensic laboratory examination was
conducted despite the fact that he was not assisted by counsel, in clear violation of his
constitutional right. Secondly, he was allegedly held guilty beyond reasonable doubt
notwithstanding the lack of sufficient basis to convict him.
The CA found the appeal devoid of merit and affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
Petitioner thus filed the present Petition for Review on certiorari. He assigns as
errors the use of hearsay evidence as basis for his conviction and the questionable
circumstances surrounding his arrest and drug test.
Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Comment, 6
saying that "petitioner's arguments cannot be the subject of a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45, as they involve questions of facts which may not be the subject
thereof; after his arraignment, he can no longer contest the validity of his arrest, less so at
this stage of the proceedings; his guilt has been adequately established by direct
evidence; and the manner in which the laboratory examination was conducted was
grounded on a valid and existing law. SCDaET
THE ISSUE
We deem it proper to give due course to this Petition by confronting head-on the
issue of whether or not the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal.
OUR RULING
We declare that the drug test conducted upon petitioner is not grounded upon any
existing law or jurisprudence.
Petitioner was charged with use of dangerous drugs in violation of the law, the
pertinent provision of which reads:
The RTC subsequently convicted petitioner, ruling that the following elements of
Section 15 were established: (1) the accused was arrested; (2) the accused was subjected
to drug test; and (3) the confirmatory test shows that he used a dangerous drug.
We find the ruling and reasoning of the trial court, as well as the subsequent
affirmation by the CA, erroneous on three counts.
The drug test in Section 15 does not
cover persons apprehended or
arrested for any unlawful act, but
only for unlawful acts listed under
Article II of R.A. 9165.
First, "[a] person apprehended or arrested" cannot literally mean any person
apprehended or arrested for any crime. The phrase must be read in context and
understood in consonance with R.A. 9165. Section 15 comprehends persons arrested or
apprehended for unlawful acts listed under Article II of the law.
Hence, a drug test can be made upon persons who are apprehended or arrested for,
among others, the "importation", 9 "sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery,
distribution and transportation", 10 "manufacture" 11 and "possession" 12 of dangerous
drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals; possession thereof "during
parties, social gatherings or meetings"; 13 being "employees and visitors of a den, dive or
resort"; 14 "maintenance of a den, dive or resort"; 15 "illegal chemical diversion of
controlled precursors and essential chemicals"; 16 "manufacture or delivery" 17 or
"possession" 18 of equipment, instrument, apparatus, and other paraphernalia for
dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals; possession of
dangerous drugs "during parties, social gatherings or meetings"; 19 "unnecessary" 20 or
"unlawful" 21 prescription thereof; "cultivation or culture of plants classified as
dangerous drugs or are sources thereof"; 22 and "maintenance and keeping of original
records of transactions on dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential
chemicals." 23 To make the provision applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended
for any crime not listed under Article II is tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning.
Note that accused appellant here was arrested in the alleged act of extortion. cCaIET
In the case at bench, the presence of dangerous drugs was only in the
form of residue on the drug paraphernalia, and the accused were found positive
for use of dangerous drugs. Granting that the arrest was legal, the evidence
obtained admissible, and the chain of custody intact, the law enforcers should
have filed charges under Sec. 15, R.A. No. 9165 or for use of dangerous drugs
and, if there was no residue at all, they should have been charged under Sec. 14
(Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for
Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings). Sec. 14
provides that the maximum penalty under Sec. 12 (Possession of Equipment,
Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) shall be
imposed on any person who shall possess any equipment, instrument, apparatus
and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. Under Sec. 12, the maximum
penalty is imprisonment of four years and a fine of PhP50,000.00. In fact, under
the same section, the possession of such equipment, apparatus or other
paraphernalia is prima facie evidence that the possessor has used a dangerous
drug and shall be presumed to have violated Sec. 15.
. . .[M]andatory drug testing can never be random and suspicionless. The ideas
of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made
defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are
they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are
charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons
thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and
peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not
necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To
impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to
harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the
stated objectives of RA 6195. Drug testing in this case would violate a
person's right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to
incriminate themselves. (Emphasis supplied)
We find that petitioner never raised the alleged irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment and raises the issue only now before this tribunal; hence, he is deemed to
have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest curing whatever defect may
have attended his arrest. 26 However, "a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not
mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless
arrest." 27
We are aware of the prohibition against testimonial compulsion and the allowable
exceptions to such proscription. Cases where non-testimonial compulsion has been
allowed reveal, however, that the pieces of evidence obtained were all material to the
principal cause of the arrest. AIcaDC
In the instant case, we fail to see how a urine sample could be material to the
charge of extortion. The RTC and the CA, therefore, both erred when they held that the
extraction of petitioner's urine for purposes of drug testing was "merely a mechanical act,
hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial investigation."
In the Gutang, et al. case, the Court clarified that "what the Constitution prohibits
is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused, but
not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be material". The situation in
Gutang was categorized as falling among the exemptions under the freedom from
testimonial compulsion since what was sought to be examined came from the body of the
accused. The Court said:
This was a mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which was
not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes
determinable by simple observation. In fact, the record shows that petitioner and
his co-accused were not compelled to give samples of their urine but they in fact
voluntarily gave the same when they were requested to undergo a drug test.
Assuming arguendo that the urine samples taken from the petitioner are
inadmissible in evidence, we agree with the trial court that the record is replete
with other pieces of credible evidence including the testimonial evidence of the
prosecution which point to the culpability of the petitioner for the crimes
charged.
We emphasize that the circumstances in Gutang are clearly different from the
circumstances of petitioner in the instant case. First, Gutang was arrested in relation to a
drug case. Second, he volunteered to give his urine. Third, there were other pieces of
evidence that point to his culpability for the crimes charged. In the present case, though,
petitioner was arrested for extortion; he resisted having his urine sample taken; and
finally, his urine sample was the only available evidence that was used as basis for his
conviction for the use of illegal drugs.
The drug test was a violation of
petitioner's right to privacy and right
against self-incrimination.
It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested
for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer prior to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising
his rights, but all of his efforts proved futile, because he was still compelled to submit his
urine for drug testing under those circumstances.
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.AEaSTC
SO ORDERED.
||| (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 200748, [July 23, 2014])
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J : p
The procedure for taking depositions in criminal cases recognizes the prosecution's
right to preserve testimonial evidence and prove its case despite the unavailability of its
witness. It cannot, however, give license to prosecutorial indifference or unseemly
involvement in a prosecution witness' absence from trial. To rule otherwise would
effectively deprive the accused of his fundamental right to be confronted with the
witnesses against him.
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, petitioners seek to nullify and set aside the February 19, 2008 Decision 1 and
November 28, 2008 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
99383, which reversed the September 12, 2006 Order 3 issued by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 27 in Civil Case No. 06-114844 and upheld the grant of
the prosecution's motion to take the testimony of a witness by oral depositions in Laos,
Cambodia.
Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila for Other Deceits under Article 318 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) docketed as Criminal Case No. 396447. The Information 4
dated September 24, 2003, later amended 5 on September 14, 2004, reads:
On October 13, 2005, the private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to
Take Oral Deposition 6 of Li Luen Ping, alleging that he was being treated for lung
infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that, upon doctor's
advice, he could not make the long travel to the Philippines by reason of ill health.
On September 12, 2006, the RTC granted the petition and declared the MeTC
Orders null and void. 11 The RTC held that Section 17, Rule 23 on the taking of
depositions of witnesses in civil cases cannot apply suppletorily to the case since there is
a specific provision in the Rules of Court with respect to the taking of depositions of
prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, which is primarily intended to safeguard the
constitutional rights of the accused to meet the witness against him face to face.
Upon denial by the RTC of their motion for reconsideration through an Order
dated March 5, 2006, 12 the prosecution elevated the case to the CA.
On February 19, 2008, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision which held that
no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed upon the MeTC for allowing the deposition-
taking of the complaining witness Li Luen Ping because no rule of procedure expressly
disallows the taking of depositions in criminal cases and that, in any case, petitioners
would still have every opportunity to cross-examine the complaining witness and make
timely objections during the taking of the oral deposition either through counsel or
through the consular officer who would be taking the deposition of the witness.
On November 28, 2008, the CA denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition alleging that —
The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court. 13
This is true especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his
right to a public trial and to meet the witnessess against him face to face. The requirement
is the "safest and most satisfactory method of investigating facts" as it enables the judge
to test the witness' credibility through his manner and deportment while testifying. 14 It is
not without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court recognizes the conditional
examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu
of direct court testimony.cCSDaI
The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows the taking of
depositions in civil cases, either upon oral examination or written interrogatories, before
any judge, notary public or person authorized to administer oaths at any time or place
within the Philippines; or before any Philippine consular official, commissioned officer
or person authorized to administer oaths in a foreign state or country, with no additional
requirement except reasonable notice in writing to the other party. 17
But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a
prosecution witness who would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial
examination should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case
is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure. The pertinent provision reads thus:
The condition of the private complainant being sick and of advanced age
falls within the provision of Section 15 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.
However, said rule substantially provides that he should be conditionally
examined before the court where the case is pending. Thus, this Court concludes
that the language of Section 15 Rule 119 must be interpreted to require the
parties to present testimony at the hearing through live witnesses, whose
demeanor and credibility can be evaluated by the judge presiding at the hearing,
rather than by means of deposition. No where in the said rule permits the taking
of deposition outside the Philippines whether the deponent is sick or not. 18
(Underscoring supplied) STcEIC
Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not
before the very same court where the case is pending would not only deprive a detained
accused of his right to attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the
opportunity to observe the prosecution witness' deportment and properly assess his
credibility, which is especially intolerable when the witness' testimony is crucial to the
prosecution's case against the accused. This is the import of the Court's ruling in Vda. de
Manguerra19 where we further declared that —
It is argued that since the Rules of Civil Procedure is made explicitly applicable in
all cases, both civil and criminal as well as special proceedings, the deposition-taking
before a Philippine consular official under Rule 23 should be deemed allowable also
under the circumstances. However, the suggested suppletory application of Rule 23 in the
testimonial examination of an unavailable prosecution witness has been categorically
ruled out by the Court in the same case of Vda. de Manguerra, as follows:
It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the
rules of civil procedure apply to all actions, civil or criminal, and special
proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of civil procedure have suppletory
application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that criminal
proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the
situation in the instant case, we find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23
suppletorily or otherwise." (Underscoring supplied)
The CA took a simplistic view on the use of depositions in criminal cases and
overlooked fundamental considerations no less than the Constitution secures to the
accused, i.e., the right to a public trial and the right to confrontation of witnesses. Section
14 (2), Article III of the Constitution provides as follows:
Section 14. (1) . . .
As the right of confrontation is intended "to secure the accused in the right to be
tried as far as facts provable by witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial who give
their testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-
examination," 26 it is properly viewed as a guarantee against the use of unreliable
testimony in criminal trials. In the American case of Crawford v. Washington, 27 the US
Supreme Court had expounded on the procedural intent of the confrontation requirement,
thus:
The CA found the frail and infirm condition of the prosecution witness as
sufficient and compelling reason to uphold the MeTC Orders granting the deposition-
taking, following the ruling in the case of People v. Webb 28 that the taking of an
unavailable witness' deposition is in the nature of a discovery procedure the use of which
is within the trial court's sound discretion which needs only to be exercised in a
reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law. 29
But the ruling in the cited case is not instantly applicable herein as the factual
settings are not similar. The accused in the Webb case had sought to take the oral
deposition of five defense witnesses before a Philippine consular agent in lieu of
presenting them as live witnesses, alleging that they were all residents of the United
States who could not be compelled by subpoena to testify in court. The trial court denied
the motion of the accused but the CA differed and ordered the deposition taken. When the
matter was raised before this Court, we sustained the trial court's disallowance of the
deposition-taking on the limited ground that there was no necessity for the procedure as
the matter sought to be proved by way of deposition was considered merely corroborative
of the evidence for the defense. 30
In this case, where it is the prosecution that seeks to depose the complaining
witness against the accused, the stringent procedure under Section 15, Rule 119 cannot be
ignored without violating the constitutional rights of the accused to due process.
Finally, the Court takes note that prosecution witness Li Luen Ping had managed
to attend the initial trial proceedings before the MeTC of Manila on September 9, 2004.
At that time, Li Luen Ping's old age and fragile constitution should have been
unmistakably apparent and yet the prosecution failed to act with zeal and foresight in
having his deposition or testimony taken before the MeTC pursuant to Section 15, Rule
119 of the Revised Rules of Court. In fact, it should have been imperative for the
prosecution to have moved for the preservation of Li Luen Ping's testimony at that first
instance given the fact that the witness is a non-resident alien who can leave the
Philippines anytime without any definite date of return. Obviously, the prosecution
allowed its main witness to leave the court's jurisdiction without availing of the court
procedure intended to preserve the testimony of such witness. The loss of its cause is
attributable to no other party.
ICAcaH
Still, even after failing to secure Li Luen Ping's conditional examination before the
MeTC prior to said witness' becoming sick and unavailable, the prosecution would
capitalize upon its own failure by pleading for a liberal application of the rules on
depositions. It must be emphasized that while the prosecution must provide the accused
every opportunity to take the deposition of witnesses that are material to his defense in
order to avoid charges of violating the right of the accused to compulsory process, the
State itself must resort to deposition-taking sparingly if it is to guard against accusations
of violating the right of the accused to meet the witnesses against him face to face. Great
care must be observed in the taking and use of depositions of prosecution witnesses to the
end that no conviction of an accused will rely on ex parte affidavits and depositions. 31
Thus, the CA ignored the procedure under the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure for taking the deposition of an unavailable prosecution witness when it upheld
the trial court's order allowing the deposition of prosecution witness Li Luen Ping to take
place in a venue other than the court where the case is pending. This was certainly grave
abuse of discretion.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Go v. People, G.R. No. 185527, [July 18, 2012], 691 PHIL 440-457)
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
HERNANDO, J : p
The peculiar factual circumstances surrounding the present case give rise to a
novel question of law. May a prosecution witness, like Mary Jane Veloso (Mary
Jane), who was convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to death by the Indonesian
Government and who is presently confined in a prison facility in Indonesia, testify by
way of deposition without violating the constitutional right to confrontation of a
witness by the accused? HTcADC
This petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assails the December 13, 2017 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
149002 which granted respondent's Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition and
reversed the August 16, 2016 Resolution 3 of the Regional Trial Court (trial court),
Branch 88, of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, granting the motion of the prosecution to
take the deposition by written interrogatories of Mary Jane in Indonesia.
Mary Jane, Maria Cristina P. Sergio (Cristina), and Julius L. Lacanilao (Julius)
were friends and neighbors in Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Taking advantage of her dire
situation and susceptibility, Cristina and Julius offered Mary Jane a job as a domestic
helper in Malaysia. Believing that the job was a ray of hope, Mary Jane scraped
whatever meager money she had and when the amount was not even enough to pay
Cristina and Julius as placement fee, she resorted to borrowing from relatives. Still,
the amount gathered was insufficient prompting Mary Jane's husband to sell even
their precious motorcycle. On April 21, 2010, Mary Jane, together with Cristina,
eventually left the Philippines for Malaysia. However, to Mary Jane's dismay, she was
informed by Cristina upon their arrival in Malaysia that the job intended for her was
no longer available. After spending a few days in Malaysia, Cristina sent Mary Jane to
Indonesia for a seven-day holiday with a promise that she will have a job upon her
return in Malaysia. Cristina gave Mary Jane her plane ticket as well as a luggage to
bring on her trip.
Upon Mary Jane's arrival at the Adisucipto International Airport in
Yogyakarta, Indonesia, she was apprehended by the police officers for allegedly
carrying 2.6 kilograms of heroin inside her luggage. She was accordingly charged
with drug trafficking before the District Court of Sleman, Yogyakarta, Indonesia.
Mary Jane sought comfort from her family in the Philippines and informed
them that she was currently detained in Indonesia. Mary Jane's family immediately
confronted Cristina who instead of helping them even threatened them to keep the
matter to themselves and not to divulge the same especially to the media. She even
told Mary Jane's family that she is part of an international drug syndicate who would
spend millions to get Mary Jane out of prison.
However, in October 2010, the District Court of Sleman, Yogyakarta,
Indonesia, convicted Mary Jane of drug trafficking and sentenced her to death by
firing squad. After the affirmance of her conviction by the High Court and the
Supreme Court of Indonesia, Mary Jane and eight other felons who were similarly
convicted of drug-related offenses were brought to a prison facility in the island of
Nusakambangan, off Central Java, Indonesia, to await their execution by firing squad,
which was originally scheduled on April 9, 2015 but later rescheduled to April 28,
2015. Eventually, the eight companions of Mary Jane were executed by firing squad.
Presently, Mary Jane is detained at the Wirogunan Penitentiary in Yogyakarta,
Indonesia.
Meanwhile, in the Philippines, Cristina and Julius were arrested by the
operatives of the Anti-Human Trafficking Division of the National Bureau of
Investigation. Thereafter, they were charged with qualified trafficking in person in
violation of Section 4 (a) in relation to Sections 3 (a) and 6 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9208, otherwise known as "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003" docketed as
Criminal Case No. SD (15)-3723. 4 Cristina and Julius were likewise charged in two
separate Informations with the crime of illegal recruitment as penalized under Section
6, par. (k) and (l) of R.A. No. 8042, otherwise known as "Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipino Workers Act of 1995," and estafa in violation of Section 2 (a),
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code docketed as Criminal Case Nos. SD (15)-3724,
5 and SD (15)-3753, 6 respectively, filed before the trial court. Upon arraignment,
Cristina and Julius entered a plea of "not guilty" on all charges.
On March 31, 2015, representatives from the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA), the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, and the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) went to Wirugonan Prison to interview Mary
Jane. She executed a document known as "Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Mary Jane Fiesta
Veloso." aScITE
In her Sinumpaang Salaysay, Mary Jane maintained her innocence and narrated
how she was recruited by Cristina and Julius. She alleged that while in Malaysia, she
and Cristina stayed at Sun Inn Lagoon since her supposed employer was not in
Malaysia. Cristina has a boyfriend named Prince whom she conversed only by phone.
Prince has a brother named "Ike." On April 24, 2010, Mary Jane and Cristina went to
the hotel parking lot and met with "Ike" who was on board a white car. They then
went inside the car wherein "Ike" handed the luggage to Cristina. When they returned
to the hotel room, Cristina gave Mary Jane the luggage. Mary Jane noticed that it was
unusually heavy but, upon checking, found nothing inside. She then asked Cristina
why the luggage was heavy but the latter simply replied that because it was new. The
luggage was the same bag she used on her trip to Indonesia. It was only after she was
apprehended at the airport when Mary Jane realized that it contained prohibited drugs.
On the basis of her affidavit, the Philippine Government requested the
Indonesian Government to suspend the scheduled execution of Mary Jane. It informed
the Indonesian Government that the recruiters and traffickers of Mary Jane were
already in police custody, and her testimony is vital in the prosecution of Cristina and
Julius.
Thus, on April 28, 2015, or a few hours before the scheduled execution of
Mary Jane, the President of Indonesia, His Excellency Joko Widodo, granted her an
indefinite reprieve. The Cabinet Secretary of the Indonesian Government informed the
public that President Widodo received reports about the on-going legal proceedings in
the Philippines with respect to the case of Mary Jane, and that her recruiters were
already in police custody.
Hence, pursuant to its obligations under the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance
in Criminal Matters entered into by Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty), the Indonesian authorities deferred indefinitely the execution of
Mary Jane to afford her an opportunity to present her case against Cristina, Julius, and
"Ike" who were allegedly responsible for recruiting and exploiting her to engage in
drug trafficking.
The Indonesian authorities however imposed the following conditions relative
to the taking of Mary Jane's testimony, viz.:
(a) Mary Jane shall remain in detention in Yogyakarta, Indonesia;
(b) No cameras shall be allowed;
(c) The lawyers of the parties shall not be present; and
(d) The questions to be propounded to Mary Jane shall be in writing.
Thereafter, the State filed a "Motion for Leave of Court to Take the Testimony
of Complainant Mary Jane Veloso by Deposition Upon Written Interrogatories." 7 It
averred that the taking of Mary Jane's testimony through the use of deposition upon
written interrogatories is allowed under Rule 23 of the Revised Rules of Court
because she is out of the country and will not be able to testify personally before the
court due to her imprisonment. The prosecution also pointed out that Rule 23 of the
Rules of Court applies suppletorily in criminal proceedings and the use of deposition
upon written interrogatories in criminal cases is not expressly prohibited under the
Rules of Court. Further, it pointed out that the Supreme Court has allowed
dispensation of direct testimony in open court under the Rules of Environmental
Cases and the Judicial Affidavit Rule. Lastly, the OSG averred that Cristina and Julius
will still have an opportunity to examine Mary Jane by propounding their own set of
written interrogatories through the designated consular officer who will be taking the
deposition; moreover, they were not precluded from objecting to the questions and
answers. HEITAD
Cristina and Julius objected to the motion asserting that the deposition should
be made before and not during the trial. The depositions under Rules 23 and 25 of the
Rules of Court are not designed to replace the actual testimony of the witness in open
court and the use thereof is confined only in civil cases. Also, they argued that such
method of taking testimony will violate their right to confront the witness, Mary Jane,
or to meet her face to face as provided under Section 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution.
Finally, they claimed that the prosecution's reliance on the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases and the Judicial Affidavit Rule was misplaced because the
affiants therein were still subject to cross-examination.
In its Resolution dated August 16, 2016, the trial court granted the
prosecution's motion subject to the following conditions:
1. Considering that the Prosecution has already submitted their proposed
questions in the written interrogatories, the accused, through counsel, is given
a period of ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution to submit their
comment to the proposed questions on the deposition upon written
interrogatories for the witness Mary Jane Veloso. Upon receipt of the
Comment, the Court shall promptly rule on the objections;
2. The Court shall schedule the taking of the deposition in Yogyakarta,
Indonesia, which shall be presided by the undersigned trial judge. The final
questions for the deposition (after ruling on the Defense objections), shall be
propounded by the Consul of the Philippines in the Republic of Indonesia or
his designated representative. The answers of the deponent to the written
interrogatories shall be taken verbatim by a competent staff in the Office of
the Philippine Consulate in the Republic of Indonesia;
3. The transcribed copy of the answers of the deponent shall be furnished the
accused, through counsel, who shall thereafter submit their proposed cross
interrogatory questions to the Prosecution within ten (10) days from receipt;
4. The Prosecution is given the same period of ten (10) days from receipt of
the proposed cross interrogatory questions of the Defense stating the ground
for the objections. Upon receipt of the comment, the Court shall promptly rule
on the objections;
5. The Court shall schedule the conduct of the cross interrogatory questions
for the deposition of Mary Jane Veloso in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, which shall
be presided by the undersigned trial judge. The final questions for the written
cross interrogatories (after ruling on the Prosecution's objections) shall be
propounded by the Consul of the Philippines in the Republic of Indonesia or
his designated representative. The answers of the deponent to the written cross
interrogatories shall be taken verbatim by a competent staff in the Office of
the Philippine Consulate in the Republic of Indonesia;
6. Unless the Prosecution opts to conduct re-direct written interrogatories, the
testimony of Mary Jane Veloso by way of deposition upon written
interrogatories shall be deemed terminated. In case the Prosecution propounds
re-direct written interrogatories on the deponent, the above-mentioned
procedure for the conduct of direct and cross interrogatories shall be observed.
8
Cristina and Julius immediately filed their "Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and to Suspend Period of Time to File Comments to Proposed
Questions for Deposition of Mary Jane Veloso." 9 However, the trial court denied
their Omnibus Motion in its November 3, 2016 Resolution. 10
Undeterred, Cristina and Julius filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
with Urgent Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction 11
before the Court of Appeals averring that the trial court judge gravely abused her
discretion in the issuance of the assailed Resolutions. ATICcS
Finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, the appellate
court, in its assailed December 13, 2017 Decision, granted the Petition for Certiorari
and reversed the August 16, 2016 Resolution of the trial court. It held that, contrary to
the RTC's findings, the conditional examination of witnesses in criminal proceedings
are primarily governed by Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. According to
the appellate court, the State failed to establish compelling reason to depart from such
rule and to apply instead Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure which only applies
in civil cases. Thus, pursuant to Rule 119, the taking of deposition of Mary Jane or
her conditional examination must be made not in Indonesia but before the court where
the case is pending, i.e., the Regional Trial Court of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija,
Branch 88, and that Cristina and Julius, being the accused in the criminal proceedings,
should be notified thereof so they can attend the examination.
The appellate court further reasoned that to allow the prosecution to take the
deposition of Mary Jane through written interrogatories will violate the right of
Cristina and Julius as the accused to confront a witness or to meet the witness face to
face.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) sought for reconsideration 12 but it
was denied by the appellate court in its June 5, 2018 Resolution. 13
Aggrieved, the OSG filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court before this Court alleging mainly that: (a) the Court of
Appeals erred in giving due course to Cristina and Julius's petition for certiorari
because there was another plain, speedy and adequate remedy available in the
ordinary course of law; in addition, the OSG contended that the Petition for
Certiorari should not have been given due course considering the lack of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court; and; (b)
Rule 23 of the Rules of Court with respect to deposition under written interrogatories
can be applied suppletorily in the taking of the testimony of Mary Jane given her
extraordinary circumstances.
Meantime, spouses Cesar and Celia Veloso, parents of Mary Jane, filed a
"Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Petition-In-Intervention." 14
They prayed to be allowed to intervene, on behalf of Mary Jane, in the instant
proceeding for the purpose of protecting and preserving their daughter's substantial
and immediate interest. Attached to their motion was their Petition-In-Intervention. 15
The OSG, on the other hand, submitted its Manifestation and Motion. 16 It
informed the Court that the trial court proceeded with the hearing of the criminal
cases in accordance with A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC, or the Revised Guidelines for
Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases. The prosecution has only Mary Jane to present as
a witness. Hence, the OSG prays that the Court immediately resolve the instant
Petition for Review and to suspend the application of A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC in the
criminal proceedings before the trial court.
In this Court's March 27, 2019 Resolution, 17 it denied the motion for
intervention of Mary Jane's parents for failure to establish legal interest in the instant
case that is actual and material as well as direct and immediate. The Court likewise
denied the OSG's prayer to suspend the application of A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC in the
criminal proceedings before the trial court for lack of basis.
Issues
(a) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in granting the writ of certiorari, and;
(b) Whether Mary Jane's testimony may be validly acquired through deposition
by written interrogatories. TIADCc
On Procedural Matters
The OSG avers that the appellate court erred in giving due course and granting
the respondents' Petition for Certiorari there being other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedies in the ordinary course of law. It further argues that the trial court did not
commit grave abuse of discretion when it granted the State's motion to allow the
taking of Mary Jane's testimony by deposition through written interrogatories.
The Court agrees.
First, Sec. 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
requiring prosecution witnesses who are either sick or infirm or has left the
Philippines without any date of return, to deliver their testimony in open court
cannot be applied to the private complainant, because her situation as a death
row convict in a foreign country incapacitates her from making decisions, on
her own, to take the witness stand. Such decision to testify and the manner by
which her testimony is to be given depends on the Indonesian authorities
before whom she was sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death;
Second, considering the inapplicability of Sec. 15, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court found it appropriate to apply
in a suppletory manner, Sec. 23 of the Revised Rules of Court for the taking
of the private complainant's deposition upon written interrogatories. Sec. 1,
Rule 23 of the Revised Rules of Court specifically provides that the deposition
of a person confined in prison may be taken only by leave of court upon such
terms as the court prescribes;
Third, in the case of People of the Philippines v. Hubert Jeffrey Webb
x x x, the Supreme Court categorically declared that "due process is not a
monopoly of the defense. The State is entitled to due process as much as the
accused." To deny the motion of the Prosecution would result in a highly
inequitable situation where the sole witness relied upon by the Prosecution to
establish their case would be denied the opportunity to present her case due to
procedural technicalities which are beyond her control;
Fourth, the deposition sought by the Prosecution is specifically aimed
at perpetuating the testimony of the private complainant, thus said deposition
may be allowed at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal pursuant
to Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court in the separate opinion of former
Chief Justice Hilario Davide in the previously cited case of People vs. Webb,
be affirmed that depositions may be allowed in criminal cases and may be
taken at any time after the commencement of the action whenever necessary
or convenient, x x x;
xxx xxx xxx
Fifth, the offense involved in this case, i.e., qualified human
trafficking, is a major transnational crime committed across continents. Unlike
the previously cited cases of Cuenco and Go where the offenses involved are
non-index crimes (i.e., estafa and other deceits), the subject suit involves a
major transnational crime that cuts across borders and is a principal policy
concern among nations. Thus, the Court believes that the Prosecution should
not be denied the opportunity to prove its case, thus assuring the global
community that the Philippines is committed to fight such modern day
menace[.] 24
Indubitably, there was absence of any proof that the grant of the taking of
deposition through written interrogatories by the trial court was made in an arbitrary,
whimsical, and capricious manner. There was no patent abuse of discretion which was
so gross in nature thereby amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. 25
What was only apparent in the instant case was that the trial court properly considered
the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the plight of Mary Jane, in relation to
applicable rules and jurisprudence. Suffice it to state that the Decision of the trial
court was not without rhyme or reason. Clearly, there was an honest effort on the part
of the trial court to support its ratiocination and conclusion based on facts and law. EcTCAD
On Substantive Matters
The OSG asserts that the presence of extraordinary circumstances, i.e., Mary
Jane's conviction by final judgment and her detention in a prison facility in
Yogyakarta, Indonesia, while awaiting execution by firing squad; the grant by the
Indonesian President of an indefinite reprieve in view of the ongoing legal
proceedings against Cristina and Julius in the Philippines; and the conditions attached
to the reprieve particularly that Mary Jane should remain in confinement in Indonesia,
and any question propounded to her must only be in writing, are more than enough
grounds to have allowed the suppletory application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court.
The OSG's contentions are meritorious.
The Court cannot subscribe to the pronouncement by the appellate court that
the State failed to show compelling reasons to justify the relaxation of the Rules and
the suppletory application of Rule 23. The Court also cannot agree to its declaration
that the constitutional rights of Cristina and Julius to confront a witness will be
violated since safeguards were set in place by the trial court precisely to protect and
preserve their rights.
In its assailed Decision, the appellate court held that the deposition of Mary
Jane's testimony through written interrogatories in Indonesia is not sanctioned by
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and that the
pronouncements of the Court in Go v. People 27 and Cuenco vda. De Manguerra v.
Risos 28 that Section 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure should not be given any
suppletory application. It held that "just like a witness who is sick or infirm, Mary
Jane's imprisonment in Indonesia presents a limitation on her mobility." 29 According
to the Court of Appeals, Section 15, Rule 119 which applies to the taking of
depositions of prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, Mary Jane's deposition must
be taken before the court where the case is pending. In other words, the appellate
court opines that Mary Jane's testimony must be taken before the trial court, where the
cases of respondents are being heard, and not in Indonesia.
The Court begs to differ. HSAcaE
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, reads:
Section 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. — When it
satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm
to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the
Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be
conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such
examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable
notice to attend the examination has been served on him, shall be conducted in
the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the
accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver.
The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.
(Emphasis Ours.)
Under the foregoing provision, in order for the testimony of the prosecution
witness be taken before the court where the case is being heard, it must be shown that
the said prosecution witness is either: (a) too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as
directed by the order of the court, or; (b) has to leave the Philippines with no definite
date of returning.
Surely, the case of Mary Jane does not fall under either category. She is neither
too sick nor infirm to appear at the trial nor has to leave the Philippines indefinitely.
To recall, Mary Jane is currently imprisoned in Indonesia for having been convicted
by final judgment of the crime of drug trafficking, a grave offense in the said state. In
fact, she was already sentenced to death and is only awaiting her execution by firing
squad. Her situation is not akin to a person whose limitation of mobility is by reason
of ill-health or feeble age, the grounds cited in Section 15 of Rule 119. In fact, Mary
Jane's predicament does not in way pertain to a restriction in movement from one
place to another but a deprivation of liberty thru detention in a foreign country with
little or no hope of being saved from the extreme penalty of death by firing squad.
It thus necessarily follows that the cases of Go v. People and Cuenco vda. De
Manguera v. Risos are not on all fours with the present case. The circumstances of the
prosecution witnesses in the cases of Go and Cuenco demanded and justified the strict
adherence to Rule 119. The witnesses in both cases anchored their allowance to testify
by way of deposition on their claims that they were too sick or infirm to testify before
the court. In the case of Go, Li Luen Pen who returned to Cambodia claimed that he
was undergoing treatment for lung infection and could not travel back to the
Philippines due to his illness.
Similarly, in the case of Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco Vda. de Manguerra
averred that she would not be able to testify before the trial court due to weak physical
condition and age. Note, however, that despite the limitation in the mobility of Li
Luen Pen and Concepcion, they can still undoubted voluntarily take the witness stand
and testify before the trial court should they get better or so decide.
This is not the same in the case of Mary Jane. She cannot even take a single
step out of the prison facility of her own volition without facing severe consequences.
Her imprisonment in Indonesia and the conditions attached to her reprieve denied her
of any opportunity to decide for herself to voluntarily appear and testify before the
trial court in Nueva Ecija where the cases of the respondents were pending.
Unfortunately, in denying the State's motion for deposition through written
interrogatories and effectively requiring the presence of Mary Jane before the RTC of
Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, the Court of Appeals appeared to have strictly and rigidly
applied and interpreted Section 15, Rule 119 without taking into consideration the
concomitant right to due process of Mary Jane and the State as well as the prejudice
that will be caused to Mary Jane or the People with its pronouncement. Considering
the circumstances of Mary Jane, the Court of Appeals demanded for the impossible to
happen and thus impaired the substantial rights of Mary Jane and the State. It was
akin to a denial of due process on the part of Mary Jane as well as of the State to
establish its case against the respondents. The peculiar circumstances obtaining in the
present case made it impossible for Mary Jane to appear before the RTC of Sto.
Domingo, Nueva Ecija. Just like when Mary Jane was recruited by the respondents
and taken advantage of because of her poor condition, the same scenario is being
repeated because the respondents are again taking advantage of Mary Jane's dire
circumstances which they themselves put her in, by depriving her the opportunity to
speak and obtain justice for herself. The Court of Appeals did not take into account
the fact that the case of the prosecution against Cristina and Julius can only be erected
through the testimony of Mary Jane herself.
Moreover, by denying the prosecution's motion to take deposition by written
interrogatories, the appellate court in effect silenced Mary Jane and denied her and the
People of their right to due process by presenting their case against the said accused.
By its belief that it was rendering justice to the respondents, it totally forgot that it in
effect impaired the rights of Mary Jane as well as the People. By not allowing Mary
Jane to testify through written interrogatories, the Court of Appeals deprived her of
the opportunity to prove her innocence before the Indonesian authorities and for the
Philippine Government the chance to comply with the conditions set for the grant of
reprieve to Mary Jane. HESIcT
It is well to remind the Court of Appeals at this point that as held in Secretary
of Justice v. Lantion, 30 "[t]he due process clauses in the American and Philippine
Constitutions are not only worded in exactly identical language and terminology, but
more importantly, they are alike in what their respective Supreme Courts have
expounded as the spirit with which the provisions are informed and impressed, the
elasticity in their interpretation, their dynamic and resilient character which make
them capable of meeting every modern problem, and their having been designed from
earliest time to the present to meet the exigencies of an undefined and expanding
future. The requirements of due process are interpreted in both the United States and
the Philippines as not denying to the law the capacity for progress and improvement.
Toward this effect and in order to avoid the confines of a legal straitjacket, the courts
instead prefer to have the meaning of the due process clause 'gradually ascertained by
the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decisions of cases as they
arise' (Twining vs. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78). Capsulized, it refers to 'the embodiment
of the sporting idea of fair play' (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Owner's Association
vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 [1967]). It relates to certain immutable
principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government (Holden vs.
Hardy, 169 U.S. 366)." Thus, it behooved upon the Court of Appeals to have provided
some leeway in its interpretation of the subject provision.
At this juncture, we find the discussion on the matter by Justice Florenz D.
Regalado instructive and relevant, viz.: 31
1. Rules 23 to 28 provide for the different modes of discovery that may
be resorted to by a party to an action, viz.:
a. Depositions pending action (Rule 23);
b. Depositions before action or pending appeal (Rule 24);
c. Interrogatories to parties (Rule 25);
d. Admission by adverse party (Rule 26);
e. Production or inspection of documents or things (Rule 27); and
f. Physical and mental examination of persons (Rule 28);
Rule 29 provides for the legal consequences for the refusal of a party
to comply with such modes of discovery lawfully resorted to by the adverse
party.
2. In criminal cases, the taking of the deposition of witnesses for the
prosecution was formerly authorized by Sec. 7, Rule 119 for the purpose of
perpetuating the evidence to be presented at the trial, without a similar
provision for defense witnesses. However, in the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, only the conditional examination, and not a deposition, of
prosecution witnesses was permitted (Sec. 7, Rule 119) and this was followed
in the latest revision (Sec. 15, Rule 119).
3. Depositions are classified into:
a. Depositions on oral examination and depositions upon written
interrogatories; or
b. Depositions de bene esse and depositions in perpetuam rei
memoriam.
Depositions de bene esse are those taken for purposes of a pending
action and are regulated by Rule 23, while depositions in perpetuam rei
memoriam are those taken to perpetuate evidence for purposes of an
anticipated action or further proceedings in a case on appeal and are now
regulated by Rule 24.
4. The court may determine whether the deposition should be taken
upon oral examination or written interrogatories to prevent abuse or
harassment (De los Reyes vs. CA, et al., L-27263, Mar. 17, 1975).
There are several instances wherein the Court has relaxed procedural rules to
serve substantial justice because of any of the following reasons: (a) matters of life,
liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances,
(c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence
of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) n the other party will not be
unjustly prejudiced thereby. 34
Nonetheless, the Court always reminds party litigants that bare invocation of
"the interest of substantial justice" is not a magic phrase that will automatically oblige
the Court to suspend procedural rules. To stress, "[p]rocedural rules are not to be
belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have prejudiced a
party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only
for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an
injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying
with the procedure prescribed." 35
The 2004 Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, also known
as the ASEAN Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, was entered into by the Southeast
Asian countries namely: Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, Republic of
Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Union of Myanmar,
Republic of the Philippines, Republic of Singapore, Kingdom of Thailand, and the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The Treaty aims to improve the effectiveness of the
law enforcement authorities of the state parties in the prevention, investigation and
prosecution of offenses through cooperation and mutual legal assistance in criminal
matters.
Article 1, paragraph 2 (a) of the Treaty states that mutual legal assistance can
be rendered by the state parties in case of taking evidence or obtaining voluntary
statements from persons, among others. The legal assistance sought by the
Requesting Party from the Requested Party is not without limitations. In fact, Article
3 of the ASEAN MLAT has laid down guidelines on limitations on assistance. In
particular, paragraph 7 of the said Article states that the Requested Party can render
legal assistance subject to certain conditions which the Requested Party must observe.
To recall, the Indonesia Government imposed the following conditions in
taking the testimony of Mary Jane:
a) Mary Jane shall remain in detention in Yogyakarta, Indonesia;
b) No cameras shall be allowed;
c) The lawyers of the parties shall not be present;
d) The questions to be propounded to Mary Jane shall be in writing.
Interestingly, nowhere in the present Rules on Criminal Procedure does it state
how a deposition, of a prosecution witness who is at the same time convicted of a
grave offense by final judgment and imprisoned in a foreign jurisdiction, may be
taken to perpetuate the testimony of such witness. The Rules, in particular, are silent
as to how to take a testimony of a witness who is unable to testify in open court
because he is imprisoned in another country.
Depositions, however, are recognized under Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure. Although the rule on deposition by written interrogatories is inscribed
under the said Rule, the Court holds that it may be applied suppletorily in criminal
proceedings so long as there is compelling reason.
In a catena of cases, the Supreme Court had relaxed the procedural rules by
applying suppletorily certain provisions of the Rules on Civil Procedure in criminal
proceedings. TCAScE
For one, in Canos v. Peralta, 36 the Supreme Court held that the trial court
judge did not abuse his discretion when it ordered the consolidation and joint trial of
the criminal cases that were filed against petitioner Adela J. Canos. It reasoned,
among others, that consolidation of cases is authorized under Section 1, Rule 31 of the
Rules on Civil Procedure.
The same rule was applied in Naguiat v. Intermediate Appellate Court 37 and
Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals 38 wherein the Supreme Court upheld the
consolidation of the criminal case and civil case that were respectively filed against
the petitioners therein.
On that score, the Court finds no reason to depart from its practice to liberally
construe procedural rules for the orderly administration of substantial justice.
The conditions with respect to the taking of the testimony of Mary Jane that
were laid down by the Indonesian Government support the allowance of written
interrogatories under Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, the pertinent provisions of which
read:
Section 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken. — By
leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over
property which is the subject of the action, or without such leave after an
answer has been served, the testimony of any person, whether a party or not,
may be taken, at the instance of any party, by deposition upon oral
examination or written interrogatories. The attendance of witnesses may be
compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in Rule 21. Depositions shall
be taken only in accordance with these Rules. The deposition of a person
confined in prison may be taken only by leave of court on such terms as the
court prescribes.
Section 11. Persons before whom depositions may be taken in foreign
countries. — In a foreign state or country, depositions may be taken (a) on
notice before a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-
consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines; (b) before such
person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters
rogatory; or (c) the person referred to in section 14 hereof.
Section 25. Deposition upon written interrogatories; service of notice
and of interrogatories. — A party desiring to take the deposition of any
person upon written interrogatories shall serve them upon every other party
with a notice stating the name and address of the person who is to answer
them and the name or descriptive title and address of the officer before whom
the deposition is to be taken. Within ten (10) days thereafter, a party so served
may serve cross-interrogatories upon the party proposing to take the
deposition. Within five (5) days thereafter, the latter may serve re-direct
interrogatories upon a party who has served cross-interrogatories. Within three
(3) days after being served with re-direct interrogatories, a party may serve
recross-interrogatories upon the party proposing to take the deposition.
A strict application of the procedural rules will defeat the very purpose for the
grant of reprieve by the Indonesian authorities to Mary Jane. Mary Jane's testimony,
being the victim, is vital in the prosecution of the pending criminal cases that were
filed against Cristina and Julius. This has been recognized by no less than the
Indonesian President, His Excellency Joko Widodo, who granted the reprieve
precisely to afford Mary Jane the opportunity to participate in the legal proceedings
obtaining in the Philippines. cTDaEH
The fundamental rights of both the accused and the State must be equally
upheld and protected so that justice can prevail in the truest sense of the word. To do
justice to accused and injustice to the State is no justice at all. Justice must be
dispensed to all the parties alike. 40 As aptly held in Dimatulac v. Villon: 41
The judge, on the other hand, "should always be imbued with a high
sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly
and properly administer justice." He must view himself as a priest, for the
administration of justice is akin to a religious crusade. Thus, exerting the same
devotion as a priest "in the performance of the most sacred ceremonies of
religious liturgy," the judge must render service with impartiality
commensurate with the public trust and confidence reposed in him. Although
the determination of a criminal case before a judge lies within his exclusive
jurisdiction and competence, his discretion is not unfettered, but rather must
be exercised within reasonable confines. The judge's action must not impair
the substantial rights of the accused, nor the right of the State and
offended party to due process of law.
Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not
to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of society and the
offended parties which have been wronged must be equally considered.
Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice, and an
acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice; for, to the society offended
and the party wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice then must be
rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and the State and
offended party, on the other. (Emphasis Supplied.)
SO ORDERED.
Peralta, Leonen and A.B. Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Inting, J., is on official leave.
||| (People v. Sergio, G.R. No. 240053, [October 9, 2019])
SECOND DIVISION
AZCUNA, J : p
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court purportedly
raising a question of law and assailing the orders dated February 6, 2002 1 and March
7, 2002 2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, of Oroquieta City (the RTC) in
Criminal Case Nos. 798-14-235 and 800-14-237.
The facts appear as follows:
Two informations, one for homicide and one for frustrated homicide, were
filed with the RTC against respondents SPO1 Mario Marcial, SPO1 Monico
Bolotano, SPO1 Anastacio Maglinte, SPO1 Alfredo Nuñez, SPO1 Rudy Bunalos and
PO3 Tomas Duhaylunsod, all members of the Philippine National Police, in
connection with a shooting incident that occurred on December 18, 1999. As a result
of the incident, one Junnyver Dagle died while one Wendell Sales was seriously
injured.
The information for homicide against the respondents reads as follows:
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On the other hand, the information for frustrated homicide reads as follows:
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(1) The identity of all respondents and their affiliation with the PNP-
Lopez Jaena Police Station; HSTAcI
(2) In the evening of December 18, 1999, all respondents were members
of the PNP Team that responded to an alleged or reported call for police
assistance at, and received by, the Lopez Jaena Police Station, coming from an
alleged caller;
(6) As a result of the shooting, Junnyver Dagle and Wendell Sales were
hit and injured, the nature of their injuries being described in their respective
Medico-legal Certificates dated December 27, 1999 issued by Dr. Olyzar H.
Recamadas, the attending physician, and attested to by Provincial Health
Officer II Jose M. Salomon, Sr. of the Misamis Occidental Provincial Hospital,
Oroquieta City as follows:
a. Junnyver Dagle:
"DOA"
Gunshoot wound left temporal area
Avulsion left leg
b. Wendell Sales:
"Avulsion left leg distal 3rd secondary to alleged
gunshot wound"
(9) For the death of Junnyver Dagle, his heirs are entitled to a civil
indemnity in the sum of P50,000;
(10) In relation to the December 18, 1999 incident subject of the present
criminal cases, there was a criminal case for robbery filed against Wendell Sales
by the Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Misamis Occidental before RTC,
Branch 14, of Oroquieta City entitled "People v. Wendell Sales" docketed as
Criminal Case No. 729-14-167. A judgment was subsequently rendered in the
latter case convicting Wendell Sales of the crime charged but this judgment was
appealed to the Court of Appeals where it remains pending to date.
(2) Whether there were warning shots made by respondents, directed in the air,
to cause the motorcycle riders to stop;
(3) Whether Junnyver Dagle or Wendell Sales tried to pull out a short firearm
and (whether Dagle or Sales) fired it at respondents, causing some of
them to fire back;
(4) Assuming a firearm was pulled out, whether it was Junnyver Dagle who
pulled out such gun and aimed and fired it at the direction of
respondents;
(5) Whether there was found near the person of the fallen Junnyver Dagle a .45
caliber pistol without a serial number;
(6) Whether the parents of the late Junnyver Dagle incurred burial and
transportation expenses by reason of the latter's untimely demise;
(7) Whether Wendell Sales incurred medical expenses by reason of his
hospitalization for the injuries he sustained; and,
(8) Whether the parents of the late Junnyver Dagle and private complainant
Wendell Sales are entitled to moral damages.
During the hearing held on February 6, 2002, petitioner made an oral motion to
reverse the order of the trial upon the ground that respondents admitted committing
the acts for which they were charged in the two informations but interposed lawful
justifying circumstances. The motion was denied by the RTC for lack of merit in the
assailed order dated February 6, 2002. Its motion for reconsideration having been
similarly denied, petitioner filed the present petition.
The issues are:
(e) When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or
information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be
modified.
If the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, he/she shall state
whether he/she interposes a negative or affirmative defense. A negative
defense shall require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt while an affirmative defense may modify the
order of trial and require the accused to prove such defense by clear and
convincing evidence.
If the accused has pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, he may state
whether he interposes a negative or affirmative defense. A negative
defense shall require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused
beyong reasonable doubt, while an affirmative defense may modify the
order of trial and require the accused to prove such defense by clear and
convincing evidence.
Thirdly, the reversal or modification of the order of trial in the present case
would promote the intent and objectives of the Speedy Trial Act, preserve the rights
of the parties, and prevent a confusing and disorderly trial.
The assailed orders of the RTC denied the request of the prosecution for a
reverse order of trial basically on the grounds that:
2. A reverse order of trial in these cases would only serve to delay rather
than speed up the proceedings; and,
3. The course of the trial is better governed by the usual order under
Section 11, Rule 119, of the Revised Rules of Court and the sequence set forth
in the pre-trial order, agreed upon by the parties, which did not include an
agreement to a reverse the order of trial.
After considering the arguments of both parties herein, the Court finds that the
RTC did not commit any reversible error in denying the request for a reverse order of
trial, a matter which under the rules is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court. In fact, the rule relied upon by petitioner clearly reflects this discretionary
nature of the procedure, thus:
If the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, he/she shall state
whether he/she interposes a negative or affirmative defense. A negative defense
shall require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt while an affirmative defense may modify the order of trial and require
the accused to prove such defense by clear and convincing evidence. (Emphasis
supplied.)
If the accused has pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, he may state
whether he interposes a negative or affirmative defense. A negative defense
shall require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyong reasonable
doubt, while an affirmative defense may modify the order of trial and require
the accused to prove such defense by clear and convincing evidence. (Emphasis
supplied.)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 209195. September 17, 2014.]
DECISION
BRION, J : p
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the amended decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 121167 entitled Manuel J. Jimenez, Jr. v. Hon. Zaldy
B. Docena, et al.
The CA did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC Branch 170, Malabon) Judge Zaldy B. Docena (Judge Docena) in issuing the
order which granted the People of the Philippines' motion to discharge Manuel A.
Montero (Montero) as a state witness in Criminal Case No. 39225-MN.
The G.R. No. 209195 petition was filed by Manuel J. Jimenez, Jr. (Jimenez). He
prays in this petition for the reversal of the CA's amended decision insofar as it ruled that
Judge Docena did not gravely abuse his discretion in issuing the assailed order.
The People likewise filed its petition, docketed as G.R. No. 209215. This petition
seeks to reverse the amended decision of the CA insofar as it ordered the re-raffle of the
criminal case to another RTC judge for trial on the merits.
On May 18, 2009 and June 11, 2009, Montero (a former employee of the BSJ
Company owned by the Jimenezes) executed sworn statements confessing his
participation in the killing of Ruby Rose Barrameda (Ruby Rose), and naming petitioner
Jimenez, Lope Jimenez (Lope, the petitioner Jimenez's younger brother), Lennard A.
Descalso (Lennard) alias "Spyke," Robert Ponce (Robert) alias "Obet," and Eric
Fernandez (Eric), as his co-conspirators. 2
The statements of Montero which provided the details on where the alleged steel
casing containing the body of Ruby Rose was dumped, led to the recovery of a cadaver,
encased in a drum and steel casing, near or practically at the place that Montero pointed
to. 3
On August 20, 2009, the People, through the state prosecutors, filed an
Information before the RTC, charging Jimenez, Lope, Lennard, Robert, Eric and Montero
of murder for the killing of Ruby Rose. 4
Montero thereafter filed a motion for his discharge entitled "Motion for the
Discharge of the Witness as Accused Pursuant to the Witness Protection Program"
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6981. The People also filed a motion to discharge Montero
as a state witness for the prosecution. Jimenez opposed both motions. 5 ITDHSE
On March 19, 2010, the RTC's Acting Presiding Judge Hector B. Almeyda (Judge
Almeyda) denied the motion to discharge Montero as a state witness. 6
Judge Almeyda ruled that the prosecution failed to comply with the requirements
of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure for the discharge of
an accused as a state witness; it failed to clearly show that Montero was not the most
guilty or, at best, the least guilty among the accused. The judge further ruled that
Montero's statements were not corroborated by the other evidence on record. The
prosecution, too, failed to present evidence to sustain the possibility of conviction against
Jimenez. 7
On July 30, 2010, Judge Docena, the newly-appointed regular judge, reconsidered
and reversed Judge Almeyda's order and ruled that the prosecution had presented clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence showing compliance with the requisites of Section
17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
According to Judge Docena, the crime would have remained undiscovered and
unsolved had it not been for Montero's extrajudicial confession that narrated in detail the
manner of the abduction and subsequent murder of Ruby Rose. As the crime was
committed in secret, only one of the co-conspirators, such as Montero, could give direct
evidence identifying the other coconspirators.
Judge Docena further ruled that Montero is qualified to be discharged as a state
witness as he does not appear to be the most guilty although he is a principal by direct
participation. The principals by inducement are more guilty because, without their orders,
the crime would not have been committed. Finally, Montero has not been convicted of
any crime involving moral turpitude.
During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, Jimenez filed a motion for
inhibition, praying that Judge Docena inhibit himself from hearing the case on the ground
of bias and prejudice. Judge Docena denied the motion in his order of December 29,
2010. 9
On June 29, 2011, Judge Docena issued an omnibus order: 1) denying the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the July 30, 2010 order; 2) denying the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the December 29, 2010 order; and 3) granting
Manuel Jimenez III's alternative motion to suspend the proceedings, as his inclusion in
the Information was still pending final determination by the Office of the President.
Jimenez responded to these adverse rulings by filing with the CA a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The petition sought the annulment of
Judge Docena's orders dated July 30, 2010, December 29, 2010, and June 29, 2011. The
petition also prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction that the CA both granted in its resolutions of December 8, 2011
and February 6, 2012, respectively. 10
On May 22, 2012, the CA's then Tenth Division, through the ponencia of
Associate Justice Agnes Reyes-Carpio (concurred in by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes,
Jr. and Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla) rendered a decision granting
Jimenez' petition. 11
However, on motion for reconsideration filed by the People, the CA reversed its
earlier ruling and issued an Amended Decision penned by Associate Justice Jose Reyes.
The CA held that Judge Docena did not gravely abuse his discretion in ordering
Montero's discharge to become a state witness because the prosecution had complied with
the requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. 12
SIaHDA
First, Judge Docena acted in accordance with settled jurisprudence when he ruled
that there was absolute necessity for the testimony of Montero as no other direct evidence
other than his testimony was available. Additionally, since the determination of the
requirements under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is
highly factual in nature, Judge Docena did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
largely relying on the recommendation of the prosecution to discharge Montero as a state
witness. 13
Furthermore, the CA agreed with Judge Docena that Montero is not the most
guilty among the accused because the principals by inducement are more guilty than the
principals by direct participation. To the CA, this finding is highly factual in nature and it
would not interfere with the trial court's exercise of discretion on factual issues in the
absence of showing that the court had acted with grave abuse of discretion. 14
On Judge Docena's 'no inhibition' order, the CA held that while the case does not
call for mandatory inhibition, it should still be raffled to another sala for trial on the
merits to avoid any claim of bias and prejudice. 15
The CA likewise dismissed the motion for the issuance of a show cause order
which Jimenez filed against Judge Docena. 16
Both Jimenez and the People moved for partial reconsideration of the CA's order
but these motions were all denied. 17 The denials prompted both parties to file with this
Court the present consolidated petitions for review on certiorari.
Second, contrary to the CA's ruling, the judge, and not the prosecution, has the
ultimate discretion in ensuring that the requirements under Section 17, Rule 119 are
complied with. 19
Third, the cases the CA cited are factually different from the present case. Chua v.
CA 20 should not apply as it deals with two accused, one of whom was ordered
discharged. 21
These inconsistencies include: Montero's statement that a "busal " was placed
inside the mouth of Ruby Rose; this statement is belied by the other prosecution witness;
Montero also never mentioned the presence of a packaging tape wrapped around the head
and neck of the recovered cadaver; in Montero's sinumpaang salaysay, he stated that
Ruby Rose was killed by strangulation using a "lubid" but the death certificate stated
asphyxia by suffocation and not by strangulation; the identification of the cadaver as
Ruby Rose is likewise questionable as there are differences in the height, and the dental
and odontological reports of Ruby Rose and the recovered cadaver.
Fifth, Montero appears to be the most guilty. He was the architect who designed
and actively participated in all phases of the alleged crime. 23
Jimenez further argued that there is no authority supporting the ruling that the
principals by inducement are more guilty than the principal by direct participation. On the
contrary, the Revised Penal Code imputes on the principal by direct participation the
heavier guilt; without the latter's execution of the crime, the principal by inducement
cannot be made liable. Even if the principal by inducement is acquitted, the principal by
direct participation can still be held liable and not vice-versa. 24
Sixth, the discharge of Montero was irregular because Judge Docena failed to
conduct a prior hearing. 25
The People argued that Jimenez is now estopped from raising the lack of hearing
as an issue since he raised this issue only after Judge Docena granted the motion to
discharge and not after Judge Almeyda denied the motion — an action that was favorable
to him. 27
It also argued that Jimenez actively participated in the proceedings for Montero's
discharge as the trial court received evidence for and against the discharge. In this light,
Judge Docena's order granting or denying the motion for discharge is in order,
notwithstanding the lack of actual hearing. 28
The People also agreed with the CA's amended ruling that the requirements for the
discharge of an accused as a state witness were complied with. 29 It added that the
availability of the extrajudicial statements in the prosecution's possession is not a ground
to disqualify an accused from being a state witness. 30
For purposes of the present case, the material allegations of Montero on the
identity of the victim and the manner of her killing were substantially corroborated by the
presence of the recovered original steel casing, the drum containing a cadaver, the place
where it was found, and the cadaver's apparel. 32
The People observed that Montero had already testified on direct examination on
June 28, 2011 and October 25, 2011. He attested and affirmed his statements in his
affidavits dated May 18 and June 11, 2009; he narrated in his statements the murder of
Ruby Rose and Jimenez' participation. 33
Reply of Jimenez
Jimenez reiterated his allegations in the comment. He added that Montero did not
identify or authenticate his sworn statements in support of the motion for his discharge.
34
The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argue that the CA's order
to re-raffle the case to another sala is not supported by Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules
of Court, either under mandatory or voluntary inhibition. 36
To disqualify a judge from hearing a case, bias and prejudice must be proven, in
the manner being done in cases of voluntary inhibition. 37
Jurisprudence establishes, too, that affiliation does not necessarily translate to bias.
38 A judge's non-favorable action against the defense is not also necessarily indicative of
bias and prejudice. 39
Finally, the administrative case filed against Judge Docena is not a ground to
disqualify him from hearing the case. 40
Comment of Jimenez
The option for voluntary inhibition does not give judges unlimited discretion to
decide whether or not they will desist from hearing a case. Jimenez enumerated Judge
Docena's acts that allegedly constituted bias and prejudice:
First, Judge Docena granted the motion to discharge even though the legal
requirements under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
were not factually and legally proven. He also relied on the suggestions and information
of the prosecutors thereby surrendering his duty to ensure that the requirements for a
discharge are duly complied with.
Second, in a previous case where his fraternity brother appeared as counsel, Judge
Docena inhibited himself from hearing the case. Thus, no reason exists for him not to
similarly act in the present case where Jimenez is his fraternity brother and State
Prosecutor Villanueva was his classmate.
Third, Judge Docena granted the prosecution's motion for cancellation of the
September 29, 2011 hearing because the state prosecutor would be attending a legal
forum. This was improper since other prosecutors were available and other prosecution
witnesses could be presented. TaCEHA
The Issues
1) Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Judge Docena did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to
discharge Montero as a state witness; and
We agree with the CA's ruling that Judge Docena did not gravely abuse his
discretion when he granted the motion to discharge Montero as a state witness.
The well-settled rule is that a petition for certiorari against a court which has
jurisdiction over a case will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is clear and patent.
The burden is on the part of the petitioner to prove not merely reversible error, but grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public
respondent issuing the impugned order.
Notably, mere abuse of discretion is not enough; the abuse must be grave.
Jurisprudence has defined "grave abuse of discretion" as the capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility. 42
We agree with the CA that the prosecution has complied with the requisites under
Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that:
(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an offense;
(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its case;
No issues have been raised with respect to conditions (1), (2), (4), and 5 (e). The
parties dispute the compliance with conditions (3) and 5 (a) to (d) as the issues before us.
We shall discuss these issues separately below.
We do not agree with Jimenez that the Court's pronouncement in Chua v. CA, et
al. is inapplicable in the present case simply because more than two accused are involved
in the present case. The requirement of absolute necessity for the testimony of a state
witness depends on the circumstances of each case regardless of the number of the
participating conspirators.
In People v. Court of Appeals and Perez, et al., 44 the Court ordered the discharge
of the accused Roncesvalles, ruling that his testimony is absolutely necessary to prove
conspiracy with his other co-accused. The Court agreed with the Solicitor General that
considering the circumstances of the case and that the other accused could not be
compelled to testify, certain facts necessary for the conviction of the accused would not
come to light unless the accused Roncesvalles was allowed to testify for the State.
Specifically, unless accused Roncesvalles was allowed to testify for the government,
there would be no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense charged, particularly on the role of his co-accused in the preparation and
completion of the falsified loan application and its supporting papers.
Similarly in People v. Court of Appeals and Tan, 45 the Court reinstated the ruling
of the trial court which ordered the discharge of accused Ngo Sin from among the five
accused. The record justified his discharge as a state witness considering the absolute
necessity of his testimony to prove that the accused Luciano Tan had planned and
financed the theft.
In the present case, not one of the accused-conspirators, except Montero, was
willing to testify on the alleged murder of Ruby Rose and their participation in her
killing. Hence, the CA was correct in ruling that Judge Docena acted properly and in
accordance with jurisprudence in ruling that there was absolute necessity for the
testimony of Montero. He alone is available to provide direct evidence of the crime.
That the prosecution could use the voluntary statements of Montero without his
discharge as a state witness is not an important and relevant consideration. To the
prosecution belongs the control of its case and this Court cannot dictate on its choice in
the discharge of a state witness, save only when the legal requirements have not been
complied with.
The prosecution's right to prosecute gives it "a wide range of discretion — the
discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a
smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors." Under Section 17,
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court is given the power to
discharge a state witness only after it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and
the accused. 46
We also do not find merit in Jimenez' argument that Montero's testimony cannot
be substantially corroborated in its material points and is even contradicted by the
physical evidence of the crime.
As the trial court properly found, the evidence consisting of the steel casing where
the cadaver was found; the drum containing the cadaver which the prosecution
successfully identified (and which even the acting Judge Almeyda believed) to be Ruby
Rose; the spot in the sea that Montero pointed to (where the cadaver was retrieved); the
apparel worn by the victim when she was killed as well as her burned personal effects, all
partly corroborate some of the material points in the sworn statements of Montero. 47 ASICDH
With these as bases, Judge Docena's ruling that Montero's testimony found
substantial corroboration cannot be characterized as grave abuse of discretion.
However, the corroborated statements of Montero discussed above are far more
material than the inconsistencies pointed out by Jimenez, at least for purposes of the
motion to discharge.
The alleged discrepancies in the physical evidence, particularly on the height and
dental records of Ruby Rose, are matters that should properly be dealt with during the
trial proper.
We emphasize at this point that to resolve a motion to discharge under Section 17,
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Rules only require that that the
testimony of the accused sought to be discharged be substantially corroborated in its
material points, not on all points. CIaDTE
We also do not agree with Jimenez that the CA erred in finding that Montero is not
the most guilty.
What the rule avoids is the possibility that the most guilty would be set free while
his co-accused who are less guilty in terms of participation would be penalized. 50
To place the Chua ruling in proper perspective, the Court considered the principal
by inducement as the most guilty based on the specific acts done by the two accused
and bearing in mind the elements constitutive of the crime of falsification of private
documents where the element of "damage" arose through the principal by
inducement's encashment of the falsified check. This led the Court to declare that the
principal by inducement is the "most guilty" (or properly, the more guilty) between the
two accused.
We note that the severity of the penalty imposed is part of the substantive criminal
law which should not be equated with the procedural rule on the discharge of the
particeps criminis. The procedural remedy of the discharge of an accused is based on
other considerations, such as the need for giving immunity to one of several accused in
order that not all shall escape, and the judicial experience that the candid admission of an
accused regarding his participation is a guaranty that he will testify truthfully. 53
On the substantive issues of the present case, we affirm the CA ruling that no
grave abuse of discretion transpired when Judge Docena ruled that Montero is not the
most guilty.
We draw attention to the requirement that a state witness does not need to be
found to be the least guilty; he or she should not only "appear to be the most guilty."
54
In light of these considerations, we affirm the ruling of the CA that Judge Docena
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in ruling that Montero is not the most guilty. cCHETI
We agree with the People that Jimenez is estopped from raising the issue of lack
of hearing prior to the discharge of Montero as a state witness. Jimenez did not raise this
issue when Acting Judge Almeyda denied the motion to discharge. This denial, of course,
was favorable to Jimenez. If he found no reason to complain then, why should we
entertain his hearing-related complaint now?
The People even supported its argument that Jimenez actively participated in the
proceedings of the motion to discharge such as his filing of a 20-page opposition to the
motion; filing a reply to the People's comment; submitting his memorandum of
authorities on the qualification of Montero as state witness; and filing a consolidated
opposition on the People's and Montero's motion for reconsideration of Judge Almeyda's
order. 57
In these lights, Jimenez cannot impute grave abuse of discretion on Judge Docena
for not conducting a hearing prior to his grant of the motion to discharge. In People v. CA
and Pring, 58 the Court ruled that with both litigants able to present their sides, the lack
of actual hearing is not sufficiently fatal to undermine the court's ability to determine
whether the conditions prescribed for the discharge of an accused as a state witness have
been satisfied.
Contrary to Jimenez' argument, the Pring ruling is applicable in the present case.
In Pring, the sworn statements of the accused sought to be discharged (Nonilo Arile),
together with the prosecution's other evidence, were already in the possession of the court
and had been challenged by the respondent in his Opposition to Discharge Nonilo Arile
and in his Petition for Bail. The issue in that case was the propriety of the trial court's
resolution of the motion to discharge Nonilo Arile without conducting a hearing pursuant
Section 9, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (now Section 17, Rule 119
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure).
With Jimenez' active participation in the proceeding for the motion to discharge as
outlined above, the ruling of the Court in Pring should squarely apply.
It must be recalled that the present case involves an appellate review of the CA's
decision which found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Docena in
granting the motion to discharge.
Under the present recourse now before this Court, we cannot rule on the notice of
withdrawal and consider it in ruling on the absence or presence of grave abuse of
discretion in the issuance of the assailed orders. The present case is not the proper venue
for the determination of the value of the notice.
This conclusion is all the more strengthened by the fact that Montero already
testified on direct examination on June 28, 2011 and October 25, 2011. He attested and
affirmed his statements in his affidavits dated May 18 and June 11, 2009; he not only
narrated the grisly murder of Ruby Rose, but also revealed Jimenez' participation in the
murder.
With this development, the notice may partake of the nature of a recantation,
which is usually taken ex parte and is considered inferior to the testimony given in open
court. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a court of justice
simply because the witness who gave it later changed his/her mind. 59
In sum on this point, the appreciation of the notice of withdrawal properly belongs
to the trial court.
In the present case, the CA cited Quarto v. Marcelo 60 in ruling that the trial court
must rely in large part upon the suggestions and the information furnished by the
prosecuting officer, thus:
We deem it important to place this ruling in its proper context lest we create the
wrong impression that the trial court is a mere "rubber stamp" of the prosecution, in the
manner that Jimenez now argues.
In Quarto, we emphasized that it is still the trial court that determines whether the
prosecution's preliminary assessment of the accused-witness' qualifications to be a state
witness satisfies the procedural norms. This relationship is in reality a symbiotic one as
the trial court, by the very nature of its role in the administration of justice, largely
exercises its prerogative based on the prosecutor's findings and evaluation. 61
We likewise do not agree with Jimenez that Quarto should not apply to the present
case, since the principles laid down in that case similarly operate in the present case,
specifically, on issue of the procedural processes required in the discharge of the accused
as a state witness.
G.R. No. 209215
We note at the outset that the CA did not provide factual or legal support when it
ordered the inhibition of Judge Docena. Additionally, we do not find Jimenez' arguments
sufficiently persuasive.
The second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 does not give judges the unlimited
discretion to decide whether or not to desist from hearing a case. The inhibition must be
for just and valid causes. The mere imputation of bias or partiality is likewise not enough
ground for their inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. 63
In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and
prejudice, a judge's ruling not to inhibit oneself should be allowed to stand. 65
AacDHE
In attributing bias and prejudice to Judge Docena, Jimenez must prove that the
judge acted or conducted himself in a manner clearly indicative of arbitrariness or
prejudice so as to defeat the attributes of the cold neutrality that an impartial judge must
possess. Unjustified assumptions and mere misgivings that the judge acted with
prejudice, passion, pride and pettiness in the performance of his functions cannot
overcome the presumption that a judge shall decide on the merits of a case with an
unclouded vision of its facts. 66
In the present case, Jimenez' allegation of bias and prejudice is negated by the CA
finding in its amended decision, as affirmed by this Court, that Judge Docena did not
gravely abuse his discretion in granting the motion to discharge. We support this
conclusion as the cancellation of the September 29, 2011 hearing is not clearly indicative
of bias and prejudice.
We GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 209215 and modify the CA's amended
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 121167 in accordance with our ruling that Judge Docena's
denial of the motion for inhibition was proper.
SO ORDERED.
(Jimenez, Jr. v. People, G.R. Nos. 209195 & 209215, [September 17, 2014], 743 PHIL
|||
468-494)
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
BRION, J : p
The People of the Philippines (the People) filed this petition for certiorari 1 to
annul and set aside the Sandiganbayan's resolution 2 dated June 21, 2011, granting
Quintin B. Saludaga, Arthus E. Adriatico and Romeo De Luna's joint demurrer to
evidence 3 (demurrer) in Criminal Case No. 28261.
The Antecedents
On March 30, 2005, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman (Ombudsman) for
Visayas charged Mayor Quintin B. Saludaga (Mayor Saludaga) and Revenue
Collection Clerk Arthus E. Adriatico (Adriatico) of Lavezares, Northern Samar,
together with Romeo De Luna (De Luna), a private individual, for falsification of
public documents penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). 4
The accused (respondents) pleaded not guilty. 5
During the pre-trial, the parties submitted their joint stipulations, to wit:
JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS
1.1 That at the time material to this case, as alleged in the information, accused
Quintin Saludaga was a public officer being then a [sic] Municipal
Mayor of the Municipality of Lavezares, Northern Samar, and Arthus
Adriatico was then the Revenue Collection Clerk of the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer of the abovementioned municipality.
1.2 That accused Romeo de Luna entered into a Pakyaw Contract with the
Municipality of Lavezares, Northern Samar for the construction of 3
Units Shallow Well Hand pump on December 9, 1997 and the
construction of 3 units Jetmatic Shallow Well Hand pump on December
17, 1997.
1.3 That from the time the Pakyaw Contract was entered into by the
Municipality of Lavezares and accused Romeo de Luna and up to the
completion of said project in 1997, private complainant Armando F.
Chan was the Vice Mayor of the said Municipality.
The respondents filed a joint motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence on
December 2, 2008. The Sandiganbayan granted the said motion; thus, on May 15,
2006, the respondents filed the demurrer.
In praying for the dismissal of the criminal case for insufficiency of evidence,
the respondents argued that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy. Conspiracy,
the respondents asserted, cannot be presumed; it must be proved by positive and
conclusive evidence and shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the
commission of the offense itself.
The respondents further argued that even implied conspiracy was not proved
because, while conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence (for it may be
inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of
the crime), it still cannot be based on mere conjectures but must be established as fact.
Since conspiracy was not shown to exist, the respondents urged the
Sandiganbayan to evaluate the prosecution's evidence vis-à-vis their individual
participation in the crime alleged to have been committed. They denied their personal
liability as follows:
Mayor Saludaga's Defense 17
Mayor Saludaga maintained that the prosecution failed to prove he had a hand
in the preparation and issuance of the subject OR; nor did he personally make the
entries in the mayor's permit. He insisted that all that could be inferred from the face
of the mayor's permit was that he signed it. In the absence of evidence that he knew
the mayor's permit to be spurious, Mayor Saludaga claimed that he could not be held
guilty of knowingly making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.
To support this theory, Mayor Saludaga invoked the case of Magsuci v.
Sandiganbayan 18 which supposedly held that when the infraction consists in the
reliance in good faith, albeit misplaced, by a head of office on a subordinate upon
whom the primary responsibility rests, absent a clear case of conspiracy, the Arias
doctrine 19 must be upheld.
The Arias doctrine held that all heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable
extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase
supplies, or enter into negotiations. There has to be some added reason why the head
of office should examine each of the documents he is supposed to sign.
Adriatico's Defense 20
Adriatico argued that the prosecution failed to show that he signed or executed
the subject OR. He noted that even the prosecution's witness admitted that it was the
name of a certain A.L. Moncada, described in the subject OR as the Collecting
Officer, that appeared on the subject OR; and that neither Adriatico's nor any of his
co-respondents' names or signatures appeared thereon.
Adriatico also argued that assuming he executed the subject OR, the
prosecution failed to show that he willingly and knowingly made an untruthful
statement in the narration of facts; that the OR was dated August 27, 1997, and that it
was received by the municipality only in 1998, do not exclude each other. Adriatico
insisted that he did not necessarily make an untruthful statement of facts when he
antedated the subject OR there being the truth that the payment received was for a
past transaction.AaCTcI
De Luna's Defense 21
De Luna argued that the prosecution failed to prove he was not a bona fide
pakyaw contractor. He alleged that the falsified documents neither affirmed nor
contradicted his legal status as a bona fide pakyaw contractor. He reasoned that with
or without the subject OR and the mayor's permit, he was either a bona fide pakyaw
contractor or not.
Moreover, De Luna emphasized that he did not sign nor execute the subject
OR and the mayor's permit and that any alleged falsification could not be attributed to
him for failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy.
The Sandiganbayan Ruling 22
The Sandiganbayan granted the demurrer. It held that in criminal prosecutions
for offenses under the RPC, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that
the accused had criminal intent to commit the offense charged. 23
In this regard, the prosecution failed to prove some of the elements of
falsification of documents under Article 171 (4) of the RPC, namely: (1) the offender
is a public officer, employee, or notary public; (2) the offender takes advantage of his
official position; and (3) the offender falsifies a document by making untruthful
statements in a narration of facts. In particular, the Sandiganbayan found that the
prosecution failed to prove the second and third elements. The graft court resolved to
grant the demurrer as follows:
First, the Sandiganbayan was not persuaded by the prosecutions' evidence that
Mayor Saludaga had a hand in the preparation and issuance of the subject OR. Thus,
he could not have taken advantage of his position as Mayor and knowingly made
untruthful narration of facts.
Second, the Sandiganbayan is unconvinced that the subject OR was falsified
despite Adriatico's admission that he antedated it upon De Luna's request. It held that
although Adriatico prepared and issued the subject OR, he did not make untruthful
statements in a narration of facts; because the statements were not altogether false
since there was some recognizable truth in these.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan took the view that Adriatico did not necessarily make
an untruthful statement as to the date since it was a fact that the payment received was
for a previous transaction.
The Sandiganbayan also found that Adriatico acted in good faith when he
issued the subject OR for the payment of a past transaction in his belief that the
municipality would derive additional revenue therefrom.
Finally, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution failed to prove that De
Luna was not a bona fide pakyaw contractor from August 27 to December 30, 1997,
or during the time the questioned pakyaw contracts were awarded. The graft court
gave no weight to the prosecution's evidence, i.e., the Time Book and Payroll
covering the period September 15 to September 30, 1997, which purportedly proved
that De Luna was a hired municipal laborer and not a pakyaw contractor.
The dispositive portion of the Sandiganbayan resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the Joint Demurrer to Evidence filed by the accused,
Saludaga, Adriatico and De Luna, is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly,
Criminal Case No. 28261 is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
The Petition
The People impute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it granted the demurrer. The
People disagree that the prosecution failed to establish the respondents' guilt with
moral certainty. Specifically, the People refute the Sandiganbayan's conclusion that
the prosecution failed to prove certain elements of the falsification charged.
With respect to the element that the offenders must have taken advantage of
their official position, the People emphasized Adriatico's own admission 24 that he
antedated the subject OR upon De Luna's request, a fact that the latter confirmed. 25
Such act, according to the People, already constitutes falsification of a public
document and thereby untruthful.
The People cite the case of Relucio v. Civil Service Commission, 26 which laid
down the elements of falsification of public documents, to wit: (i) the offender makes
in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (ii) the offender has a legal
obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (iii) the facts narrated by the
offender are absolutely false; and (iv) the perversions of truth in the narration of facts
was made with the wrongful intent to injure a third person.
As regards the element that the offender must have falsified a document by
making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, the People dispute the
Sandiganbayan's reasoning that the narration of facts be absolutely false to constitute
falsification.
The People argue that the Sandiganbayan erred when it held that there can be
no conviction of falsification of public document if the acts of the accused are
consistent with good faith. 27 Good faith does not apply in this case because Adriatico
was not confronted with a difficult question of law and he should have known better
that it was illegal to issue an antedated receipt.
Further, the People posit that Mayor Saludaga cannot invoke the Arias
doctrine, maintaining that Mayor Saludaga may be deemed a knowing participant in
the conspiracy when he affixed his signature despite the patent irregularities thereon.
28
In fine, the People insist that Mayor Saludaga and Adriatico took advantage of
their positions in falsifying the subject OR and mayor's permit; that the falsifications
were intended to evade their prosecution under the Anti-Corrupt and Practices Act;
and that the respondents' acts were so concerted it may be inferred that Mayor
Saludaga, together with his subordinates Adriatico and dummy De Luna, conspired to
commit the crime. EcTCAD
DECISION
SERENO, C.J : p
Before this Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to
reverse the following Orders in Criminal Case No. Q-07-146628 issued by public
respondent Judge Rafael R. Lagos (Judge Lagos), presiding judge of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 79:
At 11:00 p.m. of the same day, Estacio alighted from a Toyota Vios car at the
Jollibee branch located at the corner of Commonwealth Avenue and Tandang Sora. PO2
Frando, accompanied by the CI, approached Estacio. After PO2 Frando was introduced to
Estacio as the prospective buyer, the latter demanded to see the payment. However, PO2
Frando asked him to first show the ecstasy pills. 7 Estacio then opened the doors of the
vehicle and introduced his two companions, Carlo and Jonathan (later identified as herein
respondents Jonathan Dy and Carlo Castro), to PO2 Frando and the CI. Respondent
Castro handed PO2 Frando one sealed plastic sachet containing several pink pills. The
latter gave the "boodle" money to respondent Dy and immediately removed his baseball
cap. The removal of the cap was the prearranged signal to the rest of the buy-bust team
that the transaction was complete. 8
An Information dated 3 April 2007 was filed against respondents for the sale of
dangerous drugs, in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165.
The case was raffled to the sala of Judge Fernando Sagum, Jr. of the Quezon City RTC.
Upon arraignment, respondents pleaded not guilty to the charges. Trial ensued, and the
prosecution presented its evidence, including the testimonies of four witnesses: PO2
Marlo V. Frando, PO2 Ruel P. Cubian, Police Senior Inspector Yelah C. Manaog, and
PO3 Jose Rey Serrona. After the prosecution submitted its Formal Offer of Evidence on
17 November 2007, respondents filed a Motion for leave of court to file their demurrer,
as well as a Motion to resolve their Petition for Bail. On 2 January 2008, Judge Sagum
issued a Resolution denying both the Petition for Bail and the Motion for leave of court to
file a demurrer. Respondent Estacio then sought the inhibition of Judge Sagum, a move
subsequently adopted by respondents Dy and Castro. On 15 January 2008, Presiding
Judge Sagum inhibited himself from the case. On 31 January 2008, the case was re-
raffled to public respondent Judge Lagos. SHaATC
Judge Lagos issued the first assailed Order on 23 April 2008 granting respondents'
Petition for Bail and allowing them to file their demurrer. On 24 June 2008, he issued the
second assailed Order, acquitting all the accused. On Motion for Reconsideration filed
by the People, he issued the third assailed Order denying the above motion and granting
the Motion to Withdraw Cash Bonds filed by the accused.
Before this Court, the prosecution argues that Judge Lagos committed grave abuse
of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the demurrer despite
clear proof of the elements of the illegal sale, the existence of the corpus delicti, and the
arrest in flagrante delicto. 14 Private respondents counter that the Petition is dismissible
on the ground of double jeopardy and is violative of the principle of hierarchy of courts.
It has long been settled that the grant of a demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal.
An acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the
finality of his acquittal. 15 This rule, however, is not without exception. The rule on
double jeopardy is subject to the exercise of judicial review by way of the extraordinary
writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court is endowed
with the power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the government. 16 Here, the party asking for the review must show the presence of a
whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a patent
and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; an exercise of
power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility; or a blatant
abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very
power to dispense justice. 17 In such an event, the accused cannot be considered to be at
risk of double jeopardy. 18 cHSTEA
The trial court declared that the testimonies of PO2 Frando, PO2 Cubian, P S/Insp.
Manaog, and AIDSOTF Chief Leonardo R. Suan were insufficient to prove the
culmination of the illegal sale, or to show their personal knowledge of the offer to sell
and the acceptance thereof. In granting the demurrer filed by the accused, respondent
judge surmised that it was the CI who had initiated the negotiation of the sale and should
have thus been presented at trial.
The trial court's assessment that the witnesses had no personal knowledge of the
illegal sale starkly contrasts with the facts borne out by the records. PO2 Frando was
present during the negotiation and the actual buy-bust operation. PO2 Frando himself
acted as the poseur-buyer and testified in open court. PO2 Cubian frisked the accused and
recovered the buy-bust money; he also testified in court. P S/Insp. Manaog testified as to
the corpus delicti of the crime; and the 30 pills of ecstasy were duly marked, identified,
and presented in court. The validity of buy-bust transactions as an effective way of
apprehending drug dealers in the act of committing an offense is well-settled. 19
The only elements necessary to consummate the crime of illegal sale of drugs is
proof that the illicit transaction took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the
corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. 20 In buy-bust operations, the delivery of the
contraband to the poseur-buyer and the seller's receipt of the marked money successfully
consummate the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping officers and the accused.
Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team
were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their
testimonies on the operation deserve faith and credit. 21 The Court has held that when
police officers have no motive to testify falsely against the accused, courts are inclined to
uphold the presumption of regularity accorded to them in the performance of their official
duties. 22 In the present case, there is no contention that the members of AIDSOTF who
conducted the buy-bust operation were motivated by ill will or malice. Neither was there
evidence adduced to show that they neglected to perform their duties properly. Hence,
their testimonies as to the conduct of the buy-bust operation deserves full faith and
credence. SEDICa
Respondent judge harps on the fact that it was the CI who had personal knowledge
of the identity of the seller, the initial offer to purchase the ecstasy pills, and the
subsequent acceptance of the offer. It is clear from the testimonies of PO2 Frando and the
other arresting officers that they conducted the buy-bust operation based on the
information from the CI. However, the arrest was made, not on the basis of that
information, but of the actual buy-bust operation, in which respondents were caught in
flagrante delicto engaged in the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Due to the investigative
work of the AIDSOTF members, the illegal sale was consummated in their presence, and
the elements of the sale — the identity of the sellers, the delivery of the drugs, and the
payment therefor — were confirmed. That the CI initially provided this information or
"tip" does not negate the subsequent consummation of the illegal sale.
In the Court's Resolution on People v. Utoh, the accused was caught in flagrante
delicto selling P36,000 worth of shabu in a buy-bust operation conducted by the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). The accused argued that mere reliable
information from the CI was an insufficient ground for his warrantless arrest. The Court
stated:
The testimonies of arresting officers IO1 Apiit and IO1 Mosing were
straightforward, positive, and categorical. From the time they were tipped off by
the confidential informant at around 9:00 a.m. of November 22, 2008 or up to
the time until the informant confirmed Utoh's impending arrival at a very late
hour that night, and the latter's eventual arrest, the intelligence officers credibly
accounted for the briefings held, the preparations, and actions taken by them. 23
Given the foregoing, respondent Judge Lagos erred in requiring the testimony of
the CI. Respondent judge based his ruling on a 2004 case, People v. Ong, the facts of
which purportedly "mirror" those of the present case. However, there is no basis for this
conclusion, as Ong involved a conviction based on the lone testimony of one
apprehending officer, Senior Police Officer (SPO1) Gonzales. The Court found that
SPO1 Gonzales was merely the deliveryman, while the CI was the one who acted as the
poseur-buyer. In this case, one of the witnesses, PO2 Frando, was a buy-bust team
member who also acted as the poseur-buyer. He participated in the actual sale
transaction. His testimony was a firsthand account of what transpired during the buy-bust
and thus stemmed from his personal knowledge of the arrest in flagrante delicto.
Informants are usually not presented in court because of the need to hide their
identities and preserve their invaluable services to the police. Except when the accused
vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there are material inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the arresting officers, or there are reasons to believe that the officers had
motives to falsely testify against the accused, or that it was the informant who acted as
the poseur-buyer, the informant's testimony may be dispensed with, as it will merely be
corroborative of the apprehending officers' eyewitness accounts. 25 In People v. Lopez,
the Court ruled that the "informant's testimony, then, would have been merely
corroborative and cumulative because the fact of sale of the prohibited drug was already
established by the direct testimony of SPO4 Jamisolamin who actively took part in the
transaction. If the prosecution has several eyewitnesses, as in the instant case, it need not
present all of them but only as many as may be needed to meet the quantum of proof
necessary to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt." 26
Similarly, in the present case, the fact of the illegal sale has already been
established by testimonies of the members of the buy-bust team. Judge Lagos need not
have characterized the CI's testimony as indispensable to the prosecution's case. We find
and so hold that the grant of the demurrer for this reason alone was not supported by
prevailing jurisprudence and constituted grave abuse of discretion. The prosecution's
evidence was, prima facie, sufficient to prove the criminal charges filed against
respondents, subject to the defenses they may present in the course of a full-blown trial.
IESTcD
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Lagos, G.R. No. 184658, [March 6, 2013], 705 PHIL 570-582)
FIRST DIVISION
VELASCO, JR., J : p
The Case
This is an appeal from the September 30, 2008 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02135 entitled People of the Philippines v.
Ricky Alfredo y Norman, which affirmed an earlier decision 2 in Criminal Case Nos.
01-CR-4213 and 01-CR-4214 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 62 in La
Trinidad, Benguet. The RTC found accused-appellant Ricky Alfredo y Norman guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape.
The Facts
That sometime in the period from April 28-29, 2001, at Cadian, Topdac,
Municipality of Atok, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of
force, intimidation and threats, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with one [AAA], 3 a thirty six (36) year old
woman, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
That sometime in the period from April 28-29, 2001, at Cadian, Topdac,
Municipality of Atok, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of
force, intimidation and threats, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit an act of sexual assault by inserting a flashlight into the
vagina of one [AAA], a thirty six (36) year old woman, against her will and
consent, to her damage and prejudice.
In March 2001, AAA, who was six months pregnant, went home to Butiyao,
Benguet, along with her family, to harvest the peppers planted in their garden. On
April 27, 2001, AAA and her son, BBB, returned to their sayote plantation in Cadian,
Topdac, Atok, Benguet to harvest sayote. The following day, or on April 28, 2001,
AAA had the harvested sayote transported to Baguio City. Later that night, she and
her son stayed at their rented shack and retired early to bed. 7
In the middle of the night, AAA was awakened by a beam of light coming
from the gaps in the walls of the shack directly illuminating her face. She then
inquired who the person was, but nobody answered. Instead, the light was switched
off. After a few minutes, the light was switched on again. 8 Thereafter, a male voice
shouted, "Rumwar kayo ditta no saan kayo nga rumwar paletpeten kayo iti bala!" 9
AAA remained seated. Then, the male voice uttered, "Lukatam daytoy no saan mo
nga lukatan bilangan ka, maysa, duwa . . ." 10 AAA immediately woke BBB up. Just
then, the male voice said, "Pabitaken kayo iti bala." 11 AAA cried out of fear. 12
Anxious that the person outside would kill her and her son, AAA lit the gas
lamp placed on top of the table, and opened the door while her son stood beside it. As
the door opened, she saw accused-appellant directly in front of her holding a
flashlight. AAA did not immediately recognize accused-appellant, as his hair was
long and was covering his face. She invited him to come inside the shack, but the
latter immediately held her hair and ordered her to walk uphill. 13 Helpless and
terrified, AAA obeyed him. All the while, accused-appellant was behind her. 14
Upon reaching a sloping ground, accused-appellant ordered AAA to stop.
Thereafter, accused-appellant placed the lit flashlight in his pocket and ordered AAA
to remove her clothes. When she refused, accused-appellant boxed her left eye and
removed her clothes. When she also attempted to stop accused-appellant, the latter
angrily slapped her face. Completely naked, AAA was again ordered to walk uphill.
15
Upon reaching a grassy portion and a stump about one foot high, accused-
appellant ordered AAA to stop and lie on top of the stump, after accused-appellant
boxed her thighs. Accused-appellant then bent down and spread open AAA's legs.
After directing the beam of the flashlight on AAA's naked body, accused-appellant
removed his pants, lowered his brief to his knees, went on top of her, and inserted his
penis into her vagina. Accused-appellant threatened to box her if she moves. 16
Accused-appellant also held AAA's breast, as well as the other parts of her
body. He shifted the flashlight from one hand to another while he moved his buttocks
up and down. AAA cried as she felt severe pain in her lower abdomen. Accused-
appellant stood up and directed the beam of the flashlight on her after he was
satisfied. 17
Ten minutes later, accused-appellant went on top of AAA again and inserted
his penis into her vagina and moved his buttocks up and down. After being satisfied,
accused-appellant stood up and lit a cigarette. 18
Afterwards, accused-appellant went on top of AAA again and tried to insert his
penis in the latter's vagina. His penis, however, has already softened. Frustrated,
accused-appellant knelt and inserted his fingers in her vagina. After removing his
fingers, accused-appellant held a twig about 10 inches long and the size of a small
finger in diameter which he used to pierce her vagina. Dissatisfied, accused-appellant
removed the twig and inserted the flashlight in her vagina. 19 IaEASH
Between the two conflicting versions of the incident, the trial court gave
credence to the version of the prosecution and rendered its Decision dated February
17, 2006, finding accused-appellant guilty of two counts of rape. The decretal portion
reads:
The Court, likewise, finds him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Rape in Criminal Case No. 01-CR-4214 and sentences him to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of three (3) years, two (2) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, and eight (8) years, two
(2) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
For each count of rape, he shall pay [AAA] the sum of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (Php50,000.00) by way of civil indemnity and the sum of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) by way of moral damages.
SO ORDERED. 29
As stated above, the CA, in its Decision dated September 30, 2008, affirmed
the judgment of conviction by the trial court. 33
Undaunted, accused-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
denied by the CA in its Resolution dated March 19, 2009. 34
On April 21, 2009, accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal 35 from the
CA Decision dated September 30, 2008.
In our Resolution dated September 14, 2009, 36 we notified the parties that
they may file their respective supplemental briefs if they so desired. On November 9,
2009, the People of the Philippines manifested that it is no longer filing a
supplemental brief, as it believed that all the issues involved in the present
controversy have been succinctly discussed in the Brief for the Appellee. 37 On the
other hand, on January 26, 2010, accused-appellant filed his supplemental brief. CIcEHS
The Issues
I.
II.
III.
It should be noted that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to
prove that he was in another place when the crime was committed. He must likewise
prove that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. 40
A review of the records in the instant case would reveal that accused-appellant
failed to present convincing evidence that he did not leave his house, which is only
about 150 meters away from the shack of AAA, in the evening of April 28, 2001.
Significantly, it was also not physically impossible for accused-appellant to be present
on the mountain where he allegedly raped AAA at the time it was said to have been
committed.
Moreover, it has been held, time and again, that alibi, as a defense, is
inherently weak and crumbles in light of positive identification by truthful witnesses.
41 It is evidence negative in nature and self-serving and cannot attain more credibility
than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive
evidence. 42 Thus, there being no strong and credible evidence adduced to overcome
the testimony of AAA, no weight can be given to the alibi of accused-appellant.
In addition, even if the alibi of accused-appellant appears to have been
corroborated by his mother, Remina, and his sister, Margaret, said defense is
unworthy of belief not only because accused-appellant was positively identified by
AAA, but also because it has been held that alibi becomes more unworthy of merit
where it is established mainly by the accused himself and his or her relatives, friends,
and comrades-in-arms, 43 and not by credible persons. 44 ATcaID
Accused-appellant contends further that the judge who penned the appealed
decision is different from the judge who heard the testimonies of the witnesses and
was, thus, in no position to render a judgment, as he did not observe firsthand their
demeanor during trial.
We do not agree. The fact that the trial judge who rendered judgment was not
the one who had the occasion to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during trial,
but merely relied on the records of the case, does not render the judgment erroneous,
especially where the evidence on record is sufficient to support its conclusion. 51 As
this Court held in People v. Competente:
The circumstance that the Judge who rendered the judgment was
not the one who heard the witnesses, does not detract from the validity of
the verdict of conviction. Even a cursory perusal of the Decision would show
that it was based on the evidence presented during trial and that it was carefully
studied, with testimonies on direct and cross examination as well as questions
from the Court carefully passed upon. 52 (Emphasis supplied.)
Further, the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial were extant
and complete. Hence, there was no impediment for the judge to decide the case. DAESTI
Moreover, the police found the red t-shirt and blue shorts of AAA in the place
where accused-appellant was said to have removed her clothes. In addition, AAA's
son, BBB, testified as to how accused-appellant threatened them in the evening of
April 28, 2001, how he was able to identify accused-appellant as the perpetrator, and
what his mother looked like when she returned home in the early morning of April 29,
2001. According to BBB, his mother was naked except for a dirty white jacket she
was wearing. He also noticed that his mother had wounds and blood all over her body.
All these are consistent with the testimony of AAA. 61
Award of Damages
The decision of the CA as to the damages awarded must be modified. For rape
under Art. 266-A, par. 1 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, the CA was correct in
awarding PhP50,000 as civil indemnity and PhP50,000 as moral damages. However,
for rape through sexual assault under Art. 266-A, par. 2 of the Code, the award of
damages should be PhP30,000 as civil indemnity and PhP30,000 as moral damages.
62
We explained in People v. Cristobal that "for sexually assaulting a pregnant
married woman, the accused has shown moral corruption, perversity, and wickedness.
He has grievously wronged the institution of marriage. The imposition then of
exemplary damages by way of example to deter others from committing similar acts
or for correction for the public good is warranted." 63 Notably, there were instances
wherein exemplary damages were awarded despite the absence of an aggravating
circumstance. As we held in People v. Dalisay:
Nevertheless, People v. Catubig laid down the principle that courts may
still award exemplary damages based on the aforementioned Article 2230, even
if the aggravating circumstance has not been alleged, so long as it has been
proven, in criminal cases instituted before the effectivity of the Revised Rules
which remained pending thereafter. Catubig reasoned that the retroactive
application of the Revised Rules should not adversely affect the vested rights of
the private offended party.
Nevertheless, by focusing only on Article 2230 as the legal basis for the
grant of exemplary damages — taking into account simply the attendance of an
aggravating circumstance in the commission of a crime, courts have lost sight of
the very reason why exemplary damages are awarded. Catubig is enlightening
on this point, thus — DaACIH
It must be noted that, in the said cases, the Court used as basis Article
2229, rather than Article 2230, to justify the award of exemplary damages.
Indeed, to borrow Justice Carpio Morales' words in her separate opinion in
People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, "[t]he application of
Article 2230 of the Civil Code strictissimi juris in such cases, as in the
present one, defeats the underlying public policy behind the award of
exemplary damages — to set a public example or correction for the public
good." 64 (Emphasis supplied.)
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Del Castillo and Perez, JJ., concur.
(People v. Alfredo y Norman, G.R. No. 188560, [December 15, 2010], 653 PHIL 435-
|||
456)
SECOND DIVISION
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner Romeo Nazareno and his wife, Eliza Nazareno, were charged with
Serious Physical Injuries in the Municipal Trial Court of Naic, Cavite. After trial on the
merits, the said court set the promulgation of judgment for April 24, 1986, but the same
was postponed due to petitioner's filing of a motion to re-open the case on the ground of
non-presentation of a vital witness. However, the said motion was denied. Petitioner
brought the matter to the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, on April 15, 1988, Acting
Municipal Trial Court Judge Icasiano, Jr. promulgated the decision dated November 8,
1985 of Judge Manuel C. Diosomito acquitting Eliza Nazareno but convicting the
petitioner as charged. In this petition, petitioner alleged mainly that the decision is void
since at the time of the promulgation of the decision, Judge Diosomito who signed the
subject decision, had already retired from office.
In granting this petition, the Court ruled that a judgment promulgated after the
judge who signed the decision had ceased to hold office is not valid and binding. In like
manner, a decision penned by a judge during his incumbency cannot be validly
promulgated after his retirement. When a judge retired, all his authority to decide any
case, i.e., to write, sign and promulgate the decision thereon also "retired" with him. In
other words, he had lost entirely his power and authority to act on all cases assigned to
him prior to his retirement. In the instant case, therefore, Judge Icasiano, Jr. could not
validly promulgate the decision of another judge, Judge Diosomito, who had long
"retired" from the service. The decision dated November 8, 1985 of Judge Diosomito, as
promulgated by Judge Icasiano, Jr., is a void judgment. Thus, a void judgment is no
judgment at all.
SYLLABUS
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. — In like manner, a decision
penned by a judge during his incumbency cannot be validly promulgated after his
retirement. When a judge retired all his authority to decide any case, i.e., to write, sign
and promulgate the decision thereon also "retired" with him. In other words, he had lost
entirely his power and authority to act on all cases assigned to him prior to his retirement.
In the instant case, therefore, Judge Icasiano, Jr., could not validly promulgate the
decision of another judge, Judge Diosomito, who has long "retired" from the service. The
decision dated November 8, 1985 of Judge Diosomito, as promulgated by Judge Icasiano,
Jr., in Criminal Case No. 2335 of the Municipal Trial Court of Naic, Cavite is a void
judgment.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CANNOT BE SOURCE OF ANY RIGHT NOR OF ANY
OBLIGATION. — [A] void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of
any right nor of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating
from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution
based on it is void: ". . . it may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an
outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head."
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J : p
After trial on the merits, the said court set the promulgation of judgment for April
24, 1986, but the same was postponed due to petitioner's filing of a motion to re-open the
case on the ground of non-presentation of a vital witness who could not be produced
during the trial proper. 4 Said motion was opposed by the prosecution. On November 27,
1987, after Presiding Judge Manuel C. Diosomito was suspended, Acting Municipal Trial
Court Judge Aurelio Icasiano, Jr. issued a resolution denying the motion to re-open. 5
Petitioner interposed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court
questioning the February 11, 1991 decision of the Court of Appeals but the same failed
for having been filed out of time, more specifically twelve (12) days late. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was denied by the Supreme Court in a Resolution dated
September 18, 1991. 12 On October 3, 1991, petitioner received a copy of the resolution
denying his motion for reconsideration, and on the same date he filed his notice of appeal
with the said Municipal Trial Court of Naic, appealing its decision to the Regional Trial
Court. 13
On October 10, 1991, the records of the case were forwarded to the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 15, Naic, Cavite, presided by the respondent Judge Enrique M. Almario
who, in a decision dated October 12, 1992, dismissed the appeal of petitioner for having
been filed out of time. 14 Reconsideration was sought 15 by petitioner but the same was
denied by respondent Judge Almario in his Order dated February 4, 1993. 16
Undaunted, petitioner interposed a Petition for Mandamus and Certiorari with the
Court of Appeals upon the premise that respondent Judge Almario, in dismissing the
appeal, unlawfully neglected to perform a duty resulting from his office to give due
course to petitioner's appeal which was already approved. 17 The appellate court
dismissed the petition. 18 Petitioner sought 19 reconsideration of the decision but the
same was denied in a Resolution 20 promulgated on August 10, 1993.
Hence, this petition, which raises four (4) issues for resolution, to wit: 21
II
III
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE AND IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS SOUND
DISCRETION IN ORDER TO DISPENSE JUSTICE TO PETITIONER, THIS HONORABLE
TRIBUNAL MAY VALIDLY AND LEGALLY GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE PRESENT
PETITION AND TO DECLARE THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT AS NULL AND
VOID AS THE TRIAL JUDGE WHO PENNED THE DECISION HAD LONG RETIRED
FROM THE SERVICE AT THE TIME OF THE PROMULGATION OF THE SAID
JUDGMENT ON APRIL 15, 1988.
At the outset, we note that, apparently, the crucial argument raised by the
petitioner is but a repetition of his main assertion in his prior petition for review in G.R.
No. 97812 before this Court which, unfortunately, was dismissed on a technicality —
failure to file the petition within the prescribed period. Considering the transcendental
importance of the issues herein raised which involve the precious liberty of a person and
to finally settle this cycle of unsettled questions of law, justice dictates that this Court
resolve this petition on the merits.
There is one vital fact that renders the instant petition meritorious, which is
petitioner's last issue for consideration, namely, the error committed by the trial judge,
Judge Icasiano, Jr., in promulgating a decision penned by another judge, Judge
Diosomito, who has ceased to be a member of the judiciary at the time of the
promulgation of the decision.
A judgment promulgated after the judge who signed the decision has ceased to
hold office is not valid and binding. 22 Such a doctrine goes back to a 1917 decision,
Lino Luna v. Rodriguez and De los Angeles. 23 We reiterated this doctrine in the case of
People v. Labao 24 wherein we held that for a judgment to be valid, it must be duly
signed and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge who signed it. 25 Thus, a
decision penned by a judge after his retirement cannot be validly promulgated; it cannot
acquire a binding effect as it is null and void. 26 Quod ab initio non valet, in tractu
temporis non convalescit. 27
". . . [A] void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid
judgment, but may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any
tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It is attended by none of the
consequences of a valid adjudication. It has no legal or binding effect or
efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It cannot affect, impair or create rights.
It is not entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to those who
seek to enforce. All proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves
regarded as invalid. In other words, a void judgment is regarded as a nullity, and
the situation is the same as it would be if there were no judgment. It,
accordingly, leaves the parties-litigants in the same position they were in before
the trial." 32
Thus, a void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right
nor of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it
have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution based on
it is void: ". . . it may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and
slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head." 33
Admittedly, petitioner made possible the failure of the prior petition for review
(G.R. No. 97812) before this Court to proceed by reason of its late filing as well as his
choices of remedial measures. However, oft-repeated is the dictum that courts should not
place undue importance on technicalities, when by so doing, substantial justice is
sacrificed. Rules of procedure are intended to promote, not defeat, substantial justice. It is
within the power of this Court to temper rigid rules of procedure in favor of substantial
justice. While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully observed, courts should
not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration
of justice. If the rules are intended to ensure the proper and orderly conduct of litigation,
it is because of the higher objective they seek which is the attainment of justice and the
protection of substantive rights of the parties. Thus, the relaxation of procedural rules, or
saving a particular case from the operation of technicalities when substantial justice
requires it, as in the case at bar, should no longer be subject to cavil. 34
SO ORDERED.
||| (Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111610, [February 27, 2002], 428 PHIL 32-43)
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
PERALTA, J : p
For this Court's consideration is the Decision 1 dated January 9, 2009 and
Resolution 2 dated April 24, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
00657 affirming the Decision 3 dated June 21, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 44, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, in Criminal Case No. Z-1058, finding
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 14, Article III, in relation
to Section 21 (a), Article IV of Republic Act (RA) No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA No. 7659.
At 10:00 a.m. of December 3, 1998, SPO2 Lazaro Paglicawan and SPO3 Isagani
Yuzon, the officers-on-duty at the Philippine National Police (PNP) Station, Looc,
Occidental Mindoro, received a radio message from the Barangay Captain of Ambil
Island, Looc, Maximo Torreliza, that a suspicious looking boat was seen somewhere
within the vicinity of said island. 4 Immediately thereafter, the police officers headed
towards the specified location wherein they spotted two (2) boats anchored side by side,
one of which resembled a fishing boat and the other, a speedboat. They noticed one (1)
person on board the fishing boat and two (2) on board the speed boat who were
transferring cargo from the former to the latter. As they moved closer to the area, the
fishing boat hurriedly sped away. Due to the strong waves, the police officers were
prevented from chasing the same and instead, went towards the speed boat, which
seemed to be experiencing engine trouble. On board the speed boat, the officers found the
appellants Chi Chan Liu a.k.a. Chan Que and Hui Lao Chung a.k.a. Leofe Senglao with
several transparent plastic bags containing a white, crystalline substance they instantly
suspected to be the regulated drug, methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as
"shabu." They requested the appellants to show their identification papers but appellants
failed to do so. 5 Thus, the police officers directed appellants to transfer to their service
boat and thereafter towed appellants' speed boat to the shore behind the Municipal Hall of
Looc, Occidental Mindoro. On their way, the police officers testified that appellant Chi
Chan Liu repeatedly offered them "big, big amount of money" which they ignored. 6
Upon reaching the shore, the police officers led the appellants, together with the
bags containing the crystalline substance, to the police station. In the presence of the
appellants and Municipal Mayor Felesteo Telebrico, they conducted an inventory of the
plastic bags which were forty-five (45) in number, weighing about a kilo each. 7 Again,
SPO3 Yuson requested proper documentation from the appellants as to their identities as
well as to the purpose of their entry in the Philippine territory. 8 However, the appellants
did not answer any of SPO3 Yuson's questions. 9 Immediately thereafter, SPO3 Yuson
reported the incident to their superiors, PNP Provincial Command in San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro and PNP Regional Command IV in Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna. The
PNP Regional Director General Reynaldo Acop advised them to await his arrival the
following day. 10 HSIDTE
Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charges against them. Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued, where the facts earlier stated were testified to by the witnesses for the
prosecution, specifically: SPO2 Paglicawan, SPO3 Yuson, Police Inspector Culili, and
Police Inspector Geronimo.
The testimonies of the witnesses for the defense, namely: Jesus Astorga and
Fernando Oliva, both residents of Ambil Island, Leopoldo S. J. Lozada, a former
Supervising Crime Photographer of the PNP, and Godofredo de la Fuente Robles, a
Member of the Looc Municipal Council, essentially maintain that the subject crystalline
substance was merely recovered by the apprehending police officers from the house of
Barangay Captain Maximo Torreliza and not actually from the speed boat the appellants
were on. 22
The trial court found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt in its Decision
dated June 21, 2004, the dispositive portion of which reads:
SO ORDERED. 23
On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the Decision of the RTC in its Decision dated
January 9, 2009. On April 24, 2009, it further denied the appellants' Motion for
Reconsideration in its Resolution finding no cogent reason to make any revision,
amendment, or reversal of its assailed Decision. Hence, the present appeal raising the
following issues:aETASc
I.
II.
III.
V.
Appellants also claim that the prosecution failed to substantiate beyond reasonable
doubt the corpus delicti of the crime charged for the chain of custody of the illegal drugs
subject of this case was not sufficiently established. In addition, they emphasize the
irregularities attendant in their arrest and seizure of the illegal drugs in violation of their
constitutionally protected rights. Appellants further call attention to the invalidity of their
arraignment for they were not represented by a counsel of their choice.
The information filed by the prosecutor against appellants charged appellants with
violation of Section 14, Article III, in relation to Section 21 (a), Article IV of RA No.
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA No.
7659, which provide:
ARTICLE III
Regulated Drugs
Moreover, the Black's Law Dictionary defines importation as "the act of bringing
goods and merchandise into a country from a foreign country." 27 As used in our tariff
and customs laws, imported articles, those which are brought into the Philippines from
any foreign country, are subject to duty upon each importation. 28 Similarly, in a statute
controlling the entry of toxic substances and hazardous and nuclear wastes, importation
was construed as the entry of products or substances into the Philippines through the
seaports or airports of entry. 29 Importation then, necessarily connotes the introduction of
something into a certain territory coming from an external source. Logically, if the article
merely came from the same territory, there cannot be any importation of the same.
The CA, in finding that there was importation in the present case, stated:
We disagree. The mere fact that the appellants were Chinese nationals as well as
their penchant for making reference to China where they could obtain money to bribe the
apprehending officers does not necessarily mean that the confiscated drugs necessarily
came from China. The records only bear the fact that the speed boat on which the
appellants were apprehended was docked on the coast of Ambil Island in the
Municipality of Looc, Occidental Mindoro. But it could have easily come from some
other locality within the country, and not necessarily from China or any foreign port, as
held by the CA. This Court notes that for a vessel which resembles a speed boat, it is
rather difficult to suppose how appellants made their way to the shores of Occidental
Mindoro from China. Moreover, an earlier intelligence report that foreign nationals on
board extraordinary types of vessels were seen along the sealine of Lubang Island in
Cavite, and Quezon Province, does not sufficiently prove the allegation that appellants
herein were, in fact, importing illegal drugs in the country from an external source. This,
notwithstanding, had the prosecution presented more concrete evidence to convince this
Court that the prohibited drugs, indeed, came from a source outside of the Philippines,
the importation contention could have been sustained.
At the outset, appellants may argue that as We have ruled in United States v. Jose,
31 possession is not necessarily included in the charge of importation and thus, they
cannot be held liable thereof, to wit:
Counsel for neither of the parties to this action have discussed the
question whether, in case the charge of illegal importation fails, the accused
may still be convicted, under the information, of the crime of illegal possession
of opium. We, therefore, have not had the aid of discussion of this proposition;
but, believing that it is a question which might fairly be raised in the event of an
acquittal on the charge of illegal importation, we have taken it up and decided it.
Section 29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that: ECTIcS
However, in our more recent ruling in People v. Elkanish, 33 this Court held that
possession is inherent in importation. In that case, the accused, who was suspected of
being the owner of sixty-five (65) large boxes of blasting caps found aboard a ship of
American registry docked inside Philippine territory, was charged with illegal
importation of the articles under Section 2702 of the Revised Administrative Code and
illegal possession of the same articles under Section 1 of Act No. 3023, in two (2)
separate informations. Ruling that double jeopardy exists in view of the fact that
possession is necessarily included in importation, this Court affirmed the dismissal of the
information on illegal importation, in the following wise:
As We have explained in our more recent ruling above, there is double jeopardy
therein since the offense charged in the information on possession is necessarily included
in the information on importation in view of the fact that the former is inherent in the
latter. Thus, this Court sustained the dismissal of one of the two informations which
charged the accused with importation to avoid the implications of double jeopardy for
possession is necessarily included in the charge of importation.
Applying the aforequoted ruling, this Court finds that while appellants cannot be
held liable for the offense of illegal importation charged in the information, their criminal
liability for illegal possession, if proven beyond reasonable doubt, may nevertheless be
sustained. As previously mentioned, the crime of importation of regulated drugs is
committed by importing or bringing any regulated drug into the Philippines without being
authorized by law. Indeed, when one brings something or causes something to be brought
into the country, he necessarily has possession of the same. Necessarily, therefore,
importation can never be proven without first establishing possession, affirming the fact
that possession is a condition sine qua non for it would rather be unjust to convict one of
illegal importation of regulated drugs when he is not proven to be in possession thereof.
CETIDH
At this point, this Court notes that charging appellants with illegal possession
when the information filed against them charges the crime of importation does not violate
their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation brought
against them. The rule is that when there is a variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense
as charged necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the
offense proved included in that which is charged. 35 An offense charged necessarily
includes that which is proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the
former, as this is alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. 36
Indeed, We have had several occasions in the past wherein an accused, charged
with the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, was convicted of illegal possession thereof. In
those cases, this Court upheld the prevailing doctrine that the illegal sale of dangerous
drugs absorbs the illegal possession thereof except if the seller was also apprehended in
the illegal possession of another quantity of dangerous drugs not covered by or not
included in the illegal sale, and the other quantity of dangerous drugs was probably
intended for some future dealings or use by the accused. 37 Illegal possession of
dangerous drugs is therefore an element of and is necessarily included in illegal sale.
Hence, convicting the accused with the former does not violate his right to be informed of
the accusation against him for it is an element of the latter.
Thus, in view of the fact that illegal possession is an element of and is necessarily
included in the illegal importation of regulated drugs, this Court shall determine
appellants' culpability under Section 16, 39 Article III of RA No. 6425.
The elements of illegal possession of regulated drugs are as follows: (a) the
accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a regulated drug;
(b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the regulated drug. 40
Moreover, this Court is not legally prepared to accept the version of the appellants
that they had nothing to do with the incident and that they were being framed up as the
drugs seized from them were merely planted by the apprehending officers. At the outset,
this Court observes that appellants did not provide any explanation as to how the
apprehending officers were actually able to plant forty-five (45) bags of regulated drugs
weighing about one (1) kilo each in the speed boat of appellants in the middle of the
ocean without their knowledge. Also, as the trial court noted, they did not even give any
explanation as to the purpose of their presence in the coast of Ambil, Looc, Occidental
Mindoro. More importantly, aside from saying that the confiscated bags of regulated
drugs were merely implanted in their speed boat, they did not provide the court with
sufficient evidence to substantiate their claim. In the words of the lower court:
This Court has consistently noted that denial or frame up is a standard defense
ploy in most prosecutions for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Law. This defense has
been invariably viewed with disfavor for it can easily be concocted. In order to prosper,
the defense of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing evidence.
42 Without proof of any intent on the part of the police officers to falsely impute to
appellants the commission of a crime, the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty and the principle that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses are entitled to great respect, deserve to prevail over the bare denials and self-
serving claims of frame up by appellants. 43
Going now to appellants' arguments that their criminal liability is negated by
certain irregularities in the proceedings of this case. First and foremost, appellants allege
a violation of their constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. Due
to the absence of probable cause, their warrantless arrest and consequent search and
seizure on their persons and possession is unjustified and hence, the confiscated bags of
regulated drugs therefrom are inadmissible against them.
This Court has ruled that for an arrest to fall under the above exception, two (2)
elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer. 44
In this case, appellants were actually committing a crime and were caught by the
apprehending officers in flagrante delicto. As previously stated, the records reveal that on
the date of their arrest, the apprehending officers, while acting upon a report from the
Barangay Captain, spotted appellants transferring cargo from one boat to another.
However, one of the boats hastily sped away when they drew closer to the appellants,
naturally arousing the suspicion of the officers. Soon after, the police officers found them
with the illegal drugs plainly exposed to the view of the officers. When they requested
appellants to show proper documentation as to their identity as well as their purpose for
being there, appellants refused to show them anything much less respond to any of their
questions. In fact, when the officers were transporting appellants and the illegal drugs to
the shore, the appellant Chi Chan Liu even repeatedly offered the arresting officers "big,
big amount of money." Hence, the circumstances prior to and surrounding the arrest of
appellants clearly show that they were arrested when they were actually committing a
crime within the view of the arresting officers, who had reasonable ground to believe that
a crime was being committed.
In addition, this Court does not find the consequent warrantless search and seizure
conducted on appellants unreasonable in view of the fact that the bags containing the
regulated drugs were in plain view of the arresting officers, one of the judicially
recognized exceptions to the requirement of obtaining a search warrant. HcaDTE
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer,
who has a right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence. 45 It applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is
in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence
in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item
he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The
law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a
position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful
intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.
The object must be open to eye and hand, and its discovery inadvertent. 46
In the case at hand, the apprehending officers were performing their duty of
ascertaining whether a criminal activity was indeed happening at the time and place
reported by the Barangay Captain. In broad daylight, appellants were seen in the act of
transferring bags of illegal drugs from one boat to another and thereafter caught in
possession of the same, which became inadvertently and immediately apparent from the
point of view of the arresting officers. It is undeniably clear, therefore, that the seizure of
illegal drugs conducted by the officers falls within the purview of the "plain view"
doctrine. Consequently, the confiscated drugs are admissible as evidence against
appellants.
Appellants also assail the legality of their detention for being formally charged in
an Information on December 8, 1998 or five (5) days after their arrest on December 3,
1998, beyond the thirty-six (36)-hour period in Article 125 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
But while the law subjects such public officers who detain persons beyond the legal
period to criminal liability, it must be remembered that the proceeding taken against the
detained persons for the act the committed remains unaffected, for the two acts are
distinct and separate. 49 This Court is nevertheless mindful of the difficult circumstances
faced by the police officers in this case, such as the language barrier, the
unresponsiveness of the appellants, the fact that one of the days fell on a Sunday, as well
as the disparity in the distances between the different offices. But even assuming that the
police officers intentionally delayed the filing of the Information, appellants should have
taken steps to report or file charges against the officers. Unfortunately, they cannot now
rely on administrative shortcomings of police officers to get a judgment of acquittal for
these do not diminish the fact that illegal drugs were found in appellants' possession. 50
Anent appellants' claim that their constitutional rights were further violated for
during custodial investigation, they did not have counsel of their choice nor were they
provided with one, this deserves scant consideration since the same is relevant and
material only when an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from an accused
becomes the basis of his conviction. 51 In this case, neither one of the appellants
executed an admission or confession. In fact, as the records clearly show, appellants
barely even spoke and merely kept repeating the phrase "call China, big money." The
trial court convicted them not on the basis of anything they said during custodial
investigation but on other convincing evidence such as the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. Verily, there was no violation of appellants' constitutional right to counsel
during custodial investigation.
In this relation, appellants further criticize the legality of the proceedings in saying
that during their arraignment, they were not represented by a counsel of their choice but
were merely represented by a court-appointed government lawyer. Appellants assert that
the trial court likewise appointed a special interpreter, who merely understood a little
Chinese language. As such, considering the absence of any assurance that the interpreter
was able to explain to appellants the charges against them in the language they
understood, appellants therefore did not validly enter their plea. SDHITE
The facts borne by the records of the case, however, militate against the contention
of the appellants. This Court does not find a violation of appellants' right to counsel for
even in their own narration of facts, appellants stated that when they appeared without
counsel when the case was called for arraignment on January 19, 1999, the trial court
gave appellants time to secure the services of counsel of their choice. It was only when
appellants again appeared without counsel on February 23, 1999 that the court appointed
a counsel from the Public Attorney's Office. 52 It is clear, therefore, that appellants had
ample opportunity to secure the services of a counsel of their own choice. They cannot
now assign error in the proceedings conducted by the trial court for the fact remains that
they were appointed with counsel in full compliance with the law.
In much the same way, appellants had every opportunity to secure the services of a
Chinese interpreter with such competence at par with their standards. As pointed out by
the CA, the trial court gave appellants the authorization to seek, through their counsel, the
Chinese Embassy's assistance for purposes of procuring a Chinese interpreter. 53
Appellants were even given time, through several postponements, to properly secure the
services of one. If appellants were unsatisfied with the competence of the court-appointed
interpreter, it should have taken the opportunities given by the trial court. In this relation,
the trial court's observations are worth mentioning, to wit:
Another factor that militates against the accused is their failure to testify
on their own behalf, the defense is trying to justify for want of Chinese
interpreter. The instant case has been filed in Court since December 8, 1998 or
six years more or less until now. It is highly unbelievable that for such period
of time that this case has been pending in court, accused could not still
secure the services of a Chinese interpreter when as borne out by the
records, they were able to secure the services of several lawyers one after
the other. The accused on two (2) occasions have even submitted written
requests in English (Exhibit "N" and Exhibit "O") which were granted by the
Court allowing them to call their relatives but still they failed to secure the
services of an interpreter. To the mind of the Court, accused can also understand
English as proven by their letters. . . . 54
Indeed, this Court accords the highest degree of respect to the findings of the
lower court as to appellants' guilt of the offense charged against them, especially when
such findings are adequately supported by documentary as well as testimonial evidence.
It is a settled policy of this Court, founded on reason and experience, to sustain the
findings of fact of the trial court in criminal cases, on the rational assumption that it is in
a better position to assess the evidence before it, having had the opportunity to make an
honest determination of the witnesses' deportment during the trial. 55
Moreover, in view of the well-entrenched rule that the findings of facts of the trial
court, as affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive on this Court, absent any
evidence that both courts ignored, misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent facts and
circumstances of substance which, if considered, would warrant a modification or
reversal of the outcome of the case, this Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the
above findings. 56 It is clear, therefore, that based on the findings of the courts below,
appellants were, in fact, in possession of regulated drugs without the requisite authority.
As to the penalty imposed on appellants, Sections 16 and 17 of RA No. 7659,
amending RA No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, provide:
From the foregoing, considering that appellants were found to have possessed
forty-five (45) kilograms of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, which is more than the
two hundred (200) grams stipulated above, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua,
in accordance with R.A. No. 9346, otherwise known as "An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines." As regards the fine, We find that the
amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) for each appellant imposed by the RTC is
proper, in view of the quantity seized from them. ISDHcT
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Villarama, Jr., Reyes and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Chi Chan Liu, G.R. No. 189272, [January 21, 2015], 751 PHIL 146-175)
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
SERENO, C.J : p
What are the repercussions of the failure of the accused to appear, without
justifiable cause, at the promulgation of a judgment of conviction? With the resolution of
this singular issue, the Court writes finis to the 24-year-old controversy before us.
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is the Decision 1 of the Sandiganbayan finding petitioners guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide. Petitioners also challenge the Resolution
dated 29 November 2007 2 issued by the same court, which took no action on the motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioners, and the Resolution dated 26 May 2008 3 denying
the motion for reconsideration of the earlier Resolution.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
In June of 1990, the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (US DEA)
approached the NBI with information on the sale of a considerable amount of heroin in
the Philippines. Jaylo was assigned by then NBI Director Alfredo Lim to head the team
that would conduct a buy-bust operation with the aid of US DEA undercover agent Philip
Needham (Needham).
Needham arrived at the parking lot on board a taxicab with Arrastia and Philip
Manila (Manila), an undercover NBI operative who posed as Needham's bodyguard. 6
The taxicab was driven by Romeo Noriega (Noriega), another undercover NBI operative.
7
At the parking lot, Needham and Arrastia met Calanog and Avelino Manguera
(Manguera), who both alighted from a blue Volkswagen Beetle; and De Guzman, who
alighted from a brown Saab. 8 Needham approached the Volkswagen and examined the
heroin in the backseat. 9 After some time, he straightened up and walked back towards
the taxicab, while executing the prearranged signal of taking out his handkerchief and
blowing his nose. 10
It is at this point that the versions of the prosecution and the defense diverged,
particularly on the manner of the arrest.
On board two vehicles, Jaylo, Castro, Valenzona, Habalo, and at least 15 other
operatives, rushed in and surrounded De Guzman, Calanog, and Manguera. 11
Jaylo pointed his gun at De Guzman. Two other operatives instructed Calanog and
Manguera to lie face down on the ground and placed a foot on their backs while training
a gun at them. The rest cordoned the area.
Later, a car with passengers Needham, US DEA country attaché Andrew Fenrich
(Fenrich), and two armed bodyguards moved out of the cordoned area. When the car was
safely on its way, Jaylo and his men shot De Guzman, Calanog, and Manguera. They
waited 15 minutes for the victims to bleed out and thereafter loaded them into the
vehicles under the ruse of bringing them to the hospital. 12
When he saw Needham executing the prearranged signal, Manila executed the
second signal of wiping the right side of his face as confirmation. 13
Castro, who was driving a Lancer car with Jaylo as his passenger, stepped on the
accelerator to block the path of the Volkswagen. 14 Both of them immediately alighted
from the vehicle. Jaylo confronted De Guzman in the Saab, while Castro arrested
Calanog in the Volkswagen. Meanwhile, Valenzona and Habalo approached Manguera.
15 EaISTD
A speeding blue-green car and a burst of gunfire caught the attention of the
operatives while they were approaching their quarries. 16 Taking advantage of the
distraction, De Guzman, Calanog, and Manguera reached for their firearms and tried to
shoot.
Jaylo was able to move away, so only the window on the driver's side of the Saab
was hit and shattered. 17 He retaliated and shot De Guzman twice, hitting him in the left
eye and chest. 18
Out of instinct, Castro shoved the gun of Calanog upward and shot him twice. 19
Calanog staggered, but again aimed the gun at him. It was then that Castro shot Calanog
two times more, causing the latter to finally fall down.
Valenzona and Habalo saw Manguera in the act of drawing his firearm. 20 Both of
them fired and hit him.
The Sandiganbayan noted that the prosecution and the defense were in agreement
that the four accused shot and killed the three victims. 30 With this established fact, it
was only necessary to determine the following:
According to the Sandiganbayan, the evidence presented did not show conspiracy
or any intention on the part of the four accused to aid one another in the shooting. 31
They did not demonstrate a preconceived common plan or scheme to liquidate the
suspected drug dealers.
The prosecution was also unable to prove the attendance of any of the qualifying
circumstances. 32 Treachery was not established. The Sandiganbayan ruled that it could
not take judicial notice of the statements given before the Elma Committee by Dr.
Desiderio Moraleda, who had conducted the autopsy on the victims. Dr. Moraleda died
before he could testify before the Sandiganbayan, and his testimony on the trajectory of
the bullets and the positions of the assailants relative to those of the victims could not be
admitted in evidence without violating the rules on hearsay evidence.
On the allegation that the four accused took advantage of superior strength, the
court ruled that there was no evidence showing the use of excessive force out of
proportion to the defense available to the victims. In particular, the shooting of Manguera
by Valenzona and Habalo only showed numerical superiority, not superior strength.
The prosecution also failed to prove evident premeditation. It was not able to
indicate the time when the four accused determined to commit the killing; neither was it
able to pinpoint the overt act demonstrating that they adhered to their resolve to commit
the crime even after the lapse of enough time "to allow their conscience to overcome the
resolution of their will." 33
For their part, the accused also failed to prove their defense of fulfillment of a duty
or lawful exercise of a right or office. 34 The Sandiganbayan was not convinced that they
had acted within the bounds allowed for an arrest in a buy-bust operation.
For one, the Sandiganbayan highly doubted the existence of the speeding car that
distracted the operatives while they were arresting the suspected drug dealers. In this
regard, it took note of the inconsistent testimonies of Manila and Noriega on one hand
and of Needham on the other.
According to Manila, when he heard the gunfire from the speeding car, he covered
Needham and ran with him towards the South Superhighway, away from the taxicab
driven by Noriega. 35 Needham got into the diplomatic car that approached them. When
the shooting subsided, he went back to the scene.
According to Noriega, he saw the speeding car going towards the Maranaw
Building parking lot and heard three gunshots. Thereafter, he saw Needham run towards
his taxi and board it. While Noriega was trying to get Needham away from the area, a
diplomatic car blocked their taxicab, and the latter transferred to that car.
The Sandiganbayan also noted that the slugs or shells recovered from the scene all
came from short firearms, contrary to Jaylo's testimony that the shots from the speeding
car were from a rifle (an "armalite").
Further militating against the existence of the speeding car was Jaylo's incident
Report dated 10 July 1990, in which he stated that when they rushed in for the arrest, they
were met by a volley of gunfire from the three cars of the suspected drug dealers. 37
There was no mention at all of any speeding car.
Considering the failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy and the attendance
of any of the alleged qualifying circumstances, as well as the failure of the defense to
prove the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty or lawful exercise of a right or
office, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the crime committed was homicide.
On 30 April 2007, counsel for Jaylo, Valenzona, and Habalo filed a Motion for
Partial Reconsideration 39 of the Decision. In the assailed Resolution dated 29 November
2007, the Sandiganbayan took no action on the motion and ordered the implementation of
the warrants for the arrest of the convicted accused. 40 The court ruled that the 15-day
period from the promulgation of the judgment had long lapsed without any of the accused
giving any justifiable cause for their absence during the promulgation. Under Section 6 of
Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, 41 Jaylo, Valenzona and Habalo have lost the remedies
available under the Rules against the Sandiganbayan's judgment of conviction, including
the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE
On 19 June 2008, petitioners Jaylo, Valenzona and Habalo, by counsel, filed the
instant petition assailing the Sandiganbayan Decision dated 17 April 2007 and
Resolutions dated 29 November 2007 and 26 May 2008. Regarding the Decision dated 17
April 2007, petitioners argue that the Sandiganbayan erred in ruling as follows:
1. The negative finding of a conspiracy did not lead to the positive finding
of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty.
Anent the Resolutions dated 29 November 2007 and 26 May 2008, petitioners
argue:
2. The conditions under Section 6 Rule 120 of the Rules of Court do not
obtain in the instant case.
As stated at the outset, the resolution of the instant case hinges on the question
regarding the effects of the nonappearance of the accused, without justifiable cause, in the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction. In the interest of judicial economy, we shall
proceed with a discussion on this question. For reasons that will be expounded on below,
the application in this case of the law and rules on the nonappearance of the accused,
without justifiable cause, in the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall
determine for us the propriety of conducting a review of the Sandiganbayan Decision
dated 17 April 2007.
OUR RULING
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or
through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the
promulgation of the decision. If the accused was tried in absentia because he
jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be served at his last
known address.
Except when the conviction is for a light offense, in which case the judgment may
be pronounced in the presence of the counsel for the accused or the latter's representative,
the accused is required to be present at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment.
Notice of the schedule of promulgation shall be made to the accused personally or
through the bondsman or warden and counsel.
The promulgation of judgment shall proceed even in the absence of the accused
despite notice. The promulgation in absentia shall be made by recording the judgment in
the criminal docket and serving a copy thereof to the accused at their last known address
or through counsel. The court shall also order the arrest of the accused if the judgment is
for conviction and the failure to appear was without justifiable cause. 45 SDEHIa
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear was without justifiable
cause, the accused shall lose the remedies available in the Rules of Court against the
judgment. Thus, it is incumbent upon the accused to appear on the scheduled date of
promulgation, because it determines the availability of their possible remedies against the
judgment of conviction. When the accused fail to present themselves at the promulgation
of the judgment of conviction, they lose the remedies of filing a motion for a new trial or
reconsideration (Rule 121) and an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122). 46
The reason is simple. When the accused on bail fail to present themselves at the
promulgation of a judgment of conviction, they are considered to have lost their standing
in court. 47 Without any standing in court, the accused cannot invoke its jurisdiction to
seek relief. 48
Petitioners claim that their right to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal
has a statutory origin, as provided under Section 7 of P.D. 1606, to wit:
According to petitioners, Section 7 of P.D. 1606 did not provide for any situation
as to when the right to file a motion for reconsideration may be deemed lost. Thus, it is
available at all times and the Rules promulgated by the Supreme Court cannot operate to
diminish or modify the right of a convicted accused to file a motion for reconsideration.
49 Furthermore, they argue, the right to file a motion for reconsideration is a statutory
grant, and not merely a remedy "available in [the] Rules," as provided under Section 6 of
Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. Thus, according to them, their absence at the
promulgation of judgment before the Sandiganbayan cannot be deemed to have resulted
in the loss of their right to file a motion for reconsideration.
Like an appeal, the right to file a motion for reconsideration is a statutory grant or
privilege. As a statutory right, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is to be exercised
in accordance with and in the manner provided by law. Thus, a party filing a motion for
reconsideration must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court.
50
It bears stressing that the provision on which petitioners base their claim states that
"[a] petition for reconsideration of any final order or decision may be filed within fifteen
(15) days from promulgation or notice of the final order or judgment." 51 In Social
Security Commission v. Court of Appeals, 52 we enunciated that the term "may" denotes
a mere possibility, an opportunity, or an option. Those granted this opportunity may
choose to exercise it or not. If they do, they must comply with the conditions attached
thereto. 53
Aside from the condition that a motion for reconsideration must be filed within 15
days from the promulgation or notice of the judgment, the movant must also comply with
the conditions laid down in the Rules of Court, which applies to all cases and proceedings
filed with the Sandiganbayan. 54
Petitioners insist that the right to file a motion for reconsideration under Section 7
of P.D. 1606 is a guarantee, and no amount of Rules promulgated by the Supreme Court
can operate to diminish or modify this substantive right. Aptly citing Fabian v. Desierto,
55 the Sandiganbayan was correct in rejecting the argument of petitioners in this wise:
Fabian v. Desierto lays down the test for determining whether a rule
prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower
courts, abridges, enlarges or modifies any substantive right, to wit:
". . . whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the
judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly determining remedy and redress for a
disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is
not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it
may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of
implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with
procedure.
Applying the Fabian v. Desierto test, it appears indubitable that Section
6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court (ROC) clearly applies to the Sandiganbayan.
DHcEAa
Section 6, Rule 120, ROC as well as Section 4, Rule VIII of the Revised
Rules of the Sandiganbayan (which makes applicable Section 6, Rule 120, ROC
when the accused is absent during promulgation of judgment) merely regulates
the right to file a motion for reconsideration under P.D. 1606. These are mere
rules of procedure which the Supreme Court is competent to adopt pursuant to
its rule-making power under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. And,
contrary to the view espoused by the accused, said rules do not take away,
repeal or alter the right to file a motion for reconsideration as said right still
exists. The Supreme Court merely laid down the rules on promulgation of a
judgment of conviction done in absentia in cases when the accused fails to
surrender and explain his absence within 15 days from promulgation. The
Supreme Court can very well do this as the right to file a motion for
reconsideration under P.D. 1606 is not preclusive in character. Indeed, there is
nothing in P.D. 1606 which prevents the Supreme Court from regulating the
procedure for promulgation of decisions in criminal cases done in absentia. 56
Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the right of
the convicted accused to avail of the remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of the
accused to appear without justifiable cause on the scheduled date of promulgation of the
judgment of conviction that forfeits their right to avail themselves of the remedies against
the judgment.
It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court diminishes or
modifies the substantive rights of petitioners. It only works in pursuance of the power of
the Supreme Court to "provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases." 57 This provision protects the courts from delay in the speedy
disposition of criminal cases — delay arising from the simple expediency of
nonappearance of the accused on the scheduled promulgation of the judgment of
conviction.
In this case, petitioners have just shown their lack of faith in the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan by not appearing before it for the promulgation of the judgment on their
cases. Surely they cannot later on expect to be allowed to invoke the Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction to grant them relief from its judgment of conviction.
Petitioners insist that the Sandiganbayan did not bother to determine whether their
absence at the promulgation of judgment was without justifiable cause. In other words, as
petitioners would have it, it was incumbent upon the Sandiganbayan to take pains to find
out whether their absence at the promulgation was without justifiable cause, and only
then could the court conclude that petitioners have lost the remedies available in the
Rules of Court against the judgment of conviction.
It is well to note that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court also provides the
remedy by which the accused who were absent during the promulgation may reverse the
forfeiture of the remedies available to them against the judgment of conviction. In order
to regain their standing in court, the accused must do as follows: 1) surrender and 2) file a
motion for leave of court to avail of the remedies, stating the reasons for their absence,
within 15 days from the date of the promulgation of judgment. 58
In Villena v. People, 59 we stated that the term "surrender" contemplates the act
by the convicted accused of physically and voluntarily submitting themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court to suffer the consequences of the judgment against them. Upon
surrender, the accused must request permission of the court to avail of the remedies by
making clear the reasons for their failure to attend the promulgation of the judgment of
conviction.
Clearly, the convicted accused are the ones who should show that their reason for
being absent at the promulgation of judgment was justifiable. If the court finds that the
reasons proffered justify their nonappearance during the promulgation of judgment, it
shall allow them to avail of the remedies. 60 Thus, unless they surrender and prove their
justifiable reason to the satisfaction of the court, their absence is presumed to be
unjustified.
Petitioners did not surrender within 15 days from the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction. Neither did they ask for leave of court to avail themselves of the
remedies, and state the reasons for their absence. Even if we were to assume that the
failure of Jaylo to appear at the promulgation was due to failure to receive notice thereof,
it is not a justifiable reason. He should have filed a notice of change of address before the
Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan was correct in not taking cognizance of the Motion for Partial
Reconsideration filed by counsel for petitioners. While the motion was filed on 30 April
2007, it did not operate to regain the standing of petitioners in court. For one, it is not an
act of surrender that is contemplated by Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, nowhere in the Motion for Partial Reconsideration was it indicated that
petitioners were asking for leave to avail of the remedies against the judgment of
conviction, or that there were valid reasons for their absence at the promulgation.
For the failure of petitioners to regain their standing in court and avail themselves
of the remedies against the judgment of conviction, the Decision of the Sandiganbayan
attained finality 15 days reckoned from 17 April 2007.
In view thereof, this Court no longer has the power to conduct a review of the
findings and conclusions in the Decision of the Sandiganbayan. The Decision is no longer
subject to change, revision, amendment, or reversal. 63 Thus, there is no need to pass
upon the issues raised by petitioners assailing it.
SO ORDERED.
(Jaylo v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), G.R. Nos. 183152-54, [January 21, 2015], 751
|||
PHIL 123-145)
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J : p
This appeal proposes to undo the decision promulgated on December 12, 2013
in CA-G.R. SP No. 131486, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) granted the
respondent's petition for certiorari and nullified the orders dated October 26, 2011
and August 8, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasay City respectively
giving due course to the petitioner's notice of appeal, and allowing him to post bail for
his provisional liberty; and the resolution the CA promulgated on June 4, 2014
denying his Motion for Reconsideration. 2
Antecedents
The petitioner and his wife Marinel Salvador were charged in the RTC with
estafa penalized under Article 315 (a) of the Revised Penal Code docketed as
Criminal Case No. R-PSY-08-04689-CR. 3 On March 30, 2011, the date scheduled for
the promulgation of the judgment, their counsel moved for the deferment of the
promulgation inasmuch as the petitioner was then suffering from hypertension. 4
Unconvinced of the reason, the RTC proceeded to promulgate its decision, 5 and
disposed as follows:
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, accused spouses Horacio Salvador
and Marinel Salvador are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Estafa and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Both spouses are further
ordered to indemnify the victim Lisa Chua the sum of P17,371,780.00 with
interest of eight percent (8%) per annum until fully paid, plus the amount of
P50,000.00, as and by way of moral damages, and P50,000 as attorney's fees.
xxx xxx xxx
Costs against accused spouses Horacio Salvador and Marinel
Salvador.
SO ORDERED. 6
The RTC then issued a warrant for the petitioner's arrest. He was apprehended
on April 7, 2011, or eight days from the promulgation of the judgment finding him
guilty. 7
SaCIDT
The petitioner filed his Motion for Leave to file Notice of Appeal dated April
13, 2011, 8 and attached thereto the medical certificate dated March 30, 2011
purportedly issued by Dr. Paulo Miguel A. David, 9 certifying that the petitioner had
submitted himself to a medical consultation at the Rizal Medical Center on March 30,
2011 and had been found to be suffering from hypertension. 10
In his order dated July 1, 2011, 11 RTC Judge Eugenio G. Dela Cruz initially
denied the petitioner's Motion for Leave to file Notice of Appeal on the ground of non-
compliance with Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Thereafter, the respondent, who was the complainant in Criminal Case No. R-
PSY-08-04689-CR, filed her Motion for Execution dated July 29, 2011 praying for the
issuance of the writ of execution on the civil aspect. 12
The petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the July 1, 2011 order. 13 Judge
Dela Cruz granted the petitioner's motion for reconsideration on October 26, 2011,
thereby giving due course to his notice of appeal. 14
On October 27, 2011, the RTC, acting on the respondent's Motion for
Execution, issued another order, 15 to wit:
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the subject Motion for Execution
and Motion to Commit the Person of Accused Horacio Salvador to the
National Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, to Serve his Sentence are both
granted and hereby orders as follows:
b) Pay the victim Lisa Chua P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000
as attorney's fees.
On its part, the Prosecution, represented by the private prosecutor, filed its
Motion for Reconsideration against the order issued on October 26, 2011, 17 attaching
to the motion the affidavit executed by Dr. Paolo Miguel A. David 18 affirming that he
had not examined the petitioner on March 30, 2011; that he had not issued any
medical certificate in favor of the petitioner; that his name of Paolo had been
misspelled Paulo in the medical certificate submitted by the petitioner; that the
signature appearing in the medical certificate was not his; and that the Rizal Medical
Center did not officially issue the medical certificate in question.
The petitioner opposed the Prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration, 19 and
prayed that he be allowed to post bail pending appeal. He submitted another medical
certificate issued by Dr. Ma. Concepcion Santos-Enriquez, an OB-Gynecologist, 20 to
the effect that she had seen the petitioner on March 28, 2011 for headache and
dizziness; and that she had advised him to see a cardiologist because of his elevated
blood pressure.
Meanwhile, Criminal Case No. R-PSY-08-04689-CR was re-raffled to Judge
Francisco G. Mendiola, Presiding Judge of Branch 115, due to Judge Dela Cruz's
inhibition. 21 In his order dated August 8, 2013, 22 Judge Mendiola denied the
Prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration, and fixed bail of P80,000.00 for the
provisional liberty of the petitioner.
Consequently, the respondent commenced a special civil action for certiorari
in the CA to nullify the October 26, 2011 order (giving due course to the petitioner's
notice of appeal), and the August 8, 2013 order (allowing him to post bail for his
provisional liberty). 23
In the decision promulgated on December 12, 2013, the CA granted the
respondent's certiorari petition, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is
GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated October 26, 2011 and August 8, 2013
giving due course to respondent's Notice of Appeal and allowing him to post
bail, respectively, are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion. The Order dated July 1, 2011 is
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED. 24
The CA denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration in its resolution
promulgated on June 4, 2014. 25
Issues
Hence, this appeal, whereby the petitioner contends that the CA erred in
rendering its December 12, 2013 decision because: (1) the respondent had no legal
personality to challenge the assailed orders of the RTC because only the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) could appeal in a criminal case in behalf of the State; (2) she
had no legal personality to file the petition for certiorari in the CA because her
Motion for Execution in respect of the civil aspect of the criminal case had already
been granted by the RTC; and (3) his hypertension on the date of the promulgation of
the decision by the RTC constituted a justifiable cause for him to regain the right to
avail himself of the remedies under the Rules of Court against the judgment of
conviction.
The issues are, therefore: (1) whether the respondent as the complainant in the
criminal case had the legal personality to file the petition for certiorari in the CA to
assail the orders of the RTC despite the lack of consent of the OSG; and (2) whether
the petitioner had lost his standing in court for his failure to appear at the
promulgation of his conviction. cHECAS
2.
Petitioner has lost his right to appeal his conviction
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure pertinently states:
Section 6. Promulgation of judgment. — The judgment is promulgated
by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in
which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the
judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative.
When the judge is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be
promulgated by the clerk of court.
xxx xxx xxx
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of
promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by
recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof
at his last known address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to
appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available
in these rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest.
Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the
accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of
these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled
promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause,
he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from
notice.
As the rule expressly indicates, the promulgation of the judgment of conviction
may be done in absentia. The accused in such case is allowed a period of 15 days
from notice of the judgment to him or his counsel within which to appeal; otherwise,
the decision becomes final. 29 The accused who fails to appear at the promulgation of
the judgment of conviction loses the remedies available under the Rules of Court
against the judgment, specifically: (a) the filing of a motion for new trial or for
reconsideration (Rule 121), and (b) an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule
122). However, the Rules of Court permits him to regain his standing in court in order
to avail himself of these remedies within 15 days from the date of promulgation of the
judgment conditioned upon: (a) his surrender; and (b) his filing of a motion for leave
of court to avail himself of the remedies, stating therein the reason for his absence.
Should the trial court find that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he should be
allowed to avail himself of the remedies within 15 days from notice of the order
finding his absence justified and allowing him the available remedies from the
judgment of conviction. 30
Under Section 6, supra, the personal presence of the petitioner at the
promulgation of the judgment in Criminal Case No. R-PSY-08-04689-CR was
mandatory because the offense of which he was found guilty was not a light felony or
offense. 31 He was charged with and actually found guilty of estafa, and meted the
indeterminate sentence of four years and two months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Based on the records, the promulgation of the judgment was on March 30,
2011; hence, the petitioner had only until April 14, 2011 within which to meet the
mandatory requirements under Section 6, supra.
In the attempt to regain his right to avail himself of the remedies under the
Rules of Court, the petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File a Notice of Appeal, and
attached thereto the medical certificate issued by Dr. Paulo Miguel David. Yet, he did
not thereby establish that his absence had been for a justifiable cause because the
purported issuer himself, Dr. Paolo Miguel A. David, directly impugned the
credibility of this certificate by denying to have issued the certificate, and to have
examined the petitioner on March 30, 2011, or to have signed the certificate, or that
the Rizal Medical Center issued the certificate. The petitioner later submitted another
medicate certificate, which, aside from being belatedly issued, went unsupported and
unauthenticated by the testimony of the alleged issuing physician, who turned out to
be an OB-Gynecologist. The CA justly discredited the certificates. 32
Even assuming that he had suffered hypertension, which could have validly
excused his absence from the promulgation, the petitioner did not fulfill the other
requirement of Section 6, supra, to surrender himself to the trial court. The term
surrender used in the rule visibly necessitated his physical and voluntary submission
to the jurisdiction of the court to suffer any consequences of the verdict against him. 33
In its assailed decision, therefore, the CA unavoidably declared the petitioner
to have lost his standing in court because of his non-compliance with Section 6,
supra. His failure to fulfill the requirements rendered the conviction final and
immutable. 34 He ought to be reminded that the right to appeal, being neither a natural
right nor a part of due process, is a merely statutory privilege that should be exercised
in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law establishing the right;
otherwise, it is lost. 35
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on December
12, 2013; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Perez and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
||| (Salvador v. Chua, G.R. No. 212865, [July 15, 2015], 764 PHIL 244-256)
EN BANC
ABAD, J : p
This case is about a) the need, when invoking self-defense, to prove all that it
takes; b) what distinguishes frustrated homicide from attempted homicide; and c)
when an accused who appeals may still apply for probation on remand of the case to
the trial court.
The public prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the accused Arnel Colinares
(Arnel) with frustrated homicide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose,
Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case T-2213. 1
Complainant Rufino P. Buena (Rufino) testified that at around 7:00 in the
evening on June 25, 2000, he and Jesus Paulite (Jesus) went out to buy cigarettes at a
nearby store. On their way, Jesus took a leak by the roadside with Rufino waiting
nearby. From nowhere, Arnel sneaked behind and struck Rufino twice on the head
with a huge stone, about 15 1/2 inches in diameter. Rufino fell unconscious as Jesus
fled.
Ananias Jallores (Ananias) testified that he was walking home when he saw
Rufino lying by the roadside. Ananias tried to help but someone struck him with
something hard on the right temple, knocking him out. He later learned that Arnel had
hit him.aHICDc
Paciano Alano (Paciano) testified that he saw the whole incident since he
happened to be smoking outside his house. He sought the help of a barangay tanod
and they brought Rufino to the hospital.
Dr. Albert Belleza issued a Medico-Legal Certificate 2 showing that Rufino
suffered two lacerated wounds on the forehead, along the hairline area. The doctor
testified that these injuries were serious and potentially fatal but Rufino chose to go
home after initial treatment.
The defense presented Arnel and Diomedes Paulite (Diomedes). Arnel claimed
self-defense. He testified that he was on his way home that evening when he met
Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias who were all quite drunk. Arnel asked Rufino where he
supposed the Mayor of Tigaon was but, rather than reply, Rufino pushed him, causing
his fall. Jesus and Ananias then boxed Arnel several times on the back. Rufino tried to
stab Arnel but missed. The latter picked up a stone and, defending himself, struck
Rufino on the head with it. When Ananias saw this, he charged towards Arnel and
tried to stab him with a gaff. Arnel was able to avoid the attack and hit Ananias with
the same stone. Arnel then fled and hid in his sister's house. On September 4, 2000, he
voluntarily surrendered at the Tigaon Municipal Police Station.
Diomedes testified that he, Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attended a pre-wedding
party on the night of the incident. His three companions were all drunk. On his way
home, Diomedes saw the three engaged in heated argument with Arnel.
On July 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, finding Arnel guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment
from two years and four months of prision correccional, as minimum, to six years and
one day of prision mayor, as maximum. Since the maximum probationable
imprisonment under the law was only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for
probation.
Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking self-defense and,
alternatively, seeking conviction for the lesser crime of attempted homicide with the
consequent reduction of the penalty imposed on him. The CA entirely affirmed the
RTC decision but deleted the award for lost income in the absence of evidence to
support it. 3 Not satisfied, Arnel comes to this Court on petition for review.
TEAICc
In the course of its deliberation on the case, the Court required Arnel and the
Solicitor General to submit their respective positions on whether or not, assuming
Arnel committed only the lesser crime of attempted homicide with its imposable
penalty of imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years
and four months of prision correccional, as maximum, he could still apply for
probation upon remand of the case to the trial court.
Both complied with Arnel taking the position that he should be entitled to
apply for probation in case the Court metes out a new penalty on him that makes his
offense probationable. The language and spirit of the probation law warrants such a
stand. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that under the Probation Law
no application for probation can be entertained once the accused has perfected his
appeal from the judgment of conviction.
1. Whether or not Arnel acted in self-defense when he struck Rufino on the head
with a stone;
One. Arnel claims that Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attacked him first and that
he merely acted in self-defense when he hit Rufino back with a stone.
When the accused invokes self-defense, he bears the burden of showing that he
was legally justified in killing the victim or inflicting injury to him. The accused must
establish the elements of self-defense by clear and convincing evidence. When
successful, the otherwise felonious deed would be excused, mainly predicated on the
lack of criminal intent of the accused. 4ADCETI
Here, Arnel struck Rufino on the head with a huge stone. The blow was so
forceful that it knocked Rufino out. Considering the great size of his weapon, the
impact it produced, and the location of the wounds that Arnel inflicted on his victim,
the Court is convinced that he intended to kill him.
The Court is inclined, however, to hold Arnel guilty only of attempted, not
frustrated, homicide. In Palaganas v. People, 11 we ruled that when the accused
intended to kill his victim, as shown by his use of a deadly weapon and the wounds he
inflicted, but the victim did not die because of timely medical assistance, the crime is
frustrated murder or frustrated homicide. If the victim's wounds are not fatal, the
crime is only attempted murder or attempted homicide.
Thus, the prosecution must establish with certainty the nature, extent, depth,
and severity of the victim's wounds. While Dr. Belleza testified that "head injuries are
always very serious," 12 he could not categorically say that Rufino's wounds in this
case were "fatal." Thus:
Q: But in the case of the victim when you treated him the wounds actually
are not fatal on that very day?
A: I could not say, with the treatment we did, prevent from becoming fatal.
But on that case the patient preferred to go home at that time.
Q: The findings also indicated in the medical certificate only refers to the
length of the wound not the depth of the wound?
A: When you say lacerated wound, the entire length of the layer of scalp.
A: It is different laceration and abrasion so once the skin is broken up the
label of the frontal lo[b]e, we always call it lacerated wound, but in
that kind of wound, we did not measure the depth. 13 ADCTac
Indeed, Rufino had two lacerations on his forehead but there was no indication
that his skull incurred fracture or that he bled internally as a result of the pounding of his
head. The wounds were not so deep, they merely required suturing, and were estimated to
heal in seven or eight days. Dr. Belleza further testified:
Q: So, in the medical certificate the wounds will not require surgery?
A: Yes, Madam.
A: 7 to 8 days long, what we are looking is not much, we give antibiotics
and antit[e]tanus — the problem the contusion that occurred in the
brain.
A: We give antibiotics, Your Honor, antit[e]tanus and suturing the wounds.
But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted
homicide and holds that the maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be
lowered to imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years
and four months of prision correccional, as maximum. With this new penalty, it
would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for probation upon remand of the
case to the RTC.
Some in the Court disagrees. They contend that probation is a mere privilege
granted by the state only to qualified convicted offenders. Section 4 of the probation
law (PD 968) provides: "That no application for probation shall be entertained or
granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction." 15
Since Arnel appealed his conviction for frustrated homicide, he should be deemed
permanently disqualified from applying for probation.
But, firstly, while it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not
that Arnel has the right to such privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has is
the right to apply for that privilege. The Court finds that his maximum jail term
should only be 2 years and 4 months. If the Court allows him to apply for probation
because of the lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to decide whether or not
to grant him the privilege of probation, taking into account the full circumstances of
his case.
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals "from
the judgment of conviction" is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of
probation. But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out to
Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial court, now set
aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion's hard position, it will
apply the probation law on Arnel based on the trial court's annulled judgment against
him. He will not be entitled to probation because of the severe penalty that such
judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme Court's judgment of conviction for a
lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to the trial court's
judgment — even if this has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be
made to pay for the trial court's erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to
apply for probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw (the horse
errs, the carabao gets the whip). Where is justice there? AEDCHc
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation
through no fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality
towards the accused. Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent
interpretation of the statutory provisions. 18 As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in
his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere privilege
to be given to the accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its letter; to
do so would be to disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should
be applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its
beneficent purpose. 19
One of those who dissent from this decision points out that allowing Arnel to
apply for probation after he appealed from the trial court's judgment of conviction
would not be consistent with the provision of Section 2 that the probation law should
be interpreted to "provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender."
An accused like Arnel who appeals from a judgment convicting him, it is claimed,
shows no penitence.
This may be true if the trial court meted out to Arnel a correct judgment of
conviction. Here, however, it convicted Arnel of the wrong crime, frustrated
homicide, that carried a penalty in excess of 6 years. How can the Court expect him to
feel penitent over a crime, which as the Court now finds, he did not commit? He only
committed attempted homicide with its maximum penalty of 2 years and 4 months.
Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation under the
reduced penalty, it would be sending him straight behind bars. It would be robbing
him of the chance to instead undergo reformation as a penitent offender, defeating the
very purpose of the probation law.
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and
imposed on Arnel the correct penalty of two years and four months maximum, he
would have had the right to apply for probation. No one could say with certainty that
he would have availed himself of the right had the RTC done right by him. The idea
may not even have crossed his mind precisely since the penalty he got was not
probationable.
The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness. Is it fair to deny Arnel
the right to apply for probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him
is, unlike the one erroneously imposed by the trial court, subject to probation?
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition, MODIFIES
the Decision dated July 31, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 29639,
FINDS petitioner Arnel Colinares GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of attempted
homicide, and SENTENCES him to suffer an indeterminate penalty from four
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision
correccional, as maximum, and to pay Rufino P. Buena the amount of P20,000.00 as
moral damages, without prejudice to petitioner applying for probation within 15 days
from notice that the record of the case has been remanded for execution to the
Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case T-2213. HSEcTC
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Del Castillo, Perez,
Mendoza and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Brion and Bersamin, JJ., join Justice Peralta's concurring and dissenting opinion.
||| (Colinares v. People, G.R. No. 182748, [December 13, 2011], 678 PHIL 482-512)
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
NACHURA, J : p
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Court of Appeals (CA)
Resolutions 1 dated January 31, 2007 and July 16, 2007. The assailed Resolutions
granted respondents' motion for new trial of a case for quieting of title and damages,
decided in petitioners' favor by the trial court in a summary judgment.
CTaSEI
Entry No. 334151; Sale; Dionisio Ybiernas, et al.; Deed of absolute sale
of this property for the sum of P650,000.00 in favor of Dionisio Ybiernas,
Vicente M. Ybiernas, Manuel M. Ybiernas and Maria Corazon Y. Angeles in
undivided equal share to each; doc. no. 437, page 89, book VI, series of 1988 of
the not. reg. of Mr. Indalecio P. Arriola of Iloilo City. Date of instrument-April
28, 1988; Date of inscription-July 5, 1989 at 10:45 a.m. 3
Upon respondents' motion, the Pasig City RTC, in an Order 5 dated November
6, 1991, ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment upon filing of a
bond. The sheriff issued the corresponding writ of attachment and levied the subject
property. 6 On November 13, 1991, the notice of attachment was annotated on TCT
No. T-83976 as Entry No. 346816. 7
When Estrella's heirs learned about the levy, Dionisio filed, on January 14,
1992, an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim, asserting the transfer of ownership to them.
8 Respondents, however, filed an indemnity bond; thus, the sheriff refused to lift the
levy.
The Pasig City RTC resolved the Complaint for sum of money in favor of
respondents, and Estrella, et al., were ordered to pay P6,000,000.00, plus legal interest
and damages. Respondents, however, elevated the case all the way up to this Court,
questioning the interest rate. This Court eventually denied the appeal in a Minute
Resolution dated November 20, 2002, which became final and executory on April 14,
2003. 9
In the meantime, Dionisio died and was succeeded by his heirs, petitioners
Valentin Ybiernas and Violeta Ybiernas.
On November 28, 2001, petitioners filed with the RTC of Bacolod City a
Complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages, 10 claiming that the levy was invalid
because the property is not owned by any of the defendants in the Pasig City RTC
case. They averred that the annotation of the RTC Order and the Deed of Absolute
Sale on TCT No. T-83976 serves as notice to the whole world that the property is no
longer owned by Estrella.
In their Answer with Counterclaims, 11 respondents contended that (a) the case
constituted an interference in the proceeding of the Pasig City RTC, a co-equal court;
(b) petitioners should have filed their claims against the indemnity bond filed by
respondents; and (c) petitioners were guilty of forum-shopping, considering that the
case actually sought a relief similar to the third-party claim.
During pre-trial, the parties admitted, among others, the "[e]xistence of the
Order dated June 30, 1989 by RTC Branch 47, Bacolod City, in Cad. Case No. 10
concerning the same TCT No. T-83976." 12
On July 30, 2004, petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment. The RTC
initially denied the motion in the Order dated December 23, 2004. 13 Upon
petitioners' motion for reconsideration, the RTC granted the motion for summary
judgment in the decision 14 dated December 27, 2005. The RTC made the following
pronouncement:
Neither the defendants nor anyone else has challenged the validity of the
judicial proceedings before RTC, Branch 47, Bacolod City, which issued in
Cadastral Case No. 10, the said Order dated June 30, 1989, which directed the
registration and annotation of the said Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28,
1988 on said TCT No. T-83976, and which led to the annotation under said
Entry No. 334151 on said TCT No. T-83976. 15
Thus, the dispositive portion of the December 27, 2005 RTC decision reads:
SO ORDERED. 16
While the appeal was pending in the CA, respondents filed a motion for new
trial, 18 claiming that they have discovered on May 9, 2006 that Cadastral Case No.
10 did not exist and the April 28, 1988 Deed of Sale was simulated. Attached to the
motion were the affidavit 19 of Atty. Gerely C. Rico, who conducted the research in
Bacolod City in behalf of the law office representing respondents, and the following
certifications:
Respondents argued that they have satisfied all the requisites for the grant of a
new trial based on newly discovered evidence: (1) they discovered the evidence after
the trial court rendered its judgment on December 27, 2005; (2) they could not have
discovered and produced the evidence during the trial with reasonable diligence; and
(3) the evidence was material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching,
and was of such weight that, if admitted, would probably change the judgment. On the
second requisite, respondents explained that they could not have discovered the
evidence with reasonable diligence because they relied in good faith on the veracity of
the RTC Order dated June 30, 1989, based on the principle that the issuance of a court
order, as an act of a public officer, enjoys the presumption of regularity. On the third
requisite, respondents pointed out that, if the nonexistence of Cadastral Case No. 10
and the invalidity of the Order dated June 30, 1989 were allowed to be proven by the
newly discovered evidence, the action for quieting of title would probably be
dismissed, as respondents' levy would be declared superior to petitioners' claim. 23
In their Comment/Opposition, petitioners argued that (a) the questioned
decision was a partial summary judgment which could not be the subject of a motion
for new trial; (b) the existence of Cadastral Case No. 10 was an admitted fact which
could not be questioned in a motion for new trial; and (c) there was no newly
discovered evidence that would warrant a new trial. 24
The CA did not agree with petitioners. Hence, on January 31, 2007, it granted
respondents' motion for new trial, thus:
SO ORDERED. 25
At the outset, the CA noted that the RTC summary judgment was a proper
subject of an appeal because it was a final adjudication on the merits of the case,
having completely disposed of all the issues except as to the amount of damages. The
CA concluded that respondents properly availed of a motion for new trial because
such remedy could be availed of at any time after the appeal from the lower court had
been perfected and before the CA loses jurisdiction over the case. According to the
CA, respondents were able to show that they obtained the new evidence only after the
trial of the case and after the summary judgment had been rendered. The CA also held
that respondents never admitted during the pre-trial the existence of Cadastral Case
No. 10; they only admitted the existence of the Order dated June 30, 1989 in
Cadastral Case No. 10.
Petitioners subsequently filed this petition for review on certiorari, raising the
following issues:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
RULING THAT THE QUESTIONED DECISION OF THE RTC IS A
PROPER SUBJECT OF AN APPEAL AND A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
UNDER RULE 53 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
B.
C.
Petitioners posit that no appeal could be taken from the trial court's decision
because it did not completely dispose of all the issues in the case; it failed to settle the
issue on damages. Petitioners categorize the decision as a partial summary judgment,
which in Guevarra, et al. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., 28 reiterated in GSIS v.
Philippine Village Hotel, Inc., 29 the Court pronounced as not a final and an
appealable judgment, hence, interlocutory and clearly an improper subject of an
appeal. Petitioners theorize then that the appeal could not have been perfected and the
CA could not have acquired jurisdiction over the case, including the motion for new
trial. Accordingly, they conclude that the motion for new trial should have been
denied outright for being violative of Section 1, 30 Rule 53 of the Rules of Court,
which provides that the motion for new trial may be filed after the appeal has been
perfected. Petitioners argue that, pursuant to Section 4, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court,
trial should proceed instead to settle the issue on damages. Petitioners point out that
the case cited by the CA in its Decision, Bell Carpets International Trading
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 31 is not applicable to the case because, unlike in
the present case, the trial court's ruling completely disposed of all the issues in that
case.
In addition, petitioners insist that respondents already admitted the existence of
Cadastral Case No. 10 by its admission of the existence of the Order dated June 30,
1989. They maintain that respondents cannot admit the existence of an order and yet
deny the existence of the proceedings from which the order emanates. Respondents'
judicial admission that the court Order existed necessarily carried with it the
admission that the cadastral proceedings where the Order was issued likewise existed.
Petitioners aver that respondents are bound by their judicial admission and they
cannot be allowed to present evidence to contradict the same.
Petitioners next argue that the purported newly discovered pieces of evidence
have no probative value. Petitioners say that the certifications are self-serving and
inconclusive opinions of court employees, who did not even indicate the period when
they occupied their positions and state whether they had the authority to issue such
certifications and whether they had personal knowledge of the documents archived
during the year that the deed of sale was executed. According to petitioners, the
certifications cannot overcome the presumption of regularity in the issuance of the
Order dated June 30, 1989. At most, the certifications would simply show that the
records of Cadastral Case No. 10 could no longer be found in the records; hence, they
would have no bearing on the result of the case.
Petitioners also emphasize that respondents failed to meet the burden of
proving that the newly discovered pieces of evidence presented comply with the
requisites to justify the holding of a new trial. They contend that respondents could
have discovered and presented in court the certifications during trial had they
exercised reasonable diligence. HScCEa
The Rules do not give an exact definition of due diligence, and whether
the movant has exercised due diligence depends upon the particular
circumstances of each case. Nonetheless, it has been observed that the phrase is
often equated with "reasonable promptness to avoid prejudice to the defendant."
In other words, the concept of due diligence has both a time component and a
good faith component. The movant for a new trial must not only act in a timely
fashion in gathering evidence in support of the motion; he must act reasonably
and in good faith as well. Due diligence contemplates that the defendant acts
reasonably and in good faith to obtain the evidence, in light of the totality of the
circumstances and the facts known to him. 45
SO ORDERED.
||| (Ybiernas v. Tanco-Gabaldon, G.R. No. 178925, [June 1, 2011], 665 PHIL 297-312)
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
REYES, J : p
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the Decision 2 dated November 20, 2009 and the Resolution 3
dated June 17, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00390-MIN
which affirmed with modification the Decision 4 dated April 26, 2006 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, Branch 10, in Criminal Case No.
10717-00 convicting Napoleon D. Senit (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of Reckless Imprudence resulting to Multiple Serious Physical Injuries and Damage
to Property.
The Antecedents
The facts as narrated are culled from the Comments 5 of the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) and from the assailed decision of the CA:
In the morning of September 2, 2000, private complainant Mohinder
Toor, Sr. was driving north along Aglayan from the direction of Valencia on
board his Toyota pick-up with his wife Rosalinda Toor, their three-year-old
son Mohinder Toor, Jr., and househelper Mezelle Jane Silayan. He turned left
and was coming to the center of Aglayan when a speeding Super 5 bus driven
by petitioner and coming from Malaybalay headed south towards Valencia,
suddenly overtook a big truck from the right side. Petitioner tried to avoid the
accident by swerving to the right towards the shoulder of the road and
applying the brakes, but he was moving too fast and could not avoid a
collision with the pick-up. The bus crashed into the right side of private
complainant's pick-up at a right angle.
All passengers of the pick-up were injured and immediately brought to
Bethel Baptist Hospital, Sumpong, Malaybalay City. However, because of
lack of medical facilities, they were transferred to the Bukidnon Doctor's
Hospital in Valencia City, Bukidnon. Rosalinda Toor sustained an open
fracture of the humerus of the right arm and displaced, closed fracture of the
proximal and distal femur of the right lower extremity which required two
surgical operations. She was paralyzed as a result of the accident and was
unable to return to her job as the Regional Manager of COSPACHEM Product
Laboratories. Mohinder Toor, Sr. spent about P580,000.00 for her treatment
and P3,000.00 for Mezelle Jean Silayan, who suffered frontal area swelling as
a result of the accident. Mohinder Toor, Sr. suffered a complete fracture of the
scapular bone of his right shoulder while his son Mohinder Toor, Jr. sustained
abdominal injury and a wound on the area of his right eye which required
suturing. The damage sustained by the pick-up reached P106,155.00. CAIHTE
Upon being arraigned on June 21, 2001, the petitioner, with the assistance of
his counsel, pleaded not guilty to the Information in this case. 7
Trial ensued. However, after the initial presentation of evidence for the
petitioner, he resigned from his employment and transferred residence. His
whereabouts allegedly became unknown so he was not presented as a witness by his
new counsel. 8
On April 26, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision in absentia convicting the
petitioner of the crime charged. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding the accused
NAPOLEON SENIT y Duhaylungsod guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime as charged, he is hereby sentenced to an imprisonment of an
indeterminate penalty of Four [4] months and One [1] day of Arresto Mayor
maximum as minimum and to Four [4] years and Two [2] months Prision
Correc[c]ional medium as maximum. The accused is further ordered to
indemnify the private complainant the amount of Fifty Thousand [P50,000.00]
Pesos as moral damages, the amount of Four Hundred Eighty Thousand
[P480,000.00] [Pesos] for the expenses incurred in the treatment and
hospitalization of Rosalinda Toor, Mohinder Toor, Jr[.] and Mezelle Jean
Silayan and the amount of Eighty Thousand [P80,000.00] [Pesos] for the
expenses incurred in the repair of the damaged Toyota pick-up vehicle.
SO ORDERED. 9
The RTC issued a Promulgation 10 dated August 4, 2006, which included an
order for the arrest of the petitioner.
The petitioner then filed a motion for new trial via registered mail on the
ground that errors of law or irregularities have been committed during trial that are
allegedly prejudicial to his substantial rights. He claimed that he was not able to
present evidence during trial because he was not notified of the schedule. Likewise,
he mistakenly believed that the case against him has been dismissed as private
complainant Mohinder Toor, Sr. (Toor, Sr.) purportedly left the country. 11
On September 22, 2006, the public prosecutor opposed the motion for new trial
filed by the petitioner. 12
On October 26, 2006, the motion for new trial was denied by the lower court
pronouncing that notices have been duly served the parties and that the reason given
by the petitioner was self-serving. 13
Dissatisfied with the RTC decision, the petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal
dated November 6, 2006 by registered mail to the CA, on both questions of facts and
laws. 14
Ruling of the CA
On November 20, 2009, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with
modification as to the penalty imposed, the dispositive portion thereof reads:
ACCORDINGLY, with MODIFICATION that [the petitioner] should
suffer the penalty of three (3) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, the
Court AFFIRMS in all other respects the appealed 26 April 2006 Decision of
the [RTC] of Malaybalay City, Branch 10, in Criminal Case No. 10717-00. aDSIHc
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 15
In affirming with modification the decision of the RTC, the CA ratiocinated as
follows: first, the evidence presented by OSG overwhelmingly points to the petitioner
as the culprit. A scrutiny of the records further reveals that the pictures taken after the
accident and the Traffic Investigation Report all coincide with the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, which are in whole consistent and believable thus, debunking
the claim of the petitioner that he was convicted on the mere basis of allegedly biased
and hearsay testimonies which do not establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In
addition, there was no existing evidence to show that there was an improper motive
on the part of the eyewitnesses. 16
Second, it found the arguments of the petitioner to move for a new trial as
baseless. 17
Lastly, it rendered that the proper imposable penalty is the maximum period of
arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods that is — imprisonment for three
(3) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor since the petitioner has, by reckless
imprudence, committed an act which, had it been intentional, would have constituted
a less grave felony, based on the first paragraph of Article 365 in relation to Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). 18
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA,
in its Resolution 19 dated June 17, 2010.
As a final recourse, the petitioner filed the petition for review before this Court,
praying that the applicable law on the matter be reviewed, and the gross
misappreciation of facts committed by the court a quo and by the CA be given a
second look.
The Issues
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC AND THE CA ERRED IN DENYING
THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR TO RE-OPEN THE SAME IN
ORDER TO ALLOW THE PETITIONER TO PRESENT EVIDENCE ON
HIS BEHALF; AND
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
PETITIONER DESPITE THE APPARENT FAILURE ON THE PART OF
THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE PETITIONER
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 20
Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
The RTC and CA did not err in
denying the petitioner's motion for
new trial or to re-open the same.
The Court finds that no errors of law or irregularities, prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the petitioner, have been committed during trial.
The petitioner anchors his motion for new trial on Rule 121, Section 2 (a) of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 2. Grounds for a new trial. — The Court shall grant a new trial on
any of the following grounds:
(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the accused have been committed
during the trial;
(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which
the accused could not with reasonable diligence have
discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced
and admitted would probably change the judgment. (Emphasis
ours) ETHIDa
To sum up the claims of the petitioner, he theorizes that there was an error of
law or irregularities committed when the RTC promulgated a decision in absentia and
deemed that he had waived his right to present evidence resulting to denial of due
process, a one-sided decision by the RTC, and a strict and rigid application of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure against him.
First, it must be noted that the petitioner had already been arraigned and
therefore, the court a quo had already acquired jurisdiction over him. In fact, there
was already an initial presentation of evidence for the defense when his whereabouts
became unknown.
The petitioner's claims that he had not testified because he did not know the
schedule of the hearings, and mistakenly believed that the case had already been
terminated with the departure of Toor, Sr., do not merit our consideration. 21
The holding of trial in absentia is authorized under Section 14 (2), Article III
of the 1987 Constitution which provides that after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified
and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. 22 It is established that notices have been
served to the counsel of the petitioner and his failure to inform his counsel of his
whereabouts is the reason for his failure to appear on the scheduled date. Thus, the
arguments of the petitioner against the validity of the proceedings and promulgation
of judgment in absentia for being in violation of the constitutional right to due process
are doomed to fail. 23
In Estrada v. People, 24 the Court ruled that:
Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy.
In the present case, petitioner was afforded such opportunity. The trial
court set a hearing on May 14, 1997 for reception of defense evidence, notice
of which was duly sent to the addresses on record of petitioner and her
counsel, respectively. When they failed to appear at the May 14, 1997 hearing,
they later alleged that they were not notified of said setting. Petitioner's
counsel never notified the court of any change in her address, while petitioner
gave a wrong address from the very beginning, eventually jumped bail and
evaded court processes. Clearly, therefore, petitioner and her counsel were
given all the opportunities to be heard. They cannot now complain of alleged
violation of petitioner's right to due process when it was by their own fault
that they lost the opportunity to present evidence. 25 (Citation omitted)
Similarly in the present case, the petitioner clearly had previous notice of the
criminal case filed against him and was given the opportunity to present evidence in
his defense. The petitioner was not in any way deprived of his substantive and
constitutional right to due process as he was duly accorded all the opportunities to be
heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense, but he forfeited this right,
through his own negligence, by not appearing in court at the scheduled hearings. 26
The negligence of the petitioner in believing that the case was already
terminated resulting to his failure to attend the hearings, is inexcusable. The Court has
ruled in many cases that:
It is petitioner's duty, as a client, to be in touch with his counsel so as to be
constantly posted about the case. It is mandated to inquire from its counsel
about the status and progress of the case from time to time and cannot expect
that all it has to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of the case. It is
also its responsibility, together with its counsel, to devise a system for the
receipt of mail intended for them. 27 (Citations omitted) cSEDTC
The Court finds that the negligence exhibited by the petitioner, towards the
criminal case against him in which his liberty is at risk, is not borne of ignorance of
the law as claimed by his counsel rather, lack of concern towards the incident, and the
people who suffered from it. While there was no showing in the case at bar that the
counsel of the petitioner was grossly negligent in failing to inform him of the notices
served, the Court cannot find anyone to blame but the petitioner himself in not
exercising diligence in informing his counsel of his whereabouts.
The Court also agrees with the Comment of the OSG that there is neither rule
nor law which specifically requires the trial court to ascertain whether notices
received by counsel are sufficiently communicated with his client. 28
In GCP-Manny Transport Services, Inc. v. Judge Principe, 29 the Court held
that:
[W]hen petitioner is at fault or not entirely blameless, there is no reason to
overturn well-settled jurisprudence or to interpret the rules liberally in its
favor. Where petitioner failed to act with prudence and diligence, its plea that
it was not accorded the right to due process cannot elicit this Court's approval
or even sympathy. It is petitioner's duty, as a client, to be in touch with his
counsel so as to be constantly posted about the case. . . . 30 (Citations omitted)
Even if the Court assumed that the petitioner anchors his claim on Section 2 (b)
of Rule 121 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the argument still has no
merit.
"A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted
only if the following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after
trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial
even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight
that, if admitted, it would probably change the judgment. It is essential that the
offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before
or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it." 31 The Court agrees with the CA in
its decision which held that "a new trial may not be had on the basis of evidence
which was available during trial but was not presented due to its negligence.
Likewise, the purported errors and irregularities committed in the course of the trial
against [the petitioner's] substantive rights do not exist." 32
In Lustaña v. Jimena-Lazo, 33 the Court ruled that:
Rules of procedure are tools designed to promote efficiency and
orderliness as well as to facilitate attainment of justice, such that strict
adherence thereto is required. Their application may be relaxed only when
rigidity would result in a defeat of equity and substantial justice, which is not
present here. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot just be rationalized by
harking on the policy of liberal construction. 34 (Citations omitted and italics
in the original)
In the instant case, the Court finds no reason to waive the procedural rules in
order to grant the motion for new trial of the petitioner. There is just no legal basis for
the grant of the motion for new trial. The Court believes that the petitioner was given
the opportunity to be heard but he chose to put this opportunity into waste by not
being diligent enough to ask about the status of the criminal case against him and
inform his counsel of his whereabouts.
The RTC did not err in convicting
the petitioner.
The law applicable to the case at bar is Article 365 of the RPC, which provides
that:
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing
or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing
to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to
do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be
without malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and
(5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place. 35
All elements for the crime of reckless imprudence have been established in the
present case.
The petitioner questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and claims
that their testimonies are biased. He also claims that Toor, Sr. is the real culprit when
he turned left without looking for an incoming vehicle, thus violating traffic rules
resulting to the mishap.
The Court believes that the RTC and CA correctly appreciated the evidence
and testimonies presented in the instant case. AaCTcI
The Court agrees with the OSG that not only were the witnesses' narrations of
the accident credible and worthy of belief, their accounts were also consistent and
tallied on all significant and substantial points. 36 These witnesses' testimonies are as
follows:
PO3 Jesus Delfin testified that he investigated the accident at Aglayan. He
made the following findings in his accident report: the pick-up owned and driven by
Toor, Sr., together with his family and a househelper as his passengers, was turning
left along Aglayan when it was hit at a right angle position by a Super 5 bus driven by
the petitioner. He noted skid marks made by the bus and explained that the petitioner
was overtaking but was not able to do so because of the pick-up. The petitioner could
not swerve to the left to avoid the pick-up because there was a ten-wheeler truck. He
swerved to the right instead and applied breaks to avoid the accident. The investigator
clearly testified that, on the basis of data gathered, the collision was due to the error of
the bus driver who was driving too fast, as evinced by the distance from the skid
marks towards the axle. 37
Albert Alon testified that he saw Toor, Sr.'s pick-up turn left along Aglayan.
He also saw a big truck and a Super 5 bus both coming from Malaybalay. The truck
was running slowly while the Super 5 bus was running fast and overtaking the big
truck from the right side. The bus crashed into the pick-up and pushed the smaller
vehicle due to the force of the impact. He went nearer the area of collision and saw
that the four passengers of the pick-up were unconscious. 38
Mezelle Jane Silayan testified that while moving towards the center of Aglayan
on board her employer's pick-up, she saw a Super 5 bus overtaking a big truck from
the right side. Their vehicle was hit by the bus. She was thrown out of the pick-up and
hit her head on the ground. 39
Toor, Sr. testified that while he was driving his pick-up at the corner of the
center of Aglayan, a Super 5 bus, moving fast, overtook a big truck from the right
side. The bus then hit the pick up, injuring him and all his passengers. 40
Taken all together, the testimonies of the witnesses conclusively suggest that:
(1) the Super 5 bus was moving fast; (2) the bus overtook a big truck which was
moving slowly from the right side; and (3) when the petitioner saw the pick-up truck
turning left, he applied the brakes but because he was moving fast, the collision
became inevitable.
"Well-entrenched is the rule that the a trial court's assessment of the credibility
of witnesses is entitled to great weight and is even conclusive and binding, if not
tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of significance
and influence. This rule is based on the fact that the trial court had the opportunity to
observe the demeanor and the conduct of the witnesses." 41 The Court finds in the
instant case that there is no reason for this Court to deviate from the rule.
The Court finds the testimonies of the witnesses not biased. There was no
evidence of ill motive of the witnesses against the petitioner.
Lastly, the petitioner claims that Toor, Sr. committed a traffic violation and
thus, he should be the one blamed for the incident. The Court finds this without merit.
The prosecution sufficiently proved that the Super 5 bus driven by the
petitioner recklessly drove on the right shoulder of the road and overtook another
south-bound ten-wheeler truck that slowed at the intersection, obviously to give way
to another vehicle about to enter the intersection. It was impossible for him not to
notice that the ten-wheeler truck in front and traveling in the same direction had
already slowed down to allow passage of the pick-up, which was then negotiating a
left turn to Aglayan public market. Seeing the ten-wheeler truck slow down, it was
incumbent upon the petitioner to reduce his speed or apply on the brakes of the bus in
order to allow the pick-up to safely make a left turn. Instead, he drove at a speed too
fast for safety, then chose to swerve to the right shoulder of the road and overtake the
truck, entering the intersection and directly smashing into the pick-up. In flagrantly
failing to observe the necessary precautions to avoid inflicting injury or damage to
other persons and things, the petitioner was recklessly imprudent in operating the
Super 5 bus. 42EcTCAD
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
BRION, J : p
The facts of the case, gathered from the parties' pleadings, are briefly summarized
below.
On December 8, 2005, the prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for
being filed 10 days late, arguing that Neypes is inapplicable to appeals in criminal
cases. 8
On January 4, 2006, the prosecution filed a motion for execution of the
decision. 9
On January 20, 2006, the RTC considered the twin motions submitted for
resolution.
On January 26, 2006, the petitioner filed the present petition for prohibition
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the RTC from acting on the prosecution's motions to dismiss the
appeal and for the execution of the decision. 10
The Petition
The petitioner argues that the RTC lost jurisdiction to act on the prosecution's
motions when she filed her notice of appeal within the 15-day reglementary period
provided by the Rules of Court, applying the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes.
The respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a manifestation in lieu of comment, stating that Neypes applies
to criminal actions since the evident intention of the "fresh period rule" was to set a
uniform appeal period provided in the Rules. 11
In view of the OSG's manifestation, we required the Spouses Casaclang to
comment on the petition. 12
In their comment, the Spouses Casaclang aver that the petitioner cannot seek
refuge in Neypes to extend the "fresh period rule" to criminal cases because Neypes
involved a civil case, and the pronouncement of "standardization of the appeal periods
in the Rules" referred to the interpretation of the appeal periods in civil cases, i.e.,
Rules 40, 41, 42 and 45, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure among others; nowhere
in Neypes was the period to appeal in criminal cases, Section 6 of Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, mentioned. 13
Issue
The core issue boils down to whether the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes
applies to appeals in criminal cases.
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has
the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more
simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the
rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42,
43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and
compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may
consist of 15 days or more.
The Court also reiterated its ruling that it is the denial of the motion for
reconsideration that constituted the final order which finally disposed of the issues
involved in the case.
The raison d'être for the "fresh period rule" is to standardize the appeal period
provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal
period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no longer interrupted
by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration; litigants today
need not concern themselves with counting the balance of the 15-day period to appeal
since the 15-day period is now counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion
for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution.
While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Court's
pronouncement of a "fresh period" to appeal should equally apply to the period for
appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, for the following reasons:
First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is
based, makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a
criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states that "[t]he period for appeal
from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all
cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution,
award, judgment, or decision appealed from." Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we (this Court) also ought
not to recognize any distinction. 17 DCASIT
Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all
other appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.
Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC exercised its
appellate jurisdiction) and to this Court in civil and criminal cases are the same, no
cogent reason exists why the periods to appeal from the RTC (in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction) to the CA in civil and criminal cases under Section 3 of Rule 41
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure should be treated differently.
Were we to strictly interpret the "fresh period rule" in Neypes and make it
applicable only to the period to appeal in civil cases, we shall effectively foster and
encourage an absurd situation where a litigant in a civil case will have a better right to
appeal than an accused in a criminal case — a situation that gives undue favor to civil
litigants and unjustly discriminates against the accused-appellants. It suggests a
double standard of treatment when we favor a situation where property interests are at
stake, as against a situation where liberty stands to be prejudiced. We must
emphatically reject this double and unequal standard for being contrary to reason.
Over time, courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is
contrary to reason is not allowed in law — Quod est inconveniens, aut contra
rationem non permissum est in lege. 18
Thus, we agree with the OSG's view that if a delay in the filing of an appeal
may be excused on grounds of substantial justice in civil actions, with more reason
should the same treatment be accorded to the accused in seeking the review on appeal
of a criminal case where no less than the liberty of the accused is at stake. The
concern and the protection we must extend to matters of liberty cannot be overstated.
In light of these legal realities, we hold that the petitioner seasonably filed her
notice of appeal on November 16, 2005, within the fresh period of 15 days, counted
from November 3, 2005, the date of receipt of notice denying her motion for new
trial.
CDTSEI
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Yu v. Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, [February 9, 2011], 657 PHIL 431-441)
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
BRION, J : p
Before this Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 filed by petitioner
Clarita Estrellado-Mainar assailing the resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
November 28, 2007, 2 and July 29, 2008, 3 respectively, in CA-G.R. CR No. 00429.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
Sometime in February 2005, the petitioner offered for sale to Eric Naval
(Naval) portions of land located in Matina Aplaya, Davao City. During the
negotiations for this sale, the petitioner told Naval that the title to the land she was
selling had no problems. The petitioner also informed Naval that the area subject of
the proposed sale would "still be segregated from the mother title." 4
On March 24, 2003, the parties executed an Agreement to Buy and Sell 5 where
the petitioner agreed to sell to Naval a 200-square meter portion of the land covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-19932 representing a portion of the
petitioner's share in the estate of her deceased father, Nicolas Estrellado. 6 Naval paid
a down payment totaling P100,000.00, 7 and then asked permission from the
petitioner if he could construct his house on the land he bought. After the petitioner
issued an Authorization dated March 24, 2003, Naval built his house on the subject
land.
On June 3, 2005, representatives from JS Francisco & Sons, Inc. (JS
Francisco) demolished Naval's house. It was only then that Naval discovered that the
lot sold to him had been the subject of a dispute between the petitioner's family and JS
Francisco. Naval demanded from the petitioner the return of the amount he paid for
the land, as well as to pay the value of the house demolished, but the latter refused to
heed these demands.
The prosecution charged the petitioner with the crime of other forms of
swindling under Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2, Davao City 8 in an
Information that provides:
That sometime in February 2005, in the city of Davao, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused,
with deceit and intent to defraud, pretending to be the lawful owner of a two
hundred (200) square meters lot portion of a lot covered by TCT-19932
located at Cogon, Matina Aplaya, this City, with deceit and intent to gain,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeeded in selling the same to one Eric
C. Naval for which the said Eric C. Naval paid to the accused the total amount
of P123,000.00, as partial payment of the said lot when in truth and in fact and
despite her knowledge that the entire property covered by TCT No. 19931
[sic] had been sold and was already owned by JS Francisco and Sons, Inc.,
thereby defrauding the said Eric C. Naval in the aforesaid amount of
P123,000.00. AaCTcI
CONTRARY TO LAW. 9
In its decision 10 dated December 27, 2006, the MTCC found the petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of other forms of swindling under Article 316,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and sentenced her to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor.
The MTCC essentially ruled that the petitioner "represented to the complainant
that the property is free from lien and encumbrance." 11 It added that Naval relied on
the first page of the title that had been shown to him, and that the petitioner
deliberately did not inform him of the fact that she (petitioner) no longer owned the
area sold.
Accordingly, the MTCC directed the petitioner to pay the following amounts to
the offended party: (a) P123,000.00 fine with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; (b) P123,000.00 civil indemnity; (c) P65,755.45 as actual expenses
incurred and proven; (d) P10,000.00 attorney's fees; and (e) P10,000.00 moral
damages.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 16, Davao City, affirmed
the MTCC decision in toto. 12 The RTC essentially adopted the factual findings and
the conclusions of the MTCC.
The petitioner moved to reconsider this decision, but the RTC denied her
motion in its Order of May 29, 2007.
The petitioner challenged the RTC rulings before the CA via a petition for
review, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 00429. In its resolution 13 dated August 16,
2007, the CA directed the petitioner to "show cause why the petition should not be
dismissed for its failure to: (1) allege the date of receipt of the assailed decision in the
petition; (2) allege the date of receipt of the denial of the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration with the court a quo; and (3) attach Exhibits "03" to "05" referred to
on pages 8 and 9 of the petition."
In her Compliance and Manifestation, 14 the petitioner specified the date when
her counsel's messenger received the assailed RTC decision and order. She, however,
manifested that her petition for review bore no Exhibits "03" to "05" on pages 8-9.
In its resolution of November 28, 2007, 15 the CA dismissed the petition for the
petitioner's failure to attach the exhibits that would support the allegations of her
petition in violation of Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
The petitioner moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA denied her motion
in its resolution dated July 29, 2008.
THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
In the present petition, 16 the petitioner claimed that the CA erred in dismissing
her petition for review on mere technicalities. She further argued that the courts a quo
erred in convicting her of violation of Article 316, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code because the Information charged her with violation of paragraph 1 of the same
article. The petitioner also maintained that she did not misrepresent the subject land to
be free from any lien or encumbrance. acEHCD
OUR RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to grant the petition.
Noncompliance with Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court
The right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process, but
merely a statutory privilege to be exercised only in accordance with the law. As the
appealing party, the petitioner must comply with the requirements of the relevant
rules; otherwise, she loses the statutory right to appeal. We emphasize that the
procedures regulating appeals as laid down in the Rules of Court must be followed
because strict compliance with them is indispensable for the orderly and speedy
disposition of justice. 17
Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 2. Form and contents. — The petition shall be filed in seven
(7) legible copies, with the original copy intended for the court being
indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full names of the
parties to the case, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof
either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the specific material dates
showing that it was filed on time; (c) set forth concisely a statement of the
matters involved, the issues raised, the specification of errors of fact or law, or
both, allegedly committed by the Regional Trial Court, and the reasons or
arguments relied upon for the allowance of the appeal; (d) be accompanied
by clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or
final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of
the Regional Trial Court, the requisite number of plain copies thereof
and of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would
support the allegations of the petition. (emphasis ours)
Corollarily, Section 3 of this Rule states that "[t]he failure of the petitioner to
comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding, among others, the contents
of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal thereof."
We note that the CA exercised liberality in its treatment of the petitioner's
petition for review when — instead of dismissing it outright — it still directed her to
show cause why hear petition should not be dismissed for failing to strictly comply
with Section 2 of Rule 42, particularly for failure to: (1) allege the date of receipt of
the assailed decision in the petition; (2) allege the date of receipt of the denial of
petitioner's motion for reconsideration; and (3) attach exhibits "03" to "05" referred to
on pages 8 and 9 of the petition. 18
Instead of complying with the third directive, however, the petitioner stated
that the petition had no exhibits "03" and "05" on pages 8-9. An examination of the
records revealed that, indeed, exhibits "03" to "05" were stated on pages 4 to 5. The
CA itself admitted that it inadvertently stated in its directive that exhibits "03" to "05"
were on pages 8 and 9, instead of on pages 4 to 5.
Notwithstanding the CA's inadvertence, the petitioner ought to have complied
with the latter's third directive, considering that there could have been no other
exhibits "03" to "05" referred to other than those mentioned on pages 4 and 5 of the
petition, namely TCT No. T-364319 (Exh. "03"); Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
with Renunciation of Shares, Donation and Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. "04"); and
Agreement to Buy and Sell (Exh. "05").
Without doubt, these documents would have supported the material allegations
in the petitioner's petition for review. The petitioner should have been more prudent
and vigilant in pursuing her petition, instead of capitalizing on the CA's misquotation
of the pages. The CA already gave the petitioner the opportunity to rectify the
procedural infirmities in her petition, but the latter did not take advantage of this
liberality by exerting utmost diligence to comply with the CA's directives.
The records likewise showed that the petitioner did attach Exhibits "03" to "05"
in her motion for reconsideration before the CA. The CA, nonetheless, disregarded
these annexes due to the petitioner's failure to offer any explanation why she did not
attach these documents to her petition. While the CA could have stretched the limits
of its liberality a bit more, we could not fault it for ruling the way it did at that point
since the petitioner did not even bother to offer any explanation why she did not
attach these relevant documents to her petition. As the CA held:
Despite petitioner's second attempt to rectify the procedural infirmities
in the motion for reconsideration by attaching therein the exhibits, yet,
petitioner did not even proffer any explanation why she failed in the first
instance to attach the same in the petition.
xxx xxx xxx
Finally, concomitant to petitioner's plea for liberal application of the
rules of procedure is her obligation to exert her utmost to comply therewith.
Sadly, petitioner is wanting of the traits that could qualify her to invoke
liberality in the application of the Rules. 19
What constitutes a good and sufficient cause that will merit a reconsideration
of the dismissal of the petition is a discretionary call by the CA, and the Court will not
interfere with the exercise of this prerogative unless there has been a grave abuse of
discretion. Following the clear provisions of Section 2, in relation with Section 3, of
Rule 42, we hold that the CA did not act in a whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious
manner that amounted to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by
law or to act at all in contemplation of law.
The petitioner's improper conviction
under Article 316, paragraph 2 of the RPC
Notwithstanding the petitioner's noncompliance with Section 2, Rule 42, we
resolve the substantive issue raised by the petitioner in the interest of justice. This
Court has, on occasion, suspended the application of technical rules of procedure
where matters of life, liberty, honor or property, among other instances, are at stake. It
has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects
and lapses on the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice. The strict and rigid application of rules that tends to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided. 20
Section 14 (2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that an accused
has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Indeed, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be alleged in the
Information. Section 8 of said rule provides that the Information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute and aver the acts or omissions
constituting the offense. The real nature of the crime charged is determined by the
facts alleged in the Information and not by the title or designation of the offense
contained in the caption of the Information. It is fundamental that every element of
which the offense is comprised must be alleged in the Information. 21
To recall, the prosecution charged the petitioner with the crime of other forms
of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
which punishes "[a]ny person who, pretending to be the owner of any real property,
shall convey, sell, encumber, or mortgage the same."
The trial courts, however, convicted the petitioner under Article 316, paragraph
2 which punishes the act of any person who, knowing that real property is
encumbered, shall dispose of the same, although such encumbrance is not recorded.
The elements of other forms of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code are as follows: (1) that the thing disposed of be real property; (2)
that the offender knew that the real property was encumbered, whether the
encumbrance is recorded or not; (3) that there must be express representation by the
offender that the real property is free from encumbrance; and (4) that the act of
disposing of the real property be made to the damage of another. 22
The Information in the present case, aside from expressly indicating in its
caption that it is charging the petitioner under Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code, alleged that the petitioner "with deceit and intent to defraud," pretended
to be the lawful owner of a 200-square meter portion of a lot covered by TCT No. T-
19932 despite her knowledge that the entire property had already been sold and was
owned by JS Francisco. Notably, it had not been alleged that the petitioner expressly
represented to Naval that the subject property was free from any encumbrance.
In Naya v. Abing, 23 the Court set aside the petitioner's conviction for estafa
under Article 316 (2) of the Revised Penal Code since there had been no allegation in
the Information that he (petitioner) expressly represented in the sale of the subject
property to William Po that the said property was free from any encumbrance. We
explained that the gravamen of the crime is the disposition of legally encumbered real
property by the offender under the express representation that there is no
encumbrance thereon; and that the accused must make an express representation in
the deed of conveyance that the property sold or disposed of is free from any
encumbrance for one to be criminally liable. The Court explained that:
. . . there is no allegation in the Information that petitioner expressly
represented in the sale of the subject property to William Po that the said
property was free from any encumbrance. Irrefragably, then, petitioner was
not charged with estafa under Article 316, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code. Hence, the trial court committed a reversible error in finding petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa under said provision and that the
Court of Appeals likewise erred in affirming the decision of the trial court on
appeal. 24
We reiterate that the Information in the present case did not allege that the
petitioner made an express representation that the property sold is free from any
encumbrance. This Information was crafted in such a way that only one particular
crime was charged (i.e., Article 316, paragraph 1), and the alleged manner through
which such offense was committed (that is, by pretending to be the lawful owner . . .)
did not constitute ground for conviction under paragraph 2, which may be committed
even by the owner of the property.
Significantly, the Agreement to Buy and Sell between the petitioner and Naval
also did not contain any representation by the petitioner that the property being sold
was free from any encumbrance.
It is not disputed that TCT No. T-19932 bore the following annotations:
xxx xxx xxx
Entry No. 1131326 — AFFIDAVIT OF ADVERSE CLAIM — filed
by J.S. Francisco and Sons, Inc. represented by Joselito Franscisco affecting
the property covered by this Certificate of Title which is the subject of Deed
of Sale executed between the said corporation and the registered owner. This
instrument was executed before Notary Public of Davao City Francis Arnold
de Vera, as Doc. No. . . .
Date of instrument : Oct. 28, 1998;
Date of inscription : Oct. 29, 1998 at 8:10 a.m.
At any rate, paragraph 2 of Article 316 does not prohibit the sale of an
encumbered property; the vendor must have represented to the buyer that the property
was free from encumbrance. 25 What brings about criminal liability is the deceit in
selling the property. Corollarily, the deed must have a statement of warranty that is
false in order to commit the offense. 26 The petitioner's passive attitude regarding the
presence of an adverse claim (she assumed that Naval became aware of this
inscription after showing to him a copy of TCT No. T-19932 and "never complained")
is not sufficient to constitute fraud within the meaning of the law. The fraud and/or
deceit by misrepresentation contemplated by law must be the result of overt acts; they
cannot be implied or presumed.
In the light of these considerations, we hold that the trial courts erroneously
convicted the petitioner of other forms of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 2 of
the Revised Penal Code. To uphold the petitioner's conviction for an offense other
than that charged in the Information would be a violation of her right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. HSAcaE
In its April 26, 1999 decision in Civil Case No. 6, 297-C-98, the MTCC merely
resolved the issue of prior physical possession or possession de facto, and did not
resolve the issue of ownership of the disputed property. The MTCC, in fact,
recognized that the title (TCT No. T-19932) to the disputed property was registered
under the name of Nicolas.
We also point out that the petitioner sought the assistance of the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao to require the Register of Deeds of Davao City to produce the
deed of absolute sale between Nicolas and JS Francisco referred to in the affidavit of
adverse claim. While the Register of Deeds could not yet certify with finality as to the
nonexistence of this deed, 33 the petitioner's act of seeking the aid of the Ombudsman
shows her honest and earnest desire to protect her family's interest over the subject
property (she claims that the deed of sale between her father and JS Francisco was
spurious), and that she had no intention to deceive Naval. Naval and Josephine, in
fact, lived on the subject property for two years, more or less, before their house was
destroyed by the representatives of JS Francisco. Josephine even intimated that she
had been hoping that the petitioner's family would be able to settle the dispute with JS
Francisco over the subject property while she (Josephine) and Naval were living
there.
On a final note, we stress that it is the prosecution who determines the charges
to be filed and how the legal and factual elements in the case shall be utilized as
components of the information. Fairness demands that the petitioner should not be
convicted of a crime which she has not been charged with or which is not necessarily
included therein.
WHEREFORE, in the light of these considerations, we GRANT the petition,
and SET ASIDE the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated November 28, 2007,
and July 29, 2008, respectively, in CA-G.R. CR No. 00429. Accordingly, we
ACQUIT petitioner Clarita Estrellado-Mainar of the crime of other forms of
swindling under Article 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. AcICHD
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe * and Leonen, JJ., concur.
||| (Estrellado-Mainar v. People, G.R. No. 184320, [July 29, 2015])
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
PERALTA, J : p
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari questioning the Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated June 6, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-MIN. The CA
reversed and set aside the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kapatagan,
Lanao del Norte, Branch 21, dated February 28, 2006 in Criminal Case No. 21-1211, and
acquitted private respondents Raymund Carampatana, Joefhel Oporto, and Moises
Alquizola of the crime of rape for the prosecution's failure to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
Following pre-trial, 6 trial on the merits ensued. Accused Christian John Lim,
however, remains at-large.
They all contributed and it was Joseph Villame who bought the drinks — two (2)
bottles of Emperador Brandy. Then they arranged themselves in a circle for the drinking
spree. Two (2) glasses were being passed around: one glass containing the sweetener
(Pepsi) and the other glass containing the liquor. At first, AAA refused to drink because
she had never tried hard liquor before. During the session, they shared their problems
with each other. When it was AAA's turn, she became emotional and started crying. It
was then that she took her first shot. The glasses were passed around and she consumed
more or less five (5) glasses of Emperador Brandy.
Thereafter, she felt dizzy so she laid her head down on Oporto's lap. Oporto then
started kissing her head and they would remove her baseball cap. This angered her so she
told them to stop, and simply tried to hide her face with the cap. But they just laughed at
her. Then, Roda also kissed her. At that time, AAA was already sleepy, but they still
forced her to take another shot. They helped her stand up and make her drink. She even
heard Lim say, "Hubuga na, hubuga na," (You make her drunk, you make her drunk). She
likewise heard someone say, "You drink it, you drink it." She leaned on Oporto's lap
again, then she fell asleep. They woke her up and Lim gave her the Emperador Brandy
bottle to drink the remaining liquor inside. She tried to refuse but they insisted, so she
drank directly from the bottle. Again, she fell asleep.
The next thing she knew, Roda and Batoctoy were carrying her down the stairs,
and then she was asleep again. When she regained consciousness, she saw that she was
already at the Alquizola Lodging House. She recognized that place because she had been
there before. She would thereafter fall back asleep and wake up again. And during one of
the times that she was conscious, she saw Oporto on top of her, kissing her on different
parts of her body, and having intercourse with her. She started crying. She tried to resist
when she felt pain in her genitals. She also saw Carampatana and Moises Alquizola
inside the room, watching as Oporto abused her. At one point, AAA woke up while
Carampatana was inserting his penis into her private organ. She cried and told him to
stop. Alquizola then joined and started to kiss her. For the last time, she fell unconscious.
When she woke up, it was already 7:00 a.m. of the next day. She was all alone.
Her body felt heavy and exhausted. She found herself with her shirt on but without her
lower garments. The upper half of her body was on top of the bed but her feet were on the
floor. There were also red stains on her shirt. After dressing up, she hailed a trisikad and
went home. When AAA reached their house, her father was waiting for her and was
already furious. When she told them that she was raped, her mother started hitting her.
They brought her to the Lala Police Station to make a report. Thereafter, they proceeded
to the district hospital for her medical examination.
Dr. Cyrus Acusta of the Kapatagan District Hospital examined AAA in the
morning of March 26, 2004, and found an old hymenal laceration at 5 o'clock position
and hyperemia or redness at the posterior fornices. The vaginal smear likewise revealed
the presence of sperm.
On the other hand, accused denied that they raped AAA. According to the defense
witnesses, in the evening of March 25, 2004, Oporto, Carampatana, Lim, and AAA had
dinner at Gemeno's house. Gemeno then invited Oporto to attend the graduation party
hosted by Montesco at Alson's Palace, owned by the latter's family. When they reached
the place, Oporto told Montesco that they had to leave for Barangay Tenazas to fetch one
Arcie Ariola. At about 11:30 p.m., Oporto and Carampatana returned to Alson's Palace
but could not find AAA and Lim. The party subsequently ended, but the group agreed to
celebrate further. AAA, Rudinas, Dela Cruz, Lim, and Oporto contributed for two (2)
bottles of Emperador Brandy and one (1) liter of Pepsi.
Several persons were in the room at that time: AAA, Carampatana, Oporto, Dela
Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, Villame, and Lim. Also present but did not join the
drinking were Gemeno, Montesco, Angelo Ugnabia, Al Jalil Diego, Mohamad Janisah
Manalao, one Caga, and a certain Bantulan. Gemeno told AAA not to drink but the latter
did not listen and instead told him not to tell her aunt. During the drinking session, AAA
rested on Oporto's lap. She even showed her scorpion tattoo on her buttocks. And when
her legs grazed Batoctoy's crotch, she remarked, "What was that, penis?" Roda then
approached AAA to kiss her, and the latter kissed him back. Oporto did the same and
AAA also kissed him. After Oporto, Roda and AAA kissed each other again.
Meanwhile, earlier that evening, at around 9:00 p.m., Moises Alquizola was at the
Alquizola Lodging House drinking beer with his cousin, Junver, and Fiel. They stopped
drinking at around midnight. Fiel then requested Alquizola to accompany her to Alson's
Palace to see her friends there. They proceeded to the second floor and there they saw
AAA lying on Oporto's lap. Fiel told AAA to go home because her mother might get
angry. AAA could not look her in the eye, just shook her head, and said, "I just stay
here." Alquizola and Fiel then went back to the lodging house.
After thirty minutes, they went to Alson's Palace again, and saw AAA and Oporto
kissing each other. AAA was lying on his lap while holding his neck. Subsequently, they
went back to the lodging house to resume drinking.
After drinking, Batoctoy offered to bring AAA home. But she refused and instead
instructed them to take her to the Alquizola Lodging House because she has a big
problem. AAA, Lim, and Carampatana rode a motorcycle to the lodging house. When
they arrived, AAA approached Alquizola and told him, "Kuya, I want to sleep here for
the meantime." Alquizola then opened Room No. 4 where AAA, Oporto, and
Carampatana stayed. There were two beds inside, a single bed and a double-sized bed.
AAA lay down on the single bed and looked at Carampatana. The latter approached her
and they kissed. He then removed her shirt and AAA voluntarily raised her hands to give
way. Carampatana likewise removed her brassiere. All the while, Oporto was at the foot
of the bed. Thereafter, Oporto also removed her pants. AAA even lifted her buttocks to
make it easier for him to pull her underwear down. Oporto then went to AAA and kissed
her on the lips. Carampatana, on the other hand, placed himself in between AAA's legs
and had intercourse with her. When he finished, he put on his shorts and went back to
Alson's Palace to get some sleep. When he left, Oporto and AAA were still kissing.
Alquizola then entered the room. When AAA saw him, she said, "Come Kuya, embrace
me because I have a problem." Alquizola thus started kissing AAA's breasts. Oporto
stood up and opened his pants. AAA held his penis and performed fellatio on him. Then
Oporto and Alquizola changed positions. Oporto proceeded to have sexual intercourse
with AAA. During that time, AAA was moaning and calling his name. Afterwards,
Oporto went outside and slept with Alquizola on the carpet. Oporto then had intercourse
with AAA two more times. At 3:00 a.m., he went back to Alson's Palace to sleep. At
around 6:00 a.m., Oporto and Carampatana went back to the lodging house. They tried to
wake AAA up, but she did not move so they just left and went home. Alquizola had gone
outside but he came back before 7:00 a.m. However, AAA was no longer there when he
arrived.
On February 28, 2006, the RTC found private respondents Carampatana, Oporto
and Alquizola guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. It, however, acquitted
Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, and Villame for failure of the prosecution to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: CAaSHI
d) Finding accused Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda, Harold
Batoctoy and Joseph Villame NOT GUILTY of the crime charged for
failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt therefor beyond reasonable
doubt. Accordingly, the Court acquits them of said charge; and
Let the records of this case be sent to the archive files without prejudice
on the prosecution to prosecute the case against accused Christian John Lim as
soon as he is apprehended.
SO ORDERED. 7
Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, private respondents brought the case to the CA.
On June 6, 2008, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision reversing the trial
court's ruling and, consequently, acquitted private respondents. The decretal portion of
said decision reads:
SO ORDERED. 8
In sum, the CA found that the prosecution failed to prove private respondents' guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. It gave more credence to the version of the defense and ruled
that AAA consented to the sexual congress. She was wide awake and aware of what
private respondents were doing before the intercourse. She never showed any physical
resistance, never shouted for help, and never fought against her alleged ravishers. The
appellate court further relied on the medical report which showed the presence of an old
hymenal laceration on AAA's genitalia, giving the impression that she has had some
carnal knowledge with a man before. The CA also stressed that AAA's mother's unusual
reaction of hitting her when she discovered what happened to her daughter was more
consistent with that of a parent who found out that her child just had premarital sex rather
than one who was sexually assaulted.
On July 29, 2008, AAA, through her private counsel, filed a Petition for
Certiorari 9 under Rule 65, questioning the CA Decision which reversed private
respondents' conviction and ardently contending that the same was made with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The private respondents present the following arguments in their Comment dated
November 7, 2008 to assail the petition: cEHITA
I.
II.
III.
IV.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its own Comment on April 1,
2009. It assigns the following errors:
I.
II.
At the onset, the Court stresses that rules of procedure are meant to be tools to
facilitate a fair and orderly conduct of proceedings. Strict adherence thereto must not get
in the way of achieving substantial justice. As long as their purpose is sufficiently met
and no violation of due process and fair play takes place, the rules should be liberally
construed. 13 Liberal construction of the rules is the controlling principle to effect
substantial justice. The relaxation or suspension of procedural rules, or the exemption of
a case from their operation, is warranted when compelling reasons exist or when the
purpose of justice requires it. Thus, litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on
their merits and not on sheer technicalities. 14
As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a
judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. The reason is that a
judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is barred
from appealing lest the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be violated. 15
Section 21, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Despite acquittal, however, either the offended party or the accused may appeal,
but only with respect to the civil aspect of the decision. Or, said judgment of acquittal
may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
showing that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible
errors of judgment, but also exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby rendering the assailed judgment
null and void. 16 If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting petitioner's prayer is not
tantamount to putting private respondents in double jeopardy. 17
As to the party with the proper legal standing to bring the action, the Court said in
People v. Santiago: 18
Private respondents argue that the action should have been filed by the State
through the OSG. True, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of
the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of
the State. This is because the authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases
before the Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in the OSG. 20
Here, AAA filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, albeit at the instance of
her private counsel, primarily imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA
when it acquitted private respondents. As the aggrieved party, AAA clearly has the right
to bring the action in her name and maintain the criminal prosecution. She has an
immense interest in obtaining justice in the case precisely because she is the subject of
the violation. Further, as held in Dela Rosa v. CA, 21 where the Court sustained the
private offended party's right in a criminal case to file a special civil action for certiorari
to question the validity of the judgment of dismissal and ruled that the Solicitor General's
intervention was not necessary, the recourse of the complainant to the Court is proper
since it was brought in her own name and not in that of the People of the Philippines. In
any event, the OSG joins petitioner's cause in its Comment, 22 thereby fulfilling the
requirement that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and control
of the public prosecutor. 23
Private respondents further claim that even assuming, merely for the sake of
argument, that AAA can file the special civil action for certiorari without violating their
right against double jeopardy, still, it must be dismissed for petitioner's failure to
previously file a motion for reconsideration.
True, a motion for reconsideration is a condicio sine qua non for the filing of a
petition for certiorari. Its purpose is for the court to have an opportunity to correct any
actual or perceived error attributed to it by re-examination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case. This rule, however, is not absolute and admits well-defined
exceptions, such as: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has
no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been
duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and
passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of
the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of
the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was
deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal
case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial
court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of
due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public
interest is involved. 24
Here, petitioner's case amply falls within the exception. AAA raises the same
questions as those raised and passed upon in the lower court, essentially revolving on the
guilt of the private respondents. There is also an urgent necessity to resolve the issues, for
any further delay would prejudice the interests, not only of the petitioner, but likewise
that of the Government. And, as will soon be discussed, the CA decision is a patent
nullity for lack of due process and for having been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
For the writ of certiorari to issue, the respondent court must be shown to have
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An
acquittal is considered tainted with grave abuse of discretion when it is shown that the
prosecution's right to due process was violated or that the trial conducted was a sham.
The burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate and establish that the respondent
court blatantly abused its authority such as to deprive itself of its very power to dispense
justice. 25
AAA claims in her petition that the CA, in evident display of grave abuse of
judicial discretion, totally disregarded her testimony as well as the trial court's findings of
fact, thereby adopting hook, line, and sinker, the private respondents' narration of facts.
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or
tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in
a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
and hostility. 26 There is grave abuse of discretion when the disputed act of the lower
court goes beyond the limits of discretion thus effecting an injustice. 27
The Court finds that the petitioner has sufficiently discharged the burden of
proving that the respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in
acquitting private respondents.
It appears that in reaching its judgment, the CA merely relied on the evidence
presented by the defense and utterly disregarded that of the prosecution. At first, it may
seem that its narration of the facts 28 of the case was meticulously culled from the
evidence of both parties. But a more careful perusal will reveal that it was simply lifted, if
not altogether parroted, from the testimonies of the accused, especially that of Oporto, 29
Carampatana, 30 and Alquizola, 31 the accused-appellants in the case before it. The
appellate court merely echoed the private respondents' testimonies, particularly those as
to the specific events that transpired during the crucial period — from the dinner at
Gemeno's house to the following morning at the Alquizola Lodging House. As a result, it
presented the private respondents' account and allegations as though these were the
established facts of the case, which it later conveniently utilized to support its ruling of
acquittal.IDEHCa
Due process requires that, in reaching a decision, a tribunal must consider the
entire evidence presented, regardless of the party who offered the same. 32 It simply
cannot acknowledge that of one party and turn a blind eye to that of the other. It cannot
appreciate one party's cause and brush the other aside. This rule becomes particularly
significant in this case because the parties tendered contradicting versions of the incident.
The victim is crying rape but the accused are saying it was a consensual sexual
rendezvous. Thus, the CA's blatant disregard of material prosecution evidence and
outward bias in favor of that of the defense constitutes grave abuse of discretion resulting
in violation of petitioner's right to due process. 33
Moreover, the CA likewise easily swept under the rug the observations of the RTC
and made its own flimsy findings to justify its decision of acquittal.
First, the appellate court held that AAA was, in fact, conscious during the whole
ordeal. The fact that she never showed any physical resistance, never cried out for help,
and never fought against the private respondents, bolsters the claim of the latter that the
sexual acts were indeed consensual.
But the CA seemed to forget that AAA was heavily intoxicated at the time of the
assault. Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides:
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of
the following circumstances:
Under the aforecited provision, the elements of rape are: (1) the offender had
carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or
intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when
the victim is under twelve years of age. 34 Here, the accused intentionally made AAA
consume hard liquor more than she could handle. They still forced her to drink even
when she was already obviously inebriated. They never denied having sexual intercourse
with AAA, but the latter was clearly deprived of reason or unconscious at the time the
private respondents ravished her. The CA, however, readily concluded that she agreed to
the sexual act simply because she did not shout or offer any physical resistance,
disregarding her testimony that she was rendered weak and dizzy by intoxication, thereby
facilitating the commission of the crime. 35 The appellate court never provided any
reason why AAA's testimony should deserve scant or no weight at all, or why it cannot
be accorded any credence. In reviewing rape cases, the lone testimony of the victim is
and should be, by itself, sufficient to warrant a judgment of conviction if found to be
credible. Also, it has been established that when a woman declares that she has been
raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to mean that she has been raped, and where
her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on that basis
alone. This is because from the nature of the offense, the sole evidence that can usually
be offered to establish the guilt of the accused is the complainant's testimony itself. 36
The trial court correctly ruled that if AAA was not truthful to her accusation, she would
not have opened herself to the rough and tumble of a public trial. AAA was certainly not
enjoying the prying eyes of those who were listening as she narrated her harrowing
experience. 37
AAA positively identified the private respondents as the ones who violated her.
She tried to resist, but because of the presence of alcohol, her assaulters still prevailed.
The RTC found AAA's testimony simple and candid, indicating that she was telling the
truth. The trial court likewise observed that her answers to the lengthy and humiliating
questions were simple and straightforward, negating the possibility of a rehearsed
testimony. 38 Thus:
Q: Now, you said also when the Court asked you that you went asleep, when did
you regain your consciousness?
A: They woke me up and wanted me to drink the remaining wine inside the
bottle of Emperador Brandy. TAEDcS
Q: What do you mean that they hide you (sic) to drink the remaining contained
(sic) of the bottle of Emperador Brandy?
A: They gave me the bottle, sir, and I was trying to refuse but they insisted.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you remember the person or persons who was or who were carrying
you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who?
Q: If you can still remember, how did Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy carry
you?
A: Yes, sir.
A: When we entered the room and the light was switch (sic) on, I was awakened
by the flash of light.
Q: Do you have any idea, where were you when you were awakened that (sic)
flash of light.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where?
Q: When you regained your consciousness from the flash of light, what
happened?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was you (sic) reaction when you found that Joefhel Oporto was on top
of you?
A: I was starting to cry, sir.
A: I was saying don't because I feel pain my private organ (sic).
Q: What did Joefhel Oporto do, when you (sic) those words?
A: He was kissing on the different part (sic) of my body then he sexually abused
me.
ATTY. GENERALAO:
We want to make it on record, Your Honor, that the witness is crying. IATSHE
ATTY. GENERALAO:
COURT: Continue.
ATTY. GENERALAO:
Aside from Joefhel Oporto was found (sic) on top of you, who else was there
inside that room?
Q: Then, when again did you or when again did you wake up?
A: When I feel (sic) pain something inside my private part (sic), I saw Raymund
Carampatana, sir.
A: I was starting to cry again, sir, and told him don't.
Q: At that point, who else was inside that room when you found Raymund
Carampatana?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where in particular?
Q: Now, before you went asleep again (sic), what did you feel when you said
that you feel (sic) something in your private part when you saw
Raymund Carampatana?
A: Yes, sir.
A: I woke up at about 7:00 o'clock a.m in the next (sic) day, sir. 39
On the other hand, the RTC was not convinced with the explanation of the
defense. It noted that their account of the events was seemingly unusual and incredible.
40 Besides, the defense of consensual copulation was belatedly invoked and seemed to
have been a last ditch effort to avoid culpability. The accused never mentioned about the
same at the pre-trial stage. The trial court only came to know about it when it was their
turn to take the witness stand, catching the court by surprise. 41 More importantly, it
must be emphasized that when the accused in a rape case claims that the sexual
intercourse between him and the complainant was consensual, as in this case, the burden
of evidence shifts to him, such that he is now enjoined to adduce sufficient evidence to
prove the relationship. Being an affirmative defense that needs convincing proof, it must
be established with sufficient evidence that the intercourse was indeed consensua1. 42
Generally, the burden of proof is upon the prosecution to establish each and every
element of the crime and that it is the accused who is responsible for its commission. This
is because in criminal cases, conviction must rest on a moral certainty of guilt. 43 Burden
of evidence is that logical necessity which rests on a party at any particular time during
the trial to create a prima facie case in his favor or to overthrow one when created against
him. A prima facie case arises when the party having the burden of proof has produced
evidence sufficient to support a finding and adjudication for him of the issue in litigation.
44 However, when the accused alleges consensual sexual congress, he needs convincing
proof such as love notes, mementos, and credible witnesses attesting to the romantic or
sexual relationship between the offender and his supposed victim. Having admitted to
carnal knowledge of the complainant, the burden now shifts to the accused to prove his
defense by substantial evidence. 45 caCEDA
Here, the accused themselves admitted to having carnal knowledge of AAA but
unfortunately failed to discharge the burden required of them. Carampatana narrated that
upon reaching the room at the lodging house, AAA lay down on the bed and looked at
him. He then approached her and they kissed. He removed her shirt and brassiere.
Thereafter, Oporto also removed AAA's lower garments and then went to kiss AAA.
Carampatana then placed himself in between AAA's legs and had intercourse with her. 46
On the other hand, Oporto himself testified that he had sexual intercourse with AAA
three times. While Carampatana was removing AAA's shirt and brassiere, Oporto was
watching at the foot of the bed. Then he removed her pants and underwear, and AAA
even lifted her buttocks to make it easier for him to pull the clothes down. When
Carampatana left after having sexual intercourse with AAA, according to Oporto, he then
stood up, opened his pants, and took out his penis so that AAA could perform fellatio on
him. Then he proceeded to have sexual intercourse with AAA. Afterwards, Oporto went
outside and slept with Alquizola on the carpet. After a few minutes, he woke up and went
back to the room and again had intercourse with AAA. He went back to sleep and after
some time, he woke up to the sound of AAA vomitting. Shortly thereafter, he made love
with AAA for the third and last time. 47 Despite said shameless admission, however, the
accused failed to sufficiently prove that the lack of any physical resistance on AAA's part
amounts to approval or permission. They failed to show that AAA had sexual intercourse
with them out of her own volition, and not simply because she was seriously intoxicated
at that time, and therefore could not have given a valid and intelligent consent to the
sexual act.
The RTC also noticed that Fiel, one of the defense witnesses, was showy and
exaggerated when testifying, even flashing a thumbs-up to some of the accused after her
testimony, an indication of a rehearsed witness. 48 To be believed, the testimony must
not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness; it must be credible in itself such
as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under
the attending circumstances. 49
When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight,
and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some
fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full
opportunity to observe directly the witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying, the
trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial
evidence. 50 Matters of credibility are addressed basically to the trial judge who is in a
better position than the appellate court to appreciate the weight and evidentiary value of
the testimonies of witnesses who have personally appeared before him. 51 The appellate
courts are far detached from the details and drama during trial and have to rely solely on
the records of the case in its review. On the matter of credence and credibility of
witnesses, therefore, the Court acknowledges said limitations and recognizes the
advantage of the trial court whose findings must be given due deference. 52 Since the CA
and the private respondents failed to show any palpable error, arbitrariness, or
capriciousness on the findings of fact of the trial court, these findings deserve great
weight and are deemed conclusive and binding. 53
The CA continued, belaboring on the fact that the examining physician found old
hymenal laceration on AAA's private organ. The lack of a fresh hymenal laceration,
which is expected to be present when the alleged sexual encounter is involuntary, could
mean that AAA actually consented to the fornication. According to Dr. Acusta, when sex
is consensual, the vagina becomes lubricated and the insertion of the penis will not cause
any laceration. It presumed that complainant, therefore, was no longer innocent
considering the presence of old hymenal laceration that could have resulted from her
previous sexual encounters. The defense, however, failed to show that AAA was sexually
promiscuous and known for organizing or even joining sex orgies. It must be noted that
AAA was a minor, barely 17 years old at the time of the incident, having just graduated
from high school on that same day. In a similar case, 54 the Court held:
Neither does AAA's mother's act of hitting her after learning about the rape prove
anything. It is a truism that "the workings of the human mind when placed under
emotional stress are unpredictable, and the people react differently." 59 Different people
react differently to a given type of situation, and there is no standard form of behavioral
response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience. 60 At
most, it merely indicates the frustration and dismay of a mother upon learning that her
daughter had been defiled after partying late the night before. It is a settled rule that when
there is no showing that private complainant was impelled by improper motive in making
the accusation against the accused, her complaint is entitled to full faith and credence. 61
So if AAA in fact consented to the sexual act, why did she still need to immediately tell
her parents about it when she could have just kept it to herself? Why did she ever have to
shout rape? She was not caught in the act of making love with any of the private
respondents, 62 nor was she shown to have been in a relationship with any of them of
which her family disapproved. 63 She never became pregnant as a result of the deed. And
if AAA cried rape to save her reputation, why would she have to drag the private
respondents into the case and identify them as her rapists? Absent any circumstance
indicating the contrary, she brought the charge against the private respondents simply
because she was, in fact, violated and she wants to obtain justice. Her zeal in prosecuting
the case, even after the CA had already acquitted the private respondents, evinces the
truth that she merely seeks justice for her honor that has been debased. 64 Unfortunately,
the CA chose to ignore these telling pieces of evidence. Its findings are against the logic
and effect of the facts as presented by AAA in support of her complaint, 65 contrary to
common human experience, and in utter disregard of the relevant laws and jurisprudence
on the crime of rape.
Lastly, the trial court pronounced that Alquizola was not part of the conspiracy
because his participation in the crime was uncertain, 66 citing People v. Lobrigo. 67 It
found that his participation was not in furtherance of the plan, if any, to commit the crime
of rape. 68 The Court, however, finds that the RTC erred in ruling that Alquizola's
liability is not of a conspirator, but that of a mere accomplice. To establish conspiracy, it
is not essential that there be proof as to previous agreement to commit a crime, it being
sufficient that the malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.
Conspiracy is proved if there is convincing evidence to sustain a finding that the
malefactors committed an offense in furtherance of a common objective pursued in
concert. 69 Proof of conspiracy need not even rest on direct evidence, as the same may be
inferred from the collective conduct of the parties before, during or after the commission
of the crime indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the
commission of the offense. 70
In People v. Dela Torre, 72 the Court upheld the findings of the lower courts that
there was conspiracy:
[W]hile [Dela Torre] did not have carnal knowledge with [AAA], his
tacit and spontaneous participation and cooperation of pulling her towards the
parked jeep, molesting her and doing nothing to prevent the commission of the
rape, made him a co-conspirator. As such, he was properly adjudged as a
principal in the commission of the crime. 73
Finally, the Court notes that although the prosecution filed only a single
Information, it, however, actually charged the accused of several rapes. As a general rule,
a complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is
defective. 76 The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or
informations is to give the accused the necessary knowledge of the charge against him
and enable him to sufficiently prepare for his defense. The State should not heap upon the
accused two or more charges which might confuse him in his defense. 77 Non-
compliance with this rule is a ground 78 for quashing the duplicitous complaint or
information under Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused may
raise the same in a motion to quash before he enters his plea, 79 otherwise, the defect is
deemed waived. 80 The accused herein, however, cannot avail of this defense simply
because they did not file a motion to quash questioning the validity of the Information
during their arraignment. Thus, they are deemed to have waived their right to question the
same. Also, where the allegations of the acts imputed to the accused are merely different
counts specifying the acts of perpetration of the same crime, as in the instant case, there is
no duplicity to speak of. 81 There is likewise no violation of the right of the accused to be
informed of the charges against them because the Information, in fact, stated that they
"took turns in having carnal knowledge against the will of AAA" on March 25, 2004. 82
Further, allegations made and the evidence presented to support the same reveal that
AAA was indeed raped and defiled several times. Here, according to the accused
themselves, after undressing AAA, Carampatana positioned himself in between her legs
and had intercourse with her. On the other hand, Oporto admitted that he had sexual
intercourse with AAA three times. When two or more offenses are charged in a single
complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may
convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose upon him the
proper penalty for each offense. 83 Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola can then be held
liable for more than one crime of rape, or a total of four (4) counts in all, with conspiracy
extant among the three of them during the commission of each of the four violations.
Each of the accused shall thus be held liable for every act of rape committed by the other.
But while Oporto himself testified that he inserted his sexual organ into AAA's mouth,
the Court cannot convict him of rape through sexual assault therefor because the same
was not included in the Information. This is, however, without prejudice to the filing of a
case of rape through sexual assault as long as prescription has not yet set in.
Hence, in the proper execution of judgment by the lower court, the foregoing
provision should be taken into consideration by the judge in order to accord children in
conflict with the law, who have already gone beyond twenty-one (21) years of age, the
proper treatment envisioned by law.
As to their civil liability, all of them shall pay AAA the amount of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral damages, in each case. Exemplary
damages of P30,000.00 shall likewise be imposed by way of an example and to deter
others from committing the same bestial acts.
The Court hereby ORDERS the accused-respondents to pay AAA, jointly and
severally, the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each of the four (4) counts of rape. The case
is REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate action in accordance with
Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
Let the records of this case be forwarded to the court of origin for the execution of
judgment.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Del Castillo, * Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 183652, [February 25, 2015], 755 PHIL 80-120)
EN BANC
SYNOPSIS
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE
JEOPARDY; APPEAL FROM DISMISSALS OF CRIMINAL CASES ALLOWED IN
AMERICAN RULES OF PROCEDURE DOES NOT OBTAIN IN THE PHILIPPINES.
— The contextual situation in which appeals from dismissals of criminal cases are
allowed under American rules of procedure does not obtain in the Philippines. To be sure,
United States v. Scott positively spelled out that if an acquittal was based on an
appreciation of the evidence adduced, no appeal would lie. Mr. Justice Rehnquist
explained that what may seem superficially to be a "disparity in the rules governing a
defendant's liability to be tried again" refers to the underlying purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. He elaborated that "(a)s Kepner and Fong Fee [cases] illustrate, the law
attaches particular significance to an acquittal. To permit a second trial after an acquittal
however mistaken . . . would present an unacceptably high risk that the Government, with
its vastly superior resources, might wear down the defendant so that even though
innocent he may be found guilty. . . . On the other hand, to require a criminal defendant
to stand trial again after he has successfully invoked the statutory right of appeal to upset
his first conviction is not an act of governmental oppression of the sort against which
the . . . Clause was intended to protect."
aHSTID
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J : p
This case nudges the Court to revisit the doctrine on double jeopardy, a revered
constitutional safeguard against exposing the accused to the risk of answering twice for
the same offense. In this case, after trial on the merits, the accused was acquitted for
insufficiency of the evidence against him in the cases for murder and frustrated murder
(although his co-accused was convicted), and finding in the illegal carrying of firearm
that the act charged did not constitute a violation of law. But the State through this
petition for certiorari would want his acquittal reversed.
The idyllic morning calm in San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a small town north of Manila,
was shattered by gunshots fired in rapid succession. The shooting claimed the life of
young Alex Vinculado and seriously maimed his twin brother Levi who permanently lost
his left vision. Their uncle, Miguel Vinculado, Jr. was also shot. A slug tunneled through
his right arm, pierced the right side of his body and burrowed in his stomach where it
remained until extracted by surgical procedure.
As a consequence, three (3) criminal Informations — one (1) for homicide and
two (2) for frustrated homicide — were originally filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, against Honorato Galvez, Mayor of San Ildefonso, and Godofredo
Diego, a municipal employee and alleged bodyguard of the mayor. On 14 December
1993, however, the charges were withdrawn and a new set filed against the same accused
upgrading the crimes to murder (Crim. Case No. 4004-M-93) and frustrated murder
(Crim. Cases Nos. 4005-M-93 and 4006-M-93). Mayor Galvez was charged, in addition,
with violation of PD 1866 (Crim. Case No. 4007-M-94) for unauthorized carrying of
firearm outside his residence; hence, a fourth Information had to be filed. ICDcEA
After a series of legal maneuvers by the parties, venue of the cases was transferred
to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Metro Manila. There the cases were stamped
with new docket numbers (Nos. Q-94-55484, Q-94-55485, Q-94-55486 and Q-94-55487,
respectively), and raffled to Branch 103 presided over by Judge Jaime Salazar, Jr. In the
course of the proceedings, the judge inhibited himself and the cases were re-raffled to
respondent Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco of Branch 89.
On 8 October 1996 a consolidated decision on the four (4) cases was promulgated.
The trial court found the accused Godofredo Diego guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of murder and double frustrated murder. However, it acquitted Mayor Honorato
Galvez of the same charges due to insufficiency of evidence. It also absolved him from
the charge of illegal carrying of firearm upon its finding that the act was not a violation of
law.
The main hypothesis of the Government is that elevating the issue of criminal
culpability of private respondent Galvez before this Tribunal despite acquittal by the trial
court should not be considered violative of the constitutional right of the accused against
double jeopardy, for it is now settled constitutional doctrine in the United States that the
Double Jeopardy Clause permits a review of acquittals decreed by US trial magistrates
where, as in this case, no retrial is required should judgment be overturned. 1 Since
Philippine concepts on double jeopardy have been sourced from American constitutional
principles, statutes and jurisprudence, particularly the case of Kepner v. United States, 2
and because similarly in this jurisdiction a retrial does not follow in the event an acquittal
on appeal is reversed, double jeopardy should also be allowed to take the same
directional course. Petitioner in this regard urges the Court to take a second look at
Kepner, it being the "cornerstone of the battlement of the Double Jeopardy Clause" in the
Philippines 3 and seriously examine whether the precedents it established almost a
century ago are still germane and useful today in view of certain modifications wrought
on the doctrine by the succeeding American cases of United States v. Wilson 4 and
United States v. Scott. 5
Two (2) threshold issues therefore, interlocked as they are, beg to be addressed.
One is the propriety of certiorari as an extraordinary mode of review under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court where the result actually intended is the reversal of the acquittal of
private respondent Galvez. The other is the permissibility of a review by the Court of a
judgment of acquittal in light of the constitutional interdict against double jeopardy.
The recent untimely demise of respondent Galvez at the hands of alleged assassins
(not discounting to the earlier dismissal of respondent judge from the service) may
arguably have rendered these matters moot and academic, thus calling for a dismissal of
the petition on this basis alone. The Court however is not insensitive to nor oblivious of
the paramount nature and object of the pleas forcefully presented by the Government
considering especially the alleged new directions in American jurisprudence taken by the
doctrine of double jeopardy. We are thus impelled to respond to the issues advanced by
petitioner for these bear unquestionably far-reaching contextual significance and
implications in Philippine juristic philosophy and experience, demanding no less, explicit
and definitive rulings.
Jeopardy, itself "a fine poetic word," 9 derives from the Latin "jocus" meaning
joke, jest or game, 10 and also from the French term "jeu perdre" which denotes a game
that one might lose. Similarly, the Middle English word "iuparti" or "jupartie" means an
uncertain game. 11 The genesis of the concept itself however rests deep in the ancient
Grecian view of tragedy and suffering and in the old Roman legal concepts of
punishment. Greek law bound prosecutor and judge to the original verdict as can be seen
in the remark of Demosthenes in 355 B. C. that "the laws forbid the same man to be tried
twice on the same issue." 12 The Justinian Digest 13 providing that "(a) governor should
not permit the same person to be again accused of crime of which he has been acquitted,"
14 suggests certain philosophical underpinnings believed to have been influenced by
works of the great Greek tragedians of the 5th century B.C. reflecting man's "tragic
vision" or the tragic view of life. For the ancient Greeks believed that man was
continuously pitted against a superior force that dictated his own destiny. But this
prevailing view was not to be taken in the sense of man passing from one misfortune to
another without relief, as this idea was repugnant to Greek sensibilities. Rather, it
expressed a universal concept of catharsis or vindication that meant misfortune resolving
itself into a final triumph, and persecution, into freedom and liberation. To suffer twice
for the same misfortune was anathema to ancient thought.
The 18th century B. C. Babylonian king and lawgiver Hammurabi recognized that
humans could err in prosecuting and rendering judgment, thus limits were needed on
prosecutors and judges. A gruesome but effective way of preventing a second trial by the
same prosecutor after an acquittal can be found in the first law of the Hammurabic Code:
"If a man has accused a man and has charged him with manslaughter and then has not
proved [it against him], his accuser shall be put to death." 15
The most famous cause célèbre on double jeopardy in the Middle Ages was the
dispute between the English King Henry II and his good friend, Thomas á Becket,
Archbishop of Canterbury. Henry wished to continue the observance of certain customs
initiated by his predecessors called "avitae consuetudines," one of the known purposes of
which was that clerics convicted of crimes before Church courts be delivered to lay
tribunals for punishment. He asserted in the Constitutions of Clarendon that the clergy
were also subject to the king's punishment. This was met with stinging criticism and stiff
opposition by the Archbishop who believed that allowing this practice would expose the
clergy to double jeopardy. The issue between the two erstwhile friends was never
resolved and remained open-ended, for Thomas was later on mercilessly murdered in his
cathedral, allegedly at the instance of his king. 19
It was in England though, a century ago, that double jeopardy was formally
institutionalized "as a maxim of common law" 20 based on the universal principles of
reason, justice and conscience, about which the Roman Cicero commented: "Nor is it one
thing at Rome and another at Athens, one now and another in the future, but among all
nations, it is the same." 21 But even as early as the 15th century, the English courts
already began to use the term "jeopardy" in connection with the doctrine against multiple
trials. 22 Thereafter, the principle appeared in the writings of Hale (17th c.), Lord Coke
(17th c.) and Blackstone (18th c.). 23 Lord Coke for instance described the protection
afforded by the rule as a function of three (3) related common law pleas: autrefois acquit,
autrefois convict and pardon. 24 In Vaux's Case, 25 it was accepted as established that
"the life of a man shall not be twice put in jeopardy for one and the same offense, and that
is the reason and cause that autrefois acquitted or convicted of the same offense is a good
plea . . ." Blackstone likewise observed that the plea of autrefois acquit or a formal
acquittal is grounded on the universal maxim of the common law of England that "(n)o
man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offense. And
hence, it is allowed as a consequence that when a man is once fairly found not guilty
upon any indictment, or other prosecution before any court having competent jurisdiction
of the offense, he may plead such acquittal in bar of any subsequent accusation for the
same crime." 26
In 1817 the Supreme Court of Tennessee dismissed an appeal by the State after an
acquittal from perjury, declaring that: "A writ of error, or appeal in the nature of a writ of
error, will not lie for the State in such a case. It is a rule of common law that no one shall
be brought twice into jeopardy for one and the same offense. Were it not for this salutary
rule, one obnoxious to the government might be harassed and run down by repeated
attempts to carry on a prosecution against him. Because of this rule, a new trial cannot be
granted in a criminal case where the defendant is acquitted. A writ of error will lie for the
defendant, but not against him." 28 Verily, these concepts were founded upon that great
fundamental rule of common law, "Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa," in
substance expressed in the Constitution of the United States as: "Nor shall any person be
subject for the same offense, to be twice put into jeopardy of life or limb." It is in the
spirit of this benign rule of the common law, embodied in the Federal Constitution — a
spirit of liberty and justice, tempered with mercy — that, in several states of the Union, in
criminal cases, a writ of error has been denied to the State. 29
The relationship between the prohibition against second jeopardy and the power to
order a new trial following conviction or dismissal stirred a no small amount of
controversy in United States v. Gibert. 30 There, Mr. Justice Story, on circuit, declared
that "the court had no power to grant a new trial when the first trial had been duly had on
a valid indictment before a court of competent jurisdiction." The opinion formulated was
that the prohibition against double jeopardy applied equally whether the defendant had
been acquitted or convicted.
But it must be noted that even in those times, the power to grant a new trial in the
most serious cases was already being exercised by many American courts, the practice
having been observed from an early date, inspite of provisions of law against double
jeopardy. 31 For this reason, the rule in Gibert was stoutly resisted. 32 As if to taunt
Gibert, the 1839 case of United States v. Keen 33 declared that the constitutional
provision did not prohibit a new trial on defendant's motion after a conviction. In Hopt v.
Utah, 34 the defendant was retried three (3) times following reversals of his convictions.
Then in 1896 the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Ball 35 affirmed that the
double jeopardy rule did not prevent a second trial when, on appeal, a conviction had
been set aside. It declared that a defendant who procured on appeal a reversal of a
judgment against him could be tried anew upon the same indictment or upon another
indictment for the same offense of which he had been convicted. This principle of
autrefois convict was expanded nine (9) years later in Trono v. United States 36 where the
Court affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippines by holding that
"since the plaintiffs in error had appealed their convictions of the lower offense in order
to secure a reversal, there was no bar to convicting them of the higher offense in
proceedings in the appellate court that were tantamount to a new trial." Mr. Justice
Peckham, holding for the Court, concluded that "the better doctrine is that which does not
limit the court or the jury upon a new trial, to a consideration of the question of guilt of
the lower offense of which the accused was convicted on the first trial, but that the
reversal of the judgment of conviction opens up the whole controversy and acts upon the
original judgment as if it had never been." 37 It was ratiocinated that the result was
justified not only on the theory that the accused had waived their right not to be retried
but also on the ground that "the constitutional provision was really never intended to . . .
cover the case of a judgment . . . which has been annulled at the request of the
accused . . ."
cDTaSH
It must be stressed though that Ball also principally ruled that it had long been
settled under the Fifth Amendment that a verdict of acquittal is final, ending a defendant's
jeopardy, and, even when "not followed by any judgment, is a bar to a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense. It is one of the elemental principles of our criminal law
that the Government cannot secure a new trial by means of an appeal, even though an
acquittal may appear to be erroneous."
In 1891 the United States Judiciary Act was passed providing that appeals or writs
of error may be taken from the district court or from the existing circuit courts direct to
the Supreme Court in any case that involved the construction of the Constitution. The
following year an issue was raised in United States v. Sanges 38 on whether this Act
conferred upon the government the right to sue out a writ of error in any criminal case. In
that case, existing rules on double jeopardy took a significant turn when the United States
Supreme Court observed that while English law was vague on the matter, it had been
settled by overwhelming American authority that the State had no right to sue out a writ
of error upon a judgment in favor of the defendant in a criminal case, except under and in
accordance with express statutes, whether that judgment was rendered upon a verdict of
acquittal, or upon the determination by the court of a question of law. The Court noted
that in a few states, decisions denying a writ of error to the State after a judgment for the
defendant on a verdict of acquittal proceeded upon the ground that to grant it would be to
put him twice in jeopardy, in violation of the constitutional provision. 39 Sanges therefore
fixed the rule that absent explicit legislative authority, the United States Government had
no right of appeal in criminal cases in case of an acquittal as it would expose the
defendant twice to jeopardy.
Notably, however, in 1892 the Attorneys General of the United States began to
recommend the passage of legislation allowing the Government to appeal in criminal
cases. Their primary objective was to resist the power of a single district judge (under the
law then obtaining) by dismissing an indictment to defeat any criminal prosecution
instituted by the Government. No action was taken on the proposal until 1906 when
President Theodore Roosevelt in his annual message to the US Congress demanded the
enactment of legislation on the matter. Consequently, on 2 March 1907 such legislative
authority was provided when the Criminal Appeals Act became a law 40 permitting the
United States to seek a writ of error from the Supreme Court from any decision
dismissing all indictment on the basis of the "invalidity or construction of the statute
upon which the indictments is founded." 41 The law narrowed the right to appeal by the
Government to cases in which the ground of the District Court's decision was invalidity
or construction of the statute upon which the charge was founded, and that a verdict in
favor of the defendant based on evidence could not be set aside on appeal no matter how
erroneous the legal theory upon which it may be based. For these purposes, it made no
difference whether the verdict be the result of the jury's decision or that of the judge. In
other words, Government could appeal from a decision dismissing an indictment or
arresting judgment on the basis of the statutory invalidity or misconstruction of the
pertinent criminal statute and from a decision sustaining a special plea in bar, so long as
the defendant would not be put in jeopardy. 42
On 10 December 1898 the Philippine Islands was ceded by Spain to the United
States by virtue of the Treaty of Paris of 1898 which was ratified by the State Parties on
11 April 1899. The Islands was placed under military rule until the establishment of the
Philippine Commission in 1902. On 23 April 1900 the military government issued
General Order No. 58 which amended the Code of Criminal Procedure then in force by,
among others, extending to the Islands the double jeopardy provision under the Fifth
Amendment of the US Constitution. This was pursuant to the 7 April 1900 Instructions of
President McKinley issued to the Philippine Commission headed by William Howard
Taft. The Instructions read in part: " . . . the Commission should bear in mind, and the
people of the Islands should be made to understand, that there are certain great principles
of government which have been made the basis of our governmental system, which we
deem essential to the rule of law . . . and maintained in their islands for the sake of their
liberty and happiness, however much they may conflict with the customs or laws of
procedure with which they are familiar . . . Upon every division and branch of the
Government of the Philippines therefore must be imposed these inviolable rules: . . . that .
. . no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense . . ." 43
General Order No. 58 was amended by Act No. 194 which permitted an appeal by
the government after acquittal. The Philippine Civil Government Act of 1 July 1902 of
the U.S. Congress repealed the Act, adopted and restored the same principle in Gen.
Order No. 58 as enunciated in the Fifth Amendment and in McKinley's Instructions by
providing immunity from second jeopardy for the same criminal offense. It did not take
long however for the meaning and significance of the doctrine held forth in McKinley's
Instructions to be placed under severe test and scrutiny.
Questioning his conviction before the US Supreme Court, Kepner argued that the
appeal by the US government to the Philippine Supreme Court of his judgment of
acquittal constituted double jeopardy construed in light of existing US jurisprudence. On
the other hand, the Attorney General for the Philippines and the Solicitor General of the
United States jointly contended that the Philippine Bill of 1 July 1902 which included the
prohibition against double jeopardy should be construed from the perspective of the
system of laws prevailing in the Philippines prior to its cession to the United States.
Under this system, the Audiencia (Supreme Court) could entertain an appeal of a
judgment of acquittal since the proceedings before it were regarded not as a new trial but
an extension of preliminary proceedings in the court of first instance. The entire
proceedings constituted one continuous trial and the jeopardy that attached in the court of
first instance did not terminate until final judgment had been rendered by the Audiencia,
Double jeopardy was described not only in the Spanish law Fuero Real 44 as: "After a
man accused of any crime has been acquitted by the court, no one can afterwards accuse
him of the same offense (except in certain specified cases), but also in the Siete Partidas
45 which provided that: "If a man is acquitted by a valid judgment of any offense of
which he has been accused, no other person can afterwards accuse him of the offense . . ."
Under this system of law, a person was not regarded as jeopardized in the legal sense
until there had been a final judgment in the court of last resort. The lower courts then
were deemed examining courts, exercising preliminary jurisdiction only, and the accused
was not finally convicted or acquitted until the case had been passed upon in the
Audiencia or Supreme Court, whose judgment was subject to review by the Supreme
Court in Madrid (Spain) for errors of law, with power to grant a new trial.
The U.S. Supreme Court however threw out the Government's argument and held
that the proceedings after acquittal had placed the accused Kepner twice in jeopardy. It
declared in no uncertain terms that the appeal of the judgment of conviction was in
essence a trial de novo and that, whatever the Spanish tradition was, the purpose of
Congress was to carry some at least of the essential principles of American constitutional
jurisprudence to the Islands and to engraft them upon the law of these people newly
subject to its jurisdiction. There was little question therefore that Kepner soldered into
American jurisprudence the precedent that as to the defendant who had been acquitted by
the verdict duly returned and received, the court could take no other action than to order
his discharge. ". . . (I)t is then the settled law of this court that former jeopardy includes
one who has been acquitted by a verdict duly rendered, although no judgment be entered
on the verdict, and it was found upon a defective indictment. The protection is not . . .
against the peril of second punishment, but against being tried again for the same
offense." 46
This doctrine was echoed in United States v. Wills 47 where the Court further
clarified that "jeopardy implies an exposure to a lawful conviction for an offense of
which a person has already been acquitted . . ." It was reiterated in 1957 in Green v.
United States 48 in which Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Court, professed that the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy was designed to protect an individual
from being subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for an
alleged offense. Thus, under the Fifth Amendment, a verdict of acquittal was considered
final, ending the accused's jeopardy and that once a person has been acquitted of an
offense, he cannot be prosecuted again on the same charge.
Mr. Justice Black dissented, joined in by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice
Douglas, with Mr. Justice Brennan writing a separate dissenting opinion. Black rued that
the Court's ruling by a majority of one only resulted in "further limiting the already
weakened constitutional guarantees against double prosecution," citing the earlier case of
United States v. Lanza, 50 where the Court allowed the federal conviction and
punishment of a man previously convicted and punished for identical acts by a state
court. The dissent called attention to the fact that in Bartkus, for the first time in its
history, the Court allowed the state conviction of a defendant already acquitted of the
same offense in the federal court. This, Mr. Justice Black asserted, was unacceptable, for
as the Court previously found in Palko v. Connecticut, 51 "double prosecutions for the
same offense are so contrary to the spirit of our free country that they violate even the
prevailing view of the Fourteenth Amendment since some of the privileges and
immunities of the Bill of Rights . . . have been taken over and brought within the
Fourteenth Amendment by process of absorption . . . One may infer, from the fewness of
the cases, that retrials after acquittal have been considered particularly obnoxious, worse
even, in the eyes of many, than retrials after conviction."
HASTCa
Whether such forceful pronouncements steered back into course meandering views
on double jeopardy is open to question. Nonetheless, the case of Fong Foo v. United
States, 52 decided per curiam, reaffirmed the pronouncements in Ball and Kepner that
"the verdict of acquittal was final, and could not be reviewed . . . without putting (the
petitioners) twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution."
In the meantime, from 1907 up to 1970 the Criminal Appeals Act underwent
significant alterations. The 1942 amendment of its Section 682 permitted for the first time
appeals to the circuit appeals court from orders sustaining demurrer to indictment in cases
not directly appealable to the Supreme Court. 53 However, due to the many modifications
the law was subjected to, construction and interpretation became more laborious,
effectively transforming appeals into highly technical procedures. As such, the Criminal
Appeals Act developed into a judicial "bete noire," for even the U.S. Supreme Court
itself had "to struggle in a number of occasions with the vagaries of the said Act." 54 In
one of those unhappy efforts, it concluded that the Act was "a failure . . . a most unruly
child that has not improved with age." 55
The U.S. Congress finally got rid of the dismal statute in 1970 and replaced it with
a new Criminal Appeals Act intended to broaden the right of Government to appeal
whenever the Constitution would permit. It was apparent that the legislative body left to
the courts the prerogative to draw the constitutional limits of double jeopardy rather than
define them itself. Since then, pronouncements by the courts on the double jeopardy
guarantee of the Fifth Amendment focused on three (3) related protections: against a
second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; against a second prosecution for
the same offense after conviction; and, against multiple punishments for the same
offense. 56
In Wilson, 57 the Court expressed that the interests underlying these three (3)
protections are quite similar. Thus, when a defendant has been once convicted and
punished for a particular crime, principles of fairness and finality require that he be not
subjected to the possibility of further punishment by being tried or sentenced for the same
offense. 58 And when a defendant has been acquitted of an offense, the Clause guarantees
that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict him, "thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even
though innocent he may be found guilty." 59 It can thus be inferred from these cases that
the policy of avoiding multiple trials has been considered paramount so that exceptions to
the rule have been permitted only in few instances and under rigid conditions.
At this juncture, it must be explained that under existing American law and
jurisprudence, appeals may be had not only from criminal convictions but also, in some
limited instances, from dismissals of criminal charges, sometimes loosely termed
"acquittals." But this is so as long as the judgments of dismissals do not involve
determination of evidence, such as when the judge: (a) issues a post-verdict acquittal, i.e.,
acquits the defendant on a matter of law after a verdict of guilty has been entered by a
trier of facts (a jury); (b) orders the dismissal on grounds other than insufficiency of
evidence, as when the statute upon which the indictment was based is defective; (c)
conducts a judicial process that is defective or flawed in some fundamental respect, such
as incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence, incorrect instructions, or prosecutorial
misconduct; (d) issues an order arresting judgment, i.e., an act of a trial judge refusing to
enter judgment on the verdict because of an error appearing on the face of the record that
rendered the judgment; 62 or, (e) pronounces judgment on a special plea in bar (a non
obstante plea) — one that does not relate to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, but
which is set up as a special defense relating to an outside matter but which may have
been connected with the case. 63 Interestingly, the common feature of these instances of
dismissal is that they all bear on questions of law or matters unrelated to a factual
resolution of the case which consequently, on appeal, will not involve a review of
evidence. Its logical effect in American law is to render appeals therefrom non-repugnant
to the Double Jeopardy Clause.
This contextual situation in which appeals from dismissals of criminal cases are
allowed under American rules of procedure does not obtain in the Philippines. To be sure,
United States v. Scott positively spelled out that if an acquittal was based on an
appreciation of the evidence adduced, no appeal would lie. Mr. Justice Rehnquist
explained that what may seem superficially to be a "disparity in the rules governing a
defendant's liability to be tried again" refers to the underlying purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. He elaborated that "(a)s Kepner and Fong Foo illustrate, the law
attaches particular significance to an acquittal. To permit a second trial after an acquittal
however mistaken . . . would present an unacceptably high risk that the Government, with
its vastly superior resources, might wear down the defendant so that even though
innocent he may be found guilty. . . . On the other hand, to require a criminal defendant
to stand trial again after he has successfully invoked the statutory right of appeal to upset
his first conviction is not an act of governmental oppression of the sort against which
the . . . Clause was intended to protect."
Petitioner's own hermeneutic sense of the phrase "another trial" is that which
solely adverts to a proceeding before a competent trial court that rehears the case and
receives evidence anew to establish the facts after the case has been finally disposed of
by the Supreme Court. Obviously, it adheres to the Holmesian hypothesis in Kepner and,
for that matter, the concept under Spanish law then applicable in the Philippines before
the American colonization, that a trial consists of one whole continuing process from
reception of evidence by a trier of facts up to its final disposition by the Supreme Court.
But petitioner conveniently forgets that this theory has been consistently spurned by both
American and Philippine jurisprudence that has faithfully adhered to the doctrine that an
appeal of a judgment after the defendant had been acquitted by the court in a bench trial
is, quintessentially, a new trial. In Kepner, the Court regarded the two (2) events, i.e., trial
by the lower court and the appellate proceedings, as equivalent to two (2) separate trials,
and the evil that the Court saw in the procedure was plainly that of multiple prosecutions.
64 Although Kepner technically involved only one proceeding, the Court deemed the
second fact finding, that is, the review by the appellate court, as the equivalent of a
second trial. Accordingly, in subsequent cases, the Court has treated the Kepner principle
as being addressed to the evil of successive trials. 65
No less than the case of Wilson, 66 petitioner's main anchor for its propositions,
affirms this rule. There, the Court emphasized that it has, up to the present, rejected the
theory espoused by the dissenting Mr. Justice Holmes in Kepner that "a man cannot be
said to be more than once in jeopardy in the same cause however often he may be tried.
The jeopardy is one continuing jeopardy, from its beginning to the end of the cause." It
declared unequivocally that "we continue to be of the view that the policies underlying
the Double Jeopardy Clause militate against permitting the Government to appeal after a
verdict of acquittal." Wilson therefore pronounced that if acquittal is declared on the basis
of evidence adduced, double jeopardy attaches for that particular cause.
The inapplicability of this ruling to the case at bar is at once discernible. The
dismissal of the charges against private respondent Galvez was not upon his own
instance; neither did he seek to avoid trial, as it was in Scott, to be considered as
having waived his right to be adjudged guilty or innocent. Here, trial on the merits
was held during which both government and accused had their respective day in court.
Wilson, Scott and all other pertinent American case law considered, it still
behooves us to examine if at this time there is need to rethink our juristic philosophy
on double jeopardy vis-a-vis acquittals. In this respect, it would be instructive to see
how Philippine law and jurisprudence have behaved since Kepner. Has the principle
since then beneficially evolved, or has it remained an "unruly child that has not
improved with age?"
While some reservations may be had about the contemporary validity of this
observation considering the variety of offsprings begotten, at least in the United
States, by the mother rule since then, perhaps it is safer to say that not much deviation
has occurred from the general rule laid out in Kepner. For Kepner may be said to have
been the lighthouse for the floundering issues on the effect of acquittals on jeopardy
as they sail safely home. The cases of People v. Bringas, 72 People v. Hernandez, 73
People v. Montemayor, 74 City Fiscal of Cebu v. Kintanar, 75 Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 76 and Heirs of Tito Rillorta v. Firme, 77 to name a few, are illustrative.
Certainly, the reason behind this has not been due to a stubborn refusal or reluctance
to "keep up with the Joneses," in a manner of speaking, but to maintain fidelity to the
principle carefully nurtured by our Constitution, statutes and jurisprudence. As early
as Julia v. Sotto 78 the Court warned that without this safeguard against double
jeopardy secured in favor of the accused, his fortune, safety and peace of mind would
be entirely at the mercy of the complaining witness who might repeat his accusation
as often as dismissed by the court and whenever he might see fit, subject to no other
limitation or restriction than his own will and pleasure.
The 1935 Philippine Constitution provided in its Sec. 20, Art. III, that "(n)o
person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." The discussions by the
members of the Constitutional Convention of 1934 on the effect on double jeopardy
of an appeal from a judgment of acquittal are enlightening. Foreclosing appeal on a
judgment of acquittal was recognized by the Convention and the proposal to make an
appeal from acquittal permissible even only "on questions of law provided that a
verdict in favor of the defendant shall not be set aside by reason thereof" was strongly
voted down. Thus —
MR. GULLAS:
PRESIDENT:
We can vote on the amendment. (Various delegates: YES). Those who are in
favor of the amendment please say YES. (A minority: YES). Those
against the amendment say NO. (A majority: NO). The amendment is
rejected . . .
(1934 Constitutional Convention Record, Journal No. 95, November 24, 1934,
p. 361)
The case of People v. Bringas 79 was the first case to be decided under this
Constitution pertinent to the matter at hand. There the Supreme Court, guided by
Kepner, cited its finding in United States v. Tam Yung Way 80 against the right of
appeal by the government from a judgment discharging the defendant in a criminal
case after he has been brought to trial, whether defendant was acquitted on the merits
or whether his discharge was based upon the trial court's conclusion of law that the
trial had failed for some reason to establish his guilt as charged. cTADCH
The Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution, specifically Sec. 22, Art. IV
thereof, reproduced verbatim the same double jeopardy provision of the 1935
Constitution. So did the 1987 Freedom Constitution drafted by the 1986
Constitutional Commission.
Then again, during the debates on double jeopardy under Sec. 23, Art. III, on
the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, Commissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla reopened
the matter already settled at the deliberations on the article on the Judiciary. The
following exchanges ensued:
MR. PADILLA:
FR. BERNAS:
Yes.
MR. PADILLA:
I recall that when this same idea, but in different phraseology, was presented
and approved by the Committee on the Judiciary, the great objection
was that it would violate the immunity against double jeopardy. But I
recall the sponsor admitted, after I had explained the day before that it
did not violate double jeopardy but it was unnecessary and harmful.
What is the real position, Mr. Presiding Officer? Is it in violation of
double jeopardy or is it just because it need not be stated in the Bill of
Rights nor in the Article on the Judiciary?
FR. BERNAS:
MR. PADILLA:
That is correct Mr. Presiding Officer because we want to make the exercise of
that right by the state or offended party restrictive not only through a
petition for review on certiorari in the discretion of the Supreme Court
which may dismiss it outright, but also on certain grounds that are
really covered by "in excess or lack of jurisdiction.
But my common impression Mr. Presiding Officer, is that most lawyers are of
the opinion that when a judgment of acquittal is rendered by a trial
court, that is final, executory and not appealable.
Does not the sponsor think, Mr. Presiding Officer, an appeal from an arbitrary
judgment of acquittal rendered by a few corrupt judges of the offended
party or the state will improve the administration of justice?
FR. BERNAS:
The Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure relative to double jeopardy and the
effect thereon of acquittals adhere strictly to constitutional provisions. The pertinent
portions of Sec. 7 of Rule 117 thereof provide —
Thus, the doctrine that "double jeopardy may not be invoked after trial" may apply
only when the Court finds that the "criminal trial was a sham" because the
prosecution representing the sovereign people in the criminal case was denied due
process. 89 The Court in People v. Bocar 90 rationalized that the "remand of the
criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely
to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second
jeopardy." 91
Related to his right of repose is the defendant's interest in his right to have his
trial completed by a particular tribunal. 97 This interest encompasses his right to have
his guilt or innocence determined in a single proceeding by the initial jury empanelled
to try him, for society's awareness of the heavy personal strain which the criminal trial
represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit
Government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in
enforcement of criminal laws. 98 The ultimate goal is prevention of government
oppression; the goal finds its voice in the finality of the initial proceeding. 99 As
observed in Lockhart v. Nelson, 100 "(t)he fundamental tenet animating the Double
Jeopardy Clause is that the State should not be able to oppress individuals through the
abuse of the criminal process." Because the innocence of the accused has been
confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second
trial would be unfair. 101
Be that as it may, the invalidity of petitioner's argument lies in its focus on the
instrumentality empowered to rule against the evidence, i.e., the American jury versus
the Philippine judge, no matter how emphatic it qualifies its proposition with the
phrase "underlying rationale of jury acquittals," rather than on the essential function
of fact-finding itself which consists of reception, sifting and evaluation of evidence.
Where the main task of fact-finding is concerned, there exists no difference between
the American jury and the Philippine trial judge. Both are triers of facts. This much
petitioner has to concede. The attempt therefore to close the door on the applicability
of the finality rule to our legal system abjectly fails when one considers that,
universally, the principal object of double jeopardy is the protection from being tried
for the second time, whether by jury or judge. Thus, "emerging American consensus
on jury acquittals" notwithstanding, on solid constitutional bedrock is well engraved
our own doctrine that acquittals by judges on evidentiary considerations cannot be
appealed by government. The jurisprudential metes and bounds of double jeopardy
having been clearly defined by both constitution and statute, the issue of the effect of
an appeal of a verdict of acquittal upon a determination of the evidence on the
constitutionally guaranteed right of an accused against being twice placed in jeopardy
should now be finally put to rest.
Petitioner assails the decision rendered by the court a quo as blatantly
inconsistent with the material facts and evidence on record, reason enough to charge
respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
resulting in a denial of due process. Citing People v. Pablo, 102 it alleges that
"respondent aggravated his indiscretion by not . . . reviewing the evidence already
presented for a proper assessment. . . . It is in completely ignoring the evidence
already presented . . . that the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of
discretion." It adds that "discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the
confines of procedural due process, i.e., after evaluation of the evidence submitted by
the prosecution. Any order issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound
judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness." 103
We agree. The office of the common law writ of certiorari is to bring before
the court for inspection the record of the proceedings of an inferior tribunal in order
that the superior court may determine from the face of the record whether the inferior
court has exceeded its jurisdiction, or has not proceeded according to the essential
requirements of the law. However, the original function and purpose of the writ have
been so modified by statutes and judicial decisions. It is particularly so in the field of
criminal law when the state is applying for the writ and problems arise concerning the
right of the state to appeal in a criminal case. As a general rule, the prosecution cannot
appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment in favor of the defendant in a
criminal case in the absence of a statute clearly conferring that right. The problem
comes into sharper focus when the defendant contends, in effect, that the prosecution
is attempting to accomplish by the writ what it could not do by appeal, and that his
constitutional rights are being thus encroached upon. 104
The petition at hand which seeks to nullify the decision of respondent judge
acquitting the accused Honorato Galvez goes deeply into the trial court's appreciation
and evaluation in esse of the evidence adduced by the parties. A reading of the
questioned decision shows that respondent judge considered the evidence received at
trial. These consisted among others of the testimonies relative to the positions of the
victims vis-a-vis the accused and the trajectory, location and nature of the gunshot
wounds, and the opinion of the expert witness for the prosecution. While the
appreciation thereof may have resulted in possible lapses in evidence evaluation, it
nevertheless does not detract from the fact that the evidence was considered and
passed upon. This consequently exempts the act from the writ's limiting requirement
of excess or lack of jurisdiction. As such, it becomes an improper object of and
therefore non-reviewable by certiorari. To reiterate, errors of judgment are not to be
confused with errors in the exercise of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., concurs and also with Mr. Justice Panganiban in his separate
opinion.
Melo, J., in the result in view of the death of Mayor Galvez, although I must say
that the discussion on double jeopardy and the separate opinion of Justice Panganiban are
well taken.
Panganiban, J., Please see separate opinion.
||| (People v. Velasco, G.R. No. 127444, [September 13, 2000], 394 PHIL 517-564)
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
CARPIO, J : p
The Case
G.R. No. 200302 is an appeal 1 assailing the Decision 2 promulgated on 31
May 2011 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04461. The CA
affirmed the Decision 3 dated 23 March 2010 of Branch 85 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City (RTC) in Criminal Case No. Q-05-136584. The RTC found
appellant Gerry Lipata y Ortiza (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
RTC also ordered appellant to pay damages to the heirs of Rolando Cueno (Cueno). 4
The Facts
Appellant was charged with the crime of Murder in an Information which reads
as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of September, 2005, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating with two (2) other
persons whose true names, identities and definite whereabouts have not as yet
been ascertained and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and with
evident premeditation and treachery, and taking advantage of superior
strength, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one RONALDO
CUENO Y BONIFACIO, by then and there stabbing him repeatedly with
bladed weapons, hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal stab wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
Ronaldo Cueno y Bonifacio.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
Appellant was arraigned on 11 October 2005, and entered a plea of not guilty
to the charge. Pre-trial conference was terminated on 26 October 2005, and trial on
the merits ensued.
The CA summarized the parties' evidence as follows:
The Prosecution['s] Evidence
Mercelinda Valzado, sister-in-law of the victim Rolando Cueno,
testified that on September 1, 2005 at around 6:00 p.m., she was in her house
located in [sic] Lot 34, Block 4, Sipna Compound, Bagong Silangan, Quezon
City. She was about to leave the house to go to the market when she saw
appellant, his brother Larry Lipata and a certain [Rudy] attacking the victim
by repeatedly stabbing him. She was at a distance of more or less ten (10)
meters from the incident. Shocked at what she had just witnessed, she shouted
for help and pleaded the assailants to stop, but they did not stop stabbing the
victim. In her account, she recalled that the assailants, including appellant,
used a tres cantos, an ice pick and a broken piece of glass of Red Horse
[bottle]. At one point, the victim managed to take the knife away from
appellant and brandished the same at his attackers. Thereafter, the victim fell
on the ground. Upon seeing the victim fall, appellant and the other assailants
left the scene. Through the help of some neighbors, Mercelinda rushed the
victim to a hospital but he was pronounced dead on arrival. CAIHTE
Criz Reymiluz Cueno, daughter of the victim, testified that she saw
appellant together with Larry Lipata and Rudy Lipata [stab] her father to death
in front of their house. She recounted that upon arriving at home from work
on September 1, 2005 at around 6:00 p.m., her father immediately went to the
house of her aunt Mercelinda Valzado, which was located only a block away
from their house, to ask for malunggay leaves. Upon coming home from her
aunt's house, the victim was attacked by the Lipatas which prompted the
victim to run away. Thinking that his assailants were no longer around, the
victim proceeded to their [sic] house but then the Lipatas stabbed him to
death. She was at a distance of six (6) to eight (8) meters away from the scene.
She further testified that she had no knowledge of any reason why the Lipatas
would kill her father, but her father's death brought her pain and sadness and
anger against the perpetrators of her father's killing.
The Defense['s] Evidence
The defense presented a sole witness in the person of appellant
himself. According to appellant, he was resting in his house in Sipna
Compound, Brgy. Bagong Silangan, Quezon City on September 1, 2005 at
around 6:00 p.m. when two children, namely John Paul Isip and a certain
Rommel, called him and told him to help his brother, Larry Lipata. He
immediately rushed to his brother and upon arrival he saw Larry being
stabbed by the victim. He instantaneously assisted his brother but the victim
continued stabbing Larry, causing Larry to fall to the ground. Thereafter,
appellant managed to grab the knife from the victim and stab the victim. Then
he fled from the scene [of the crime] because he was wounded. Appellant's
sister-in-law, a certain Lenlen, brought him to the Amang Medical Center for
treatment of his stab wound where he was apprehended by police officers. 6
The RTC's Ruling
The RTC noted that since appellant raised the justifying circumstance of
defense of a relative, he hypothetically admitted the commission of the crime. Hence,
the burden of proving his innocence shifted to appellant. The RTC found that the
defense failed to adequately establish the element of unlawful aggression on the part
of Cueno. There was no actual or imminent danger to the life of appellant or of his
brother Larry. On the contrary, the three Lipata brothers (appellant, Larry, and Rudy)
7 employed treachery and took advantage of their superior strength when they
attacked Cueno after Cueno left the house of his sister-in-law. Cueno suffered 17 stab
wounds on his trunk from the Lipata brothers. The existence of multiple stab wounds
on the trunk of the unarmed Cueno is inconsistent with appellant's theory of defense
of a relative. The RTC, however, ruled that the prosecution failed to show conclusive
proof of evident premeditation.
The dispositive portion of the RTC's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court
here[b]y renders judgment finding the accused GERRY LIPATA Y ORTIZA
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua from
twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years.
The accused is hereby adjudged to pay the heirs of Rolando Cueno the
following amounts:
(a) Php50,000.00 representing civil indemnity ex delicto of the
accused;
(b) Php120,550.00 representing the actual damages incurred by
the heirs of Rolando Cueno, incident to his death plus 12%
interest per annum computed from 6 September 2005 until
fully paid;
(c) Php50,000.00 as moral damages for the mental and
emotional anguish suffered by the heirs arising from the death
of Rolando Cueno; and
(d) Php25,000[.00] as exemplary damages.
The accused shall be credited with the full period of his preventive
imprisonment, subject to the conditions imposed under Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.
SO ORDERED. 8
Appellant, through the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), filed a notice of appeal
9on 6 April 2010. The RTC granted appellant's notice in an Order 10 dated 19 April
2010.
The CA's Ruling
The CA dismissed appellant's appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC.
The CA agreed with the RTC's ruling that appellant's claim of defense of a relative
must fail. There was no actual or imminent threat on the life of appellant or of his
brother Larry. There was also no reason for appellant to stab Cueno. Cueno was
outnumbered by the Lipata brothers, three to one. The requirement of lack of
provocation on the part of appellant is negated by the multiple stab wounds that
Cueno sustained.
The CA disagreed with appellant's contention that the prosecution failed to
establish treachery. The CA pointed out that Cueno was not forewarned of any
impending threat to his life. Cueno was unarmed, and went to his sister-in-law's house
to gather malunggay leaves. The Lipata brothers, on the other hand, were readily
armed with tres cantos, an icepick, and a broken piece of glass from a Red Horse
bottle. The execution of the Lipata brothers' attack made it impossible for Cueno to
retaliate.
The CA also disagreed with appellant's contention that there was no abuse of
superior strength. The three Lipata brothers were all armed with bladed weapons
when they attacked the unarmed Cueno. The Lipata brothers refused to stop stabbing
Cueno until they saw him unconscious.
The dispositive portion of the CA's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the appeal to be bereft of merit, the same is
hereby DISMISSED. The appealed decision of the trial court convicting
appellant of the crime of murder is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 11
The PAO filed a notice of appeal 12 on behalf of appellant on 10 June 2011.
The CA ordered the immediate elevation of the records to this Court in its 30 June
2011 Resolution. 13DETACa
On 9 July 2014, this Court issued a Resolution which declared that "the [PAO]
shall continue as the legal representative of the estate of the deceased [appellant] for
purposes of representing the estate in the civil aspect of this case." 24
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, we declare that because of appellant's death prior to the
promulgation of the CA's decision, there is no further need to determine appellant's
criminal liability. Appellant's death has the effect of extinguishing his criminal
liability. Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability
is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment;
xxx xxx xxx
What this Court will discuss further is the effect of appellant's death with
regard to his civil liability. In 1994, this Court, in People v. Bayotas, 25 reconciled the
differing doctrines on the issue of whether the death of the accused pending appeal of
his conviction extinguishes his civil liability. We concluded that "[u]pon death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action
instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal." 26
We also ruled that "if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil
liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission
complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 ([of the then applicable] 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time
predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation.
The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised determines
against whom the same shall be enforced." 27
We proceeded to distinguish the defendants among the different causes of
action. If the act or omission complained of arises from quasi-delict or, by provision
of law, results in an injury to person or real or personal property, the separate civil
action must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. 28 On the other hand, if the act or omission
complained of arises from contract, the separate civil action must be filed against the
estate of the accused pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. 29
We summarized our ruling in Bayotas as follows:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As
opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to
final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability
directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil
liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the
death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these
other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result
of the same act or omission: aDSIHc
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J : p
The issue for resolution is whether the People of the Philippines should be
impleaded as respondents in the petition for certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals
(CA) to annul and set aside the order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) denying the
petitioner's motion to quash the search warrant issued against him. HTcADC
Antecedents
It appears that respondent Presiding Judge issued a search warrant against the
petitioner upon the application of respondent Special Investigator U R. Bahinting of
the Saranggani District Office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI SARDO)
on the basis of his finding of probable cause for a violation of Section 2 (b) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 33, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1865, for hoarding large
quantities of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) in steel cylinders belonging to respondent
Pryce Gases, Inc. (Pryce Gases). The application for the search warrant was filed at
the instance of Pryce Gases through its letter dated September 28, 2003 to the NBI
SARDO complaining about the collection and hoarding by the petitioner of embossed
or name-plated Pryce Gases' LPG cylinders in violation of Sections 155, 156, 168 and
169 of Republic Act No. 8293 (Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines).
On October 14, 2003, the petitioner presented his Omnibus Motion to Quash
Warrant and/or Suppress Evidence and to Order Return of Seized Items, raising
therein the lack of probable cause, failure to specify the single offense committed,
illegality of the nighttime search, improper application of the plain view doctrine, and
inclusion of other offenses.
In his order of November 20, 2003, 1 respondent Presiding Judge denied the
petitioner's Omnibus Motion to Quash Warrant and/or Suppress Evidence and to
Order Return of Seized Items by observing that he had issued the search warrant for
one specific offense; that there was probable cause to issue the search warrant; that
the search began late in the day and continued into the night, but the actual seizure
was carried out in the daytime of the next day; and that the seizure of the blue
cylinders with the markings and logo of Pryce Gases was justified under the plain
view doctrine because they were found among the large stockpile of cylinders in the
petitioner's warehouse.
The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on January 5, 2004. 2
Decision of the CA
The petitioner assailed the order of November 20, 2003 on certiorari, 3 mainly
positing that respondent Presiding Judge had committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction:
. . . in issuing the November 20, 2003 Order by ruling that the search
warrant was issued based on the existence of probable cause in connection
with a specified offense and validly implemented even if the same was served
starting at nighttime and including the seizure of blue colored steel cylinders
and steel cylinders of different brand names despite the fact that the steel
cylinders were either empty or effectively empty having been received and
possessed by petitioner in the ordinary course of his business being a
legitimate dealer of Shellane brand LPG, a petroleum product of the Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corp. and thereafter in issuing the Order dated January 5,
2004 denying the motion for reconsideration. 4
However, the CA promulgated the first assailed order on March 25, 2004, 5
dismissing the petition for certiorari for failure to implead the People of the
Philippines as respondents, and for lack of any showing that a copy of the petition had
been served on the OSG, to wit:
We resolve to DISMISS the petition pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46 of
the Revised Rules of Court for the following reasons:
2. no proof that a copy of the petition was served on the Office of the
Solicitor General.
SO ORDERED.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration, 6 arguing that impleading the People
of the Philippines as respondents was premature because no criminal case had yet
been filed against him with only the application for the issuance of the search warrant
having been made; and that serving the copy of the petition on the OSG pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court was not indispensable. Nevertheless, he
attached to his motion for reconsideration the affidavit of service executed by one
Salvador R. Dumaop, Jr. presumably to conform with the rule on proof of service to
the respondents, whereby the affiant attested that the copy of the petition and the
motion for reconsideration were served on the OSG by registered mail. aScITE
On July 21, 2004, the CA denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration 7
on the ground that although the petitioner had served on the OSG copies of the
petition and the motion for reconsideration he did not file the appropriate motion or
manifestation to amend the petition and to actually amend the petition in order to
implead the People of the Philippines as respondents. The CA ratiocinated that:
We call the petitioner's attention to the fact that Section 1, Rule 126 of
the Revised Rules of Court provides that "a search warrant is an order in
writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge
and directed to a peace officer commanding him to search for personal
property described therein and bring it before the Court." A search warrant is
issued in the name of the People of the Philippines because there is a finding
of probable cause in connection with one specific offense that the object
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
In legal contemplation, the crime or offense had been committed against the
State — the People of the Philippines — and this is the State interest in the
proceedings. If the petitioner wishes to contest the finding of probable cause
or any other aspect of the issuance of the search warrant, then he must
implead the entity who in legal contemplation made the finding and in whose
name the finding was made; otherwise, there can be no final determination of
the case because the party indispensable to its resolution had been omitted. 8
Hence, according to the CA, it was left with no choice but to deny the motion
for reconsideration.
Not satisfied, the petitioner has come to the Court on appeal to reverse and set
aside the aforesaid resolutions by insisting that the failure to implead the People of the
Philippines was not a fatal defect.
Issue
In this appeal, the petitioner relevantly avers in his petition for review on
certiorari, 9 as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
20. It is humbly submitted that the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing the petition by ruling that the failure to implead the
People of the Philippines as an indispensable party is a fatal defect. The
petition has shown a grave violation of a constitutional right that must
necessarily override a rule on technicality, assuming it is applicable and
correct.HEITAD
The petitioner argues that his petition for certiorari did not need to implead the
People of the Philippines because there was yet no criminal case commenced in court,
averring:
To restate, a search warrant proceedings is not a criminal action, much
less a civil action (WASHINGTON DISTILLERS, INC. VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, 260 SCRA 821, quoting Malaloan vs. Court of Appeals, 232
SCRA 249). While a search warrant is issued in the name of the People of the
Philippines, the application is made not by the People of the Philippines but
by the interested party or parties. In this instant case, it is the NBI-SARDO
(through respondent SI Bahinting) and Pryce Gases, Inc. It is humbly
submitted that since there is no criminal case filed and pending when the
search warrant application was made, the People of the Philippines is not yet a
proper party to be impleaded as respondent as required under Section 3 of
Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. 18
The argument of the petitioner is untenable.
Impleading the People of the Philippines in the petition for certiorari did not
depend on whether or not an actual criminal action had already been commenced in
court against the petitioner. It cannot be denied that the search warrant in question had
been issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, and that fact rendered the
People of the Philippines indispensable parties in the special civil action for certiorari
brought to nullify the questioned orders of respondent Presiding Judge. We also note
that the impleading is further expressly demanded in Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules
of Court, to wit:
Section 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance
with requirements. — The petition shall contain the full names and actual
addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the
matters involved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied
upon for the relief prayed for.
xxx xxx xxx
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
(n) (emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, the omission of the People of the Philippines from the petition
was fatal.
The requirement that the search warrant be issued in the name of the People of
the Philippines is imposed by Section 1, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 1. Search warrant defined. — A search warrant is an order in
writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a
judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal
property described therein and bring it before the court.
TIADCc
We may agree with the petitioner that the application for the search warrant
was not a criminal action; and that the application for the search warrant was not of
the same form as that of a criminal action. Verily, the search warrant is not similar to
a criminal action but is rather a legal process that may be likened to a writ of
discovery employed by no less than the State to procure relevant evidence of a crime.
In that respect, it is an instrument or tool, issued under the State's police power, and
this is the reason why it must issue in the name of the People of the Philippines. 19
Equally clear is that the sworn application for the search warrant 20 and the
search warrant itself 21 were upon the behest of the People of the Philippines. It defies
logic and common sense for the petitioner to contend, therefore, that the application
against him was not made by the People of the Philippines but by the interested party
or parties. The immutable truth is that every search warrant is applied for and issued
by and under the authority of the State, regardless of who initiates its application or
causes its issuance.
The petitioner could have quickly rectified his omission by the immediate
amendment of the petition. However, although made aware of the omission as a fatal
defect, he did not cause the amendment but continued to ignore the need to amend. He
thereby exhibited his adamant refusal to recognize the People of the Philippines as
indispensable parties, which impelled the CA to aptly remark in its denial of his
motion for reconsideration, thusly:
We note that while the petitioner furnished the OSG with copies of the
petition and the motion for reconsideration, he did not attempt to cure the
defect of the petition — i.e., the failure to implead the People of the
Philippines — by filing the appropriate motion or manifestation to amend the
petition and by amending the petition to implead the Republic of the
Philippines as a party to the proceedings. Hence, the first ground upon which
we based our dismissal of the petition still holds and we are left with no
choice but to deny the present motion. 22 (emphasis supplied)
AIDSTE
With its dismissal of the petition for certiorari being proper and in accord with
the pertinent rules of procedure, the CA did not abuse its discretion, least of all
gravely. Grave abuse of discretion, as the ground for the issuance of the writ of
certiorari, connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
excess, or lack of jurisdiction. 23 The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. 24
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari;
AFFIRMS the resolution of the Court of Appeals promulgated on March 25, 2004
(dismissing the petition for certiorari in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 82797); and ORDERS the
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Te v. Breva, G.R. No. 164974 , [August 5, 2015])
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
PERALTA, J : p
This deals with the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court praying that the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated March 13, 2009,
and the Resolution 2 dated September 14, 2009, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration thereof, be reversed and set aside.
Petitioners received information that respondent was selling, offering for sale, or
distributing liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) by illegally refilling the steel cylinders
manufactured by and bearing the duly registered trademark and device of respondent
Petron. Petron then obtained the services of a paralegal investigation team who sent their
people to investigate. The investigators went to respondent's premises located in San
Juan, Baao, Camarines Sur, bringing along four empty cylinders of Shellane, Gasul, Total
and Superkalan and asked that the same be refilled. Respondent's employees then refilled
said empty cylinders at respondent's refilling station. The refilled cylinders were brought
to the Marketing Coordinator of Petron Gasul who verified that respondent was not
authorized to distribute and/or sell, or otherwise deal with Petron LPG products, and/or
use or imitate any Petron trademarks. Petitioners then requested the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to investigate said activities of respondent for the purpose of
apprehending and prosecuting establishments conducting illegal refilling, distribution
and/or sale of LPG products using the same containers of Petron and Shell, which acts
constitute a violation of Section 168, 3 in relation to Section 170 4 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines,
and/or Section 2 5 of R.A. No. 623, otherwise known as An Act to Regulate the Use of
Duly Stamped or Marked Bottles, Boxes, Casks, Kegs, Barrels and Other Similar
Containers.
The NBI proceeded with their investigation and reportedly found commercial
quantities of Petron Gasul and Shellane cylinders stockpiled at respondent's warehouse.
They also witnessed trucks coming from respondent's refilling facility loaded with Gasul,
Shellane and Marsflame cylinders, which then deposit said cylinders in different places,
one of them a store called "Edrich Enterprises" located at 272 National. Highway, San
Nicolas, Iriga City. The investigators then bought Shellane and Gasul cylinders from
Edrich Enterprises, for which they were issued an official receipt.ADcEST
Thus, the NBI, in behalf of Petron and Shell, filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Naga City (RTC-Naga), two separate Applications for Search Warrant for
Violation of Section 155.1, 6 in relation to Section 170 7 of R.A. No. 8293 against
respondent and/or its occupants. On October 23, 2002, the RTC-Naga City issued an
Order granting said Applications and Search Warrant Nos. 2002-27 and 2002-28 were
issued. On the same day, the NBI served the warrants at the respondent's premises in an
orderly and peaceful manner, and articles or items described in the warrants were seized.
In an Order dated July 28, 2003, the RTC-Naga issued an Order granting
respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, thereby quashing Search Warrant Nos. 2002-27
and 2002-28.
Petitioner then appealed to the CA, but the appellate court, in its Decision dated
March 13, 2009, affirmed the RTC Order quashing the search warrants. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied per Resolution dated
September 14, 2009.
Elevating the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari, petitioner
presents herein the following issues:
A.
B.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides thus:
SEC. 2. Court where applications for search warrant shall be filed. —
An application for search warrant shall be filed with the following:
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application
shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending. (Emphasis
supplied)
The above provision is clear enough. Under paragraph (b) thereof, the application
for search warrant in this case should have stated compelling reasons why the same was
being filed with the RTC-Naga instead of the RTC-Iriga City, considering that it is the
latter court that has territorial jurisdiction over the place where the alleged crime was
committed and also the place where the search warrant was enforced. The wordings of
the provision is of a mandatory nature, requiring a statement of compelling reasons if the
application is filed in a court which does not have territorial jurisdiction over the place of
commission of the crime. Since Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees
the right of persons to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and search
warrants constitute a limitation on this right, then Section 2, Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure should be construed strictly against state authorities who
would be enforcing the search warrants. On this point, then, petitioner's application for a
search warrant was indeed insufficient for failing to comply with the requirement to state
therein the compelling reasons why they had to file the application in a court that did not
have territorial jurisdiction over the place where the alleged crime was committed.
Notwithstanding said failure to state the compelling reasons in the application, the
more pressing question that would determine the outcome of the case is, did the RTC-
Naga act properly in taking into consideration the issue of said defect in resolving
respondent's motion for reconsideration where the issue was raised for the very first time?
The record bears out that, indeed, respondent failed to include said issue at the first
instance in its motion to quash. Does the omnibus motion rule cover a motion to quash
search warrants?
The omnibus motion rule embodied in Section 8, Rule 15, in relation to Section 1,
Rule 9, demands that all available objections be included in a party's motion, otherwise,
said objections shall be deemed waived; and, the only grounds the court could take
cognizance of, even if not pleaded in said motion are: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter; (b) existence of another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause; and (c) bar by prior judgment or by statute of limitations. 9 It should be
stressed here that the Court has ruled in a number of cases that the omnibus motion rule is
applicable to motions to quash search warrants. 10 Furthermore, the Court distinctly
stated in Abuan v. People, 11 that "the motion to quash the search warrant which the
accused may file shall be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however,
that objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the
quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress . . . ."
12
In accordance with the omnibus motion rule, therefore, the trial court could only
take cognizance of an issue that was not raised in the motion to quash if, (1) said issue
was not available or existent when they filed the motion to quash the search warrant; or
(2) the issue was one involving jurisdiction over the subject matter. Obviously, the issue
of the defect in the application was available and existent at the time of filing of the
motion to quash. What remains to be answered then is, if the newly raised issue of the
defect in the application is an issue of jurisdiction.
In resolving whether the issue raised for the first time in respondent's motion for
reconsideration was an issue of jurisdiction, the CA ratiocinated, thus:
The foregoing explanation shows why the CA arrived at the wrong conclusion. It
gravely erred in equating the proceedings for applications for search warrants with
criminal actions themselves. As elucidated by the Court, proceedings for said
applications are not criminal in nature and, thus, the rule that venue is jurisdictional does
not apply thereto. Evidently, the issue of whether the application should have been filed
in RTC-Iriga City or RTC-Naga, is not one involving jurisdiction because, as stated in
the afore-quoted case, the power to issue a special criminal process is inherent in all
courts.
Inferring from the foregoing, the Court deems it improper for the RTC-Naga to
have even taken into consideration an issue which respondent failed to raise in its motion
to quash, as it did not involve a question of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is quite
clear that the RTC-Naga had jurisdiction to issue criminal processes such as a search
warrant.
Moreover, the Court must again emphasize its previous admonition in Spouses
Anunciacion v. Bocanegra, 17 that:
SO ORDERED.
(Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Romars International Gases Corp., G.R. No. 189669,
|||
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
SERENO, C.J : p
Petitioners filed the present Petitions under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set
aside the Decision 1 dated 20 August 2003 and the Resolution 2 dated 27 November
2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) reversing the quashal of the search warrants
previously issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas of the Regional Intelligence Special
Operations Office (RISOO) of the Philippine National Police filed applications for
warrants 3 before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 78, to search the office premises
of petitioner Worldwide Web Corporation (WWC) 4 located at the 11th floor, IBM
Plaza Building, No. 188 Eastwood City, Libis, Quezon City, as well as the office
premises of petitioner Planet Internet Corporation (Planet Internet) 5 located at UN
2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig
City. The applications alleged that petitioners were conducting illegal toll bypass
operations, which amounted to theft and violation of Presidential Decree No. 401
(Penalizing the Unauthorized Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone
Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or Electrical Meters and Other Acts), to the
damage and prejudice of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT).
6
On 25 September 2001, the trial court conducted a hearing on the applications
for search warrants. The applicant and Jose Enrico Rivera (Rivera) and Raymund Gali
(Gali) of the Alternative Calling Pattern Detection Division of PLDT testified as
witnesses. IEcaHS
Gali further alleged that because PLDT lines and equipment had been illegally
connected by petitioners to a piece of equipment that routed the international calls and
bypassed PLDT's IGF, they violated Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 401 as amended,
13 on unauthorized installation of telephone connections. Petitioners also committed
theft, because through their misuse of PLDT phone lines/numbers and equipment and
with clear intent to gain, they illegally stole business and revenues that rightly belong
to PLDT. Moreover, they acted contrary to the letter and intent of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7925, because in bypassing the IGF of PLDT, they evaded the payment of access
and bypass charges in its favor while "piggy-backing" on its multi-million dollar
facilities and infrastructure, thus stealing its business revenues from international long
distance calls. Further, petitioners acted in gross violation of Memorandum Circular
No. 6-2-92 of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) prohibiting the
use of customs premises equipment (CPE) without first securing type approval license
from the latter.
Based on a five-day sampling of the phone line of petitioners, PLDT computed
a monthly revenue loss of P764,718.09. PLDT likewise alleged that petitioners
deprived it of foreign exchange revenues, and evaded the payment of taxes, license
fees, and charges, to the prejudice of the government.
During the hearing, the trial court required the identification of the office
premises/units to be searched, as well as their floor plans showing the location of
particular computers and servers that would be taken. 14
On 26 September 2001, the RTC granted the application for search warrants.
15 Accordingly, the following warrants were issued against the office premises of
petitioners, authorizing police officers to seize various items:
1.Search Warrant No. Q-01-3856, 16 issued for violation of paragraph one (1)
of Article 308 (theft) in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code against
WWC, Adriel S. Mirto, Kevin L. Tan, Cherryll L. Yu, Carmelo J. Canto, III,
Ferdinand B. Masi, Message One International Corporation, Adriel S. Mirto, Nova
Christine L. Dela Cruz, Robertson S. Chiang, and Nolan B. Sison with business
address at 11/F IBM Plaza Building, No. 188 Eastwood City, Cyberpark Libis,
Quezon City:
2.Search Warrant No. Q-01-3857, 17 issued for violation of P.D. 401 against
Planet Internet Corporation/Mercury One, Robertson S. Chiang, Nikki S. Chiang,
Maria Sy Be Chiang, Ben C. Javellana, Carmelita Tuason with business address at
UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio,
Pasig City:
3.Search Warrant No. Q-01-3858, 18 issued for violation of paragraph one (1)
of Article 308 (theft) in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code against
Planet Internet Corporation/Mercury One, Robertson S. Chiang, Nikki S. Chiang,
Maria Sy Be Chiang, Ben C. Javellana, Carmelita Tuason with business address at
UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio,
Pasig City:
The warrants were implemented on the same day by RISOO operatives of the
National Capital Region Police Office.
Over a hundred items were seized, 19 including 15 central processing units
(CPUs), 10 monitors, numerous wires, cables, diskettes and files, and a laptop
computer. 20 Planet Internet notes that even personal diskettes of its employees were
confiscated; and areas not devoted to the transmission of international calls, such as
the President's Office and the Information Desk, were searched. Voltage regulators, as
well as reserve and broken computers, were also seized.
Petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu, 21 and Planet Internet 22 filed their
respective motions to quash the search warrants, citing basically the same grounds:
(1) the search warrants were issued without probable cause, since the acts complained
of did not constitute theft; (2) toll bypass, the act complained of, was not a crime; (3)
the search warrants were general warrants; and (4) the objects seized pursuant thereto
were "fruits of the poisonous tree."
PLDT filed a Consolidated Opposition 23 to the motions to quash.
In the hearing of the motions to quash on 19 October 2001, the test calls
alluded to by Gali in his Affidavit were shown to have passed the IGF of Eastern
Telecommunications (Philippines), Inc. (Eastern) and of Capital Wireless (Capwire).
24 Planet Internet explained that Eastern and Capwire both provided international
direct dialing services, which Planet Internet marketed by virtue of a "Reseller
Agreement." Planet Internet used PLDT lines for the first phase of the call; but for the
second phase, it used the IGF of either Eastern or Capwire. Planet Internet religiously
paid PLDT for its domestic phone bills and Eastern and Capwire for its IGF usage.
None of these contentions were refuted by PLDT.
The RTC granted the motions to quash on the ground that the warrants issued
were in the nature of general warrants. 25 Thus, the properties seized under the said
warrants were ordered released to petitioners.
PLDT moved for reconsideration, 26 but its motion was denied 27 on the
ground that it had failed to get the conformity of the City Prosecutor prior to filing the
motion, as required under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. aEDCSI
THE CA RULING
PLDT appealed to the CA, where the case was docketed as CA-G.R. No.
26190. The CA reversed and set aside the assailed RTC Resolutions and declared the
search warrants valid and effective. 28
Petitioners separately moved for reconsideration of the CA ruling. 29 Among
the points raised was that PLDT should have filed a petition for certiorari rather than
an appeal when it questioned the RTC Resolution before the CA. The appellate court
denied the Motions for Reconsideration. 30
Rule 45 Petitions were separately filed by petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu,
31 and Planet Internet 32 to assail the CA Decision and Resolution. The Court
consolidated the two Petitions. 33
ISSUES
I.Whether the CA erred in giving due course to PLDT's appeal despite the
following procedural infirmities:
II.Whether the assailed search warrants were issued upon probable cause,
considering that the acts complained of allegedly do not constitute
theft.
OUR RULING
I.
Petitioners contend that PLDT had no personality to question the quashal of the
search warrants without the conformity of the public prosecutor. They argue that it
violated Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
The above provision states the general rule that the public prosecutor has
direction and control of the prosecution of "(a)ll criminal actions commenced by a
complaint or information." However, a search warrant is obtained, not by the filing of
a complaint or an information, but by the filing of an application therefor. 34
Furthermore, as we held in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, 35 an application for
a search warrant is a "special criminal process," rather than a criminal action:
Petitioners also claim that since the RTC ruling on the motions to quash was
interlocutory, it cannot be appealed under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. PLDT
should have filed a Rule 65 petition instead. Petitioners cite, as authority for their
position, Marcelo v. de Guzman. 38 The Court held therein as follows:
But is the order of Judge de Guzman denying the motion to quash the
search warrant and to return the properties seized thereunder final in character,
or is it merely interlocutory? In Cruz vs. Dinglasan, this Court, citing American
jurisprudence, resolved this issue thus:
II.
Petitioners claim that no probable cause existed to justify the issuance of the
search warrants.
The rules pertaining to the issuance of search warrants are enshrined in Section
2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 2.The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis
supplied)
In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause requires "such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place
to be searched." 42
There is no exact test for the determination of probable cause 43 in the
issuance of search warrants. It is a matter wholly dependent on the finding of trial
judges in the process of exercising their judicial function. 44 They determine probable
cause based on "evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and that it was committed" by the offender. 45
When a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is made
by a trial judge, the finding is accorded respect by reviewing courts:
The transcript of stenographic notes during the hearing for the application for
search warrants on 25 September 2001 shows that Judge Percival Mandap Lopez
asked searching questions to the witnesses and particularly sought clarification on the
alleged illegal toll bypass operations of petitioners, as well as the pieces of evidence
presented. Thus, the Court will no longer disturb the finding of probable cause by the
trial judge during the hearing for the application for the search warrants. ADHcTE
Petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu only take issue with categorizing the
earnings and business as personal properties of PLDT. However, in Laurel v.
Abrogar, 49 we have already held that the use of PLDT's communications facilities
without its consent constitutes theft of its telephone services and business:
Section 1.Any person who installs any water, electrical, telephone or piped
gas connection without previous authority from the Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System, the Manila Electric Company, the
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, or the Manila Gas
Corporation, as the case may be, tampers and/or uses tampered water,
electrical or gas meters, jumpers or other devices whereby water, electricity or
piped gas is stolen; steals or pilfers water, electric or piped gas meters, or
water, electric and/or telephone wires, or piped gas pipes or conduits;
knowingly possesses stolen or pilfered water, electrical or gas meters as well
as stolen or pilfered water, electrical and/or telephone wires, or piped gas
pipes and conduits, shall, upon conviction, be punished with prision
correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from two thousand
to six thousand pesos, or both. (Emphasis supplied)
A trial judge's finding of probable cause may be set aside and the search
warrant issued by him based on his finding may be quashed if the person against
whom the warrant is issued presents clear and convincing evidence that when the
police officers and witnesses testified, they committed a deliberate falsehood or
reckless disregard for the truth on matters that are essential or necessary to a showing
of probable cause. 52 In that case, the finding of probable cause is a nullity, because
the trial judge was intentionally misled by the witnesses. 53
On the other hand, innocent and negligent omissions or misrepresentation of
witnesses will not cause the quashal of a search warrant. 54 In this case, the
testimonies of Rivera and Gali that the test calls they conducted did not pass through
PLDT's IGF are true. They neglected, however, to look into the possibility that the
test calls may have passed through other IGFs in the Philippines, which was exactly
what happened. Nevertheless, the witnesses did not commit a deliberate falsehood.
Even Planet Internet stated that the conclusion that the test calls bypassed all IGFs in
the country was made "carelessly and haphazardly." 55
On this score, the quashal of the search warrants is not in order. It must be
noted that the trial judge did not quash the warrants in this case based on lack of
probable cause. Instead, the issue before us is whether the CA erred in reversing the
RTC, which ruled that the search warrants are general warrants.
III.
Petitioners claim that the subject search warrants were in the nature of general
warrants because the descriptions therein of the objects to be seized are so broad and
all-encompassing as to give the implementing officers wide discretion over which
articles to seize. In fact, the CA observed that the targets of the search warrants were
not illegalper se, and that they were "innocuous goods." Thus, the police officers were
given blanket authority to determine whether the objects were legal or not, as in fact
even pieces of computer equipment not involved in telecommunications or Internet
service were confiscated.
On the other hand, PLDT claims that a search warrant already fulfills the
requirement of particularity of description when it is as specific as the circumstances
will ordinarily allow. 56 Furthermore, it cites Kho v. Makalintal, 57 in which the
Court allowed leeway in the description of things to be seized, taking into
consideration the effort and the time element involved in the prosecution of criminal
cases.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment 58 filed with the
CA, likewise prayed for the reversal of the quashal of the search warrants in view of
the OSG's position that the scheme was a case of electronic theft, and that the items
sought to be seized could not be described with calibrated precision. According to the
OSG, assuming that the seized items could also be used for other legitimate
businesses, the fact remains that the items were used in the commission of an offense.
A general warrant is defined as "(a) search or arrest warrant that is not
particular as to the person to be arrested or the property to be seized." 59 It is one that
allows the "seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another" and gives the
officer executing the warrant the discretion over which items to take. 60
Such discretion is abhorrent, as it makes the person, against whom the warrant
is issued, vulnerable to abuses. Our Constitution guarantees our right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, and safeguards have been put in place to ensure
that people and their properties are searched only for the most compelling and lawful
reasons. IHCDAS
Sec. 2.The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no such search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
SEC. 4.Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not
issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized
which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
Within the context of the above legal requirements for valid search warrants,
the Court has been mindful of the difficulty faced by law enforcement officers in
describing the items to be searched, especially when these items are technical in
nature, and when the extent of the illegal operation is largely unknown to them.
Vallejo v. Court of Appeals 61 ruled as follows:
Furthermore, the Court also had occasion to rule that the particularity of the
description of the place to be searched and the things to be seized is required
"wherever and whenever it is feasible." 62 A search warrant need not describe the
items to be seized in precise and minute detail. 63 The warrant is valid when it
enables the police officers to readily identify the properties to be seized and leaves
them with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized. 64
In this case, considering that items that looked like "innocuous goods" were
being used to pursue an illegal operation that amounts to theft, law enforcement
officers would be hard put to secure a search warrant if they were required to pinpoint
items with one hundred percent precision. In People v. Veloso, we pronounced that
"[t]he police should not be hindered in the performance of their duties, which are
difficult enough of performance under the best of conditions, by superficial adherence
to technicality or far-fetched judicial interference." 65
A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in the description of
the things to be seized when the things described are limited to those that bear a direct
relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. 66
To our mind, PLDT was able to establish the connection between the items to
be searched as identified in the warrants and the crime of theft of its telephone
services and business. Prior to the application for the search warrants, Rivera
conducted ocular inspection of the premises of petitioners and was then able to
confirm that they had "utilized various telecommunications equipment consisting of
computers, lines, cables, antennas, modems, or routers, multiplexers, PABX or
switching equipment, and support equipment such as software, diskettes, tapes,
manuals and other documentary records to support the illegal toll bypass operations."
67
In HPS Software and Communication Corp. v. PLDT, 68 we upheld a similarly
worded 69 description of items to be seized by virtue of the search warrants, because
these items had been sufficiently identified physically and shown to bear a relation to
the offenses charged. cDSaEH
PHIL 18-46)
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
PERALTA, ** J : p
This is to resolve the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court dated November 12, 2012 of petitioner People of the Philippines as represented
by Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Carlos B. Sagucio, that seeks to reverse
and set aside the Regional Trial Court's (RTC, Branch 6, Aparri, Cagayan) Joint
Resolution 1 dated May 14, 2012 quashing Search Warrant No. 45 issued by the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Gattaran, Cagayan and eventually dismissing
Criminal Case No. II-10881 against private respondent Jeofrey Jil Rabino y Taloza.
The facts follow.
On January 13, 2012, Judge Marcelo C. Cabalbag of the MTC of Gattaran,
Cagayan issued Search Warrant No. 45, which reads, in part, as follows:
SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER
TO ANY OFFICER OF THE LAW:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining
under oath SPO1 RONEL P. SATURNO of the Regional Intelligence
Division based at Regional Office 2, Camp Adduru, Tuguegarao City, the
applicant herein, and his witness that there is probable cause to believe that a
Violation [of] R.A. 9165 Comprehensive Dangerous Drug, has been and is
being committed and there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that
JOEFREY JIL RABINO @ JEFF/JEO, a resident of Rizal Street, Maura,
Aparri, Cagayan has in his possession or control the following items, to wit:
SHABU (Methamphetamine and PARAPHERNALIAS
you are hereby ordered to make an immediate search at any time of the day or
night but preferably at daytime at the afore-stated residential place of
JEOFREY JIL RABINO @ JEFF/JEO and its premises and forthwith seize
and take possession of the above-described items to immediately bring him,
thereafter, to the undersigned to be dealt with in accordance with Section 12,
Rule 126 of the December 1, 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
WITNESS MY HAND and SEAL this 13th day of January 2012, at
Gattaran, Cagayan. 2
Thereafter, to effect the above Search and Seizure Order, a search was
conducted by elements of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and
officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP) yielding one (1) sachet containing
residue of suspected methamphetamine hydrochloride inside the house of private
respondent Rabino located in Aparri, Cagayan. When the confiscated item was
submitted to the Regional Crime Laboratory Office No. 2 of the PNP in Tuguegarao
City for qualitative examination, the test gave positive result for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. 3
Thus, an Information 4 dated January 15, 2012 was filed against private
respondent Rabino for violation of Section 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, which
reads as follows:AcICHD
The general rule is that the proper party to file a petition in the CA or
Supreme Court to assail any adverse order of the RTC in the search warrant
proceedings is the People of the Philippines, through the OSG. However, in
Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court allowed
a private corporation (the complainant in the RTC) to file a petition for
certiorari, and considered the petition as one filed by the OSG. The Court in
the said case even held that the petitioners therein could argue its case in lieu
of the OSG:
From the records, it is clear that, as complainants,
petitioners were involved in the proceedings which led to the
issuance of Search Warrant No. 23. In People v. Nano, the
Court declared that while the general rule is that it is only the
Solicitor General who is authorized to bring or defend actions
on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once
the case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals, if
there appears to be grave error committed by the judge or a
lack of due process, the petition will be deemed filed by the
private complainants therein as if it were filed by the Solicitor
General. In line with this ruling, the Court gives this petition
due course and will allow petitioners to argue their case against
the questioned order in lieu of the Solicitor General.
The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of
courts. However, in exceptional cases, the Court, for compelling reasons or if
warranted by the nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions
filed directly before it. In this case, the Court has opted to take cognizance of
the petition, considering the nature of the issues raised by the parties. 21
Therefore, if this Court had previously considered the petitions filed by private
complainants and deemed them as if filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, there
is no reason to disallow the petition herein filed by the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor.
Anent the main issue as to whether a municipal trial court has the authority to
issue a search warrant involving an offense in which it has no jurisdiction, this Court
answers in the affirmative.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
ITAaHc
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is
present; (2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the
judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the
witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the
facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to
be searched and the things to be seized. 22 Necessarily, a motion to quash a search
warrant may be based on grounds extrinsic of the search warrant, such as (1) the place
searched or the property seized are not those specified or described in the search
warrant; and (2) there is no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. 23
The respondent RTC judge, in this case, quashed the search warrant and
eventually dismissed the case based merely on the fact that the search warrant was
issued by the MTC of Gattaran, Cagayan proceeding from a suspected violation of
R.A. 9165 or The Dangerous Drugs Act, an offense which is beyond the jurisdiction
of the latter court. It is therefore safe to presume that the other grounds raised by the
private respondent in his motion to quash are devoid of any merit. By that alone, the
respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in quashing the search warrant on a
basis other than the accepted grounds. It must be remembered that a search warrant is
valid for as long as it has all the requisites set forth by the Constitution and must only
be quashed when any of its elements are found to be wanting.
This Court has provided rules to be followed in the application for a search
warrant. Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. —
An application for search warrant shall be filed with the following:
(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the
judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission
of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the
warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application
shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending.
Apparently, in this case, the application for a search warrant was filed within
the same judicial region where the crime was allegedly committed. For compelling
reasons, the Municipal Trial Court of Gattaran, Cagayan has the authority to issue a
search warrant to search and seize the dangerous drugs stated in the application
thereof in Aparri, Cagayan, a place that is within the same judicial region. The fact
that the search warrant was issued means that the MTC judge found probable cause to
grant the said application after the latter was found by the same judge to have been
filed for compelling reasons. Therefore, Sec. 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court was
duly complied with.
It must be noted that nothing in the above-quoted rule does it say that the court
issuing a search warrant must also have jurisdiction over the offense. A search
warrant may be issued by any court pursuant to Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court and the resultant case may be filed in another court that has jurisdiction over the
offense committed. What controls here is that a search warrant is merely a process,
generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a
criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. 24
Thus, in certain cases when no criminal action has yet been filed, any court may issue
a search warrant even though it has no jurisdiction over the offense allegedly
committed, provided that all the requirements for the issuance of such warrant are
present.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, dated November 12, 2012, of petitioner People of the Philippines is
GRANTED. Consequently, the Joint Resolution dated May 14, 2012 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 6, Aparri, Cagayan, insofar as it quashed Search Warrant No. 45
issued by the Municipal Trial Court of Gattaran, Cagayan, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and Criminal Case No. 11-10881 against private respondent Jeofrey Jil
Rabino y Taloza is REINSTATED. CHTAIc
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Castillo, Sr., G.R. No. 204419, [November 7, 2016], 798 PHIL 77-90)
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
PER CURIAM : p
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the Decision 2 dated April
25, 2011 and the Resolution 3 dated October 17, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP. No. 113017 upholding the validity of Search Warrant No. 09-14407. 4
The Facts
On July 10, 2009, the Philippine National Police (PNP), through Police Senior
Superintendent Roberto B. Fajardo, applied with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 50 (Manila-RTC) for a warrant to search three (3) caves located inside
the Laud Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Ma-a, Davao City, where the alleged remains
of the victims summarily executed by the so-called "Davao Death Squad" may be found.
5 In support of the application, a certain Ernesto Avasola (Avasola) was presented to the
RTC and there testified that he personally witnessed the killing of six (6) persons in
December 2005, and was, in fact, part of the group that buried the victims. 6DSAacC
Judge William Simon P. Peralta (Judge Peralta), acting as Vice Executive Judge of
the Manila-RTC, found probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, and thus,
issued Search Warrant No. 09-14407 7 which was later enforced by the elements of the
PNP-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, in coordination with the members of
the Scene of the Crime Operatives on July 15, 2009. The search of the Laud Compound
caves yielded positive results for the presence of human remains. 8
On July 20, 2009, herein petitioner, retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud (Laud), filed
an Urgent Motion to Quash and to Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence 9 premised on the
following grounds: (a) Judge Peralta had no authority to act on the application for a
search warrant since he had been automatically divested of his position as Vice Executive
Judge when several administrative penalties were imposed against him by the Court; 10
(b) the Manila-RTC had no jurisdiction to issue Search Warrant No. 09-14407 which was
to be enforced in Davao City; 11 (c) the human remains sought to be seized are not a
proper subject of a search warrant; 12 (d) the police officers are mandated to follow the
prescribed procedure for exhumation of human remains; 13 (e) the search warrant was
issued despite lack of probable cause; 14 (f) the rule against forum shopping was violated;
15 and (g) there was a violation of the rule requiring one specific offense and the proper
specification of the place to be searched and the articles to be seized. 16
In an Order 17 dated July 23, 2009, the Manila-RTC granted the motion of Laud
"after a careful consideration [of] the grounds alleged [therein]." Aside from this general
statement, the said Order contained no discussion on the particular reasons from which
the Manila-RTC derived its conclusion.
Respondent, the People of the Philippines (the People), filed a Motion for
Reconsideration 18 which was, however, denied in an Order 19 dated December 8, 2009,
wherein the Manila-RTC, this time, articulated its reasons for the warrant's quashal,
namely: (a) the People failed to show any compelling reason to justify the issuance of a
search warrant by the Manila-RTC which was to be implemented in Davao City where
the offense was allegedly committed, in violation of Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court; 20 (b) the fact that the alleged offense happened almost four (4) years before the
search warrant application was filed rendered doubtful the existence of probable cause;
21 and (c) the applicant, i.e., the PNP, violated the rule against forum shopping as the
subject matter of the present search warrant application is exactly the same as the one
contained in a previous application 22 before the RTC of Davao City, Branch 15 (Davao-
RTC) which had been denied. 23 DISaEA
Unconvinced, the People filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP. No. 113017.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 24 dated April 25, 2011, the CA granted the People's petition and
thereby annulled and set aside the Orders of the Manila-RTC for having been tainted with
grave abuse of discretion.
It held that the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant were satisfied,
pointing out that an application therefor involving a heinous crime, such as Murder, is an
exception to the compelling reasons requirement under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court as explicitly recognized in A.M. No. 99-20-09-SC 25 and reiterated in A.M. No.
03-8-02-SC, 26 provided that the application is filed by the PNP, the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF) or
the Reaction Against Crime Task Force (REACT-TF), 27 with the endorsement of its
head, before the RTC of Manila or Quezon City, and the warrant be consequently issued
by the Executive Judge or Vice-Executive Judge of either of the said courts, as in this
case. 28
Also, the CA found that probable cause was established since, among others,
witness Avasola deposed and testified that he personally witnessed the murder of six (6)
persons in December 2005 and was actually part of the group that buried the victims —
two bodies in each of the three (3) caves. 29 Further, it observed that the Manila-RTC
failed to consider the fear of reprisal and natural reluctance of a witness to get involved in
a criminal case, stating that these are sufficient reasons to justify the delay attending the
application of a search warrant. 30 Accordingly, it deemed that the physical evidence of a
protruding human bone in plain view in one of the caves, and Avasola's first-hand eye
witness account both concur and point to the only reasonable conclusion that the crime of
Murder had been committed and that the human remains of the victims were located in
the Laud Compound. 31
Finally, the CA debunked the claim of forum shopping, finding that the prior
application for a search warrant filed before the Davao-RTC was based on facts and
circumstances different from those in the application filed before the Manila-RTC. 32 aEcDTC
The issues for the Court's resolution are as follows: (a) whether the administrative
penalties imposed on Judge Peralta invalidated Search Warrant No. 09-14407; (b)
whether the Manila-RTC had jurisdiction to issue the said warrant despite non-
compliance with the compelling reasons requirement under Section 2, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court; (c) whether the requirements of probable cause and particular description
were complied with and the one-specific-offense rule under Section 4, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court was violated; and (d) whether the applicant for the search warrant, i.e., the
PNP, violated the rule against forum shopping.
Citing Section 5, Chapter III of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC which provides that "[t]he
imposition upon an Executive Judge or Vice-Executive Judge of an administrative
penalty of at least a reprimand shall automatically operate to divest him of his position as
such," Laud claims that Judge Peralta had no authority to act as Vice-Executive Judge
and accordingly issue Search Warrant No. 09-14407 in view of the Court's Resolution in
Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. v. Judge Peralta 34 wherein he was administratively
penalized with fines of PhP15,000.00 and PhP5,000.00. 35 cHESAD
While the Court does agree that the imposition of said administrative penalties did
operate to divest Judge Peralta's authority to act as Vice-Executive Judge, it must be
qualified that the abstraction of such authority would not, by and of itself, result in the
invalidity of Search Warrant No. 09-14407 considering that Judge Peralta may be
considered to have made the issuance as a de facto officer whose acts would, nonetheless,
remain valid.
Funa v. Agra 36 defines who a de facto officer is and explains that his acts are just
as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third
persons who are interested therein are concerned, viz.:
A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having
colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose
appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one who is in possession of an
office, and is discharging [his] duties under color of authority, by which is
meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so
that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de
facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so
far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned. 37
The treatment of a de facto officer's acts is premised on the reality that third
persons cannot always investigate the right of one assuming to hold an important office
and, as such, have a right to assume that officials apparently qualified and in office are
legally such. 38 Public interest demands that acts of persons holding, under color of title,
an office created by a valid statute be, likewise, deemed valid insofar as the public — as
distinguished from the officer in question — is concerned. 39 Indeed, it is far more
cogently acknowledged that the de facto doctrine has been formulated, not for the
protection of the de facto officer principally, but rather for the protection of the public
and individuals who get involved in the official acts of persons discharging the duties of
an office without being lawful officers. 40
In order for the de facto doctrine to apply, all of the following elements must
concur: (a) there must be a de jure office; (b) there must be color of right or general
acquiescence by the public; and (c) there must be actual physical possession of the office
in good faith. 41EHcaDT
The existence of the foregoing elements is rather clear in this case. Undoubtedly,
there is a de jure office of a 2nd Vice-Executive Judge. Judge Peralta also had a colorable
right to the said office as he was duly appointed to such position and was only divested of
the same by virtue of a supervening legal technicality — that is, the operation of Section
5, Chapter III of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC as above-explained; also, it may be said that there
was general acquiescence by the public since the search warrant application was regularly
endorsed to the sala of Judge Peralta by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Manila-
RTC under his apparent authority as 2nd Vice Executive Judge. 42 Finally, Judge
Peralta's actual physical possession of the said office is presumed to be in good faith, as
the contrary was not established. 43 Accordingly, Judge Peralta can be considered to have
acted as a de facto officer when he issued Search Warrant No. 09-14407, hence, treated
as valid as if it was issued by a de jure officer suffering no administrative impediment.
B. Jurisdiction of the Manila-RTC to Issue Search Warrant No. 09-14407;
Exception to the Compelling Reasons Requirement under Section 2, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court.
Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC states the requirements for the
issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs of Manila and
Quezon City. These special criminal cases pertain to those "involving heinous crimes,
illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions, as well as violations of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code, the
Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, and
other relevant laws that may hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included herein by the
Supreme Court." Search warrant applications for such cases may be filed by "the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the
Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF)," and "personally endorsed by the heads of such
agencies." As in ordinary search warrant applications, they "shall particularly describe
therein the places to be searched and/or the property or things to be seized as prescribed
in the Rules of Court." "The Executive Judges [of these RTCs] and, whenever they are on
official leave of absence or are not physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive
Judges" are authorized to act on such applications and "shall issue the warrants, if
justified, which may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said
courts." IcEaST
The Court observes that all the above-stated requirements were complied with in
this case.
As the records would show, the search warrant application was filed before the
Manila-RTC by the PNP and was endorsed by its head, PNP Chief Jesus Ame Versosa,
44 particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized (as will be
elaborated later on) in connection with the heinous crime of Murder. 45 Finding probable
cause therefor, Judge Peralta, in his capacity as 2nd Vice-Executive Judge, issued Search
Warrant No. 09-14407 which, as the rules state, may be served in places outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the said RTC.
Notably, the fact that a search warrant application involves a "special criminal
case" excludes it from the compelling reason requirement under Section 2, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court which provides:
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application
shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending. (Emphasis
supplied) EDaHAT
In order to protect the people's right against unreasonable searches and seizures,
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) provides that no
search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized: STDEcA
Complementarily, Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court states that a search
warrant shall not be issued except upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall
not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized
which may be anywhere in the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the existence of probable cause for the issuance of Search Warrant
No. 09-14407 is evident from the first-hand account of Avasola who, in his deposition,
stated that he personally witnessed the commission of the afore-stated crime and was, in
fact, part of the group that buried the victims:
Q9 - Who are these six (6) male victims who were killed and buried in the caves
in December 2005 at around 9:00 p.m.? TcEDHa
A9 - I heard Tatay Laud calling the names of the two victims when they were
still alive as Pedro and Mario. I don't know the names of the other four
victims.
Q10 - What happened after Pedro, Mario and the other four victims were killed?
A10 - Tatay Laud ordered me and the six (6) killers to bring and bury equally
the bodies in the three caves. We buried Pedro and Mario altogether in
the first cave, located more or less 13 meters from the makeshift house
of Tatay Laud, the other two victims in the second cave and the
remaining two in the third cave.
Q11 - How did you get there at Laud Compound in the evening of December
2005?
A11 - I was ordered by Tatay Laud to go [to] the place. I ran errands [for] him.
46
Avasola's statements in his deposition were confirmed during the hearing on July
10, 2009, where Judge Peralta conducted the following examination:
Court:
Mr. Avasola:
Court:
Mga ilang katao?
Mr. Avasola:
Court:
Mr. Avasola:
Verily, the facts and circumstances established from the testimony of Avasola,
who was personally examined by Judge Peralta, sufficiently show that more likely than
not the crime of Murder of six (6) persons had been perpetrated and that the human
remains in connection with the same are in the place sought to be searched. In Santos v.
Pryce Gases, Inc., 48 the Court explained the quantum of evidence necessary to establish
probable cause for a search warrant, as follows:
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the quantum of proof to establish the
existence of probable cause had been met. That a "considerable length of time" attended
the search warrant's application from the crime's commission does not, by and of itself,
negate the veracity of the applicant's claims or the testimony of the witness presented. As
the CA correctly observed, the delay may be accounted for by a witness's fear of reprisal
and natural reluctance to get involved in a criminal case. 50 Ultimately, in determining
the existence of probable cause, the facts and circumstances must be personally examined
by the judge in their totality, together with a judicious recognition of the variable
complications and sensibilities attending a criminal case. To the Court's mind, the
supposed delay in the search warrant's application does not dilute the probable cause
finding made herein. In fine, the probable cause requirement has been sufficiently met.
The Court similarly concludes that there was compliance with the constitutional
requirement that there be a particular description of "the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized."
Search Warrant No. 09-14407 evidently complies with the foregoing standard
since it particularly describes the place to be searched, namely, the three (3) caves located
inside the Laud Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Ma-a, Davao City: ESTCDA
For further guidance in its enforcement, the search warrant even made explicit
reference to the sketch 53 contained in the application. These, in the Court's view, are
sufficient enough for the officers to, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the
place to be searched, which they in fact did.
The things to be seized were also particularly described, namely, the remains of
six (6) victims who were killed and buried in the aforesaid premises. Laud's posturing
that human remains are not "personal property" and, hence, could not be the subject of a
search warrant deserves scant consideration. Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
states:
Neither does the Court agree with Laud's contention that the term "human
remains" is too all-embracing so as to subvert the particular description requirement. As
the Court sees it, the description points to no other than the things that bear a direct
relation to the offense committed, i.e., of Murder. It is also perceived that the description
is already specific as the circumstances would ordinarily allow given that the buried
bodies would have naturally decomposed over time. These observations on the
description's sufficient particularity square with the Court's pronouncement in Bache and
Co., (Phil.), Inc. v. Judge Ruiz, 57 wherein it was held:
Consequently, the Court finds that the particular description requirement — both
as to the place to be searched and the things to be seized — had been complied with. DTEIaC
Finally, the Court finds no violation of the one-specific-offense rule under Section
4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court as above-cited which, to note, was intended to prevent
the issuance of scattershot warrants, or those which are issued for more than one specific
offense. The defective nature of scatter-shot warrants was discussed in the case of People
v. CA 59 as follows:
There is no question that the search warrant did not relate to a specific offense,
in violation of the doctrine announced in Stonehill v. Diokno and of Section 3
[now, Section 4] of Rule 126 providing as follows:
SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized.
Significantly, the petitioner has not denied this defect in the search
warrant and has merely said that there was probable cause, omitting to continue
that it was in connection with one specific offense. He could not, of course, for
the warrant was a scatter-shot warrant that could refer, in Judge Dayrit's own
words, "to robbery, theft, qualified theft or estafa." On this score alone, the
search warrant was totally null and void and was correctly declared to be so by
the very judge who had issued it. 60ACETID
In Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA, 61 the Court, however, settled that a search
warrant that covers several counts of a certain specific offense does not violate the one-
specific-offense rule, viz.:
Hence, given that Search Warrant No. 09-14407 was issued only for one specific
offense — that is, of Murder, albeit for six (6) counts — it cannot be said that Section 4,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court had been violated.
That being said, the Court now resolves the last issue on forum shopping.
D. Forum Shopping.
Forum shopping cannot be said to have been committed in this case considering
the various points of divergence attending the search warrant application before the
Manila-RTC and that before the Davao-RTC. For one, the witnesses presented in each
application were different. Likewise, the application filed in Manila was in connection
with Murder, while the one in Davao did not specify any crime. Finally, and more
importantly, the places to be searched were different — that in Manila sought the search
of the Laud Compound caves, while that in Davao was for a particular area in the Laud
Gold Cup Firing Range. There being no identity of facts and circumstances between the
two applications, the rule against forum shopping was therefore not violated. cTEICD
Thus, for all the above-discussed reasons, the Court affirms the CA Ruling which
upheld the validity of Search Warrant No. 09-14407.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 25, 2011 and
the Resolution dated October 17, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No.
113017 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Laud v. People, G.R. No. 199032, [November 19, 2014], 747 PHIL 503-527)
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J : p
In a Joint Decision 14 dated March 29, 2010, the trial court convicted accused-
appellants for violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. No. 9165 and sentenced them to
suffer a penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum,
to fourteen (14) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P300,000.00.
The trial court held that the issuance of a search warrant against the premises
of different persons named therein is valid as there is no requirement that only one
search warrant for one premise to be searched is necessary for its validity. Also, the
address of the accused-appellants Jerry and Patricia Punzalan was clearly and
adequately described. A sketch that specifically identifies the places to be searched
was attached to the records and such description of the place was unquestionably
accurate that the PDEA agents were led to, and were able to successfully conduct their
operation in the premises described in the search warrant.
The trial court also ruled that the implementation of the search warrant
sufficiently complied with the requirements of the law. Despite accused-appellants'
assertion that they were arrested outside their house and were made to board a van
parked along the street beside the river and were not allowed by the PDEA agents to
witness the search conducted inside the house, the trial court was convinced that
accused-appellants Jerry and Patricia Punzalan were in fact inside their house and
were physically present during the conduct of the search.
The trial court gave weight to the prosecution's version and found no reason to
doubt the credibility of IO1 Pagaragan, whose testimony was sufficiently
corroborated by SI2 Esteban. The court found no showing of any improper or ill
motive on the part of both PDEA agents to testify against the accused-appellants and
neither was there evidence that the two PDEA agents were not properly performing
their official duties and functions at that time. On the other hand, the defense merely
offered alibi and bare denials which cannot overcome the presumption of regularity of
performance of functions accorded to IO1 Pagaragan's and SI2 Esteban's detailed
declarations under oath.
In its findings, the trial court observed that there were actually two phases of
the search done in the Punzalan house. The first or initial search was done at the
ground floor of the house, immediately after the PDEA agents gained entry and was
beyond doubt made in the presence of both accused. This is where the bulk of illegal
drugs were found, confiscated and consequently marked. The trial court further stated
that it is of no moment that the barangay officials were not able to witness the said
initial search and their failure to arrive on time to witness the first or initial search at
the ground floor of the Punzalan house, or even their total absence thereat, will not
render the subject search invalid and unlawful inasmuch as their presence is not
required. The trial court held that the prosecution successfully and sufficiently
established that the two accused were present during the initial search, thus, satisfying
the requirement of a lawful and valid search.
The second phase of the search was conducted at the upper floors of the house
after the markings on the 293 sachets of confiscated specimens were completed by
IO1 Pagaragan. This was witnessed and participated in by the barangay officials.
Finally, after the search of the entire house was concluded, it is not disputed that an
inventory of all the items seized was conducted by IO1 Pagaragan in compliance with
the provisions of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. In fact, it was admitted by
the barangay officials that they were requested to wait for the DOJ representative, to
which they willingly acceded. aDSIHc
In assailing the validity of the search warrant, accused-appellants claim that the
PDEA agents who applied for a search warrant failed to comply with the requirements
for the procurement of a search warrant particularly the approval of the PDEA
Director General. Accused-appellants also contended that the court which issued the
search warrant, the RTC of Manila, Branch 17, had no authority to issue the search
warrant since the place where the search is supposed to be conducted is outside its
territorial jurisdiction.
We are not persuaded. A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, entitled "Guidelines on the
Selection and Appointment of Executive Judges and Defining their Powers,
Prerogatives and Duties" as approved by the Court in its Resolution of January 27,
2004, as amended, provides:
SEC. 12. Issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the
Regional Trial Courts of Manila and Quezon City. — The Executive Judges
and, whenever they are on official leave of absence or are not physically
present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and
Quezon City shall have authority to act on applications filed by the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the
Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF), for search warrants involving heinous
crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions as
well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the
Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the
Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, and other relevant laws that may
hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included herein by the Supreme Court.
The applications shall be endorsed by the heads of such agencies or
their respective duly authorized officials and shall particularly describe therein
the places to be searched and/or the property or things to be seized as
prescribed in the Rules of Court. The Executive Judges and Vice-Executive
Judges concerned shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may be served
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said courts.
xxx xxx xxx 18
In the instant case, aside from their bare allegation, accused-appellants failed to
show that the application for search warrant of the subject premises was not approved
by the PDEA Regional Director or his authorized representative. On the contrary, the
search warrant issued by the RTC of Manila, Branch 17 satisfactorily complies with
the requirements for the issuance thereof as determined by the issuing court, thus: ETHIDa
In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause requires such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place
to be searched. There is no exact test for the determination of probable cause in the
issuance of search warrants. It is a matter wholly dependent on the finding of trial
judges in the process of exercising their judicial function. When a finding of probable
cause for the issuance of a search warrant is made by a trial judge, the finding is
accorded respect by reviewing courts. 20
Accused-appellants insist that they were not inside their house and were inside
the closed van when their house was searched. They allege that upon forcibly
breaking into their house through the use of an acetylene torch, the members of the
raiding party handcuffed them, dragged them outside and held them for three hours
inside a van while conducting the search of the premises. They thus argue that the
shabu seized by the PDEA agents were inadmissible in evidence.
We affirm the conviction of accused-appellants. TIADCc
It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial court which are factual in
nature and which involve the credibility of witnesses are accorded with respect, more
so, when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts, and speculative, arbitrary,
and unsupportive conclusions can be gathered from such findings. 21 The reason
behind this rule is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of
witnesses having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner
of testifying during the trial. This rule finds an even more stringent application where
the trial court's findings are sustained by the CA. 22
After carefully reviewing the records of the case, we find no cogent reason to
overturn the findings of both the lower courts, which were adequately supported by
the evidence on record. It cannot be overemphasized that in cases involving violations
of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the narration of the incident
by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are
presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence
to the contrary. 23
In the instant case, like the trial and the appellate courts, we are not persuaded
by accused-appellants' claim that they were not inside their house but were inside a
closed van when their house was searched. In weighing the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses vis-a-vis that of the defense, we find that the former is more
worthy of credit. Both IO1 Pagaragan and SI2 Esteban clearly narrated how the search
on the house of accused-appellants was conducted. As aptly noted by the trial court
and concurred in by the appellate court, there were actually two phases of the search
done in the house of accused-appellants. The first or initial search was done at the
ground floor of the house, immediately after the PDEA agents gained entry. IO1
Sandaan knocked on the house and a woman, later identified as Patricia Punzalan
slightly opened the door and when they introduced themselves as PDEA agents and
informed the occupant that they have a search warrant, Patricia immediately tried to
close the door but was prevented by the PDEA agents from closing it and they were
able to enter the premises. IO1 Pagaragan showed and read the search warrant in front
of the accused-appellants and the agents searched the house and immediately found
several heat-sealed transparent sachets of white crystalline substance of suspected
shabu. Immediately, the seized items were marked "ADP" in the presence of accused-
appellants and media practitioner Jimmy Mendoza. It has been sufficiently shown by
the prosecution that accused-appellants were present when their house was searched.
The pictures taken during the marking and inventory and showing the accused-
appellants in their house are clear proof that they were present when their house was
searched and the illegal drugs found were seized. It was only after the marking of the
drugs and while the PDEA agents waited for the barangay officials to arrive that
accused-appellants were made to board the van. This explains the testimony of
Kagawad Edwin Razon that accused-appellants were not inside their house when he
arrived. After the barangay officials arrived, accused-appellants were brought back to
the house for the continuation of the search of the upper floors but they found no
additional contrabands. They then went back to the ground floor to conduct inventory
of the seized items.
The testimonies of the police officers who caught accused-appellants in
flagrante delicto in possession of illegal drugs during the conduct of a valid search are
usually credited with more weight and credence, in the absence of evidence that they
have been inspired by an improper or ill motive. Here, there is no proof of any ill
motive or odious intent on the part of the police officers to impute such a serious
crime to accused-appellants.
On the other hand, accused-appellants hammer on the supposed inconsistencies
in the testimonies of the witnesses such as whether barangay officials were present at
the time of the conduct of the search. The latter was sufficiently explained by the
prosecution while the other inconsistencies pertain to minor details and are so
inconsequential that they do not affect the credibility of the witnesses nor detract from
the established fact of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
We have previously held that discrepancies and inconsistencies in the
testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details, and not in actuality touching upon
the central fact of the crime, do not impair their credibility. Testimonies of witnesses
need only corroborate each other on important and relevant details concerning the
principal occurrence. In fact, such minor inconsistencies may even serve to strengthen
the witnesses' credibility as they negate any suspicion that the testimonies have been
rehearsed. 24
Notably, Section 8, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:
SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of
two witnesses. — No search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be
made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of
his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality.
As correctly ruled by the CA, even if the barangay officials were not present
during the initial search, the search was witnessed by accused-appellants themselves,
hence, the search was valid since the rule that "two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality" must be present applies only in the absence of
either the lawful occupant of the premises or any member of his family.
To successfully prosecute a case of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
following elements must be established: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or
object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
25 In the case at bench, the prosecution was able to establish with moral certainty the
guilt of the accused-appellants for the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
Accused-appellants were caught in actual possession of the prohibited drugs during a
valid search of their house. It bears stressing that aside from assailing the validity of
the search, accused-appellants did not deny ownership of the illegal drugs seized.
They have not proffered any valid defense in the offense charged for violation of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. AIDSTE
As to accused-appellants' assertion that the chain of custody rule has not been
complied with when no inventory or acknowledgment receipt signed by Atty. Gaspe
was submitted in evidence and that no evidence was shown as to the condition of the
specimen upon its presentation to Atty. Gaspe, who was not presented in court to
explain the discrepancy, we are also not persuaded.
This Court has time and again adopted the chain of custody rule, a method of
authenticating evidence which requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded
by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. This would include testimony about every link in the chain,
from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such
a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom
it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession,
the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to
the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken
to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. 26
The Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 on the handling
and disposition of seized dangerous drugs provides as follows:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia
and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for
proper disposition in the following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control
of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department
of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the
physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the
search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office
of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of
and custody over said items[.]
It is essential for the prosecution to prove that the prohibited drug confiscated
or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit.
Its identity must be established with unwavering exactitude for it to lead to a finding
of guilt. 27 In this case, the chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs was duly
established from the time the heat-sealed plastic sachets were seized and marked by
IO1 Pagaragan to its subsequent turnover to Atty. Gaspe of the PDEA Office in
Quezon City. IO1 Pagaragan was also the one who personally delivered and
submitted the specimens composed of 293 sachets of shabu to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for laboratory examination. The specimens were kept in custody until they
were presented as evidence before the trial court and positively identified by IO1
Pagaragan as the very same specimens he marked during the inventory.
The fact that the Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized was not signed by Atty.
Gaspe does not undermine the integrity and evidentiary value of the illegal drugs
seized from accused-appellants. The failure to strictly comply with the prescribed
procedures in the inventory of seized drugs does not render an arrest of the accused
illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. 28 What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused. 29
With regard to the handling of the seized drugs, there are no conflicting
testimonies or glaring inconsistencies that would cast doubt on the integrity thereof as
evidence presented and scrutinized in court. It is therefore safe to conclude that, to the
unprejudiced mind, the testimonies show without a doubt that the evidence seized
from the accused-appellants at the time of the search was the same one tested,
introduced and testified to in court. In other words, there is no question as to the
integrity of the evidence against accused-appellants.
In fine, we find no error on the part of the CA in affirming the trial court's
conviction of accused-appellants of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The
prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused-appellants Jerry
Punzalan and Patricia Punzalan of the crime charged. We likewise find proper the
modification by the trial court of the penalty imposed to life imprisonment and a fine
of P400,000.00.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The
Decision dated October 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
04557 is hereby AFFIRMED. AaCTcI
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
PERALTA, J : p
For the Court's consideration is the Decision 1 dated March 19, 2012 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 04587 affirming the Decision 2 dated
August 2, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 2, in Criminal
Case No. 09-271907, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
In an information filed on November 5, 2009, appellant Eduardo dela Cruz y
Gumabat was charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5 of Article
II of RA No. 9165, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about October 23, 2009, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused, not having been authorized by law to sell, trade, deliver or
give away to another any dangerous drug, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and knowingly sell or offer for sale to poseur-buyer, one (1)
Blister pack with label "Valium" containing Ten (10) round blue tablets
weighing ONE POINT SEVEN TWO ZERO (1.720) grams which after a
qualitative examination, gave positive result to the test of diazepam, a
dangerous drug.
Contrary to law. 3
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Consequently, trial on the merits ensued. 4
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the witnesses of the prosecution,
namely, PO1 Jaycee John Galotera, who acted as the poseur-buyer; PO1 Roderick
Magpale, who was the investigator-on-duty at the Special Operation and Task Unit;
and PO3 Ryan Sulayao, who acted as the perimeter back-up, are as follows:
At around 7:30 p.m. on October 22, 2009, a confidential informant arrived at
the Jose Abad Santos Police Station, Manila Police District and informed PO1 Ronnie
Tan, PO3 Ryan Sulayao and PO3 Eric Guzman about the illegal drug activities being
conducted by appellant along Solis Street, Tondo, Manila. Said informant claimed to
have gained access to appellant. Consequently, the police officers immediately
informed their station commander, P/Supt. Remigio Sedanto, who tasked the unit to
conduct a buy-bust operation, to be led by P/Inspector Jeffrey Dallo, with PO1
Galotera acting as poseur-buyer, and the rest of the team to serve as back-up.
P/Inspector Dallo gave PO1 Galotera three (3) pieces of One Hundred Peso (P100.00)
bills to be utilized as buy-bust money, which PO1 Galotera marked with his initials
"JJG." The team also agreed that PO1 Galotera's removal of his ball cap constitutes
the signal indicating that the transaction has been consummated and that the appellant
may be arrested. After a thorough briefing and coordination with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the team left the station and proceeded to the target
area at around 12:20 a.m. 5
PO1 Galotera and the confidential informant went straight to the destination
aboard a motorcycle, while PO1 Tan, PO3 Sulayao, and PO3 Guzman, aboard a
separate motorcycle, positioned themselves about ten (10) meters away from PO1
Galotera and the informant. PO1 Galotera and the informant then walked along an
alley on Solis Street towards Villanueva Street and saw two (2) men standing at a
dark portion thereof. As they approached said men, the confidential informant
whispered to PO1 Galotera that the person on the right was appellant. Thereafter,
appellant asked the informant what he needed. 6 In reply, the informant told appellant
that he and his companion, PO1 Galotera, needed "Valium," which contains
Diazepam, a dangerous drug. Appellant then asked how much Valium they need, to
which PO1 Galotera answered, "Isang banig lang." PO1 Galotera then handed the
marked money in the amount of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) to appellant, who
placed the same in his front left pocket. Thereafter, appellant pulled out one blister
pack containing ten (10) pieces of round, blue tablets from his right pocket and
handed the same to PO1 Galotera. Believing that what he received was Valium based
on its appearance, PO1 Galotera executed the pre-arranged signal. Upon seeing the
signal, PO3 Guzman proceeded to assist PO1 Galotera, who immediately grabbed
appellant. Appellant's companion, who tried to escape, was also subdued by PO3
Guzman. PO1 Galotera then apprised appellant of the nature of his arrest and read
him his constitutional rights. He also marked the seized tablets with the initials
"EDG" corresponding to appellant's name. AcICHD
Afterwards, he turned over the appellant and the seized evidence to PO1
Roderick Magpale, an investigator of the Anti-Illegal Special Operation Task Unit at
the Police Station. PO1 Magpale then took pictures of appellant and the seized
evidence, prepared the Booking and Information Sheet, and forwarded the seized
tablets to the forensic laboratory for examination. Accordingly, Forensic Chemist
Erickson L. Calabocal, conducted a chemistry examination and in his Chemistry
Report No. D-787-09, found that the ten (10) round, blue tablets seized from appellant
tested positive for Diazepam, a dangerous drug. 7 During trial, however, Calabocal's
testimony was dispensed with after the parties stipulated on the existence and due
execution of Chemistry Report No. D-787-09. 8
Against the foregoing charges, appellant testified on his own version of facts,
and further presented the testimonies of his mother, Leonora dela Cruz, and one
Roberto Balatbat. 9
Appellant testified that he was a jeepney driver by profession and a resident at
Solis Street, Tondo, Manila. At around 3:00 p.m. on October 23, 2009, he went to see
his friend, Nicanor Guevarra, to convince him to place a bet on the "karera." He
found him at the tricycle terminal at Solis Street corner Callejon Villanueva, playing
cara y cruz and joined him. Suddenly, the policemen arrived. They tried to run but
were eventually arrested. Appellant requested that he be brought to the barangay hall,
but the policemen brought him directly to the police station. He thought that he was
only being accused of illegal gambling for playing cara y cruz. It turned out, however,
that he was being charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs. 10
After appellant, the defense presented appellant's mother who denied that her
son was into selling dangerous drugs. According to her, at around 3:00 p.m. on
October 23, 2009, appellant asked her permission to leave the house to place a bet.
However, she later learned from her granddaughter that her son had been arrested.
Next was Roberto Balatbat, a tricycle driver residing at Solis Street, Tondo,
Manila, who testified that on that day, he was at the tricycle terminal on Solis Street
playing cara y cruz. When the four (4) police officers arrived, he quickly ran away
leaving behind appellant and Guevarra, who were arrested. He denied that any sale of
dangerous drugs transpired at the time and place of appellant's arrest. 11
In its Decision dated August 2, 2010, the RTC gave credence to the testimonies
of the police officers as they were given in a clear and convincing manner showing
that the officers were at the place of the incident to accomplish exactly what they had
set out to do, which was to conduct a legitimate buy-bust operation on appellant. 12 It
found that unless the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any ill motive to
testify falsely against appellant, their testimonies deserve full faith and credit,
particularly in light of the presumption that they have performed their duties regularly.
Indeed, the positive identification of appellant by the prosecution witnesses prevails
over appellant's denial, which is inherently a weak defense. 13 The trial court,
therefore, disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, from the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered,
finding the accused, Eduardo dela Cruz y Gumabat @ Eddie, GUILTY,
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. He is hereby sentenced to life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
The specimen is forfeited in favor of the government and the Branch
Clerk of Court, accompanied by the Branch Sheriff, is directed to turn over
with dispatch and upon receipt the said specimen to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposal in accordance with the law
and rules.
SO ORDERED. 14
Appellant appealed his conviction arguing that his warrantless arrest was
unlawful for he was not, in fact, caught selling dangerous drugs but was merely
committing the offense of illegal gambling. Thus, the ten (10) tablets of Valium
allegedly seized from him is inadmissible as evidence. 15 Appellant also argued that
there was no showing that he was informed of the reason for his arrest, of his
constitutional right to remain silent and to be assisted by a counsel of his choice. 16
Appellant further faulted the prosecution for not only failing to present the buy-bust
money as evidence in court 17 but also failing to show proof that the confiscated
Valium was subjected to a qualitative examination. 18 He noted that the chemist who
supposedly conducted the laboratory examination on the drug did not know the source
from which it came. 19
On March 19, 2012, the CA sustained appellant's conviction. At the outset, it
noted that it was only in appellant's appeal that appellant raised for the first time the
issue of the irregularity of his arrest. At no time before or during his arraignment did
he object to the same. As such, jurisprudence dictates that he should be estopped from
assailing said irregularity, for issues not raised in the lower courts cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal without offending the basic rules of fair play. 20 Even
assuming that the police officers failed to inform appellant of his rights under
custodial investigation, the appellate court held that such would not necessarily result
in appellant's acquittal because his conviction was based not on any extrajudicial
confession but on the testimony of PO1 Galotera who clearly and convincingly
narrated the material details of the buy-bust operation that led to appellant's arrest. 21
TAIaHE
On appellant's main contention that the police officers should have obtained a
judicial warrant to validly effect his arrest, the appellate court held that the instant
case falls within one of the settled exceptions: an arrest made after an entrapment
operation. This is because such warrantless arrest is considered valid under Section 5
(a), 22 Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The CA explained that
buy-bust operations, such as the one conducted herein, is a form of entrapment where
means are resorted to for the purpose of capturing lawbreakers in the execution of
their own, criminal plan. In upholding the validity of the operation, the "objective
test" demands that the details of the purported transaction be clearly shown, beginning
from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to
purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration, until the consummation of the
sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. 23 Here, the appellate court
found that said requirements were adequately met for as observed by the trial court,
the testimonies presented by the prosecution were given in a clear, straightforward
and convincing manner.
As for the failure by the prosecution to offer as evidence the marked money,
the CA cited jurisprudence holding that the absence of the marked money does not
create a hiatus in the prosecution's evidence, as long as the sale of the dangerous drug
is adequately proved. 24 Furthermore, the appellate court rejected appellant's
contention that there was no proof that the Valium that was subjected to qualitative
examination was the same Valium seized from him during the buy-bust operation.
According to the appellate court, the unbroken chain of custody of the ten (10)
Valium tablets was established by the prosecution through the testimonies of PO1
Galotera and PO1 Magpale. Thus, in the absence of any bad faith or proof that the
evidence has been tampered with, the integrity of the evidence is presumed to have
been preserved. 25
Aggrieved, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal 26 on April 4, 2012. Thereafter,
in compliance with the Resolution of the Court, dated March 13, 2013, notifying the
parties that they may file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire, within
thirty (30) days from notice, appellant filed his Supplemental Brief on June 14, 2013
raising the following errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE NON-
COMPLIANCE BY THE ARRESTING OFFICERS OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROPER CUSTODY OF SEIZED
DANGEROUS DRUGS UNDER R.A. NO. 9165.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE
PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE THE IDENTITY OF THE
CORPUS DELICTI. 27
Appellant maintains that the instant case does not fall under the exceptions to
the requirement of obtaining a judicial warrant prior to making an arrest under Section
5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. According to appellant, for
in flagrante warrantless arrests to be lawful, the following elements must concur: (1)
the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. But here,
appellant asserts that he was not exhibiting any strange actuation at the time of his
arrest, merely playing cara y cruz with a friend. Thus, absent any physical act on the
part of the accused, positively indicating that he had just committed a crime or was
committing or attempting to commit one, no reasonable suspicion would be sufficient
enough to justify his arrest and subsequent search without a warrant. 28
Next, appellant asseverates that the prosecution failed to establish, with moral
certainty, that the item seized from him was the very same item presented and proved
in court because of its non-compliance with the requirements under Section 21 of RA
No. 9165 mandating the arresting team to conduct a physical inventory of the items
seized and photograph the same in the presence of: (1) the accused; (2) a
representative from the media; (3) a representative from the Department of Justice
(DOJ); and (4) any elected public official who shall further be required to sign the
copies of the said inventory. According to appellant, no physical inventory nor
photograph was ever taken in this case. 29
Furthermore, while appellant recognizes the jurisprudential teaching that non-
compliance with Section 21 of RA No. 9165 is not fatal so long as: (1) there is
justifiable ground therefor; and (2) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items were properly preserved by the apprehending team, he stressed that said
conditions were not established in this case. Not only did the prosecution fail to
adequately explain its failure to comply with said requirements, it likewise failed to
show the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.
Appellant asserts that this is due to a gaping hole in the chain of custody of the seized
items arising from the prosecution's failure to show how the seized drugs were
transported from the place of arrest to the police station, or from the time they were
delivered to the laboratory until their eventual presentation in court.
The appeal is unmeritorious. cDHAES
All things considered, the Court finds no compelling reason to disturb the
findings of the courts below for the prosecution adequately established, with moral
certainty, all the elements of the crime charged herein. It is hornbook doctrine that the
factual findings of the appellate court affirming those of the trial court are binding on
this Court unless there is a clear showing that such findings are tainted with
arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error. 42 Thus, there exists no reason to
overturn the conviction of appellant.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The
Decision dated March 19, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
04587, affirming the Decision dated August 2, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 2, Manila, in Criminal Case No. 09-271907, finding appellant Eduardo Dela
Cruz y Gumabat guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Perez and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Perlas-Bernabe, * J., is on leave.
||| (People v. Dela Cruz y Gumabat, G.R. No. 205414, [April 4, 2016])
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J : p
This is an appeal from the January 17, 2012 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04069, affirming in toto the July 23, 2009 Decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 127, finding accused-appellant
Medario Calantiao y Dimalanta (Calantiao) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002.
On November 13, 2003, Calantiao was charged before the RTC of violation of
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 in an Information, 3 the pertinent portion
of which reads:
The facts, as synthesized by the RTC and adopted by the Court of Appeals, are as
follows:
The police officers on duty then were PO1 NELSON MARIANO and
PO3 EDUARDO RAMIREZ. PO1 Mariano testified that they immediately
responded to said complaint by proceeding to 5th Avenue corner 8th Street,
Caloocan City where they found the white taxi. While approaching said vehicle,
two armed men alighted therefrom, fired their guns towards them (police
officers) and ran away. PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez chased them but they
were subdued. PO1 Mariano recovered from Calantiao a black bag containing
two (2) bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops and a magazine of super 38
stainless with ammos, while PO3 Ramirez recovered from Calantiao's
companion [a] .38 revolver.
The suspects and the confiscated items were then turned over to SPO3
PABLO TEMENA, police investigator at Bagong Barrio Police Station for
investigation. Thereat, PO1 Mariano marked the bricks of marijuana contained
in a black bag with his initials, "NM". Thereafter, said specimen were
forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis. The result of the
examination conducted by P/SINSP. JESSSE DELA ROSA revealed that the
same was positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug. CSaIAc
MR. CRISENDO AMANSEC, the driver of the taxi where the suspects
boarded was also presented in open court and testified as to what he knows
about the incident. He confirmed that on that date, two (2) persons boarded on
his taxi and upon reaching C-3 Road, they alighted and fired three (3) shots and
ran away.
Aside from the oral testimonies of the witnesses, the prosecution also
offered the following documentary evidence to boost their charge against the
accused:
Exh. "A" — Request for Laboratory Examination dated
November 12, 2003
On July 23, 2009, the RTC rendered its Decision giving credence to the
prosecution's case. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring accused MEDARIO CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA, GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the offense of Violation of Section 11,
Article II, R.A. 9165, for illegally possessing 997.9 grams of marijuana fruiting
tops. Henceforth, this Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php500,000.00). 5
In convicting Calantiao, the RTC held that the illegal drug seized was admissible
in evidence as it was discovered during a body search after Calantiao was caught in
flagrante delicto of possessing a gun and firing at the police officers. Moreover, the RTC
found all the elements of the offense to have been duly established by the prosecution. 6
IaHSCc
II
III
Undaunted, Calantiao is now before this Court praying for an acquittal, adding the
following arguments in support of his position:
Second, Calantiao did not waive the inadmissibility of the seized items.
This Court cannot subscribe to Calantiao's contention that the marijuana in his
possession cannot be admitted as evidence against him because it was illegally
discovered and seized, not having been within the apprehending officers' "plain view." 12
Searches and seizure incident to a lawful arrest are governed by Section 13, Rule
126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
In People v. Valeroso, 14 this Court had the occasion to reiterate the permissible
reach of a valid warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest, viz.:
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the
apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of
the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latter's reach. Otherwise
stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either
on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control.
The phrase "within the area of his immediate control" means the area from
within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A
gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous
to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested.
(Citations omitted.)AICEDc
In Valeroso, however, the Court held that the evidence searched and seized from
him could not be used against him because they were discovered in a room, different
from where he was being detained, and was in a locked cabinet. Thus, the area searched
could not be considered as one within his immediate control that he could take any
weapon or destroy any evidence against him. 15
In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black bag in Calantiao's
possession and within his immediate control. He could have easily taken any weapon
from the bag or dumped it to destroy the evidence inside it. As the black bag containing
the marijuana was in Calantiao's possession, it was within the permissible area that the
apprehending officers could validly conduct a warrantless search. EIAHcC
Calantiao's argument that the marijuana cannot be used as evidence against him
because its discovery was in violation of the Plain View Doctrine, is misplaced.
Calantiao claims that even if the search and seizure were validly effected, the
marijuana is still inadmissible as evidence against him for failure of the apprehending
officers to comply with the rules on chain of custody, as the item was marked at the
police station. 18
This Court has held that the failure to strictly comply with Section 21, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, such as immediately marking seized drugs, will not
automatically impair the integrity of chain of custody because what is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. 19
Section 21 and its IRR do not even mention "marking." What they require are (1)
physical inventory, and (2) taking of photographs. As this Court held in People v.
Ocfemia: 20
What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not
expressly specify is the matter of "marking" of the seized items in warrantless
seizures to ensure that the evidence seized upon apprehension is the same
evidence subjected to inventory and photography when these activities are
undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency
with the "chain of custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items
— to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are
eventually the ones offered in evidence — should be done (1) in the presence of
the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation.
The prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody of the seized marijuana
from the time the police officers confiscated it, to the time it was turned over to the
investigating officer, up to the time it was brought to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination. 21 This Court has no reason to overrule the RTC and the Court of Appeals,
which both found the chain of custody of the seized drugs to have not been broken so as
to render the marijuana seized from Calantiao inadmissible in evidence.
Furthermore, unless it can be shown that there was bad faith, ill will, or tampering
of the evidence, the presumption that the integrity of the evidence has been preserved will
remain. The burden of showing the foregoing to overcome the presumption that the
police officers handled the seized drugs with regularity, and that they properly discharged
their duties is on Calantiao. Unfortunately, Calantiao failed to discharge such burden. 22
It is worthy to note that these arguments were only raised by Calantiao on his
appeal. He himself admits this. 23 His theory, from the very beginning, was that he did
not do it, and that he was being framed for having offended the police officers. Simply
put, his defense tactic was one of denial and frame-up. However, those defenses have
always been frowned upon by the Court, to wit:
Hence, as Calantiao failed to show clear and convincing evidence that the
apprehending officers were stirred by illicit motive or failed to properly perform their
duties, their testimonies deserve full faith and credit. 25 TaDAHE
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Calantiao y Dimalanta, G.R. No. 203984, [June 18, 2014], 736 PHIL 661-676)
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J : p
Assailed herein by Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court are the October 30, 2003 Resolution 1 of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices — Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) which dismissed for lack of probable cause the criminal
complaint, docketed as OMB-P-C-02-0109-B, filed by Feliciano Galvante 2
(petitioner) against SPO4 Benjamin Conde, PO1 Ramil Avenido, PO1 Eddie Degran,
PO1 Valentino Rufano, and PO1 Federico Balolot (private respondents) for arbitrary
detention, illegal search and grave threats; and the January 20, 2004 Ombudsman
Order 3 which denied his motion for reconsideration.
The facts are of record.
In the afternoon of May 14, 2001 at Sitio Cahi-an, Kapatungan, Trento,
Agusan del Sur, private respondents confiscated from petitioner one colt pistol super .
38 automatic with serial no. 67973, one short magazine, and nine super .38 live
ammunitions. 4 The confiscated materials were covered by an expired Memorandum
Receipt dated September 2, 1999. 5
Consequently, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor filed against petitioner an
Information 6 for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in Relation to
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 3258, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 5047, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur.
Pending resolution of Criminal Case No. 5047, petitioner filed against private
respondents an administrative case, docketed as Administrative Case No. IASOB-
020007 for Grave Misconduct, before the Internal Affairs Service (IAS), Region XIII,
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG); 7 and a criminal case,
docketed as OMB-P-C-02-0109-B for Arbitrary Detention, Illegal Search and Grave
Threats, before the Ombudsman. 8
In the June 21, 2001 Affidavit-Complaint he filed in both cases, petitioner
narrated how, on May 14, 2001, private respondents aimed their long firearms at him,
arbitrarily searched his vehicle and put him in detention, thus:
1. That sometime on May 14, 2001 I left my house at around 1:00 o'clock
in the afternoon after having lunch for Sitio Cahi-an, Brgy.
Kapatungan, Trento, Agusan del Sur to meet retired police Percival
Plaza and inquire about the retirement procedure for policemen;
2. That upon arrival at the house of retired police Percival Plaza, together
with Lorenzo Sanoria, Delfin Ramirez and Pedro Ramas who
asked for a ride from the highway in going to Sitio Cahi-an, I
immediately went down of the jeep but before I could call Mr.
Plaza, four policemen in uniform blocked my way;
5. That my other companions on the jeep also went down and raised their
arms and showed their waistline when the same policemen and a
person in civilian attire holding an armalite also pointed their
firearms to them to which Mr. Percival Plaza who came down from
his house told them not to harass me as I am also a former police
officer but they did not heed Mr. Plaza's statements;
7. That after a while they saw my super .38 pistol under the floormat of
my jeep and asked me of the MR of the firearm but due to fear that
their long arms were still pointed to us, I searched my wallet and
gave the asked [sic] document;
11. That after the disarming of the civilian I was put to jail with the said
person by Police Chief Rocacorba and was released only at 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon of May 16, 2001 after posting a bailbond;
12. That I caused the execution of this document for the purpose of filing
cases of Illegal Search, Grave Misconduct and Abuse of Authority
against SPO4 Benjamin Conde, Jr., of Trento Police Station; PO1
Ramil Avenido, PO1 Velantino Rufano, PO1 Federico Balolot and
PO1 Eddie Degran. 9
In its Memorandum, 27 the Office of the Solicitor General argued that public
respondents acted within the bounds of their discretion in dismissing OMB-P-C-02-
0109-B given that private respondents committed no crime in searching petitioner and
confiscating his firearm as the former were merely performing their duty of enforcing
the law against illegal possession of firearms and the COMELEC ban against the
carrying of firearms outside of one's residence.
Private respondent Conde filed a Comment 28 and a Memorandum for himself.
29 Private respondents Avenido, Degran, Rufano and Balolot filed their separate
Letter-Comment dated June 25, 2004. 30
The petition lacks merit.
The Constitution vests in the Ombudsman the power to determine whether
there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding
information with the appropriate courts. 31 The Court respects the relative autonomy
of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute, and refrains from interfering when
the latter exercises such powers either directly or through the Deputy Ombudsman, 32
except when the same is shown to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 33
Grave abuse of discretion is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when judgment
rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim and despotism. 34
This does not obtain in the present case.
It is noted that the criminal complaint which petitioner filed with the
Ombudsman charges private respondents with warrantless search, arbitrary detention,
and grave threats.
The complaint for warrantless search charges no criminal offense. The
conduct of a warrantless search is not a criminal act for it is not penalized under the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) or any other special law. What the RPC punishes are only
two forms of searches:
Petitioner did not allege any of the elements of the foregoing felonies in his
Affidavit-Complaint; rather, he accused private respondents of conducting a search on
his vehicle without being armed with a valid warrant. This situation, while
lamentable, is not covered by Articles 129 and 130 of the RPC.
The remedy of petitioner against the warrantless search conducted on his
vehicle is civil, 35 under Article 32, in relation to Article 2219 36 (6) and (10) of the
Civil Code, which provides:
and/or disciplinary and administrative, under Section 41 of Republic Act No. 6975. 37