payment of just compensation is imperative.

The taking
contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land.

What is required is the:

Association of Small Landowners in the Phil vs. 1. surrender of the title

Sec. of Agrarian Reform 2. and the physical possession of said excess and all beneficial
rights accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer-
beneficiary.

G.R. NO. L-78742 The Court declares that the content and manner of the just
compensation provided for in Section 18 of the CARP Law is not
violative of the Constitution.

FACTS:

The following are consolidated cases:

1. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO

228 and 229 and RA 6657. Subjects of the petition are a 9-
hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by four tenants.
Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228 as qualified
farmers under PD 27. The petitioners now contend that
President Aquino usurped the legislature‘s power.

2. A petition by landowners and sugar planters in Victoria‘s

Mill Negros Occidental against Proclamation 131 and EO
229. Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian Reform
Fund with initial fund of P50Billion.

3. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR

under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer.

4. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to

owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven
hectares.

ISSUE:

Whether the aforementioned EO‘s, PD, and RA were constitutional.

HELD:

The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise

of Police power and eminent domain.

The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228

and 229 was authorized under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of
the 1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exercise of Police Power
and Eminent Domain

RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under

CARP becomes necessary to deprive owners of whatever lands they
may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is
definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which

ROXAS & co. vs CA
321 scra 106
FACTS:
This case involves three (3) haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas owned
by petitioner and the validity of the acquisition of thesehaciendas by
the government under Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic
corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas, namely,
Haciendas Palico,Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the
Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. On July 27, 1987, the Congress
of the Philippinesformally convened and took over legislative power
from the President.
2 President, Eduardo Roxas, reiterated its request to withdraw
This Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, theComprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. The Act was signed by the
President on June 10, 1988 and took effect onJune 15, 1988.Before
the law's effectivity, on May 6, 1988, petitioner filed with
respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda
Caylawaypursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas
Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition
byrespondent DAR in accordance with the CARL., petitioner applied
with the DAR for conversion of Haciendas Palico and Banilad from
agricultural to non-agricultural lands under theprovisions of the
CARL.
13
On July 14, 1993, petitioner sent a letter to the DAR Regional
Director reiterating its request for conversionof the two haciendas.
14
Despite petitioner's application for conversion, respondent DAR
proceeded with the acquisition of the two Haciendas. TheLBP trust
accounts as compensation for Hacienda Palico were replaced by
respondent DAR with cash and LBP bonds.
15
On October 22, 1993, from the mother title of TCT No. 985 of the
Hacienda, respondent DAR registered Certificate of Land Ownership
Award(CLOA) No. 6654. On October 30, 1993, CLOA's
were distributed to farmer beneficiaries.
16
On August 6, 1992, petitioner, through its President, Eduardo J.
Roxas, sent a letter to the Secretary of respondent DARwithdrawing
its VOS (voluntary offer to sell) of Hacienda Caylaway. The
Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedlyauthorized the
reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-
agricultural. As a result, petitioner informed respondentDAR that it
was applying for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural
to other uses.
34
In a letter dated September 28, 1992, respondent DAR Secretary
informed petitioner that a reclassification of the land wouldnot
exempt it from agrarian reform. Respondent Secretary also denied
petitioner's withdrawal of the VOS on the ground thatwithdrawal
could only be based on specific grounds such as unsuitability of the
soil for agriculture, or if the slope of the land is over 18 degrees and
that the land is undeveloped.
35
Despite the denial of the Voluntary Offer to sell withdrawal of
Hacienda Caylaway, on May 11, 1993, petitioner filed its application
for conversion of both Haciendas Palico and Banilad. , through its
the VOSover Hacienda Caylaway in light of the following:1)
Certification issued by Conrado I. Gonzales, Officer-in-Charge,
Department of Agriculture, Region 4, 4th Floor, ATI (BA)
Bldg.,Diliman, Quezon City dated March 1, 1993 stating that the
lands subject of referenced titles "are not feasible and economically
soundfor further agricultural development.2) Resolution No. 19 of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas approving the Zoning
Ordinance reclassifying areas coveredby the referenced titles to
non-agricultural which was enacted after extensive consultation
with government agencies, including [theDepartment of Agrarian
Reform], and the requisite public hearings.3) Resolution No. 106 of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batangas dated March 8, 1993
approving the Zoning Ordinance enactedby the Municipality of
Nasugbu.4) Letter dated December 15, 1992 issued by Reynaldo U.
Garcia of the Municipal Planning & Development, Coordinator
andDeputized Zoning Administrator addressed to Mrs. Alicia
P. Logarta advising that the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas
has noobjection to the conversion of the lands subject of referenced
titles to non-agricultural.
37
Petitioner alleged that the Municipality of Nasugbu, where the
haciendas are located, had been declared a tourist zone, that the
landis not suitable for agricultural production, and that the
Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu had reclassified the land to non-
agricultural..Petitioner urges the Court to take cognizance of
the conversion proceedings and rule accordingly
ISSUE:
WON the courts are in a better position to resolve petitioner's
application for conversion of land.
HELD :
NO.
91
Respondent DAR is in a better position to resolve petitioner's
application for conversion, being primarily the agencypossessing the
necessary expertise on the matter The DAR's mandate over
applications for conversion was first laid down in Section 4 (j) and
Section 5 (l) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987 and
reiterated in the CARL and Memorandum Circular No. 54, Series of
1993 of the Office of the President. TheDAR's jurisdiction over
applications for conversion is provided as follows:A. The Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is mandated to "approve or disapprove
applications for conversion, restructuring or readjustment of
agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses," pursuant to Section 4
(j) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987.B. Sec. 5 (l) of E.O.
129-A, Series of 1987, vests in the DAR, exclusive authority to
approve or disapprove applications for conversionof agricultural
lands for residential, commercial, industrial and other land uses

Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) vs. Presidential Agrarian
Reform Council (PARC), et al.,
G.R. No. 171101,
November 22, 2011
I.      THE FACTS
On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted
unanimously (11-0) to:
1. DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and
2. AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC
revoking HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and
3. placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under
compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) of the government.
The Court however did not order outright land
distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are operative
facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly
ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP
must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the
right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries
(FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders
or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to “immediately schedule meetings with
the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences
and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the
FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the
ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the
case may be, over their printed names.”
       The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for
reconsideration of the Court decision.
II.    THE ISSUES
(1)  Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?
(2)  Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?
(3)  Can’t the Court order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda
Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657
and previously held by Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco),
and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP?
(4)  Is the date of the “taking” (for purposes of determining the just
compensation payable to HLI) November 21, 1989, when PARC
approved HLI’s SDP?
(5)  Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands
under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were
placed under CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11,
1989), and thus the qualified FWBs should now be allowed to sell
their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties, whether they
have fully paid for the lands or not?
(6)  THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision
that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders
of HLI be reconsidered?
III.   THE RULING
            [The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for
reconsideration of respondents PARC, et al. with respect to the
option granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of
Hacienda Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI, which option the
Court thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered its earlier
decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to
remain as stockholders of HLI, and UNANIMOUSLY directed
immediate land distribution to the qualified FWBs.]
1.    YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.
[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact
doctrine is applicable in this case since, contrary to the suggestion of
the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or
unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the
President or the administrative agencies that have the force and
effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions,
they may have produced acts and consequences that must be
respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should
be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the
implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of
HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact
doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact
favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain
the benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution
scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves
whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.]
2.    NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional. Court however ordered that the unused balance of the proceeds of
the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare
land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.]

[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to

rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it
was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution 4.    YES, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989, when PARC
thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been approved HLI’s SDP.
rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the
modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its
July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the
[For the purpose of determining just compensation, the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that
date of “taking” is November 21, 1989 (the date when PARC
there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may
approved HLI’s SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs were
justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.]
considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda
Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian
reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon
3.    NO, the Court CANNOT order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of the approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989. Such
Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares and not just the approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under
4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP. compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice
Sereno) that the date of the notice of coverage [after PARC’s
revocation of the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of
the just compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court
[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety
majority noted that none of the cases cited to justify this position
of the revocation of the SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 has. of
involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not
agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court is constrained to
squarely apply to the instant case.  The foregoing notwithstanding, it
rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural
bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and
land.Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR, under its
is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The
mandate under the agrarian reform law, from subsequently
landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting as a special
subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands originally held
agrarian court to determine just compensation. The court has the
by Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were
right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of
supposedly covered by RA 6657.
what is admittedly a judicial function.]

However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the

5.    NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands
July 5, 2011 Decision appears too restrictive – considering that there
under RA 6657 has NOT lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified
are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are
FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell their land interests in
considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these may
Hacienda Luisita to third parties.
necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may be
awarded per FWB – the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves
to give the DAR leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded
per FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs decreases. In [Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only
order to ensure the proper distribution of the agricultural lands of be transferred or conveyed after 10 years from
Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that matters the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or
involving strictly the administrative implementation and certificate of land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs
enforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the
the DAR, it is the latter which shall determine the area with which instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even started.
each qualified FWB will be awarded. Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA,
and not the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage.
Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the option to
sell or convey their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at
On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its
agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of
holding that the 500-hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita that have
the day, these lands will just be transferred to persons not entitled
been validly converted to industrial use and have been acquired by
to land distribution under CARP.]
intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and
Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate
80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be
excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The
6.    YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs
be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI should be
reconsidered. Issue:

[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the 1)   Whether or not operative fact doctrine is applicable in the said
qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders case.
of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control
2)   Whether or not Sec. 31 of R.A. 6657 unconstitutional.
[over the subject lands] given the present proportion of
shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the share of the FWBs in
3)   Whether or not the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer
the HLI capital stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of
of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999, since
this 33.296% unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which
Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through the
is unlikely, control will never be in the hands of the FWBs.  Control
SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989, and thus the qualified FWBs should
means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the
now be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to
common shares and other voting shares.  Applying the formula to
third parties, whether they have fully paid for the lands or not?
the HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the
majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares 4)   Whether or not qualified FWBs shall be entitled to the option of
divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share).  The 118,391,976.85 shares remaining as stockholder be reconsidered.
subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall short of the
295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over
HLI.]
Ruling:

1)   Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable to the instant case. The

Hacienda Luisita Incorporated vs Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council, et al., Case Digest G.R. No. 171101 November 22, 2011
Facts:
court ruled that the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or
unconstitutional law but also to decisions made by the president or
the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws,
especially if the said decisions produced acts and consequences that
must be respected. That the implementation of PARC resolution
approving SDP of HLI manifested such right and benefits favorable to
the FWBs;

2)   The SC said that the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of R.A. 6657 is

The SC en banc voted 11-0 dismissing the petition filed by HLI Affirm
not the lis mota of the case and it was not raised at the earliest
with modifications the resolutions of the Presidential Agrarian
opportunity and did not rule on the constitutionality of the law;
Reform Council (PARC for brevity) revoking Hacienda Luisita Inc.
(HLI for brevity) Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the
subject land in HL under compulsory coverage of the CARP of the
government. 3)   The SC ruled that it has not yet lapsed on May 10, 1999, and
qualified FWBs are not allowed to sell their land interest in HL to
third parties; That the start of the counting of the prohibitive
period shall be ten years from the issuance and registration of the
Thereafter, the SC voting 6-5 averred that there are operative facts
Emancipation Patent (EP for brevity) or Certificate of Land
that occurred in the premises.  The SC thereat declared that the
Ownership Award (CLOA for brevity), and considering that the EPs
revocation of the SDP shall, by application of the operative fact
and CLOAs have not yet been issued, the prohibitive period has not
principle, give the 5296 qualified Farmworkers Beneficiaries (FWBs
started yet.
for brevity) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI
stockholders or choose actual land distribution. Considering the
premises, DAR immediately scheduled a meeting regarding the
effects of their choice and therefrom proceeded to secret voting of 4)   The SC ruled in the affirmative, giving qualified FWBs the option
their choice. to remain as stockholder

The parties, thereafter, filed their respective Motion for

Reconsideration regarding the SC’s decision.
YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs
be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI should be
reconsidered.

[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs
should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI,
inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control [over the
subject lands] given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI.
The Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is
[just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296%
unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely,
control will never be in the hands of the FWBs.  Control means the
majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the common shares
and other voting shares.  Applying the formula to the HLI
stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority
is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided
by 2 plus one [1] HLI share).  The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to
the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101
shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.]

The SC PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of

respondents PARC, et al., The 6,296 original FWBs shall forfeit and
relinquish their rights over the HLI shares of stock issued to them in
favor of HLI.  The HLI Corporate Secretary shall cancel the shares
issued to the said FWBs and transfer them to HLI in the stocks and
transfer book. The 4,206 non-qualified FWBs shall remain as
stockholders of HLI.
 "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree," in
that no application for conversion of the NATALIA lands from
agricultural to residential was ever filed with the DAR. In other
words, there was no valid conversion.
Natalia Realty Inc vs. DAR

ISSUE: 

FACTS: Whether or not the subject properties shall be included in the

coverage of CARP
Petitioner Natalia is the owner of three contiguous parcels of land
located in Banaba, Antipolo, Rizal.

On 18 April 1979, Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 set aside

20,312 hectares of land located in the Municipalities of Antipolo,
San Mateo and Montalban as townsite areas to absorb the
population overspill in the metropolis which were designated as the
Lungsod Silangan Townsite. The Natalia properties are situated
within the areas proclaimed as townsite reservation.
EDIC, developer of Natalia, applied for and was granted preliminary
approval and locational clearances by the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission. Petitioners were likewise issued
development permits after complying with the requirements. Thus
the Natalia properties later became the Antipolo Hills Subdivision.
On 15 June 1988, CARL was enacted.
DAR, through MARO, issued a Notice of Coverage on the
undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision which
consisted of roughly 90.3307 hectares.
Natalia and EDIC protested to this.
Members of the Samahan ng Magsasaka sa Bundok Antipolo, Inc.
(SAMBA), filed a complaint against Natalia and EDIC before the DAR
Regional Adjudicator to restrain petitioners from developing areas
under cultivation by SAMBA members.
HELD:
NO.
Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall "cover,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all
public and private agricultural lands."
As to what constitutes "agricultural land," it is referred to as "land
devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and  not
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial
land. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm
this limitation.
"Agricultural lands" are only those lands which are "arable and
suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial,
industrial and residential lands."
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of
the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language be
considered as "agricultural lands." These lots were intended for
residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval
of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation.

DAR Regional ruled by temporarily restraining petitioners from

further developing the subdivision.

Petitioners elevated their cause to DARAB but the latter merely

remanded the case to the Regional Adjudicator for further
proceedings

Natalia wrote respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform reiterating

its request to set aside the Notice of Coverage. Neither respondent
Secretary nor respondent Director took action on the protest-letters.

Hence, this petition.

Natalia’s contention: Subject properties already ceased to be

agricultural lands when they were included in the areas reserved by
presidential fiat for townsite reservation.

OSG’s contention: The permits granted petitioners were not valid

and binding because they did not comply with the implementing
Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957, otherwise known as
 Luz Farms vs. Sec. of Agrarian Reform
en banc decision
G.R. No. 86889
Facts:
Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in livestock and poultry
business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the
enforcement of CARP.
Luz Farms petitions CARP to be declared unconstitutional together
with a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining the order. It seeks
to nullify Sec. 3 (b) and Sec. 11 of RA 6657 in so far as they apply to
livestock and poultry business. The Court resolved to deny the
petition.
Later, after a motion for reconsideration, the Court granted the
motion regarding the injunction and required the parties to file their
respective memoranda.
Luz Farm: Livestock or poultry raising is not similar to crop or tree
farming. Land is not the primary resource in this undertaking and
represents no more than five percent (5%) of the total investment of
commercial livestock and poultry raisers. Indeed, there are many
owners of residential lands all over the country who use available
space in their residence for commercial livestock and raising
purposes, under "contract-growing arrangements," whereby
processing corporations and other commercial livestock and poultry
raisers.
DAR: livestock and poultry raising is embraced in the term
"agriculture" and the inclusion of such enterprise under Section 3(b)
of R.A. 6657 is proper. He cited that Webster's International
Dictionary, "Agriculture — the art or science of cultivating the
ground and raising and harvesting crops, often, including also,
feeding, breeding and management of livestock, tillage, husbandry,
farming.
Issue:
Constitutionality of CARP, insofar as the said law includes the raising
of livestock, poultry, swine in its coverage.
Ruling:
The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural,"
clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the
Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the
coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program
of the Government.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion
of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well
as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in
accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being
unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary injunction issued is
hereby MADE permanent.
Held:
Sec. 3 (b) and Sec. 11 of RA 6657 are unconstitutional in so far as
they include lands devoted to raising livestock, swine and poultry
within its coverage. The use of land is incidental to but not the
principal factor or consideration of productivity in this industry. The
Supreme Court held that:
The transcripts of deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of
1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it
was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include
livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-
mandated agrarian reform program of the government.
The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as
defined under Section 166 of RA 3844, as land devoted to any
growth, including but not limited to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds,
idle and abandoned land (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III,
p. 11).
The Supreme Court noted that the intention of the Committee to
limit the application of the word "agriculture" is further shown by
the proposal of Commissioner Jamir to insert the word "arable" to
distinguish this kind of agricultural land from such lands as
commercial and industrial lands and residential properties. The
proposal, however, was not considered because the Committee
contemplated that agricultural lands are limited to arable and
suitable agricultural lands and therefore, do not include commercial,
industrial and residential lands (Record, CONCOM, 7 August 1986,
Vol. III, p. 30).
Moreover, in his answer to Commissioner Regalado's interpellation,
Commissioner Tadeo clarified that the term "farmworker" was used
instead of "agricultural worker" in order to exclude therein piggery,
poultry and livestock workers (Record, CONCOM, August 2, 1986,
Vol. II, p. 621).

Dept. of Agrarian Reform vs. Sutton
GR NO. 162070, 2005-10-19
Facts:
The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by
respondents which has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf
breeding.
On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657,
also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of
1988, took effect. It included in its coverage farms used for raising
livestock, poultry and swine.
On December 4, 1990, in an en banc decision in the case of Luz
Farms v. Secretary of DAR, this Court ruled that lands devoted to
livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the definition of
agricultural land. Hence, we declared as... unconstitutional certain
provisions of the CARL insofar as they included livestock farms in the
coverage of agrarian reform.
In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed with petitioner
DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding
was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from
the coverage of the CARL
On December 27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which
provided that only portions of private agricultural lands used for
the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall
be excluded from the coverage of the CARL.
In determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed the
following retention limits, viz:
1. 1:1 animal-land ratio (i.e., 1 hectare of land per 1 head of
animal shall be retained by the landowner), and
2. a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure for
every 21... heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded from
the operations of the CARL.
On February 4, 1994, respondents wrote the DAR Secretary and
advised him to consider as final and irrevocable the withdrawal of
their VOS as, under the Luz Farms doctrine, their entire landholding
is exempted from the CARL.
On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao
issued an Order partially granting the application of respondents
for exemption from the coverage of CARL. Applying the retention
limits outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9, petitioner exempted 1,209
hectares of respondents' land for grazing purposes, and a maximum
of 102.5635 hectares for infrastructure. Petitioner ordered the rest
of respondents' landholding to be segregated and placed under
Compulsory Acquisition.
Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that their
entire landholding should be exempted as it is devoted exclusively to
cattle-raising. Their motion was denied
Issues:
The main issue in the case at bar is the constitutionality of DAR A.O.
No. 9, series of 1993, which prescribes a maximum retention limit
for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising.
Ruling:
Invoking its rule-making power under Section 49 of the CARL,
petitioner submits that it issued DAR A.O. No. 9 to limit the area of
livestock farm that may be retained by a landowner pursuant to its
mandate to place all public and private agricultural lands under the
coverage of... agrarian reform.
Petitioner DAR also contends that the A.O. seeks to remedy reports
that some unscrupulous landowners have converted their
agricultural farms to livestock farms in order to evade their
coverage in the agrarian reform program.
Petitioner's arguments fail to impress.
Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in
nature, i.e., the power to make rules and regulations.
Delegated rule-making
However, while administrative rules and regulations have the force
and effect of law, they are not immune from judicial review. They
may be... properly challenged before the courts to ensure that they
do not violate the Constitution and no grave abuse of administrative
discretion is committed by the administrative body concerned.
The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid,
administrative rules and regulations must be issued by authority of a
law and must not contravene the provisions of the Constitution
Nor can it be used to enlarge the power of the administrative agency
beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions
control with respect to what... rules and regulations may be
promulgated by administrative agencies and the scope of their
regulations.
In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it
contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock
farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and
prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership.
However, the... deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission
show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively
devoted to livestock, swine and poultry- raising. The Court clarified
in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are
industrial... activities and do not fall within the definition of Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the
"agriculture" or "agricultural activity." coverage of agrarian reform.

Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms
which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage
of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed
A.O.
The subsequent case of Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR reiterated our
ruling in the Luz Farms case. In Natalia Realty, the Court held that
industrial, commercial and residential lands are not covered by the
CARL.
In sum, it is doctrinal that rules of administrative bodies must be in
harmony with the provisions of the Constitution. They cannot
amend or extend the Constitution. To be valid, they must conform to
and be consistent with the Constitution. In case of conflict between
an... administrative order and the provisions of the Constitution, the
latter prevails.[22] The assailed A.O. of petitioner DAR was properly
stricken down as unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of
agrarian reform beyond the scope intended by the 1987
Constitution.

We stressed anew that while Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 provides

that the CARL shall cover all public and private agricultural lands, the
term "agricultural land" does not include lands classified as mineral,
forest, residential, commercial or industrial.

Thus, in Natalia Realty, even portions of the Antipolo Hills

Subdivision, which are arable yet still undeveloped, could not be
considered as agricultural lands subject to agrarian reform as these
lots were already classified as residential lands.

A similar logical deduction should be followed in the case at bar.

Lands devoted to raising of livestock, poultry and swine have been
classified as industrial, not agricultural, lands and thus exempt from
agrarian reform. Petitioner DAR argues that, in issuing the impugned
A.O.,... it was seeking to address the reports it has received that
some unscrupulous landowners have been converting their
agricultural lands to livestock farms to avoid their coverage by the
agrarian reform. Again, we find neither merit nor logic in this
contention. The undesirable... scenario which petitioner seeks to
prevent with the issuance of the A.O. clearly does not apply in this
case. Respondents' family acquired their landholdings as early as
1948. They have long been in the business of breeding cattle in
Masbate which is popularly known as the... cattle-breeding capital of
the Philippines.[18] Petitioner DAR does not dispute this fact.
Indeed, there is no evidence on record that respondents have just
recently engaged in or converted to the business of breeding cattle
after the enactment of the CARL... that may lead one to suspect that
respondents intended to evade its coverage. It must be stressed that
what the CARL prohibits is the conversion of agricultural lands for
non-agricultural purposes after the effectivity of the CARL. There has
been no change of business... interest in the case of respondents.

Moreover, it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the

reenactment of a statute by Congress without substantial change is
an implied legislative approval and adoption of the previous law. On
the other hand, by making a new law, Congress seeks to supersede
an... earlier one.[19] In the case at bar, after the passage of the 1988
CARL, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7881[20] which amended certain
provisions of the CARL. Specifically, the new law changed the
definition of the terms "agricultural... activity" and "commercial
farming" by dropping from its coverage lands that are devoted to
commercial livestock, poultry and swine-raising.[21] With this
significant modification, Congress clearly sought to align the
provisions of our agrarian laws with the... intent of the 1987

Milestone Farms vs. Office of the President
FACTS:
Among the pertinent secondary purposes of Milestone Farms are
1) to engage in the raising of cattle, pigs, and other livestock;
2) to breed, raise, and sell poultry; and
3) to import cattle, pigs, and other livestock, and animal food
necessary for the raising of said cattle, pigs, and other livestock
On June 10, 1988, CARL took effect
CA primarily ruled in favor of Milestone in exempting the entire
property from the coverage of CARP. However, six months earlier,
without the knowledge of the CA – as the parties did not inform the
appellate court – then DAR Secretary Villa issued DAR conversion
order granting petitioner’s application to convert portions of the
316.0422-hectare property from agricultural to residential and golf
courses use. The portions converted was with a total area of
153.3049 hectares. With this Conversion Order, the area of the
property subject of the controversy was effectively reduced to
162.7373 hectares.
With the CA now made aware of these developments, particularly
Secretary Villa’s Conversion Order, CA had to acknowledge that the
property subject of the controversy would now be limited to the
remaining 162.7373 hectares. CA, in its amended decision, states
that the subject landholding from the coverage of CARP is hereby
lifted, and the 162.7373 hectare-agricultural portion thereof is
hereby declared covered by the CARP.

In May 1993, petitioner applied for the exemption/exclusion of its

ISSUE: 
316.0422-hectare property pursuant to the aforementioned ruling
of this Court in Luz Farms. Whether or not Milestone’s property should be exempted from the
coverage of CARP
Meanwhile, on December 27, 1993, DAR issued AO No. 9, Series of
1993, setting forth rules and regulations to govern the exclusion of
agricultural lands used for livestock, poultry, and swine raising from
CARP coverage. HELD:

Milestone re-documented its application pursuant to said AO. No.

DAR’s Land Use Conversion and Exemption Committee (LUCEC)
conducted an ocular inspection on petitioner’s property and
recommended the exemption of petitioner’s 316.0422-hectare
property from the coverage of CARP.
DAR Regional Director Dalugdug adopted LUCEC’s recommendation
The Pinugay Farmers, represented by Balajadia, moved for the
reconsideration of the said Order, but the same was denied by
Director Dalugdug. Hence, they filed an appeal with DAR Secretary
When CA made its decision, DAR AO No. 9 was not yet declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Thus, it could not be said
that the CA erred or gravely abused its discretion in respecting the
mandate of DAR A.O. No. 9, which was then subsisting and in full
force and effect.
As correctly held by respondent OP, the CA correctly held that the
subject property is not exempt from the coverage of the CARP, as
substantial pieces of evidence show that the said property is not
exclusively devoted to livestock, swine, and/or poultry raising.

Subsequently, Milestone filed a complaint for Forcible Entry against

Balajadia and company before the MCTC.

MCTC ruled in favor of Milestone

RTC reversed the decision of MCTC

CA ruled in favor of Milestone

DAR Secretary Garilao issued an Order exempting from CARP only

240.9776 hectares of the 316.0422 hectares previously exempted by
Director Dalugdug, and declaring 75.0646 hectares of the property
to be covered by CARP.

Office of the President primarily reinstated the decision of Director

Dalugdug but when the farmers filed a motion for reconsideration,
Office of the President reinstated the decision of Director Garilao.
 Central Mindanao University vs. Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
215 SCRA 86 (1992)

Facts:

On 16 January 1958, President Carlos Garcia issued Proclamation No.

467 reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College, now the CMU,
a piece of land to be used as its future campus. In 1984, CMU
embarked on a project titled "Kilusang Sariling Sikap" wherein
parcels of land were leased to its faculty members and employees.
Under the terms of the program, CMU will assist faculty members
and employee groups through the extension of technical know-how,
training and other kinds of assistance. In turn, they paid the CMU a
service fee for use of the land. The agreement explicitly provided
that there will be no tenancy relationship between the lessees and
the CMU.

When the program was terminated, a case was filed by the

participants of the "Kilusang Sariling Sikap" for declaration of status
as tenants under the CARP. In its resolution, DARAB, ordered, among
others, the segregation of 400 hectares of the land for distribution
under CARP. The land was subjected to coverage on the basis of
DAR's determination that the lands do not meet the condition for
exemption, that is, it is not "actually, directly, and exclusively used"
for educational purposes.

Issue:

Is the CMU land covered by CARP? Who determines whether lands

reserved for public use by presidential proclamation is no longer
actually, directly and exclusively used and necessary for the purpose
for which they are reserved?

Held:

The land is exempted from CARP. CMU is in the best position to

resolve and answer the question of when and what lands are found
necessary for its use. The Court also chided the DARAB for resolving
this issue of exemption on the basis of "CMU's present needs." The
Court stated that the DARAB decision stating that for the land to be
exempt it must be "presently, actively exploited and utilized by the
university in carrying out its present educational program with its
present student population and academic faculty" overlooked the
very significant factor of growth of the university in the years to
come.
 other hand, means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which
tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the
whole community.

In this case, the proposed pilot development center would inure to

Province of Camarines Sur vs CA the direct benefit and advantage of the CamSur peeps. (How?)
invaluable info and tech on agriculture, fishery, and cottage industry,
May 17, 1993
enhance livelihood of farmers and fishermen, etc.

FACTS:
2) No, (citing Ardana vs Reyes, SC here said that the
implication of the Ardana case is that) the power of
Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Cam Sur passed Res. 129
expropriation is superior to the power to distribute lands
authorizing the Prov. Gov. To purchase/expropriate property to
under the land reform program.
establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-agricultural crops and
housing project for the government employees. By virtue of the
resolution, Cam Sur filed 2 cases for expropriation against private
respondents (San Joaquins). Old LGC does not intimate in the least that LGUs must first secure
approval of the Dept of Land Reform for conversion of agri to non-
agri use. Likewise, no provision in the CAR Law subjecting
expropriation by LGUs to the control of DAR.
RTC: denied motion to dismiss on the ground of inadequacy of price
of San Joaquins.
Moreover, Sec 65 of CAR Law is not in point because it is applicable
only to lands previously placed under the agrarian reform program.
CA: San Joaquins raised issue of a) declaring the resolution null and
This is limited only to applications for reclassification submitted by
void, b) complaint for expropriation de dismissed. CA asked Sol Gen
land owners or tenant beneficiaries.
to give comment.

Statutes conferring power of eminent domain to political

SolGen: under the LGC, no need for approval by the OP of the
subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by implication.
exercise of the SP of the right to eminent domin. However, approval
of DAR must first be secured (since this involves appropriation of
3) Fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the
agricultural lands).
basis of the valuation decalred in the tax declarations of
their property, are unfounded.
CA: set aside order of RTC (without however disposing of the issues
raised. The SC said that the CA assumed that the resolution is valid
It is unconstitutional to fix just compensation in expropriation cases
and the expropriation is for a public use).
based on the value given either by the owners or the assessor. Rules
for determining just compensation are those laid down in Rule 67
ROC, evidence must be submitted to justify what they consider is the
Issues: just compensation.

1) WON the resolution is null and void. Corollary to this issue is WON
the expropriation is for a public use.

2) WON the exercise of the power of eminent domain in this case is

restricted by the CAR Law

3) WON the complaint for expropriation may be dismissed on the PROV. OF CAMARINES SUR vs. COURT OF APPEALS
ground of inadequacy of the compensation offered
G.R. No. 103125 May 17, 1993

Held/ratio:
FACTS:
1) The expropriation is for a public purpose, hence the
resolution is authorized and valid.
On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
SC explained that there had been a shift from the old to the new
Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of
concept of “public purpose:. Old concept is that the property must
1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or
actually be used by the general public. The new concept, on the
expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in
order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional
agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government
employees.
Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province, through its Governor, Hon.
Luis R. Villafuerte, filed two separate cases for expropriation against
Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin.
The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of
inadequacy of the price offered for their property.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the
Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon
the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount of P5,714.00, the
amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages
that private respondents may suffer in the event that the
expropriation cases do not prosper. The trial court issued a writ of
possession in an order dated January18, 1990.
Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition,
the Solicitor General stated that under Section 9 of the Local
Government Code, there was no need for the approval by the Office
of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General
expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first
secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the
plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing
project.
The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing
the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private
respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of the
amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to
suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of
Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the
Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the
property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-
agricultural land.
ISSUE 1: WON, the expropriation was for a public purpose.
YES. Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader
interpretation of "public purpose" or "public use" for which the
power of eminent domain may be exercised. The old concept was
that the condemned property must actually be used by the general
public (e.g. roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.) before the taking
thereof could satisfy the constitutional requirement of "public use".
Under the new concept, "public use" means public advantage,
convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general
welfare and the prosperity of the whole community, like a
resort complex for tourists or housing project (Heirs of Juancho
Ardano v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 [1983]; Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154
SC.RA 461 [1987]).
The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned
resolution is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot
development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage
of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational,
the center would make available to the community invaluable
information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage
industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and
craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the
public purpose requirement of the Constitution. As held in Sumulong
v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461, "Housing is a basic human need.
Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and
significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in
sum the general welfare."
ISSUE 2: WON a local government unit needs the approval of the
DAR to reclassify land before it can expropriate it.
The power of expropriation is superior to the power to distribute
lands under the land reform program.  (Juancho Ardana v Reyes).
It is true that local government units have no inherent power of
eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized
by the legislature. It is also true that in delegating the power to
expropriate, the legislature may retain certain control or impose
certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the local governments.
While such delegated power may be a limited authority, it is
complete within its limits. Moreover, the limitations on
the exercise of the delegated power must be clearly expressed ,
either in the law conferring the power or in other legislations.
Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, was promulgated pursuant to
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, which
provides:
A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant ● Although local governments do not have inherent power of
to a resolution of its sanggunian exercise the right of eminent eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized
domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or by legislature, and the latter may retain certain control or impose
purpose. certain restraints on the exercise thereof, such delegated power
although limited it is complete within its limits. Nothing in the LGC
limits this power by requiring the approval of DAR. Likewise, there is
nothing in CAR law which expressly subjects such expropriations
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local
under the control of DAR. 
government units must first secure the approval of the Department
of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-
agricultural use before they can institute the necessary
expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the
expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units to the G.R. No. 103125 Case Digest
control of the Department of Agrarian Reform.
G.R. No. 103125, May 17, 1993

Province of Camarines Sur

Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political
vs Court of Appeals
subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by implication.
Ponente: Quiason

To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local

government units can no longer expropriate agricultural
Facts:
lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools,
hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of the This is an appeal for certiorari on the decision on the issue on
lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these whether the expropriation of agricultural lands by LGU is subject to
projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it prior approval of the DAR.
would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize
whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.

December 1988, Sangguniang Panlalawigan of CamSur authorized

Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit
that shall determine whether the use of the property sought to be
expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of
legislative policy. The courts defer to such legislative determination
and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or
substantial relation to the public use.
There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes, no matter how
broad their terms are, do not embrace the sovereign unless the
sovereign is specially mentioned as subject thereto.
the provincial governor to purchase or expropriate property
contiguous to the provincial capitol site in order to establish a pilot
farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a
housing project for provincial government employees.
Pursuant to the resolution, Gov. Villafuerte filed two separate cases
for expropriation against Ernesto San Joaquin and Efren San Joaquin.
Upon motion for the issuance of writ or possession, San Joaquins
failed to appear at the hearing.

San Joaquins later moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of

inadequacy of the price offered for their property. The court denied
The orders of the CA nullifying the trial court's order allowing the the motion to dismiss and authorized the province to take
Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private possession of the properties.
respondents' property and requiring the Province of Camarines Sur
to obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform
to convert or reclassify private respondents' property from
agricultural to non-agricultural use are set aside.
San Joaquins filed for motion for relief, but denied as well. In their
petition. Asked by the CA, Solicitor General stated that there is no
need for the approval of the president for the province to
expropriate properties, however, the approval of the DAR is needed
to convert the property from agricultural to non-agricultural
(housing purpose).

CA set aside the decision of the trial court suspending the possession
and expropriation of the property until th province has acquired the
approval of DAR. Hence, this petition.

Ruling:

The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k)

and 5 (1) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987, cannot be the
source of the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to
determine the suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for the
purpose to which it would be devoted by the expropriating
authority. While those rules vest on the Department of Agrarian
Reform the exclusive authority to approve or disapprove
conversions of agricultural lands for residential, commercial or
industrial uses, such authority is limited to the applications for
reclassification submitted by the land owners or tenant
beneficiaries.

To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local

government units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands
needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc,
without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the
Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would
naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be
the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the
expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.

Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit

that shall determine whether the use of the property sought to be
expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of
legislative policy. The courts defer to such legislative determination
and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or
substantial relation to the public use.