DE VERA vs AGUILAR

During her lifetime, Marcosa owned a parcel of land in Bulacan.

● Said parcel of land was mortgaged by Basilio and Felipe to a certain Atty. Leonardo.
● When the mortgage matured, it was the Sps. Aguilar who redeemed the property
from
Atty. Leonardo. Thus, Marcosa sold the same to them as evidenced by a deed of
absolute
sale.
● Sps. Aguilar then registered with the Registry of Deeds the sale, resulting in the
cancellation of the tax declaration in the name of Marcosa and the issuance of another
in
the name of the Aguilars. Since then and up to the present, the Aguilars have been
paying
taxes on the land.
● Thereafter in 1977, Mariano Aguilar was issued a free patent to the land, and he was
issued an OCT in his name.
● In 1980, De Vera et. al wrote to the Sps. Aguilar claiming that as children of Marcosa,
they
are the co-owners of the property. They demanded the partition of the property on
threats
that Sps. Aguilar would be charged with perjury and/or falsification if they did not
comply. They claimed that Sps. Aguilar had resold the property to Marcosa on 1959.
● Sps. Aguilar wrote back stating that they are the sole owners of the Bulacan property.
They denied having resold the property to Marcosa.
● Because of this, De Vera et. al filed a falsification case against the spouses. This
was,
however, dismissed so De Vera et. al filed a suit for reconveyance of the Bulacan lot
against the spouses.
● RTC ruled in favor of De Vera et. al. It admitted, over the objection of the spouses,
Exhibit
A which was a photocopy of an alleged deed of sale executed in 1959 by the spouses
Aguilar. This deed showed that the spouses sold, transferred, and conveyed the
Bulacan
property back to Marcosa for and in consideration of P1,500.
● On appeal, Sps. Aguilar contended that since De Vera et. al failed to produce the
original of the alleged deed of sale dated 1959, the same was not the best evidence of
the alleged sale; hence, it should have been excluded and should not have been
accorded any evidentiary value.
○ On this argument, De Vera et. al contended that the existence of the deed of sale
had been duly established by the testimony of the notary public before whom
the deed was acknowledged and by Luis De Vera who was present during its
execution. They further contend that the loss of the original document had
been proven by the testimony of the representatives of the offices of the
National Archives and the Provincial Assessor of Bulacan.
● CA reversed the decision of the RTC, ruling in favor of the spouses. It ruled that the
loss ordestruction of the original deed of sale has not been duly proven. Hence,
secondary
evidence is inadmissible.
● Hence, this case.

ISSUE: WON De Vera et. al have duly proven the loss/destruction of the original deed
of sale,
making the presentation of the photocopy thereof admissible as secondary evidence--
NO,

RULING:
While it is true that secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were
lost or destroyed, prior to the introduction of such secondary, evidence, however, the
proponent must first establish the former existence of the instrument.
In the case at bar, the trial court failed to look into the facts and circumstances
surrounding the loss or destruction of the original copies of the deed.
● While the execution of the deed was established (through the testimony of the notary
public before whom the deed was acknowledged), the next step is to prove that the
deed
had been lost or destroyed. This may be proved by any person knowing the fact.

In this case, when Luis De Vera was called to the witness stand, he said that his sister,
Maria, borrowed from him the original document and a certified true copy of the deed,
and that she brought them to the Office of the Register of Deeds in Malolos for the
purpose
of having it registered. When Maria got back, she told him (Luis) that the original copy
was submitted to the office and that the property was accordingly transferred back to
Marcosa.
● Based on this testimony, it is clear that the original and certified true copy of the deed
have not been lost or destroyed. Rather, it was submitted to the Office of the ROD of
Malolos for registration. De Vera et. al should have therefore asked the said Office to
produce the original in court, and if it could not be produced, it should have called a
representative to explain why. But this they have failed to do.
● The loss or destruction of the original has not, therefore, been established. Hence,
the
secondary evidence of it is inadmissible.
Other testimonies that were discredited (just in case it is asked):
● Testimony of the notary public Ibasco, Jr. -- he claims that he did not have a copy of
the
deed of sale because his files were burnt when his office in Manila was gutted by fire in
1971 and 1972. Court : this does not establish the loss or destruction of the original
document in question because what was lost or destroyed in the custody of Atty.
Ibasco, Jr.
was but one of the duplicate original copies on filed with him.
● Testimony of Hipolito Timoteo, representative of the Assessor's Office of Bulacan --
he claims that failed to see the deed of absolute sale annotated on the simple copy of
tax declaration. Court: it does not prove loss or destruction of the original and of all the
duplicate original copies of the document in question.
● Testimony of David Montenegro, Jr. of the National Archives -- he claims that his
office
had no copy of the document in question because the notary public might not have
submitted a copy thereof; or that it was lost or destroyed during the transmittal; and that
most of the record before 1960 were destroyed by termites. Court: it does not prove loss
or
destruction of the original and of all the duplicate original copies of the document in
question.

 REMEDIAL LAW; SECONDARY EVIDENCE WHEN ORIGINAL IS LOST OR

DESTROYED; WHEN ADMISSIBLE. — Secondary evidence is admissible when the
original documents were actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such
secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the
instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: Existence; execution loss;
contents although this order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court.
The sufficiency of proof offered as a predicate for the admission of an alleged lost deed
lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of the
particular case. In establishing the execution of a document the same may be
established by the person or persons who executed it, by the person before whom its
execution was acknowledged, or by any person who was present and saw it executed
or who, after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures; or by a person to
whom the parties to the instrument had previously confessed the execution thereof.
After the due execution of the document has been established, it must next be proved
that said document has been lost or destroyed. The destruction of the instrument may
be proved by any person knowing the fact. The loss may be shown by any person who
knew the fact of its loss, or by any one who had made, in the judgment of the court, a
sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar
character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and
has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to
satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed lost.
2. ALL DUPLICATES OR COUNTERPARTS MUST BE ACCOUNTED FOR BEFORE
USING COPIES. — However, all duplicates or counterparts must be accounted for
before using copies. For, since all the duplicates or multiplicates are parts of the writing
itself to be proved, no excuse for non-production of the writing itself can be regarded as
established until it appears that all of its parts are unavailable (i.e. lost, retained by the
opponent or by a third person or the like). In the case at bar, Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr.,
notary public who notarized the document testified that the alleged deed of sale has
about four or five original copies. Hence, all originals must be accounted for before
secondary evidence can be given of any one. This petitioners failed to do. Records
show that petitioners merely accounted for three out of four or five original copies.
||| (De Vera v. Aguilar, G.R. No. 83377, [February 9, 1993])

MCC vs Sannyong

Petitioner is engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless

steel products. One of its suppliers is the respondent, an international trading
company with head office in Seoul, South Korea and regional headquarters in
Makati City, Philippines. The two corporations conducted business through
telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions. Respondent would send
the pro forma invoices containing the details of the steel product order to
petitioner; if the latter conforms thereto, its representative affixes his signature on
the faxed copy and sends it back to the respondent, again by fax.

Respondent filed a civil action for damages due to breach of contract

against petitioner before the RTC of Makati City. In its complaint,
respondent alleged that defendants breached their contract when they refused to
open the letter of credit in the amount of US$170,000.00 for the remaining 100MT
of steel under Pro Forma Invoice.

After respondent rested its case, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence

alleging that respondent failed to present the original copies of the pro forma
invoices on which the civil action was based. Petitioner contends that the
photocopies of the pro forma invoices presented by respondent Ssangyong to
prove the perfection of their supposed contract of sale are inadmissible in
evidence and do not fall within the ambit of R.A. No. 8792, because the law merely
admits as the best evidence the original fax transmittal. On the other hand,
respondent posits that, from a reading of the law and the Rules on Electronic
Evidence, the original facsimile transmittal of the pro forma invoice is admissible
in evidence since it is an electronic document and, therefore, the best evidence under the law and the
Rules. Respondent further claims that the photocopies of these fax transmittals are
admissible under the Rules on Evidence because the respondent sufficiently
explained the non-production of the original fax transmittals.

ISSUE:
Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are
electronic evidence and admissible in evidence as such?

R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000,
considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional
equivalent of a written document for evidentiary purposes. The Rules on
Electronic Evidence regards an electronic document as admissible in evidence if it
complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and
related laws, and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by the said Rules. An
electronic document is also the equivalent of an original document under the Best
Evidence Rule, if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means,
shown to reflect the data accurately.

Further, in a virtual or paperless environment, technically, there is no original

copy to speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual reality are the same, in all
respects, and are considered as originals. Ineluctably, the law's definition of
"electronic data message," which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable with "electronic
document," could not have included facsimile transmissions, which have an
original paper-based copy as sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received.
These two copies are distinct from each other, and have different legal effects.

"We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic
document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include
a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be
considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original
under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.

Since a facsimile transmission is not an "electronic data message" or an

"electronic document," and cannot be considered as electronic evidence by the
Court, with greater reason is a photocopy of such a fax transmission not electronic
evidence. In the present case, therefore, Pro Forma Invoices, which are mere photocopies of the
original fax transmittals, are not electronic evidence, contrary to the position of
both the trial and the appellate courts.

IMPORTANT LESSON: Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be

considered as the functional equivalent of an original document under the Best
Evidence Rule, the writing must foremost be an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document."

PEOPLE VS NAVARRO

Doctrine: The Anti-Wiretapping Act prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of

private communications. Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not
private, its tape recording is not prohibited.

Facts
Reporters of a radio station in Lucena City, Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique Lingan, went to the police
station to report alleged indecent show in one of the night establishment shows in the City. At the
station, a heated confrontation followed between victim Lingan and accused policeman Navarro
who was then having drinks outside the headquarters, which led to a fisticuffs. The victim was hit
with the handle of the accused's gun below the left eyebrow, followed by a fist blow on the
forehead, where victim fell and died under treatment.

The exchange of words was recorded on tape, specifically the frantic exclamations made by
Navarro after the altercation that it was the victim who provoked the fight. During the trial,
Jalbuena, the other media man, testified. Presented in evidence to confirm his testimony was a
voice recording he had made of the heated discussion at the police station between the
accused police officer Navarro and the deceased Lingan, which was taken without the
knowledge of the two.

RTC found Navarro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. CA affirmed.

Prosection’s evidence:
 Recorded tape
 Testimony of Jalbuena, another media man

Defendant’s objection:


Issues
1. Whether or not the voice recording is admissible in evidence in view of RA 4200, which
prohibits wire-tapping.

1. Yes, the tape is admissible in view of RA 4200, which prohibits wire-tapping. Jalbuena's
testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had made. The law provides:

SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie
or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described: It shall also be unlawful for any person, be
he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly
possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof,
of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this
Act in the manner prohibited by this law;

SECTION 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport,
effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or
secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in
evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.

The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications . Since
the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording
is not prohibited.

Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated by
the testimony of a witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversation; (2) that the tape
played in court was the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the
persons such are claimed to belong.

In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice recording; that the tape
played in court was the one he recorded; and that the speakers on the tape were petitioner
Navarro and Lingan.

The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1) that there was a heated exchange
between petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the police blotter of an entry against
him and Jalbuena; and (2) that some form of violence occurred involving petitioner Navarro and
Lingan, with the latter getting the worst of it.

Dr. Eva Yamamoto, who performed the autopsy on the body of Lingan, issued a medical certificate
containing the findings that Lingan suffered cerebral concussion and shock which directly caused
his death.

LAND SETTLEMENT DEVELOPMENT VS GARCIA

FACTS: This is a case for specific performance instituted by the petitioner against the respondents for
the recovery of payment for the unpaid balance of the purchase price of the two tractors bought
by the respondents.

On trial, the respondents, i.e. Salud Garcia, admitted to execution of 2 promissiory notes
wherein she personally assumed the account of the respondent company. However, she claims
that the same has been novated. She presented as evidence a letter containing an extension
given to her by Kintanar, Manager, Board of Liquidators of the petitioner. They contended that
the action is premature having been filed on February 20, 1957 when the extension was until
May 31, 1957.

On trial, when the petitioners were to present the legal officer of the board of liquidators to testify
on the true agreement and intention of the parties at the time the letter was drafted, the same
was objected by the respondents on the ground that it is parol evidence. To which the court
ruled in their favor.

The trial court dismissed the case for being premature. The CA certified this case to the SC.

Petitioner’s evidence:
 Legal officer of the board of liquidators

Respondent’s evidence:
 letter containing an extension

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in excluding the parol evidence?

Ruling:
Yes. The lower court should have admitted the parol evidence sought to be introduced to prove
the failure of the document in question to express the true intent and agreement of the parties.
The Court explained that the rule on parol evidence does not prevent the introduction of
extrinsic evidence to show that a supposed contract never became effective by reason of the
failure of some collateral condition or stipulation, pre-requisite to liability.
The rule excluding parol evidence to vary or contradict a writing does not extend so far as to
preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence, to show prior or contemporaneous collateral parol
agreement between the parties.

In this case, the testimony of the witness would have been to the effect that in view of the pleas
of respondents for an extension of time to pay their accounts the witness gave them an
extension provided that they will make substantial down payment immediately, with the
understanding that upon non-payment… the extension shall be deemed not granted.
This agreement was made referenced in the 2 nd paragraph of the letter presented by the
respondents.

Wherefore, the lower court should have admitted the parol evidence sought to be introduced to
prove failure of the document in question to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

Heirs of Ureta vs. Heirs of Ureta (Gueco)

Doctrine: The exception in paragraph (b) is allowed to enable the court to ascertain the true
intent of the parties, and once the intent is clear, it shall prevail over what the document appears
to be on its face. As the true intent of the parties was duly proven in the present case, it now
prevails over what appears on the Deed of Sale.

Facts:
● Alfonso Ureta (“Alfonso”) was financially well-off during his lifetime. He owned several
fishpens, a fishpond, a sari-sari store, a passenger jeep, and was engaged in the buying and
selling of copra.
● Alfonso begot 14 children, namely: Policronio , Liberato, Narciso, Prudencia, Vicente,
Francisco, Inocensio, Roque, Adela, Wenefreda, Merlinda, Benedicto, Jorge, and Andres. Of
all of them, only Policronio failed to finish schooling. Instead, he worked on his father’s
lands.
● Sometime in October 1969, Alfonso and four of his children (Policronio, Liberato,
Prudencia, and Francisco) met at the house of Liberato.
● Francisco,who was then a municipal judge, suggested that in order to reduce the
inheritance taxes, their father should make it appear that he had sold some of his lands to
his children.
● Accordingly, Alfonso executed four (4) Deeds of Sale covering several parcels of land in
favor of Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia, and his common- law wife, Valeriana Dela Cruz.
The Deed of Sale executed on October 25, 1969, in favor of Policronio, covered six parcels
of land, which are the properties disputed in this case.
● Since the sales were only made for taxation purposes, and no monetary consideration was
given, Alfonso continued to own, possess and enjoy the lands and their produce.
● When Policronio died, Alfonso’s heirs executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, which
included all the lands that were covered by the four (4) deeds of sale that were previously
executed by Alfonso for taxation purposes.
● Since Policronio died, it was his eldest son, Conrado, who represented the Heirs of
Policronio. He was the one who signed the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition on behalf of his
co-heirs.
● When the other heirs of Policronio learned about the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition
involving Alfonso’s estate they averred that the extrajudicial partition is void because
Conrado’s consent was vitiated by mistake and undue influence, and that he signed the
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition without the authority or consent of his co-heirs.
● The heirs of Policronio believed that the six parcels of land belonged to their father and
thus excluded from the deed of extrajudicial partition.
● Since amicable settlement with the heirs of Alfonso failed, the heirs of Policronio filed a
complaint for declaration of ownership, recovery of possession, annulment of document,
partition and damages against the heirs of Alfonso.
● The RTC ruled in favor of the Heirs of Alfonso
● On appeal, the CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that the deed of sale was void for being
absolutely simulated. It also noted that Alfonso continued to exercise all the rights of an
owner even after the execution of the deed of sale. Further, it stated that the testimony of
Amparo Castillo (“Amparo”) as to the circumstances surrounding the actual
arrangement (about the fake sale) between the parties prior to the execution of the
four deeds of sale is unrebutted.
● The heirs of Policronio filed a Motion for reconsideration. They argued that the CA
violated the best evidence rule in giving credence to the testimony of Amparo with respect
to the simulation of the deed of sale. They claim that prescription had already set in, thus
precluding any question on the validity of the contract.
○ With respect to this argument, the CA held that the oral testimony of Amparo is
admissible under Rule 130, §9(b) and (c), which provides that evidence aliunde1
may be allowed to explain the terms of the written agreement if the same failed to
express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto, or when the validity
of the written agreement was put in issue.
● Aggrieved, the heirs of Policronio brought this case to the SC. They argue the following:
○ They argued that based on the parol evidence rule, the Heirs of Alfonso and,
specifically, Amparo, were not in a position to prove the terms outside of the
contract because they were not parties nor successors-in-interest in the Deed of
Sale in question. Thus, it is argued that the testimony of Amparo Castillo violates
the parol evidence rule.
○ It is also argued that the parol evidence rule may not be properly invoked by
either party in the litigation against the other, where at least one of the parties to
the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question
and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the
instrument or the relation established thereby

ISSUE: WON the rules on parol evidence and hearsay were violated by the CA when it ruled that
the Deed of Sale was void-- NO, parol evidence does not apply in this case because it falls under
two of the exceptions. Neither was the testimony of Amparo violative of the rule on hearsay.

RULING:
● The objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at the proper time, as
soon as the grounds therefor become reasonably apparent. If not so made, it will be
understood to have been waived.
● In the case of testimonial evidence, the objection must be made when the objectionable
question is asked or after the answer is given if the objectionable features become
apparent only by reason of such answer. In this case, the Heirs of Policronio failed to
timely object to the testimony of Amparo. Thus, they are deemed to have waived the
benefit of the parol evidence rule.

● The failure of the Deed of Sale to express the true intent and agreement of the parties was
clearly put in issue in the Answer of the Heirs of Alfonso to the Complaint. It was alleged
that the Deed of Sale was only made to lessen the payment of estate and inheritance taxes
and not meant to transfer ownership. The exception in paragraph (b) is allowed to enable
the court to ascertain the true intent of the parties, and once the intent is clear, it shall
prevail over what the document appears to be on its face.
● It was proven in this case that the true intent of the sale was to lessen the payment of
inheritance tax; this intent this prevails over what appears on the Deed of Sale.
● As to par. (c) which speaks of the validity of the Deed of Sale, the Court said that the
operation of the parol evidence rule in this paragraph requires the existence of a valid
written agreement. It is, therefore, not applicable in a proceeding where the validity of
such agreement is the fact in dispute, such as when a contract may be void for lack of
consideration.
● In this case, the Deed of Sale has been shown to be void for being absolutely simulated and
for lack of consideration; therefore, the Heirs of Alfonso are not precluded from
presenting evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement.
● On the argument that the Heirs of Alfonso may not question the Deed of Sale for not being
parties or successors-in-interest to the deed -- Court said that if their argument was to be
accepted, then the Heirs of Policronio would themselves be precluded from invoking the
parol evidence rule to exclude the evidence of the Heirs of Alfonso.
● Although the applicability of the parol evidence rule requires that the case be between
parties and their successors-in-interest, in this case, both the Heirs of Alfonso and the
Heirs of Policronio are successors-in- interest of the parties to the Deed of Sale as they
claim rights under Alfonso and Policronio, respectively. The parol evidence rule
excluding evidence aliunde , however, still cannot apply because the present case
falls under two exceptions to the rule, as discussed above.

On the issue on hearsay:

● With respect to hearsay, the Heirs of Policronio contended that the rule on hearsay was
violated when the testimony of Amparo Castillo was given weight in proving that the
subject lands were only sold for taxation purposes as she was a person alien to the
contract. Even granting that they did not object to her testimony during trial, they argued
that it should not have been appreciated by the CA because it had no probative value
whatsoever.
● The Court disagrees.
● It has indeed been held that hearsay evidence whether objected to or not cannot be given
credence for having no probative value. This principle, however, has been relaxed in
cases where, in addition to the failure to object to the admissibility of the subject evidence,
there were other pieces of evidence presented or there were other circumstances
prevailing to support the fact in issue

● In the case at bar, there were other prevailing circumstances which corroborate the
testimony of Amparo. First , the other Deeds of Sale which were executed in favor of
Liberato, Prudencia, and Valeriana on the same day as that of Policronio’s were all
presented in evidence. Second , all the properties subject therein were included in the Deed
of Extrajudicial Partition of the estate of Alfonso. Third , Policronio, during his lifetime,
never exercised acts of ownership over the subject properties (as he never demanded or
took possession of them, never demanded or received the produce thereof, and never paid
real estate taxes thereon). Fourth , Policronio never informed his children of the sale.
● As the Heirs of Policronio failed to controvert the evidence presented, and to timely object
to the testimony of Amparo Castillo, both the RTC and the CA correctly accorded probative
weight to her testimony.

Garcia vs. Dominga Robles

Doctrine: The Dead Man’s Statute provides that "if one party to the alleged
transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities,
the other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own
uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction."

FACTS: Makapugay is the owner of a 2.5-hectare farm being tilled by Eugenio as

agricultural lessee under a leasehold agreement. Makapugay passed away and was
succeeded by her nephews and niece, namely Amanda, Justo and Augusto. On the
other hand, Eugenio’s children – Garcia, Salamat and Pedro – succeeded him.
Before she passed away, Makapugay appointed Amanda as her attorney-in-fact. After
Eugenio died, Amanda and Pedro entered into a leasehold agreement, “Kasunduan sa
Buwisan”, which installed and recognized Pedro as the lone agricultural lessee and
cultivator of the land. Pedro passed away in 1984, and his wife, Dominga, took over as
agricultural lessee.

Learning that the “Kasunduan sa Buwisan” excluded Pedro’s heirs, Amanda, Justo
and Augusto, and Pedro’s sisters Garcia and Salamat, entered into a " Kasunduan sa
Buwisan ng Lupa " whereby Garcia and Salamat were acknowledged as co-lessees of
Pedro. Thereafter, petitioners Garcia and Salamat filed a Complaint for nullification of the
first leasehold agreement.

Garcia and Salamat claimed that:

1) they entered into an agreement with their brother Pedro to farm the
land on a "per-season basis";
2) that Pedro reneged on this agreement and cultivated the land all by
himself;
3) that as a result, Amanda was deceived into installing him as sole
agricultural lessee;
4) that when Amanda learned of Pedro’s misrepresentations, she
executed an Affidavit stating among others that Pedro assured her that
he would not deprive Garcia and Salamat of their "cultivatory rights"; and
5) that in order to correct matters, Amanda, Justo and Augusto executed
in their favor the "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" , recognizing them as
Pedro’s co-lessees.

In her Answer, herein respondent Dominga claimed that:

1) that Amanda’s July 10, 1996 Affidavit and "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng
Lupa" of even date between her and the petitioners are self-serving and
violate the existing 1979 Agricultural Leasehold Contract ;
2) Dominga further claimed that Pedro has been in possession of the
land even while Eugenio lived;
3) that petitioners have never cultivated nor possessed the land even for
a single cropping; that Pedro has been the one paying the lease rentals
as evidenced by receipts;
4) that when Pedro died in 1984, she succeeded in his rights as lessee by
operation of law, and that she had been remitting lease rentals to the
landowners since 1985; and
5) that petitioners had no right to institute themselves as her co-lessees.

Ruling of the PARAD

The PARAD held that Amanda’s act of executing Affidavit and
"Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" amounted to dispossession of Pedro’s landholding
and rights without cause.

Ruling of the DARAB

Amanda’s Affidavit and the 1996 "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" between the
landowners and petitioners cannot defeat Pedro’s 1979 Agricultural Leasehold
Contract and his rights as the sole tenant over the land; that for sleeping on their
rights, petitioners are now barred by laches from claiming that they are co-lessees

ISSUE: WON Amanda’s Affidavit stating that “(the late) Pedro assured her (Amanda)
that he would not deprive Garcia and Salamat of their "cultivatory rights” is
admissible.
RULING: No. Violation of the Dead Man’s Statute.
Amanda’s declaration in her Affidavit covering Pedro’s alleged admission and
recognition of the alternate farming scheme is inadmissible for being a violation of
the Dead Man’s Statute , which provides that "if one party to the alleged transaction is
precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other
party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and
unexplained account of the transaction." Thus, since Pedro is deceased, and
Amanda’s declaration which pertains to the leasehold agreement affects the 1996
"Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" which she as assignor entered into with petitioners,
and which is now the subject matter of the present case and claim against Pedro’s
surviving spouse and lawful successor-in-interest Dominga, such declaration cannot
be admitted and used against the latter, who is placed in an unfair situation by reason
of her being unable to contradict or disprove such declaration as a result of her
husband-declarant Pedro’s prior death.

If petitioners earnestly believed that they had a right, under their supposed mutual
agreement with Pedro, to cultivate the land under an alternate farming scheme, then
they should have confronted Pedro or sought an audience with Amanda to discuss
the possibility of their institution as co-lessees of the land; and they should have done
so soon after the passing away of their father Eugenio. However, it was only in 1996,
or 17 years after Pedro was installed as tenant in 1979 and long after his death in
1984, that they came forward to question Pedro’s succession to the leasehold. As
correctly held by the PARAD, petitioners slept on their rights, and are thus precluded
from questioning Pedro’s 1979 agricultural leasehold contract.

Amanda, on the other hand, cannot claim that Pedro deceived her into believing that
he is the sole successor to the leasehold. Part of her duties as the landowner’s
representative or administrator was to know the personal circumstances of the
lessee Eugenio; more especially so, when Eugenio died. She was duty-bound to make
an inquiry as to who survived Eugenio, in order that the landowner – or she as
representative – could choose from among them who would succeed to the
leasehold. Under Section 9 of RA 3844, Makapugay, or Amanda – as Makapugay’s
duly appointed representative or administrator – was required to make a choice,
within one month from Eugenio’s death, who would succeed as agricultural lessee.
There is no other logical conclusion than that the "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa"
between Amanda and petitioners, which is grounded on Pedro’s inadmissible verbal
admission, and which agreement was entered into without obtaining Dominga’s
consent, constitutes an undue infringement of Dominga’s rights as Pedro’s
successor-in-interest under Section 9, and operates to deprive her of such rights and
dispossess her of the leasehold against her will.

11. Uy Chico vs Union Life

Doctrine: A communication made by a client to his attorney for the express purpose
of its being communicated to a third person is essentially inconsistent with the
confidential relation. Such communication is between the third person and the client,
the attorney being merely an agent.

Facts:
The plaintiff seeks to recover the face value of two insurance policies upon a stock of
dry goods destroyed by fire. It appears that the father of the plaintiff died in 1897, at
which time he was conducting a business under his own name, Uy Layco. The plaintiff
and his brother took over the business and continued it under the same name, "Uy Layco."

Sometime before the date of the fire, the plaintiff purchased his brother's interest in
the business and continued to carry on the business under the father's name. At the
time of the fire "Uy Layco" was heavily indebted and subsequent thereto the creditors
of the estate of the plaintiff's father.

During the course of these proceedings, the

plaintiff's attorney surrendered the policies of insurance to the administrator of the
estate, who compromised with the insurance company for one.half their face value, or
P6,000. This money was paid into court and is now being held by the sheriff. The
plaintiff now brings this action, maintaining that the policies and goods insured
belonged to him and not to the estate of his deceased father and alleges that he is
not bound by the compromise effected by the administrator of his father's estate.

The defendant insurance company sought to show that the plaintiff had agreed to
compromise settlement of the policies, and for that purpose introduced evidence
showing that the plaintiff's attorney had surrendered the policies to the administrator
with the understanding that such a compromise was to be effected. The plaintiff was
asked, while on the witness stand, if he had any objection to his attorney's testifying
concerning the surrender of the policies, to which he replied in the negative. The
attorney was then called for that purpose. Whereupon, counsel for the plaintiff
formally withdrew the waiver previously given by the plaintiff and objected to the
testimony of the attorney on the ground that it was privileged. Counsel, on this appeal,
base their argument of the proposition that a waiver of the client's privilege may be
withdrawn at any time before acted upon.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony is privileged?

Ruling: NO.

It will be noted that the evidence in question concerned the dealings of the plaintiff's
attorney with a third person. Of the very essence of the veil of secrecy which
surrounds communications made between attorney and client, is that such
communications are not intended for the information of third persons or to be acted
upon by them, but of the purpose of advising the client as to his rights. It is evident
that a communication made by a client to his attorney for the express purpose of its
being communicated to a third person is essentially inconsistent with the confidential
relation. When the attorney has faithfully carried out his instructions by delivering the
communication to the third person for whom it was intended and the latter acts upon
it, it cannot, by any reasoning whatever, be classified in a legal sense as a privileged
communication between the attorney and his client. It is plain that such a
communication, after reaching the party for whom it was intended at least, is a
communication between the client and a third person, and that the attorney simply
occupies the role of intermediary or agent.

12. People vs Sandiganbayan

DOCTRINE: If the client seeks his lawyer’s advice with respect to a crime which he
has already committed, he is given the protection of a virtual confessional seal which
the privilege declares cannot be broken by the attorney without the client’s consent.
The same privileged confidentiality, however, does not attach with regard to a crime a
client intends to commit thereafter or in the future and for purposes of which he
seeks the lawyer’s advice.

FACTS:
● Ceferino Paredes, Jr. is the former Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur. He
was also the former Governor and Congressman of the same place.
● Sometime in 1976, Paredes applied for and was granted a free patent over
Lot No. 3097 of the Rosario Public Land Subdivision Survey
● However, in 1985, the Director of Lands filed an action for the cancellation of
the said patent and certificate of title since the land already been designated
and reserved as a school site.
● The court rendered judgment nullifying the said patent and title after finding
that Paredes had obtained title thereto through fraudulent
misrepresentations in his application.
● Pursuant to the above decision of the court, a case for perjury was filed
against Paredes. However, the same was dismissed on the ground of
prescription.
● Later on, another case was filed against him for violation of RA 3019
for using his former position as Provincial Attorney to influence and induce the Bureau of Lands officials to
favorably act on his application for patent.
In all these cases (RA 3019 and Perjury case), Paredes was represented by Atty. Sansaet.
● Paredes contends that he has already been charged under the same set of
facts and the same evidence in the Perjury case, which has already been
dismissed. Hence, double jeopardy has already attached
● To support this contention of double jeopardy, Paredes presented court
records and transcripts as proof of his arraignment in the perjury case
● However, these records and transcripts were found to be falsified by
Paredes in conspiracy with his counsel and the clerk of court where the
perjury case was filed.
● A certain Teofilo Gelacio further claims that no notice of arraignment was
ever received by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal.
● Because of this, another case was filed for falsification of judicial records. It
was then that Atty. Sansaet offered to testify as a state witness against his
client Paredes, claiming that the latter contrived and induced him to have the
graft case dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy by having him
prepare and falsify the subject documents.
● The Sandiganbayan denied the motion of Atty. Sansaet to testify as a state
witness on the ground of attorney-client privilege since the lawyer could not
testify against his own client. In view of such relationship, confidential
matters must have been disclosed by Paredes, as client, to accused
Sansaet, as his lawyer, in his professional capacity, and therefore privileged.

ISSUE: WON the testimony of Atty. Sansaet as state witness is barred by

attorney-client privilege—NO.

RULING:
● There is no privileged communication rule in this case.

● The privilege applies only if the information was relayed by the client to the
lawyer respecting a past crime . The reckoning point to consider is when the
communication was given, and not when the lawyer was made to testify.

● While it is correct that there was a confidential communication made by

Paredes to Atty. Sansaet in connection with the criminal cases of perjury and
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the privilege, however,
does not extend to the announced intention of a client to commit a crime.
Such is not included within the confidence, which his attorney is bound to
respect.

● Insofar as the falsifications are concerned, those crimes were necessarily

committed in the past. But for the privilege to apply, the period to be
considered is the date when the privileged communication was made by the
client to the attorney in relation to either a crime committed in the past or
with respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future. In other
words, if the client seeks his lawyer’s advice with respect to a crime which
he has already committed, he is given the protection of a virtual
confessional seal which the privilege declares cannot be broken by the
attorney without the client’s consent. The same privileged confidentiality,
however, does not attach with regard to a crime a client intends to commit
thereafter or in the future and for purposes of which he seeks the lawyer’s
advice.

● In this case, the testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state

witness are the communications made to him by physical acts and/or
accompanying words of Paredes at the time he and Honrada were about to
falsify the documents. Clearly, therefore, the confidential communications
thus made by Paredes to Atty. Sansaet were for purposes of and in
reference to the crime of falsification which had not yet been committed in
the past by Paredes but which he, in confederacy with his present
co-respondents, later committed. Having been made for purposes of a future
offense, those communications are outside the pale of the attorney-client
privilege.

13. US vs Gordon-Nikkar

Doctrine:
A communication divulged to "strangers" or outsiders can scarcely be considered a
confidential communication between attorney and client. Also, attorney-client
privilege does not extend to communications regarding an intended or future crime.

Facts:
Appellant, Ana Gordon-Nikkar, was convicted after a trial by jury on three counts of
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute approximately four kilograms of
cocaine, and the substantive charges of possession with intent to distribute and
distribution of the cocaine.

On appeal, Ana exclaimed that her conviction be reversed

because one of her co-defendants, Brenda March, was permitted to testify on
allegedly privileged conversations between appellant's attorney (Mr. Estrumsa) and
his clients.

Brenda pled guilty to one count and testified for the Government. Brenda
claims that they had two meetings in the office Estrumsa. On each of these
Occasions, several of the co-defendants were present. Brenda further testified that
Estrumsa's suggestion was to give cover-up testimonies that none of them
possessed the cocaine, but merely happened to be at a party where the cocaine was
discovered. Brenda, however, was not a client of Estrumsa, and it is unclear whether
all codefendants were Estrumsa's clients.

Issue:
W/N the statements in Estrumsa's office were protected by attorney-client privilege.

Ruling:
No. At least five persons were present at Estrumsa's office, and at least one of them
(Brenda), and perhaps others, were not clients of Estrumsa.

A communication
divulged to "strangers" or outsiders can scarcely be considered as confidential
communication between attorney and client.
Even considering the communication as privileged, Brenda’s testimony is admissible.
The conversations dealt with plans to commit perjury so as to hide criminal activity.
Attorney-client privilege does not extend to communications regarding an intended
crime. It would be a perversion of the privilege to extend it so as to protect
communications designed to frustrate justice by committing other crimes to conceal
past misdeeds.

14. US vs McPartlin
Doctrine:
The client-lawyer privilege rule applies in communications between joint parties with
common interest and their counsels, pursuant to the joint interest privilege or
common defense rule. Communications to the agent of the lawyer is also
communications to the lawyer.

Facts:
This is a criminal case for conspiring to violate the Travel Act and the Wire, Radio,
Television Fraud Act.

1. The Sanitary District is a municipal corporation with primary responsibility for

disposing of sewage from Chicago and surrounding areas. It operates a sewage
treatment plant in Stickney, Illinois.

2. The sludge produced as a by-product was disposed of by pumping it into nearby

lagoons. The lagoons were rapidly filled and efforts to clean it had failed, so the
District announced plans to have the sludge hauled and solicited bids on the project.

3. (Short facts: Benton (VP of Ingram Corporation) , acting with the knowledge and
complicity of Ingram (Chairman of the Board of Ingram Corporation) and through
intermediaries Bull (President of a towing company) and Weber (A businessman ),
bribed McPartlin (Illinois legislator) and Janicki (Trustee of the Metropolitan
Sanitary District) to cause the sludge-hauling contract to be awarded to Ingram
Corporation and Ingram Contractors Inc (subsidiary), and later bribed the same
officials to secure favorable treatment under the contract and modifications of the
contract.)

4. In a meeting, Bull and Weber told Benton that if Ingram Corporation wanted the
project, it would have to make a $250,000 (later on raised to $450,000 tungod sa
competitors) political contribution. Benton then called Ingram about the matter, to
which the latter agreed.

5. When McPartlin and Benton met, the former assured the latter that Ingram
Corporation would receive at least $21,500,000 in total revenue from the contract.

6. During the bidding, Oberle (employee of Ingram) bid $16,990,000, and was
instructed by Benton/Webber to go to a bar to meet Janicki, which he did. Janicki told
Oberle to raise the bid to $17,990,000, to which he did.

7. The Sanitary District Board awarded the contract to Ingram Corporation.

8. Janicki and Weber told Benton that the corporation would receive an additional
$2,100,000 by billing the Sanitary District a second time for the construction of a
pipeline. The Illinois Commerce Commission granted Ingram Corporation’s request
for a certificate of convenience and necessity.

9. Ingram Barge Corporation began transporting sludge but was six days delayed, so
the Sanitary District assessed liquidated damages, however was withdrawn.
10. Janicki wanted $100,000 payment asap, however, when Benton informed Ingram
of this request, the latter refused and said that no payments would be made until the
Sanitary District began making payments on the pipeline.

11. Weber called Benton that the Sanitary District would issue a $1,000,000 as partial
payment, however, Janicki disclaimed any knowledge of such. Benton threatened to
“jerk the rug” from under everyone in Chigago.

13. A federal grand jury commenced an investigation of the events surrounding the
sludge-hauling contract, and it granted immunity to Benton.

14. Throughout the period covered by the indictment, Benton kept diaries, or
appointment calendars, in which he made notes concerning meetings and telephone
conversations, naming the persons involved and often recording the substance of the
conversations. The Benton diaries figured prominently in the government's case, for
they corroborated much of his testimony.

15. It was important for the defense to destroy Benton’s credibility, because their
account of the events in issue differed materially from Benton’s testimony, and the
government’s case is largely hinged on that testimony. Naay content sa entries sa
diary nga di umano nakadawat ug payments si McPartlin.

16. An investigator acting for Ingram’s counsel twice interviewed McPartlin for the
purpose of determining whether there was a basis for challenging the truth of some
diary entries.

17. In the interviews, McPartlin made certain statements (which were made in
confidence), which Ingram argues tend to support his defense and offered these
statements as evidence.
18. McPartlin objected on the ground of the attorney-client privilege.
19. Ingram argued that this privilege communication does not apply because
McPartlin was not the client of Mr. Ingram’s lawyer and the one who received the
information was not a lawyer but an investigator hired by Mr. Ingram’s lawyer.

ISSUE:
WON the attorney-client privilege is applicable. YES
RULING:
1. McPartlin was entitled to the protection of the attorney-client privilege, because his
statements were made in confidence to an attorney for a co-defendant for a common
purpose related to both defenses.
2. They were made in connection with the project of attempting to discredit Benton, a
project in which Ingram and McPartlin and their attorneys were jointly engaged for the
benefit of both defendants.
3. Uninhibited communication among joint parties and their counsel about matters of
common concern is important for the protection of their interest, and is covered
under the privileged communication rule. There is no waiver and such cannot be
inferred from the disclosure in confidence to a co-party’s attorney for a common
purpose.
4. This privilege applies even if the position and defenses of the different parties are
not compatible in all respects. The privilege protects pooling of information for any
defense purpose common to the participating defendants.
5. Even if it was made to an investigator and not the attorney himself, the investigator
was an agent of the attorney, and so it is as if the communications made to the
former is also made to the latter.
6. When the Ingram and McPartlin camps decided to join in an attempt to discredit
Benton, the attorney for each represented both for purposes of that joint effort. The
attorney who thus undertakes to serve his client's co-defendant for a limited purpose
becomes the co-defendant's attorney for that purpose. STATEMENTS MADE BY
MCPARTLIN TO THE AGENT OF INGRAM’S LAWYER ARE INADMISSIBLE.

15. Krohn vs CA
DOCTRINE: Privilege communication between Physician and patient is applicable only
to person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. ITC, the husband is
not covered by the rule. Hence, he can testify to the contents of the Med. report.

FACTS:
Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married in Manila. They had three
children. Sadly, the relationship between the couple developed into a stormy one. In
1971, Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing purportedly in an effort to ease the
marital strain.

In 1973, they finally separated in fact. Edgar was able to secure a copy of the
confidential psychiatric report on Ma. Paz prepared and signed by Drs. Cornelio
Banaag, Jr., and Baltazar Reyes. In November 1978, presenting the report among
others, he obtained a decree from the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in
Manila nullifying his church marriage on the ground of "incapacitas assumendi onera
conjugalia due to lack of due discretion existent at the time of the wedding and
thereafter." Later on became final and definite

In 1990, Edgar filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Ma. Paz with the
RTC. In his petition, he cited the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report which Ma.
Paz merely denied in her Answer as "either unfounded or irrelevant."
At the hearing, Edgar took the witness stand and tried to testify on the contents of the
Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report. This was objected to on the ground that it
violated the rule on privileged communication between physician and patient.
Subsequently, Ma. Paz filed a Manifestation expressing her "continuing objection" to
any evidence, oral or documentary, on the ground of physician-patient privileged
communication rule.
The TC issued an Order sustaining Edgar’s motion and admitting the Psychiatric
Report.
On appeal to the CA, it was dismissed. Hence, the instant petition for review.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
● Seeks to enjoin the presentation and disclosure of the contents of the
psychiatric report
● That since Sec. 24, par. (c), Rule 130, of of ROC prohibits a physician from
testifying on matters acquired in attending to a patient in a professional
capacity, "WITH MORE REASON should be third person be PROHIBITED or
from submitting any medical report, findings or evaluation prepared by a
physician as a result of his confidential and privileged relation with a
patient."
● To allow her husband to testify on the contents "will set a very bad and
dangerous precedent because it abets circumvention of the rule's intent in
preserving the sanctity, security and confidence to the relation of physician
and his patient."

PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:

● That the prohibition applies only to a physician. Hence not applicable to him
where the person sought to be barred from testifying is not the physician of
the petitioner."

ISSUE: Won the rule under Privilege communication between Physician and patient
extends to 3 rd persons
RULING : No.
In Lim v. Court of Appeals it clearly lays down the requisites in order that the privilege
may be successfully invoked:
(a) the privilege is claimed in a civil case
(b) the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to
practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics ; (c) such person acquired the information
while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity
(d) the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and,
(e) the information was confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation of
the patient.

In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is invoked is not one duly
authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient's
husband who wishes to testify on a document executed by medical practitioners.
Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the claimed prohibition. Neither can his
testimony be considered a circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony
cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the
patient and executed the report.

Counsel for the petitioner indulged heavily in objecting to the testimony of private
respondent on the ground that it was privileged. She invoked the rule on privileged
communications but never questioned the testimony as hearsay. It was a fatal
mistake . For, in failing to object to the testimony on the ground that it was hearsay,
counsel waived his right to make such objection and, consequently, the evidence
offered may be admitted.

The wife should have argued that the testimony is hearsay and not privilege
communication rule . It is not the husband who prepared the report, hence he has no
personal knowledge of the records.

Also, here the wife was accompanied by her Father, the latter knew what the doctor
and wife here shared in the course of the interviews, Hence, Privileged
communication ceases to operate since it is known to 3 rd person.
The other issue raised by petitioner is too trivial to merit the full attention of this
Court. The allegations contained in the Statement for the Records are but refutations
of private respondent's declarations which may be denied or disproved during the
trial.

16. San Miguel vs Kalalo

DOCTRINE: An offer of compromise made prior to the filing of a criminal case may
not be considered as evidence against the offeror.
FACTS:
Kalalo had been a dealer of beer products since 1998. She had a credit overdraft
arrangement with petitioner SMC whereby, prior to the delivery of beer products, she
would be required to issue two checks to petitioner: a blank check and a check to be
filled up with an amount corresponding to the gross value of the goods delivered. At
the end of the week, Kalalo and an agent of SMC would compute the actual amount
due to the latter by deducting the value of the returned empty beer bottles and cases
from the gross value of the goods delivered. Once they succeeded in determining the
actual amount owed to SMC, that amount would be written on the blank check, and
Kalalo would fund her account accordingly.

As Kalalo’s business grew, so did the number of beer products delivered to her by
SMC (from 200 to 4,000 cases a week). It then became difficult to keep track of
transactions. Thus, she requested regular statements of account from petitioner, but
it failed to comply.

SMC’s agent required Kalalo to issue several post-dated checks to cope with the
probable increase in orders during the busy Christmas season, without informing her
of the breakdown of the balance. She complied with the request; but after making
several cash payments and returning a number of empty beer bottles and cases, she
noticed that she still owed SMC a substantial amount. She then insisted that it
provide her with a detailed statement of account, but it failed to do so. In order to
protect her rights and to compel SMC to update her account, she ordered her bank to
stop payment on the last seven checks she had issued to SMC.
SMC sent Kalalo a demand letter for the value of the seven dishonoured checks.
Later, SMC made constant threats to Kalalo, such as imprisonment, so she gave SMC
an Offer of Compromise, wherein she acknowledged the receipt of the statement of
account demanding the payment of the sum of P816,689.00 and submitted a
proposal by way of ‘Compromise Agreement’ to settle the said obligation. SMC did
not accept this proposal. 3 months later, it filed a complaint against Kalalo for
violating the Bouncing Checks Law.
During trial, SMC finally complied with Kalalo’s demand that her account be updated.
It showed a remaining balance of P71,009.00 only. Kalalo then recanted her Offer of
Compromise and stated that, at the time she had the letter prepared, she was being
threatened by SMC agents with imprisonment, and that she did not know how much
she actually owed petitioner.
ISSUE: W/N the Offer of Compromise made by Kalalo may be considered as evidence
against her such that she admitted her liability to SMC.

HELD: OF COURSE NOT!

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF RECEIPT NOT OF LIABILITY
The letter of compromise did not contain an express acknowledgement of liability. It
merely shows the acknowledgement by Kalalo that she received the statement of
account.

The fact that the respondent made a compromise offer to petitioner SMC cannot be
considered as an admission of liability. As ruled by SC in previous cases this is
because the law favours settlement out of court and if the offer to compromise could
be used as evidence against the one who presents it, no one would dare to offer a
compromise which would result in unnecessary litigation.

While it is true that Rule 130, Section 27 of the Revised Rules on Evidence that an
offer of compromise may be received in evidence as implied admission in criminal
cases, in this case, the offer of compromise was made prior to the filing of the
criminal complaint. The Offer of Compromise was clearly not made in the context of a
criminal proceeding and, therefore, cannot be considered as an implied admission of
guilt.

Lastly, during the testimony of the respondent and after her receipt of the Statement
of Account from SMC, she recanted the contents of the Offer of Compromise. She
explained that, at the time she had the letter prepared, the final amount owed to
petitioner SMC was yet undetermined; and that she was constantly facing threats of
imprisonment from petitioner’s agents.

17. Civil Service commission vs Allyson Belagan

DOCTRINE: Credibility means the disposition and intention to tell the truth in the
testimony given. It refers to a person's integrity, and to the fact that he is worthy of
belief. A witness may be discredited by evidence attacking his general reputation for
truth, honesty or integrity.
FACTS:
The instant case stemmed from two (2) separate complaints filed respectively by
Magdalena Gapuz , founder/directress of the "Mother and Child Learning Center," and
Ligaya Annawi , a public school teacher at Fort Del Pilar Elementary School, against
respondent Dr. Allyson Belagan , Superintendent of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS), all from Baguio City. Magdalena charged respondent with
sexual indignities and harassment, while Ligaya accused him of sexual harassment
and various malfeasances.
DECS Secretary: Belagan guilty of sexual indignities and ordered dismissed. He was
absolved of charges of administrative malfeasance or dereliction of duty.
CSC: Guilty of grave misconduct. His position is that which requires a high degree of
moral uprightness Respondent filed a MR, contending that he has never been charged
of any offense in his thirty-seven years of service. By contrast, Magdalena was
charged with several offenses before the MTC of Baguio City. (Respondent listed all
the cases; A LOT like daghan jud) Respondent claimed that the numerous cases filed
against Magdalena cast doubt on her character, integrity, and credibility, MR was
denied.
CA: reversed the CSC and held that Magdalena is an unreliable witness, her character
being questionable. Given her aggressiveness and propensity for trouble, "she is not
one whom any male would attempt to steal a kiss’’.
ISSUE: Whether or not Magdalena, the complaining witness, is credible .
RULING:
Generally, the character of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a
controversy. One statutory exception is that relied upon by respondent, i.e.,Section 51
(a) 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, which we quote here: "SEC. 51. Character evidence not generally
admissible; exceptions. —
(a) In Criminal Cases: xxx xxx xxx (3) The good or bad moral character of the
offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable
degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged."
It will be readily observed that the above provision pertains only to criminal cases, not
to administrative offenses. And even assuming that this technical rule of evidence
can be applied here, still, we cannot sustain respondent's posture. Not every good or
bad moral character of the offended party may be proved under this provision. Only
those which would establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged.
This means that the character evidence must be limited to the traits and
characteristics involved in the type of offense charged.
Thus, on a charge of rape — character for chastity, on a charge of assault — character
for peaceableness or violence, and on a charge of embezzlement — character for
honesty.
In one rape case, where it was established that the alleged victim was morally loose
and apparently uncaring about her chastity, we found the conviction of the accused
doubtful.
In the present administrative case for sexual harassment, respondent did not offer
evidence that has a bearing on Magdalena's chastity. What he presented are charges
for grave oral defamation, grave threats, unjust vexation, physical injuries, malicious
mischief, etc. filed against her. Certainly, these pieces of evidence are inadmissible
under the above provision because they do not establish the probability or
improbability of the offense charged.
Credibility means the disposition and intention to tell the truth in the testimony
given. It refers to a person's integrity, and to the fact that he is worthy of belief .

honesty or integrity. Section 11, Rule 132 of the same Revised Rules on Evidence
reads:
"SEC. 11. Impeachment of adverse party's witness. — A witness may be
impeached by the party against whom he was called, by contradictory
evidence, by evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or
integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at other times statements
inconsistent with his present testimony, but not by evidence of particular
wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the examination of the
witness, or the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of an
offense."
With the foregoing disquisition, the CA is correct in holding that the character or
reputation of a complaining witness in a sexual charge is a proper subject of inquiry.

This leads us to the ultimate question — is Magdalena's derogatory record sufficient

to discredit her credibility? A careful review of the record yields a negative answer.
1) Magdalena's derogatory record is NOT sufficient to discredit her credibility.
Evidence of one's character or reputation must be confined to a time not too remote
from the time in question. What is to be determined is the character or reputation of
the person at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote from
the commencement of the suit. Most of the twenty-two (22) cases filed with the MTC
of Baguio City relate to acts committed in the 70s and 80s and one was in 1994.
Surely, those cases and complaints are no longer reliable proof of Magdalenas
character or reputation. Every person can change
2) Belagan also failed to prove that Magdalena was convicted of any of the
criminal cases . It is not permissible to show that a witness has been arrested or that
he has been charged with or prosecuted for a criminal offense, or confined in jail for
the purpose of impairing his credibility.

18. Fuentes vs CA

One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that pertaining to

DECLARATIONS MADE AGAINST INTEREST. SEC. 38, RULE 130, Rules of Court: “the
declarations made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of
the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so
far contrary to declarant’s own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would
not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, amy be received in
evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third persons.”

FACTS:
Julieto Malaspina together with Godofredo Llames, Honorio Osok, and
Alberto Toling was at a benefit dance. FUENTES called Malaspina and placed his right
arm on the shoulder of the latter saying “Before, I saw you with a long hair but now
you have a short hair.” Suddenly, Petitioner FUENTES stabbed Malaspina in the
abdomen with a hunting knife.
FUENTES fled. Before the victim died, he muttered that ALEJANDRO
FUENTES JR., stabbed him.
FUENTES claimed that it was his cousin Zoilo Jr., aka JONIE who knifed
Malaspina
RTC: found FUENTES GUILTY of Murder qualified with treachery.
CA: AFFIRMED.

ISSUE:
Whether the declaration particularly against penal interest attributed to
ZOILO FUENTES JR. is admissible.

RULING:
NO. the declaration particularly against penal interest attributed to Zoilo
Fuentes Jr. is NOT ADMISSIBLE in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Petitioner would make much of the alleged confession of ZOILO FUENTES
JR. since it is a declaration against penal interest and therefore an exception to the
hearsay rule.
The so called declaration was given to their UNCLE Felicisiomo Fuentes and
relayed to P/Sgt. Conde in which Feliciano testified that he (ZOILO) killed MALASPINA
in “retaliation”, that he even showed him the knife he used and asked his help in
finding a lawyer, in securing bail, and if possible, in working out a settlement with the
relatives of the deceased. The following day however he learned that the
SELF-CONFESSED KILLER was GONE and that Petitioner had been arrested for a
crime he did not commit.
One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that pertaining to
declarations made against interest. SEC. 38, RULE 130, RULES OF COURT provides
that “the declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the
interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was
made so far contrary to the declarant’s own interest, that a reasonable man in his
position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be
received in evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third
persons.”
There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration
against interest:
(a) THE DECLARANT MUST NOT BE AVAILABLE TO TESTIFY;
(b) THE DECLARATION MUST CONCERN A FACT COGNIZABLE BY THE
DECLARANT; and
(c) THE CIRCUMSTANCES MUST RENDER IT IMPROBABLE THAT A MOTIVE
TO FALSIFY EXISTED.
In the instant case, the Court finds that THE DECLARATION PARTICULARLY
AGAINST PENAL INTEREST ATTRIBUTED TO ZOILO FUENTES JR. IS NOT
ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE.
The far weightier reason why the admission against penal interest cannot be
accepted in the instant case is that THE DECLARANT IS NOT “UNABLE TO TESTIFY.”
There is no showing that Zoilo is either dead, mentally incapacitated or physically
incompetent which Sec. 38 obviously contemplates. His mere absence from the
jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto unavailable under this rule.
For it is incumbent upon the defense to produce each and every piece of
evidence that can break the prosecution and assure the acquittal of the accused.
OTHER THAN THE GRATUITOUS STATEMENTS OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND
HIS UNCLE TO THE EFFECT THAT ZOILO ADMITTED HAVING KILLED MALASPINA,
THE RECORDS SHOW THAT THE DEFENSE DID NOT EXERT ANY SERIOUS EFFORT
TO PRODUCE AS A WITNESS.
Thus, the CA and RTC correctly determined the crime to be murder qualified
by treachery. The suddenness of the attack, without any provocation from the
unsuspecting victim, made the stabbing of Malaspina treacherous.

19. Mendoza vs CA
DOCTRINE: Acts or declarations about pedigree is an exception to the hearsay
evidence rule.

FACTS:
· Respondent Teopista filed a complaint for compulsory recognition. She alleged
that she was born to Brigida Toring and defendant Casimiro Mendoza who was
married at that time to Emiliana. She contended that Mendoza recognized her as an
illegitimate child by treating her as such and according to her the right and privileges
of a recognized illegitimate child.
· Medoza denied her claim and even set up a counterclaim.
· Teopista presented witnesses: herself, her son and 2 relatives of Mendoza
Gaudencio and Isaac. Isaac testified that his uncle Casimiro was the father of
Teopista because his father Hipolito, Casimiro's brother, and his grandmother,
Brigida Mendoza (mother of Casimiro), so informed him. He worked on Casimiro's
boat and whenever Casimiro paid him his salary, he would also give him
various amounts from P2.00 to P10.00 to be delivered to Teopista. Isaac also
declared that Casimiro intended to give certain properties to Teopista.
· Mendoza did not testify because of hils old age. He died during the
pendency of the case. He was substituted by Vicente Toring. Vicente, who professed
to be Casimiro's only illegitimate child by Brigida Toring, declared that
Teopista's father was not Casimiro but a carpenter named Ondoy, who later
abandoned her.

ISSUE: WON Teopista is an illegitimate child of Mendoza

HELD: YES
Although Teopista has failed to show that she was in open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro (she was not living
with Casimiro, but lived with her mother; also, the monetary support given by
Mendoza to Teopista was not on a continuous or regular basis), we find that she
has nevertheless established that status by another method.
● Rule 130, Section 39, of the Rules of Court, providing as follows:
○ Sec. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. — The act or declaration of a
person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another
person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where
it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two
persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word
``pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the
dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the
relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.
● Isaac Mendoza testified on this question of pedigree. His testimony was
that he was informed by his father Hipolito, who was Casimiro's brother, and
Brigida Mendoza, Casimiro's own mother, that Teopista was Casimiro's
illegitimate daughter.
● Such acts or declarations may be received in evidence as an exception
to the hearsay rule because it is the best the nature of the case admits and
because greater evils are apprehended from the rejection of such proof than
from its admission. Nevertheless, precisely because of its nature as hearsay
evidence, there are certain safeguards against its abuse. Commenting on this
provision, Francisco enumerates the following requisites that have to be
complied with before the act or declaration regarding pedigree may be admitted
in evidence:
1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify.
2. The pedigree must be in issue.
3. The declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in
issue.
4. The declaration must be made before the controversy arose.
5. The relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree
is in question must be shown by evidence other than such declaration.
● All the above requisites are present in the case at bar.
○ The persons who made the declarations about the pedigree of
Teopista, namely, the mother of Casimiro, Brigida Mendoza, and his brother,
Hipolito, were both dead at the time of Isaac's testimony.
○ The declarations referred to the filiation of Teopista and the paternity
of Casimiro, which were the very issues involved in the complaint for
compulsory recognition.
○ The declarations were made before the complaint was filed by Teopista
or before the controversy arose between her and Casimiro.
○ Finally, the relationship between the declarants and Casimiro has been
established by evidence other than such declaration, consisting of the
extrajudicial partition of the estate of Florencio Mendoza, in which Casimiro
was mentioned as one of his heirs.

20. Jison vs CA

doctrine: For the success of an action to establish illegitimate filiation under the second
paragraph (open and continuous possession of status as child), , a "high standard of
proof" is required. Specifically, to prove open and continuous possession of the
status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the
permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by
continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be
attributed to pure charity.

Facts:
Monina filed for recognition as an illegitimate child of petitioner Francisco.
In her complaint, MONINA alleged that FRANCISCO had been married to a certain Lilia
Lopez Jison since 1940. At the end of 1945 or the start of 1946 , however,
FRANCISCO impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar (who was then employed as the nanny
of FRANCISCO's daughter, Lourdes) .
As a result, MONINA was born and since childhood, had enjoyed the continuous,
implied recognition as an illegitimate child of FRANCISCO by his acts and that of his
family.
MONINA further alleged that FRANCISCO gave her support and spent for her
education, such that she obtained a Master's degree, became a certified public
accountant (CPA) and eventually, a Central Bank examiner.
At trial on the merits, MONINA presented a total of eleven (11) witnesses (sa full text
gi-usa usa ang testimony sa kada witness; if naa mo’y gusto tan-awun na testimony,
refer nalang sa full text kay mutaas ang digest).
Monina also herself took the witness stand. One of the things she testified about was
this:
“MONINA went to see FRANCISCO, told him that she resigned and asked him for
money to go to Spain, but FRANCISCO refused as she could not speak Spanish and
would not be able find a job. The two quarreled and FRANCISCO ordered a helper to
send MONINA out of the house. In the process, MONINA broke many glasses at the
pantry and cut her hand, after which, FRANCISCO hugged her, gave her medicine,
calmed her down, asked her to return to Bacolod City and promised that he would
give her the money. (Awww)
(Plot twist)

MONINA also declared that Atty. Tirol then told her that she would have to go to Iloilo
and sign a certain affidavit, before Mr. Cruz would turn over the money promised by
FRANCISCO.
After going over the draft of the affidavit, refused to sign it as it stated that she was
not FRANCISCO's daughter. She explained that all she had agreed with FRANCISCO
was that he would pay for her fare to go abroad, and that since she was a little girl,
she knew about her illegitimacy. She started crying, begged Atty. Tirol to change the
affidavit, to which Atty. Tirol responded that he was also a father and did not want
this to happen to his children as they could not be blamed for being brought into the
world. (char ui)
MONINA subsequently met FRANCISCO in Bacolod City where they discussed the
affidavit which she refused to sign. FRANCISCO told her that the affidavit was for his
wife, that in case she heard about MONINA going abroad, the affidavit would keep her
peace.
MONINA then narrated that the first time she went to Atty. Tirol's office, she was
accompanied by one Atty. Fernando Divinagracia, who advised her that the affidavit
would "boomerang" against FRANCISCO "as it is contrary to law." MONINA returned to
Bacolod City, then met with Atty. Tirol once more to reiterate her plea, but Atty. Tirol
did not relent.
Thus, she signed the affidavit as she was jobless and needed the money to support
herself and finish her studies. In exchange for signing the document, MONINA
received a Bank of Asia check for P15,000.00 (Exh. Q), which was less than the
P25,000.00 which FRANCISCO allegedly promised to give.”
(Anyway, daghan pa kaau mga other things gitestify about ug documents na gipang
offer so di na nako include kay sa ruling gi-isa isa sila sa court)
RTC: Dismissed the case; did not
CA: Reversed; testimonies of [Monina’s witnesses] Lope Amolar, Adela Casabuena
and Dominador Savariz were already sufficient to establish MONINA's filiation

Issue: W/N Monina was sufficiently able to prove her filiation to Francisco

Ruling: YES
All told, MONINA's evidence hurdled "the high standard of proof" required for the
success of an action to establish one's illegitimate filiation when relying upon the
provisions regarding "open and continuous possession'' or "any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws;" moreover, MONINA proved her filiation by
more than mere preponderance of evidence.
Law on Proving Filiation
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as MONINA's, may be
established in the same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children.
Article 172 thereof provides the various forms of evidence by which legitimate
filiation is established, thus:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
For the success of an action to establish illegitimate filiation under the second
paragraph. which MONINA relies upon given that she has none of the evidence
mentioned in the first paragraph, a "high standard of proof" is required. Specifically, to
prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there
must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed
father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental
affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of
such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the
apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in

life, not accidentally, but continuously. By "continuous" is meant uninterrupted and

consistent, but does not require any particular length of time.
On the testimony of Monina’s witnesses
The complaint stated that FRANCISCO had carnal knowledge of Pansay "by about the
end of 1945." We agree with MONINA that this was broad enough to cover the fourth
quarter of said year, hence her birth on 6 August 1946 could still be attributed to
sexual relations between FRANCISCO and MONINA's mother. In any event, since it
was established that her mother was still in the employ of FRANCISCO at the time
MONINA was conceived as determined by the date of her birth, sexual contact
between FRANCISCO and MONINA's mother was not at all impossible, especially in
light of the overwhelming evidence, as hereafter shown, that FRANCISCO fathered
MONINA, has recognized her as his daughter and that MONINA has been enjoying the
open and continuous possession of the status as FRANCISCO's illegitimate daughter.
We readily conclude that the testimonial evidence offered by MONINA, woven by her
narration of circumstances and events that occurred through the years, concerning
her relationship with FRANCISCO, coupled with the testimonies of her witnesses,
overwhelmingly established the following facts:
1) FRANCISCO is MONINA's father and she was conceived at the time when her
mother was in the employ of the former;
2) FRANCISCO recognized MONINA as his child through his overt acts and conduct
which the Court of Appeals took pains to enumerate, thus:
[L]ike sending appellant to school, paying for her tuition fees, school uniforms, books,
board and lodging at the Colegio del Sagrado de Jesus, defraying appellant's
hospitalization expenses, providing her with [a] monthly allowance, paying for the
funeral expenses of appellant's mother, acknowledging appellant's paternal greetings
and calling appellant his "Hija" or child, instructing his office personnel to give
appellant's monthly allowance, recommending appellant to use his house in Bacolod
and paying for her long distance telephone calls, having appellant spend her long
distance telephone calls, having appellant spend her vacation in his apartment in
Manila and also at his Forbes residence, allowing appellant to use his surname in her
scholastic and other records. . .
3) Such recognition has been consistently shown and manifested throughout the
years publicly, spontaneously, continuously and in an uninterrupted manner.
Accordingly, in light of the totality of the evidence on record, testimonial evidence of
filiation is clear and convincing.
On the certificate of live birth, baptismal and school records (DIRI MALI SI MONINA)

MONINA's reliance on the certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar concerning
her birth is clearly misplaced. It is settled that a certificate of live birth purportedly
identifying the putative father is not competent evidence as to the issue of paternity,
when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of
said certificates, and the Local Civil Registrar is devoid of authority to record the
paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third person.
Simply put, if the alleged father did not intervene in the birth certificate, e.g., supplying
the information himself, the inscription of his name by the mother or doctor or
registrar is null and void; the mere certificate by the registrar without the signature of
the father is not proof of voluntary acknowledgment on the latter's part.

In like manner, FRANCISCO's lack of participation in the preparation of the baptismal

and school records renders these documents incompetent to prove paternity, the
former being competent merely to prove the administration of the sacrament of
baptism on the date so specified.However, despite the inadmissibility of the school
records per se to prove the paternity, they may be admitted as part of MONINA's
testimony to corroborate her claim that FRANCISCO spent for her education.

We likewise disagree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the certificates
issued by the Local Civil Registrar and the baptismal certificates may be taken as
circumstantial evidence to prove MONINA's filiation.

Since they are per se

inadmissible in evidence as proof of such filiation, they cannot be admitted indirectly
as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.
On the affidavit Monina signed which says she is not Francisco’s daughter
If MONINA were truly not FRANCISCO's illegitimate daughter, it would have been
unnecessary for him to have gone to such great lengths in order that MONINA
denounce her filiation. For as clearly established before the trial court and properly
appreciated by the Court of Appeals, MONINA had resigned from Miller & Cruz five (5)
months prior to the execution of the sworn statement in question, hence negating
FRANCISCO's theory of the need to quash rumors circulating within Miller & Cruz
regarding the identity of MONINA's father.

Hence, coupled with the assessment of the

credibility of the testimonial evidence of the parties discussed above, it is evident that
the standard to contradict a notarial document, i.e. clear and convincing evidence and
more than merely preponderant, has been met by MONINA.

(Last na gyud ni) On Francisco’s defense

Francisco’s testimony was comprised of mere denials, rife with bare, unsubstantiated
responses such as "That is not true," "I do not believe that," or "None that I know."
Second, the reasons for the dismissals of Tingson, Baylosis and Savariz were
unspecified or likewise unsubstantiated, hence FRANCISCO's attempt to prove
ill-motive on their part to falsely testify in MONINA's favor may not succeed.
As to FRANCISCO's other witnesses, nothing substantial could be obtained either.
Basta ang gist kay tungod kay sige ra deny si Francisco, wala niya na overcome ang
mga evidence na gipangsubmit ni Monina.

21. In Re Mallari

Doctrine: Reputation has been held admissible as evidence of age, birth, race, or race
ancestry, and on the question of whether a child was born alive. Unlike that of matters
of pedigree, general reputation of marriage may proceed from persons who are not
members of the family - the reason for the distinction is the public interest that is
taken in the question of the existence of marital relations.
Facts:
● Mallare’s father, Esteban, was the illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a
Filipino mother, and believed himself to be Chinese. Mallare, the son,
became a lawyer, but his admission to the bar was revoked because his
citizenship was questionable.
● The case was first decided by the SC in 1968 ruling against Mallare.
● Respondent's petition to set aside the decision of this Court of 1968 is
premised upon three basic arguments, to wit:
(a) Respondent's father, Esteban Mallare, being the natural son of Ana
Mallare, a Filipino, was a Filipino citizen ;
(b) Esteban Mallare, the son of a Filipino mother, by his own overt acts, had
chosen Philippine citizenship; and
(c) respondent, a legitimate san of Esteban Mallare, is a Filipino citizen

Issue: WON Mallare is a Filipino citizen?

Ruling: YES.
With the additional evidence submitted by respondent pursuant to the
authority granted by this Court, the aforementioned void in the proof of respondent's
citizenship has been duly filled.
The witnesses, all natives of Macalelon, who had personal knowledge of the
person, birth and residency of both Ana Mallare and her son Esteban, were one in
their declaration that Ana Mallare is a Tagalog who had continuously resided in the
place, and that Esteban, her son, was reputedly born out of wedlock. Such
declarations constitute admissible evidence of the birth and illegitimacy of Esteban
Mallare.
Reputation has been held admissible as evidence of age, birth, race, or race
ancestry, and on the question of whether a child was born alive. Unlike that of matters
of pedigree, general reputation of marriage may proceed from persons who are not
members of the family - the reason for the distinction is the public interest that is
taken in the question of the existence of marital relations (Emphasis supplied).
The principle could not have been more true than in a Philippine rural
community where relationships not in conformity with established conventions
become the subject of criticisms and public cynosure. Thus, the public reputation in
Macalelon that Esteban was Ana's natural child, testified to by the witnesses, wouldconstitute proof of the illegitimacy of the
former. Besides, if Esteban were really born
out of legal union, it is highly improbable that he would be keeping the surname
"Mallare" after his mother, instead of adopting that of his father. And it would be
straining the imagination to perceive that this situation was purposely sought by
Esteban's parents to suit some ulterior motives. In 1903, we can not concede that
alien inhabitants of his country were that sophisticated or legally-oriented.
The assertion of the witnesses, which have not been controverted, that Ana
Mallare is a Tagalog (and, therefore, a Filipino citizen), cannot be assailed as being
mere conclusions devoid of evidentiary value. The declarations were not only based
on the reputation in the community regarding her race or race-ancestry, which is
admissible in evidence, but they must have certain factual basis. For it must be
realized that in this Philippine society, every region possesses certain characteristics
all its own . Thus, a Tagalog would normally detect if a person hails from the same
region even from the way the latter speaks. Considering that the witnesses testified
having known, and lived with, Ana Mallare in Macalelon, their declaration that she is a
Tagalog should receive a high degree of credibility.
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore
himself a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the
rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship neither could any act taken on
the erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to
which he is rightfully entitled.
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were legally married to an
alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has been established that Esteban
Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928 and that as early as 1925 (when
he was about 22 years old), Esteban was already participating in the elections and
campaigning for a certain candidate. These acts are sufficient to show his
preference for Philippine citizenship . Indeed, it would be unfair to expect the
presentation of a formal deed to that effect considering that prior to the enactment of
Commonwealth Act 625 on June 7, 1941, no particular proceeding was required to
exercise the option to elect Philippine citizenship, granted to the proper party by
Section 1, subsection 4, Article IV of the 1935 Philippine Constitution.

22People vs Victor Padit

DOCTRINE : TESTIMONIES OF CHILD-VICTIMS ARE NORMALLY GIVEN FULL WEIGHT
AND CREDIT

FACTS:
1)A four-year-old girl, was playing inside their house while her mother was looking
after her younger brother. After a while, AAA went out of the house to buy bread.
On her way to the store, she was called by accused-appellant, who is their neighbor
and the uncle of her mother, and whom AAA calls as Lolo Victor.
Accused-appellant brought AAA inside his house and allowed her to play. He then
brought her upstairs, caused her to lie down and removed her short pants.
Accused-appellant also removed his short pants and proceeded to rub his penis
against AAA's vagina.
AAA felt pain but was rendered helpless and prevented from making any sound as
accused-appellant covered her mouth with his hand. T
hereafter, accused-appellant threatened to hurt AAA with his knife if she tells anybody
about the incident.
2)Meanwhile, AAA's mother was about to serve lunch when she noticed that AAA was
not yet around. She then went out of their house and around their neighborhood
calling for AAA.
While she was in accused-appellant's yard, the latter came out of his house and told
her that AAA is inside watching him weave baskets. Accused-appellant then went
back inside the house and, after a few minutes, brought AAA outside.
3)Back at their house, her mother asked AAA why she did not respond to her calls.
AAA then told her mother about what accused-appellant did to her. Upon hearing
AAA's account of her sexual molestation committed by accused-appellant, AAA's
mother immediately went to accused-appellant's house to confront him.
Accused-appellant, however, denied having molested AAA.
Unable to elicit an admission from accused-appellant, AAA's mother went back to
their house and proceeded to give AAA a bath.
While she was washing AAA's vagina, the latter cried and asked her not to touch it
because it was very painful.
4)Subsequently, AAA's mother filed a criminal Complaint
5)The RTC gave full faith and credence to the testimony of the victim as corroborated,
in its material points, by the medical findings of the physician who examined the
victim.
ISSUE/S: Whether full faith and credence should be given to the testimony of the child
victim to convict the accused.

RULING: YES!
TESTIMONIES OF CHILD-VICTIMS ARE NORMALLY GIVEN FULL WEIGHT AND
CREDIT
particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that
is necessary to show that rape has, in fact, been committed.
When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give
credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability
but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she
testified is not true.
Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.
oConsidering that AAA was only four (4) years old when she was raped and was only
five (5) years old when she took the witness stand, she could not have invented a
horrible story. For her to fabricate the facts of rape and to charge the accused falsely
of a crime is certainly beyond her mental capacity.
oThe Court does not agree with accused-appellant's contention that the prosecution
failed to prove carnal knowledge on the ground that AAA explicitly stated in her
testimony that accused-appellant merely rubbed his penis against her vagina.
oAAA, who was then four years old at the time of the molestation, was not expected
to be knowledgeable about sexual intercourse and every stage thereof. The fact that
she claimed that accused-appellant rubbed his penis against her vagina did not mean
that there was no penetration.
oBesides, the testimony of AAA is corroborated by the findings of the physician who
examined her indicating the presence of slight hymenal abrasion upon examination of
her vulva.
oThus, the RTC and the CA are correct in concluding that both the victim's positive
testimony and the findings of the medico-legal officer complemented each other in
the conclusion that there was penetration, however slight.
THE FACT THAT THE OFFENDED PARTY IS A MINOR DOES NOT MEAN THAT SHE IS
INCAPABLE OF PERCEIVING AND MAKING HER PERCEPTION KNOWN.
Children of sound mind are likely to be more observant of incidents which take place
within their view than older persons, and their testimonies are likely more correct in
detail than that of older persons.
oIn fact, AAA had consistently, positively, and categorically identified
accused-appellant as her abuser. Her testimony was direct, candid, and replete with
details of the rape.
IT IS ONLY WHEN ONE TESTIFIES TO FACTS WHICH HE LEARNED FROM A THIRD
PERSON NOT SWORN AS WITNESS TO THOSE FACTS, IS HIS TESTIMONY
INADMISSIBLE AS HEARSAY EVIDENCE.
Accused-appellant also contends that the testimony of AAA's mother that it was
accused-appellant who molested her child is nothing but hearsay, considering that
she only came to know of the alleged molestation when she found AAA inside
accused-appellant's house and after the child told her about it when they got back
home.
oThe Court does not agree.
oThe term "hearsay" as used in the law on evidence, signifies evidence which is not
founded upon the personal knowledge of the witness from whom it is elicited and
which consequently does not depend wholly for its credibility and weight upon the
confidence which the court may have in him; its value, if any, is measured by the
credit to be given to some third person not sworn as a witness to that fact, and
consequently, not subject to cross-examination.
oIf one therefore testifies to facts which he learned from a third person not sworn as
a witness to those facts, his testimony is inadmissible as hearsay evidence.
In the instant case, the declarant, AAA herself, was sworn as a witness to the fact
testified to by her mother. Accused-appellant's counsel even cross-examined AAA.
Moreover, the trial court had the opportunity to observe AAA's manner of testifying.
Hence, the testimony of AAA's mother on the incident related to her by her daughter
cannot be disregarded as hearsay evidence.
Even assuming that the aforementioned testimony of AAA's mother is hearsay, its
non-admission would not save the day for accused-appellant. Such testimony is not
indispensable, as it merely serves to corroborate AAA's testimony that
accused-appellant forced himself upon her. As discussed earlier, AAA's testimony,
which was found to be credible by the trial court, and was corroborated by the
findings of the medico-legal, is sufficient basis for conviction
At any rate, the testimony of AAA's mother is proof of the victim's conduct
immediately after the rape. It shows that AAA immediately revealed to her mother the
rape incident and the identity of her defiler. Such conduct is one of the earmarks of
the truth of the charge of rape.
WHEREFORE, petition is dismissed.

23Heirs of Arcilla vs Teodoro

DOCTRINE:
Section 24, Rule 132, Rules of Court does not include documents acknowledged before a notary public
abroad.
FACTS:
● Teodoro (respondent) filed an application for land registration of two parcels of land.
Respondent alleged that, with the exception of the commercial building constructed
thereon, she purchased the subject lots from her father, Pacifico Arcilla (Pacifico), as
shown by a Deed of Sale dated December 9, 1966;
○ that, prior thereto, Pacifico acquired the said lots by virtue of the partition of the
estate of his father, Jose Arcilla evidenced by a document entitled Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate.
○ Respondent also presented as evidence an Affidavit of Quit-Claim in favor of
Pacifico, executed by herein petitioners as Heirs of Vicente Arcilla (Vicente),
brother of Pacifico.
● In their Opposition, petitioners contended that they are the owners pro-indiviso of the
subject lots including the building and other improvements constructed thereon by virtue
of inheritance from their deceased parents, spouses Vicente and Josefa Arcilla;
o That contrary to the claim of respondent, the lots in question were owned by their
father, Vicente, having purchased the same from a certain Manuel Sarmiento
sometime in 1917;
o That Vicente's ownership is evidenced by several tax declarations attached to the
record;
o That petitioners and their predecessors-in- interest had been in possession of the
subject lots since 1906.
● Respondent filed a Motion for Admission contending that through oversight and
inadvertence she failed to include in her application, the verification and certificate
against forum shopping required by Supreme Court (SC) Revised Circular No. 28-91 in
relation to SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94.
● Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss Application on the ground that respondent should
have filed the certificate against forum shopping simultaneously with the petition for land
registration which is a mandatory requirement of SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94
and that any violation of the said Circular shall be a cause for the dismissal of the
application upon motion and after hearing.
● Opposing the motion to dismiss, respondents asserted that the petitioners' Motion to
Dismiss Application was filed out of time;
o That respondent's failure to comply with SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94 was not
willful, deliberate or intentional;
o and the Motion to Dismiss was deemed waived for failure of petitioners to file the
same during the earlier stages of the proceedings.

ISSUE:
1. WON the belated filing of a sworn certification against forum shopping in Respondent's
application for land registration, constituted substantial compliance with SC Admin. Circular
No. 04-94. – YES, substantial compliance!
2. WON that the certification of non-forum shopping subsequently submitted by respondent
does not require a certification from an officer of the foreign service of the Philippines as
provided under Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. – Yes, bec not covered under S24
R132! (MAO NI ang related sa Evidence. Wa jud ni sya gimention sa facts. Nigawas rag kalit
sa issue, tsk!)

RULING:
YES. The CA ruled correctly when it held that the belated filing of a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping was substantial compliance with SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94.
The Court is fully aware that procedural rules are not to be belittled or simply disregarded, for
these prescribed procedures insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. However, it is equally
settled that litigation is not merely a game of technicalities. Rules of procedure should be viewed as mere
tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result
in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle.
Moreover, the emerging trend in our jurisprudence is to afford every party-litigant the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause free from the constraints of technicalities.
It must be kept in mind that while the requirement of the certificate of non-forum shopping is
mandatory, nonetheless the requirement must not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the objective
of preventing the undesirable practice of forum shopping.
Citing De Guia v. De Guia the Court, in Estribillo v. Department of Agrarian Reform, held that even
if there was complete non-compliance with the rule on certification against forum-shopping, the Court
may still proceed to decide the case on the merits pursuant to its inherent power to suspend its own rules
on grounds of substantial justice and apparent merit of the case.
In the instant case, the Court finds that the lower courts did not commit any error in proceeding to
decide the case on the merits, as herein respondent was able to submit a certification of non-forum
shopping. More importantly, the apparent merit of the substantive aspect of the petition for land
registration filed by respondent with the MTC coupled with the showing that she had no intention to
violate the Rules with impunity, as she was the one who invited the attention of the court to the
inadvertence committed by her counsel, should be deemed as special circumstances or compelling
reasons to decide the case on the merits.
YES. The certification of non-forum shopping executed in a foreign country is not covered by Section
24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
There is no merit to petitioners' contentions that the verification and certification subsequently
submitted by respondent did not state the country or city where the notary public exercised her notarial
functions; and that the MTC simply concluded, without any basis, that said notary public was from
Maryland, USA; that even granting that the verification and certification of non-forum shopping were
notarized in the USA, the same may not be deemed admissible for any purpose in the Philippines for failure
to comply with the requirement of Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court that the notarized document
must be accompanied by a certificate issued by an officer in the foreign service of the Philippines who is
stationed in the country in which a record of the subject document is kept, proving or authenticating that
the person who notarized the document is indeed authorized to do so and has custody of the same.
The Court agrees with the disquisition of the CA, to wit:
From the foregoing provision [referring to Section 24, Rule 132, Rules of Court], it can be
gathered that it does not include documents acknowledged before [a] notary public abroad. For
foreign public documents to be admissible for any purpose here in our courts, the same must be
certified by any officer of the Philippine legation stationed in the country where the documents could
be found or had been executed. However, after judicious studies of the rule, Sec. 24, Rule 132 of the
1997 Rules of Court basically pertains to written official acts, or records of the official of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of
a foreign country. This is so, as Sec. 24, Rule 132 explicitly refers only to paragraph (a) of Sec. 19. If
the rule comprehends to cover notarial documents, the rule could have included the same. Thus,
17
petitioners-oppositors' contention that the certificate of forum shopping that was submitted was
defective, as it did not bear the certification provided under Sec. 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, is
devoid of any merit. What is important is the fact that the respondent-applicant certified before a
commissioned officer clothed with powers to administer oath that [s]he has not and will not commit
forum shopping.
SEE Section 24, Rule 132 and Section 19(a), Rule 132 of the existing Rules for reference.
It cannot be overemphasized that the required certification of an officer in the foreign service
under Section 24 refers only to the documents enumerated in Section 19 (a), to wit: written official acts or
records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers of
the Philippines or of a foreign country. The Court agrees with the CA that had the Court intended to
include notarial documents as one of the public documents contemplated by the provisions of Section 24,
it should not have specified only the documents referred to under paragraph (a) of Section 19.
SC sustained findings of facts and conclusions of law of MTC and RTC
Petitioners were only able to present tax declarations in Vicente's name to prove their allegation
that Vicente became the owner of the subject property. The tax declarations presented in evidence by
petitioners are not supported by any other substantial proofs.
On the other hand, respondent's claim of ownership is not only backed up by tax declarations but
also by other pieces of evidence such as the subject Extrajudicial Settlement, Affidavit of Quitclaim, and
Deed of Sale. CA, RTC and MTC found these documents to be all notarized. It is settled that a notarized
document is executed to lend truth to the statements contained therein and to the authenticity of the
signatures. Notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity which can be overturned only by
clear and convincing evidence.

24Catuira vs CA

25. Erlinda Ramos vs CA

26 Lamsen vs people

27 Daubert vs Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical

28 People vs Carpo

29 Tortona vs Gregorio