Obergefell v.

Hodges - Ganto

Topic: Marriage – Concept and Nature

Doctrine: The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. Same-sex couples may exercise the
fundamental right to marry.

Facts: In this case, 14 same-sex couples were the plaintiffs, and James Obergefell was one of them. The defendant is the Director of
the Ohio Department of Health named Richard Hodges.

The States of Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee defined marriage as a union between one man and one woman and did not
recognize same-sex marriages. The plaintiffs confronted these laws under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. They challenge the constitutionality of those bans on same-sex marriage. They filed lawsuits in federal district court in
their home states. They argued that:

1) The State’s statute violated the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;
2) The Fourteenth Amendment required the States to allow same-sex marriage;
3) The Fourteenth Amendment recognized the validity of such marriages executed in other jurisdictions.

The federal district courts ruled in favor of the plaintiffs but the Court of Appeals consolidated the cases and reversed the rulings
consequently the plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.

Issue: Whether or not same-sex couples have the right to marry under the Fourteenth Amendment

Held: Yes. The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. Same-
sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry.

The fundamental liberties protected by the Due Process Clause extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and
autonomy, including intimate choices defining personal identity and beliefs. Courts must exercise reasoned judgment in identifying
interests of the person so fundamental that the State must accord them its respect.

Four principles and traditions demonstrate that the reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal force
to same-sex couples:
1. The right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.
2. The right to marry is fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the
committed individuals.
3. The right to marry is that it safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of child-rearing,
procreation, and education.
4. Marriage is a keystone of the nation’s social order.

The challenged laws burden the liberty of same-sex couples, and they abridge central precepts of equality. The marriage laws at
issue are in essence unequal: Same-sex couples are denied benefits afforded opposite-sex couples and are barred from exercising a
fundamental right. Especially against a long history of disapproval of their relationships, this denial works a grave and continuing
harm, serving to disrespect and subordinate gays and lesbians.

Republic v. Albios - Ishihara

Topic: Nature of the Contract of Marriage

Doctrine: No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State. It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This
Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily
nullified when no longer needed.
Facts: On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married in the Metropolitan Trial Court, Mandaluyong City
(MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588. On December 6. 2006, Albios filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer in the RTC. She reveals that they never lived as husband and wife because they
never had the intention of entering into a married state or complying with the essential marital obligations. They were even
immediately separated after their marriage. She claims their marriage was one made in jest, and therefore, null and void ab initio

Issue: Whether or not a marriage declared as sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and
inexistent

Held: The Court declared that the marriage between Fringer and Albios as valid and subsisting. Albios claims that the marriage was
made in jest, however, a marriage in jest is defined as a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real
intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound. Albios and
Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire
American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a valid
marriage can properly support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual
marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present. The avowed
purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that
the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely
entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided
by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law
declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law
are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.

Although fraud is a ground for declaring a marriage void, this situation is not one of the reasons allowed listed under Article 46 of the
Family Code. The Court refuses to allow the individuals to use marriage for their fraudulent schemes for their convenience and also
allow them to get out of it easily due to the inconvenient situation.

Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be declared void
would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to
qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous
individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial
institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient
situation.

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court
cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily
nullified when no longer needed.

Cabague v. Auxillo - Lee, Gerard

Topic: Breach of Promise to Marry

Doctrine: Parol evidence is not admissible to prove an agreement made upon the consideration of marriage other than a mutual
promise to marry.

Facts: Felipe Cabague and his son Geronimo sued the defendant Matias Auxilio and his daughter Socorro to recover damages
resulting from defendants' refusal to carry out the previously agreed marriage between Socorro and Geronimo. The complainant
allege hat defendants promised such marriage to plaintiffs, provided the latter would improve the defendants' house in Basud and
spend for the wedding feast and the needs of the bride and that relying upon such promises plaintiffs made the improvement and
spent P700.

Issue: WON that the transaction was not in writing can be proven in court?

Held: The understanding between the plaintiffs on one side and the defendants on the other, really involves two kinds of agreement.
The agreement between Felipe Cabague and the defendants in consideration of the marriage of Socorro and Geronimo and another,
the agreement between the two lovers, as "a mutual promise to marry”.
For breach of that mutual promise to marry, Geronimo may sue Socorro for damages. This is such action, and evidence of such
mutual promise is admissible. However Felipe Cabague's action may not prosper, because it is to enforce an agreement in
consideration of marriage. Evidently as to Felipe Cabague and Matias Auxilio this action could not be maintained on the theory of
"mutual promise to marry”. Neither, may it be regarded, as action by Felipe against Socorro "on a mutual promise to marry."

Domalagan v. Bolifer - Lee, Ivan

Topic: Breach of promise to marry

Doctrine: If the parties to an action, during the trial of the cause, make no objection to the admissibility of oral evidence to support
contracts like the one in question and permit the contract to be proved, by evidence other than a writing, it will be just as binding
upon the parties as if it had been reduced to writing.

Facts: Plaintiff alleged that, in the month of November, 1909, he and the defendant entered into a contract by virtue of the terms of
which he was to pay to the defendant the sum of P500 upon the marriage of his son Cipriano Domalagan with the daughter of the
defendant, Bonifacia Bolifer;

He completed his obligation under said contract by paying to the defendant the said sum of P500, together with the further sum of
P16 "as hansel or token of future marriage," that, notwithstanding said agreement, the said Bonifacia Bolifer, in the month of
August, 1910, was joined in lawful wedlock to Laureano Sisi.

He demanded of the defendant the return of the said sum of P516 together with the interest and damages; that the damages which
he suffered resulted from the fact that he, in order to raise said sum of P500, was obliged to sell certain real property belonging to
him, located in the Province of Bohol, at a great sacrifice.

Issue: WON the verbal contract entered into by the plaintiff and the defendant in regard to the delivery of the money by reason of a
prospective marriage is valid and effective

Ruling: YES
The appellant contends that a contract, such as the one relied upon by the plaintiff, in order to be valid, must be reduced to
writing. We have examined the record in vain to find that the defendant during the trial of the cause objected to any proof or any
part thereof, presented by the plaintiff, which showed or tended to show the existence of the alleged contract. That part of said
section 335 which the appellant relies upon for relief provides:

"In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action unless the same, or some note or
memorandum thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement
can not be received without the writing or secondary evidence of its contents:
"1.** * "2.** *
"3. An agreement made upon the consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry."

Said section (335) does not render oral contracts invalid. A contract may be valid and yet, by virtue of said section, the parties will
be unable to prove it.

Said section provides that the contract shall not be enforced by an action unless the same is evidenced by some note or
memorandum. Said section simply provides the method by which the contracts mentioned therein may be proved. It does not
declare that said contracts are invalid, which have not been reduced to writing, except perhaps those mentioned in paragraph 5
of said section (335). A contract may be a perfectly valid contract even though it is not clothed with the necessary form. If it is not
made in conformity with said section of course it cannot be proved, if proper objection is made. But a failure to except to
evidence presented in order to prove the contract, because it does not conform to the statute, is a waiver of the provisions of the
law.

If the parties to an action, during the trial of the cause, make no objection to the admissibility of oral evidence to support
contracts like the one in question and permit the contract to be proved, by evidence other than a writing, it will be just as binding
upon the parties as if it had been reduced to writing.
Hermosisima v. CA - Matanog

Topic: Marriage – Breach of Promise to Marry

Doctrine: That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia.

Facts: The complainant Soledad Cagigas is thirty six years old, a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent. The petitioner
Francisco Hermosisima is ten years younger than complainant, and an apprentice pilot. Intimacy developed between them and thus
sometime 1953 after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin. In February 1954, the woman advised the
man that she is pregnant whereupon the man promised to marry her. Their daughter Chris Hermosisima was born June 1954 in a
private clinic. However, subsequently the man married one Romanita Perez. Hence, Soledad filed a complaint against Francisco for
acknowledgement of her child as a natural child of the petitioner, as well as for support of said child and moral damages for alleged
breach of promise to marry. The CFI declared the child a natural daughter of the defendant, ordered Francisco to support the child
by giving a monthly alimony, awarded actual damages and moral damages. On appeal of the petitioner, the CA affirmed the assailed
decision however increased the amount for actual and moral damages.

Issue: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry.

Held: No. The Civil Code of Spain permitted the recovery of damages for breach of promise to marry (Articles 43 and 44 of said
Code). Inasmuch as these articles were never in force in the Philippines, this Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866), that
"the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property
advanced upon the faith of such promise".

The Code Commission charged with the drafting of the Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines deemed it best, however, to change
the law thereon. We quote from the report of the Code Commission on said Proposed Civil Code:

"Articles 43 and 44 of the Civil Code of 1889 refer to the promise of marriage. But these articles are not in
force in the Philippines. The subject is regulated in the proposed Civil Code not only as to the aspects treated of in
said articles but also in other particulars. It is advisable to furnish legislative solutions to some questions that might
arise relative to betrothal. Among the provisions proposed are: That authorizing the adjudication of moral
damages, in case of breach of promise of marriage, and that creating liability for causing a marriage engagement to
be broken."

Accordingly, provisions on breach of promise to marry were inserted in said Proposed Civil Code. These articles were, however,
eliminated in Congress. The reason therefor are set forth in the report of the corresponding Senate Committee, from which we
quote:
"The elimination of this Chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been
definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil., 866. The history of breach of promise suits in the
United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing
women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-
called Balm suits in many of the American States.

In the light of the clear and manifest intent of our law making body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry, the
award of moral damages made by the lower court is, accordingly, untenable.
Moreover, it was the woman who virtually seduced the man by surrendering herself to him because she a girl ten years older was
overwhelmed by her love for him, she wanted to bind him by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of
clergy.

Wassmer v. Velez -Mirhan

Topic: Breach of promise to marry

Doctrine: Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the
preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably
and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21
which provides in part “any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”

Facts: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love decided to get married on September 4, 1954.
Wassmer made the necessary preparations for the wedding including making and sending wedding invitations, buying of wedding
dress and other apparels, and other wedding necessities.

On Sept. 2, 1954, Velez left this note for his bride-to-be advising her that he will not be able to attend the wedding because his mom
was opposed to said wedding.

And one day before the wedding, he sent another message to Wassmer advising her that nothing has changed and that he will be
returning soon. Therefore, Velez did not appear and was not heard from again.

Wassmer sued Velez for damages and he failed to answer and was declared in default. On April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered
ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as
attorney’s fees; and the costs.

On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was because of fortuitous events. He further argued that
he cannot be held civilly liable for breaching his promise to marry Wassmer because there is no law upon which such an action may
be grounded. He also contested the award of exemplary and moral damages against him.

Issue: Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong in this case.

Held: This is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.
But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to
be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 which provides in part “any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”

And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an award for moral damages as properly awarded
by the lower court in this case. Further, the award of exemplary damages is also proper. Here, the circumstances of this case show
that Velez, in breaching his promise to Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless, and oppressive manner – this warrants the imposition of
exemplary damages against him.

Estremos v. Ephan - Ganto

Topic: Breach of promise to marry

Doctrine: In the Wassmer case, moral and exemplary damages were awarded considering the particular circumstances of the case.
However, it was the parties themselves who entered into the agreement to marry. In this case, the boy's parents to save the girl
from "shame" to their neighbors and friends agreed to connive Virgilio to Erlinda in a marriage celebration. We do not consider what
Virgilio did as covered by Wassmer v. Velez in view of the difference in facts and circumstances.

Facts: Virgilio Ephan and Erlinda Estremos were college sweethearts. They engaged in carnal knowledge several times, eventually
resulting in Erlinda finding herself 4 months pregnant. When the parents of both parties found out, they arranged for them to get
married. Virgilio protested that he was not ready but his father insisted. So they went to the Local Civil Registrar to apply for a
marriage license. The parents gave their parental consent.

10 days later, Virgilio sent a letter to Mrs. Estremos thru a pedicab driver, stating that he was not going through with the wedding
and that he was disappearing. Pertinent portions of said letter are as follows:
● “Now is not the right moment for me to marry. I want to marry when I am already prepared.”
● “I can already work if I want to work but do not have yet money for capital in a small business, this is one thing that stop me
from getting married.”
 ● “I would not like to ask money from my parents after I get married, and every person has a different principle and this is my
principle.”
● They had planned to get the baby aborted by a “Hilot” but since Erlinda was already 4 months on the way, he did not
continue because he “did not want to add more to [his] sins.”

When the date of the marriage came about, the house of Estremos where the wedding was to take place was empty. The Ephans did
not prepare for the celebration. Hence, this case was filed.

The CFI sentenced Virgilio to pay the sum of P20,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages. He is likewise
ordered to recognize the child as his natural child and while a minor, to support him at a rate of P50.00 a month to be increased as
circumstances will warrant. Virgilio must likewise reimburse plaintiffs the sum of P400.00 spent by them in the wedding
preparations. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the ruling in Wassmer v. Velez may be applied in this case to hold Virgilio Ephan liable for breach of promise
to marry

Held: No. Marriage being a lifelong arrangement, parties to it should be deliberative and mature, so that there being no divorce in
the Philippines, the parties will not live to regret it for a lifetime.

A mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. However, the Court made an exception in Wassmer v. Velez:

"Surely, this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable
wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity only to walk out of it
when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for
which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid."

In that case, moral and exemplary damages were awarded considering the particular circumstances of the case. However, it was the
parties themselves who entered into the agreement to marry. In this case, the boy's parents to save the girl from "shame" to their
neighbors and friends agreed to connive Virgilio to Erlinda in a marriage celebration. True that Miss Estremos bought a wedding
gown and spent P50.00 for her sandals and invited friends, but after being pregnant Erlinda was as much to blame.

In the libertarian conduct she exhibited considering that she is of the same age as Ephan, there having been no objection on her
part, she entered into the relationship with eyes wide open and of mutual passion. Why should Virgilio alone suffer? In this day and
age, male or female under the same circumstances and at the same ages as the pair here should be more responsible morally and
face the consequences of their conduct.

If the defendant has suddenly realized that marriage is not for him, We do not believe in making him go through a lifetime of
marriage which he felt in the first place, he was not prepared for. Making him go through with it against his will would in the long
run make him a bitter husband and consequently an inept father - factors which do not make for a good family life. We do not
consider what Virgilio did as covered by Wassmer v. Velez in view of the difference in facts and circumstances.

Tanjanco v. CA - Ishihara

Topic: Breach of Promise to marry (visavis seduction)

Doctrine: To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield
because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire,
there is no seduction

Facts: About December 1997, Apolonio courted Arceli both of adult age. That Apolonio expressed his undying love affection to
Araceli also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings, in consideration of Apolonio promise of marriage Araceli consented and
acceded to Apolonio’s pleas for carnal knowledge. Until December 1959, through his protestations of love and promises of marriage,
defendant succeeded in having carnal access to plaintiff, as a result of which the latter conceived a child. Araceli informed Apolonio
and pleaded with him to make good his promises of marriage but instead of honoring his promises and righting his wrong, Apolonio
stopped and refrained from seeing Araceli since about July 1959 has not visited her and to all intents and purposes has broken their
engagement and his promises.
Because of Apolonio’s refusal to marry Araceli, she filed a complaint for moral and exemplary damages and for the recognition of
their child and support. The CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action which the CA reversed, finding basis for damages
in article 21 of the Civil Code

Issue: Whether or not Apolonio is liable for damages

Held: No. The CA relied on the example of an Article 21 situation given during the Code Commission’s deliberation, but such was not
the point – the example set forth in the Code Commision’s memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. he
essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes
essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has
yielded. To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield
because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire,
there is no seduction.

The facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate
sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly
there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the
deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year,
without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut chart all sexual relations upon finding that
defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises.

Baksh v. CA - Lee, Gerard

Topic: Breach of Promise to Marry

Doctrine: The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. This notwithstanding, the said
Code contains a provision in Art. 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate
and punish in the statute books.

Facts: Petitioner Gashem Shookat Baksh was an Iranian citizen, exchange student taking a medical course in Dagupan City, who
courted private respondent Marilou Gonzales, and promised to marry her. On the condition that they would get married, she
reciprocated his love. They then set the marriage after the end of the school semester. He visited Marilou‘s parents to secure their
approval of marriage. In August 1987, he forced her to live with him, which she did. However, his attitude toward her changed after
a while; he would maltreat and even threatened to kill her, from which she sustained injuries. Upon confrontation with the barangay
captain, he repudiated their marriage agreement, saying that he was already married to someone living in Bacolod. Marilou then
filed for damages before the RTC. Baksh denied the accusations but asserted that he told her not to go to his place since he
discovered her stealing his money and passport. The RTC ruled in favor of Gonzales. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.

Issue: Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong.

Held: Mere breach of marriage is not punishable by law. However, since the respondent was proved to have a good moral character,
and that she had just let her virginity be taken away by the petitioner since the latter offered a promise of marriage, then she could
ask for payment for damages. Furthermore, since she let her lover, the petitioner, ―deflowered her since she believed that his
promise to marry was true, and not due to her carnal desire, then she could have her claims against the petitioner. Moreover, the
father of the respondent had already looked for pigs and chicken for the marriage reception and the sponsors for the marriage, and
then damages were caused by the petitioner against the respondents, which qualified the claims of the respondent against the
petitioner.

Panganiban v. Borromeo - Lee, Ivan

Topic: Marriage - Not subject to stipulation

Doctrine: Marriage is an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject
to stipulation.
Facts: Husband and wife Alejandro Pabro and Juana Mappala signed a contract before the notary public of Elias Borromeo. The
contract had been prepared by the municipal secretary of Naguilian, Isabela. Atty. Borromeo cooperated in the execution of the
document. He was quite knowledgeable about its contents, although he did not know it fully because of a difference in dialect. The
contract is an agreement between the husband and the wife which permitted the husband to take unto himself a concubine and the
wife to live in an adulterous relationship with another man, without opposition from either one of them.

Issue: Whether or not the contract is valid

Held: No. Although RPC allowed the offended party to give pardon to his or her offender spouse, this doesn’t mean that the purpose
of the legislature is to legalize adultery and concubinage. A notarized contract that permits concubinage and adultery is not judicially
recognizable. Although the consent of a party is a bar to the prosecution of the said crimes, the acts are still contrary to customs,
good morals and against the sanctity of marriage which is constitutionally provided for.

In re Santiago - Matanog

Topic: Marriage - Not subject to stipulation

Doctrine: Marriage is an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject
to stipulation.

Facts: In this administrative case, the Solicitor General charged the respondent Atty. Roque Santiago with malpractice and prayed
that disciplinary action be taken against him.

The respondent gave legal advice to one Ernesto Baniquit who was living separately from his wife for some nine consecutive years
and seeking to contract a second marriage. The respondent assured Baniquit that he could secure a separation from his wife and
marry again. The lawyer prepared a document (Exhibit A) stating that the contracting parties, husband and wife, were authorized to
marry again and at the same time giving the authorization to renounce or waive each member’s right against the party marrying.

The notary let the husband and wife execute and acknowledge the document and declared that they were again single and as such
could contract another marriage. Relying on this document, Baniquit contracted a second marriage.

The respondent, upon realizing his mistake, sent for the parties and let them sign the deed of cancellation (Exhibit C) a month later
but after the second marriage of Baniquit.

Issue: Whether or not the contract (Exhibit A) is valid.

Held: There is no doubt that the contract Exhibit A executed by and between the spouses Ernesto Baniquit and Soledad Colares upon
the advice of the respondent and prepared by the latter as a lawyer and acknowledged by him as a notary public is contrary to law,
moral, and tends to subvert the vital foundation of the family. The advice given by the respondent, the preparation and
acknowledgment by him of the contract constitute malpractice which justifies disbarment from the practice of law.

(NOTE: THE CASE IS VERY SHORT. NOTHING MUCH ABOUT MARRIAGE COZ ADMIN CASE SYA AGAINST THE LAWYER. DUN
NAGFOCUS YUNG RULING.)

Marriage separation should be sanctioned in the proper court and before the separation. (Not in the case.)

Selanova v. Mendoza - Mirhan

Topic: Marriage - Not subject to stipulation

Doctrine: Even before the approval of the Civil Code, the Supreme Court held that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal
partnership without judicial approval was void. An agreement between husband and wife which permits the husband to take a
concubine and for the wife to live in adulterous relationship with another man, is void. While adultery and concubinage are private
crimes, they still remain crimes, and a contract legalizing their commission is contrary to law, morals and public orders, and as a
consequence not judicially recognizable.

FACTS: On November 21, 1972, respondent judge Alejandro Mendoza prepared and ratified a document extrajudicially liquidating
the conjugal partnership of complainant Saturnino Selanova and his wife, Avelina Ceniza. The contract, signed by the spouses and
two witnesses before the culpable judge, divided the two pieces of conjugal assets of the spouses between them, and licensed either
spouse to commit any act of infidelity; and withdraw the complaint fro adultery or concubinage which each had filed against the
other.

ISSUE: Whether or not an extrajudicial agreement between spouses to dissolve their marriage is valid.

HELD: The agreement in question is void because it contravenes the provision under Art. 221 of the Civil Code, which state that the
following shall be void and of no effect: (1) any contract for personal separation between husband and wife; (2) every extrajudicial
agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute community of property
between husband and wife.

Even before the approval of the Civil Code, the Supreme Court held that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership
without judicial approval was void. An agreement between husband and wife which permits the husband to take a concubine and
for the wife to live in adulterous relationship with another man, is void. While adultery and concubinage are private crimes, they still
remain crimes, and a contract legalizing their commission is contrary to law, morals and public orders, and as a consequence not
judicially recognizable.

The judge having become a lawyer in 1948, who was in good faith and with honest intent to terminate the marital conflict, since he
was not aware of Art. 221 of the Civil Code, was merely reprimanded.

Lichauco-De Leon v. CA - Ganto

Topic: Marriage – Concept and Nature – Not subject to stipulation

Doctrine: The letter-agreement “for a peaceful and amicable termination of relations” was void because it contravened Article 221
of the Civil Code, which provides that certain contracts shall be void: (a) any contract for personal separation between husband and
wife; and (b) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the
absolute community of property between husband and wife.

Facts: Sylvia and Jose were married in October 1969 and had a daughter Susana about two years later. 3 years later, a de facto
separation between the spouses occurred due to “irreconcilable marital differences.” Sylvia went to the United States where she
obtained American citizenship. She filed a petition for dissolution of marriage with the Superior Court of California against Jose.
However, since Jose was then a Philippine resident and did not have assets in the United States, Sylvia held the divorce proceedings
in abeyance.

In 1977, Sylvia entered into a letter-agreement with her mother-in-law, Macaria (on her own behalf and as Jose’s representative). In
consideration for a peaceful and amicable termination of relations between Sylvia and Jose, Macaria agreed to deliver title to
several properties1 and respect the sole custody of Sylvia over Susana. For her part, Sylvia agreed to judicial separation of property
in accordance with Philippine law and to do whatever necessary to obtain this. She also agreed to amend her petition for divorce to
fit the letter-agreement and to permit Susana to spend 2-3 months with her father. The contract was agreed to be applicable both in
the Philippines and in the US, and an actionable document, the use of which the parties waived their rights to object to in the event
a legal issue arose relating to its validity.

Two weeks later, Sylvia and Jose filed a joint petition for judicial approval of dissolution of their conjugal partnership before the CFI
of Rizal. The trial court approved the petition.

1 A condominium suite in Ortigas, an apartment in Wack Wack, two Ayala lots in Alabang, a house in Wexford, San Francisco, P100,000.00, $35,000.00, and monthly
support for Susana.
Macaria then filed a complaint-in-intervention assailing the validity and legality of the letter-agreement which had for its purpose
the termination of marital relationship between Sylvia and Jose. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Macaria, declaring the
letter-agreement to be null and void and ordering Sylvia to return the money Macaria had already paid, plus legal interest, attorney’s
fees, costs, and an additional P100,000.00. The RTC affirmed the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of Jose and Sylvia as well as
the division of properties and assets provided in the petition, except insofar as the adjudication to Sylvia of properties belonging to
Macaria. Jose was still ordered to pay monthly support.

Sylvia appealed, insisting that the cause of the letter-agreement was not the termination of marital relations with Jose but merely
the termination of property relations. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.

Issue: Whether or not the letter-agreement between Sylvia and Macaria for the purpose of terminating the marital relations is valid
– No.

Held: The relevant portion of the letter-agreement reads as follows—

“In consideration for a peaceful and amicable termination of relations between the undersigned and her lawfully wedded
husband, Jose Vicente De Leon, your son, the following are agreed upon: xxx”

As found by the trial court, the parties contemplated not only to agree to a judicial separation of property, but likewise to continue
with divorce proceedings. Clearly, “termination of relations” did not just refer to property relations but marital relations in its
entirety.

Furthermore, there was no consideration for Macaria to get involved if this case only dealt with termination of conjugal property
relationship. On the other hand, if the case involved termination of marital relations entirely, Macaria had consideration to enter
into the letter-agreement, i.e. “to secure freedom for her son”, ensure that Sylvia pardoned Jose for adultery and concubinage, and
finally to “buy peace from Sylvia for myself and for the whole family…for the peaceful and amicable termination of marital
relationship between my son and Sylvia.”

Finally, the letter-agreement also provided that “It is the stated objective of this agreement that said divorce proceedings in the
United States will continue.”

Since the letter-agreement was for the purpose of terminating marital relations, the Court declared it null and void. As basis, the
Court cited Article 1306 and Article 1409 of the Civil Code. In this case, the letter-agreement was contrary to law, i.e. Article 52 of the
Civil Code, which provides that “marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution. Its nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulations.” The letter-agreement was also contrary to Filipino morals and public
policy.

Even if the letter-agreement referred only to the termination of property relations, the agreement was nevertheless void because it
contravened Article 221 of the Civil Code, which provides that certain contracts shall be void: (a) any contract for personal
separation between husband and wife; and (b) Every extrajudicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains or of the absolute community of property between husband and wife.

Republic v. Orbecido -Ishihara

Topic: Validity of Divorce obtained abroad under Art. 26

Facts: On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva were married in Lam-an, Ozamis City and were blessed with
a son and a daughter. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the U. S.bringing along their son and after a few years she was naturalized as an
American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido learned from his son – who was living with his wife in the States – that his wife had
remarried after obtaining her divorce decree. Thereafter, he filed a petition for authority to remarry with the trial court invoking par.
2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code.

Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur granted the petition of the respondent and
allowed him to remarry.
The Solicitor General’s motion for reconsideration was denied. In view of that, petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari of
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Herein petitioner raised the issue of the applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to the instant case.

Issue: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26(2).

Held: Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino
citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to
remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U. S. A.Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art. 26 does not apply
to the instant case.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the
time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to
remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the
“divorced” Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

However, since Cipriano was not able to prove as fact his wife’s naturalization he is still barred from remarrying.

Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to submit competent evidence showing his allegations that his naturalized
American wife had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried.

Garcia-Recio v. Recio - Lee, Gerard

Topic: Special rule in marriage (FC 26)

Doctrine: Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos
cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving
a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is
"validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are
both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.

Facts: A Filipino (Recio) was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen in 1987. In 1989, a decree of divorce purportedly
dissolving the marriage was issued by an Australian family court. On 1992, Recio became an Australian citizen and married a Filipina
(Garcia) in Cabanatuan City. The application for marriage license showed that Recio was single and a Filipino. Late 1995, couple
started living separately. On May 1996, conjugal assets were divided in accordance with Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.
On 1998, Garcia filed a complaint to nullify the marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that Recio had a subsisting marriage
when they were married and that she only became aware of this on November of the preceding year. Recio says otherwise and
claims that his first marriage was dissolved by the Australian divorce decree, was legally capacitated to marry, and that Garcia was
aware of this as early as 1993. On 1998, five years after the couple’s wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was
pending, respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Australia. RTC declared the marriage dissolved
because the Australian divorce had ended the marriage. Garcia filed current petition in the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the divorce between Recio and Samson was proven.

Held: The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family
court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent’s cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner
objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.
The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner’s qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded
weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner’s failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the
Family Court of Sydney, Australia. Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the
legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from
the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent
severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.

Republic v. Manalo - Lee, Ivan

Topic: Recognition of foreign divorce decree in the Philippines

Doctrine: blind adherence to Art. 15 should not be allowed if it will cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of
individuals whose rights are equally protected by the law.

Facts: Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national, Yoshino Minoro. Manalo filed a case for divorce in Japan and
after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011, was granted. Manalo now wants to cancel the entry of marriage
between her and Minoro from the Civil Registry and to be allowed to reuse her maiden surname, Manalo.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code,

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse incapacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law

Issues:
1. Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, can the Filipino spouse initiate the divorce instead of the foreign spouse?
2. Was the divorce obtained by Marelyn Manalo from Japan valid here in the Philippines?

Ruling:
1. Yes. The Court ruled that in interpreting the law, the intent should be taken into consideration. According to Justice Alicia Sempio-
Dy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, the aim of the amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of having the Filipino
deemed still married to a foreign spouse even though the latter is no longer married to the former. According to the Supreme Court,
the wording of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code requires only that there be a valid divorce obtained abroad and does not
discriminate as to who should file the divorce, i.e., whether it is the Filipino spouse or the foreign spouse. Also, even if assuming
arguendo that the provision should be interpreted that the divorce proceeding should be initiated by the foreign spouse, the Court
will not follow such interpretation since doing so would be contrary to the legislative intent of the law.

In the issue of the application of Article 15 of the Civil Code in this case, the Court ruled that even if Manalo should be bound by the
nationality principle, blind adherence to it should not be allowed if it will cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain
classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by the law.

The Court also ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code is in violation of the equal protection clause. They said that the limitation
provided by Article 26 is based on a superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification. The violation of the equal protection clause in
this case is shown by the discrimination against Filipino spouses who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding and Filipinos who
obtained a divorce decree because the foreign spouse had initiated the divorce proceedings. Their circumstances are alike, and
making a distinction between them as regards to the validity of the divorce decree obtained would give one undue favor and
unjustly discriminate against the other.

The Court also said that it is the State’s duty not only to strengthen the solidarity of the Filipino family but also to defend, among
others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of neglect abuse, cruelty, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development. The State cannot do this if the application of paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is limited to only those
foreign divorces initiated by the foreign spouse.

2. The Court cannot determine due to insufficient evidence.

It has been ruled that foreign laws must be proven. There are two basic types of divorces: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in
full force.

The presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice to lead the Court to believe that the decree is valid or constitutes
absolute divorce. The fact of divorce must still be proven. Therefore, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

In this case, the Court remanded the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant
Japanese law on divorce.

Juego v. Republic - Matanog

Topic: Special rule in marriage (FC 26)

Doctrine: The fact that it was the Filipino spouse who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted should not
affect the application nor remove him from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

Facts: Petitioner Stephen I. Juego-Sakai and Toshiharu Sakai got married on August 11, 2000 in Japan pursuant to the wedding rites
therein. After two (2) years, the parties, by agreement, obtained a divorce decree in said country dissolving their marriage.
Thereafter, on April 5, 2013, petitioner filed a Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 40, Camarines Norte. In its Decision dated October 9, 2014, the RTC granted the petition and recognized the divorce
between the parties as valid and effective under Philippine Laws.

On November 25, 2015, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

In an Amended Decision dated March 3, 2016, however, the CA revisited its findings and recalled and set aside
its previous decision.

Issue: Whether or not the 2nd paragraph of Article 26 is applicable.

Held: Yes. Despite the fact that petitioner participated in the divorce proceedings in Japan, and even if it is assumed that she
initiated the same, she must still be allowed to benefit from the exception provided under Paragraph 2 of Article 26. Consequently,
since her marriage to Toshiharu Sakai had already been dissolved by virtue of the divorce decree they obtained in Japan, thereby
capacitating Toshiharu to remarry, petitioner shall likewise have the capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

To interpret the word "obtained" to mean that the divorce proceeding must actually be initiated by the alien spouse would depart
from the true intent of the legislature and would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of Paragraph 2
of Article 26, which is, specifically, to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The
subject provision, therefore, should not make a distinction for a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same
place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.

Nevertheless, as similarly held in Manalo, We cannot yet grant petitioner's Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment for
she has yet to comply with certain guidelines before our courts may recognize the subject divorce decree and the effects thereof.

Dela Cruz v. Morisono - Mirhan

Topic: Special rule in marriage (FC 26)

Doctrine: Pursuant to the Manalo doctrine, foreign divorce decrees obtained to nullify marriages between a Filipino and an alien
citizen may already be recognized in this jurisdiction, regardless of who between the spouses initiated the divorce; provided, of
course, that the party petitioning for the recognition of such foreign divorce decree – presumably the Filipino citizen – must prove
the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.

Facts: Luzviminda was married to private respondent Ryoji Morisono (Ryoji) in Quezon City on December 8, 2009.3 Thereafter, they
lived together in Japan for one (1) year and three (3) months but were not blessed with a child. During their married life, they would
constantly quarrel mainly due to Ryoji's philandering ways, in addition to the fact that he was much older than Luzviminda.4 As such,
she and Ryoji submitted a "Divorce by Agreement" before the City Hall of Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya City, Japan, which was eventually
approved on January 17, 2012 and duly recorded with the Head of Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya City, Japan on July 1, 2012.5 In view of the
foregoing, she filed a petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree obtained by her and Ryoji6 before the RTC so that she
could cancel the surname of her former husband in her passport and for her to be able to marry again.7

After complying with the jurisdictional requirements, the RTC set the case for hearing. Since nobody appeared to oppose her petition
except the government, Luzviminda was allowed to present her evidence ex-parte. After the presentation and absent any objection
from the Public Prosecutor, Luzviminda's formal offer of evidence was admitted as proof of compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements, and as part of the testimony of the witnesses

Issue: Whether or not the RTC correctly denied Luzviminda's petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree she procured with
Ryoji.

Held: The petition is partly meritorious.

Pursuant to the Manalo doctrine, foreign divorce decrees obtained to nullify marriages between a Filipino and an alien citizen may
already be recognized in this jurisdiction, regardless of who between the spouses initiated the divorce; provided, of course, that the
party petitioning for the recognition of such foreign divorce decree – presumably the Filipino citizen – must prove the divorce as a
fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.

In this case, a plain reading of the RTC ruling shows that the denial of Luzviminda's petition to have her foreign divorce decree
recognized in this jurisdiction was anchored on the sole ground that she admittedly initiated the divorce proceedings which she, as a
Filipino citizen, was not allowed to do. In light of the doctrine laid down in Manalo, such ground relied upon by the RTC had been
rendered nugatory. However, the Court cannot just order the grant of Luzviminda's petition for recognition of the foreign divorce
decree, as Luzviminda has yet to prove the fact of her "Divorce by Agreement" obtained, in Nagoya City, Japan and its conformity
with prevailing Japanese laws on divorce. Notably, the RTC did not rule on such issues. Since these are questions which require an
examination of various factual matters, a remand to the court a quo is warranted.

Racho v. Tanaka - Ganto

Topic: Lex loci celebrationis (FC 26)

Doctrine: Judicial recognition of a foreign divorce requires that the national law of the foreign spouse and the divorce decree be
pleaded and proved as a fact before the Regional Trial Court. The Filipino spouse may be granted the capacity to remarry once our
courts find that the foreign divorce was validly obtained by the foreign spouse according to his or her national law, and that the
foreign spouse's national law considers the dissolution of the marital relationship to be absolute.

Facts: Racho and Seiichi Tanaka were married in 2001. They lived together for 9 years in Japan and did not have any children. Racho
alleged that in 2009, Tanaka filed for divorce and the divorce was granted. She secured a Divorce Certificate issued by the Japanese
Consulate in the Philippines and had it authenticated. She filed the Divorce Certificate with the Philippine Consulate General in
Tokyo, Japan, where she was informed that by reason of certain administrative changes, she was required to return to the
Philippines to report the documents for registration and to file the appropriate case for judicial recognition of divorce. She tried to
have the Divorce Certificate registered with the Civil Registry of Manila but was refused by the City Registrar since there was no
court order recognizing it. She filed a Petition for Judicial Determination and Declaration of Capacity to Marry.

The RTC rendered a Decision, finding that Racho failed to prove that Tanaka legally obtained a divorce. It stated that while she was
able to prove Tanaka's national law, the Divorce Certificate was not competent evidence since it was not the divorce decree itself.

Petitioner argues that under Japanese law, a divorce by agreement becomes effective upon notification, whether oral or written, by
both parties and by two (2) or more witnesses. She contends that the Divorce Certificate stating "Acceptance Certification of
Notification of Divorce issued by the Mayor of Fukaya City, Japan" is sufficient to prove that she and her husband have divorced by
agreement and have already effected notification of the divorce.

The OSG posits that a divorce by agreement is not the divorce contemplated in Article 26 of the Family Code. Considering that Article
26 states that divorce must be "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse," OSG posits that only the foreign spouse may initiate
divorce proceedings.

Issue: Whether or not the divorce agreement obtained by Racho and Tanaka in Japan capacitates Rancho, the Filipina spouse, to
remarry

Held: Yes. It would be inherently unjust for a Filipino woman to be prohibited by her own national laws from something that a
foreign law may allow. Parenthetically, the prohibition on Filipinos from participating in divorce proceedings will not be protecting
our own nationals.

Our laws should never be intended to put Filipinos at a disadvantage. Considering that the Constitution guarantees fundamental
equality, this Court should not tolerate an unfeeling and callous interpretation of laws. To rule that the foreign spouse may remarry,
while the Filipino may not, only contributes to the patriarchy. This interpretation encourages unequal partnerships and perpetuates
abuse m intimate relationships.

In any case, the Solicitor General's argument has already been resolved in Republic v. Manalo, where this Court held:

“Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce . . . validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad.
The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the
divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign
divorce proceeding. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure."

The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the
marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively
be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance
as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a
distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos
whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter's national law.”

Recent jurisprudence, therefore, holds that a foreign divorce may be recognized in this jurisdiction as long as it is validly obtained,
regardless of who among the spouses initiated the divorce proceedings.

By virtue of Article 26, 2nd paragraph of the Family Code and the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce, petitioner is
declared capacitated to remarry.

Pugeda v. Trias - Ishihara

Topic: Requisites of a Valid Marriage

Doctrine: As to marriages contracted subsequently, no proof other than a certificate of the record in the civil register shall be
admitted, unless such books have never been kept, or have disappeared, or the question arises in litigation, in which cases the
marriage may be proved by evidence of any kind. (Art. 53)

Facts: The plaintiff alleges that during the lifetime of the marriage between himself and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, they acquired
with conjugal partnership funds certain lands acquired from the Friar Lands Estate Administration and that upon the death of Maria,
he became co-owners of the properties with defendants and defendants managed the properties in trust as co-owners. He prays
that the properties be partitioned and ½ be given as his share.

(Trias and Viniegra) defendants denied the claims of the plaintiff and alleged that the properties had been inherited by them from
their deceased father Mariano Trias and Maria Ferrer and had been in possession and full enjoyment thereof for more than 10 years.
Defendants Trias also denied that plaintiff was married to Maria and introduced a photostatic copy of the month of January 1916,
which showed that no record of the alleged marriage existed therein.

Defendants Pugeda joined plaintiff in his claim that the properties were joint properties of the plaintiff and the defendants.

Issue: Whether or not a valid marriage exists between Fabian Pugeda and Maria Ferrer

Held: Yes. There is a valid marriage. the existence of marriage, plaintiff and his witness Ricardo Ricafrente testified that in the
afternoon of January 5, 1916, on the eve of Epiphany or Three Kings, plaintiff and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer went to the office of
the Justice of the Peace, who was then witness Ricardo Ricafrente, to ask the latter to marry them; that accordingly Ricafrente
celebrated the desired marriage in the presence of two witnesses one of whom was Santiago Salazar and another Amado Prudente,
deceased; that after the usual ceremony Ricafrente asked the parties to sign two copies of a marriage contract, and after the
witnesses had signed the same, he delivered one copy to the contracting parties and another to the President of the Sanitary
Division, which officer was at that time the keeper of the records of the civil register. Plaintiff and his witnesses explained that no
celebration of the marriage was held in spite of the prominence of the contracting parties because plaintiff was then busy
campaigning for the office of Member of the Provincial Board and Maria C. Ferrer was already on the family way.

The defendants denied the existence of the marriage and introduced a photostatic copy of the record of marriages in the
municipality of Rosario, Cavite, in the month of January 1916, which showed that no record of the alleged marriage existed therein;
but this absence was explained by the Justice of the Peace that perhaps the person who kept the register forgot to make an entry of
the marriage in the registry.

Other witnesses were introduced to the effect that after the marriage plaintiff lived in the house of Maria C. Ferrer, which was the
house of spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer. Evidence was also submitted to the effect that the first issue was baptized on
August 26, 1917 and the one who acted as sponsor was a sister-in-law of Maria C. Ferrer. The baptismal certificate submitted states
that the baptized child was the issue of the spouses Fabian Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer. The registry of said birth was also submitted
and it states that the father is Fabian Pugeda and the mother is Maria C. Ferrer.

It is also not denied that after the marriage, plaintiff cohabited with Maria until the death of the latter, publicly and openly as
husband and wife. Lastly, a document entitled “Project of Partition” was signed by the defendants themselves, which states ”x x x
Teofilo and Virginia, both surnamed Pugeda y Ferrer are the children of her second marriage with Fabian Pugeda.

NB: ART. 53 of the Civil Code provides: As to marriages contracted subsequently, no proof other than a certificate of the record in
the civil register shall be admitted, unless such books have never been kept, or have disappeared, or the question arises in litigation,
in which cases the marriage may be proved by evidence of any kind.

Sison v. Te Jay Li - Lee, Gerard

Topic: Essential Requisites - Legal Capacity

Doctrine: As a general Rule, the law will not look behind the appearance of consent which was clearly manifested to determine its
reality. However, mere words without any corresponding intention will not create the marriage relation. Notwithstanding that the
formalities indicating consent have been complied with, there is no valid marriage where the parties do not intend to enter into the
marriage.

Facts: In the morning of April 28, 1949, a civil wedding before Judge Delfin Hofilena of MC of Davao was held, in the afternoon,
spouses remarried in accordance with rites of Republic of China before Chinese Consul S.T. Mih in office in Davao City. Plaintiff‘s
testifies that the defendant never wooed her. And that the wedding arranged by father. The father whipped her often as she
opposed marriage and resorted to beating her. She ran away from home but found by father and promised she will not force her
again. But when the subject of marriage was renewed, they handed her a knife telling her to choose between her life or his. Because
of fear that her father might kill her she agreed to the marriage. Testimony corroborated by mother and Epifania del Rio, relative of
her mother. She lived with her husband in his parent‘s home but considered him a stranger since she doesn‘t love him. She was kept
a prisoner in the house; she never occupied the same bed with husband. They never had sexual intercourse except on June 1, 1949
forced by husband using a knife, she mustered courage to escape from her husband‘s home. Defendant claims that the marriages
were regular and legal, entered into marriage freely and voluntarily. The plaintiff was not kept a prisoner and plaintiff would
everyday ask her father in law to give her and her husband their own house and business. She slapped her only when she ran away
with P1200 and when asked where she came from she retorted it was none of his business. The CFI found the plaintiff‘s marriage
consummated only by intimidation and force and that plaintiff never for a moment acquiesced to the status of a wife to the
defendant and declared two marriages between them null and void; defendant ordered to return the P1200 and whatever personal
belongings the plaintiff had left in their house.

Issue: WON Juanita's consent to marriage was procured by force and intimidation

Held: Yes. While it is true that it is the policy of the law to maintain the marriage ties, when it is amply proved that the marriage is
effected through duress and intimidation and w/o the consent and against the will of one of the parties, there are no ties to be
preserved and the marriage should consequently be annulled. There was no voluntary cohabitation on the wife‘s part. Although
marriage effected by force or intimidation may be ratified and confirmed by cohabitation, it must be voluntary. It is clear from
Juanita's testimony that there was no voluntary cohabitation on her part and she never acquiesced to the status of wife.

Vilar v. Paraiso - Lee, Ivan

Topic: Authority of solemnizing officer

Doctrine: The purpose of registration is two-fold: to inform the public not only of the authority of the minister to discharge religious
functions , but equally to keep it informed of any change in his religious status. This information is necessary for the protection of
the public. This is especially so with regard to the authority to solemnized marriages, the registration of which is made by the law
mandatory.

FACTS: Vilar and Paraiso were candidates registered and voted for the office of mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija. After the canvass was
made, Paraiso was declared as the mayor duly elected. However, Vilar instituted a present quo warranto proceedings before the tial
court contending that Paraiso be declared ineligible to assume office because he was a minister of the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines (UCCP) and such was disqualified to be a candidate under section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code. He also
prayed that he be declared duly elected mayor of Rizal. Paraiso denied his ineligibility and claimed that he resigned as minister of
UCCP and that even if he was not eligible to the office, petitioner could not be declared elected to take his place. The lower court
favored Vilar but stated that the latter could not be declared as mayor. Both parties appealed before the CA. However, the court
elevated it to the Supreme Court because of the conflicting issues between Vilar and Paraiso.

ISSUE: Whether or not Paraiso actually resigned as minister of the UCCP (and, as such, an authorized solemnizing officer) before the
date of the elections

RULING: No. It appears that as of April 7, 1951, Paraiso applied for, and was issued, a license to solemnize marriages as minister of
the UCCP up to the end of April, 1952, and said license has never been cancelled, as neither the head of the UCCP nor Paraiso has
requested for its cancellation. Paraiso has also been publicly known as minister of the UCCP, but he has not attached to his
certificate of candidacy a copy of his alleged resignation as minister. The Court affirmed the finding of the trial court that Paraiso
never ceased as minister of the order to which he belonged and that the resignation he claims to have filed months before the date
of the elections is but a mere scheme to circumvent the prohibition of the law regarding ecclesiastics who desire to run for a
municipal office. Indeed, if respondent really and sincerely intended to resign, he should have resigned in due form and have the
acceptance of his resignation registered with the Bureau of Public Libraries. The purpose of registration is two-fold: to inform the
public not only of the authority of the minister to discharge religious functions , but equally to keep it informed of any change in his
religious status. This information is necessary for the protection of the public. This is especially so with regard to the authority to
solemnized marriages, the registration of which is made by the law mandatory.

Aranes v. Occiano - Matanog

Topic: Authority of the solemnizing officer (FC 7)

Doctrine: Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where
a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in
Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.

Facts: On Feb 17, 2000, Judge Salvador Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, solemnized
the marriage of Mercedita Mata Arañes and Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license at Nabua, Camarines Sur
which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
When Orobia died, the petitioner’s right to inherit the “vast properties” of Orobia was not recognized, because the marriage was a
null. She also cannot claim the pension of her husband who is a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.

Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations which
allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.

In his Comment, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the
marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000. He was assured that all the documents were complete, thus he agreed to solemnize
the marriage in his sala. However, on 17 February 2000, he acceded to the request of Arroyo that he solemnize the marriage in
Nabua because Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan. Before starting the ceremony
he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license, thus he refused to solemnize the marriage and
suggested its resetting to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of
provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He also feared that if he reset the
wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated
the necessity for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void.
Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When
they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the
marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Respondent judge vigorously
denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is valid despite the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the
hardships and embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.

On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 confessing that she filed the complaint out
of rage, and she realizes her own shortcomings. She attested that respondent judge initially refused to solemnize her marriage and
that it was because of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually solemnized the same.

From the records, petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for Marriage License on 5 January

2000 to be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it. Also, the Civil

Registrar General and the Local Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur has no records of the marriage. On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought
the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines
Sur for the issuance of her marriage license. The LCR informed the judge that they cannot issue the same due to the failure of Orobia
to submit the Death Certificate of his previous spouse.

Issue: Whether or not the Judge erred in solemnizing the marriage outside his jurisdiction and without the requisite marriage
license.

Held: Yes. Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of
inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. An appellate court
Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long
as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings
only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the
officiating official to administrative liability.

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of
solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly
solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. Marriage which
preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even
add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer
the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of
petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.

Martinez v. Tan - Mirhan

Topic: Marriage Ceremony; form

Doctrine: No particular form from the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare in the presence of the person
solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife.

Facts: It is claimed by the plaintiff that what took place before the justice of the peace, even admitting all that the witnesses for the
defendant testified to, did not constitute a legal marriage.Lower court ruled ruled in favor of the defendant Angel Tan that Tan and
Martinez were married on Sept. 25, 1907. Evidence supporting this were: document signed by plaintiff, testimony of defendant that
he and plaintiff appeared before the justice of peace along with their witnesses (by Ballori and Esmero), testimony of Esmero that
he, the defendant, plaintiff and Ballori appeared before the justice of peace and signed the document, the testimony of Ballori who
also testified to the same effect, and the testimony of the bailiff of court that defendant, appellant, justice of peace and two
witnesses were all present during the ceremony.

Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff and the defendant were married on the 25th day of September, 1907, before the justice of the
peace

Held: The judgment of the court below acquitting the defendant of the complaint is affirmed. The petition signed the plaintiff and
defendant contained a positive statement that they had mutually agreed to be married and they asked the justice of the peace to
solemnize the marriage. The document signed by the plaintiff, the defendant, and the justice of the peace, stated that they ratified
under oath, before the justice, the contents of the petition and that witnesses of the marriage were produced. A marriage took place
as shown by the certificate of the justice of the peace, signed by both contracting parties, which certificates gives rise to the
presumption that the officer authorized the marriage in due form, the parties before the justice of the peace declaring that they
took each other as husband and wife, unless the contrary is proved, such presumption being corroborated in this case by the
admission of the woman to the effect that she had contracted the marriage certified to in the document signed by her, which
admission can only mean the parties mutually agreed to unite in marriage when they appeared and signed the said document which
so states before the justice of the peace who authorized the same. It was proven that both the plaintiff and the defendant were able
to read and write the Spanish language, and that they knew the contents of the document which they signed; and under the
circumstances in this particular case were satisfied, and so hold, that what took place before the justice of the peace on this occasion
amounted to a legal marriage.

Madridejo v. De Leon - Ganto

Topic: Marriage certificate, FC 6, FC 22

Doctrine: Failure to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary does not invalidate a marriage, as long as in
the celebration thereof all requisites for its validity were present, the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate not being one
of said requisites.

NOTE: Guys, this is a super short case. Yan lang talaga yung given facts. The full text did not even mention specifically the nature
of the complaint before the CFI, just that it’s “to restore and deliver the ownership and possession of the property described.” (No
property was described!!)

Facts: Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez were married. After Eulogio died in 1915, Flaviana started living with Pedro Madridejo.
When Flaviana was at death’s door, the parish priest of Siniloan solemnized her marriage to Pedro . However, the priest was not
able to submit a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary. Flaviana died the following day. The CFI ruled that the
marriage between Pedro and Flaviana was valid.

Issue: Whether or not the failure of the priest to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary invalidates the
marriage between Pedro and Flaviana

Held: No. The mere fact that the parish priest who married Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez failed to send a copy of the marriage
certificate to the municipal secretary does not invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis, it not appearing that the essential requisites
required by law for its validity were lacking in the ceremony, and the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate is not one of
said essential requisites.
Macua v. Avenido - Ishihara

Topic: Marriage Certificate

Doctrine: While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and
exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the
marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his
parents. It is an error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate, no other proof of the fact can be accepted.

Facts: This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to the same man, now deceased.
Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on November 11, 1998 a Complaint forDeclaration of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina
Macua Vda. De Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that Tecla is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio).

Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on September 20, 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish
Priest of the said town. While a marriage certificate was recorded with the local civil registrar, the records of the LCR were destroyed
during World War II. Tecla and Eustaquio bgot four children, but Eustaquio left his family in 1954.

In 1979, Tecla learned that Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name of Peregrina, which marriage she claims must be
declared null and void for being bigamous. In support of her claim,, Tecla presented eyewitnesses to the ceremony, the birth
certificate of their children and certificates to the fact that the marriage certificate/records were destroyed.

Peregrina, on the other hand, averred that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on September 22, 1989, their
marriage having been celebrated on March 30, 1979 and showed the marriage contract between her and Eustaquio.

RTC ruled in favor of Peregrina; relied on Tecla’s failure to present her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. Without such certificate,
ETC considered as useless the certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon over the lack of records.

The CA, on appeal, ruled in favor of Tecla. It held that there was a presumption of lawful marriage between Tecla and Eustaquio as
they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot four children. Such presumption, supported by documentary evidence
consisting of the same Certifications disregarded by the RTC, and testimonial evidence created sufficient proof of the fact of
Marriage. The CA found that its appreciation of the evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.

Issue: Whether or not the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate

Held: While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive
evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage
certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.
It is an error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate, no other proof of the fact can be accepted.

In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO was established by the testimonial evidence
furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be present during the marriage ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a living witness to the
event. The loss was shown by the certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These are relevant, competent and
admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented,
secondary evidence – testimonial and documentary – may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.

The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage. The very intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case,
to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our
Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper – praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage.

Keuppers v. Murcia - Lee, Gerard

Topic: Effect of Irregularity

Doctrine: A municipal trial judge who solemnizes a marriage outside of his territorial jurisdiction violates Article 7 of the Family
Code, and is guilty of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. He should be properly sanctioned.

Facts: That on May 12, 2008, Rosalinda Keuppers and her husband, Peter Keuppers, went to the Local Civil Registrar's Office (LCRO)
of Davao City to apply for a marriage license because they wanted to get married before Peter's departure so that he could bring the
marriage certificate with him back to Germany; that Julie Gasatan, an employee of the LCRO, explained the process for securing the
license, and apprised them that it would be virtually impossible to solemnize their marriage before May 22, 2008 because of the
requirement for the mandatory 10-day posting of the application for the marriage license; that Gasatan then handed a note with the
advice for the couple to proceed to the office of DLS Travel and Tours Corporation (DLS Travel and Tours) in Sandawa, Matina, Davao
City to look for a person who might be able to help the couple; that in the office of the DLS Travel and Tours, Lorna Siega, the owner,
told the couple that the marriage processing fees charged by her office would be higher than the P600.00 fee collected in the City
Hall in Davao City; that Siega assured that the couple would immediately get the original as well as the National Statistics Office
(NSO) copies of the marriage certificate; that Siega then required the couple to fill up forms but instructed the couple to leave the
spaces provided for the address and other information blank; that the couple paid P15,750.00 to Siega purportedly to cover the fees
of the solemnizing Judge, the certification fee, the security fee, the City Hall fee, the service fee and the passport fee; and that Siega
later on confirmed to the couple the date, time and place of the solemnization of the marriage. According to the complainant,
respondent Judge solemnized the marriage on May 19, 2008 in the premises of the DLS Travel and Tours in Davao City; that the staff
of the DLS Travel and Tours later on handed to the couple the copy of the marriage certificate for their signatures; that on the
following day, May 20, 2008, the couple returned to the DLS Travel and Tours to pick up the documents as promised by Siega; that
the couple was surprised to find erroneous entries in the marriage certificate as well as on the application for marriage license,
specifically: (a) the certificate stating "Office of the MTCC Judge, Island Garden City of Samal" as the place of the solmenization of the
marriage although the marriage had been solemnized in the office of the DLS Travel and Tours in Davao City; (b) the statement in the
application for marriage license that she and her husband had applied for the marriage license in Sta. Cruz, Davao City on May 8,
2008 although they had accomplished their application on May 12, 2008 in the office of the DLS Travel and Tours; and (c) the
statement in their application for marriage license on having appeared before Mario Tizon, the Civil Registrar of Sta. Cruz, Davao del
Sur, which was untrue.

Upon the recommendation of the OCA, the Court referred the complaint to the Court of Appeals in Cagayan de Oro City for
investigation, report and recommendation. The undersigned Investigating Officer (Justice Siempo-Dy), in the course of the
investigation, has been hurled with overwhelming evidence that the marriage between complainant and Peter Keuppers was held
only in the premises of DLS Travel and Tours Corporation, Sandawa Road, Matina, Davao City, and was solemnized by respondent
judge. Several witnesses for complainant affirmed the same. More importantly, this Office has conducted an ocular inspection of the
premises of DLS Travel and Tours. During said inspection, it was confirmed that the premises where respondent is seen solemnizing
a wedding, is the same place subject of the ocular inspection. Hence, the DLS Travel and Tours building is, in fact, the actual venue of
complainant's wedding. It is also of equal importance to note that respondent admitted that he indeed solemnized the subject
marriage outside of his jurisdiction.

Issue: Was respondent Judge liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service?

Held: Yes. The respondent judge is guilty of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for
solemnizing the marriage of the complainant and her husband outside his territorial jurisdiction, and in the office premises of the
DLS Tour and Travel in Davao City. Such place of solemnization was a blatant violation of Article 7 of the Family Code, which
pertinently provides:

Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;

Furthermore, in solemnizing the marriage of the complainant and her husband in the office premises of the DLS Tour and Travel in
Davao City despite the foregoing provision of the Family Code, respondent Judge flagrantly violated the spirit of the law. Article 8 of
the Family Code disallows solemnizing the marriage in a venue other than the judge's courtroom or chambers, viz.:

Article. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple,
or in the office the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages
contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both of the parties request
the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn
statement to that effect.

Respondent Judge's explanation of having done so only out of pity for the complainant after she had supposedly claimed that her
German fiancé was soon returning to Germany and wanted to bring with him the certified copy of the marriage certificate did not
diminish his liability, but instead highlighted his dismissive and cavalier attitude towards express statutory requirements instituted to
secure the solemnization of marriages from abuse. By agreeing to solemnize the marriage outside of his territorial jurisdiction and at
a place that had nothing to do with the performance of his duties as a Municipal Trial Judge, he demeaned and cheapened the
inviolable social institution of marriage. Article 8 of the Family Code contains the limiting phrase and not elsewhere, which
emphasizes that the place of the solemnization of the marriage by a judge like him should only be in his office or courtroom. Indeed,
the limiting phrase highlighted the nature and status of the marriage of the complainant and her husband as "a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman," and as "the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation." The only exceptions to the limitation are
when the marriage was to be contracted on the point of death of one or both of the complainant and her husband, or in a remote
place in accordance with Article 29 of the Family Code, or where both of the complainant and her husband had requested him as the
solemnizing officer in writing to solemnize the marriage at a house or place designated by them in their sworn statement to that
effect.

Palma v. Omelio - Lee, Ivan

Topic: Duties of a Solemnizing Officer

Doctrine: "No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State." Marriage should not be trivialized, especially by the solemnizing officers themselves.

Facts:

1. Both respondents Judge Murcia and Judge Omelio solemnized the marriage of Julius Regor M. Echevarria and Khristine Marie D.
Duo. But it is respondent Judge Murcia whose name and signature appear in the Certificate of Marriage while there are only pictures
to show that respondent Judge George E. Omelio also married the couple.

2. Per Certificate of Marriage, respondent Judge Murcia officiated the marriage in MTCC, Branch 2 Babak District, Island Garden City
of Samal, Davao del Norte on February 28, 2008 at 5:30 P.M.

3. Respondent Judge Omelio re-enacted the marriage of Regor and Khristine Marie, in the residence of the Echevarrias, x x x in
Monte Maria Village, Catalunan Grande, Davao City, on February 29, 2008 at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening. x x x

Based on the above facts, it cannot be ascertained if respondent Judge Murcia and his Clerk of Court, respondent Ma. Florida C.
Omelio falsified the Certificate of Marriage.

Issue: WON the marriage was a “sham”

Held: YES. Records show that Judge Murcia and Judge Omelio both violated AO 125- 2007. Although both judges were clothed with
authority to solemnize marriages, in this instance however, they overstepped the bounds of their authority.

As correctly found by the OCA, Judge Murcia affixed his signature in the Marriage Contract of Julius and Khristine Without actually
solemnizing their marriage. Judge Murcia's claim that the contracting parties personally appeared before him was belied by the
groom himself, Julius. When confronted by the investigating team from OCA, Julius denied knowing or appearing before Judge
Murcia; moreover, he asserted that he was not married in the sala of Judge Murcia in the Island Garden City of Samal, but at their
residence in Davao City. Julius also narrated that it was Judge Omelio, and not Judge Murcia, who acted as the solemnizing officer.
Julius even presented pictures which were taken during the wedding at their residence showing Judge Omelio as the solemnizing
officer.

What further militates against Judge Murcia's version was the fact that he claimed in his Comment to have examined "all x x x
document[s] in support for a valid marriage under the Family Code and the corresponding receipt of payment for marriage
solemnization;" he also attested that "all the documents were in place and x x x the appropriate fees were paid." However, during
the hearing conducted by the Investigating Justice, Judge Murcia could no longer recall whether there was a receipt issued by the
court to the payment of the solemnization fee. In addition, it was unearthed during the proceedings that no solemnization fee was
received by the court, no receipt was issued corresponding therefor, and no remittance to the Judiciary Development Fund
pertaining to said solemnization fee was made. In fine, it was established that by signing the Certificate of Marriage, Judge Murcia
made it appear that he solemnized the marriage of Julius and Khristine without the contracting parties and their witnesses
personally appearing before him and sans payment of the solemnization fee.
AO 125-2007 dated August 9, 2007 provided for the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary
and laid down the rules "to enable the solemnizing authorities of the Judiciary to secure and safeguard the sanctity of marriage
as a social institution."30 The pertinent portions of AO 125-2007 provide as follows:

Sec. 3. Venue of marriage ceremony solemnized by Judges. - As a general rule, a marriage shall be solemnized
publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court except in the following instances:

xxxx

b. A marriage where both parties submit a written request to the solemnizing officer that the marriage be
solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to this effect.

Sec. 4. Duties of solemnizing officer before the performance of marriage ceremony. - Before performing the
marriage ceremony, the solemnizing officer shall:

a. Ensure that the parties appear personally and are the same contracting parties to the marriage;

b. Personally interview the contracting parties and examine the documents submitted to ascertain if there is
compliance with the essential and formal requisites of marriage under the Family Code; and

xxxx

Sec. 6. Duty of solemnizing officer during the solemnization of the marriage. - The solemnizing officer shall require
the contracting parties to personally declare before him and in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal
age that the said parties take each other as husband and wife.

Sec. 7. Duties of solemnizing officer after solemnization of the marriage. - After performing the marriage ceremony,
the solemnizing officer shall:

a. Ensure that the marriage certificate is properly accomplished and has the complete entries, x x x;

b. See to it that the marriage is properly documented x x x

xxxx

Sec. 9. Recording of marriages solemnized and safekeeping of documents. - a. The solemnizing officer shall cause to
be kept in the court a record book of all marriages solemnized. x x x

b. The solemnizing officer shall cause to be filed in the court the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the
original of the marriage license, x x x when applicable, the affidavit of the contracting parties regarding the request
for change in the venue for the marriage. All documents pertaining to a marriage shall be kept in one file x x x.

Sec. 18. Fees for the Solemnization of Marriage. -For the performance of marriage ceremony and issuance of
marriage certificate and subject to further provisions of AM No. 04-2-04-SC (16 August 2004) the legal fees in the
following amounts shall be collected:

xxxx

(c) For marriages solemnized by Judges of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal
Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts and Shari’a Circuit Courts- ‘Three hundred (₱12300.00) pesos.

xxxx

Sec. 19. Payment of legal tees in Philippine legal tender. - All fees shall be x x x properly officially receipted.

Abbas v. Abbas - Matanog

Topic: Marriage License

Doctrine: As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage license is
an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.

Facts: Syed, a Pakistani citizen, and Gloria, a Filipino citizen, met in Taiwan in 1991. He arrived in the Philippines and on January 9,
1993, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-law’s residence, in Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law
arrived with two men. He was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the
Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said ceremony where he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he only found
out that it was a marriage contract when Gloria told him. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a
marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area.

In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license. The Municipal Civil
Registrar, issued a certification stating that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted was the
number of another marriage license issued to another couple. He also alleged that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001
and 2002.

On the other hand, Gloria presented her own side. Rev. Mario Dauz, a minister of the Gospel and a brgy captain stated that he is
authorized to solemnize marriage and that he was doing it since 1982 and he is familiar with the requirements. There were two
witnesses, one of them was Atty Sanchez who handed him the marriage license on the day of the wedding. Gloria testified that a
certain Qualin went to their house and said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after several days returned with an
application for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the marriage license, they gave
the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria also alleged that she has a daughter with Syed.
She filed a bigamy case because Syed married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura.

RTC’s ruling: no marriage license, neither of the parties was a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Void ab initio.
CA’s ruling: granted Gloria’s appeal. Marriage is valid and subsisting.

Issue: Whether or not the marriage license is valid.

Held: No. Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as
well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned
to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that he
requested certification that no such license was issued.

It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She failed to explain why the marriage
license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for the
license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses she
presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her mother,
Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license, having admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty.
Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in securing the license, admitted not
knowing where the license came from. The task of applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have
testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the
testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys
probative value.

It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of the marriage license were submitted to
the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have simply been secured from that office and
submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there was a valid marriage
license issued for her and Syed.

This marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without a marriage license, is
void ab initio. As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives are less than pure,
that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that
they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot
be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal
requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.

Borja v. Sanchez - Mirhan

Topic: Marriage License; Investigation of Impediments

Doctrine: Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is
merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a
subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.

FACTS: Complainant Herminia, the wife of late David Manzano, charged Judge Sanchez with gross ignorance of the law, for
solemnizing the marriage between her husband and one Luzviminda Payao. The complaint was filed with the Office of Court
Administration on May 12, 1999. Herminia said that she was Manzano’s lawful wife, having been married to him on May 21, 1966
and having borne him four children.
She claimed that Judge Sanchez ought to have known that the marriage he officiated was void and bigamous since their marriage
contract already stated that both parties were separated.
Judge Sanchez didn’t know of Manzano’s marriage and only knew that the two were living together for seven years without the
benefit of a marriage. He prayed for the complaint to be dismissed.
The Office of Court Administration found him guilty of gross ignorance of the law and was fined P2,000.
On October 25, 2000, upon resolution of this case in the SC, Judge Sanchez submitted two affidavits of the late Manzano and Payao
where they said that they were both married, but had left their families. Judge said this was his basis in solemnizing their marriage.

LAW: Article 34 of the Family Code

ISSUE: WON the marriage between Manzano and Payao, officiated by Judge Sanchez, was legal, as per Art. 34 of the Family Code

RATIO: No. According to the law, the following requisites must be present for the legal ratification of marital cohabitation:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are without legal
impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that
he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.
Not all were present in this case.
a.) A subsisting previous marriage is a legal impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. Judge
Sanchez cannot deny knowledge of Manzano and Payao’s previous marriage since it was stated in their separate affidavits
sworn and was also indicated in their marriage contract.
b.) The fact that Manzano and Payao were living apart from their spouses for a long time is immaterial. Neither legal
separation nor de facto separation, as in this case, can sever marriage bonds.
c.) The same applies to free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years. It cannot be used by the
Judge as the basis for solemnizing a subsequent marriage.

VERDICT: Recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be
imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000

Ninal v. Bayadog - Ganto

Topic: Marriage license

Doctrine: The five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing
factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of
the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no third party was involved at any time
within the 5 years and continuity – that is unbroken.
At the time of their marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior
to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20
months had elapsed.

Facts: Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones in 1974. Out of their marriage, the petitioners were born. Teodulfa was shot by
Pepito resulting in her death in 1985. One year and 8 months after, Pepito married Norma Bayadog without any marriage license. In
lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and
were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.

In 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage
of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license.

Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action. The RTC dismissed the petition, finding that
the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the issues.

Issue: Whether or not the marriage between Pepito and Norma is exempt from the license requirement on account of their five-year
cohabitation

Held: No. The marriage between Pepito and Norma Bayadog is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage
license, therefore, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

One instance wherein a marriage license is dispensed with refers to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together
and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.

The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license.
The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status.

The five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the
special contract of marriage to validate the union. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage
and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity- meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5
years and continuity - that is unbroken.

At the time of their marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior
to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20
months had elapsed.

Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with
each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the
absence of the marriage contract.

Republic v. Albios (supra but diff issue) - Ishihara

(See above, ang issue kasi dito if may requisite consent)

Facts: On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588. On
December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that
immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of
entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made
in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio. She stated that in consideration of $2,000.00, Fringer will help her process her
application for American citizenship. The RTC ruled that their marriage is one entered into in jest and therefore void. On appeal by
the OSG, the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Issue: Whether a marriage contracted into by two individuals for the sole purpose of acquiring Amercian citizenship in consideration
of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent.
Held: The marriage is valid. Under said Article 2 (of the Family Code), for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made
in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter
into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent
under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence.

Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and
both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.

Their understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.

Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated
nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and
the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was
freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly
demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding
of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.