EVIDENCE: WEEK 5, DAY 1 CASES
G.R. No. 166403             November 2, 2006
BENZON O. ALDEMITA,  Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF MELQUIADES SILVA, represented by RAMON G. VILLORDON,
JR.,  Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
questioning the Decision1 dated November 22, 2004 promulgated by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 72445, which affirmed in toto the Decision2 dated August
20, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 11, Cebu City, docketed as Civil Case
No. CEB-23011.
This case originated from a Complaint for Quieting of Title filed with the RTC by the Heirs
of Melquiades Silva, represented by Ramon G. Villordon, Jr., (respondents) on November
18, 1998 against the Heirs of Dionisia Vda. De Zabate (Heirs of Vda. De Zabate),
represented by Emelia Deiparine and Benzon O. Aldemita (petitioner).
The antecedent facts of the case, as found by the RTC and upheld by the CA, are as
follows:
On November 25, 1998, a verified complaint dated November 18, 1998 for Quieting of
Title was filed by the [respondents] through counsel with the Regional Trial Court, Cebu
City docketed therein as Civil Case No. CEB-23011 and was assigned through raffle to
Branch 11 thereof.
On January 14, 1999, a verified Answer With Special And Affirmative Defenses, Counter-
claim and Cross-claim dated January 13, 1999 was filed by [petitioner] Benzon O.
Aldemita through counsel with the court a quo.
On April 22, 1999, an Urgent Motion To Declare Defendants Roger Deiparine and
Josephine Deiparine In Default And A Motion To Set Case For Pre-Trial dated April 20,
1999 was filed by the petitioners through counsel after the above-named respondents
were substituted for respondent Emilia Deiparine who died last September 15, 1998 per
Order dated February 1, 1999, which motion was granted by the public respondent court
per Order dated April 30, 1999 by declaring Roger Deiparine and Josephine Deiparine in
default and setting the case for Pre-trial.
On August 12, 1999, a Pre-trial was conducted by the trial court wherein the parties
made the following stipulations of facts and/or admissions, to wit:
1) [Petitioner] Benzon O. Aldemita admitted that Lot 11330 of Pcs-945 located
in Minglanilla, Cebu has been registered in the name of Melquiades Silva as
shown by Transfer Certificate No. T-18993 of the Registry of Deeds for the
Province of Cebu (Exhibit A) and has been covered by Tax Declaration No.
25845-R also in the name of Melquiades Silva (Exhibit B);
2) [Petitioner] Benzon O. Aldemita also admitted that the [respondents] in this
case have been the ones in actual physical possession of Lot 11330 of Pcs-945
except a portion thereof with an area of 2,000 square meters which said
[petitioner] is claiming to be possessed by him;
3) [Petitioner] Aldemita admitted, too, that a document denominated as "Kalig-
onan sa Palit" (Exhibit C) which was purportedly executed on March 15, 1949
by Melquiades Silva in favor of Dionisia Vda. De Zabate involving the land in
question is actually a forged document. However, [petitioner] contended that
another document denominated as "Kalig-onan sa Panagpalit nga Dayon"
(Exhibit 1) was executed by Melquiades Silva in favor of Dionisia Vda. De
Zabate and that thereafter this was confirmed by Proferia Silva and Emeliana
Zabate Paran in a Deed of Confirmation of Previous Deed of Sale executed on
PFebruary 20, 1979 (Exhibit 2).
On October 25, 1999 per agreement of the parties, the trial court issued an order
appointing the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office VII as commissioner of the court
for the purpose of determining whether the purported signature of Melquiades Silva in
Exhibit 1 and that of Porferia Silva in Exhibit 2 for the answering defendant Benzon O.
Aldemita are really those of Melquiades Silva and Porferia Silva.
On February 10, 2000, a Questioned Document Report 3 No. 013-2000 by the Document
Examiner Romeo Oliva Varona was submitted to the court.
On March 6, 2000 an Order of even date was issued by the court giving respondent
Aldemita fifteen (15) days to submit his comment on the Questioned Document Report
No. 013-2000 which he did by submitting to the court his Comment, etc. dated April 3,
2000.
On September 15, 2000, an order was issued by the trial court wherein it considered the
Questioned Document Report 013-2000 as the findings of fact duly established in the
case.
On January 23, 2001 per manifestation of the parties through their respective counsel
that they would submit the case for decision without need of trial especially that the
findings embodied in the commissioner’s report have already been considered as the
findings of facts in this case. Nonetheless, the trial court gives the parties fifteen (15)
days within which to file their respective memorandum if they so desire and thereafter
the case was considered as submitted for decision. 4
On February 8, 2001, petitioner Aldemita filed a Position Paper with the RTC. On March
24, 2001, Atty. Manuel S. Paradela, then counsel of petitioner Aldemita, filed a Motion To
Withdraw As Counsel. Immediately thereafter, or on April 2, 2001, the new counsel for
petitioner Aldemita, Atty. Rodolfo A. Ugang, Sr., entered his appearance. On April 6, 2001,
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petitioner Aldemita, through his newly retained counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss for
lack of cause of action. The Motion averred in main that the respondents should first be
declared as heirs of Melquiades Silva in a special proceeding before they can be
considered as real parties-in-interest to institute the action in this case. In an Order
dated April 20, 2001, the RTC denied the Motion, thus:
Filed with the Court by the defendant Benzon O. Aldemita is a motion to dismiss this case
on the ground of plaintiffs’ lack of cause of action.
The Court finds the motion to be not impressed with merit. As it may not be amiss to
recall, this case was already considered as submitted to the Court for decision way back
on February 8, 2001 pursuant to the order issued in this case on January 23, 2001. The
aforementioned motion to dismiss was filed only on April 6, 2001. Apparently, the said
motion was not filed within the proper time, i.e., within the time for filing the answer to
the complaint as provided Section 1 of Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. A
motion to dismiss cannot be filed anytime except if the grounds therefor are lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, pendency of another action between the same
parties for the same cause and bar by prior judgment or statute of limitations. The
motion filed in this case is not on account of any of the said exceptional three grounds.
IN VIEW THEREOF, the Court hereby denies the aforementioned motion to dismiss.
SO ORDERED.5
The petitioner, again through his new counsel, filed a Motion for Reconsideration on June
4, 2001. In an Order dated August 17, 2001, the RTC denied the motion. This Order
reads:
Anent the motion filed by the defendant Benzon O. Aldemita for reconsideration of the
order issued in this case on April 20, 2001, the Court finds it to be devoid of merit. There
is no gainsaying the fact that the late Melquiades Silva was the registered owner of Lot
No. 1130 of Pcs-945, Talisay-Minglanilla estate, as shown by TCT No. T-18993 of the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cebu. Thus, if there are claims which are prejudicial
to the title to the said land, thereby casting a cloud of doubt on its authenticity and
indefeasibility, the heirs of Melquiades Silva are certainly the real parties in interest who
could institute an action for quieting of title. It is therefore surprising why the defendant
Benzon O. Aldemita is now contending very much belatedly that the plaintiffs are not real
parties in interest in the case at bench. The invoking by the said defendant-movant of the
ruling in Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario, 304 SCRA 18, is
misplaced. Here in this case, the heirs of Melquiades Silva are significantly suing
through the administrator of the estate of their decedent. In other words, there is
already an on-going special proceeding wherein the declaration of heirship of the
plaintiffs is being sought. So, the defendant Benzon O. Aldemita should not insist
that the plaintiffs should first be declared as heirs of Melquiades Silva before they
can be considered as real parties in interest to institute the action in this case.
Things have already been placed in their proper perspectives. (Emphasis supplied)
EVIDENCE: WEEK 5, DAY 1 CASES
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Court hereby denies the
aforementioned motion for reconsideration.
SO ORDERED.6
On August 20, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by the
Court in this case:
a. Declaring the [respondents] as the rightful and absolute owners of Lot No.
11330 of Pcs-945 (Talisay-Minglanilla Estate) located in Vito, Minglanilla, Cebu;
b. Declaring as null and void and without force and effect the documents
denominated as "Kalig-onan Sa Palit" purportedly executed by Melquiades Silva
on March 15, 1949 in favor of Dionisia Vda. de Zabate (Exhibit C), "Kalig-onan
sa Panagpalit nga Dayon" which was purportedly executed by Melquiades de
Silva on March 15, 1949 in favor of Dionisia Vda. de Zabate (Exhibit 1), Deed of
Confirmation of Previous Deed of Sale which was purportedly executed by
Porferia de Silva on February 20, 1979 in favor Emiliana Zabate Paran (Exhibit
2) and the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Emilia Deiparine on April 26,
1996 in favor of [petitioner] Benzon O. Aldemita (Exhibit 3);
c. Ordering the [Heirs of Vda. De Zabate and petitioner] to respect and not
disturb the [respondents’] title to and ownership of Lot No. 11330 of Pcs-945;
and
d. Ordering [petitioner] Benzon O. Aldemita to vacate the premises of Lot No.
11330 of Pcs-945.
IT IS SO ORDERED.7
The RTC held that the respondents, as heirs of Melquiades Silva who appears to be the
registered owner under the TCT, have a cause of action under Article 476 8 of the Civil
Code; that the petitioner expressly admitted in his Answer to the petition and also during
pre-trial that the "Kalig-onan sa Palit"9 is "a true and real forgery;" that the "Kalig-onan
sa Panagpalit nga Dayon"10 and the Deed of Confirmation of Previous Deed of Sale 11 were
likewise found by the PNP Crime Laboratory Office to be forged documents; that, in view
of these reasons, the said documents cannot be the sources of rights; that the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated April 26, 1996 executed by Emilia Deiparine in favor of petitioner
Aldemita has no leg to stand on since, as the saying goes, the spring cannot rise higher
than its source; and that the respondents, as admitted by petitioner Aldemita, have been
the ones in actual possession of the land in question.
Petitioner Aldemita appealed to the CA claiming that the RTC erred:
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I.
In declaring the [respondents] as the rightful and absolute owners of Lot No.
11330 of Pcs-945 (Talisay-Minglanilla Estate) located in Vito, Minglanilla, Cebu,
Philippines;
II.
In declaring as null and void and without force and effect the documents
denominated as "Kalig-onan sa Panag-palit nga Dayon" (Deed of Absolute Sale),
which was purportedly executed by Melquiades Silva on March 15, 1949 in
favor of Dionisia Vda. de Zabate (Exhibit 1), Deed of Confirmation of Previous
Deed of Sale which was purportedly executed by Porferia Silva and Emiliana
Zabate Paran on February 20, 1979 (Exhibit 2) and the Deed of Absolute Sale
Executed by Emilia Deiparine on April 26, 1996 in favor of [petitioner] Benzon
O. Aldemita (Exhibit 3);
III.
In ordering [petitioner] Aldemita to respect and not disturb the [respondents’]
title to and ownership of Lot No. 11330 of Pcs-945;
IV.
In ordering [petitioner] Aldemita to vacate the premises of Lot No. 11330 of
Pcs-945.12
On November 22, 2004, the CA promulgated its Decision affirming the Decision of the
RTC in toto. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, this appeal is DISMISSED. The
appealed Decision dated August 20, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Cebu
City in Civil Case No. CEB-23011 is affirmed in toto. Costs against the [petitioner].13
The CA held that the question of whether the respondents are real parties-in-interest
was raised for the first time on appeal considering that this issue was never raised in
the RTC before the case was submitted for decision and, hence, it cannot be resolved
without offending basic rules of fair play, justice and due process; that the only issues
raised before the RTC were confined to (a) whether the ancient documents are valid, and
(b) whether the various transactions are valid; that although a Motion to Dismiss was
filed invoking lack of cause of action, this Motion was not filed within the proper time;
that even if this issue were considered, nonetheless, since the respondents filed and
pursued the case through the administrator of the estate of their decedent, a declaration
of heirship is no longer necessary; and that since petitioner Aldemita manifested to
submit the case for decision dispensing trial, and having failed to offer any evidence to
prove the due execution and authenticity of the documents, the findings of the RTC that
EVIDENCE: WEEK 5, DAY 1 CASES
the foregoing documents were indeed forged, as confirmed by the court-appointed
commissioner, are binding and conclusive on the parties.
Hence, the instant Petition assigning the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO  SERIOUSLY ERRED AND GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DECLARED THE RESPONDENTS AS THE
RIGHTFUL AND ABSOLUTE OWNERS OF LOT NO. 11330 OF PCS-945 (TALISAY-
MINGLANILLA ESTATE) LOCATED IN VITO, MINGLANILLA, CEBU DESPITE THE
RESPONDENTS’ UTTER FAILURE TO PRESENT PROOF THAT ONE OF THE
RESPONDENTS WAS APPOINTED BY THE COURT AS ADMINISTRATOR
PURSUANT TO RULE 78 OF THE RULES OF COURT AND THE ABSENCE OF
PROOF THAT ALL THE RESPONDENTS WERE DECLARED LEGAL HEIRS
THROUGH A COURT ORDER.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED AS NULL AND VOID AND WITHOUT FORCE
AND EFFECT THE DOCUMENTS DENOMINATED AS "KALIG-ONAN SA
PANAGPALIT NGA DAYON" (DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE), WHICH WAS
PURPORTEDLY EXECUTED BY MELQUIADES SILVA ON MARCH 15, 1949 IN
FAVOR OF DIONISIA VDA. DE ZABATE (EXHIBIT 1), DEED OF CONFIRMATION
OF PREVIOUS DEED OF SALE WHICH WAS PURPORTEDLY EXECUTED BY
PORFERIA SILVA AND EMILIANA ZABATE PARAN ON FEBRUARY 20, 1979
(EXHIBIT 2) AND THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED BY EMILIA
DEIPARINE ON APRIL 26, 1996 IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER BENZON O.
ALDEMITA (EXHIBIT 3).14
The petition must fail.
Under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SECTION 1. Grounds. – Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint
or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following
grounds:
xxxx
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;
xxxx
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petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss should have been filed within the time for but before filing
the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim. As it appears, the motion was
filed in the RTC after the case has been submitted for decision.
Petitioner must have relied on the former Section 2, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court 15 which
reads:
SEC. 2. Defenses and objections not pleaded deemed waived.  - Defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived; except the
failure to state a cause of action which may be alleged in a later pleading, if one is
permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits; but
in the last instance, the motion shall be disposed of as provided in Section 5 of Rule 10 in
the light of any evidence which may have been received. Whenever it appears that the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter, it shall dismiss the action.
where failure to state a cause of action was not deemed waived even if raised after the
answer has been filed. However, the Complaint against petitioner was filed on November
25, 1998, after the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, amending the Rules of
Court.
Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:
SECTION 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. - Defenses and objections not pleaded
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it
appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties
for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of
limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
As it now stands, only the following defenses are not waived even if not raised in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(b) litis pendentia; (c) res judicata; and (d) prescription on the action.16 Failure to state a
cause of action is not an exception in said Rule. Thus, under Section 1, Rule 16, petitioner
is deemed to have waived this ground and cannot now raise it after the case in the RTC
had been submitted for decision or on appeal to the CA.
Further, a reading of the Petition for Quieting of Title 17 readily shows that such pleading
states a cause of action.
A cause of action, which is an act or omission by which a party violates the right of
another,18 has these elements:
1) the legal right of the plaintiff;
2) the correlative obligation of the defendant to respect that legal right; and
3) an act or omission of the defendant that violates such right. 19
EVIDENCE: WEEK 5, DAY 1 CASES
In the case of Goodyear Phil., Inc. v. Sy,20 the Court held that in determining whether an
initiatory pleading states a cause of action, "the test is as follows: admitting the truth of
the facts alleged, can the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the
prayer?"21 To be taken into account are only the material allegations in the complaint;
extraneous facts and circumstances or other matters aliunde are not considered.22 Stated
otherwise, the test is whether the material allegations, assuming these to be true, state
ultimate facts which constitute plaintiff's cause of action, such that plaintiff is entitled to
a favorable judgment as a matter of law. 23 The general rule is that inquiry is confined to
the four corners of the complaint, and no other. 24
As the Court has ruled, the Petition for Quieting of Title sufficiently states a cause of
action. Respondents alleged that they are the heirs of the late Melquiades Silva who died
on July 3, 1961 and are thus the true owners of a parcel of land registered in the name of
the latter (first and second elements); that the private documents allegedly executed by
the late Melquiades Silva in favor of the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioner are
forged documents (third element); and that the existence of these documents casts a
cloud over the title of the respondents as owners of the property (fourth element).
There are well-recognized exceptions to the rule that the allegations are hypothetically
admitted as true and inquiry is confined to the face of the complaint. Examples are
whenever there is no hypothetical admission of the veracity of allegations if their falsity
is subject to judicial notice, or if such allegations are legally impossible, or if these refer
to facts which are inadmissible in evidence, or if by the record or document included in
the pleading these allegations appear unfounded. Also, inquiry is not confined to the
complaint if there is evidence which has been presented to the court by stipulation of the
parties, or in the course of hearings related to the case. 25 However, none of the
exceptions are present in the instant case.
The petitioner insists that the 54 respondents claiming to be the heirs of the deceased
Melquiades Silva must first establish their status as legal heirs through a special
proceeding in order to prosecute the instant case as real parties-in-interest. Without a
declaration of heirship and a court order appointing an administrator of the estate, the
petitioner argues, the respondents have failed to establish that they are real parties-in-
interest, and therefore, the case must be dismissed for lack of cause of action, citing
the Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario.26 As aptly held by the RTC, the invocation of
petitioner of the ruling in said case is misplaced. In the Heirs of Yaptinchay, the motion to
dismiss was filed immediately after the Second Amended Complaint was filed. In the
present case, the Motion to Dismiss was filed only after the case was submitted for
decision.
As earlier pointed out, petitioner did not raise said issue when he filed his Answer.
Moreover, during the pre-trial, petitioner did not question the capacity of the Heirs of
Melquiades Silva to sue; nor did he question the representation of Ramon G. Villordon, Jr.
as administrator of the estate of the deceased. In fact, petitioner, in his Pre-Trial Brief
dated July 24, 1999 filed before the RTC, delimited the issues only to: (1) whether the
ancient documents are valid; and (2) whether the various transactions are valid. 27 It is
not disputed that the parties manifested to the RTC that they were submitting the
case without the need of trial.28 Petitioner did not complain in the RTC about the
capability of the Heirs of Melquiades Silva in his Position Paper. 29 It is only after the case
4

had already been submitted for decision of the RTC that the issue on the capacity of the
Heirs was raised through a new counsel. As appropriately denied by the RTC in its
Orders dated April 20, 2001 and August 17, 2001, petitioner’s motion is without merit, as
said ground was raised belatedly.1âwphi1
At any rate, what is established in this case is that petitioner does not have any right to
the subject property and that the Heirs of Melquiades Silva are entitled thereto. As to
whether the persons enumerated in the complaint are actually the Heirs of Melquiades
Silva may still be threshed out in the proper proceeding for declaration of heirs and
settlement of the Estate of said decedent.
Under the second assignment of error, the petitioner theorizes that the "Kalig-onan sa
Panagpalit nga Dayon"30 which purports to be a deed of absolute sale qualifies as an
ancient document under Section 2131 of Rule 132, and, hence, evidence of authenticity is
not necessary. In view of this, the property in question, petitioner argues, thus
transferred to Emilia Deiparine as successor-in-interest of Dionisia Vda. De Zabate. The
petitioner then predicates his title by virtue of The Deed of Sale dated April 26,
199632 executed by Emilia Deiparine in his favor.
We disagree.
An ancient document is one that is (1) more than 30 years old, (2) found in the proper
custody, and (3) unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. It
must on its face appear to be genuine. 33
It must be stressed that during the pre-trial of the case, the parties agreed to submit the
questioned documents to a commissioner for the purpose of determining whether the
purported signatures of Melquiades Silva in "Kalig-onan sa Panagpalit nga Dayon"34 and
Porferia Silva in Deed of Confirmation of Previous Deed of Sale dated February 20,
197935 are genuine. After the appointed commissioner submitted his report finding the
foregoing signatures as forgeries, the parties manifested through their respective
counsel to submit the case for decision without need of trial since the findings embodied
in the report have already been considered as findings of facts in the case. The petitioner,
after confirming that the findings of the RTC, which adopted the commissioner’s findings,
cannot now spin around and question them, because he agreed that these findings shall
be considered as the findings of fact of the case without necessity of a trial. The Court
concurs with the findings of the CA:
Moreover, the mere fact that the document designated as "Kalig-onan sa Panagpalit nga
Dayon" (Exhibit 1) would be considered as an ancient document being purportedly
executed by Melquiades Silva in favor of Dionisia Vda. de Zabate on March 15, 1949 and
accordingly being more than thirty (30) years already, it does not follow that its due
execution and authenticity need not be proven considering that in this case, said
document per Questioned Document Report No. 013-200 by Document Examiner Romeo
O. Varona who was appointed by the trial court as its commissioner, per Order dated
October 25, 1999 is not genuine and is a product of forgery. Hence, [the petitioner]
should have presented evidence to prove the due execution and authenticity of the said
document which he failed to do so but instead together with the [respondents] have
manifested that they would submit the case for decision without the need of undergoing
EVIDENCE: WEEK 5, DAY 1 CASES
trial and having failed to present and offered any evidence of the due execution and
authenticity of this document, [petitioner] has only himself to be blamed if the trial court
has declared it null and void.
Furthermore, the Deed of Confirmation of Previous Deed of Sale purportedly executed by
Porferia Silva and Emiliana Zabate Paran having likewise reported by the commissioner
document examiner Romeo Varona, that the signature of Porferia Silva was forged, said
document has no legal effect and has not confirmed anything.
Due to the foregoing, the trial court did not err when it declared the documents marked
as Exhibits 1 and 2 to be null and void and no legal effect and as such have not
transmitted any rights to the property in litigation to the Heirs of Dionisia Vda. de Zabate.
Consequently, the Deed of Sale dated April 26, 1996 executed by Emilia Deiparine has no
legal basis and cannot transfer any legal right to the property in question considering
that the documents on which it is based are null and void and can never be the source of
any rights and title.36
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
March 11, 2015
G.R. No. 185374
SIMPLICIA CERCADO-SIGA and LIGAYA CERCADO-BELISON, Petitioners,
vs.
VICENTE CERCADO, JR., MANUELA C. ARABIT, LOLITA C. BASCO, MARIA C. ARALAR
and VIOLETA C. BINADAS, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Not too long ago, we were called to pass upon the issue of the probative value of a
marriage contract issued by the church to prove the fact of marriage. 1 Once again, it
behooves upon us to determine whether the marriage contract or Contrato Matrimonial,
as it is denominated in this case, is sufficient to prove the fact of marriage.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the 5 August 2008 Decision 2 of the Court of
Appeals and its 14 November 2008 Resolution 3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 89585 reversing the 30
January 2007 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch
69, which nullified the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Vicente
Cercado, Sr. (Vicente) and Leonora Ditablan (Leonora).
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In their Complaint against respondents Vicente Cercado, Jr., Manuela C. Arabit, Lolita
Basco, Maria C. Aralar, Violeta C. Binadas and the Registrar of Deeds of Binangonan, Rizal,
petitioners Simplicia Cercado-Siga (Simplicia) and Ligaya Cercado-Belison (Ligaya)
claimed that they are the legitimate children of the late Vicente and Benita Castillo
(Benita), who were married last 9 October 1929 in Pililla, Rizal. Petitioners alleged that
during the lifetime of their parents, their father acquired by gratuitous title a parcel of
land identified as Lot No. 7627 Cad 609-D located at Barangay Kinagatan, Binangonan,
Rizal with an area of 6,032 square meters and covered by Tax Declaration No. BIP-021-
0253. Petitioners claimed that upon the death of their father Vicente and by virtue of
intestate succession, ownership over the subject land pertained to them as heirs; that
upon the death of Benita, her share was acquired by petitioners by operation of law.
Sometime in September 1998, petitioners read from a newspaper a notice that the estate
of Vicente and a certain Leonora Ditablan has been extrajudicially settled by their heirs,
respondents herein. Upon verification, petitioners were furnished a copy of the
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate (Deed) executed and signed by respondents.
Petitioners insist that Vicente and Leonora were not married or if they were so married,
then said marriage was null and void by reason of the subsisting marriage of their
parents, Vicente and Benita. Petitioners prayed for the declaration of the Deed as null
and void; for the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal to correct the entry on the
marital status of Vicente; and for the payment of damages and attorney’s fees. 5
To prove the marriage between Vicente and Benita, petitioners presented the following
documents: 1) Contrato Matrimonial or the marriage contract; 6 2) Certification dated 19
November 2000 issued by Iglesia Filipina Independiente of its acceptance of original
marriage contract;7 3) Certification of non-production of record of birth of Simplicia
issued by the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Pililla, Rizal; 8 4) Certificate of
Baptism of Simplicia;9 5) Certification of non-production of record of birth of Ligaya
issued by the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Pililla, Rizal; 10 and 6) Joint Affidavit
of two disinterested persons attesting that Ligaya is the child of Vicente and Benita. 11
In their Answer, respondents alleged that they are the legitimate heirs of Vicente and
Leonora, who were married on 27 June 1977 as evidenced by a marriage certificate
registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Binangonan, Rizal. They averred that
petitioners are not the real-parties- interest to institute the case because they failed to
present their birth certificates to prove their filiation to Vicente; that the marriage
between Vicente and Benita was not valid; that the document showing that Vicente was
married to Benita is not a certified true copy; and that they are now estopped by laches. 12
On 30 January 2007, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. The dispositive
portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1.The Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of the deceased Vicente Cercado, Sr.
and Benita Ditablan is hereby declared null and void and therefore no force and
effect;
2.The [petitioners] and the [respondents] are entitled to share pro- indiviso in
the subject property as follows:
EVIDENCE: WEEK 5, DAY 1 CASES
a.2,639 square meters – For [petitioner] Simplicia Cercado-Siga;
b.2,639 square meters – For [petitioner]Ligaya Cercado-Belison;
c.150.8 square meters – For [respondent] Vicente Cercado, Jr.;
d.150.8 square meters – For [respondent] Manuela C. Arabit;
e.150.8 square meters – For [respondent]Lolita C. Basco;
f.150.8 square meters – For [respondent]Maria C. Aralar; and
g.150.8 square meters – For [respondent] Violeta C. Binadas;
3.In the event that the property has already been sold by the [respondents],
they are hereby ordered to pay the [petitioners] the amount equivalent to their
share, at the time the subject property was sold;
4.[respondents] to pay [petitioners] the amount of P30,000.00 attorney’s fees;
and
5.To pay the cost of suit.13
The trial court reduced the issues into three: 1) whether the Extra- Judicial Settlement of
the Estate of the Deceased Vicente Cercado, Sr. and Leonora Ditablan-Cercado is valid; 2)
whether petitioners are entitled to recover from respondents their share in the property;
and 3) whether petitioners are entitled to damages and attorney’s fees.
In resolving the issues, the trial court relied on the following material findings:
The [petitioners] are the legitimate children of the late Vicente Cercado, Sr. and Benita
Castillote/Castillo who were married on October 9, 1929, as evidenced by a Contrato
Matrimonial x x x.14
The trial court first upheld the validity of the marriage between Vicente and Benita and
considered the subsequent marriage between Vicente and Leonora as void and bigamous
before it concluded that the subject property was part of the conjugal property of Vicente
and Benita. Consequently, the trial court held that the Deed is null and void because it
deprived Benita of her share of the property as surviving spouse and impaired the shares
and legitimes of petitioners. 15 Thus, the trial court ruled that petitioners are entitled to
recover from respondents their share in the property subject of this action.
Respondents appealed from said judgment and assigned the following errors: 1) the trial
court erred in passing upon the validity of the marriage between Vicente and Leonora; 2)
the trial court failed to consider the probative value of the certificate of marriage
between Vicente and Benita; 3) the trial court failed to consider the probative value of
6

the certificate of live birth to prove filiation; and 4) the trial court erred when it relied on
the baptismal certificate to prove filiation. 16
The appellate court ruled that the trial court "can pass upon the issue of the validity of
marriage of Vicente and Leonora [because] no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity and the court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even
in a suit not directly instituted to question the same, as long as it is essential to the
determination of the case before it." 17 However, the appellate court found that the
Contrato Matrimonial of Vicente and Benita, being a private document, was not properly
authenticated, hence, not admissible in evidence. Moreover, the appellate court did not
consider the baptismal certificate submitted by petitioners as conclusive proof of
filiation. The Joint Affidavit executed by a certain Mario Casale and Balas Chimlangco
attesting to the birth of Ligaya to Vicente and Benita was not given credence by the
appellate court for being a hearsay evidence. For failure of petitioners to prove their
cause of action by preponderance of evidence, the appellate court reversed and set aside
the Decision and Resolution of the RTC.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied it in its
Resolution18 dated 14 November 2008.
Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
DID NOT CONSIDER THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT AS A PUBLIC DOCUMENT – AND SO
WITH ITS DUPLICATE ORIGINAL. THE CONTRATO MATRIMONIAL BUTTRESSED A
CERTIFICATION ISSUED BY THE IGLESIA FILIPINA INDEPENDIENTE IS A PUBLIC
DOCUMENT, [IT] BEING REQUIRED BY LAW TO BE KEPT NOT ONLY BY THE CHURCH
CONCERNED BUT BY THE OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR – AND THE
NATIONAL STATISTIC OFFICE. AND THE DUPLICATE ORIGINAL COPY OF THE SAME IS
ALSO CONSIDERED ORIGINAL (SECTION 4, RULE 130) (AND HENCE ALSO A PUBLIC
DOCUMENT UNDER THE RULE) ON EVIDENCE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, COMMITTED ANOTHER
REVERSIBLE ERROR, WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER THE SAID DUPLICATE ORIGINAL OF
THE SUBJECT MARRIAGE CONTRACT AS AN ANCIENT DOCUMENT, BESIDES, THE SAID
DOCUMENT, MORE THAN 30 YEARS IN EXISTENCE IS CONSIDERED AS AN ANCIENT
DOCUMENT, OUTSIDE THE NEEDED REQUIREMENT OF AUTHENTICATION
APPLICABLE TO PRIVATE DOCUMENT.
III
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT IGNORED THE
PROBATIVE VALUE OF A BAPTISMAL CERTIFICATE AND PETITIONERS’ PARENTS
YEARS [OF] COHABITATION. THE BAPTISMAL CERTIFICATE WHILE NOT ADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE: WEEK 5, DAY 1 CASES
AS DIRECT EVIDENCE FOR A MARITAL CONTRACT, THE SAME IS OF STRONG
EVIDEN[T]IARY SUPPORT TO THE EXISTENCE OF MARRIAGE OF [PETITIONERS’]
PARENTS, EVIDENCED BY EXHIBIT "A" AND EXHIBIT "A-1" AND BY THE CERTIFICATE
OF ITS DESTRUCTION DURING WORLD WAR II, ALSO, BY THE OPEN AND PUBLIC
COHABITATION OF [PETITIONERS’] PARENTS, ADDED THE PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR
OF SUCH MARRIAGE, BOLSTERED BY THE OPEN AND PUBLIC COHABITATION.
IV
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED ANOTHER REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
IGNORED THE WEIGHT AND PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE JOINT AFFIDAVIT OF TWO (2)
DISINTERESTED PERSONS. THE AFFIDAVIT OF TWO (2) DISINTERESTED PERSONS
BEING A REQUIREMENT BY THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR AND/OR THE NSO TO
SUPPORT THE EXISTENCE OF [PETITIONERS’] PARENTS MARRIAGE, AND IN THAT
SINCE BECOMES ALSO A PUBLIC DOCUMENT OR AT THE VERY LEAST, A
CIRCUMSTANTIAL DOCUMENTARY PROOF, WHICH IF ADDED TO THE BAPTISMAL
CERTIFICATE EXHIBIT "H-1", THE CONTRATO MATRIMONIAL AND THE
CERTIFICATION ISSUED BY THE IGLESIA FILIPINA INDEPENDIENTE TAKEN
TOGETHER, PLUS THE OPEN AND PUBLIC COHABITATION OF THE [PETITIONERS’]
PARENTS MARRIAGE, AND THE PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE PROVIDED FOR BY LAW,
BANDED TOGETHER, ARE STRONG EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF
[PETITIONERS’] PARENTS MARRIAGE.
V
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED ANOTHER YET SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR,
WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER THE RESPONDENTS’ PARENTS’ MARRIAGE AS
BIGAMOUS. THE NULLITY OF THE [RESPONDENTS’] PARENTS’ MARRIAGE, FOR BEING
BIGAMOUS, AND BEING THE INCIDENT NECESSARILY INTERTWINED IN THE ISSUES
PRESENTED, AND IT BEING A BIGAMOUS MARRIAGE, CAN BE COLLATERALLY
ATTACK[ED] OR SLAIN AT SIGHT WHEREVER AND WHENEVER ITS HEAD (THE
[RESPONDENTS’] PARENTS MARRIAGE) IS EXHIBITED.19
Petitioners insist that the Contrato Matrimonial is a public document because it is
required by law to be recorded in the local civil registrar and the National Statistics
Office (NSO). Petitioners claim to have in their possession a duplicate original of the
Contrato Matrimonial which should be regarded as original. Petitioners emphasize that
the certification issued by the Iglesia Filipina Independiente Church, the joint affidavit of
two disinterested persons, the baptismal certificate presented by petitioners, and the
open and public cohabitation of petitioners’ parents are sufficient proof of their
marriage.
Granting that the Contrato Matrimonial is a private document, petitioners maintain that
said document should be considered an ancient document which should be excluded
from the requirement of authentication.
Petitioners aver that the Court of Appeals should have considered the marriage between
Vicente and Leonora as bigamous.
7

In their Comment,20 respondents submit that the Contrato Matrimonial is a private
document and the fact that marriages are required to be registered in the local civil
registrar does not ipso facto make it a public document. Respondents assert that the
certificate of baptism is likewise a private document which tends to prove only the
administration of the sacrament of baptism and not the veracity of the declarations
therein. Respondents moreover refute the certification issued by the local civil registry
arguing that it does not prove filiation but only the fact that there is no record of Ligaya
on file with said office.
With respect to the joint affidavit attesting to the marriage of Vicente and Benita,
respondents assert that it is inadmissible for being a hearsay evidence because the two
affiants were never presented on the witness stand.
The validity of the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Vicente and Leonora hinges
on the existence of the first marriage of Vicente and Benita.
In support of the existence of the alleged first marriage, petitioners presented a copy of
the Contrato Matrimonial. 21 There is no dispute that said marriage contract was issued
by Iglesia Filipina Independiente church.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that it is a private document. As early as in the case
of U.S. v. Evangelista, 22 it has been settled that church registries of births, marriages, and
deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders No. 68 23 and the passage
of Act No. 190 are no longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public
officials. They are private writings and their authenticity must therefore be proved as are
all other private writings in accordance with the rules of evidence. 24
Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court, 25 before a private document is admitted in
evidence, it must be authenticated either by the person who executed it, the person
before whom its execution was acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it
executed, or who after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or the person
to whom the parties to the instruments had previously confessed execution thereof. 26 As
observed by the Court of Appeals, petitioners failed to present any one of such witnesses.
In fact, only Simplicia testified that her mother gave her the marriage contract.
Unfortunately however, she was not present during its execution nor could she identify
Benita’s handwriting because Simplicia admitted that she is illiterate.
Petitioners insist on the admissibility of the marriage contract on the ground that it is a
duplicate original, hence, the original need not be produced. We do not agree. We had
previously ruled in Vallarta v. Court of Appeals 27 that " a signed carbon copy or duplicate
of a document executed at the same time as the original is known as a duplicate original
and maybe introduced in evidence without accounting for the non- production of the
original. But, an unsigned and uncertified document purporting to be a carbon copy is
not competent evidence. It is because there is no public officer acknowledging the
accuracy of the copy." 28
Next, while petitioners concede that the marriage contract is a private document, they
now argue that it is an ancient document which need not be authenticated. Petitioners’
EVIDENCE: WEEK 5, DAY 1 CASES
argument still has no merit. Section 21, Rule 132 defines an ancient document as one
that: 1) is more than 30 years old; 2) is produced from custody in which it would
naturally be found if genuine; and 3) is unblemished by any alteration or by any
circumstance of suspicion. The marriage contract was executed on 9 October 1929,
hence it is clearly more than 30-years old. On its face, there appears to be no evidence of
alteration.
The marriage contract however does not meet the second requirement.
Ancient documents are considered from proper custody if they come from a place from
which they might reasonably be expected to be found. Custody is proper if it is proved to
have had a legitimate origin or if the circumstances of the particular case are such as to
render such an origin probable. If a document is found where it would not properly and
naturally be, its absence from the proper place must be satisfactorily accounted for. 29
Gibson v. Poor30 cited the reason why it is required that an ancient document shall be
produced from the proper depository:
x x x that thereby credit is given to its genuineness. Were it not for its antiquity, and the
presumption that consequently arises that evidence of its execution cannot be obtained,
it would have to be proved. It is not that any one particular place of deposit can have
more virtue in it than another, or make that true which is false; but the fact of its coming
from the natural and proper place, tends to remove presumptions of fraud, and
strengthens the belief in its genuineness. It may be false, and so shown, notwithstanding
the presumptions in its favor. If found where it would not properly and naturally be, its
absence from the proper place must be satisfactorily accounted for; but that being done
and all suspicions against its genuineness removed, we can discover no reason why it
may not be read in evidence. The real question which is to affect its consideration is,
whether the instrument offered is genuine, and contains a true statement of what it
purports to. In the Bishop of Meath v. Marquis of Winchester, 2 Bing. 183, Tindal, C. J.,
speaking of ancient documents, holds this language. "It is not necessary that they should
be found in the best and most proper place of deposit. If documents continued in such
custody, there never would be any question as to their authenticity; but it is when
documents are found in other than their proper place of deposit, that the investigation
commences whether it was reasonable and natural under the circumstances in the
particular case, to expect that they should have been in the place where they are actually
found; for it is obvious, that while there can be only one place of deposit strictly and
absolutely proper, there may be many and various that are reasonable and probable,
though differing in degree; some being more so, some less; and in those cases the
proposition to be determined is, whether the actual custody is so reasonably and
probably accounted for, that it impresses the mind with the conviction, that the
instrument found in such custody must be genuine." Some authorities hold, that the
antiquity of the document is alone sufficient to entitle it to be read, and that the other
circumstances only go to its effect in evidence.
In Bartolome v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 31 the Court ruled that the requirement of
proper custody was met when the ancient document in question was presented in court
by the proper custodian thereof who is an heir of the person who would naturally keep it.
In this case however, we find that Simplicia also failed to prove her filiation to Vicente
8

and Benita. She merely presented a baptismal certificate which has long been held "as
evidence only to prove the administration of the sacrament on the dates therein
specified, but not the veracity of the declarations therein stated with respect to her
kinsfolk. "The same is conclusive only of the baptism administered, according to the rites
of the Catholic Church, by the priest who baptized subject child, but it does not prove the
veracity of the declarations and statements contained in the certificate concerning the
relationship of the person baptized." 32 As such, Simplicia cannot be considered as an heir,
in whose custody the marriage contract is expected to be found. It bears reiteration that
Simplicia testified that the marriage contract was given to her by Benita but that
Simplicia cannot make out the contents of said document because she cannot read and
write.
On the other hand, the document presented to prove Ligaya’s kinship is a Joint Affidavit
executed by two persons to the effect that she was born to Vicente and Benita. These two
affiants were never presented in court. Thus, their statement is tantamount to hearsay
evidence.
Petitioners also presented certifications from the local civil registrar certifying that the
records of birth from 1930 to 1946 were destroyed by fire and/or war. In said
documents, there contains an advice that petitioners may make a further verification
with the NSO because the local civil registrar submits a copy of the birth certificate of
every registered birth with the NSO. The advice was not heeded. Petitioners failed to
present a certification from NSO whether such records do exist or not.
While we acknowledge the difficulty of obtaining old records, we simply cannot ignore
the rules on evidence, specifically the rule on authentication with respect to private
documents which is precisely in place to prevent the inclusion of spurious documents in
the body of evidence that will determine the resolutions of an issue.
Considering that petitioners failed to prove the validity of the marriage between Vicente
and Benita, it follows that they do not have a cause of action in the case for the
declaration of nullity of the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Vicente and Leonora.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 5 August 2008 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89585 reversing and setting aside the 30 January 2007
Decision and 16 April 2007 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69 of
Binangonan, Rizal in Civil Case No. R-98-047 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
EVIDENCE: WEEK 5, DAY 1 CASES
G.R. No. 175378, November 11, 2015
MULTI-INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DATA SYSTEM, INC., PETITIONER, VS. RUEL
MARTINEZ, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari[1] (petition) under Rule 45 filed by Multi-
International Business Data System, Inc. (petitioner) to annul and set aside the
Decision[2] dated October 18, 2006 rendered by the Appeals (CA) Sixteenth Division in CA
G.R. CV No. 82686.
The Facts
Respondent Ruel Martinez (respondent) was the Operations Manager [3] of petitioner
from the last quarter of 1990 to January 22, 1999. [4] Sometime in June 4, 1994,
respondent applied for and was granted a car loan amounting to P648,288.00. [5] Both
parties agreed that the loan was payable through deductions from respondent's bonuses
or commissions, if any. [6] Further, if respondent would be terminated for any cause
before the end of the term of the loan obligation, the unpaid balance would be
immediately due and demandable without need of demand. [7] On November 11, 1998,
petitioner sent respondent a letter informing him of the breakdown of his outstanding
obligation with petitioner amounting to P418,012.78, detailing every bonus, loan or
advance obtained and deducted.[8] The subject vehicle remains with respondent. [9]
In a letter dated November 24, 1998, respondent requested for a breakdown of his
benefits from petitioner as director/operations manager in case he will resign from his
position. In said letter, respondent stated that the computation "is only for the assumed
amount on my end to deduct whatever I owe the Company." [10]
In a letter dated January 22, 1999 which respondent received the next day, petitioner
terminated respondent for cause effective immediately and demanded that respondent
pay his outstanding loan of P418,012.78 and surrender the car to petitioner within three
days from receipt.[11] Despite this, respondent failed to pay the outstanding balance.
In a letter dated June 23, 1999, petitioner demanded respondent to pay his loan within
three days from receipt thereof at petitioner's office. [12] Again, despite demand,
respondent failed to pay his outstanding obligation.
On July 12, 1999, petitioner filed a complaint [13] with the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 148 (trial court) against respondent praying that respondent be ordered to
pay his outstanding obligation of P418,012.78 plus interest, and that respondent be held
liable for exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs of the suit. [14]
In his answer[15] dated August 28, 1999, respondent alleged that he already paid his loan
through deductions made from his compensation/salaries, bonuses and commissions.
[16]
 During trial, respondent presented a certification dated September 10, 1996 issued by
9

petitioner's president, Helen Dy (Dy), stating that respondent already paid the amount of
P337,650.00 as of the said date. [17] Respondent alleged that a simple accounting would
show that the he already paid the loan considering that it is payable within four years
from 1994.[18]
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision[19] dated November 22, 2002, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner. It
decreed, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment i[s] hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff as against the
defendant[ ] as follows:
1. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the balance of his car loan in the amount of
Four Hundred Eighteen Thousand Twelve and 78/100 Pesos ([P]418,012.78)
plus interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) [per annum] from [June 23,]
1999 until full payment;
2. Ordering defendant Martinez to pay plaintiff the amount of Ten Thousand
Pesos ([P]10,000.00), by way of exemplary damages;
3. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
([P]20,000.00) by way of attorney's fees;
4. Dismissing the counterclaims interposed by defendant;
5. Ordering defendant to pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[20]
In arriving at the above pronouncement, the trial court held that the respondent failed to
present evidence to prove payment. The trial court also held that the due execution and
authenticity of the certification dated September 10, 1996 were not established. In
respondent's direct examination, he merely testified that he knows Dy and her spouse
but did not state that the document was actually executed by Dy. [21]
On December 16, 2002, respondent filed a motion seeking the reconsideration of the trial
court's decision dated November 22, 2002. The trial court denied this motion in its
Order[22] dated March 22, 2004.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Respondent appealed the trial court's decision with the CA. Docketed as CA G.R. CV No.
82686, the appeal alleged that the parties agreed that the car loan would be payable
EVIDENCE: WEEK 5, DAY 1 CASES
within four years from the time respondent secured the loan in June 1994. [23] Respondent
alleged that he already completed his payment in June 1998 and that the payment was
done through salary deductions because if it were otherwise, petitioner would be
seeking full payment in the amount of P648,288.00 and not only the balance of
P418,012.78.[24] Respondent also assailed the finding that the due execution of the
certification dated September 10, 1996 was not proven. Respondent alleged that by mere
comparison, one can safely say that the signatures appearing in the certification and in
Dy's affidavit submitted before the National Labor Relations Commission are signatures
by one and the same person, Dy. Respondent claims that he is very much familiar with
the signature of Dy, his former boss for ten years and even petitioner's witness, who is
also its administrative manager, Aida Valle (Valle), also identified the signature of Dy in
the certification.[25]
The CA in its Decision[26] dated October 18, 2006 reversed the trial court and ruled in
favor of respondent in holding that the latter already fulfilled his loan obligation with
petitioner. The CA found credence in the following pieces of evidence: (1) certification
dated September 10, 1996 signed by Dy; (2) deduction of the monthly installments from
respondent's salary pursuant to the agreement between him and petitioner; and (3)
petitioner's admission of respondent's installment payments made in the amount of
P230,275.22.[27] The CA held that Dy never denied nor confirmed in open court the
authenticity of her signature in the certification dated September 10, 1996.
[28]
 Citing Permanent Savings and Loan Bank v. Velarde [29] and Consolidated Bank and
Trust Corporation (SOLIDBANK) v. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc., [30] the CA held that Dy
must declare under oath that she did not sign the document or that it is otherwise false
or fabricated.[31]
Thus, the CA reversed the trial court's ruling and held:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the November 22, 2002 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 148, in Civil Case No. 99-1295, is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[32] (Emphasis in the original)
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
The issues for resolution are:
1. Whether respondent has fulfilled his obligation with petitioner; and
2. Whether the certification dated September 10, 1996 should be admitted as
basis for respondent's payment of his loan with petitioner. [33]
10

Our Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
Verification/Certification on Non-Forum Shopping
Before going into the substantive merits of the case, we shall first resolve the technical
issue raised by respondent in his Comment[34] dated February 8, 2007 and
Memorandum[35] dated November 6, 2007.
Respondent alleged that the petition should be dismissed for failing to comply with
Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Sections 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the Rules
of Court.[36] Respondent alleged that the signature of Dy in the Verification/Certification
in the petition differs from her signature in the letter dated November 11, 1998, thus,
inferred that someone not authorized signed the Verification/Certification. [37]
Upon a review of the records, however, we found Dy's signature in the petition to be the
same with Dy's signature in the Ex-Parte Manifestation of Compliance [38] dated February
22, 2005 which petitioner filed with the CA. Respondent never objected to Dy's signature
in petitioner's Ex-Parte Manifestation of Compliance. Further, Dy did not refute that the
signature in the petition is hers. Thus, we find no reason to dismiss the petition outright
based on respondent's allegation.
Review of factual findings
Before going into the merits of the petition, we stress the well-settled rule that only
questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, since "the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts." [39] It is not our function to
review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented.
When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and
binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under
any of the recognized exceptions in jurisprudence. [40]
In the present case, the factual findings of the trial court and the CA on whether
respondent has fully paid his car loan are conflicting. The trial court found that no
deductions were made from respondent's salary to establish full payment of the car loan
while the CA found otherwise. The trial court held, thus:
Culled from the evidence adduced and the testimony of the witnesses, it appears that the
defendant himself admitted on cross-examination that no deductions were made in his
monthly salary. Thus, it was a mere presumption of fact on his part that he had been able
to fully pay off his car loan. The testimony of the defendant creating merely an inference
of payment will not be regarded as conclusive on that issue. Thus, payment cannot be
presumed by a mere inference from surrounding circumstances. At most, the agreement
that the payments for the car loan shall be deducted from the defendant's salary and
bonus is only affirmative of the capacity or ability of the defendant to fulfill his part of the
bargain.
EVIDENCE: WEEK 5, DAY 1 CASES
But whether or not there was actual payment through deductions from the defendant's
salary and bonus remains to be proven by independent and credible evidence. As the
saying goes: "a proof that an act could have been done is no proof that it was actually
done." Hence for failure to present evidence to prove payment, defendant miserably
failed in his defense and in effect admitted the allegations of plaintiff. [41]
The CA, on the other hand, found that respondent sufficiently established that deductions
were made from his salary:
x x x Moreover, it had been sufficiently established by witness Aida Valle (VALLE),
Administrative manager of plaintiff-appellee MULTI-INTERNATIONAL, that defendant-
appellant MARTINEZ had been the only employee granted by plaintiff-appellee MULTI-
INTERNATIONAL a car loan as such [sic]. With that, it can fairly be inferred that plaintiff-
appellee MULT1-INTERNATlONAL's asseveration that the deductions from the salary of
defendant-appellant MARTINEZ had not been reflected in his payslips is for naught, since
indeed, no such "item" in the payslip is provided, considering that it is only defendant-
appellant MARTINEZ who had been granted such car loan x x x.[42]
Thus, the conflicting factual findings of the trial court and CA compel us to re-evaluate
the facts of this case, an exception to the rule that only questions of law may be dealt
with in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45.
Admissibility of the certification dated September 10, 1996
Respondent relies on the certification [43] dated September 10, 1996 to bolster his defense
that he already fully paid his car loan to petitioner. We affirm the findings of the CA that
the certification is admissible in evidence.
Section 22,[44] Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court to compare
the handwriting in issue with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the
judge. In Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relations of the United
Presbyterian Church in the USA,[45] we held:
It is also hornbook doctrine that the opinions of handwriting experts, even those from
the NBI and the PC, are not binding upon courts. This principle holds true especially
when the question involved is mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which can be
determined by a visual comparison of specimens of the questioned signatures with those
of the currently existing ones.
Handwriting experts are usually helpful in the examination of forged documents because
of the technical procedure involved in analyzing them. But resort to these experts is not
mandatory or indispensable to the examination or the comparison of handwriting. A
finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts,
because the judge must conduct an independent examination of the questioned signature
in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity, x x x [46] (Citations
omitted)
11

The documents containing the signature of Dy which have been submitted by petitioner
as authentic are the following: (1) letter dated November 11, 1998; [47] (2) termination
letter dated January 22, 1999; [48] (3) promissory note dated June 17, 1994;[49] and (4)
chattel mortgage signed on June 27, 1994. [50] Examining and analyzing the signatures in
these documents with Dy's signature in the certification, we find no substantial reason to
doubt the latter's authenticity. In fact, the testimonies of Dy herself and Valle support our
finding.
Dy testified on cross-examination as follows:
Q: Now, ms witness [sic], sometime in December 10, 1996, do you recall having executed
a certification to Mr. Martinez?
A: No.
Q: Just to refresh your memory, would you please identify if this is the signature you
signed given [sic] to Mr. Martinez?
A: Yeah. If looks like my signature, but...
Q: Is that your signature?
A: But I said it looks like my signature. I want you to notice something because
everytime...
Q: Just answer the question please. Is that your signature?
A: I said it looks like my signature.
xxx
Q: Just answer the question please.
A: I said it looks like my signature.[51] (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Valle, on cross-examination testified as follows:
Q: If I show you Certification dated September 10, 1996 will you be able to confirm if this
is a Certification signed by the president?
A: It looked like the signature of the president but I think she will be the one to
testify because she was the one who signed.[52] (Emphasis supplied)
Aside from supporting our finding that the signature in the certification is genuine, the
foregoing testimonies of Dy and Valle substantially comply with the other modes of
authenticating a private document under Section 20,[53] Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Dy never testified that any forgery or fraud attended the certification. [54] In fact, she did
not deny the authenticity of her signature but actually admitted that the signature
therein looks like hers. Additionally, Valle, who is familiar with the signature of Dy
because of the requirements of her job, also positively testified that the signature in the
EVIDENCE: WEEK 5, DAY 1 CASES
certification looks like that of Dy's.[55]
The defenses of Dy that she does not have a copy or record of the certification in her file
and that the letterhead shows an old address are weak and do not prove that the
certification was not duly executed.
For having established the due execution and authentication of the certification dated
September 10, 1996, the certification should be admitted in evidence to prove that
respondent partially paid the car loan in the amount ofP337,650.00.
Insufficient evidence to prove full payment of loan
It is established that the one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even
where the creditor alleges non-payment, the general rule is that the debtor has the
burden to prove payment, rather than the creditor. The debtor has the burden of
showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by payment. Where
the debtor introduces some evidence of payment, the burden of going forward with the
evidence—as distinct from the general burden of proof—shifts to the creditor, who is
then under a duty of producing some evidence to show non-payment. [56]
It must be emphasized that both parties have not presented any written agreement or
contract governing respondent's obligation. Nevertheless, it has been established that
respondent obtained a car loan amounting to P648,288.00 from petitioner. Thus, the
burden is now on respondent to prove that the obligation has already been extinguished
by payment.
Although not exclusive, a receipt of payment is the best evidence of the fact of payment.
[57]
 We held that the fact of payment may be established not only by documentary
evidence but also by parol evidence.[58]
Except for respondent's bare allegations that he has fully paid the P648,288.00 car loan,
there is nothing in the records which shows that full payment has indeed been made.
Respondent did not present any receipt other than the certification dated September 10,
1996 which only proves that respondent has already paid P337,650.00 of the car loan. A
balance of P310,638.00 still remained.
Even respondent's testimony lacks credence. He alleged that the amortization of the car
loan was deducted from his salaries, bonuses and commissions. However, he could not
even answer nor give an estimate of how much bonuses and commissions he receives
from petitioner.[59]
Respondent also alleged that although deductions were made from his salaries, bonuses
and commissions, his payslips do not reflect such deductions because "there is no such
car loan field" in the accounting program for the payroll. [60] Respondent admitted in his
testimony that he only presumed that the deductions were being made from his salaries,
bonuses and commissions, to wit:
Q: So my question was that, whether or not your regular salary which was received twice
a month, the monthly amortization| s] are being deducted from that? [sic]
12

A: There is no reflection in the payslip.
Q: But do you know it was ever deducted from your monthly salary? [sic]
A: It must be deducted from my salary, [sic]
Q: You are assuming?
A: That is the agreement.
Q: That is the agreement but you don't know if it was indeed deducted?
A: Yes.[61]
If indeed deductions were made on his salaries, bonuses and commissions, respondent
should have been confident in answering the questions propounded on him during trial.
Me should have presented his payslips and shown that even if his payslips did not reflect
any deductions for his car loan, deductions were indeed made, by comparing the amount
of compensation he could have gotten based on his employment contract and the amount
he actually received. Respondent merely made calculations on what he presumed he
already paid. Further, respondent could have presented testimonies of persons other
than himself to prove payment of the loans. The letter dated November 24, 1998 showed
that respondent was aware that he still had outstanding obligations with petitioner.
In Royal Cargo Corporation v. DFS Sports Unlimited, Inc., we held that the defense of
payment was not proven by the respondent's failure to present any supporting evidence
such as official receipts or the testimony of the person who made payment or who had
direct knowledge of the payment, among others. [62] Respondent's witness therein also
assumed that payment was made even in the absence of any receipt "once the accounting
department of respondent forwarded to her the original invoice which was stamped
PAID". We held in this case that such testimony and the invoices which were stamped
paid, are all self-serving and do not, by themselves, prove respondent's claim of payment.
[63]
Nevertheless, even if the parties agreed to make deductions from respondent's salary,
bonuses and commissions, we agree with the trial court that this is "only affirmative of
the capacity or ability of the [respondent] to fulfill his part of the bargain. But whether or
not there was actual payment through deductions from [respondent]'s salary and bonus
remains to be proven by independent and credible evidence." [64]
Finally, we find it questionable why respondent would agree on a setup where petitioner
would not give him any written acknowledgment receipt of his payments or accounting
of his loan.[65] Respondent should have insisted that receipts be issued in his favor in the
first place if it were true that the program for issuing the payslips could not reflect the
deductions from his salaries, bonuses and commissions. Since he was the only employee
who was given a car loan, it would not have been an inconvenience for the petitioner. His
actions go against the legal presumption that a person takes ordinary care of his
concerns.[66]
Statement of account is self-serving
Similarly, we find that the statement of account, showing the amount of P418,012.78 as
respondent's outstanding loan obligation to petitioner, is self-serving. Dy admitted that
she prepared the statement of account. [67] However, she neither explained clearly, during
EVIDENCE: WEEK 5, DAY 1 CASES
her testimony, the breakdown nor supported the amounts stated therein with
documentary evidence.[68]
Although petitioner refers to the amount of P418,012.78 in the statement to represent
only the car loan obligation, the statement itself shows that the amount also includes the
cash advances of respondent from the company. The trial court has already ruled that
judgment cannot be rendered on the issue regarding cash advances because this was not
made subject of petitioner's complaint and the same was not amended. [69] Such issue was
also not raised with us on appeal. Further, it was not explained why Valle was not the one
who prepared the statement or was not asked to testify on the document when her
duties include supervising the accounting department and assisting in the preparation of
the employees' payroll.[70]
Thus, having only proven payment to the extent of P337,650.00, respondent is obligated
to pay petitioner the balance of P310,638.00 with interest.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.  The Court of Appeals'
Decision dated October 18, 2006 in CA G.R. CV No. 82686 is SET ASIDE. The respondent
is ORDERED to pay petitioner the balance of the car loan in the amount of P310,638.00
plus interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum computed from January 23,
199971 until the date of finality of this judgment. The total amount shall thereafter earn
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum [72] until fully paid. The trial court's
Decision dated November 22, 2002 is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 205681               July 1, 2015
JANET CARBONELL, Petitioner,
vs.
JULITA A. CARBONELL-MENDES, represented by her brother and attorney-in-fact,
VIRGILIO A. CARBONELL, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
This petition for review1 assails the 4 July 2012 Decision 2 and the 16 January 2013
Resolution3
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95816. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 26
June 2009 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Rosales, Pangasinan, Branch 53,
in Civil Case No. 1374-R, declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 2 April 1997 fictitious
and of no force and effect, and the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-51120 5 as
invalid and restoring the efficacy of TCT No. T-45306.6
The Facts
13

Respondent Julita A. Carbonell-Mendes (respondent) filed a complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Documents, Annulment of Title,Reconveyance, Recovery of Possession and
Ownership, Declaration of Bad Faith of Mortgage Bank and Damages against Spouses
Bonifacio and Janet Carbonell (Spouses Carbonell) and the Rural Bank of Bayambang,
Pangasinan (Rural Bank). Respondent is the sister of Bonifacio Carbonell (Bonifacio) and
the sister-in-law of petitioner Janet Carbonell (petitioner).Petitioner and Bonifacio are
now separated.
Respondent alleged in the complaint that she is the owner of a residential land located in
Barangay Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan (property), covered by TCT No. T-45 306 and
registered under her maiden name, Julita Carbonell. TCT No. T-45306 was later cancelled
and replaced by TCT No.51120 in the name of the Spouses Carbonell. Respondent
contended that TCT No. T-51120 should be annulled since it was issued on the basis of a
simulated and fictitious Deed of Absolute Sale dated 2 April 1997. Respondent, a
permanent resident of Canada, was then in Canada when the fictitious Deed of Absolute
Sale was executed with her forged signature. She discovered the fictitious sale only in
December 2005 during her vacation in the Philippines.
Rural Bank was also a defendant in the complaint because the Spouses Carbonell
mortgaged the property to Rural Bank. Respondent accused Rural Bank as a mortgagee
in bad faith for failing to observe due diligence under the circumstances. The case against
Rural Bank was later dismissed upon its motion and manifestation that the Spouses
Carbonell had already paid the ₱345,000 mortgage indebtedness, which terminated the
encumbrance on the property.
During the trial, respondent’s mother, Maria Carbonell (Maria) testified that the property
is owned by respondent. The title to the property was in Maria’s custody but when she
left for Canada in 1995, the SpousesCarbonell requested custody of the title because they
intended to purchase the property. Respondent was displeased when she learned that
her mother left the title with the Spouses Carbonell. Maria requested the Spouses
Carbonell to return the title but they ignored her request. On cross-examination, Maria
stated that it was s the Spouses Carbonell who facilitated the purchase of the property
for respondent, using the money given by respondent for such purpose.
In her testimony, respondent averred that although the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 2
April 1997 stated that she was the seller, she insisted that she was not the one who
signed on the space above the name "Julita Carbonell." She testified that she married in
1996, resulting to her change of name to Julita Carbonell-Mendes. She became a
Canadian citizen in 1996. Respondent presented her passport to prove that she was in
Canada when the fictitious Deed of Absolute Sale was executed. Her passport, which still
bore her maiden name, showed her signature when she was still using her maiden name.
Respondent’s signature on her passport was clearly different from the signature on the
Deed of Absolute Sale. Respondent also presented other documents, such as citizenship
card, driver’s license, health insurance card, and SSS card, which contained d her genuine
signature.
Respondent further testified that she had been living in Canada since 1989 and had
acquired the property in 1994. She provided the purchase money of P 210,000 to her
parents, who bought the property on her behalf. The owner’s duplicate of TCT No. T-
EVIDENCE: WEEK 5, DAY 1 CASES
45306 was with her parents and she only had the photocopy. When her mother went to
Canada, she requested her to bring the original title but her mother failed to do so.
Respondent tried to talk to Boniface and petitioner regarding the title but they refused to
talk to her, prompting respondent to file this case.
The Land Registration Examiner of the Register of Deeds of Tayug, Pangasinan, Menelio
Imus, was also presented as a witness to present and authenticate the certified true
copies of the titles to the property, particularly TCT No. T-45306 and TCT No. T-51120.
Menelio Imus testified that TCT No. T-45306 was registered in respondent’s name and
was cancelled by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 2 April 1997, as evidenced by
Entry No. 170997 annotated at the back of TCT No. T-45306. The Deed of Absolute Sale
stated that the property was sold by respondent to Spouses Carbonell. Thus, the Register
of Deeds issued a new title, TCT No. T-51120 in the name of Spouses Carbonell.
For the defense, petitioner testified that she and her husband bought the property from
Juanita Tulio for P 200,000, and paid in installments. She stated that they started paying
for the property in 1994 and that in 1997, her husband gave her the title to the property
which was already under their name. However, other than TCT No. T-51120, petitioner
failed to present any other document to prove that they purchased the property. On
cross- examination, petitioner stated that she could not remember the number of
installment payments for the property.1awp++i1 She remembered paying Juanita Tulio P
100,000 but she could not present any receipt evidencing payment for the property,
alleging that all payment receipts were kept by her now estranged husband. Neither
could petitioner present any document evidencing the sale transaction because
according to her, it was her husband who dealt with Juanita Tulio. However, she
admitted that she did not witness the transaction between her husband and Juanita
Tulio.
Another defense witness, Julieta Sanchez Mariano testified that she sold the property for
P 200,000 to the Spouses Carbonell, through Juanita Tulio. She testified that the property
was previously covered by TCT No. T- 44975.
The Ruling of the RTC
The RTC held that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 2 April 1997 was fictitious and that
the signature of respondent was forged.1âwphi1 The RTC found significant differences in
the signature of respondent on the Deed of Absolute Sale and respondent’s original
signature as found on her passport. Furthermore, the RTC found that respondent was in
Canada when the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on 2 April 1997, a fact not disputed
by petitioner. Clearly, respondent could not have personally appeared before the Notary
Public Ignacio Nacion when the Deed of Absolute Sale was allegedly executed on 2 April
1997. Thus, the Deed of Absolute Sale is invalid and could not have affected the transfer
of the property to the Spouses Carbonell.
As regards the claim of petitioner that she and her husband bought the property from
Juanita Tulio, the RTC ruled that such claim was not substantiated by any documentary
evidence. The RTC also found dubious the claim of Julieta Sanchez Mariano that she sold
a portion of her property to the Spouses Carbonell since the annotation Entry No.
150345, at the back of TCT No. T-44975 registered in her name, stated that the 300 sq.m.
14

Portion of her lot was sold to respondent and not to the Spouses Carbonell. This sale to
respondent of the 300 sq .m. lots caused the issuance of TCT No. T-45306, which also
indicated that this title was a transfer from TCT No. T-44975. On 26 June 2009, the RTC
rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 2, 1997 FICTITIOUS and of no force
and effect;
2. Declaring T.C.T. No. T-51120 as INVALID and restoring the efficacy of T.C.T. No. T-
45306. Upon the finality of this Decision, the Register of Deeds of Tayug, Pangasinan is
ordered to CANCEL T.C.T. NO. T-51120 and to REVIVE T.C.T. No. 45306 in the name of
the plaintiff JULITA CARBONELL MENDES.
3. Ordering the defendants-spouse s Bonifacio and Janel Carbonell:
a) To surrender the owner’s copy of T.C.T. No. T-51120 to theRegister of Deeds
of Tayug, Pangasinan to effect its cancellation;
b) to reconvey to the plaintiff the possession of the subject property; and
c) To pay the plaintiff the amount of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P 25,000.00)
as Attorney’s fees; a nd the costs of the suit. 7
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC. The Court of Appeals
noted that petitioner did not directly deny the forgery of respondent’s signature on the
Deed of Absolute Sale, which was clearly alleged in respondent’s complaint. The Court of
Appeals held that allegations in the complaint which are not specifically denied are
deemed admitted. Thus, petitioner was deemed to have admitted the alleged forgery on
the Deed of Absolute Sale. Besides, the forgery was clearly established by the evidence
presented during trial, which petitioner was not able to dispute. Like the RTC, the Court
of Appeals found that the signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale is substantially different
from respondent’s genuine signatures as shown on her passport, citizenship card, SSS
card, and the specimen signatures made by respondent in open court. Furthermore,
respondent’s absence in the Philippines when the Deed of Absolute Sale was supposedly
executed, as proven by her passports, supported the conclusion that her signature was
forged on the Deed of Absolute Sale.
The Court of Appeals gave no credence to the testimony of Julieta Sanchez Mariano that
she sold the property to the Spouses Carbonell, through Juanita Tulio.1âwphi1 The Court
of Appeals found her testimony lacking in credibility considering that her title to the
property, TCT No. T-44975, was cancelled through a Deed of Absolute Sale she executed
in favor of respondent, which resulted in the issuance of respondent ’s title, TCT No. T-
45306. Thus, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s appeal and affirmed in toto the
EVIDENCE: WEEK 5, DAY 1 CASES
Decision dated 26 June 2009 of the RTC. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
which the Court of Appeals denied for lack of merit in its Resolution dated 16 January
2013.
The Issue
Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the RTC’s finding of
forgery on the Deed of Absolute Sale.
We find the petition without merit.
Petitioner in this case is raising a question of fact: whether the signature of respondent
was forged on the Deed of Absolute Sale, which would invalidate TCT No. T-51120 issued
in the name of Spouses Carbonell. The issue raised by petitioner is clearly a question of
fact which requires a review of the evidence presented. This Court is not a trier of
facts, 8 and it is not its function to examine, review, or evaluate the evidence all over
again. 9
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover only
questions of law, thus:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. – A party desiring to appeal by certiorari
from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan,
the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only
questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. 10
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the Court is generally limited
to reviewing only errors of law. Nevertheless, the Court has enumerated several
exceptions to this rule, such as when: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of
facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence
on which the factual findings are based; (7) the findings of absence of facts are
contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the
issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both
parties.11Petitioner failed to show that this case falls under any of the exceptions. The
finding of forgery by the RTC was upheld by the Court of Appeals. Well-settled is the rule
that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are deemed
binding and conclusive. 12
Besides, the Court finds no justifiable reason to deviate from the finding of the RTC and
the Court of Appeals that the signature of respondent was forged on the Deed of Absolute
15

Sale dated 2 April 1997, which was clearly established by the evidence presented during
the trial. Under Section 22, 13
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, among the methods of proving the genuineness of the
handwriting are through a witness familiar with such handwriting or a comparison by
the court of the questioned handwriting and the admitted genuine specimens of the
handwriting. In this case, respondent, the purported writer or signatory to the Deed of
Absolute Sale, testified that her signature was forged. To prove the forgery, respondent
presented, among others, her Canadian and Philippine passports, driver’s license,
citizenship card, and health card, showing her genuine signature which was clearly
different from the signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale. 14
Comparing the genuine signature of respondent on these documents with her purported
signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale, the RTC found "significant differences in terms of
handwriting strokes, as well as the shapes and sizes of letters, fairly suggesting that the
plaintiff [Julita A. Carbonell-Mendes] was not the author of the questioned
signature."15 Signatures on a questioned document may be examined by the trial court
judge and compared with the admitted genuine signatures to determine the issue of
authenticity of the contested document. As held in Spouses Estacio v. Dr. Jaramillo: 16
It bears stressing that the trial court may validly determine forgery from its own
independent examination of the documentary evidence at hand. This the trial court judge
can do without necessarily resorting to experts, especially when the question involved is
mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual
Comparison of specimen of the questioned signatures with those of the currently existing
ones. Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court, by itself,
to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting "with writings admitted or treated as
genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to
the satisfaction of the judge."17
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 4 July 2012 Decision and the 16
January 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95816.
SO ORDERED.
January 23, 2017
G.R. No. 215009
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. CARMEN SANTORIO GALENO,
Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2
EVIDENCE: WEEK 5, DAY 1 CASES
dated June 27, 2013 and the Resolution 3 dated September 17, 2014 rendered by the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 02085, affirming the Orders dated October 13,
20064 and January 22, 20075 of the Regional Trial Court of Dumangas, Iloilo, Branch 68
(RTC), which allowed the correction of the area of Lot No. 2285 in Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 46417 from 20,948 square meters to 21,298 square meters.
The Facts
On September 2, 2003, respondent Carmen Santorio Galeno (respondent) filed a
petition6 for correction of the area of Lot No. 2285 covered by OCT No. 46417, Dingle
Cadastre (subject property) before the RTC. She alleged therein that she is one of the co-
owners of the subject property by virtue of a Deed of Sale 7 dated July 6, 1962. The survey
and subdivision of the subject property was duly approved by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) per its Approved Subdivision Plan of Lot
No. 2285.8
Respondent further alleged that when she and her co-owners had the subject property
resurveyed for the purpose of partition, they discovered a discrepancy in the land area of
the subject property as appearing in OCT No. 46417, 9 in that the title reflects an area
of 20,948 square meters, while the Certification 10 issued by the DENR Office of the
Regional Technical Director, Lands Management Services, shows an area
of 21,298 square meters. Hence, she sought to correct the area of the subject property in
order to avoid further confusion, and claimed to have notified the adjoining owners. 11
There being no opposition to the petition, the RTC allowed the presentation of
respondent's evidence ex parte  before the Branch Clerk as well as for the satisfaction of
the jurisdictional requirements. 12
The RTC Ruling
In an Order13 dated October 13, 2006, the RTC granted the petition upon a finding that
respondent was able to substantiate the allegations in her petition to warrant a
correction of the area of the subject property. Hence, it directed the Register of Deeds of
the Province of Iloilo to correct such area in OCT No. 46417 from 20,948 to 21,298
square meters. 14
Herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that the adjoining
owners had not been notified, stressing that such notice is a jurisdictional
requirement. 15 In the Order 16 dated January 22, 2007, the RTC denied the motion,
finding that a Notice of Hearing 17 was sent to the adjoining owners. As such, respondent
was able to prove compliance with the said jurisdictional requirement. 18
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA.19
The CA Ruling
16

In a Decision20 dated June 27, 2013, the CA affirmed the RTC Order.1âwphi1 It found that
respondent, by a preponderance of evidence, was able to prove, based on the records of
the proper government authority, i.e., the Office of the Technical Director, Land
Management Services of the DENR, that the true and correct area of the subject property
was 21,298 square meters as shown in the approved plan. Moreover, petitioner failed to
rebut with contrary evidence respondent's claim that she and her co-owners followed
the boundaries in the technical description of OCT No. 46417 when they caused its
resurvey. In fact, no proof had been adduced to show that the boundaries had been
altered. Also, the CA pointed out that none of the adjoining owners, who were properly
notified of the proceedings and who stand to be adversely affected by the change in the
land area of the subject property, objected to respondent's petition. 21
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration 22 was denied in a Resolution23 dated September
17, 2014; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue advanced for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in
upholding the correction of the area of the subject property in OCT No. 46417.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
A scrutiny of the evidence marked and formally offered by respondent before the court  a
quo shows that the former failed to prove that there was sufficient basis to allow the
correction of the area of the subject property in OCT No. 46417 from 20,948 square
meters to 21,248 square meters.
Records reveal that respondent offered in evidence the following documents: (a) the
Certification24 issued by a certain Althea C. Acevedo (Acevedo), Engineer IV, Chief of the
Technical Services Section of the Office of the Regional Technical Director, Land
Management Services of the DENR in Iloilo City, which states that "the true and correct
area of [L]ot 2285, Cad. 246 Dingle Cadastre is 21,928 square meters;" (b)  the technical
description25 of Lot No. 2285, a copy of which was certified by Ameto Caballero
(Caballero), Chief of the Surveys Division, while another copy was certified correct by
Acevedo; and (c)  the approved subdivision plan of Lot No. 2258, 26 certified by Rogelio M.
Santome (Santome), Geodetic Engineer; Alfredo Muyarsas (Muyarsas), Chief of the
Regional Surveys Division, and Edgardo R. Gerobin (Gerobin), OIC, Regional Technical
Director of the Land Management Services, DENR. On the strength of these pieces of
evidence, respondent sought a reconciliation of the area of the subject property with the
records of the DENR.
Unfortunately, the foregoing documentary evidence are not sufficient to warrant the
correction prayed for. The Court cannot accord probative weight upon them in view of
the fact that the public officers who issued the same did not testify in court to prove the
facts stated therein.
EVIDENCE: WEEK 5, DAY 1 CASES
In Republic v. Medida,  27 the Court held that certifications of the Regional Technical
Director, DENR cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein,
holding that:
Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence as follows:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a
foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments;
and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be
entered therein.
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section
19(a), when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy x x x.
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
"Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence.  - Documents consisting of entries in public
records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are  prima facie evidence of
the facts stated therein. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third
person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter."
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications [do] not fall
within the class of public documents contemplated in the first sentence of Section
23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect "entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer," such as entries made by the Civil Registrar in
the books of registries, or by a ship captain in the ship's logbook.  The certifications are
not the certified copies or authenticated reproductions of original official records
in the legal custody of a government office. The certifications are not even records
of public documents. x x x28 (Emphases supplied)
As such, sans the testimonies of Acevedo, Caballero, and the other public officers who
issued respondent's documentary evidence to confirm the veracity of its contents, the
same are bereft of probative value and cannot, by their mere issuance, prove the facts
stated therein. 29 At best, they may be considered only as prima facie  evidence of their
due execution and date of issuance but do not constitute prima facie  evidence of the facts
stated therein.30
In fact, the contents of the certifications are hearsay because respondent's sole witness
and attorney-in-fact, Lea Galeno Barraca, was incompetent to testify on the veracity of
17

their contents, 31 as she did not prepare any of the certifications nor was she a public
officer of the concerned government agencies. Notably, while it is true that the public
prosecutor who represented petitioner interposed no objection to the admission of the
foregoing evidence in the proceedings in the court below, 32 it should be borne in mind
that "hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value unless the
proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence
rule,"33 which do not, however, obtain in this case. Verily, while respondent's
documentary evidence may have been admitted due to the opposing party's lack of
objection, it does not, however, mean that they should be accorded any probative weight.
The Court has explained that:
The general rule is that hearsay evidence is not admissible. However, the lack of
objection to hearsay testimony may result in its being admitted as evidence. But one
should not be misled into thinking that such declarations are thereby impressed with
probative value. Admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of
evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not cannot be given credence for it
has no probative value.34
Besides, case law states that the "absence of opposition from government agencies is of
no controlling significance because the State cannot be estopped by the omission,
mistake or error of its officials or agents. Neither is the Republic barred from assailing
the decision granting the petition for reconstitution [or correction of title, as in this case]
if, on the basis of the law and the evidence on record, such petition has no
merit."35 Moreover, "in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a
preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his
own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant's." 36
In fine, the Court holds that respondent did not present any competent evidence to prove
that the true and correct area of the subject property is 21,298 square meters instead of
20,948 square meters to warrant a correction thereof in OCT No. 46417. Accordingly,
respondent's petition for the correction of the said Certificate of Title must be denied,
and the present petition be granted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated June 27, 2013 and
the Resolution dated September 17, 2014 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 02085 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Carmen Santorio Galeno's petition for
correction of area of Lot No. 2285 on Original Certificate of Title No. 46417
is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 156330               November 19, 2014
NEDLLOYD LIJNEN B.V. ROTTERDAM and THE EAST ASIATIC CO., LTD., Petitioners,
vs.
GLOW LAKS ENTERPRISES, LTD., Respondent.
DECISION
EVIDENCE: WEEK 5, DAY 1 CASES
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 filed pursuant to Ruic 45 of the Revised Rules
of Comi, primarily assailing the 11 December 2002 Resolution rendered by the Special
Former Sixteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48277, 2 the decretal
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED and the April 29. 1994 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 52 thereof' in Civil Case No. 88-45595, SET ASIDE. Nedlloyd
Lijncn B.V. Rotterdam and The East Asiatic Co., Ltd arc ordered to pay Glow l ,aks
Enterprises, I ,td. the following:
1. The invoice value of the goodslost worth $53,640.00, or its equivalent in
Philippine currency;
2. Attorney’s fees of ₱50,000.00; and
3. Costs.3
The Facts
Petitioner Nedlloyd Lijnen B.V. Rotterdam (Nedlloyd) is a foreign corporation engaged in
the business of carrying goods by sea, whose vessels regularly call at the port of Manila.
It is doing business in the Philippines thru its local ship agent, co-petitioner East Asiatic
Co., Ltd. (East Asiatic).
Respondent Glow Laks Enterprises,Ltd., is likewise a foreign corporation organized and
existing under the laws of Hong Kong. It is not licensed to do, and it is not doing business
in, the Philippines.
On or about 14 September 1987, respondent loaded on board M/S Scandutch at the Port
of Manila a total 343 cartoons of garments, complete and in good order for pre-carriage
tothe Port of Hong Kong. The goods covered by Bills of Lading Nos. MHONX-2 and
MHONX-34 arrived in good condition in Hong Kong and were transferred to M/S
Amethyst for final carriage to Colon, Free Zone, Panama. Both vessels, M/S Scandutch
and M/S Amethyst, are owned by Nedlloyd represented in the Phlippines by its agent,
East Asiatic. The goods which were valued at US$53,640.00 was agreed to be released to
the consignee, Pierre Kasem, International, S.A., upon presentation of the original copies
of the covering bills of lading. 5 Upon arrival of the vessel at the Port of Colon on 23
October 1987, petitioners purportedly notified the consignee of the arrival of the
shipments, and its custody was turned over tothe National Ports Authority in accordance
with the laws, customs regulations and practice of trade in Panama. By an unfortunate
turn ofevents, however, unauthorized persons managed to forge the covering bills of
lading and on the basis of the falsified documents, the ports authority released the goods.
On 16 July 1988, respondent filed a formal claim with Nedlloyd for the recovery of the
amount of US$53,640.00 representing the invoice value of the shipment but to no
18

avail.6 Claiming that petitioners are liable for the misdelivery of the goods, respondent
initiated Civil Case No. 88-45595 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch
52, seeking for the recovery of the amount of US$53,640.00, including the legal interest
from the date of the first demand.7
In disclaiming liability for the misdelivery of the shipments, petitioners asserted in their
Answer8 that they were never remiss in their obligation as a common carrier and the
goods were discharged in good order and condition into the custody of the National
Ports Authority of Panama in accordance with the Panamanian law. They averred that
they cannot be faulted for the release of the goods to unauthorized persons, their
extraordinary responsibility as a common carrier having ceased at the time the
possession of the goods were turned over to the possession of the port authorities.
After the Pre-Trial Conference, trial on the merits ensued. Both parties offered
testimonial and documentary evidence to support their respective causes. On 29 April
2004, the RTC rendered a Decision 9 ordering the dismissal of the complaint but granted
petitioners’ counterclaims. In effect, respondent was directed to pay petitioners the
amount of ₱120,000.00 as indemnification for the litigation expenses incurred by the
latter. In releasing the common carrier from liability for the misdelivery of the goods, the
RTC ruled that Panama law was duly proven during the trial and pursuant to the said
statute, carriers of goods destined to any Panama port of entry have to discharge their
loads into the custody of Panama Ports Authority to make effective government
collection of port dues, customs duties and taxes. The subsequent withdrawal effected by
unauthorized persons on the strength of falsified bills of lading does not constitute
misdelivery arising from the fault of the common carrier. The decretal part of the RTC
Decision reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is renderedfor [petitioners] and against
[Respondent], ordering the dismissal of the complaint and ordering the latter to pay
[petitioners] the amount of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱120,000.00)
on their counterclaims.
Cost against [Respondent].10
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the findings of the RTC and held that foreign
laws were not proven in the manner provided by Section 24, Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules of Court, and therefore, it cannot be given full faith and credit. 11 For failure to prove
the foreign law and custom, it is presumed that foreign laws are the sameas our local or
domestic or internal law under the doctrine of processual presumption. Under the New
Civil Code, the discharge of the goods intothe custody of the ports authority therefore
does not relieve the commoncarrier from liability because the extraordinary
responsibility of the common carriers lasts until actual or constructive delivery of the
cargoes tothe consignee or to the person who has the right to receive them. Absent any
proof that the notify party or the consignee was informed of the arrival of the goods, the
appellate court held that the extraordinary responsibility of common carriers remains.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals directed petitioners to pay respondent the value of the
misdelivered goods in the amount of US$53,640.00.
The Issues
EVIDENCE: WEEK 5, DAY 1 CASES
Dissatisfied with the foregoing disquisition, petitioners impugned the adverse Court of
Appeals Decision before the Court on the following grounds:
I.
THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO NEED TO PROVE PANAMANIAN LAWS BECAUSE
THEYHAD BEEN JUDICIALLY ADMITTED. AN ADMISSION BY A PARTY IN THE
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS DOES NOT REQUIRE PROOF.
II.
BY PRESENTING AS EVIDENCE THE [GACETA] OFFICIAL OF REPUBLICA DE
PANAMA NO. 17.596 WHERE THE APPLICABLE PANAMANIAN LAWS WERE
OFFICIALLY PUBLISHED, AND THE TESTIMONY OF EXPERT WITNESSES,
PETITIONERS WERE ABLE TO PROVE THE LAWS OF PANAMA.
III.
IF WE HAVE TO CONCEDE TO THE COURT OF APPEALS’ FINDING THAT THERE
WAS FAILURE OF PROOF, THE LEGAL QUESTION PRESENTED TO THE
HONORABLE COURT SHOULD BE RESOLVED FAVORABLY BECAUSE THE
CARRIER DISCHARGED ITS DUTY WHETHER UNDER THE PANAMANIAN LAW
OR UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.12
The Court’s Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
It is well settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our
courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proved.13 To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy
thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court14 which read: SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents
referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in
the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which
the record is kept is in a foreigncountry, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice- consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or
record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state,in substance,
that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may
be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any,
or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
19

For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are
mandatory: (1) itmust be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by
his deputy; and (2) it must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy
or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consular or consular agent or foreign service
officer, and with the seal of his office. 15 Such official publication or copy must be
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the
attesting officer has the legal custody thereof. 16 The certificate may be issued by any of
the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign country
in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. 17 The attestation
must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be, and mustbe under the official seal of the attesting officer. 18
Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, the Panamanian laws, particularly Law 42
and its Implementing Order No. 7, were not duly proven in accordance with Rules of
Evidence and as such, it cannot govern the rights and obligations of the parties in the
case at bar. While a photocopy of the Gaceta Official of the Republica de Panama No.
17.596, the Spanish text of Law 42 which is theforeign statute relied upon by the court a
quoto relieve the common carrier from liability, was presented as evidence during the
trial of the case below, the same however was not accompanied by the required
attestation and certification.
It is explicitly required by Section 24, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court that a copy
of the statute must be accompanied by a certificate of the officer who has legal custody of
the records and a certificate made by the secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice-consular or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The latter
requirement is not merely a technicality but is intended to justify the giving of full faith
and credit to the genuineness of the document in a foreign country. 19 Certainly, the
deposition of Mr. Enrique Cajigas, a maritime law practitioner in the Republic of Panama,
before the Philippine Consulate in Panama, is not the certificate contemplated by law. At
best, the deposition can be considered as an opinion of an expert witness who possess
the required special knowledge on the Panamanian laws but could not be recognized as
proof of a foreign law, the deponent not being the custodian of the statute who can
guarantee the genuineness of the document from a foreign country. To admit the
deposition as proof of a foreign law is, likewise, a disavowal of the rationaleof Section 24,
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, which isto ensure authenticity of a foreign law
and its existence so as to justify its import and legal consequence on the event or
transaction in issue. The above rule, however, admits exceptions, and the Court in certain
cases recognized that Section 25, Rule132 of the Revised Rules of Court does not exclude
the presentation of other competent evidence to prove the existence of foreign law. In
Willamete Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal20 for instance, we allowed the foreign law
tobe established on the basis of the testimony in open court during the trial in the
Philippines of an attorney-atlaw in San Francisco, California, who quoted the particular
foreign law sought to be established. 21 The ruling is peculiar to the facts. Petitioners
cannot invoke the Willamete ruling to secure affirmative relief since their so called
expert witness never appeared during the trial below and his deposition, that was
supposed to establish the existence of the foreign law, was obtained ex-parte.
It is worth reiterating at this point that under the rules of private international law, a
foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. In the absence of pleading
EVIDENCE: WEEK 5, DAY 1 CASES
and proof, the laws of the foreign country or state will be presumed to be the same as our
local or domestic law. This is known as processual presumption. 22 While the foreign law
was properly pleaded in the case at bar, it was,however, proven not in the manner
provided by Section 24, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. The decision of the RTC,
which proceeds from a disregard of specific rules cannot be recognized.
Having settled the issue on the applicable Rule, we now resolve the issue of whether or
not petitioners are liable for the misdelivery of goods under Philippine laws.
Under the New Civil Code, common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligencein the vigilance
over goods, according to the circumstances of each case. 23 Common carriers are
responsible for loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods unless the same is due to
flood, storm, earthquake or other natural disaster or calamity. 24 Extraordinary diligence
is that extreme care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection
use for securing or preserving their own property or rights. 25 This expecting
standardimposed on common carriers in contract of carrier of goods is intended to tilt
the scales in favor of the shipper who is at the mercy of the common carrier once the
goods have been lodged for the shipment. 26 Hence, in case of loss of goods in transit, the
common carrier is presumed under the law to have been in fault or negligent. 27
While petitioners concede that, as a common carrier, they are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the care and custody of the goods in their possession, they
insist that they cannot be held liable for the loss of the shipments, their extraordinary
responsibility having ceased at the time the goods were discharged into the custody of
the customs arrastreoperator, who in turn took complete responsibility over the care,
storage and delivery of the cargoes.28
In contrast, respondent, submits that the fact that the shipments were not delivered to
the consignee as statedin the bill of lading or to the party designated or named by the
consignee, constitutes misdelivery thereof, and under the law it is presumed that the
common carrier is at fault or negligent if the goods they transported, as in this case, fell
into the hands of persons who have no right to receive them.
We sustain the position of the respondent.
Article 1736 and Article 1738 are the provisions in the New Civil Code which define the
period when the common carrier is required to exercise diligence lasts, viz:
Article 1736. The extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier lasts from the time
the goodsare unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by the carrier for
transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to
the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them, without prejudice to the
provisions of article 1738.
Article 1738. The extraordinary liability of the common carrier continues to be operative
even during the time the goods are stored in a warehouse of the carrier at the place of
20

destination, until the consignee has been advised of the arrival of the goods and has had
reasonable opportunity thereafter to remove them or otherwise dispose of them.
Explicit is the rule under Article 1736 of the Civil Code that the extraordinary
responsibility of the common carrier begins from the time the goods are delivered to the
carrier.29 This responsibility remains in full force and effect even when they are
temporarily unloaded or stored in transit, unless the shipper or owner exercises the
right of stop page in transitu, and terminates only after the lapse of a reasonable time for
the acceptance, of the goods by the consignee or such other person entitled to receive
them.30
It was further provided in the samestatute that the carrier may be relieved from the
responsibility for loss or damage to the goods upon actual or constructive delivery of the
same by the carrier to the consignee or to the person who has the right to receive
them.31 In sales, actual delivery has been defined as the ceding of the corporeal
possession by the seller, and the actual apprehension of the corporeal possession by the
buyer or by some person authorized by him to receive the goods as his representative for
the purpose of custody or disposal. 32 By the same token, there is actual delivery in
contracts for the transport of goods when possession has been turned over to the
consignee or to his duly authorized agent and a reasonable time is given him to remove
the goods.33
In this case, there is no dispute that the custody of the goods was never turned over to
the consignee or his agents but was lost into the hands of unauthorized persons who
secured possession thereof on the strength of falsified documents. The loss or the
misdelivery of the goods in the instant case gave rise to the presumption that the
common carrier is at fault or negligent.
A common carrier is presumed to have been negligent if it fails to prove that it exercised
extraordinary vigilance over the goods it transported. 34 When the goods shipped are
either lost or arrived in damaged condition, a presumption arises against the carrier of
its failure to observe that diligence, and there need not be an express finding of
negligence to hold it liable. 35 To overcome the presumption of negligence, the common
carrier must establish by adequateproof that it exercised extraordinary diligence over
the goods.36 It must do more than merely show that some other party could be
responsible for the damage.37
In the present case, petitioners failed to prove that they did exercise the degree of
diligence required by law over the goods they transported. Indeed, aside from their
persistent disavowal of liability by conveniently posing an excuse that their
extraordinary responsibility isterminated upon release of the goods to the Panamanian
Ports Authority, petitioners failed to adduce sufficient evidence they exercised
extraordinary care to prevent unauthorized withdrawal of the shipments. Nothing in the
New Civil Code, however, suggests, even remotely, that the common carriers’
responsibility over the goods ceased upon delivery thereof to the custom authorities. To
the mind of this Court, the contract of carriage remains in full force and effect even after
the delivery of the goods to the port authorities; the only delivery that releases it from
their obligation to observe extraordinary care is the delivery to the consignee or his
agents. Even more telling of petitioners’ continuing liability for the goods transported to
EVIDENCE: WEEK 5, DAY 1 CASES
the fact that the original bills of lading up to this time, remains in the possession of the
notify party or consignee. Explicit on this point is the provision of Article 353 of the Code
of Commerce which provides:
Article 353. The legal evidence of the contract between the shipper and the carrier shall
be the bills of lading, by the contents of which the disputes which may arise regarding
their execution and performance shall be decided, no exceptions being admissible other
than those of falsity and material error in the drafting.
After the contract has been complied with, the bill of lading which the carrier has issued
shall be returned to him, and by virtue of the exchange of this title with the thing
transported, the respective obligations and actions shall be considered cancelled, unless
in the same act the claim which the parties may wish to reserve be reduced to writing,
with the exception of that provided for in Article 366.
In case the consignee, upon receiving the goods, cannot return the bill of lading
subscribed by the carrier, because of its loss or of any other cause, he must give the latter
a receiptfor the goods delivered, this receipt producing the same effects as the return of
the bill of lading.
While surrender of the original bill of lading is not a condition precedent for the common
carrier to bedischarged from its contractual obligation, there must be, at the very least,
an acknowledgement of the delivery by signing the delivery receipt, if surrender of the
original of the bill of lading is not possible. 38 There was neither surrender of the original
copies of the bills of lading nor was there acknowledgment of the delivery in the present
case. This leads to the conclusion that the contract of carriage still subsists and
petitioners could be held liable for the breach thereof.
Petitioners could have offered evidence before the trial court to show that they exercised
the highest degree of care and caution even after the goods was turned over to the
custom authorities, by promptly notifying the consignee of its arrival at the P01i of
Cristobal in order to afford them ample opportunity to remove the cargoes from the port
of discharge. We have scoured the records and found that neither the consignee nor the
notify paiiy was informed by the petitioners of the arrival of the goods, a crucial fact
indicative of petitioners' failure to observe extraordinary diligence in handling the goods
entrusted to their custody for transport. They could have presented proof to show that
they exercised extraordinary care but they chose in vain, full reliance to their cause on
applicability of Panamanian law to local jurisdiction. It is for this reason that we find
petitioners liable for the misdelivery of the goods. It is evident from the review of the
records and by the evidence adduced by the respondent that petitioners failed to rebut
the prima facie presumption of negligence. We find no compelling reason to depa1i from
the ruling of the Court of Appeals that under the contract of carriage, petitioners are
liable for the value of the misdelivcred goods.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed
Resolution of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
21

G.R. No. 189998               August 29, 2012
MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND RESORT, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
ELLEN JOHANNE HARPER, JONATHAN CHRISTOPHER HARPER, and RIGOBERTO
GILLERA, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The hotel owner is liable for civil damages to the surviving heirs of its hotel guest whom
strangers murder inside his hotel room.
The Case
Petitioner, the owner and operator of the 5-star Shangri-La Hotel in Makati City (Shangri-
La Hotel), appeals the decision promulgated on October 21, 2009, 1 whereby the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the judgment rendered on October 25, 2005 by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City holding petitioner liable for damages for
the murder of Christian Fredrik Harper, a Norwegian national. 2 Respondents Ellen
Johanne Harper and Jonathan Christopher Harper are the widow and son of Christian
Harper, while respondent Rigoberto Gillera is their authorized representative in the
Philippines.
Antecedents
In the first week of November 1999, Christian Harper came to Manila on a business trip
as the Business Development Manager for Asia of ALSTOM Power Norway AS, an
engineering firm with worldwide operations. He checked in at the Shangri-La Hotel and
was billeted at Room 1428. He was due to check out on November 6, 1999. In the early
morning of that date, however, he was murdered inside his hotel room by still
unidentified malefactors. He was then 30 years old.
How the crime was discovered was a story in itself. A routine verification call from the
American Express Card Company to cardholder Harper’s residence in Oslo, Norway (i.e.,
EVIDENCE: WEEK 5, DAY 1 CASES
Bygdoy Terasse 16, 0287 Oslo, Norway) led to the discovery. It appears that at around
11:00 am of November 6, 1999, a Caucasian male of about 30–32 years in age, 5’4" in
height, clad in maroon long sleeves, black denims and black shoes, entered the Alexis
Jewelry Store in Glorietta, Ayala Center, Makati City and expressed interest in purchasing
a Cartier lady’s watch valued at ₱ 320,000.00 with the use of two Mastercard credit cards
and an American Express credit card issued in the name of Harper. But the customer’s
difficulty in answering the queries phoned in by a credit card representative sufficiently
aroused the suspicion of saleslady Anna Liza Lumba (Lumba), who asked for the
customer’s passport upon suggestion of the credit card representative to put the credit
cards on hold. Probably sensing trouble for himself, the customer hurriedly left the store,
and left the three credit cards and the passport behind.
In the meanwhile, Harper’s family in Norway must have called him at his hotel room to
inform him about the attempt to use his American Express card. Not getting any
response from the room, his family requested Raymond Alarcon, the Duty Manager of the
Shangri-La Hotel, to check on Harper’s room. Alarcon and a security personnel went to
Room 1428 at 11:27 a.m., and were shocked to discover Harper’s lifeless body on the
bed.
Col. Rodrigo de Guzman (de Guzman), the hotel’s Security Manager, initially investigated
the murder. In his incident report, he concluded from the several empty bottles of wine
in the trash can and the number of cigarette butts in the toilet bowl that Harper and his
visitors had drunk that much and smoked that many cigarettes the night before. 3
The police investigation actually commenced only upon the arrival in the hotel of the
team of PO3 Carmelito Mendoza4 and SPO4 Roberto Hizon. Mendoza entered Harper’s
room in the company of De Guzman, Alarcon, Gami Holazo (the hotel’s Executive
Assistant Manager), Norge Rosales (the hotel’s Executive Housekeeper), and Melvin
Imperial (a security personnel of the hotel). They found Harper’s body on the bed
covered with a blanket, and only the back of the head could be seen. Lifting the blanket,
Mendoza saw that the victim’s eyes and mouth had been bound with electrical and
packaging tapes, and his hands and feet tied with a white rope. The body was identified
to be that of hotel guest Christian Fredrik Harper.
Mendoza subsequently viewed the closed circuit television (CCTV) tapes, from which he
found that Harper had entered his room at 12:14 a.m. of November 6, 1999, and had
been followed into the room at 12:17 a.m. by a woman; that another person, a Caucasian
male, had entered Harper’s room at 2:48 a.m.; that the woman had left the room at
around 5:33 a.m.; and that the Caucasian male had come out at 5:46 a.m.
On November 10, 1999, SPO1 Ramoncito Ocampo, Jr. interviewed Lumba about the
incident in the Alexis Jewelry Shop. During the interview, Lumba confirmed that the
person who had attempted to purchase the Cartier lady’s watch on November 6, 1999
had been the person whose picture was on the passport issued under the name of
Christian Fredrik Harper and the Caucasian male seen on the CCTV tapes entering
Harper’s hotel room.
Sr. Insp. Danilo Javier of the Criminal Investigation Division of the Makati City Police
reflected in his Progress Report No. 2 5 that the police investigation showed that Harper’s
22
 EVIDENCE: WEEK 5, DAY 1 CASES

passport, credit cards, laptop and an undetermined amount of cash had been missing Ruling of the CA
from the crime scene; and that he had learned during the follow-up investigation about
an unidentified Caucasian male’s attempt to purchase a Cartier lady’s watch from the Petitioner appealed, assigning to the RTC the following errors, to wit:
Alexis Jewelry Store in Glorietta, Ayala Center, Makati City with the use of one of Harper’s
credit cards.
I
On August 30, 2002, respondents commenced this suit in the RTC to recover various
damages from petitioner,6 pertinently alleging: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES ARE THE
HEIRS OF THE LATE CHRISTIAN HARPER, AS THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE ON
RECORD SUPPORTING SUCH RULING.
xxx
II
7. The deceased was to check out and leave the hotel on November 6, 1999, but in the
early morning of said date, while he was in his hotel room, he was stabbed to death by an
(sic) still unidentified male who had succeeded to intrude into his room. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT’SNEGLIGENCE WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF MR.
HARPER, OR IN NOT RULING THAT IT WAS MR. CHRISTIAN HARPER’S OWN
8. The murderer succeeded to trespass into the area of the hotel’s private rooms area and NEGLIGENCE WHICH WAS THE SOLE, PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS DEATH.
into the room of the said deceased on account of the hotel’s gross negligence in providing
the most basic security system of its guests, the lack of which owing to the acts or
omissions of its employees was the immediate cause of the tragic death of said deceased. III

xxx THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING TO THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES THE

10. Defendant has prided itself to be among the top hotel chains in the East claiming to
provide excellent service, comfort and security for its guests for which reason ABB
Alstom executives and their guests have invariably chosen this hotel to stay. 7
xxx
Ruling of the RTC
On October 25, 2005, the RTC rendered judgment after trial, 8 viz:
AMOUNTOF PH₱ 43,901,055.00, REPRESENTING THE ALLEGED LOST EARNING OF THE
LATE CHRISTIAN HARPER, THERE BEING NO COMPETENT PROOF OF THE EARNING OF
MR. HARPER DURING HIS LIFETIME AND OF THE ALLEGATION THAT THE PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLEES ARE MR. HARPER’S HEIRS.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING TO THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES THE
AMOUNT OF PH₱ 739,075.00, REPRESENTING THE ALLEGED COST OF TRANSPORTING
THE REMAINS OF MR. CHRISTIAN HARPER TO OSLO, NORWAY, THERE BEING NO
PROOF ON RECORD THAT IT WAS PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES WHO PAID FOR SAID COST.

WHEREFORE, finding the defendant hotel to be remiss in its duties and thus liable for the
death of Christian Harper, this Court orders the defendant to pay plaintiffs the amount of:
PhP 43,901,055.00 as and by way of actual and compensatory damages;
PhP 739,075.00 representing the expenses of transporting the remains of
Harper to Oslo, Norway;
PhP 250,000.00 attorney’s fees;
and to pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COST OF SUIT TO
THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, THERE BEING NO PROOF ON RECORD SUPPORTING
SUCH AWARD.
On October 21, 2009, the CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC with modification, 9 as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated October 25, 2005 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accordingly, defendant-appellant is ordered to
pay plaintiffs-appellees the amounts of ₱ 52,078,702.50, as actual and compensatory
damages; ₱ 25,000.00, as temperate damages; ₱ 250,000.00, as attorney’s fees; and to
pay the costs of the suit.

23

SO ORDERED.10
Issues
Petitioner still seeks the review of the judgment of the CA, submitting the following
issues for consideration and determination, namely:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES WERE ABLE TO PROVE WITH
COMPETENT EVIDENCE THE AFFIRMATIVE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT THAT
THEY ARE THE WIDOW AND SON OF MR. CHRISTIAN HARPER.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLEES WERE ABLE TO PROVE WITH COMPETENT
EVIDENCE THE AFFIRMATIVE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT THAT THERE WAS
NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE APPELLANT AND ITS SAID NEGLIGENCE WAS THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF MR. CHRISTIAN HARPER.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF MR. CHRISTIAN
HARPER WAS HIS OWN NEGLIGENCE.
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
I.
Requirements for authentication of documents establishing respondents’ legal
relationship with the victim as his heirs were complied with
As to the first issue, the CA pertinently held as follows:
The documentary evidence that plaintiffs-appellees offered relative to their heirship
consisted of the following –
1. Exhibit "Q" - Birth Certificate of Jonathan Christopher Harper, son of
Christian Fredrik Harper and Ellen Johanne Harper;
2. Exhibit "Q-1" - Marriage Certificate of Ellen Johanne Clausen and Christian
Fredrik Harper;
EVIDENCE: WEEK 5, DAY 1 CASES
3. Exhibit "R" - Birth Certificate of Christian Fredrick Harper, son of Christopher
Shaun Harper and Eva Harper; and
4. Exhibit "R-1" - Certificate from the Oslo Probate Court stating that Ellen
Harper was married to the deceased, Christian Fredrick Harper and listed Ellen
Harper and Jonathan Christopher Harper as the heirs of Christian Fredrik
Harper.
Defendant-appellant points out that plaintiffs-appellees committed several mistakes as
regards the above documentary exhibits, resultantly making them incompetent evidence,
to wit, (a) none of the plaintiffs-appellees or any of the witnesses who testified for the
plaintiffs gave evidence that Ellen Johanne Harper and Jonathan Christopher Harper are
the widow and son of the deceased Christian Fredrik Harper; (b) Exhibit "Q" was labeled
as Certificate of Marriage in plaintiffs-appellees’ Formal Offer of Evidence, when it
appears to be the Birth Certificate of the late Christian Harper; (c) Exhibit "Q-1" is a
translation of the Marriage Certificate of Ellen Johanne Harper and Christian Fredrik
Harper, the original of which was not produced in court, much less, offered in evidence.
Being a mere translation, it cannot be a competent evidence of the alleged fact that Ellen
Johanne Harper is the widow of Christian Fredrik Harper, pursuant to the Best Evidence
Rule. Even assuming that it is an original Marriage Certificate, it is not a public document
that is admissible without the need of being identified or authenticated on the witness
stand by a witness, as it appears to be a document issued by the Vicar of the Parish of
Ullern and, hence, a private document; (d) Exhibit "R" was labeled as Probate Court
Certificate in plaintiffs-appellees’ Formal Offer of Evidence, when it appears to be the
Birth Certificate of the deceased, Christian Fredrik Harper; and (e) Exhibit "R-1" is a
translation of the supposed Probate Court Certificate, the original of which was not
produced in court, much less, offered in evidence. Being a mere translation, it is an
incompetent evidence of the alleged fact that plaintiffs-appellees are the heirs of
Christian Fredrik Harper, pursuant to the Best Evidence Rule.
Defendant-appellant further adds that Exhibits "Q-1" and "R-1" were not duly attested by
the legal custodians (by the Vicar of the Parish of Ullern for Exhibit "Q-1" and by the
Judge or Clerk of the Probate Court for Exhibit "R-1") as required under Sections 24 and
25, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. Likewise, the said documents are not
accompanied by a certificate that such officer has the custody as also required under
Section 24 of Rule 132. Consequently, defendant-appellant asseverates that Exhibits "Q-
1" and "R-1" as private documents, which were not duly authenticated on the witness
stand by a competent witness, are essentially hearsay in nature that have no probative
value. Therefore, it is obvious that plaintiffs-appellees failed to prove that they are the
widow and son of the late Christian Harper.
Plaintiffs-appellees make the following counter arguments, viz, (a) Exhibit "Q-1", the
Marriage Certificate of Ellen Johanne Harper and Christian Fredrik Harper, was issued by
the Office of the Vicar of Ullern with a statement that "this certificate is a transcript from
the Register of Marriage of Ullern Church." The contents of Exhibit "Q-1" were translated
by the Government of the Kingdom of Norway, through its authorized translator, into
English and authenticated by the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, which in
turn, was also authenticated by the Consul, Embassy of the Republic of the Philippines in
Stockholm, Sweden; (b) Exhibit "Q", the Birth Certificate of Jonathan Christopher Harper,
24

was issued and signed by the Registrar of the Kingdom of Norway, as authenticated by
the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, whose signature was also authenticated
by the Consul, Embassy of the Republic of the Philippines in Stockholm, Sweden; and (c)
Exhibit "R-1", the Probate Court Certificate was also authenticated by the Royal Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of Norway, whose signature was also authenticated by the Consul,
Embassy of the Republic of the Philippines in Stockholm, Sweden.
They further argue that since Exhibit "Q-1", Marriage Certificate, was issued by the vicar
or parish priest, the legal custodian of parish records, it is considered as an exception to
the hearsay rule. As for Exhibit "R-1", the Probate Court Certificate, while the document
is indeed a translation of the certificate, it is an official certification, duly confirmed by
the Government of the Kingdom of Norway; its contents were lifted by the Government
Authorized Translator from the official record and thus, a written official act of a foreign
sovereign country.
WE rule for plaintiffs-appellees.
The Revised Rules of Court provides that public documents may be evidenced by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record. The attestation must state,
in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as
the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if
there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
If the record is not kept in the Philippines, the attested copy must be accompanied with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a
foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept,
and authenticated by the seal of his office.
The documents involved in this case are all kept in Norway. These documents have been
authenticated by the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; they bear the official
seal of the Ministry and signature of one, Tanja Sorlie. The documents are accompanied
by an Authentication by the Consul, Embassy of the Republic of the Philippines in
Stockholm, Sweden to the effect that, Tanja Sorlie is duly authorized to legalize official
documents for the Ministry.
Exhibits "Q" and "R" are extracts of the register of births of both Jonathan Christopher
Harper and the late Christian Fredrik Harper, respectively, wherein the former explicitly
declares that Jonathan Christopher is the son of Christian Fredrik and Ellen Johanne
Harper. Said documents bear the signature of the keeper, Y. Ayse B. Nordal with the
official seal of the Office of the Registrar of Oslo, and the authentication of Tanja Sorlie of
the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, which were further authenticated by
Philippine Consul Marian Jocelyn R. Tirol. In addition, the latter states that said
documents are the birth certificates of Jonathan Christopher Harper and Christian
Fredrik Harper issued by the Registrar Office of Oslo, Norway on March 23, 2004.
EVIDENCE: WEEK 5, DAY 1 CASES
Exhibits "Q-1", on the other hand, is the Marriage Certificate of Christian Fredrik Harper
and Ellen Johanne Harper issued by the vicar of the Parish of Ullern while Exhibit "R-1" is
the Probate Court Certificate from the Oslo Probate Court, naming Ellen Johanne Harper
and Jonathan Christopher Harper as the heirs of the deceased Christian Fredrik Harper.
The documents are certified true translations into English of the transcript of the said
marriage certificate and the probate court certificate. They were likewise signed by the
authorized government translator of Oslo with the seal of his office; attested by Tanja
Sorlie and further certified by our own Consul.
In view of the foregoing, WE conclude that plaintiffs-appellees had substantially
complied with the requirements set forth under the rules. WE would also like to stress
that plaintiffs-appellees herein are residing overseas and are litigating locally through
their representative. While they are not excused from complying with our rules, WE
must take into account the attendant reality that these overseas litigants communicate
with their representative and counsel via long distance communication. Add to this is the
fact that compliance with the requirements on attestation and authentication or
certification is no easy process and completion thereof may vary depending on different
factors such as the location of the requesting party from the consulate and the office of
the record custodian, the volume of transactions in said offices and even the mode of
sending these documents to the Philippines. With these circumstances under
consideration, to OUR minds, there is every reason for an equitable and relaxed
application of the rules on the issuance of the required attestation from the custodian of
the documents to plaintiffs-appellees’ situation. Besides, these questioned documents
were duly signed by the officers having custody of the same. 11
Petitioner assails the CA’s ruling that respondents substantially complied with the rules
on the authentication of the proofs of marriage and filiation set by Section 24 and Section
25 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court when they presented Exhibit Q, Exhibit Q-1, Exhibit R
and Exhibit R-1, because the legal custodian did not duly attest that Exhibit Q-1 and
Exhibit R-1 were the correct copies of the originals on file, and because no certification
accompanied the documents stating that "such officer has custody of the originals." It
contends that respondents did not competently prove their being Harper’s surviving
heirs by reason of such documents being hearsay and incompetent.
Petitioner’s challenge against respondents’ documentary evidence on marriage and
heirship is not well-taken.
Section 24 and Section 25 of Rule 132 provide:
Section 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of
the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines,
with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept
is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
25

Section 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or
record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance,
that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may
be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any,
or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
Although Exhibit Q,12 Exhibit Q-1,13 Exhibit R14 and Exhibit R-115 were not attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record or by his deputy in the manner required in
Section 25 of Rule 132, and said documents did not comply with the requirement under
Section 24 of Rule 132 to the effect that if the record was not kept in the Philippines a
certificate of the person having custody must accompany the copy of the document that
was duly attested stating that such person had custody of the documents, the deviation
was not enough reason to reject the utility of the documents for the purposes they were
intended to serve.
Exhibit Q and Exhibit R were extracts from the registry of births of Oslo, Norway issued
on March 23, 2004 and signed by Y. Ayse B. Nordal, Registrar, and corresponded to
respondent Jonathan Christopher Harper and victim Christian Fredrik Harper,
respectively.16 Exhibit Q explicitly stated that Jonathan was the son of Christian Fredrik
Harper and Ellen Johanne Harper, while Exhibit R attested to the birth of Christian
Fredrik Harper on December 4, 1968. Exhibit Q and Exhibit R were authenticated on
March 29, 2004 by the signatures of Tanja Sorlie of the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Norway as well as by the official seal of that office. In turn, Consul Marian Jocelyn R.
Tirol of the Philippine Consulate in Stockholm, Sweden authenticated the signatures of
Tanja Sorlie and the official seal of the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway on
Exhibit Q and Exhibit R, explicitly certifying to the authority of Tanja Sorlie "to legalize
official documents for the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway." 17
Exhibit Q-1,18 the Marriage Certificate of Ellen Johanne Clausen Harper and Christian
Fredrik Harper, contained the following data, namely: (a) the parties were married on
June 29, 1996 in Ullern Church; and (b) the certificate was issued by the Office of the
Vicar of Ullern on June 29, 1996.
Exhibit Q-1 was similarly authenticated by the signature of Tanja Sorlie of the Royal
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, with the official seal of that office. Philippine
Consul Tirol again expressly certified to the capacity of Sorlie "to legalize official
documents for the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway," 19 and further certified
that the document was a true translation into English of a transcript of a Marriage
Certificate issued to Christian Frederik Harper and Ellen Johanne Clausen by the Vicar of
the Parish of Ullern on June 29, 1996.
Exhibit R-1,20 a Probate Court certificate issued by the Oslo Probate Court on February
18, 2000 through Morten Bolstad, its Senior Executive Officer, was also authenticated by
the signature of Tanja Sorlie and with the official seal of the Royal Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Norway. As with the other documents, Philippine Consul Tirol explicitly
certified to the capacity of Sorlie "to legalize official documents for the Royal Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Norway," and further certified that the document was a true
translation into English of the Oslo Probate Court certificate issued on February 18, 2000
EVIDENCE: WEEK 5, DAY 1 CASES
to the effect that Christian Fredrik Harper, born on December 4, 1968, had reportedly
died on November 6, 1999.21
The Oslo Probate Court certificate recited that both Ellen Johanne Harper and
Christopher S. Harper were Harper’s heirs, to wit:
The above names surviving spouse has accepted responsibility for the commitments of
the deceased in accordance with the provisions of Section 78 of the Probate Court Act
(Norway), and the above substitute guardian has agreed to the private division of the
estate.
The following heir and substitute guardian will undertake the private division of the
estate:
Ellen Johanne Harper
Christopher S. Harper
This probate court certificate relates to the entire estate.
Oslo Probate Court, 18 February 2000.22
The official participation in the authentication process of Tanja Sorlie of the Royal
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway and the attachment of the official seal of that office
on each authentication indicated that Exhibit Q, Exhibit R, Exhibit Q-1 and Exhibit R-1
were documents of a public nature in Norway, not merely private documents. It cannot
be denied that based on Philippine Consul Tirol’s official authentication, Tanja Sorlie was
"on the date of signing, duly authorized to legalize official documents for the Royal
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway." Without a showing to the contrary by petitioner,
Exhibit Q, Exhibit R, Exhibit Q-1 and Exhibit R-1 should be presumed to be themselves
official documents under Norwegian law, and admissible as prima facie evidence of the
truth of their contents under Philippine law.
At the minimum, Exhibit Q, Exhibit R, Exhibit Q-1 and Exhibit R-1 substantially met the
requirements of Section 24 and Section 25 of Rule 132 as a condition for their admission
as evidence in default of a showing by petitioner that the authentication process was
tainted with bad faith. Consequently, the objective of ensuring the authenticity of the
documents prior to their admission as evidence was substantially achieved.
In Constantino-David v. Pangandaman-Gania,23 the Court has said that substantial
compliance, by its very nature, is actually inadequate observance of the requirements of
a rule or regulation that are waived under equitable circumstances in order to facilitate
the administration of justice, there being no damage or injury caused by such flawed
compliance.
The Court has further said in Constantino-David v. Pangandaman-Gania that the focus in
every inquiry on whether or not to accept substantial compliance is always on the
presence of equitable conditions to administer justice effectively and efficiently without
damage or injury to the spirit of the legal obligation. 24 There are, indeed, such equitable
conditions attendant here, the foremost of which is that respondents had gone to great
26

lengths to submit the documents. As the CA observed, respondents’ compliance with the
requirements on attestation and authentication of the documents had not been easy;
they had to contend with many difficulties (such as the distance of Oslo, their place of
residence, from Stockholm, Sweden, where the Philippine Consulate had its office; the
volume of transactions in the offices concerned; and the safe transmission of the
documents to the Philippines).25 Their submission of the documents should be presumed
to be in good faith because they did so in due course. It would be inequitable if the
sincerity of respondents in obtaining and submitting the documents despite the
difficulties was ignored.
The principle of substantial compliance recognizes that exigencies and situations do
occasionally demand some flexibility in the rigid application of the rules of procedure
and the laws.26 That rules of procedure may be mandatory in form and application does
not forbid a showing of substantial compliance under justifiable circumstances, 27 because
substantial compliance does not equate to a disregard of basic rules. For sure, substantial
compliance and strict adherence are not always incompatible and do not always clash in
discord. The power of the Court to suspend its own rules or to except any particular case
from the operation of the rules whenever the purposes of justice require the suspension
cannot be challenged.28 In the interest of substantial justice, even procedural rules of the
most mandatory character in terms of compliance are frequently relaxed. Similarly, the
procedural rules should definitely be liberally construed if strict adherence to their letter
will result in absurdity and in manifest injustice, or where the merits of a party’s cause
are apparent and outweigh considerations of non-compliance with certain formal
requirements.29 It is more in accord with justice that a party-litigant is given the fullest
opportunity to establish the merits of his claim or defense than for him to lose his life,
liberty, honor or property on mere technicalities. Truly, the rules of procedure are
intended to promote substantial justice, not to defeat it, and should not be applied in a
very rigid and technical sense.30
Petitioner urges the Court to resolve the apparent conflict between the rulings in  Heirs of
Pedro Cabais v. Court of Appeals 31  (Cabais) and in Heirs of Ignacio Conti v. Court of
Appeals32  (Conti) establishing filiation through a baptismal certificate. 33
Petitioner’s urging is not warranted, both because there is no conflict between the
rulings in Cabais and Conti, and because neither Cabais nor Conti is relevant herein.
In Cabais, the main issue was whether or not the CA correctly affirmed the decision of the
RTC that had relied mainly on the baptismal certificate of Felipa C. Buesa to establish the
parentage and filiation of Pedro Cabais. The Court held that the petition was meritorious,
stating:
A birth certificate, being a public document, offers prima facie evidence of filiation and a
high degree of proof is needed to overthrow the presumption of truth contained in such
public document. This is pursuant to the rule that entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. The evidentiary nature of such document must, therefore, be sustained in the
absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity.
EVIDENCE: WEEK 5, DAY 1 CASES
On the contrary, a baptismal certificate is a private document, which, being hearsay, is
not a conclusive proof of filiation. It does not have the same probative value as a record
of birth, an official or public document. In US v. Evangelista, this Court held that church
registers of births, marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of
General Orders No. 68 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no longer public writings, nor
are they kept by duly authorized public officials. Thus, in this jurisdiction, a certificate of
baptism such as the one herein controversy is no longer regarded with the same
evidentiary value as official records of birth. Moreover, on this score, jurisprudence is
consistent and uniform in ruling that the canonical certificate of baptism is not sufficient
to prove recognition.34
The Court sustained the Cabais petitioners’ stance that the RTC had apparently erred in
relying on the baptismal certificate to establish filiation, stressing the baptismal
certificate’s limited evidentiary value as proof of filiation inferior to that of a birth
certificate; and declaring that the baptismal certificate did not attest to the veracity of the
statements regarding the kinsfolk of the one baptized. Nevertheless, the Court ultimately
ruled that it was respondents’ failure to present the birth certificate, more than anything
else, that lost them their case, stating that: "The unjustified failure to present the birth
certificate instead of the baptismal certificate now under consideration or to otherwise
prove filiation by any other means recognized by law weigh heavily against
respondents."35
In Conti, the Court affirmed the rulings of the trial court and the CA to the effect that the
Conti respondents were able to prove by preponderance of evidence their being the
collateral heirs of deceased Lourdes Sampayo. The Conti petitioners disagreed, arguing
that baptismal certificates did not prove the filiation of collateral relatives of the
deceased. Agreeing with the CA, the Court said:
We are not persuaded. Altogether, the documentary and testimonial evidence submitted
xxx are competent and adequate proofs that private respondents are collateral heirs of
Lourdes Sampayo.
xxx
Under Art. 172 of the Family Code, the filiation of legitimate children shall be proved by
any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, in the absence of a
record of birth or a parent’s admission of such legitimate filiation in a public or private
document duly signed by the parent. Such other proof of one’s filiation may be a
baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been
entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimonies of witnesses and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court. By analogy, this method of proving filiation may also be utilized in the instant
case.
Public documents are the written official acts, or records of the official act of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or a foreign country. The baptismal certificates presented in evidence by
private respondents are public documents. Parish priests continue to be the legal
27

custodians of the parish records and are authorized to issue true copies, in the form of
certificates, of the entries contained therein.
The admissibility of baptismal certificates offered by Lydia S. Reyes, absent the testimony
of the officiating priest or the official recorder, was settled in People v. Ritter, citing U.S.
v. de Vera (28 Phil. 105 1914, thus:
.... The entries made in the Registry Book may be considered as entries made in the
course of business under Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an exception to the hearsay
rule. The baptisms administered by the church are one of its transactions in the exercise
of ecclesiastical duties and recorded in the book of the church during this course of its
business.
It may be argued that baptismal certificates are evidence only of the administration of
the sacrament, but in this case, there were four (4) baptismal certificates which, when
taken together, uniformly show that Lourdes, Josefina, Remedios and Luis had the same
set of parents, as indicated therein. Corroborated by the undisputed testimony of
Adelaida Sampayo that with the demise of Lourdes and her brothers Manuel, Luis and
sister Remedios, the only sibling left was Josefina Sampayo Reyes, such baptismal
certificates have acquired evidentiary weight to prove filiation. 36
Obviously, Conti did not treat a baptismal certificate, standing alone, as sufficient to
prove filiation; on the contrary, Conti expressly held that a baptismal certificate had
evidentiary value to prove filiation if considered alongside other evidence of filiation. As
such, a baptismal certificate alone is not sufficient to resolve a disputed filiation.
Unlike Cabais and Conti, this case has respondents presenting several documents, like the
birth certificates of Harper and respondent Jonathan Harper, the marriage certificate of
Harper and Ellen Johanne Harper, and the probate court certificate, all of which were
presumably regarded as public documents under the laws of Norway. Such documentary
evidence sufficed to competently establish the relationship and filiation under the
standards of our Rules of Court.
II
Petitioner was liable due to its own negligence
Petitioner argues that respondents failed to prove its negligence; that Harper’s own
negligence in allowing the killers into his hotel room was the proximate cause of his own
death; and that hotels were not insurers of the safety of their guests.
The CA resolved petitioner’s arguments thuswise:
Defendant-appellant contends that the pivotal issue is whether or not it had committed
negligence and corollarily, whether its negligence was the immediate cause of the death
of Christian Harper. In its defense, defendant-appellant mainly avers that it is equipped
with adequate security system as follows: (1) keycards or vingcards for opening the
guest rooms, (2) two CCTV monitoring cameras on each floor of the hotel and (3) roving
guards with handheld radios, the number of which depends on the occupancy rate of the
EVIDENCE: WEEK 5, DAY 1 CASES
hotel. Likewise, it reiterates that the proximate cause of Christian Harper’s death was his
own negligence in inviting to his room the two (2) still unidentified suspects.
Plaintiffs-appellees in their Brief refute, in that, the liability of defendant-appellant is
based upon the fact that it was in a better situation than the injured person, Christian
Harper, to foresee and prevent the happening of the injurious occurrence. They maintain
that there is no dispute that even prior to the untimely demise of Christian Harper,
defendant-appellant was duly forewarned of its security lapses as pointed out by its
Chief Security Officer, Col. Rodrigo De Guzman, who recommended that one roving guard
be assigned on each floor of the hotel considering the length and shape of the corridors.
They posit that defendant-appellant’s inaction constitutes negligence.
This Court finds for plaintiffs-appellees.
As the action is predicated on negligence, the relevant law is Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, which states that –
"Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there was no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this chapter."
Negligence is defined as the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided
by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would
do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. The
Supreme Court likewise ruled that negligence is want of care required by the
circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application
depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the
circumstances reasonably require. In determining whether or not there is negligence on
the part of the parties in a given situation, jurisprudence has laid down the following
test: Did defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If
not, the person is guilty of negligence. The law, in effect, adopts the standard supposed to
be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet pater familias of the Roman law.
The test of negligence is objective. WE measure the act or omission of the tortfeasor with
a perspective as that of an ordinary reasonable person who is similarly situated. The test,
as applied to the extant case, is whether or not defendant-appellant, under the attendant
circumstances, used that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary reasonable
person would have used in the same situation.
WE rule in the negative.
In finding defendant-appellant remiss in its duty of exercising the required reasonable
care under the circumstances, the court a quo reasoned-out, to wit:
"Of the witnesses presented by plaintiffs to prove its (sic) case, the only one with
competence to testify on the issue of adequacy or inadequacy of security is Col. Rodrigo
28

De Guzman who was then the Chief Security Officer of defendant hotel for the year 1999.
He is a retired police officer and had vast experience in security jobs. He was likewise a
member of the elite Presidential Security Group.
He testified that upon taking over the job as the chief of the security force of the hotel, he
made an assessment of the security situation. Col. De Guzman was not satisfied with the
security set-up and told the hotel management of his desire to improve it. In his
testimony, De Guzman testified that at the time he took over, he noticed that there were
few guards in the elevated portion of the hotel where the rooms were located. The
existing security scheme then was one guard for 3 or 4 floors. He likewise testified that
he recommended to the hotel management that at least one guard must be assigned per
floor especially considering that the hotel has a long "L-shaped" hallway, such that one
cannot see both ends of the hallway. He further opined that "even one guard in that
hallway is not enough because of the blind portion of the hallway."
On cross-examination, Col. De Guzman testified that the security of the hotel was
adequate at the time the crime occurred because the hotel was not fully booked. He
qualified his testimony on direct in that his recommendation of one guard per floor is the
"ideal" set-up when the hotel is fully-booked.
Be that as it may, it must be noted that Col. De Guzman also testified that the reason why
the hotel management disapproved his recommendation was that the hotel was not
doing well. It is for this reason that the hotel management did not heed the
recommendation of Col. De Guzman, no matter how sound the recommendation was, and
whether the hotel is fully-booked or not. It was a business judgment call on the part of
the defendant.
Plaintiffs anchor its (sic) case on our law on quasi-delicts.
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict.
Liability on the part of the defendant is based upon the fact that he was in a better
situation than the injured person to foresee and prevent the happening of the injurious
occurrence.
There is no dispute that even prior to the untimely demise of Mr. Harper, defendant was
duly forewarned of the security lapses in the hotel. Col. De Guzman was particularly
concerned with the security of the private areas where the guest rooms are. He wanted
not just one roving guard in every three or four floors. He insisted there must be at least
one in each floor considering the length and the shape of the corridors. The trained eyes
of a security officer was (sic) looking at that deadly scenario resulting from that wide
security breach as that which befell Christian Harper.
The theory of the defense that the malefactor/s was/were known to Harper or was/were
visitors of Harper and that there was a shindig among [the] three deserves scant
consideration.
EVIDENCE: WEEK 5, DAY 1 CASES
The NBI Biology Report (Exh. "C" & "D") and the Toxicology Report (Exh. "E") belie the
defense theory of a joyous party between and among Harper and the unidentified
malefactor/s. Based on the Biology Report, Harper was found negative of prohibited and
regulated drugs. The Toxicology Report likewise revealed that the deceased was negative
of the presence of alcohol in his blood.
The defense even suggests that the malefactor/s gained entry into the private room of
Harper either because Harper allowed them entry by giving them access to the vingcard
or because Harper allowed them entry by opening the door for them, the usual gesture of
a room occupant to his visitors.
While defendant’s theory may be true, it is more likely, under the circumstances
obtaining that the malefactor/s gained entry into his room by simply knocking at
Harper’s door and the latter opening it probably thinking it was hotel personnel, without
an inkling that criminal/s could be in the premises.
The latter theory is more attuned to the dictates of reason. If indeed the female "visitor"
is known to or a visitor of Harper, she should have entered the the room together with
Harper. It is quite unlikely that a supposed "visitor" would wait three minutes to be with
a guest when he/she could go with the guest directly to the room. The interval of three
minutes in Harper’s entry and that of the alleged female visitor belies the "theory of
acquaintanceship". It is most likely that the female "visitor" was the one who opened the
door to the male "visitor", undoubtedly, a co-conspirator.
In any case, the ghastly incident could have been prevented had there been adequate
security in each of the hotel floors. This, coupled with the earlier recommendation of Col.
De Guzman to the hotel management to act on the security lapses of the hotel, raises the
presumption that the crime was foreseeable.
Clearly, defendant’s inaction constitutes negligence or want of the reasonable care
demanded of it in that particular situation.
In a case, the Supreme Court defined negligence as:
The failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of
care, precaution and vigilance, which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
person suffers injury.
Negligence is want of care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative,
not an absolute term, and its application depends upon the situation of the parties, and
the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably impose. Where the
danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary.
Moreover, in applying the premises liability rule in the instant case as it is applied in
some jurisdiction (sic) in the United States, it is enough that guests are injured while
inside the hotel premises to make the hotelkeeper liable. With great caution should the
liability of the hotelkeeper be enforced when a guest died inside the hotel premises.
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It also bears stressing that there were prior incidents that occurred in the hotel which
should have forewarned the hotel management of the security lapses of the hotel. As
testified to by Col. De Guzman, "there were ‘minor’ incidents" (loss of items) before the
happening of the instant case.
These "minor" incidents may be of little significance to the hotel, yet relative to the
instant case, it speaks volume. This should have served as a caveat that the hotel security
has lapses.
Makati Shangri-La Hotel, to stress, is a five-star hotel. The "reasonable care" that it must
exercise for the safety and comfort of its guests should be commensurate with the grade
and quality of the accommodation it offers. If there is such a thing as "five-star hotel
security", the guests at Makati Shangri-La surely deserves just that!
When one registers (as) a guest of a hotel, he makes the establishment the guardian of
his life and his personal belongings during his stay. It is a standard procedure of the
management of the hotel to screen visitors who call on their guests at their rooms. The
murder of Harper could have been avoided had the security guards of the Shangri-La
Hotel in Makati dutifully observed this standard procedure."
WE concur.
Well settled is the doctrine that "the findings of fact by the trial court are accorded great
respect by appellate courts and should not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court
has overlooked, ignored, or disregarded some fact or circumstances of sufficient weight
or significance which, if considered, would alter the situation." After a conscientious
sifting of the records, defendant-appellant fails to convince US to deviate from this
doctrine.
It could be gleaned from findings of the trial court that its conclusion of negligence on the
part of defendant-appellant is grounded mainly on the latter’s inadequate hotel security,
more particularly on the failure to deploy sufficient security personnel or roving guards
at the time the ghastly incident happened.
A review of the testimony of Col. De Guzman reveals that on direct examination he
testified that at the time he assumed his position as Chief Security Officer of defendant-
appellant, during the early part of 1999 to the early part of 2000, he noticed that some of
the floors of the hotel were being guarded by a few guards, for instance, 3 or 4 floors by
one guard only on a roving manner. He then made a recommendation that the ideal-set
up for an effective security should be one guard for every floor, considering that the hotel
is L-shaped and the ends of the hallways cannot be seen. At the time he made the
recommendation, the same was denied, but it was later on considered and approved on
December 1999 because of the Centennial Celebration.
On cross-examination, Col. De Guzman confirmed that after he took over as Chief
Security Officer, the number of security guards was increased during the first part of
December or about the last week of November, and before the incident happened, the
security was adequate. He also qualified that as to his direct testimony on "ideal-set up",
EVIDENCE: WEEK 5, DAY 1 CASES
he was referring to one guard for every floor if the hotel is fully booked. At the time he
made his recommendation in the early part of 1999, it was disapproved as the hotel was
not doing well and it was not fully booked so the existing security was adequate enough.
He further explained that his advice was observed only in the late November 1999 or the
early part of December 1999.
It could be inferred from the foregoing declarations of the former Chief Security Officer
of defendant-appellant that the latter was negligent in providing adequate security due
its guests. With confidence, it was repeatedly claimed by defendant-appellant that it is a
five-star hotel. Unfortunately, the record failed to show that at the time of the death of
Christian Harper, it was exercising reasonable care to protect its guests from harm and
danger by providing sufficient security commensurate to it being one of the finest hotels
in the country. In so concluding, WE are reminded of the Supreme Court’s enunciation
that the hotel business like the common carrier’s business is imbued with public interest.
Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for hotel
guests but also security to their persons and belongings. The twin duty constitutes the
essence of the business.
It is clear from the testimony of Col. De Guzman that his recommendation was initially
denied due to the fact that the business was then not doing well. The "one guard, one
floor" recommended policy, although ideal when the hotel is fully-booked, was observed
only later in November 1999 or in the early part of December 1999, or needless to state,
after the murder of Christian Harper. The apparent security lapses of defendant-
appellant were further shown when the male culprit who entered Christian Harper’s
room was never checked by any of the guards when he came inside the hotel. As per
interview conducted by the initial investigator, PO3 Cornelio Valiente to the guards, they
admitted that nobody know that said man entered the hotel and it was only through the
monitor that they became aware of his entry. It was even evidenced by the CCTV that
before he walked to the room of the late Christian Harper, said male suspect even looked
at the monitoring camera. Such act of the man showing wariness, added to the fact that
his entry to the hotel was unnoticed, at an unholy hour, should have aroused suspicion
on the part of the roving guard in the said floor, had there been any. Unluckily for
Christian Harper, there was none at that time.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces, the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred. More comprehensively, proximate cause is that cause
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as
an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom.
Defendant-appellant’s contention that it was Christian Harper’s own negligence in
allowing the malefactors to his room that was the proximate cause of his death, is
untenable. To reiterate, defendant-appellant is engaged in a business imbued with public
30

interest, ergo, it is bound to provide adequate security to its guests. As previously
discussed, defendant-appellant failed to exercise such reasonable care expected of it
under the circumstances. Such negligence is the proximate cause which set the chain of
events that led to the eventual demise of its guest. Had there been reasonable security
precautions, the same could have saved Christian Harper from a brutal death.
The Court concurs entirely with the findings and conclusions of the CA, which the Court
regards to be thorough and supported by the records of the trial. Moreover, the Court
cannot now review and pass upon the uniform findings of negligence by the CA and the
RTC because doing so would require the Court to delve into and revisit the factual bases
for the finding of negligence, something fully contrary to its character as not a trier of
facts. In that regard, the factual findings of the trial court that are supported by the
evidence on record, especially when affirmed by the CA, are conclusive on the
Court.37 Consequently, the Court will not review unless there are exceptional
circumstances for doing so, such as the following:
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
(f) When in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case,
or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(g) When the findings are contrary to the trial court;
(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based;
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; and
(k) When the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed
by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. 38
None of the exceptional circumstances obtains herein. Accordingly, the Court cannot
depart from or disturb the factual findings on negligence of petitioner made by both the
RTC and the CA.39
EVIDENCE: WEEK 5, DAY 1 CASES
Even so, the Court agrees with the CA that petitioner failed to provide the basic and
adequate security measures expected of a five-star hotel; and that its omission was the
proximate cause of Harper’s death.
The testimony of Col. De Guzman revealed that the management practice prior to the
murder of Harper had been to deploy only one security or roving guard for every three
or four floors of the building; that such ratio had not been enough considering the L-
shape configuration of the hotel that rendered the hallways not visible from one or the
other end; and that he had recommended to management to post a guard for each floor,
but his recommendation had been disapproved because the hotel "was not doing well" at
that particular time.40
Probably realizing that his testimony had weakened petitioner’s position in the case, Col.
De Guzman soon clarified on cross-examination that petitioner had seen no need at the
time of the incident to augment the number of guards due to the hotel being then only
half-booked. Here is how his testimony went:
ATTY MOLINA:
I just forgot one more point, Your Honor please. Was there ever a time, Mr. Witness, that
your recommendation to post a guard in every floor ever considered and approved by
the hotel?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: When was this?
A: That was on December 1999 because of the Centennial Celebration when the hotel
accepted so many guests wherein most of the rooms were fully booked and I
recommended that all the hallways should be guarded by one guard. 41
xxx
ATTY COSICO:
Q: So at that time that you made your recommendation, the hotel was half-filled.
A: Maybe.
Q: And even if the hotel is half-filled, your recommendation is that each floor shall be
maintained by one security guard per floors?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Would you agree with me that even if the hotel is half-filled, there is no need to
increase the guards because there were only few customers?
31
 EVIDENCE: WEEK 5, DAY 1 CASES

A: I think so. Civil Code (all of which concerned the hotelkeepers’ degree of care and responsibility as
to the personal effects of their guests), we hold that there is much greater reason to
Q: So you will agree with me that each floor should be maintained by one security guard apply the same if not greater degree of care and responsibility when the lives and
if the rooms are filled up or occupied? personal safety of their guests are involved. Otherwise, the hotelkeepers would simply
stand idly by as strangers have unrestricted access to all the hotel rooms on the pretense
of being visitors of the guests, without being held liable should anything untoward befall
A: Yes sir. the unwary guests. That would be absurd, something that no good law would ever
envision.
Q: Now, you even testified that from January 1999 to November 1999 thereof, only minor
incidents were involved? In fine, the Court sees no reversible-error on the part of the CA.

A: Yes sir. WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the judgment of the Court of Appeals;

and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
Q: So it would be correct to say that the security at that time in February was adequate?
SO ORDERED.
A: I believe so.

Q: Even up to November when the incident happened for that same reason, security was
adequate?

A: Yes, before the incident.

Q: Now, you testified on direct that the hotel posted one guard each floor?

A: Yes sir.

Q: And it was your own recommendation?

A: Yes, because we are expecting that the hotel will be filled up.

Q: In fact, the hotel was fully booked?

A: Yes sir.42

Petitioner would thereby have the Court believe that Col. De Guzman’s initial
recommendation had been rebuffed due to the hotel being only half-booked; that there
had been no urgency to adopt a one-guard-per-floor policy because security had been
adequate at that time; and that he actually meant by his statement that "the hotel was not
doing well" that the hotel was only half-booked.

We are not convinced.

The hotel business is imbued with public interest. Catering to the public, hotelkeepers
are bound to provide not only lodging for their guests but also security to the persons
and belongings of their guests. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the
business.43 Applying by analogy Article 2000,44 Article 200145 and Article 200246 of the

32