THINKING & REASONING, 2012, 18 (3), 225–243

Introduction

Reasoning and argumentation: Towards an integrated

psychology of argumentation

Jos Hornikx1 and Ulrike Hahn2

1
Department of Business Communication, Radboud University Nijmegen,
Nijmegen, The Netherlands
2
School of Psychology, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK

Although argumentation plays an essential role in our lives, there is no

integrated area of research on the psychology of argumentation. Instead
research on argumentation is conducted in a number of separate research
communities that are spread across disciplines and have only limited interaction.
With a view to bridging these different strands, we first distinguish between three
meanings of the word ‘‘argument’’: argument as a reason, argument as a
structured sequence of reasons and claims, and argument as a social exchange.
All three meanings are integral to a complete understanding of human reasoning
and cognition. Cognitive psychological research on argumentation has focused
mostly on the first and second of these meanings, so we present perspectives on
argumentation from outside of cognitive psychology, which focus on the second
and third. Specifically, we give an overview of the methods, goals, and
disciplinary backgrounds of research on the production, the analysis, and the
evaluation of arguments. Finally, in introducing the experimental studies
included in this special issue, which were conducted by researchers from a range
of theoretical backgrounds, we underline the breadth of argumentation research
as well as stress opportunities for mutual awareness and integration.

Keywords: Argumentation; Argument quality; Fallacies; Persuasion;

Reasoning.

Given the importance of argumentation to our lives, it seems surprising

that there is no established core area within cognitive psychology of that
name. What there has been, of course, is a long tradition of research on

Correspondence should be addressed to Jos Hornikx, Department of Business Commu-

nication, Centre for Language Studies, Radboud University Nijmegen, P.O. Box 9103, 6500
HD Nijmegen, The Netherlands. E-mail: j.hornikx@let.ru.nl

Ó 2012 Psychology Press, an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business
http://www.psypress.com/tar http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2012.674715
226 HORNIKX AND HAHN

‘‘reasoning’’; but it has become increasingly clear that reasoning research as

traditionally conceived has been too narrow in its focus in a number of
ways. These may be traced by considering the different, interrelated
meanings that the term ‘‘argument’’ has—a term that has been central to
reasoning research.
The first sense of the term ‘‘argument’’ to be distinguished here is an
argument as a ‘‘reason’’. Giving an argument for something is providing a
reason for it. The strongest such reason possible is one from which the claim
or conclusion in question follows by necessity.
This leads on to the second, closely related, sense of the term argument.
Here the term is used not just to refer to the reason itself but to the core unit
of reason and claim. It is in this sense that the term ‘‘logical argument’’ is
understood: namely as a structured unit comprising one or more premises
and a conclusion. Probably the most well-known example of such an
argument is the conditional argument modus ponens:
If daffodils are red, the moon is made of cheese
Daffodils are red
.........
The moon is made of cheese.

For much of the last 50 years, ‘‘argument’’ within cognitive psychology

has been largely synonymous with ‘‘logical argument’’ in this sense.
Likewise, ‘‘reasoning’’, as a cognitive activity, to a great extent has simply
meant ‘‘logical reasoning’’. From a logical perspective, the crucial aspect of
interest in arguments is the presence or absence of a logical consequence
relation between premises and conclusion. Consequently the focus of
psychological research on logical reasoning has been on people’s ability to
distinguish logically valid from invalid arguments.
However, as has become abundantly clear, most of our everyday thought
does not involve deduction (see e.g., Evans, 2002; Oaksford & Chater,
1991), not just because we might be ‘‘poor’’ logical reasoners, but because
much of our everyday reasoning involves uncertain information and
relevance relations between pieces of information that are beyond the remit
of (classical) logic. Consequently, a number of other ‘reasoning’ literatures
emerged within cognitive psychology. For example, a literature emerged on
‘‘inductive reasoning’’ which, following on from the seminal work of Rips
(1975) and Osherson, Smith, Wilkie and Lopez (1990), centred around
‘‘category-based induction’’; that is, a type of inductive argument that
involves inferences about members of a category on the basis of information
about other categories. A standard example here is given by the following
two arguments, of which the second is typically perceived to be stronger
than the first (a phenomenon known as the ‘‘typicality effect’’ in category-
based induction):
 REASONING AND ARGUMENTATION 227
Penguins have ulnar arteries
.........
All birds have ulnar arteries

versus
Robins have ulnar arteries
.........
All birds have ulnar arteries

Although the literature on category-based induction has remained largely

separate from the logical reasoning literature (for some exceptions see Heit
& Rotello, 2010, 2012 this issue), it too has focused on ‘‘arguments’’ in the
sense of one (or more) premises and a conclusion.
In short, the resultant psychology of reasoning has been very selective
given the breadth of everyday reasoning activities. Much is to be gained here
from the general realisation that there are many distinct types of premise–
conclusion schemes that are every bit as prevalent and practically important
(if not more so) as the narrow range of logical (e.g., modus ponens, modus
tollens etc.) or inductive arguments (e.g., category-based induction) that
have been studied so extensively in the past. Furthermore, these many
distinct types of premise–conclusion schemes may be amenable to
theoretically unified treatment. Much of the most recent literature on
reasoning and argument that has examined, for example, other forms of
conditionals such as persuasions, dissuasions, or slippery slope arguments
(e.g., Beller, Bender, & Kuhnmünch, 2005; Bonnefon, 2009; Bonnefon &
Hilton, 2004; Corner, Hahn, & Oaksford, 2011; Hahn & Oaksford, 2007a;
Ohm & Thompson, 2004; Thompson, Evans, & Handley, 2005) may be seen
as attempts to redress the theoretical imbalance and broaden out reasoning
research in this way.
A further limitation in the focus of reasoning research has been that
arguments as structured units need not be restricted to a single claim and
reason. Although many logical arguments involve multiple premises (as in
the modus ponens example above), these multiple premises typically
combine in such a way as to jointly constitute only a single reason.
However, the term argument in the structural sense can also readily refer to
longer sequences of individual claims, counter-claims, and supporting
statements. For example, something that constitutes a ‘‘well-developed’’
argument will typically involve more than a simple, single reason, even if the
topic itself is trivial. Consider, for example, the following case for picking up
the milk before lunch:
It would be good to pick up the milk before lunch, because there would be
some in the house for a cappuccino with dessert, but going to the shops
now will mean not being able to finish the paper. However, it looks like that
228 HORNIKX AND HAHN

really might not be finished anyway. On the other hand, maybe now would be
a good time to stop having dessert, after all, it has become clear that there is a
bit too much sugar in my diet. So then the cappuccino is also not really a
priority.
So skip the milk.

This overall ‘‘argument’’ for (not) picking up the milk for lunch involves
not just a single, overall conclusion, but also intermediate conclusions
(‘‘stop having dessert’’), as well as a variety of supporting reasons (‘‘going to
the shops will mean not finishing the paper’’) and counter reasons (‘‘but that
it won’t get finished anyway’’) which individually constitute ‘‘arguments’’ in
the first sense.
In fact, the realisation that much of ‘‘everyday’’ argument takes this more
complex form was arguably one of the reasons philosophers such as
Toulmin (1958) came to the conclusion that there is much more to argument
and argumentation than logic, and that a different framework for dealing
with argument was required. According to Toulmin an overall argument can
be broken down into distinct types of components: a claim (that is, the
conclusion whose merits are to be established); data (that is, the facts that
are used to support the claim); and warrants (that is, the reasons that are
used to justify the connections). Toulmin’s framework (and others like it)
has been influential in education and developmental research on argumen-
tation (e.g., Brem, Russell, & Weems, 2001; Kelly, Druker, & Chen, 1998).
However, treatment of interconnected sequences of claims and counter-
claims has been virtually absent from mainstream cognitive psychology
(for exceptions see Bailenson & Rips, 1996; McKenzie, Lee, & Chen, 2002;
Rips, 1998).
Finally, it is only when one considers more complex arguments as
structured units, such as the preceding example, that a third and final
distinct sense of the term argument comes into view. Specifically, the term
argument can be used not just to refer to information content—whether this
be a single premise and conclusion pair or a sequence interconnected claims
and counter-claims—but also to the dialogical, social activity that may be
giving rise to these claims. So, for example, the above sequence of claims,
supporting reasons, and counter-claims might reflect not the thoughts of a
single reasoner, but actually form the information content of an adversarial
dialogue with distinct proponents:
John: It would be good to pick up the milk before lunch
Joan: Why?
John: Because there would be some in the house for a cappuccino with dessert
Joan: But going to the shops now will mean not being able to finish the paper
John: But it looks like that really might not be finished anyway!
. . . etc.
 REASONING AND ARGUMENTATION 229

At the level of social activity, philosophers have distinguished different

kinds of argument, ranging from ‘‘quarrels’’ through to rational debate (see,
e.g., Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004). A specific type, such as rational
debate, is characterised by procedural rules or norms that must be respected
in order for an argument to qualify as being of this type. Again there has
been not just theoretical work within philosophy, but also empirical, and
often experimental work on people’s appreciation of these procedural norms
(Christmann, Mischo, & Groeben, 2000; Mischo, 2003; Schreier, Groeben,
& Christmann, 1995; Van Eemeren, Garssen, & Meuffels, 2009, 2012 this
issue). However, this work too has been largely absent from mainstream
cognitive psychology.
It is the contention of this special issue of Thinking & Reasoning that these
different senses of the word ‘‘argument’’—argument as reason, argument as
structured sequence of reasons and claims, and argument as a social
exchange—need to be brought together.1 All three are integral to the
complex phenomenon that is argument, which itself seems central to our
understanding of higher-level cognition. Moreover, we believe that under-
standing, both theoretically and empirically, even any single one of the
three different senses of argument distinguished here requires attention to
the others.
There is ample evidence, for example, that attempts to understand our
‘‘reasoning’’ ability—that is, our ability to evaluate individual premise–
conclusion connections—must take into account that, in our everyday lives,
such reasoning is typically embedded in broader argumentative contexts
(of the second and third sense; Hahn & Oaksford, 2007a). The presence or
absence of such wider argumentative context may influence profoundly the
seeming levels of competence observed, a point that has recently been
developed extensively within Mercier and Sperber’s argumentative theory
of reasoning (2011). At the same time reasoning experiments, like other
psychological experiments, are themselves communicative situations, and
the way participants interpret those communicative situations will be
influenced by pragmatic rules of communication outside the laboratory.
This can give rise to systematic differences in interpretation between

1
The three senses of argument as (1) reason, as (2) a structured unit of reason(s) and
claims(s), and (3) as a dialogical, social exchange distinguished here are related to a distinction
by O’Keefe (1977). O’Keefe distinguishes two sense of argument: the first is a particular kind of
utterance or communicative act (as in ‘‘he made an argument’’), and the second a particular
kind of interaction; that is, an argument in the first sense is something a person makes, whereas
in the second sense it is something two or more people have. This second sense corresponds to
arguments as dialogical, social exchange. In contrast to O’Keefe’s first sense of argument,
arguments as reasons or structured units of reasons and claims as we conceive of them, can, but
need not be, expressed in ‘‘utterances’’ or ‘‘communicative acts’’, in the same way that standard
logical derivations do not consider premise material to be conversational.
230 HORNIKX AND HAHN

experimenters and participants of what the task is actually about—much to

the detriment of the experimental finding (see Hilton, 1995). To provide just
one example, Nisbett, Zukier and Lemley (1981) found evidence of seeming
irrationality in people’s evaluation of reasons in that the addition of non-
diagnostic information lessened the impact of a diagnostic reason lessened
(the so-called ‘‘dilution effect’’), However, Gricean conversational norms
(Grice, 1975) mean that information presented in communication has the
presumption of relevance. Hence participants seek to incorporate the non-
diagnostic information, because they assume they have been given it with
good cause (Peters & Rothbart, 2000; Tetlock, Lerner, & Boettger, 1996);
they actively try to make relevant what the experimenter deemed irrelevant
because their reasoning is set in the communicative context of the
experiment.
Conversely, those researchers studying complex sequences of claims and
counter-claims or those focusing on procedural rules of debate still require
insight into the normative relationship between individual premises and
conclusions, and the extent to which premise material does or does not
support a particular inference (see for discussion also Hahn & Oaksford,
2007b, 2012).
In light of this, the aim of this special issue is to bring together
psychological, experimental research originating in what are presently
distinct and very much separate communities (cognitive psychologists,
communication researchers, and philosophers) that highlights some of these
different aspects. It is our hope that bringing together research (and
researchers) in this way will increase mutual awareness of the many facets of
argument and provide a step towards a broad and integrated psychology of
argumentation, which (in our view) should be a cornerstone of cognitive
psychology.

RESEARCH ON ARGUMENT: WHO DOES WHAT

(AND WHERE)?
If there are many ways to think about the term ‘‘argument’’, it should come
as no surprise that research on argumentation is diverse in its methods
(e.g., analytical, empirical), its goals (e.g., the analysis or evaluation of
arguments), and its disciplinary backgrounds (e.g., philosophy, linguistics,
psychology, computer science). As a consequence, there is no common,
accepted theory of what constitutes argumentation.
However, scholars appear to agree that the study of argumentation
centres around (at least) three different, but interrelated, topics: the
production, the analysis, and the evaluation of arguments (Van Eemeren,
Grootendorst, & Snoeck Henkemans, 1996). In the following we introduce
different perspectives on argumentation. We focus in particular on research
 REASONING AND ARGUMENTATION 231

that is from outside cognitive psychology and hence is complementary to the

reasoning and argumentation work discussed so far.
This overview is organised around the three central topics of production,
analysis, and evaluation. For each of these topics we explain the specific
research goals involved, and situate research relative to the three senses
of ‘‘argument’’ distinguished above. We also identify the main methods
that are used, the disciplines within which that research typically takes
place, and the key journals in which it is published. It should be noted that
even research grouped here under the same header (e.g., production,
analysis, or evaluation), may be very heterogeneous in detail, with respect
to both methodology and theoretical background or perspective. In
providing this overview our aim is not to be exhaustive, but to give a
broad sense of what kinds of research on argumentation have been
conducted.2 Interested readers who want a more complete overview of
approaches may consult, for instance, Van Eemeren et al. (1996, 2012) and
Hahn and Oaksford (2012).

PRODUCTION OF ARGUMENTS
The study of argument production aims to investigate how ordinary
language users employ arguments. Questions that have been addressed are,
among others: What kinds of arguments are used in professional persuasive
documents (Schellens & De Jong, 2004) or in students’ speeches (Kline,
1971)? What kinds of evidence are employed in presidential debates
(Levasseur & Dean, 1996)? What kinds of arguments or evidence would
people prefer to use if they had to persuade another person (Hornikx, 2008),
and why (Hample & Dallinger, 2006)? Does mood affect the kinds of
arguments people produce to oppose or favour a standpoint (Bohner &
Schwarz, 1993)? How do students write an argumentative text (Wolfe, Britt,
& Butler, 2009)?

2
Readers should also note that we have largely neglected research on argumentation within
computer science and artificial intelligence (AI) in the following. While there has been a
burgeoning interest in argumentation (for an overview see, e.g., Bench-Capon & Dunne, 2007;
Rahwan & Simari, 2009), and there has been work on production (Carenini & Moore, 2006;
Green, Dwight, Navoraphan & Stadler, 2011; Zukerman, 2009) or assisted production (see
Verheij, 2003), analysis (e.g., Rahwan, Zablith & Reed, 2007; Reed & Rowe, 2004), and
evaluation (in particular in the context of non-classical logics, e.g., Amgoud & Cayrol, 2002;
Dung, 1995; for a review of non-classical logics for argumentation see Prakken & Vreeswijk,
2002; for other approaches see, e.g., Pollock, 2001), there have been fewer links with empirical
psychological work to date (for an exception see Rahwan, Madakkatel, Bonnefon, Awan &
Abdallah, 2010), and there is no research from these communities represented in the present
special issue.
232 HORNIKX AND HAHN

These kinds of questions relate to our first meaning of the term

‘‘argument’’: an argument as a reason that you give for a standpoint. Studies
on argument production are generally descriptive, and usually empirically
oriented. They are often conducted by scholars working in (speech)
communication and rhetoric, and are published in journals such as
Argumentation, Argumentation and Advocacy, and Communication Mono-
graphs.

ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS
This second group of argument research focuses on detailed analysis of
arguments or argumentative discourse. Researchers aim to best describe a
text, film, or debate from an argumentative perspective. Important
questions are: What is the argumentative structure of (complex) argumen-
tative discourse (Snoeck Henkemans, 2000, 2003)? What exactly is a
standpoint (Houtlosser, 1998), and how do people use discourse markers to
express standpoints (Craig & Sanusi, 2000)? How do people use language to
indicate different ‘‘moves’’ in argumentative discourse (Van Eemeren,
Houtlosser, & Snoeck Henkemans, 2008)? Which kinds of argumentation
schemes (generalised types of argument) can be distinguished (e.g., Godden
& Walton, 2007; Kienpointner, 1992)? How are discussions moderated
(Weger & Aakhus, 2005)? And, from a methodological point of view, what
means are available for analysing discourse (e.g., Pallotta & Delmonte,
2011; Reznitskaya & Anderson, 2006)?
Such analysis of arguments relates to our second and third meanings of
‘‘argument’’. Argument as a unit that consists of a claim and a reason
(second meaning) is relevant when analysis is conducted on extant concrete
samples of argumentative discourse (e.g., Zenker, 2010). For genres such as
films and debates, the third meaning comes into play: the dialogical, social
activity in which people argue. Research on argument analysis is descriptive,
and empirical. It is often conducted by scholars working in (speech)
communication, rhetoric, informal logic, and pragma-dialectics. Readings
can be found in edited books (e.g., Van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2005;
Van Haaften, Jansen, De Jong, & Koetsenruijter, 2011), and outlets such as
Argumentation, Argumentation and Advocacy, Argument and Computation,
Cogency, Informal Logic, and Rhetoric Society Quarterly.

EVALUATION OF ARGUMENTS
Research concerned with the analysis of argumentative discourse is often
(though by no means necessarily) followed by evaluation of arguments as a
natural, second step. Whereas the analysis of arguments is relatively non-
judgmental in that it does not judge whether, for instance, the underlying
 REASONING AND ARGUMENTATION 233

argumentative structure found in the text is correct, studies on argument

evaluation judge the quality of arguments and argumentative discourse.
Central questions are: What is good argumentative practice, and what are
strong and weak arguments? These questions can be formulated more
concretely, such as in: What distinguishes fallacies from reasonable
arguments (e.g., Hahn & Oaksford, 2006; Tindale, 2007; Van Eemeren
et al., 2009; Walton, 1995)? What rules and norms are important for
reasonable argumentation (e.g., Godden & Walton, 2007; Kienpointner,
1992)?
Like research on the analysis of arguments, argument evaluation research
relates to our second and third meaning of ‘‘argument’’—arguments as
structured units comprising reasons and claims, and arguments as dialogues.
In contrast with research on production and analysis, research on argument
evaluation is largely normative, and analytically oriented: what should
‘‘good’’ argumentation be like? The specific tools for argument evaluation
differ depending on the theoretical paradigm chosen. Theoretical frame-
works include so-called informal logic (e.g., Govier, 2005; Johnson, 2000;
Walton, 1997) and pragma-dialectics (e.g., Van Eemeren & Grootendorst,
2004), along with the more familiar standards of logic, probability theory
and statistics that are used also in the related study of ‘‘evidence’’, be it in
philosophy of science (e.g., Howson & Urbach, 1996), epistemology (e.g.,
Bovens & Hartmann, 2003), or law (see, e.g., Schum, 1994). Finally, many
empirical studies have relied on intuitive criteria, or special purpose
evaluation schemes tailored to the specific aspect or domain of argumenta-
tion at hand (see e.g., Driver, Newton, & Osborne, 2000; Kuhn, Shaw, &
Felton, 1997).
At the same time there are descriptive, empirical, approaches to
evaluating arguments that equate argument quality with persuasive success.
These approaches focus on the effects of arguments on receivers, and are
typically taken by scholars in communication (working on persuasion and
decision making; see O’Keefe, 2002, for an introduction), by scholars in
social psychology (working on persuasion and attitude change; see, e.g.,
Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Maio & Haddock, 2010, for introductions), and by
researchers in the field of rhetoric (for an overview see Lunsford, Wilson &
Eberly, 2009). Among the questions are: Does making an explicit standpoint
(O’Keefe, 1997) or explicit justification (O’Keefe, 1998) an argument more
persuasive? Is evidence that respects normative criteria for good argumenta-
tion more persuasive than evidence that does not respect such criteria
(Hoeken & Hustinx, 2009; Hornikx & De Best, 2011; Hornikx & Hoeken,
2007)? Under which conditions are strong arguments more effective than
weak arguments in persuasive texts (Park, Levine, Kingsley Westerman,
Orfgen, & Foregger, 2007)? Research on argument evaluation can be found
in all the journals mentioned above.
234 HORNIKX AND HAHN

OVERVIEW OF THIS SPECIAL ISSUE

Having set the stage, we now turn to the individual papers in this special
issue of Thinking & Reasoning. Our aim has been to bring together
researchers from the different strands of argumentation research that we
have described in the context of a journal aimed traditionally at a cognitive
psychology audience. It is hoped not only that this has led to an interesting
set of articles, but also that this diversity will serve to consolidate
argumentation research and raise overall awareness and interest in the
field. The breadth of the topic ‘‘argumentation’’ is reflected in the fact that
the contributors to this issue are drawn from psychology, philosophy,
communications, and cognitive science departments, and business pro-
grammes. Nevertheless, all papers constitute ‘‘experimental psychology’’,
and report the outcomes of novel, experimental studies.
The paper by Heit and Rotello on The pervasive effects of argument length
on inductive reasoning deals with the question of how the amount of evidence
is balanced against the strength of the evidence in one specific context in
which the two can dissociate, namely where short, but logically valid,
arguments may be contrasted with longer, but only inductively probable,
arguments. Heit and Rotello experimentally address the question of whether
argument length is so compelling that people cannot help being influenced
by it. Materials and format of these experiments are paradigmatic of
reasoning research within cognitive psychology. At the same time, however,
Heit and Rotello set their question in the context of an extensive review of
relevant literature drawn from a wide range of research areas. These include
not just core cognitive topics such as category-based inductive reasoning
and causal reasoning, but also argumentation and persuasion research, thus
exemplifying the way in which these areas may be linked to mutual benefit.
The second contribution in this special issue, Belief bias in informal
reasoning by Thompson and Evans, also has the reasoning literature as its
point of departure. Specifically, it starts with a standard phenomenon within
the logical reasoning literature, namely that judgements of logical validity
are influenced both by actual validity and the believability of the
conclusions, and show an interaction between the two. Apparently
analogous effects of belief and argument strength have been observed in
informal reasoning; however, the design of those studies has not made it
possible to examine directly whether belief bias in formal and informal
reasoning is a unitary phenomenon. Thompson and Evans paper redesigns
two familiar, informal reasoning tasks—the Argument Evaluation Task
(AET, Stanovich & West, 1997) and a Law of Large Numbers (LLN,
Klaczynski & Robinson, 2000) task—in order to test the similarity of the
belief bias in informal reasoning tasks. Thompson and Evans find little
support for the idea of a unitary phenomenon. Their studies underline the
 REASONING AND ARGUMENTATION 235

fact that findings reported in formal reasoning tasks do not always translate
to results in more informal reasoning tasks, which are more close to
everyday argumentation.
Harris, Hsu and Madsen’s paper Because Hitler did it! Quantitative tests
of Bayesian argumentation using ad hominem is a contribution to the
emerging Bayesian approach to argumentation. ‘‘Ad hominem’’ arguments
(see e.g., Walton, 1998) are arguments that target the proponent of a claim
instead of the claim itself. Ad hominem arguments have often been viewed
as fallacious, on the grounds that a statement may be sound even if the
person uttering it is not. However, it is also clear that characteristics of the
source may be informative in considering a claim. For example, when we
lack sufficient expertise to evaluate it ourselves, we may rely on an expert
(e.g., Walton, 1997). In light of this, argumentation researchers have sought
to characterise the circumstances under which the nature of the source
should or should not be taken into account (e.g., Walton, 1997, 1998, 2008)
and how source considerations should be integrated with other criteria in
evaluating how convinced we should be by a given argument (Hahn, Harris,
& Corner, 2009; Hahn, Oaksford, & Harris, in press). In this special issue
Harris et al. examine a specific type of argument found in many real-world
argumentation contexts which appeals to the fact that Hitler might have
endorsed a particular policy as sufficient grounds for rejecting that policy.
Harris et al. provide a Bayesian (probabilistic) formalisation of the
‘‘ad Hitlerum’’ argument, as a special case of the ad hominem argument.
They then demonstrate, across three experiments, how people’s evaluation
of this argument is sensitive to probabilistic factors deemed relevant on this
Bayesian formalisation. Importantly, they also go beyond past research
within this framework by providing direct quantitative evidence in favour of
the Bayesian approach to argumentation from a priori, parameter-free,
model fits.
Ad hominem arguments are also the focus of Van Eemeren, Garssen, and
Meuffels’ paper The disguised abusive ad hominem empirically investigated:
Strategic manoeuvring with direct personal attacks. However, the ad
hominem argument is viewed from a very different theoretical perspective
in this paper. Van Eemeren et al.’s contribution stems from a research
tradition focusing on the kinds of procedural rules that define reasonable
argumentation (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004). While much of that
research tradition has been concerned solely with normative issues, more
recent work has also started to examine empirically the descriptive,
psychological question of the extent to which lay people are sensitive to
procedural norms for rational argument (Van Eemeren et al., 2009; for
studies beyond pragma-dialectics, see also O’Keefe, 2007). This has direct
bearing on putative fallacies of argumentation such as the ad hominem
argument, because authors such as Van Eemeren and colleagues have
236 HORNIKX AND HAHN

argued specifically for a procedural treatment of the traditional catalogue of

fallacies, whereby arguments such as the ad hominem argument are viewed
as fallacious specifically because they violate fundamental procedural norms
of rational arguments (specifically, it is an attempt to eliminate the opponent
as a serious partner in a discussion by undermining his or her right to
advance a standpoint or to cast doubt on a standpoint, see, e.g., Van
Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004; see also Walton, 1997, for a related
position). Van Eemeren, Garssen, and Meuffels’ contribution to this special
issue takes on the ad hominem argument, outlining how and why it may be
fallacious from a pragma-dialectical perspective. At the same time, the paper
seeks to address a puzzle that has emerged from recent empirical research
within the pragma-dialectical tradition. Specifically, Van Eemeren et al.
(2009) found that ordinary language users judge to be unreasonable
discussion moves that are considered fallacious from a pragma-dialectical
perspective. In light of this it may seem surprising that fallacies such as the
ad hominem argument occur and often seem not to be noticed by the
participants in the discourse. Van Eemeren and colleagues argue that this
tension may be resolved by the fact that fallacious instances of ad hominem
arguments may be masked or disguised as instances of non-fallacious
versions of this argument form. Specifically, Van Eemeren et al. analyse so-
called abusive ad hominem attacks (which are clearly fallacious) as a mode of
strategic manoeuvring which takes on a reasonable appearance in real-life
situations when it mimics legitimate critical reactions to authority
argumentation. This explanation is then tested in two experiments. Results
show that, indeed, when the ad hominem arguments are presented as
criticising arguments by authority, they are seen to be more reasonable.
It should be clear from the preceding discussion that, while classic
fallacies such as the ad hominem argument or the appeal to authority are
topics that have only fairly recently started to attract experimental,
psychological research (see e.g., Corner et al., 2011; Hahn & Oaksford,
2007a; Neuman, Glassner, & Weinstock, 2004; Neuman, Weinstock, &
Glasner, 2006; Neuman & Weitzman, 2003; Rips, 2002; Weinstock,
Neuman, & Tabak, 2004), they have been the long-standing focus of
theoretical inquiry, in particular within philosophy. One might assume that
a long history of research on argumentation across a range of different
disciplines (as outlined above) would have identified all the basic topics or
issues that psychological research should address if we are to gain an
understanding of how it is that people generate and evaluate arguments.
However, such an assumption would be mistaken. Mercier and Strick-
land’s paper Evaluating arguments from the reaction of the audience draws
attention to a probabilistic cue to argument evaluation that has been
overlooked. Specifically, observers might evaluate arguments by the reaction
they evoke in an audience—a type of evaluation that is likely to occur when
 REASONING AND ARGUMENTATION 237

people are not privy to the actual content of the argument or when they are
not expert enough to appropriately evaluate it. Mercier and Strickland’s
paper presents a series of four experiments providing a first empirical
examination of this important social cue.
Similarly, Bonnefon’s paper Utility conditionals as consequential argu-
ments: A random sampling experiment draws attention to the fact that people
must not only have a capacity for evaluating arguments, but often they first
need to work out what the argument is. Orthogonal to much of the work
presented in this special issue, which concerns itself with the question of
when and why an argument might be considered to be weak or strong,
Bonnefon’s paper focuses on one how we generate interpretations for
certain kinds of arguments, namely arguments involving consequential
arguments, such as ‘‘if you do this, I will hurt you’’. Researchers have
sought to characterise formally the circumstance under which such
arguments should be viewed as convincing or not (Thompson et al., 2005;
Hoeken, Timmers, & Schellens, 2012 this issue). Bonnefon’s concern, by
contrast, is how it is that we work out, in the absence of any other
contextual information, that the speaker of this argument is seeking to
provide support for the claim that ‘‘this’’ (whatever it may be) should not be
done. Bonnefon’s recent (2009) theory of utility conditionals provides a
framework for generating such arguments and a simple ‘‘inference engine’’
that reasoner’s may draw on when inferring a default interpretation.
Although not cast explicitly in this way, one might view this interpretation
process as guided by generic assumptions about behaviour that mean that
those interpretations are preferred on which the statement would seem like
the stronger argument. Hence this paper too emphasises the close links
between reasoning and argumentation and the benefits that arise from
considering the two together.
The last paper in the issue, Hoeken, Timmers, and Schellens’ Arguing
about desirable consequences: What constitutes a convincing argument? draws
together many of the themes that run through the other papers. Their paper
reports on a study in which participants without training in argumentation
theory rated the acceptance of claims about the desirability of a consequence
that were supported by either an inductive argument from analogy, an
argument from authority, or an argument from consequences. These
supporting arguments were systematically manipulated so as to include
violations of criteria that theorists have proposed as integral to normative
evaluation of such arguments. Like Heit and Rotello (2012 this issue), their
paper takes great care to set these experiments in a broader context of not
just argumentation, but also persuasion research.
In our opinion the most important contribution this special issue of
Thinking & Reasoning could make would be for the kind of integration
across reasoning, argumentation, and persuasion research that Hoeken
238 HORNIKX AND HAHN

et al., and Heit and Rotello provide to become commonplace. The synergy
that comes from such integration can be seen nowhere better than in the
many different ways the papers in this special issue could be grouped and
the many links that exist between them, even though each of them reflects
a specific project, within a specific research tradition.
In particular, the different senses of argument outlined in the introduc-
tion are reflected in different ways across the papers in this special issue. The
papers by Heit and Rotello, by Harris et al., and by Thompson and Evans
focus on arguments as reasons, and hence are relevant even to the lone
reasoner. By contrast, the contributions by Van Eemeren et al., by Hoeken
et al., by Mercier and Strickland, and by Bonnefon deal intrinsically with
situations where there are multiple protagonists in a communicative
exchange. At the same time, all but the experiments of Heit and Rotello
and that of Bonnefon use experimental materials that involve dialogues.
This illustrates the fact that such methodological use of dialogue is distinct
from the question of whether the unit of theoretical and experimental
evaluation is a single reason or a broader communicative exchange.
Moreover, even for a single reason, different theoretical frameworks
represented in the issue diverge with regard to the question of whether or
not the normative judgement on that reason would be different if it were
being evaluated in the head of a single person, or as a move in a wider
dialectic exchange. Specifically, the contributions in this special issue may
also be grouped by the normative frameworks to which they appeal. For
Heit and Rotello, for Harris et al., and for Thompson and Evans, that
framework is logic and probability theory, which, as classic epistemic
standards for deduction and induction respectively, are concerned with
truth and make no reference to dialogue. By contrast, for Van Eemeren
et al. norms derive from pragmatic rules and social conventions, and
consequently it matters whether reasons are considered in isolation or in a
dialogical exchange. For Hoeken et al., standards for evaluation originate
from normative criteria for argumentation schemes. Finally, Bonnefon, on
the one hand, and Mercier and Strickland, on the other, are agnostic about
norms, although it seems clear that both rely on a likely or ‘‘normal’’ course
of affairs.
In short, the different senses of argument, and with them different
perspectives on argumentation, weave through these papers on many levels
and in a variety of ways.

CONCLUDING REMARK
Argumentation is an essential component of our lives. Our legal system,
our political system, and science itself, are unimaginable without rational
debate. Moreover, much of the reasoning we do in our day to day lives
 REASONING AND ARGUMENTATION 239

arguably takes place in the context of exchanges about what to believe and
what to do (see also Mercier & Sperber, 2011). It would seem time for
cognitive psychology to follow other disciplines in giving argumentation the
attention it deserves.

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