Page 1 of 100
Republic of the Philippines aspect, the appellants are correct in their claim that it is void for the following
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS,
Administratrix, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO
RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors- appellants.
Testate Succession, The testator cannot impose any lien, substitution, or
condition on his widow’s legitime.—The appellant’s do not question the legality of
giving Marcelle one-half of the estate in full ownership. They adroit that the
testator’s dispositions impaired his widow’s legitime. Indeed, under Art. 900 of the
Civil Code “If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled
to one-half of the hereditary estate.” And since Marcelle alone survived the
deceased, she is entitled to one-half of his estate over which he could impose no
burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever. (Art. 904,
par. 2, Civil Code.)
Same; The proposed creation by the administratrix in favor of the testator’s
widow of a usufruct over 113 of the free portion of the testator’s estate cannot be
made where it will run counter to testator’s express will.—It is the one-third
usufruct over the free portion which the appellants question and justifiably so. It
appears that the court a quo approved the usufruct in favor of Marcelle because
the testament provides for a usufruct in her favor of one-third of the estate. The
court a quo erred for Marcelle who is entitled to one-half of the estate “en pleno
dominio” as her legitime and which is more than what she is given under the will
is not entitled to have any additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more
than her legitime will run counter to the testator’s intention for as stated above his
dispositions even impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.
Same; A vulgar substitution of heirs is valid even if the heir designated survives
the testator inasmuch us vulgar substitution can take place also by refusal or
incapacity to inherit of the first heir.—They allege that the substitution in its vulgar
aspect is void because Wanda survived the testator or stated differently because
she did not predecease the testator. But dying before the testator is not the only
case for vulgar substitution for it also includes refusal or incapacity to accept the
inheritance as provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra. Hence, the vulgar
substitution is valid.
Same; A fideicommissary substitution is void if first heir is not related in the
1st degree to the second heir.—As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary
reasons: The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not
related to Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art 863 of the Civil Code validates
a fideicommissary substitution “provided such substitution does not go beyond
one degree from the heir originally instituted.”
Same; Constitutional Law; The Constitutional provision which allows aliens to
acquire lands by succession does not apply to testamentary succession.—We are of
the opinion that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire
private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the
prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would be able to
circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in
exchange for a devise of a piece of land.
Same; Same; An alien may be bestowed usufructuary rights over a parcel of
land in the Philippines.—We uphold the usufruct in favor of Wanda because a
usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it
is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the
Constitution.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
The main issue in this appeal is the manner of partitioning the testate estate of
Jose Eugenio Ramirez among the principal beneficiaries, namely: his widow
Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez; his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez;
and his companion Wanda de Wrobleski.
The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French who lives in
Paris, while the companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover, the
testator provided for substitutions.
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964,
with only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios
was appointed administratrix of the estate. In due time she submitted an
inventory of the estate as follows:
INVENTARIO
Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de un terreno, con sus mejoras y edificaciones,
situadoen la Escolta, Manila.................................................................................... P500,000.00
Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de dos parcelas de terreno situadas en Antipolo,
Rizal................................................................................................................................................. 658.34

Cuatrocientos noventa y uno (491) acciones de la 'Central Azucarera de la Carlota
a P17.00 por accion ...............................................................................................................8,347.00
Diez mil ochocientos seize (10,806) acciones de la 'Central Luzon Milling Co.',
disuelta y en liquidacion a P0.15 por accion .............................................................1,620.90
Cuenta de Ahorros en el Philippine Trust Co............................................................ 2,350.73
TOTAL................................................................................................................................ P512,976.97
MENOS:
Deuda al Banco de las Islas Filipinas, garantizada con prenda de las acciones de La
Carlota ................................................................................................................................... P 5,000,00
VALOR LIQUIDO...................................... P507,976.97
The testamentary dispositions are as follows:
A.—En nuda propiedad, a D. Roberto y D. Jorge Ramirez, ambas menores de
edad, residentes en Manila, I.F., calle 'Alright, No. 1818, Malate, hijos de su
sobrino D. Jose Ma. Ramirez, con sustitucion vulgar a favor de sus respectivos
descendientes, y, en su defecto, con sustitucion vulgar reciprocal entre ambos.
El precedente legado en nuda propiedad de la participacion indivisa de la finca
Santa Cruz Building, lo ordena el testador a favor de los legatarios nombrados,
en atencion a que dicha propiedad fue creacion del querido padre del
otorgante y por ser aquellos continuadores del apellido Ramirez,
B.—Y en usufructo a saber: —
a. En cuanto a una tercera parte, a favor de la esposa del testador, Da. Marcelle
Ramirez, domiciliada en IE PECO, calle del General Gallieni No. 33, Seine
Francia, con sustitucion vulgar u fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de
Wrobleski, de Palma de Mallorca, Son Rapina Avenida de los Reyes 13,
b.—Y en cuanto a las dos terceras partes restantes, a favor de la nombrada Da.
Wanda de Nrobleski con sustitucion vulgar v fideicomisaria a saber:—
En cuanto a la mitad de dichas dos terceras partes, a favor de D. Juan Pablo
Jankowski, de Son Rapina Palma de Mallorca; y encuanto a la mitad restante, a
Page 2 of 100
favor de su sobrino, D. Horace V. Ramirez, San Luis Building, Florida St.
Ermita, Manila, I.F.
A pesar de las sustituciones fideiconiisarias precedentemente ordinadas, las
usufiructuarias nombradas conjuntamente con los nudo propietarios, podran
en cualquier memento vender a tercero los bienes objeto delegado, sin
intervencion alguna de los titulares fideicomisaarios.
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows:
the property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to
the widow 'en pleno dominio" in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or
"free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en nuda propriedad."
Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the widow's
usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that the
provisions for vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to
the widow's usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez,
with respect to Wanda's usufruct are invalid because the first heirs Marcelle and
Wanda) survived the testator; (b) that the provisions for fideicommissary
substitutions are also invalid because the first heirs are not related to the second
heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as provided in Article 863 of the Civil
Code; (c) that the grant of a usufruct over real property in the Philippines in favor
of Wanda Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates Section 5, Article III of the Philippine
Constitution; and that (d) the proposed partition of the testator's interest in the
Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building between the widow Marcelle and the appellants,
violates the testator's express win to give this property to them Nonetheless, the
lower court approved the project of partition in its order dated May 3, 1967. It is
this order which Jorge and Roberto have appealed to this Court.
1. The widow's legitime.
The appellant's do not question the legality of giving Marcelle one-half of the
estate in full ownership. They admit that the testator's dispositions impaired his
widow's legitime. Indeed, under Art. 900 of the Civil Code "If the only survivor is
the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary
estate." And since Marcelle alone survived the deceased, she is entitled to one-half
of his estate over which he could impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or
substitution of any kind whatsoever. (Art. 904, par. 2, Civil Code.)
It is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the appellants question and
justifiably so. It appears that the court a quo approved the usufruct in favor of
Marcelle because the testament provides for a usufruct in her favor of one-third of

the estate. The court a quo erred for Marcelle who is entitled to one-half of the
estate "en pleno dominio" as her legitime and which is more than what she is given
under the will is not entitled to have any additional share in the estate. To give
Marcelle more than her legitime will run counter to the testator's intention for as
stated above his dispositions even impaired her legitime and tended to favor
Wanda.
2. The substitutions.
It may be useful to recall that "Substitution is the appoint- judgment of another
heir so that he may enter into the inheritance in default of the heir originally
instituted." (Art. 857, Civil Code. And that there are several kinds of substitutions,
namely: simple or common, brief or compendious, reciprocal, and fideicommissary
(Art. 858, Civil Code.) According to Tolentino, "Although the Code enumerates four
classes, there are really only two principal classes of substitutions: the simple and
the fideicommissary. The others are merely variations of these two." (111 Civil
Code, p. 185 [1973].)
The simple or vulgar is that provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 859. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the
heir or heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before him, or
should not wish, or should be incapacitated to accept the inheritance.
A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it refers, shall
comprise the three mentioned in the preceding paragraph, unless the testator
has otherwise provided.
The fideicommissary substitution is described in the Civil Code as follows:
ART. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or
first heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to
transmit to a second heir the whole or part of inheritance, shall be valid and
shall take effect, provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree
from the heir originally instituted, and provided further that the fiduciary or
first heir and the second heir are living at time of the death of the testator.
It will be noted that the testator provided for a vulgar substitution in respect of the
legacies of Roberto and Jorge Ramirez, the appellants, thus: con sustitucion vulgar
a favor de sus respectivos descendientes, y, en su defecto, con substitution vulgar
reciprocal entre ambos.
Page 3 of 100
The appellants do not question the legality of the substitution so provided. The
appellants question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda
de Wrobleski" in connection with the one-third usufruct over the estate given to
the widow Marcelle However, this question has become moot because as We have
ruled above, the widow is not entitled to any usufruct.
The appellants also question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria in connection
with Wanda's usufruct over two thirds of the estate in favor of Juan Pablo
Jankowski and Horace v. Ramirez.
They allege that the substitution in its vulgar aspect as void because Wanda
survived the testator or stated differently because she did not predecease the
testator. But dying before the testator is not the only case for vulgar substitution
for it also includes refusal or incapacity to accept the inheritance as provided in
Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra. Hence, the vulgar substitution is valid.
As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the appellants are
correct in their claim that it is void for the following reasons:
(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related
to Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a
fideicommissary substitution "provided such substitution does not go beyond one
degree from the heir originally instituted."
What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by Tolentino as
follows:
Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe "degree" as designation, substitution,
or transmission. The Supreme Court of Spain has decidedly adopted this
construction. From this point of view, there can be only one tranmission or
substitution, and the substitute need not be related to the first heir. Manresa,
Morell and Sanchez Roman, however, construe the word "degree" as
generation, and the present Code has obviously followed this interpretation. by
providing that the substitution shall not go beyond one degree "from the heir
originally instituted." The Code thus clearly indicates that the second heir must
be related to and be one generation from the first heir.
From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a
parent of the first heir. These are the only relatives who are one generation or
degree from the fiduciary (Op. cit., pp. 193-194.)
(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the
substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee
 Page 4 of 100

admits "that the testator contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of Wanda because
substitution when he permits the properties subject of the usufruct to be sold a usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and
upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the naked owners." (Brief, p. it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the
26.) Constitution.

3. The usufruct of Wanda. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby
ordered distributed as follows:
The appellants claim that the usufruct over real properties of the estate in favor of
Wanda is void because it violates the constitutional prohibition against the One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;
acquisition of lands by aliens.
One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in
The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows: naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple
substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez.
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land
shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo. No special
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the pronouncement as to costs.
Philippines. (Art. XIII.)
SO ORDERED.
The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the ground
that the Constitution covers not only succession by operation of law but also Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., De Castro, Ericta and Escolin, JJ., concur.
testamentary succession. We are of the opinion that the Constitutional provision
which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary Aquino J., took no part.
succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any
alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine
landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land.

Republic of the Philippines TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE LINNIE JANE HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1307).
SUPREME COURT TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE CHARLES NEWTON HODGES (Sp. Proc. No.
Manila 1672). PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, administrator-
appellant,
EN BANC vs.
LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL, SALVADOR GUZMAN,
G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974 BELCESAR CAUSING, FLORENIA BARRIDO, PURIFICACION CORONADO,
GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR, MELQUIADES BATISANAN,
PEPITO IYULORES, ESPERIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO ESPADA, ROSARIO
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, Administrator of the ALINGASA, ADELFA PREMAYLON, SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, and AVELINA A.
Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the Court of MAGNO, the last as Administratrix in Sp. Proc. No. 1307, appellees, WESTERN
First Instance of Iloilo), petitioner, INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, INC., movant-appellee.
vs.
THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, respondents. San Juan, Africa, Gonzales and San Agustin for Philippine Commercial and Industrial
Bank.
G.R. Nos. L-27936 & L-27937 March 29, 1974

Manglapus Law Office, Antonio Law Office and Rizal R. Quimpo for private
respondents and appellees Avelina A. Magno, etc., et al.
Appeals; Certiorari; Certiorari available when remedy of appeal not adequate;
Case at bar.—There is a common thread among the basic issues involved in all
these thirty-three appeals which, unless resolved in one single proceeding, will
inevitably cause the proliferation of more or less similar or closely related
incidents and consequent eventual appeals. If for this consideration alone, and
without taking account anymore of the unnecessary additional effort, expense and
time which would be involved in as many individual appeals as the number of such
incidents, it is logical and proper to hold that the remedy of appeal is not adequate
in the present cases.
Same; Same; Same; Circumstances considered in determining inadequacy of
appeal.—In determining whether or not a special civil action of certiorari or
prohibition may be resorted to in lieu of appeal, in instances wherein lack or
excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion is alleged, it is not enough that
the remedy of appeal exists or is possible. It is indispensable that taking all the
relevant circumstances of the given case, appeal would better serve the interests
of justice. Obviously, the longer delay, augmented expense and trouble and
unnecessary repetition of the same work attendant to the present multiple
appeals, which, after all, deal with practically the same basic issues that can be
more expeditiously resolved or determined in a single special civil action, make
the remedies of certiorari and prohibition preferable for purposes of resolving the
common basic issues raised in all of them, despite the conceded availability of
appeal. Besides, the settling of such common fundamental issues would naturally
minimize the areas of conflict between the parties and render more simple the
determination of the secondary issues in each of them.
Special proceedings; Settlement of estate of deceased persons; Where estate
settled when spouses are both deceased.—We are not unmindful of the fact that
under section 2 of Rule 73, “When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the
husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and
liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the
deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be
liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either.” Indeed, it is true that
the last sentence of this provision allows or permits the conjugal partnership of
spouses who are both deceased to be settled or liquidated in the testate or
intestate proceedings of either, but precisely because said sentence allows or
permits that the liquidation be made in either proceeding, it is a matter of sound
judicial discretion in which one it should be made. After all, the former rule
referring to the administrator of the husband’s estate in respect to such
liquidation was done away with by Act 3176, the pertinent provisions of which are
now embodied in the rule just cited.
Same; Same; When proceedings for settlement of estate deemed ready for final
closure.—The provisions of section 1 of Rule 90 cannot mean anything less than
Page 5 of 100
that in order that a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person may be deemed ready for final closure, (1) there should have been issued
already an order of distribution or assignment of the estate of the decedent among
or to those entitled thereto by will or by law, but (2) such order shall not be issued
until after it is shown that the “debts, funeral expenses, expenses of
administration, allowances, taxes, etc. chargeable to the estate” have been paid,
which is but logical and proper. (3) Besides, such an order is usually issued upon
proper and specific application for the purpose of the interested party or parties,
and not of the court.
Same; Same; Administration of estate; Factors considered in appointment of
administrator.—An administrator is not supposed to represent the interests of any
particular party and his acts are deemed to be objectively for the protection of the
rights of everybody concerned with the estate of the decedent. On the other hand,
however, it is evidently implicit in section 6 of Rule 78 fixing the priority among
those to whom letter of administration should be granted that the criterion in the
selection of the administrator is not his impartiality alone, but more importantly,
the extent of his interest in the estate, so much so that the one assumed to have
greater interest is preferred to another who has less.
Wills and succession; Substitution of heirs; Simple or vulgar
substitution; Fideicommissary substitution; Requisites; Case at bar.—Legally
speaking, Mrs. Hodges’ will provide neither for a simple or vulgar substitution
under article 859 of the Civil Code nor for a fideicommissary substitution under
article 863 thereof. There is no vulgar substitution therein because there is no
provision for either (1) predecease of the testator by the designated heir or (2)
refusal or (3) incapacity of the latter to accept the inheritance, as required by
article 859; and neither is there a fideicommissary substitution therein because no
obligation is imposed thereby upon Hodges to preserve the estate or any part
thereof for anyone else.
Same; Same; When substitution of heir occurs.—Substitution occurs only
when another heir is appointed in a will “so that he may enter into inheritance in
default of the heir originally instituted.”
Same; Institution of heirs simultaneously; Institution considered partially
resolutory; Reasons; Case at bar.—The brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are also
heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges, subject, however, to certain
conditions, partially resolutory insofar as Hodges was concerned and
correspondingly suspensive with reference to his brothers and sisters-in-law. It is
partially resolutory, since it bequeaths unto Hodges the whole of her estate to be
owned and enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir with absolute dominion over
them only during his lifetime, which means that while he could completely and
absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter rivos to anyone other than himself,
he was not free to do so mortis causa, and all his right to what might remain upon
his death would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that contingency, inasmuch
as the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law to the inheritance, although vested
already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges, would automatically become operative

upon the occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of actual existence of any
remainder of her estate then.
Same; Same; Same; Institution in case at bar without legal impediment but
cannot apply to legitime.—The Court sees no legal impediment to this kind of
institution, in this jurisdiction or under Philippine law, except that it cannot apply
to the legitime of Hodges as the surviving spouse, consisting of one-half of the
estate, considering that Mrs. Hodges had no surviving ascendants nor descendants.
Same; Order of succession and amount of successional rights; Conflict of
laws; Question of foreign law governing matters in issue one of fact; Foreign law has
to be proven.—The question of what are the laws of Texas governing the matters in
issue is, in the first instance, one of fact, not of law. Elementary is the rule that
foreign laws may not be taken judicial notice of and have to be proven like any
other fact in dispute between the parties in any proceeding, with the rare
exception in instances when the said laws are already within the actual knowledge
of the court, such as when they are well and generally known or they have been
actually ruled upon in other cases before it and none of the parties concerned do
not claim otherwise.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Exception.—When, with respect to certain
aspects of the foreign laws concerned, the parties in a given case do not have any
controversy or are more or less in agreement, the Court may take it for granted for
the purposes of the particular case before it that the said laws are as such virtual
agreement indicates, without the need of requiring the presentation of what
otherwise would be competent evidence on the point.
Evidence; Judicial admissions; Case at bar.—PCIB’s representations in regard
to the laws of Texas virtually constitute admissions of fact which the other parties
and the court are being made to rely and act upon. PCIB is “not permitted to
contradict them or subsequently take a position contradictory to or inconsistent
with them.”
BARREDO, J.:
Certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction; certiorari to "declare all
acts of the respondent court in the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc.
No. 1307 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo) subsequent to the order of
December 14, 1957 as null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction" ;
prohibition to enjoin the respondent court from allowing, tolerating, sanctioning,
or abetting private respondent Avelina A. Magno to perform or do any acts of
administration, such as those enumerated in the petition, and from exercising any
authority or power as Regular Administratrix of above-named Testate Estate, by
entertaining manifestations, motion and pleadings filed by her and acting on them,
and also to enjoin said court from allowing said private respondent to interfere,
meddle or take part in any manner in the administration of the Testate Estate of
Charles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the same court and branch); with
prayer for preliminary injunction, which was issued by this Court on August 8,
Page 6 of 100
1967 upon a bond of P5,000; the petition being particularly directed against the
orders of the respondent court of October 12, 1966 denying petitioner’s motion of
April 22, 1966 and its order of July 18, 1967 denying the motion for
reconsideration of said order.
Related to and involving basically the same main issue as the foregoing petition,
thirty-three (33) appeals from different orders of the same respondent court
approving or otherwise sanctioning the acts of administration of the respondent
Magno on behalf of the testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges.
THE FACTS
On May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City leaving a will executed on
November 22, 1952 pertinently providing as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"FIRST: I direct that all my just debts and funeral expenses be first paid out of my
estate.
SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my
estate, both personal and real, wherever situated, or located, to my beloved
husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and to hold unto him, my said husband,
during his natural lifetime.
THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton Hodges,
shall have the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his
lifetime, and he is hereby given the right to make any changes in the physical
properties of said estate, by sale or any part thereof which he may think best, and
the purchase of any other or additional property as he may think best; to execute
conveyances with or without general or special warranty, conveying in fee simple
or for any other term or time, any property which he may deem proper to dispose
of; to lease any of the real property for oil, gas and/or other minerals, and all such
deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee simple title to the interest so conveyed
in such property as he may elect to sell. All rents, emoluments and income from
said estate shall belong to him, and he is further authorized to use any part of the
principal of said estate as he may need or desire. It is provided herein, however,
that he shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any of the improved property now
owned by us located at, in or near the City of Lubbock, Texas, but he shall have the
full right to lease, manage and enjoy the same during his lifetime, above provided.
He shall have the right to subdivide any farm land and sell lots therein, and may
sell unimproved town lots.
FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give, devise
and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and
personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my brothers

and sisters, share and share alike, namely:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Saddie Rascoe, Era
Roman and Nimroy Higdon.
FIFTH: In case of the death of any of my brothers and/or sisters named in item
Fourth, above, prior to the death of my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, then it is
my will and bequest that the heirs of such deceased brother or sister shall take
jointly the share which would have gone to such brother or sister had she or he
survived.
SIXTH: I nominate and appoint my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to be
executor of this, my last will and testament, and direct that no bond or other
security be required of him as such executor.
SEVENTH: It is my will and bequest that no action be had in the probate court, in
the administration of my estate, other than that necessary to prove and record this
will and to return an inventory and appraisement of my estate and list of claims."
(Pp. 2-4, Petition.)
This will was subsequently probated in aforementioned Special Proceedings No.
1307 of respondent court on June 28, 1957, with the widower Charles Newton
Hodges being appointed as Executor, pursuant to the provisions thereof.
Previously, on May 27, 1957, the said widower (hereafter to be referred to as
Hodges) had been appointed Special Administrator, in which capacity he filed a
motion on the same date as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION TO ALLOW OR AUTHORIZE PETITIONER TO
CONTINUE THE BUSINESS IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND TO PERFORM ACTS
WHICH HE HAD BEEN DOING WHILE DECEASED WAS LIVING
Come petitioner in the above-entitled special proceedings, thru his undersigned
attorneys, to the Hon. Court, most respectfully states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
1. That Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving her last will and testament, a copy of
which is attached to the petition for probate of the same.
2. That in said last will and testament herein petitioner Charles Newton Hodges is
directed to have the right to manage, control use and enjoy the estate of deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges, in the same way, a provision was placed in paragraph two, the
following: ‘I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my
estate, to my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and (to) hold unto
Page 7 of 100
him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime.’
3. That during the lifetime of Linnie Jane Hodges, herein petitioner was engaged in
the business of buying and selling personal and real properties, and do such acts
which petitioner may think best.
4. That deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no descendants or ascendants,
except brothers and sisters and herein petitioner as the surviving spouse, to
inherit the properties of the decedent.
"5. That the present motion is submitted in order not to paralyze the business of
petitioner and the deceased, especially in the purchase and sale of properties. That
proper accounting will be had also in all these transactions.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that, petitioner C. N. Hodges (Charles
Newton Hodges) be allowed or authorized to continue the business in which he
was engaged and to perform acts which he had been doing while deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges was living.
City of Iloilo, May 27, 1957." (Annex "D", Petition.)
which the respondent court immediately granted in the following
order:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It appearing in the urgent ex-parte motion filed by petitioner C. N. Hodges, that
the business in which said petitioner and the deceased were engaged will be
paralyzed, unless and until the Executor is named and appointed by the Court, the
said petitioner is allowed or authorized to continue the business in which he was
engaged and to perform acts which he had been doing while the deceased was
living.
SO ORDERED.
City of Iloilo, May 27, 1957."cralaw virtua1aw library
(Annex "E", Petition.)
Under date of December 11, 1957, Hodges filed as such Executor another motion
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"MOTION TO APPROVE ALL SALES, CONVEYANCES, LEASES, MORTGAGES THAT
THE EXECUTOR HAD MADE FURTHER AND SUBSEQUENT TRANSACTIONS
WHICH THE EXECUTOR MAY DO IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAST WISH OF THE
DECEASED LINNIE JANE HODGES.

"Comes the Executor in the above-entitled proceedings, thru his undersigned
attorney, to the Hon. Court, most respectfully states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
1. That according to the last will and testament of the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges, the executor as the surviving spouse and legatee named in the will of the
deceased; has the right to dispose of all the properties left by the deceased, portion
of which is quoted as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Second: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my
estate, both personal and real, wherever situated, or located, to my beloved
husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and to hold unto him, my said husband,
during his natural lifetime.
Third: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, shall
have the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, and
he is hereby given the right to make any changes in the physical properties of said
estate, by sale or any part thereof which he may think best, and the purchase of
any other or additional property as he may think best; to execute conveyances
with or without general or special warranty, conveying in fee simple or for any
other term or time, any property which he may deem proper to dispose of; to lease
any of the real property for oil, gas and/or other minerals, and all such deeds or
leases shall pass the absolute fee simple title to the interest so conveyed in such
property as he may elect to sell. All rents, emoluments and income from said estate
shall belong to him, and he is further authorized to use any part of the principal of
said estate as he may need or desire. . . . .
2. That herein Executor, is not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal,
but also, the successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges. That during the lifetime of herein Executor, as Legatee, has the right to
sell, convey, lease or dispose of the properties in the Philippines. That inasmuch as
C. N. Hodges was and is engaged in the buy and sell of real and personal
properties, even before the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, a motion to authorize said
C. N. Hodges was filed in Court, to allow him to continue in the business of buy and
sell, which motion was favorably granted by the Honorable Court.
3. That since the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, Mr. C. N. Hodges had been buying
and selling real and personal properties, in accordance with the wishes of the late
Linnie Jane Hodges.
4. That the Register of Deeds for Iloilo, had required of late the herein Executor to
have all the sales, leases, conveyances or mortgages made by him, approved by the
Hon. Court.
Page 8 of 100
5. That it is respectfully requested, all the sales, conveyances leases and mortgages
executed by the Executor, be approved by the Hon. Court and subsequent sales
conveyances, leases and mortgages in compliances with the wishes of the late
Linnie Jane Hodges, and within the scope of the terms of the last will and
testament, also be approved;
6. That the Executor is under obligation to submit his yearly accounts, and the
properties conveyed can also be accounted for, especially the amounts received.
"WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that, all the sales, conveyances,
leases, and mortgages executed by the Executor, be approved by the Hon. Court,
and also the subsequent sales, conveyances, leases, and mortgages, in consonance
with the wishes of the deceased contained in her last will and testament, be with
authorization and approval of the Hon. Court.
City of Iloilo, December 11, 1967."cralaw virtua1aw library
(Annex "G", Petition.)
which again was promptly granted by the respondent court on December 14, 1957
as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
ORDER
As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the Executor for the reasons stated
in his motion dated December 11, 1957, which the Court considers well taken all
the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all properties left by the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the Executor Charles N. Hodges are hereby
APPROVED. The said Executor is further authorized to execute subsequent sales,
conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes conveyed in the last will and
testament of the latter.
So ordered.
Iloilo City, December 14,1957."cralaw virtua1aw library
(Annex "H", Petition.)
On April 14, 1959, in submitting his first statement of account as Executor for
approval, Hodges alleged:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of Court, herein executor of the deceased,

renders the following account of his administration covering the period from
January 1, 1958 to December 31, 1958, which account may he found in detail in
the individual income tax return filed for the estate of deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
That a certified public accountant has examined the statement of net worth of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, the assets and liabilities, as well as the income and
expenses, copy of which is hereto attached and made integral part of this
statement of account as Annex "A."
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is most respectfully prayed that the statement of
net worth of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges the assets and liabilities, income and
expenses as shown in the individual income tax return for the estate of the
deceased and marked as Annex "A", be approved by the Honorable Court, as
substantial compliance with the requirements of the Rules of Court.
That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining the
herein accounts be given notice, as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of
the deceased, in accordance with the last will and testament already probated by
the Honorable Court.
City of Iloilo April 14, 1959."cralaw virtua1aw library
(Annex "I", Petition.)
The respondent court approved this statement of account on April 21, 1959 in its
order worded thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Upon petition of Atty. Gellada, in representation of the Executor, the statement of
net worth of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, the assets and liabilities, income and
expenses as shown in the individual income tax return for the estate of the
deceased and marked as Annex "A" is approved.
SO ORDERED. cd
City of Iloilo, April 21, 1959."cralaw virtua1aw library
(Annex "J", Petition.)
His accounts for the periods January 1, 1959 to December 31, 1959 and January 1,
1960 to December 31, 1960 were submitted likewise accompanied by allegations
identical mutatis mutandis to those of April 14, 1959, quoted above; and the
respective orders approving the same, dated July 30, 1960 and May 2, 1961, were
substantially identical to the above-quoted order of April 21, 1959. In connection
Page 9 of 100
with the statements of account just mentioned, the following assertions related
thereto made by respondent-appellee Magno in her brief do not appear from all
indications discernible in the record to be disputable:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Under date of April 14, 1959, C. N. Hodges filed his first ‘Account by the Executor’
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the ‘Statement of Networth of Mr. C. N.
Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges’ as of December 31, 1958 annexed
thereto, C. N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net
income of P328,402.62, divided evenly between him and the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an ‘individual income tax return’ for calendar
year 1958 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said
estate as having earned income of P164,201.31, exactly one-half of the net income
of his combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges." (P
91, Appellee’s Brief.).
x       x       x
"Under date of July 21, 1960, C. N. Hodges filed his second ‘Annual Statement of
Account by the Executor’ of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the ‘Statement of
Networth of Mr. C. N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges’ as of December
31, 1959 annexed thereto, C. N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate
earned a net income of P270,623.32, divided evenly between him and the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an ‘individual income tax return’ for
calendar year 1959 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the
said (state as having earned income of P135,311.66, exactly one-half of the net
income of his combined personal assets and that of the estate or Linnie Jane
Hodges." (Pp. 91-92, Appellee’s Brief.)
x       x       x
"Under date of April 20, 1961, C. N. Hodges filed his third ‘Annual Statement of
Account by the Executor for the Year 1960’ of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In
the ‘Statement of Net Worth of Mr. C. N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges’ as of December 31, 1960 annexed thereto, C. N. Hodges reported that the
combined conjugal estate earned a net income of P314,857.94, divided evenly
between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an
‘individual income tax return’ for calendar year 1960 on the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges reporting, under oath, the aid estate as having earned income of
P157,428.97, exactly one-half of the net income of his combined personal assets
and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges." (Pp. 92-93, Appellee’s Brief.)
Likewise the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In the petition for probate that he (Hodges) filed, he listed the seven brothers and
sisters of Linnie Jane as her ‘heirs’ (see p. 2, Green ROA). The order of the court
admitting the will to probate unfortunately omitted one of the heirs, Roy Higdon
(see p. 14, Green ROA). Immediately, C. N. Hodges filed a verified motion to have
Roy Higdon’s name included as an heir, stating that he wanted to straighten the
records ‘in order the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may not think or believe they
were omitted, and that they were really and are interested in the estate of
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.
"As an executor, he was bound to file tax returns for the estate he was
administering under American law. He did file such as estate tax return on August
8, 1958. In Schedule ‘M’ of such return, he answered ‘Yes’ to the question as to
whether he was contemplating ‘renouncing the will’. On the question as to what
property interests passed to him as the surviving spouse, he answered:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
‘None, except for purposes of administering the Estate, paying debts, taxes and
other legal charges. It is the intention of the surviving husband of deceased to
distribute the remaining property and interests of the deceased in their
Community estate to the devisees and legatees named in the will when the debts,
liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration are finally determined and paid.’
"Again, on August 9, 1962, barely four months before his death, he executed an
‘affidavit’ wherein he ratified and confirmed all that he stated in Schedule ‘M’ of his
estate tax returns as to his having renounced what was given him by his wife’s
will. 1
"As appointed executor, C. N. Hodges filed an ‘Inventory’ dated May 12, 1958. He
listed all the assets of his conjugal partnership with Linnie Jane Hodges on a
separate balance sheet and then stated expressly that her estate which has come
into his possession as executor was ‘one-half of all the items’ listed in said balance
sheet." (Pp. 89-90, Appellee’s Brief.)
Parenthetically, it may be stated, at this juncture, that We are taking pains to quote
wholly or at least, extensively from some of the pleadings and orders whenever
We feel that it is necessary to do so for a more comprehensive and clearer view of
the important and decisive issues raised by the parties and a more accurate
appraisal of their respective positions in regard thereto.
The records of these cases do not show that anything else was done in the above-
mentioned Special Proceedings No. 1307 until December 26, 1962, when on
account of the death of Hodges the day before, the same lawyer, Atty. Leon P.
Gellada, who had been previously acting as counsel for Hodges in his capacity as
Page 10 of 100
Executor of his wife’s estate, and as such had filed the aforequoted motions and
manifestations, filed the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATRIX
COMES the undersigned attorney for the Executor in the above-entitled
proceedings, to the Honorable Court, most respectfully states:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
1. That in accordance with the Last Will and Testament of Linnie Jane Hodges
(deceased), her husband, Charles Newton Hodges was to act as Executor, and in
fact, in an order issued by this Hon. Court dated June 28, 1957, the said Charles
Newton Hodges was appointed Executor and had performed the duties as such.
2. That last December 22, 1962, the said Charles Newton Hodges was stricken ill,
and brought to the Iloilo Mission Hospital for treatment, but unfortunately, he died
on December 25, 1962, as shown by a copy of the death certificate hereto attached
and marked as Annex ‘A’.
3. That in accordance with the provisions of the last will and testament of Linnie
Jane Hodges, whatever real and personal properties that may remain at the death
of her husband Charles Newton Hodges, the said properties shall be equally
divided among their heirs. That there are real and personal properties left by
Charles Newton Hodges, which need to be administered and taken care of.
4. That the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as that of Charles
Newton Hodges, have not as yet been determined or ascertained, and there is
necessity for the appointment of a general administrator to liquidate and
distribute the residue of the estate to the heirs and legatees of both spouses. That
in accordance with the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 75 of the Rules of Court, the
conjugal partnership of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges shall be
liquidated in the testate proceedings of the wife.
5. That the undersigned counsel, has perfect personal knowledge of the existence
of the last will and testament of Charles Newton Hodges, with similar provisions as
that contained in the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges. However, said
last will and testament of Charles Newton Hodges is kept inside the vault or iron
safe in his office, and will be presented in due time before this Honorable Court.
6. That in the meantime, it is imperative and indispensable that, an Administratrix
be appointed for the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and a Special Administratrix for
the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, to perform the duties required by law, to
administer, collect, and take charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and

estate of both spouses, Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges, as
provided for in Section 1 and 2, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
7. That there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration,
because the last will and testament of deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, is still
kept in his safe or vault, and in the meantime, unless an administratrix (and,) at
the same time, a Special Administratrix is appointed, the estate of both spouses are
in danger of being lost, damaged or go to waste.
8. That the most trusted employee of both spouses Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N.
Hodges, who had been employed for around thirty (30) years, in the person of
Miss Avelina Magno, (should) be appointed Administratrix of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges and at the same time Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles
Newton Hodges. That the said Miss Avelina Magno is of legal age, a resident of the
Philippines, the most fit, competent, trustworthy and well-qualified person to
serve the duties of Administratrix and Special Administratrix and is willing to act
as such.
9. That Miss Avelina Magno is also willing to file bond in such sum which the Hon.
Court believes reasonable.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, it is most respectfully prayed that, Miss
AVELINA A. MAGNO be immediately appointed Administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges and as Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton
Hodges, with powers and duties provided for by law. That the Honorable Court fix
the reasonable bond of P1,000.00 to be filed by Avelina A. Magno." (Annex "O",
Petition.)
which respondent court readily acted on in its order of even date
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"For the reasons alleged in the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion filed by counsel for the
Executor dated December 25, 1962, which the Court finds meritorious, Miss
AVELINA A. MAGNO, is hereby appointed Administratrix of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges and as Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges,
in the latter case, because the last will of said Charles Newton Hodges is still kept
in his vault or iron safe and that the real and personal properties of both spouses
may be lost, damaged or go to waste, unless a Special Administratrix is appointed.
Miss Avelina A. Magno is required to file bond in the sum of FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P5,000.00), and after having done so, let letters of Administration be
issued to her." (Annex "P", Petition.)
On December 29, 1962, however, upon urgent ex-parte petition of respondent
Page 11 of 100
Magno herself, thru Atty. Gellada, Harold, R. Davies, "a representative of the heirs
of deceased Charles Newton Hodges (who had) arrived from the United States of
America to help in the administration of the estate of said deceased" was
appointed as Co-Special Administrator of the estate of Hodges, (pp. 29-33, Yellow
— Record on Appeal) only to be replaced as such co-special administrator on
January 22, 1963 by Joe Hodges, who, according to the motion of the same
attorney, is "the nephew of the deceased (who had) arrived from the United States
with instructions from the other heirs of the deceased to administer the properties
or estate of Charles Newton Hodges in the Philippines", (Pp. 47-50, id.)
Meanwhile, under date of January 9, 1963, the same Atty. Gellada filed in Special
Proceedings 1672 a petition for the probate of the will of Hodges, 2 with a prayer
for the issuance of letters of administration to the same Joe Hodges, albeit the
motion was followed on February 22, 1963 by a separate one asking that Atty.
Fernando Mirasol be appointed as his co-administrator. On the same date this
latter motion was filed, the court issued the corresponding order of probate and
letters of administration to Joe Hodges and Atty. Mirasol, as prayed for.
At this juncture, again, it may also be explained that just as, in her will, Mrs.
Hodges bequeathed her whole estate to her husband to have and to hold unto him,
my said husband, during his natural lifetime", she, at the same time or in like
manner, provided that "at the death of my said husband — I give devise and
bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and
personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my brothers
and sisters, share and share alike —." Accordingly, it became incumbent upon
Hodges, as executor of his wife’s will, to duly liquidate the conjugal partnership,
half of which constituted her estate, in order that upon the eventuality of his death,
"the rest, residue and remainder" thereof could be determined and
correspondingly distributed or divided among her brothers and sisters And it was
precisely because no such liquidation was done, furthermore, there is the issue of
whether the distribution of her estate should be governed by the laws of the
Philippines or those of Texas, of which State she was a national, and, what is more,
as already stated, Hodges made official and sworn statements or manifestations
indicating that as far as he was concerned no "property interests passed to him as
surviving spouse — ‘except for purposes of administering the estate, paying debts,
taxes and other legal charges’ and it was the intention of the surviving husband of
the deceased to distribute the remaining property and interests of the deceased in
their Community Estate to the devisees and legatees named in the will when the
debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration are finally determined and
paid", that the incidents and controversies now before Us for resolution arose. As
may be observed, the situation that ensued upon the death of Hodges became
rather unusual and so, quite understandably, the lower court’s actuations
presently under review are apparently wanting in consistency and seemingly lack
proper orientation.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Thus, We cannot discern clearly from the record before Us the precise perspective
from which the trial court proceeded in issuing its questioned orders. And,
regretably, none of the lengthy briefs submitted by the parties is of valuable
assistance in clearing up the matter.
To begin with, We gather from the two records on appeal filed by petitioner, as
appellant in the appealed cases, one with green cover and the other with a yellow
cover, that at the outset, a sort of modus operandi had been agreed upon by the
parties under which the respective administrators of the two estates were
supposed to act conjointly, but since no copy of the said agreement can be found in
the record before Us, We have no way of knowing when exactly such agreement
was entered into and under what specific terms. And while reference is made to
said modus operandi in the order of September 11, 1964, on pages 205-206 of the
Green Record on Appeal, reading thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The present incident is to hear the side of administratrix, Miss Avelina A. Magno,
in answer to the charges contained in the motion filed by Atty. Cesar Tirol on
September 3, 1964. In answer to the said charges, Miss Avelina A. Magno, through
her counsel, Atty. Rizal Quimpo, filed a written manifestation.
"After reading the manifestation here of Atty. Quimpo, for and in behalf of the
administratrix, Miss Avelina A. Magno, the Court finds that everything that
happened before September 3, 1964, which was resolved on September 8, 1964, to
the satisfaction of parties, was simply due to a misunderstanding between the
representative of the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank and Miss Magno
and in order to restore the harmonious relations between the parties, the Court
ordered the parties to remain in status quo as to their modus operandi before
September 1, 1964, until after the Court can have a meeting with all the parties
and their counsels on October 3, as formerly agreed upon between counsels, Attys.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta, Attys. Tirol and Tirol and Atty. Rizal Quimpo.
"In the meantime, the prayers of Atty. Quimpo as stated in his manifestation shall
not be resolved by this Court until October 3, 1964.
SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
there is nothing in the record indicating whatever happened to it afterwards,
except that again, reference thereto was made in the appealed order of October 27,
1965, on pages 292-295 of the Green Record on Appeal, as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"On record is an urgent motion to allow PCIB to open all doors and locks in the
Hodges Office at 206-208 Guanco street, Iloilo city, to take immediate and
Page 12 of 100
exclusive possession thereof and to place its own locks and keys for security
purposes of the PCIB dated October 27, 1965 thru Atty. Cesar Tirol. It is alleged in
said urgent motion that Administratrix Magno of the testate estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges refused to open the Hodges Office at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City
where PCIB holds office and therefore PCIB is suffering great moral damage and
prejudice as a result of said act. It is prayed that an order be issued authorizing it
(PCIB) to open all doors and locks in the said office, to take immediate and
exclusive possession thereof and place thereon its own locks and keys for security
purposes; instructing the clerk of court or any available deputy to witness and
supervise the opening of all doors and locks and taking possession of the PCIB.
"A written opposition has been filed by Administratrix Magno of even date (Oct.
27) thru counsel Rizal Quimpo stating therein that she was compelled to close the
office for the reason that the PCIB failed to comply with the order of this Court
signed by Judge Anacleto I. Bellosillo dated September 11, 1964 to the effect that
both estates should remain in status quo as to their modus operandi as of
September 1, 1964.
"To arrive at a happy solution of the dispute and in order not to interrupt the
operation of the office of both estates, the Court aside from the reasons stated in
the urgent motion and opposition heard the verbal arguments of Atty. Cesar Tirol
for the PCIB and Atty. Rizal Quimpo for Administratrix Magno.
"After due consideration, the Court hereby orders Magno to open all doors and
locks in the Hodges Office at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo city in the presence of
the PCIB or its duly authorized representative and deputy clerk of court Albis of
this branch not later than 7:30 tomorrow morning October 28, 1965 in order that
the office of said estates could operate for business.
"Pursuant to the order of this Court thru Judge Bellosillo dated September 11,
1964, it is hereby ordered:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) That all cash collections should be deposited in the joint account of the estates
of Linnie Jane Hodges and estate of C. N. Hodges;
(b) That whatever cash collections that had been deposited in the account of either
of the estates should be withdrawn and since then deposited in the joint account of
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and the estate of C. N. Hodges;
(c) That the PCIB should countersign the check in the amount of P250 in favor of
Administratrix Avelina A, Magno as her compensation as administratrix of the
Linnie Jane Hodges estate chargeable to the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
only;

(d) That Administratrix Magno is hereby directed to allow the PCIB to inspect
whatever records, documents and papers she may have in her possession in the
same manner that Administrator PCIB is also directed to allow Administratrix
Magno to inspect whatever records, documents and papers it may have in its
possession;
(e) That the accountant of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges shall have access to all
records of the transactions of both estates for the protection of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges; and in like manner the accountant or any authorized representative
of the estate of C. N. Hodges shall have access to the records of transactions of the
Linnie Jane Hodges estate for the protection of the estate of C. N. Hodges.
"Once the estates’ office shall have been opened by Administratrix Magno in the
presence of the PCIB or its duly authorized representative and deputy clerk Albis
or his duly authorized representative, both estates or any of the estates should not
close it without previous consent and authority from this court.
SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
As may be noted, in this order, the respondent court required that all collections
from the properties in the name of Hodges should be deposited in a joint account
of the two estates, which indicates that seemingly the so-called modus operandi
was no longer operative, but again there is nothing to show when this situation
started.
Likewise, in paragraph 3 of the petitioner’s motion of September 14, 1964, on
pages 188-201 of the Green Record on Appeal, (also found on pp. 83-91 of the
Yellow Record on Appeal) it is alleged that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"3. On January 24, 1964 virtually all of the heirs of C. N. Hodges, Joe Hodges and
Fernando P. Mirasol acting as the two co-administrators of the estate of C. N.
Hodges, Avelina A. Magno acting as the administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges, and Messrs. William Brown and Ardell Young acting for all of the Higdon
family who claim to be the sole beneficiaries of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
and various legal counsel representing the aforementioned parties entered into an
amicable agreement, which was approved by this Honorable Court, wherein the
parties thereto agreed that certain sums of money were to be paid in settlement of
different claims against the two estates and that the assets (to the extent they
existed) of both estates would be administered jointly by the PCIB as
administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges and Avelina A. Magno as administratrix
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, subject, however, to the aforesaid October 5,
1963 Motion, namely, the PCIB’s claim to exclusive possession and ownership of
one hundred percent (100%) (or, in the alternative, seventy-five percent (75%) of
all assets owned by C. N. Hodges or Linnie Jane Hodges situated in the Philippines.
Page 13 of 100
On February 1, 1964 (pp. 934-935, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672) this Honorable Court
amended its order of January 24, 1964 but in no way changed its recognition of the
aforedescribed basic demand by the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges to one hundred percent (100%) of the assets claimed by both
estates."cralaw virtua1aw library
but no copy of the mentioned agreement of joint administration of the two estates
exists in the record, and so, We are not informed as to what exactly are the terms
of the same which could be relevant in the resolution of the issues herein.
On the other hand, the appealed order of November 3, 1965, on pages 313-320 of
the Green Record on Appeal, authorized payment by respondent Magno of, inter
alia, her own fees as administratrix, the attorney’s fees of her lawyers, etc., as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Administratrix Magno thru Attys. Raul S. Manglapus and Rizal R. Quimpo filed a
Manifestation and Urgent Motion dated June 10, 1964 asking for the approval of
the Agreement dated June 6, 1964 which Agreement is for the purpose of retaining
their services to protect and defend the interest of the said Administratrix in these
proceedings and the same has been signed by and bears the express conformity of
the attorney-in-fact of the late Linnie Jane Hodges, Mr. James L. Sullivan. It is
further prayed that the Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
be directed to pay the retainers fee of said lawyers, said fees made chargeable as
expenses for the administration of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 1641-
1642, Vol. V, Sp. 1307).
"An opposition has been filed by the Administrator PCIB thru Atty. Herminio
Ozaeta dated July 11, 1964, on the ground that payment of the retainers fee of
Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo as prayed for in said Manifestation and Urgent
Motion is prejudicial to the 100% claim of the estate of C. N. Hodges; employment
of Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo is premature and/or unnecessary; Attys. Quimpo
and Manglapus are representing conflicting interests and the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges should be closed and terminated (pp. 1679-1684, Vol. V, Sp. 1307).
"Atty. Leon P. Gellada filed a memorandum dated July 28, 1964 asking that the
Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed by Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo be denied
because no evidence has been presented in support thereof. Atty. Manglapus filed
a reply to the opposition of counsel for the Administrator of the C. N. Hodges estate
wherein it is claimed that expenses of administration include reasonable counsel
or attorney’s fees for services to the executor or administrator. As a matter of fact
the fee agreement dated February 27, 1964 between the PCIB and the law firm of
Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta as its counsel (Pp. 1280-1284, Vol. V, Sp. 1307) which
stipulates the fees for said law firm has been approved by the Court in its order
dated March 31, 1964. If payment of the fees of the lawyers for the administratrix

of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges will cause prejudice to the estate of C. N.
Hodges, in like manner the very agreement which provides for the payment of
attorney’s fees to the counsel for the PCIB will also be prejudicial to the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 1801-1814, Vol. V, Sp. 1307).
"Atty. Herminio Ozaeta filed a rejoinder dated August 10, 1964 to the reply to the
opposition to the Manifestation and Urgent Motion alleging principally that the
estates of Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges are not similarly situated for the
reason that C. N. Hodges is an heir of Linnie Jane Hodges whereas the latter is not
an heir of the former for the reason that Linnie Jane Hodges predeceased C. N.
Hodges (pp. 1839-1848, Vol. V, Sp. 1307); that Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo
formally entered their appearance in behalf of Administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges on June 10, 1964 (pp. 1639-1640, Vol. V, Sp. 1307).
"Atty. Manglapus filed a manifestation dated December 18, 1964 stating therein
that Judge Bellosillo issued an order requiring the parties to submit memorandum
in support of their respective contentions. It is prayed in this manifestation that
the Manifestation and Urgent Motion dated June 10, 1964 be resolved (pp. 6435-
6439, Vol. VII, Sp. 1307).
"Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a counter manifestation dated January
5, 1965 asking that after the consideration by the court of all allegations and
arguments and pleadings of the PCIB in connection therewith (1) said
manifestation and urgent motion of Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo be denied (pp.
6442-6453, Vol. VII, Sp. 1307). Judge Querubin issued an order dated January 4,
1965 approving the motion dated June 10, 1964 of the attorneys for the
administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and agreement annexed to said
motion. The said order further states: "The Administratrix of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges is authorized to issue or sign whatever check or checks may be
necessary for the above purpose and the administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges is ordered to countersign the same." (pp. 6518-6523, Vol. VII, Sp. 1307).
"Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a manifestation and motion dated
January 13, 1965 asking that the order of January 4, 1965 which was issued by
Judge Querubin be declared null and void and to enjoin the clerk of court and the
administratrix and administrator in these special proceedings from all
proceedings and action to enforce or comply with the provision of the aforesaid
order of January 4, 1965. In support of said manifestation and motion it is alleged
that the order of January 4, 1965 is null and void because the said order was never
delivered to the deputy clerk Albis of Branch V (the sala of Judge Querubin) and
the alleged order was found in the drawer of the late Judge Querubin in his office
when said drawer was opened on January 13, 1965 after the death of Judge
Querubin by Perfecto Querubin, Jr., the son of the judge and in the presence of
Executive Judge Rovira and deputy clerk Albis (Sec. 1, Rule 36, New Civil Code)
Page 14 of 100
(Pp. 6600-6606, Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307).
"Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a motion for reconsideration dated
February 23, 1965 asking that the order dated January 4, 1964 be reversed on the
ground that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Attorneys retained must render services to the estate not to the personal heir;
2. If services are rendered to both, fees should be pro-rated between them;
3. Attorneys retained should not represent conflicting interests to the prejudice of
the other heirs not represented by said attorneys;
4. Fees must be commensurate to the actual services rendered to the estate;
"5. There must be assets in the estate to pay for said fees (Pp. 6625-6636, Vol. VIII,
Sp. 1307).
"Atty. Quimpo for Administratrix Magno of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges filed a
motion to submit dated July 15, 1965 asking that the manifestation and urgent
motion dated June 10, 1964 filed by Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo and other
incidents directly appertaining thereto he considered submitted for consideration
and approval (pp. 6759-6765, Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307).
"Considering the arguments and reasons in support to the pleadings of both the
Administratrix and the PCIB, and of Atty. Gellada, herein before mentioned, the
Court believes that the order of January 4, 1965 is null and void for the reason that
the said order has not been filed with deputy clerk Albis of this court (Branch V)
during the lifetime of Judge Querubin who signed the said order. However, the said
manifestation and urgent motion dated June 10, 1964 is being treated and
considered in this instant order. It is worthy to note that in the motion dated
January 24, 1964 (Pp. 1149-1163, Vol. V, Sp. 1307) which has been filed by Atty.
Gellada and his associates and Atty. Gibbs and other lawyers in addition to the
stipulated fees for actual services rendered. However, the fee agreement dated
February 27, 1964, between the Administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges and
Atty. Gibbs which provides for retainer fee of P4,000 monthly in addition to
specific fees for actual appearances, reimbursement for expenditures and
contingent fees has also been approved by the Court and said lawyers have
already been paid. (pp. 1273-1279, Vol. V, Sp. Proc. 1307 pp. 1372-1373, Vol. V, Sp.
Proc. 1307).
"WHEREFORE, the order dated January 4, 1965 is hereby declared null and void.
"The manifestation and motion dated June 10, 1964 which was filed by the

attorneys for the administratrix of the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is
granted and the agreement annexed thereto is hereby approved.
"The administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is hereby directed to be
needed to implement the approval of the agreement annexed to the motion and
the administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges is directed to countersign the said
check or checks as the case may be.
SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
thereby implying somehow that the court assumed the existence of independent
but simultaneous administrations.
Be that as it may, again, it appears that on August 6, 1965, the court, acting on a
motion of petitioner for the approval of deeds of sale executed by it as
administrator of the estate of Hodges, issued the following order, also on appeal
herein:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Acting upon the motion for approval of deeds of sale for registered land of the
PCIB, Administrator of the Testate Estate of C. N. Hodges in Sp. Proc. 1672 (Vol. VII,
pp. 2244-2245), dated July 16, 1965, filed by Atty. Cesar T. Tirol in representation
of the law firms of Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta and Tirol and Tirol and the opposition
thereto of Atty. Rizal R. Quimpo (Vol. VIII, pp. 6811-6813) dated July 22, 1965 and
considering the allegations and reasons therein stated, the court believes that the
deeds of sale should be signed jointly by the PCIB, Administrator of the Testate
Estate of C. N. Hodges and Avelina A. Magno, Administratrix of the Testate Estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges and to this effect the PCIB should take the necessary steps so
that Administratrix Avelina A. Magno could sign the deeds of sale.
SO ORDERED." (P. 248, Green Record on Appeal.)
Notably, this order required that even the deeds executed by petitioner, as
administrator of the Estate of Hodges, involving properties registered in his name,
should be co-signed by respondent Magno. 3 And this was not an isolated instance.
In her brief as appellee, respondent Magno states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"After the lower court had authorized appellee Avelina A. Magno to execute final
deeds of sale pursuant to contracts to sell executed by C. N. Hodges on February
20, 1963 (pp. 45-46, Green ROA), motions for the approval of final deeds of sale
(signed by appellee Avelina A. Magno and the administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges first Joe Hodges, then Atty. Fernando Mirasol and later the appellant) were
approved by the lower court upon petition of appellee Magno’s counsel, Atty. Leon
P. Gellada, on the basis of section 8 of Rule 89 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Page 15 of 100
Subsequently, the appellant, after it had taken over the bulk of the assets of the
two estates, started presenting these motions itself. The first such attempt was a
‘Motion for Approval of Deeds of Sale for Registered Land and Cancellations of
Mortgages’ dated July 21, 1964 filed by Atty. Cesar T. Tirol, counsel for the
appellant, thereto annexing two (2) final deeds of sale and two (2) cancellations of
mortgages signed by appellee Avelina A. Magno and D. R. Paulino, Assistant Vice-
President and Manager of the appellant (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Vol. V, pp.
1694-1701). This motion was approved by the lower court on July 27, 1964. It was
followed by another motion dated August 4, 1964 for the approval of one final
deed of sale again signed by appellee Avelina A. Magno and D. R. Paulino (CFI
Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Vol. V, pp. 1825-1828), which was again approved by
the lower court on August 7, 1964. The gates having been opened, a flood ensued:
the appellant subsequently filed similar motions for the approval of a multitude of
deeds of sales and cancellations of mortgages signed by both the appellee Avelina
A. Magno and the Appellant.
A random check of the records of Special Proceeding No. 1307 alone will show
Atty. Cesar T. Tirol as having presented for court approval deeds of sale of real
properties signed by both appellee Avelina A. Magno and D. R. Paulino in the
following numbers: (a) motion dated September 21, 1964 — 6 deeds of sale; (b)
motion dated November 4, 1964 — 1 deed of sale; (c) motion dated December 1,
1964 — 4 deeds of sale; (d) motion dated February 3, 1965 — 8 deeds of sale; (f)
motion dated May 7, 1965 — 9 deeds of sale. In view of the very extensive
landholdings of the Hodges spouses and the many motions filed concerning deeds
of sale of real properties executed by C. N. Hodges the lower court has had to
constitute special but separate expedientes in Special Proceedings Nos. 1307 and
1672 to include mere motions for the approval of deeds of sale of the conjugal
properties of the Hodges spouses.
As an example, from among the very many, under date of February 3, 1965, Atty.
Cesar T. Tirol, as counsel for the appellant, filed a ‘Motion for Approval of Deeds of
Sale for Registered Land and Cancellations of Mortgages" (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No.
1307, Vol. VIII, pp. 6570-6596) the allegations of which read:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
‘1. In his lifetime, the late C. N. Hodges executed ‘Contracts to Sell’ real property,
and the prospective buyers under said contracts have already paid the price and
complied with the terms and conditions thereof;
‘2. In the course of administration of both estates, mortgage debtors have already
paid the debts secured by chattel mortgages in favor of the late C. N. Hodges, and
are now entitled to release therefrom;
‘3. There are attached hereto documents executed jointly by the Administratrix in
 Page 16 of 100

Sp. Proc. No. 1307 and the Administrator in Sp. Proc. No. 1672, consisting of deeds
of sale in favor — "Considering that in both eases there is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor
distribution of properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto, the Court believes
Fernando Cano, Bacolod City, Occ. Negros that payment to both the administrator of the testate estate of C. N. Hodges and the
Fe Magbanua, Iloilo City administratrix of the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges or to either one of the
Policarpio M. Pareno, La Paz, Iloilo city two estates is proper and legal.
Rosario T. Libre, Jaro, Iloilo City
Federico B. Torres, Iloilo City WHEREFORE, movant Ricardo T. Salas can pay to both estates or either of them.
Reynaldo T. Lataquin, La Paz, Iloilo City
Anatolio T. Viray, Iloilo City SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
Benjamin Rolando, Jaro, Iloilo City
(Pp. 334-335, Green Record on Appeal.)
and cancellations of mortgages in favor of —
On the other hand, as stated earlier, there were instances when respondent Magno
Pablo Manzano, Oton, Iloilo was given authority to act alone. For instance, in the other appealed order of
Ricardo M. Diana, Dao, San Jose, Antique December 19, 1964, on page 221 of the Green Record on Appeal, the respondent
Simplicio Tingson, Iloilo City court approved payments made by her of overtime pay to some employees of the
Amado Magbanua, Pototan, Iloilo court who had helped in gathering and preparing copies of parts of the records in
Roselia M. Baes, Bolo, Roxas City both estates as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
William Bayani, Rizal Estanzuela, Iloilo City
Elpidio Villarete, Molo, Iloilo City "Considering that the expenses subject of the motion to approve payment of
Norma T. Ruiz, Jaro, Iloilo City. overtime pay dated December 10, 1964, are reasonable and are believed by this
Court to be a proper charge of administration chargeable to the testate estate of
‘4. That the approval of the aforesaid documents will not reduce the assets of the the late Linnie Jane Hodges, the said expenses are hereby APPROVED and to be
estates so as to prevent any creditor from receiving his full debt or diminish his charged against the testate estate of the late Linnie Jane Hodges. The
dividend.’ administrator of the testate estate of the late Charles Newton Hodges is hereby
ordered to countersign the check or checks necessary to pay the said overtime pay
And the prayer of this motion is indeed very revealing:chanrob1es virtual 1aw as shown by the bills marked Annex ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ of the motion.
library
‘WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that, under Rule 89, Section 8 of the Rules SO ORDERED." (Pp. 221-222, Green Record on Appeal.)
of Court, this honorable court approve the aforesaid deeds of sale and
cancellations of mortgages.’" (Pp. 113-117, Appellee’s Brief.) Likewise, the respondent court approved deeds of sale executed by respondent
Magno alone, as Administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, covering properties in
None of these assertions is denied in petitioner’s reply brief. the name of Hodges, pursuant to "contracts to sell’ executed by Hodges,
irrespective of whether they were executed by him before or after the death of his
Further indicating lack of concrete perspective or orientation on the part of the wife. The orders of this nature which are also on appeal herein are the
respondent court and its hesitancy to clear up matters promptly, in its other following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
appealed order of November 23, 1965, on pages 334-335 of the Green Record on
Appeal, said respondent court allowed the movant Ricardo Salas, President of 1. Order of March 30, 1966, on p. 137 of the Green Record on Appeal, approving
appellee Western Institute of Technology (successor of Panay Educational the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Lorenzo Carles
Institutions, Inc.), one of the parties with whom Hodges had contracts that are in on February 24, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on June
question in the appeals herein, to pay petitioner, as Administrator of the estate of 17, 1958, after the death of his wife, which contract petitioner claims was
Hodges and/or respondent Magno, as Administrator of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, cancelled by it for failure of Carles to pay the installments due on January 7, 1965.
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

2. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 139-140, id., approving the deed of sale executed
by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Salvador Guzman on February 28, 1966
pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on September 13, 1960, after the
death of his wife, which contract petitioner claims it cancelled on March 3, 1965 in
view of failure of said appellee to pay the installments on time.
3. Order of April 20, 1966, on pp. 167-168, id., approving the deed of sale executed
by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Purificacion Coronado on March 28,
1966 pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on August 14, 1961, after
the death of his wife.
4. Order of April 20, 1966, on pp. 168-169, id., approving the deed of sale executed
by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Florenia Barrido on March 28, 1966,
pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on February 21, 1958, after the
death of his wife.
5. Order of June 7, 1966, on pp. 184-185, id., approving the deed of sale executed
by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Belcezar Causing on May 2, 1966,
pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on February 10, 1959, after the
death of his wife.
6. Order of June 21, 1966, on pp. 211-212, id., approving the deed of sale executed
by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Artheo Thomas Jamir on June 3, 1966,
pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on May 26, 1961, after the death
of his wife.
7. Order of June 21, 1966, on pp. 212-213, id., approving the deed of sale executed
by respondent Magno in favor of appellees Graciano Lucero and Melquiades
Batisanan on June 6 and June 3, 1966, respectively, pursuant to "contracts to sell"
signed by Hodges on June 9, 1959 and November 27, 1961, respectively, after the
death of his wife.
8. Order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 303-304, id., approving the deed of sale
executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellees Espiridion Partisala,
Winifredo Espada and Rosario Alingasa on September 6, 1966, August 17, 1966
and August 3, 1966, respectively, pursuant to "contracts to sell" signed by Hodges
on April 20, 1960, April 18, 1960 and August 25, 1958, respectively, that is, after
the death of his wife.
9. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 137-138, id., approving the deed of sale executed
by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Alfredo Catedral on March 2, 1966,
pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on May 29, 1954, before the
death of his wife, which contract petitioner claims it had cancelled on February 16,
1966 for failure of appellee Catedral to pay the installments due on time.
Page 17 of 100
10. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 138-139, id., approving the deed of sale executed
by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Jose Pablico on March 7, 1966, pursuant
to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on March 7, 1950, after the death of his
wife, which contract petitioner claims it had cancelled on June 29, 1960, for failure
of appellee Pablico to pay the installments due on time.
11. Order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 303-304, id., in so far as it approved the
deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Pepito Iyulores on
September 6, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on February
5, 1951, before the death of his wife.
12. Order of January 3, 1967, on pp. 335-336, id., approving three deeds of sale
executed by respondent Magno, one in favor of appellees Santiago Pacaonsis and
two in favor of appellee Adelfa Premaylon on December 5, 1966 and November 3,
1966, respectively, pursuant to separate "promises to sell" signed respectively by
Hodges on May 26, 1955 and January 30, 1954, before the death of his wife, and
October 31, 1959, after her death.
In like manner, there were also instances when respondent court approved deeds
of sale executed by petitioner alone and without the concurrence of respondent
Magno, and such approvals have not been the subject of any appeal. No less than
petitioner points this out on pages 149-150 of its brief as appellant
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The points of fact and law pertaining to the two abovecited assignments of error
have already been discussed previously. In the first abovecited error, the order
alluded to was general, and as already explained before, it was, as admitted by the
lower court itself, superseded by the particular orders approving specific final
deeds of sale executed by the appellee, Avelina A. Magno, which are subject of this
appeal, as well as the particular orders approving specific final deeds of sale
executed by the appellant, Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, which were
never appealed by the appellee, Avelina A. Magno, nor by any party for that matter,
and which are now therefore final."cralaw virtua1aw library
Now, simultaneously with the foregoing incidents, others of more fundamental
and all embracing significance developed. On October 5, 1963, over the signature
of Atty. Allison J. Gibbs in representation of the law firm of Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta,
as counsel for the co-administrators Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol, the
following self-explanatory motion was filed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"URGENT MOTION FOR AN ACCOUNTING AND DELIVERY TO ADMINISTRATION
OF THE ESTATE OF C . N . HODGES OF ALL OF THE ASSETS OF THE CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP OF THE DECEASED LINNIE JANE HODGES AND C . N. HODGES

EXISTING AS OF MAY 23, 1957 PLUS ALL THE RENTS, EMOLUMENTS AND
INCOME THEREFROM
COMES NOW the co-administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, Joe Hodges,
through his undersigned attorneys in the above-entitled proceedings, and to this
Honorable Court respectfully alleges:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) On May 23, 1957 Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City.
(2) On June 28, 1957 this Honorable Court admitted to probate the Last Will and
Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed November 22, 1952 and
appointed C. N. Hodges as Executor of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 24-25,
Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).
(3) On July 1, 1957 this Honorable Court issued Letters Testamentary to C. N.
Hodges in the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 30, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).
(4) On December 14, 1957 this Honorable Court, on the basis of the following
allegations in a Motion dated December 11, 1957 filed by Leon P. Gellada as
attorney for the executor C. N. Hodges:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘That herein Executor, (is) not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal,
but also, the successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges.’ (p. 44, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; Emphasis supplied.)
issued the following order:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the Executor, for the reasons stated
in his motion dated December 11, 1957 which the court considers well taken, all
the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all properties left by the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The said executor is further authorized
to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties
lift by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes
contained in the last will and testament of the latter.’ (p. 46, Rec. Sp. Proc.
1307; Emphasis supplied.)
(5) On April 21, 1959 this Honorable Court approved the inventory and accounting
submitted by C. N. Hodges through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on April 14, 1959
wherein he alleged among other things.
‘That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining
the herein account, be given notice, as herein executor is the only devisee or
legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the last will and testament already;
probated by the Honorable Court.’ (pp. 77-78. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; Emphasis
Page 18 of 100
supplied.)
(6) On July 30, 1960 this Honorable Court approved the ‘Annual Statement of
Account’ submitted by C. N. Hodges through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on July 21,
1960 wherein he alleged among other things:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining
the herein account, be given notice as herein executor is the only devisee or
legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in accordance with the last will and
testament of the deceased, already probated by this Honorable Court.’ (pp. 81-82,
Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; Emphasis supplied.)
(7) On May 2, 1961 this Honorable court approved the ‘Annual Statement of
Account By The Executor For the Year 1960’ submitted through Leon P. Gellada on
April 20, 1961 wherein he alleged:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘That no person interested in the Philippines be given notice, of the time and place
of examining the herein account, as herein Executor is the only devisee or legatee
of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in accordance with the last will and testament
of the deceased, already probated by this Honorable Court.’ (pp. 90-91, Rec. Sp.
Proc. 1307; Emphasis supplied.)
(8) On December 25, 1962, C. N. Hodges died.
(9) On December 25, 1962, on the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion of Leon P. Gellada filed
only in Special Proceeding No. 1307, this Honorable Court appointed Avelina A.
Magno.
‘Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and as Special Administratrix of
the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in the latter case because the last will of said
Charles Newton Hodges is still kept in his vault or iron safe and that the real and
personal properties of both spouses may be lost, damaged or go to waste, unless a
Special Administratrix is appointed.’(p. 100. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
(10) On December 26, 1962 Letters of Administration were issued to Avelina
Magno pursuant to this Honorable Court’s aforesaid Order of December 25, 1962.
‘With full authority to take possession of all the property of said deceased in any
province or provinces in which it may be situated and to perform all other acts
necessary for the preservation of said property, said Administratrix and/or Special
Administratrix having filed a bond satisfactory to the Court.’
(p. 102. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)

(11) On January 22, 1963 this Honorable Court on petition of Leon P. Gellada of
January 21, 1963 issued Letters of Administration to:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
(a) Avelina A. Magno as Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
(b) Avelina A. Magno as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Charles Newton
Hodges; and
(c) Joe Hodges as Co-Special Administrator of the Estate of Charles Newton
Hodges.
(p. 43, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
(12) On February 20, 1963 this Honorable Court on the basis of a motion filed by
Leon P. Gellada as legal counsel on February 16, 1963 for Avelina A. Magno acting
as Administratrix of the Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (pp. 114-116, Sp. Proc.
1307) issued the following order:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘. . . se autoriza a aquella (Avelina A. Magno) a firmar escrituras de venta definitiva
de propiedades cubiertas por contratos para vender, firmados, en vida, por el
finado Charles Newton Hodges, cada vez que el precio estipulado en cada contrato
este totalmente pagado. Se autoriza igualmente a la misma a firmar escrituras de
cancelacion de hipoteca tanto de bienes reales como personales cada vez que la
consideracion de cada hipoteca este totalmente pagada.
‘Cada una de dichas escrituras que se otorguen debe ser sometida para la
aprobacion de este Juzgado.’(p. 117, Sp. Proc. 1307).
[Par. 1 (c), Reply to Motion For Removal of Joe Hodges]
(13) On September 16, 1963 Leon P. Gellada, acting as attorney for Avelina A.
Magno as Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, alleges:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
‘3. That since January, 1963, both estates of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles
Newton Hodges have been receiving in full, payments for those ‘contracts to sell’
entered into by C. N. Hodges during his lifetime, and the purchasers have been
demanding the execution of definite deeds of sale in their favor.
‘4. That hereto attached are thirteen (13) copies deeds of sale executed by the
Administrative and by the co-administrator (Fernando P. Mirasol) of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges respectively, in compliance with
the terms and conditions of the respective ‘contracts to sell’ executed by the
Page 19 of 100
parties thereto.’
(14) The properties involved in the aforesaid motion of September 16, 1963 are all
registered in the name of the deceased C. N. Hodges.
(15) Avelina A. Magno, it is alleged on information and belief, has been advertising
in the newspaper in Iloilo thusly:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘For Sale
Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges.
All Real Estate or Personal Property will be sold on First Come First Served Basis.
Avelina A. Magno
Administratrix
(16) Avelina A. Magno, it is alleged on information and belief, has paid and still is
paying sums of money to sundry persons.
(17) Joe Hodges through the undersigned attorneys manifested during the
hearings before this Honorable Court on September 5 and 6, 1963 that the estate
of C. N. Hodges was claiming all of the assets belonging to the deceased spouses
Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges situated in Philippines cause of the aforesaid
election by C. N. Hodges wherein he claimed and took possession as sole owner of
all of said assets during the administration of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on
the ground that he was the sole devisee and legatee under her Last Will and
Testament.
(18) Avelina A. Magno has submitted no inventory and accounting of her
administration as Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Special
Administratrix of the estate of C. N. Hodges. However, from manifestations made
by Avelina A. Magno and her legal counsel, Leon P. Gellada, there is no question
she will claim that at least fifty per cent (50%) of the conjugal assets of the
deceased spouses and the rents, emoluments and income therefrom belong to the
Higdon family who are named in paragraphs Fourth and Fifth of the Will of Linnie
Jane Hodges (p. 5, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, movant respectfully prays that this Honorable
Court, after due hearing, order:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) Avelina A. Magno to submit an inventory and accounting of all of the funds,
properties and assets of any character belonging to the deceased Linnie Jane

Hodges and C. N. Hodges which have come into her possession, with full details of
what she has done with them;
(2) Avelina A. Magno to turn over and deliver to the Administrator of the estate of
C. N. Hodges all of the funds, properties and assets of and character remaining in
her possession;
(3) Pending this Honorable Court’s adjudication of the aforesaid issues, Avelina A.
Magno to stop, unless she first secures the conformity of Joe Hodges (or his duly
authorized representative, such as the undersigned attorneys) as the Co-
administrator and attorney-in-fact of a majority of the beneficiaries of the estate of
C. N. Hodges:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) Advertising the sale and the sale of the properties of the estates:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
(b) Employing personnel and paying them any compensation.
(4) Such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and equitable in the
premises. (Annex "T", Petition.)
Almost a year thereafter, or on September 14, 1964, after the co-administrators
Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol were replaced by herein petitioner Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank as sole administrator, pursuant to an agreement
of all the heirs of Hodges approved by the court, and because the above motion of
October 5, 1963 had not yet been heard due to the absence from the country of
Atty. Gibbs, petitioner filed the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"MANIFESTATION AND MOTION, INCLUDING MOTION TO SET FOR HEARING
AND RESOLVE URGENT MOTION FOR AN ACCOUNTING AND DELIVERY TO
ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE OF C. N. HODGES OF ALL THE ASSETS OF THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE DECEASED LINNIE JANE HODGES AND C. N.
HODGES EXISTING AS OF MAY 23, 1957 PLUS ALL OF THE RENTS, EMOLUMENTS
AND INCOME THEREFROM OF OCTOBER 5, 1963.
COMES NOW Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (hereinafter referred to
as PCIB), the administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, deceased, in Special
Proceedings No. 1672, through its undersigned counsel, and to this Honorable
Court respectfully alleges that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. On October 5, 1963, Joe Hodges acting as the co-administrator of the estate of C.
N. Hodges filed, through the undersigned attorneys, an ‘Urgent Motion For An
Accounting and Delivery To Administrator of the Estate of C. N. Hodges of all of
The Assets of The Conjugal Partnership of The Deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C.
Page 20 of 100
N. Hodges Existing as of May 23, 1957 Plus All of The Rents, Emoluments and
Income Therefrom’ (pp. 536-542, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672).
2. On January 24, 1964 this Honorable Court, on the basis of an amicable
agreement entered into on January 23, 1964 by the two co-administrators of the
estate of C. N. Hodges and virtually all of the heirs of C. N. Hodges (p. 912, CFI Rec.,
S. P. No. 1672), resolved the dispute over who should act as administrator of the
estate of C. N. Hodges by appointing the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges (pp. 905-906, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672) and issuing letters of administration
to the PCIB.
3. On January 24, 1964 virtually all of the heirs of C. N. Hodges, Joe Hodges and
Fernando P. Mirasol acting as the two co-administrators of the estate of C. N.
Hodges, Avelina A. Magno acting as the administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges, and Messrs. William Brown and Ardel Young Acting for all of the Higdon
family who claim to be the sole beneficiaries of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
and various legal counsel representing the aforenamed parties entered into an
amicable agreement, which was approved by this Honorable Court, wherein the
parties thereto agreed that certain sums of money were to be paid in settlement of
different claims against the two estates and that the assets (to the extent they
existed) of both estates would be administered jointly by the PCIB as
administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges and Avelina A. Magno as administratrix
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, subject, however, to the aforesaid October 5,
1963 Motion, namely, the PCIB’s claim to exclusive possession and ownership of
one-hundred percent (100%) (or, in the alternative, seventy-five percent [75%] of
all assets owned by C. N. Hodges or Linnie Jane Hodges situated in the Philippines.
On February 1, 1964 (pp. 934-935, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672) this Honorable Court
amended its order of January 24, 1964 but in no way changes its recognition of the
aforedescribed basic demand by the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges to one hundred percent (100%) of the assets claimed by both estates.
4. On February 15, 1964 the PCIB filed a ‘Motion to Resolve’ the aforesaid Motion
of October 5, 1963. This Honorable Court set for hearing on June 11, 1964 the
Motion of October 5, 1963.
5. On June 11, 1964, because the undersigned Allison J. Gibbs was absent in the
United States, this Honorable Court ordered the indefinite postponement of the
hearing of the Motion of October 5, 1963.
6. Since its appointment as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges the PCIB has
not been able to properly carry out its duties and obligations as administrator of
the estate of C. N. Hodges because of the following acts, among others, of Avelina A.
Magno and those who claim to act for her as administratrix of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) Avelina A. Magno illegally acts as if she is in exclusive control of all of the assets
in the Philippines of both estates including those claimed by the estate of C. N.
Hodges as evidenced in part by her locking the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street,
Iloilo City on August 31, 1964 and refusing to reopen same until ordered to do so
by this Honorable Court on September 7, 1964.
(b) Avelina A. Magno illegally acts as though she alone may decide how the assets
of the estate of C. N. Hodges should be administered, who the PCIB shall employ
and how much they may be paid as evidenced in party by her refusal to sign
checks issued by the PCIB payable to the undersigned counsel pursuant to their
fee agreement approved by this Honorable Court in its order dated March 31,
1964.
(c) Avelina A. Magno illegally gives access to and turns over possession of the
records and assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges to the attorney-in-fact of the
Higdon Family, Mr. James L. Sullivan, as evidenced in part by the cashing of his
personal checks.
(d) Avelina A. Magno illegally refuses to execute checks prepared by the PCIB
drawn to pay expenses of the estate of C. N. Hodges as evidenced in part by the
check drawn to reimburse the PCIB’s advance of P48,445.50 to pay the 1964
income taxes reported due and payable by the estate of C.N. Hodges.
7. Under and pursuant to the orders of this Honorable Court, particularly those of
January 24 and February 1, 1964, and the mandate contained in its Letters of
Administration issued on January 24, 1964 to the PCIB, it has
‘full authority to take possession of all the property of the deceased C. N. Hodges.
‘and to perform all other acts necessary for the preservation of said property.’ (p.
914, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672.)
8. As administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, the PCIB claims the right to the
immediate exclusive possession and control of all of the properties, accounts
receivables, court cases, bank accounts and other assets, including the
documentary records evidencing same, which existed in the Philippines on the
date of C. N. Hodges’ death, December 25, 1962, and were in his possession and
registered in his name alone. The PCIB knows of no assets in the Philippines
registered in the name of Linnie Jane Hodges, the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, or,
C. N. Hodges, Executor of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, on December 25, 1962.
All of the assets of which the PCIB has knowledge are either registered in the name
of C. N. Hodges, alone or were derived therefrom since his death on December 25,
1962.
Page 21 of 100
9. The PCIB as the current administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, deceased,
succeeded to all of the rights of the previously duly appointed administrators of
the estate of C. N. Hodges, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) On December 25, 1962, date of C. N. Hodges’ death, this Honorable Court
appointed Miss Avelina A. Magno simultaneously as:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
(i) Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 102, CFI Rec., S.P. No.
1307) to replace the deceased C. N. Hodges who on May 28, 1957 was appointed
Special Administrator (p. 13, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1307) and on July 1, 1957 Executor
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 30, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1307);
(ii) Special Administration of the estate of C. N. Hodges (p. 102, CFI Rec. S.P. No.
1307).
(b) On December 29, 1962 this Honorable Court appointed Harold K. Davies as co-
special administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges along with Avelina A. Magno (pp.
108-111, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1307).
(c) On January 22, 1963, with the conformity of Avelina A. Magno, Harold K. Davies
resigned in favor of Joe Hodges (pp. 35-36, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672) who thereupon
was appointed on January 22, 1963 by this Honorable Court as special co-
administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges (pp. 38-40 & 43, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672)
along with Miss Magno who at that time was still acting as special co-
administratrix of the estate of C. N. Hodges.
(d) On February 22, 1963, without objection on the part of Avelina A. Magno, this
Honorable Court appointed Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol as co-
administrators of the estate of C.N. Hodges (pp. 76-78, 81 & 85, CFI Rec., S.P. No.
1672).
10. Miss Avelina A. Magno, pursuant to the orders of this Honorable Court of
December 25, 1962, took possession of all Philippine Assets now claimed by the
two estates. Legally, Miss Magno could take possession of the assets registered in
the name of C. N. Hodges alone only in her capacity as Special Administratrix of the
Estate of C.N. Hodges. With the appointment by this Honorable Court on February
22, 1963 of Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol as the co-administrators of the
estate of C.N. Hodges, they legally were entitled to take over from Miss Magno the
full and exclusive possession of all of the assets of the estate of C.N. Hodges. With
the appointment on January 24, 1964 of the PCIB as the sole administrator of the
estate of C.N. Hodges in substitution of Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol, the
PCIB legally became the only party entitled to the sole and exclusive possession of

all of the assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges.
11. The PCIB’s predecessors submitted their accounting and this Honorable Court
approved same, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) The accounting of Harold K. Davies dated January 18, 1963 (pp. 16-33, CFI Rec.,
S.P. No. 1672); which shows on its face the:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(i) Conformity of Avelina A. Magno acting as ‘Administratrix of the Estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges and Special Administratrix of the Estate of C.N. Hodges’;
(ii) Conformity of Leslie Echols, a Texas lawyer acting for the heirs of C. N. Hodges;
and
(iii) Conformity of William Brown, a Texas lawyer acting for the Higdon family
who claim to be the only heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 18, 25-33, CFI Rec., S.P.
No. 1672).
"Note: This accounting was approved by this Honorable Court on January 22, 1963
(p. 34, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672).
(b) The accounting of Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol as of January 23, 1964,
filed February 24, 1964 (pp. 990-1000, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672 and pp. 1806-1848,
CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1307).
Note: This accounting was approved by this Honorable Court on March 3, 1964.
(c) The PCIB and its undersigned lawyers are aware of no report or accounting
submitted by Avelina A. Magno of her acts as administratrix of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges or special administratrix of the estate of C.N. Hodges, unless it is the
accounting of Harold K. Davies as special co-administrator of the estate of C.N.
Hodges dated January 18, 1963 to which Miss Magno manifested her conformity
(supra).
12. In the aforesaid agreement of January 24, 1964, Miss Avelina A. Magno agreed
to receive P10,000.00.
‘for her services as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges’
and in addition she agreed to be employed, starting February 1, 1964, at
‘a monthly salary of P500.00 for her services as an employee of both estates.’
24 ems.
Page 22 of 100
13. Under the aforesaid agreement of January 24, 1964 and the orders of this
Honorable Court of same date, the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges is entitled to the exclusive possession of all records, properties and assets
in the name of C. N. Hodges as of the date of his death on December 25, 1962
which were in the possession of the deceased C. N. Hodges on that date and which
then passed to the possession of Miss Magno in her capacity as Special Co-
Administratrix of the estate of C. N. Hodges or the possession of Joe Hodges or
Fernando P. Mirasol as co-administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges.
14. Because of Miss Magno’s refusal to comply with the reasonable request of PCIB
concerning the assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges, the PCIB dismissed Miss Magno
as an employee of the estate of C. N. Hodges effective August 31, 1964. On
September 1, 1964 Miss Magno locked the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street and
denied the PCIB access thereto. Upon the Urgent Motion of the PCIB dated
September 3, 1964, this Honorable Court on September 7, 1964 ordered Miss
Magno to reopen the aforesaid premises at 206-208 Guanco Street and permit the
PCIB access thereto no later than September 8, 1964.
15. the PCIB pursuant to the aforesaid orders of this Honorable Court is again in
physical possession of all of the assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges. However, the
PCIB is not in exclusive control of the aforesaid records, properties and assets
because Miss Magno continues to assert the claims hereinabove outlined in
paragraph 6, continues to use her own locks to the doors of the aforesaid premises
at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City and continues to deny the PCIB its right to
know the combinations to the doors of the vault and safes situated within the
premises at 206-208 Guanco Street despite the fact that said combinations were
known to only C. N. Hodges during his lifetime.
16. The Philippine estate and inheritance taxes assessed the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges were assessed and paid on the basis that C. N. Hodges is the sole
beneficiary of the assets of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges situated in the
Philippines. Avelina A. Magno and her legal counsel at no time have questioned the
validity of the aforesaid assessment and the payment of the corresponding
Philippine death taxes.
17. Nothing further remains to be done in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges except
to resolve the aforesaid Motion of October 5, 1963 and grant the PCIB the
exclusive possession and control of all of the records, properties and assets of the
estate of C. N. Hodges.
18. Such assets as may have existed of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges were
ordered by this Honorable Court in special Proceedings No. 1307 to be turned over
and delivered to C. N. Hodges alone. He in fact took possession of them before his

death and asserted and exercised the right of exclusive ownership over the said
assets as the sole beneficiary of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the PCIB respectfully petitions that this
Honorable court.
(1) Set the Motion of October 5, 1963 for hearing at the earliest possible date with
notice to all interested parties;
(2) Order Avelina A. Magno to submit an inventory and accounting as
Administratrix of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Co-Administratrix of the
Estate of C. N. Hodges of all of the funds, properties and assets of any character
belonging to the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges which have come
into her possession, with full details of what she has done with them;
(3) Order Avelina A. Magno to turn over and deliver to the PCIB as administrator
of the estate of C. N. Hodges all of the funds, properties and assets of any character
remaining in her possession;
(4) Pending this Honorable Court’s adjudication of the aforesaid issues, order
Avelina A. Magno and her representatives to stop interfering with the
administration of the estate of C. N. Hodges by the PCIB and its duly authorized
representatives;
(5) Enjoin Avelina A. Magno from working in the premises at 206-208 Guanco
Street, Iloilo City as an employee of the estate of C. N. Hodges and approve her
dismissal as such by the PCIB effective August 31, 1964;
(6) Enjoin James L. Sullivan, Attorneys Manglapus and Quimpo and others
allegedly representing Miss Magno from entering the premises at 206-208 Guanco
Street, Iloilo City or any other properties of C. N. Hodges without the express
permission of the PCIB;
(7) Order such other relief as this Honorable Court finds just and equitable in the
premises." (Annex "U", Petition.)
On January 8, 1965, petitioner also filed a motion for "Official Declaration of Heirs
of Linnie Jane Hodges Estate" alleging:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
COMES NOW Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (hereinafter referred to
as PCIB), as administrator of the estate of the late C. N. Hodges, through the
undersigned counsel, and to this Honorable Court respectfully alleges
that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Page 23 of 100
‘1. During their marriage, spouses Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges,
American citizens originally from the State of Texas, U.S.A., acquired and
accumulated considerable assets and properties in the Philippines and in the
States of Texas and Oklahoma, United States of America. All said properties
constituted their conjugal estate.
2. Although Texas was the domicile of origin of the Hodges spouses, this Honorable
Court, in its orders dated March 31 and December 12, 1964 (CFI Record, Sp. Proc.
No. 1307, pp. ----; Sp. Proc. No. 1672, p. ----), conclusively found and categorically
ruled that said spouses had lived and worked for more than 50 years in Iloilo City
and had, therefore, acquired a domicile of choice in said city, which they retained
until the time of their respective deaths.
3. On November 22, 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges executed in the City of Iloilo her Last
Will and Testament, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "A." The bequests
in said will pertinent to the present issue are the second, third, and fourth
provisions, which we quote in full hereunder:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my
estate, both personal and real, wherever situated, or located, to my husband,
Charles Newton Hodges, to have and to hold unto him, my said husband during his
natural lifetime.
"THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton Hodges,
shall have the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his
lifetime, and he is hereby given the right to make and changes in the physical
properties of said estate, by sale of any part thereof which he may think best, and
the purchase of any other or additional property as he may think best; to execute
conveyances with or without general or special warranty, conveying in fee simple
or for any other term or time, any property which he may deem proper to dispose
of; to lease any of the real property for oil, gas and/or other minerals, and all such
deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee simple title to the interest so conveyed
in such property as he may elect to sell. All rents, emoluments and income from
said estate shall belong to him, and he is further authorized to use any part of the
principal of said estate as he may need or desire. It is provided herein, however,
that he shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any of the improved property now
owned by us located at, in or near the City of Lubbock, Texas, but he shall have the
full right to lease, manage and enjoy the same during his lifetime, as above
provided. He shall have the right to sub-divide any farmland and sell lots therein,
and may sell unimproved town lots.
"FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give, devise
and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate both real and
personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my brothers

and sisters, share and share alike, namely:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era
Boman and Nimray Higdon.’
4. On November 14, 1953, C. N. Hodges executed in the City of Iloilo his Last Will
and Testament, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "B." In said Will, C. N.
Hodges designated his wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, as his beneficiary using the
identical language she used in the second and third provisos of her Will, supra.
5. On May 23, 1957 Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City, pre-deceasing her
husband by more than five (5) years. At the time of her death, she had no forced or
compulsory heir, except her husband, C. N. Hodges. She was survived also by
various brothers and sisters mentioned in her Will (supra), which, for
convenience, we shall refer to as the HIGDONS.
6. On June 28, 1957, this Honorable Court admitted to probate the Last Will and
Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges (Annex "A"), and appointed C. N.
Hodges as executor of her estate without bond. (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp.
24-25). On July 1, 1957, this Honorable Court issued letters testamentary to C. N.
Hodges in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 30.)
7. The Will of Linnie Jane Hodges, with respect to the order of succession, the
amount of successional rights, and the intrinsic validity of its testamentary
provisions, should be governed by Philippine laws, because:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
(a) The testatrix, Linnie Jane Hodges, intended Philippine laws to govern her Will;
(b) Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that "the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property
and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found", shall prevail.
However, the Conflict of Law of Texas, which is the "national law" of the testatrix,
Linnie Jane Hodges, provide that the domiciliary law (Philippine law — see
paragraph 2, supra) should govern the testamentary dispositions and successional
rights over movables (personal properties), and the law of the situs of the
property (also Philippine law as to properties located in the Philippines) with
regards immovable (real properties). Thus applying the "Renvoi Doctrine", as
approved and applied by our Supreme Court in the case of "In The Matter Of The
Testate Estate of Eduard E. Christensen", G.R. No. L-16749, promulgated January
31, 1963, Philippine law should apply to the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges and to the
successional rights to her estate insofar as her movable and immovable assets in
the Philippines are concerned. We shall not, at this stage, discuss what law should
govern the assets of Linnie Jane Hodges located in Oklahoma and Texas, because
Page 24 of 100
the only assets in issue in this motion are those within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court in the two above-captioned Special Proceedings.
8. Under Philippine and Texas law, the conjugal or community estate of spouses
shall, upon dissolution, be divided equally between them. Thus, upon the death of
Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957, one-half (1/2) of the entirety of the assets of
the Hodges spouses constituting their conjugal estate pertained automatically to
Charles Newton Hodges, not by way of inheritance, but in his own right as partner
in the conjugal partnership. The other one-half (1/2) portion of the conjugal estate
constituted the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. This is the only portion of the
conjugal estate capable of inheritance by her heirs.
9. This one-half (1/2) portion of the conjugal assets pertaining to Linnie Jane
Hodges cannot, under a clear and specific provision of her Will, be enhanced or
increased by income, earnings, rents, or emoluments accruing after her death on
May 23, 1957. Linnie Jane Hodges’ Will provides that "all rents, emoluments and
income from said estate shall belong to him (C. N. Hodges) and he is further
authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as he may need or desire."
(Paragraph 3, Annex "A." ) Thus, by specific provision of Linnie Jane Hodges’ Will,
"all rents, emoluments and income" must be credited to the one-half (1/2) portion
of the conjugal estate pertaining to C. N. Hodges. Clearly, therefore the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges capable of inheritance by her heirs, consisted exclusively of no
more than one-half (1/2) of the conjugal estate, computed as of the time of her
death on May 23, 1957.
10. Articles 900, 995 and 1001 of the New Civil Code provide that the surviving
spouse of a deceased leaving no ascendants or descendants is entitled, as a matter
of right and by way of irrevocable legitime, to at least one-half (1/2) of the estate
of the deceased, and no testamentary disposition by the deceased can legally and
validly affect this right of the surviving spouse. In fact, her husband is entitled to
said one-half (1/2) portion of her estate by way of legitime. (Article 886, Civil
Code.) Clearly, therefore, immediately upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, C. N.
Hodges was the owner of at least three-fourths (3/4) or seventy-five (75%)
percent of all of the conjugal assets of the spouses, (1/2 or 50% by way of conjugal
partnership share and 1/4 or 25% by way of inheritance and legitime), plus all
"rents, emoluments and income" accruing to said conjugal estate from the moment
of Linnie Jane Hodges’ death (see paragraph 9, supra).
11. The late Linnie Jane Hodges designated her husband C. N. Hodges as her sole
and exclusive heir with full authority to do what he pleased, as exclusive heir and
owner of all the assets constituting her estate, except only with regards certain
properties "owned by us, located at, in or near the City of Lubbock, Texas." Thus,
even without relying on our laws of succession and legitime, which we have cited
above, C. N. Hodges, by specific testamentary designation of his wife, was entitled

to the entirety to his wife’s estate in the Philippines.
12. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that "the rights of the successor are
transmitted from the death of the decedent." Thus, title to the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges was transmitted to C. N. Hodges immediately upon her death on May 23,
1957. For the convenience of this Honorable Court, we attached hereto as Annex
"C" a graph of how the conjugal estate of the spouses Hodges should be divided in
accordance with Philippine law and the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges.
13. In his capacity as sole heir and successor to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges as
above-stated, C. N. Hodges, shortly after the death of Linnie Jane Hodges,
appropriated to himself the entirety of her estate. He operated all the assets,
engaged in business and performed all acts in connection with the entirety of the
conjugal estate, in his own name alone, just as he had been operating, engaging
and doing while the late Linnie Jane Hodges was still alive. Upon his death on
December 25, 1962, therefore, all said conjugal assets were in his sole possession
and control, and registered in his name alone, not as executor, but as exclusive
owner of all said assets.
14. All these acts of C. N. Hodges were authorized and sanctioned expressly and
impliedly by various orders of this Honorable Court, as follows:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
(a) In an Order dated May 27, 1957, this Honorable Court ruled that C. N. Hodges
"is allowed or authorized to continue the business in which he was engaged, and to
perform acts which he had been doing while the deceased was living." (CFI Record,
Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 11.)
(b) On December 14, 1957, this Honorable Court, on the basis of the following fact,
alleged in the verified Motion dated December 11, 1957 filed by Leon P. Gellada as
attorney for the executor C. N. Hodges:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘That herein Executor, (is) not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal,
but also, the successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges.’ (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 44; Emphasis supplied.)
issued the following order:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the Executor, for the reasons stated
in his motion dated December 11, 1957, which the Court considers well taken, all
the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all the properties left by the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the Executor, Charles Newton Hodges
are hereby APPROVED. The said Executor is further authorized to execute
subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the
Page 25 of 100
said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes contained in the
last will and testament of the latter." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p.
46; Emphasis supplied.)
24 ems.
(c) On April 21, 1959, this Honorable Court approved the verified inventory and
accounting submitted by C. N. Hodges through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on April
14, 1959 wherein he alleged among other things,
‘That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining
the herein account, be given notice, as herein executor is the only devisee or
legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the last will and testament already
probated by the Honorable Court.’ (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp 77-
78; Emphasis supplied.)
(d) On July 20, 1960, this Honorable Court approved the verified "Annual
Statement of Account" submitted by C. N. Hodges through his counsel Leon P.
Gellada on July 21, 1960 wherein he alleged, among other things,
‘That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining
the herein account, be given notice as herein executor is the only devisee or
legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in accordance with the last will and
testament of the deceased, already probated by this Honorable Court.’ (CFI Record,
Sp. Proc. No 1307, pp. 81-82; Emphasis supplied.)
(e) On May 2, 1961, this Honorable Court approved the verified "Annual Statement
of Account By The Executor For the Year 1960’ submitted through Leon P. Gellada
on April 20, 1961 wherein he alleged:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘That no person interested in the Philippines be given notice, of the time and place
of examining the herein account, as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee
of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in accordance with the last will and testament
of the deceased, already probated by this Honorable Court.’ (CFI Record, Sp. Proc.
No. 1307, pp. 90-91; Emphasis supplied.)
15. Since C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir of Linnie Jane Hodges, not
only by law, but in accordance with the dispositions of her will, there was, in fact,
no need to liquidate the conjugal estate of the spouses. The entirety of said
conjugal estate pertained to him exclusively, therefore this Honorable Court
sanctioned and authorized, as above-stated, C. N. Hodges to manage, operate and
control all the conjugal assets as owner.
16. By expressly authorizing C. N. Hodges to act as he did in connection with the

estate of his wife, this Honorable Court has (1) declared C. N. Hodges as the sole
heir of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, and (2) delivered and distributed her
estate to C. N. Hodges as sole heir in accordance with the terms and conditions of
her Will. Thus, although the "estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" still exists as a legal and
juridical personality, it had no assets or properties located in the Philippines
registered in its name whatsoever at the time of the death of C. N. Hodges on
December 25, 1962.
17. The Will of Linnie Jane Hodges (Annex "A"), fourth paragraph, provides as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give, devise and
bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate both real and
personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my brothers
and sisters, share and share alike, namely:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era
Boman and Nimray Higdon.’
Because of the facts hereinabove set out there is no "rest, residue and remainder",
at least to the extent of the Philippine assets, which remains to vest in the
HIGDONS, assuming this proviso in Linnie Jane Hodges’ Will is valid and binding
against the estate of C. N. Hodges.
18. Any claims by the HIGDONS under the above-quoted provision of Linnie Jane
Hodges’ Will is without merit because said provision is void and invalid at least as
to the Philippine assets. It should not, in anyway, affect the rights of the estate of C.
N. Hodges or his heirs to the properties, which C. N. Hodges acquired by way of
inheritance from his wife Linnie Jane Hodges upon her death.
(a) In spite of the above-mentioned provision in the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges, C.
N. Hodges acquired, not merely a usufructuary right, but absolute title and
ownership to her estate. In a recent case involving a very similar testamentary
provision, the Supreme Court held that the heir first designated acquired full
ownership of the property bequeathed by the will, not mere usufructuary rights.
(Consolacion Florentino de Crisologo, Et Al., v. Manuel Singson, G. R. No. L-13876,
February 28, 1962.)
(b) Article 864, 872 and 886 of the New Civil Code clearly provide that no charge,
condition or substitution whatsoever upon the legitime can be imposed by a
testator. Thus, under the provisions of Articles 900, 995 and 1001 of the New Civil
Code, the legitime of a surviving spouse is 1/2 of the estate of the deceased spouse.
Consequently, the above-mentioned provision in the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges is
clearly invalid insofar as the legitime of C. N. Hodges was concerned, which
Page 26 of 100
consisted of 1/2 of the 1/2 portion of the conjugal estate, or 1/4 of the entire
conjugal estate of the deceased.
(c) There are generally only two kinds of substitution provided for and authorized
by our Civil Code (Articles 857-870), namely, (1) simple or common substitution,
sometimes referred to as vulgar substitution (Article 859), and (2)
fideicommissary substitution (Article 863). All other substitutions are merely
variations of these. The substitution provided for by paragraph four of the Will of
Linnie Jane Hodges is not fideicommissary substitution, because there is clearly no
obligation on the part of C. N. Hodges as the first heir designated, to preserve the
properties for the substitute heirs. (Consolacion Florentino de Crisologo, Et. Al. v.
Manuel Singson, G.R. No. L-13876.) At most, it is a vulgar or simple substitution.
However, in order that a vulgar or simple substitution can be valid, three
alternative conditions must be present, namely, that the first designated heir (1)
should die before the testator; or (2) should not wish to accept the inheritance; or
(3) should be incapacitated to do so. None of these conditions apply, to C. N.
Hodges, and, therefore, the substitution provided for by the above-quoted
provision of the Will is not authorized by the Code, and, therefore, it is void.
Manresa, commenting on these kinds of substitution, meaningfully stated that: ". . .
cuando el testador instituye un primer heredero, y por fallecimiento de este,
nombra otro u otros, ha de entenderse que estas segundas designaciones solo han
de llegar a tener efectividad en el caso de que el primer instituido muera antes que
el testador, fuera o no esta su verdadera intencion. . . .." (6 Manresa, 7 a ed., pag.
175.) In other words, when another heir is designated to inherit upon the death of
a first heir, the second designation can have effect only in case the first instituted
heir dies before the testator, whether or not that was the true intention of said
testator. Since C. N. Hodges did not die before Linnie Jane Hodges, the provision for
substitution contained in Linnie Jane Hodges’ Will is void.
(d) In view of the invalidity of the provision for substitution in the Will, C. N.
Hodges’ inheritance to the entirety of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate is irrevocable
and final.
19. Be that as it may, at the time of C. N. Hodges’ death, the entirety of the conjugal
estate appeared and was registered in him exclusively as owner. Thus, the
presumption is that all said assets constituted his estate. Therefore —
(a) If the HIGDONS wish to enforce their dubious rights as substituted heirs to 1/4
of the conjugal estate (the other 1/4 is covered by the legitime of C. N. Hodges
which can not be affected by any testamentary disposition), their remedy, if any, is
to file their claim against the estate of C. N. Hodges, which should be entitled at the
present time to full custody and control of all the conjugal estate of the spouses.
(b) The present proceedings, in which two estates exist under separate

administration, where the administratrix of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate
exercises an officious right to object and intervene in matters affecting exclusively
the C. N. Hodges estate, is anomalous.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that after trial and reception of
evidence, this Honorable Court declare:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. That the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges was and is composed exclusively of one-
half (1/2) share in the conjugal estate of the spouses Hodges, computed as of the
date of her death on May 23, 1957;
2. That the other half of the conjugal estate pertained exclusively to C. N. Hodges as
his share as partner in the conjugal partnership;
3. That all "rents, emoluments and income" of the conjugal estate accruing after
Linnie Jane Hodges’ death pertains to C. N. Hodges;
4. That C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges;
5. That, therefore, the entire conjugal estate of the spouses located in the
Philippines, plus all the "rents, emoluments and income" above-mentioned, now
constitutes the estate of C. N. Hodges, capable of distribution to his heirs upon
termination of Special Proceedings No. 1672;
6. That PCIB, as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, is entitled to full and
exclusive custody, control and management of all said properties; and
7. That Avelina A. Magno, as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, as
well as the HIGDONS, has no right to intervene or participate in the administration
of the C. N. Hodges estate.
PCIB further prays for such and other relief as may be deemed just and equitable
in the premises." (Record, pp. 265-277)
Before all of these motions of petitioner could be resolved, however, on December
21, 1965, private respondent Magno filed her own "Motion for the Official
Declaration of Heirs of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"COMES NOW the Administratrix of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and, through
undersigned counsel, unto this Honorable Court most respectfully states and
manifests:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Page 27 of 100
1. That the spouses Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges were
American citizens who died at the City of Iloilo after having amassed and
accumulated extensive properties in the Philippines;
2. That on November 22, 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges executed a last will and
testament (the original of this will now forms part of the records of these
proceedings as Exhibit ‘C’ and appears as Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Folio I, pp. 17-18);
3. That on May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died at the City of Iloilo, at the time
survived by her husband, Charles Newton Hodges, and several relatives named in
her last will and testament;
4. That on June 28, 1957, a petition therefor having been priorly filed and duly
heard, this Honorable Court issued an order admitting to probate the last will and
testament of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Folio I, pp. 24-25, 26-28);
5. That the required notice to creditors and to all others who may have any claims
against the decedent, Linnie Jane Hodges, has already been printed, published and
posted (Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Folio I, pp. 34-40) and the reglementary period for
filing such claims has long ago lapsed and expired without any claims having been
asserted against the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, approved by the
Administrator/Administratrix of the said estate, nor ratified by this Honorable
Court;
6. That the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges already admitted to
probate contains an institution of heirs in the following
words:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my
estate, both personal and real, wherever situated or located, to my beloved
husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and to hold unto him, my said husband,
during his natural lifetime.
THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton Hodges,
shall have the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his
lifetime, and he is hereby given the right to make any changes in the physical
properties of said estate, by sale of any part thereof which he may think best, and
the purchase of any other or additional property as he may think best; to execute
conveyances with or without general or special warranty, conveying in fee simple
or for any other term or time, any property which he may deem proper to dispose
of; to lease any of the real property for oil, gas and/or other minerals, and all such
deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee simple title to the interest so conveyed
in such property as he may elect to sell. All rents, emoluments and income from
said estate shall belong to him, and he is further authorized to use any part of the

principal of said estate as he may need or desire. It is provided herein, however,
that he shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any of the improved property now
owned by us located at, in or near the City of Lubbock, Texas, but he shall have the
full right to lease, manage and enjoy the same during his lifetime, above provided.
He shall have the right to subdivide any farm land and sell lots therein, and may
sell unimproved town lots.
FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give, devise
and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and
personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my brothers
and sisters, share and share alike, namely:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era
Boman and Nimroy Higdon.
FIFTH: In case of the death of any of my brothers and/or sisters named in item
Fourth, above, prior to the death of my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, then it is
my will and bequest that the heirs of such deceased brother or sister shall take
jointly the share which would have gone to such brother or sister had she or he
survived.’
7. That under the provisions of the last will and testament already above-quoted,
Linnie Jane Hodges gave a life-estate or a usufruct over all her estate to her
husband, Charles Newton Hodges, and a vested remainder-estate or the naked title
over the same estate to her relatives named therein;
8. That after the death of Linnie Jane Hodges and after the admission to probate of
her last will and testament, but during the lifetime of Charles Newton Hodges, the
said Charles Newton Hodges, with full and complete knowledge of the life-estate
or usufruct conferred upon him by the will since he was then acting as
Administrator of the estate and later as Executor of the will of Linnie Jane Hodges,
unequivocably and clearly through oral and written declarations and sworn public
statements, renounced, disclaimed and repudiated his life-estate and usufruct over
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
9. That, accordingly, the only heirs left to receive the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges,
pursuant to her last will and testament, are her named brothers and sisters, or
their heirs, to wit: Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Aline Higdon and
David Higdon, the latter two being the wife and son respectively of the deceased
Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimroy Higdon, all of legal ages,
American citizens, with residence at the State of Texas, United States of America;
10. That at the time of the death of Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957, she was
the co-owner (together with her husband Charles Newton Hodges) of an
Page 28 of 100
undivided one-half interest in their conjugal properties existing as of that date,
May 23, 1957, which properties are now being administered sometimes jointly
and sometimes separately by the Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and/or the Administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges but all of which are
under the control and supervision of this Honorable Court;
11. That because there was no separation or segregation of the interests of
husband and wife in the combined conjugal estate, as there has been no such
separation or segregation up to the present, both interests have continually
earned exactly the same amount of ‘rents, emoluments and income’, the entire
estate having been continually devoted to the business of the spouses as if they
were alive;
12. That the one-half interest of Linnie Jane Hodges in the combined conjugal
estate was earning ‘rents, emoluments and income’ until her death on May 23,
1957, when it ceased to be saddled with any more charges or expenditures which
are purely personal to her in nature, and her estate kept on earning such ‘rents,
emoluments and income’ by virtue of their having been expressly renounced,
disclaimed and repudiated by Charles Newton Hodges to whom they were
bequeathed for life under the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges;
13. That, on the other hand, the one-half interest of Charles Newton Hodges in the
combined conjugal estate existing as of May 23, 1957, while it may have earned
exactly the same amount of ‘rents, emoluments and Income’ as that of the share
pertaining to Linnie Jane Hodges, continued to be burdened by charges,
expenditures, and other dispositions which are purely personal to him in nature,
until the death of Charles Newton Hodges himself on December 25, 1962;
14. That of all the assets of the combined conjugal estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and
Charles Newton Hodges as they exist today, the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is
clearly entitled to a portion more than fifty percent (50%) as compared to the
portion to which the estate of Charles Newton Hodges may be entitled, which
portions can be exactly determined by the following manner:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
a. An inventory must be made of the assets of the combined conjugal estate as they
existed on the death of Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957 — one-half of these
assets belong to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
b. An accounting must be made of the ‘rents, emoluments and income’ of all these
assets — again one-half of these belong to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
c. Adjustments must be made, after making a deduction of charges disbursements
and other dispositions made by Charles Newton Hodges personally and for his

own personal account from May 23, 1957 up to December 25, 1962, as well as
other charges, disbursements and other dispositions made for him and in his
behalf since December 25, 1962 up to the present;
15. That there remains no other matter for disposition now insofar as the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges is concerned but to complete the liquidation of her estate,
segregate them from the conjugal estate, and distribute them to her heirs pursuant
to her last will and testament.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully moved and prayed that
this Honorable Court, after a hearing on the factual matters raised by this motion,
issue an order:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a. Declaring the following persons, to wit: Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard
Higdon, Aline Higdon, David Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimroy Higdon,
as the sole heirs under the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges and as the
only persons entitled to her estate;
b. Determining the exact value of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges in accordance
with the system enunciated in paragraph 14 of this motion;
c. After such determination ordering its segregation from the combined conjugal
estate and its delivery to the Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges for
distribution to the heirs to whom they properly belong and appertain."cralaw
virtua1aw library
(Green Record on Appeal, pp. 382-391)
whereupon, instead of further pressing on its motion of January 8, 1965
aforequoted, as it had been doing before, petitioner withdrew the said motion and
in addition to opposing the above motion of respondent Magno, filed a motion on
April 22, 1966 alleging in part that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. That it has received from the counsel for the administratrix of the supposed
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges a notice to set her ‘Motion for Official Declaration of
Heirs of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges’;
"2. That before the aforesaid motion could be heard, there are matters pending
before this Honorable Court, such as:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a. The examination already ordered by this Honorable Court of documents relating
to the allegation of Avelina Magno that Charles Newton Hodges ‘through . . .
written declarations and sworn public statements, renounced, disclaimed and
repudiated his life-estate and usufruct over the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges’;
Page 29 of 100
b. That ‘Urgent Motion for An Accounting and Delivery to the Estate of C. N. Hodges
of All the Assets of the Conjugal Partnership of the Deceased Linnie Jane Hodges
and C. N. Hodges Existing as of May 23, 1957 Plus All the Rents, Emoluments and
Income Therefrom’;
c. Various motions to resolve the aforesaid motion;
d. Manifestation of September 14, 1964, detailing acts of interference of Avelina
Magno under color of title as administratrix of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
which are all prejudicial, and which involve no issues of fact, all facts involved
therein being matters of record, and therefore require only the resolution of
questions of law;
"3. That whatever claims any alleged heirs or other persons may have could be
very easily threshed out in the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges;
"4. That the maintenance of two separate estate proceedings and two
administrators only results in confusion and is unduly burdensome upon the
Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, particularly because the bond filed by
Avelina Magno is grossly insufficient to answer for the funds and property which
she has inofficiously collected and held, as well as those which she continues to
inofficiously collect and hold;
"5. That it is a matter of record that such state of affairs affects and inconveniences
not only the estate but also third-parties dealing with it," (Annex "V", Petition.)
and then, after further reminding the court, by quoting them, of the relevant
allegations of its earlier motion of September 14, 1964, Annex U, prayed
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Immediately order Avelina Magno to account for and deliver to the
administrator of the Estate of C. N. Hodges all the assets of the conjugal
partnership of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges, plus all the
rents, emoluments and income therefrom;
"2. Pending the consideration of this motion, immediately order Avelina Magno to
turn over all her collections to the administrator Philippine Commercial &
Industrial Bank;
"3. Declare the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307) closed;
"4. Defer the hearing and consideration of the motion for declaration of heirs in

the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges until the matters hereinabove set forth
are resolved." (Prayer, Annex "V" of Petition.)
On October 12, 1966, as already indicated at the outset of this opinion, the
respondent court denied the foregoing motion, holding thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"O R D E R
On record is a motion (Vol. X, Sp. 1672, pp. 4379-4390) dated April 22, 1966 of
administrator PCIB praying that (1) Immediately order Avelina Magno to account
for and deliver to the administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges all assets of the
conjugal partnership of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges, plus all
the rents, emoluments and income therefrom; (2) Pending the consideration of
this motion, immediately order Avelina Magno to turn over all her collections to
the administrator PCIB; (3) Declare the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp.
Proc. No. 1307) closed; and (4) Defer the hearing and consideration of the motion
for declaration of heirs in the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges until the
matters hereinabove set forth are resolved.
This motion is predicated on the fact that there are matters pending before this
court such as (a) the examination already ordered by this Honorable Court of
documents relating to the allegation of Avelina Magno that Charles Newton
Hodges thru written declaration and sworn public statements renounced,
disclaimed and repudiated his life-estate and usufruct over the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges (b) the urgent motion for accounting and delivery to the estate of C. N.
Hodges of all the assets of the conjugal partnership of the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges and C. N. Hodges existing as of May 23, 1957 plus all the rents,
emoluments and income therefrom; (c) various motions to resolve the aforesaid
motion; and (d) manifestation of September 14, 1964, detailing acts of
interference of Avelina Magno under color of title as administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges.
These matters, according to the instant motion, are all prejudicial involving no
issues of facts and only require the resolution of question of law; that in the
motion of October 5, 1963 it is alleged that in a motion dated December 11, 1957
filed by Atty. Leon Gellada as attorney for the executor C. N. Hodges, the said
executor C. N. Hodges is not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal but
also the successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.
Said motion of December 11, 1957 was approved by the Court in consonance with
the wishes contained in the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges.
That on April 21, 1959 this Court approved the inventory and accounting
submitted by C. N. Hodges thru counsel Atty. Leon Gellada in a motion filed on
Page 30 of 100
April 14, 1959 stating therein that executor C. N. Hodges is the only devisee or
legatee of Linnie Jane Hodges in accordance with the last will and testament
already probated by the Court.
That on July 13, 1960 the Court approved the annual statement of accounts
submitted by the executor C. N. Hodges thru his counsel Atty. Gellada on July 21,
1960 wherein it is stated that the executor, C. N. Hodges is the only devisee or
legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges; that on May 2, 1961 the Court
approved the annual statement of accounts submitted by executor, C. N. Hodges
for the year 1960 which was submitted by Atty. Gellada on April 20, 1961 wherein
it is stated that executor Hodges is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges;
That during the hearing on September 5 and 6, 1963 the estate of C. N. Hodges
claimed all the assets belonging to the deceased spouses Linnie Jane Hodges and C.
N. Hodges situated in the Philippines; that administratrix Magno has executed
illegal acts to the prejudice of the testate estate of C. N. Hodges.
An opposition (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4415-4421) dated April 27, 1966 of
administratrix Magno has been filed asking that the motion be denied for lack of
merit and that the motion for the official declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges be set for presentation and reception of evidence.
It is alleged in the aforesaid opposition that the examination of documents which
are in the possession of administratrix Magno can be made prior to the hearing of
the motion for the official declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges,
during said hearing.
That the matters raised in the PCIB’s motion of October 5, 1963 (as well as the
other motion) dated September 14, 1964 have been consolidated for the purpose
of presentation and reception of evidence with the hearing on the determination
of the heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. It is further alleged in the
opposition that the motion for the official declaration of heirs of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges is the one that constitutes a prejudicial question to the motions
dated October 5 and September 14, 1964 because if said motion is found
meritorious and granted by the Court, the PCIB’s motions of October 5, 1963 and
September 14, 1964 will become moot and academic since they are premised on
the assumption and claim that the only heir of Linnie Jane Hodges was C. N.
Hodges;
That the PCIB and counsel are estopped from further questioning the
determination of heirs in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges at this stage since it was
PCIB as early as January 8, 1965 which filed a motion for official declaration of
heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges; that the claim of any heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges can

be determined only in the administration proceedings over the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges and not that of C. N. Hodges, since the heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges are
claiming her estate and not the estate of C. N. Hodges.
A reply (Sp. 1612, Vol. X, pp. 4436-4444) dated May 11, 1966 of the PCIB has been
filed alleging that the motion dated April 22, 1966 of the PCIB is not to seek
deferment of the hearing and consideration of the motion for official declaration of
heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges but to declare the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
closed and for administratrix Magno to account for and deliver to the PCIB all
assets of the conjugal partnership of the deceased spouses which has come to her
possession plus all rents and income.
A rejoinder (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4458-4462) of administratrix Magno dated May
19, 1966 has been filed alleging that the motion dated December 11, 1957 only
sought the approval of all conveyances made by C. N. Hodges and requested the
Court authority for all subsequent conveyances that will be executed by C. N.
Hodges; that the order dated December 14, 1967 only approved the conveyances
made by C. N. Hodges; that C. N. Hodges represented by counsel never made any
claim in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and never filed a motion to declare
himself as the heir of the said Linnie Jane Hodges despite the lapse of more than
five (5) years after the death of Linnie Jane Hodges; that it is further alleged in the
rejoinder that there can be no order of adjudication of the estate unless there has
been a prior express declaration of heirs and so far no declaration of heirs in the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. 1307) has been made.
Considering the allegations and arguments in the motion and reply of the PCIB as
well as those in the opposition and rejoinder of administratrix Magno, the Court
finds the opposition and rejoinder to be well taken for the reason that so far there
has been no official declaration of heirs in the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
and therefore no disposition of her estate.
WHEREFORE, the motion of the PCIB dated April 22, 1966 is hereby
DENIED."cralaw virtua1aw library
(Annex "W", Petition)
In its motion dated November 24, 1966 for the reconsideration of this order,
petitioner alleged inter alia that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It cannot be over-stressed that the motion of December 11, 1957 was based on
the fact that.
a. Under the last will and testament of the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, the late
Charles Newton Hodges was the sole heir instituted insofar as her properties in
Page 31 of 100
the Philippines are concerned;
b. Said last will and testament vested upon the said late Charles Newton Hodges
rights over said properties which, in sum, spell ownership, absolute and in fee
simple;
c. Said late Charles Newton Hodges was, therefore, ‘not only part owner of the
properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the properties left by the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.
"Likewise, it cannot be over-stressed that the aforesaid motion was granted by this
Honorable Court ‘for the reasons stated’ therein.
"Again, the motion of December 11, 1957 prayed that not only ‘all the sales,
conveyances, leases, and mortgages executed by’ the late Charles Newton Hodges,
but also all ‘the subsequent sales, conveyances, leases, and mortgages . . .’ be
approved and authorized. This Honorable Court, in its order of December 14,
1957, ‘for the reasons stated’ in the aforesaid motion, granted the same, and not
only approved all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all properties
left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the late Charles Newton
Hodges, but also authorized ‘all subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges." (Annex
"X", Petition)
and reiterated its fundamental pose that the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
had already been factually, although not legally, closed with the virtual declaration
of Hodges and adjudication to him, as sole universal heir of all the properties of the
estate of his wife, in the order of December 14, 1957, Annex G. Still unpersuaded,
on July 18, 1967, respondent court denied said motion for reconsideration and
held that "the court believes that there is no justification why the order of October
12, 1966 should be considered or modified", and, on July 19, 1967, the motion of
respondent Magno "for official declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges", already referred to above, was set for hearing.
In consequence of all these developments, the present petition was filed on August
1, 1967 (albeit petitioner had to pay another docketing fee on August 9, 1967,
since the orders in question were issued in two separate testate estate
proceedings, Nos. 1307 and 1672, in the court below).
Together with such petition, there are now pending before Us for resolution
herein, appeals from the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. The order of December 19, 1964 authorizing payment by respondent Magno of
overtime pay, (pp. 221, Green Record on Appeal) together with the subsequent

orders of January 9, 1965, (pp. 231-232, id.) October 27, 1965, (pp. 227, id.) and
February 15, 1966 pp. 455-456, id.) repeatedly denying motions for
reconsideration thereof.
2. The order of August 6, 1965 (pp. 248, id.) requiring that deeds executed by
petitioner to be co-signed by respondent Magno, as well as the order of October
27, 1965 (pp. 276-277) denying reconsideration.
3. The other of October 27, 1965 (pp. 292-295, id.) enjoining the deposit of all
collections in a joint account and the same order of February 15, 1966 mentioned
in No. 1 above which included the denial of the reconsideration of this order of
October 27, 1965.
4. The order of November 3, 1965 (pp. 313-320, id.) directing the payment of
attorney’s fees, fees of the respondent administratrix, etc. and the order of
February 16, 1966 denying reconsideration thereof.
5. The order of November 23, 1965 (pp. 334-335, id.) allowing appellee Western
Institute of Technology to make payments to either one or both of the
administrators of the two estates as well as the order of March 7, 1966 (p. 462, id.)
denying reconsideration.
6. The various orders hereinabove earlier enumerated approving deeds of sale
executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellees Carles, Catedral, Pablito,
Guzman, Coronado, Barrido, Causing, Javier, Lucero and Batisanan, (see pp. 35 to
37 of this opinion), together with the two separate orders both dated December 2,
1966 (pp. 306-308, and pp. 308-309, Yellow Record on Appeal) denying
reconsideration of said approval.
7. The order of January 3, 1967, on pp. 335-336, Yellow Record on Appeal,
approving similar deeds of sale executed by respondent Magno, as those in No. 6,
in favor of appellees Pacaonsis and Premaylon, as to which no motion for
reconsideration was filed.
8. Lastly, the order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 305-306, Yellow Record on Appeal,
directing petitioner to surrender to appellees Lucero, Batisanan, Javier, Pablito,
Barrido, Catedral, Causing, Guzman, and Coronado, the certificates of title covering
the lands involved in the approved sales, as to which no motion for
reconsideration was filed either.
Strictly speaking, and considering that the above orders deal with different
matters, just as they affect distinctly different individuals or persons, as outlined
by petitioner in its brief as appellant on pp. 12-20 thereof, there are, therefore,
thirty-three (33) appeals before Us, for which reason, petitioner has to pay also
Page 32 of 100
thirty-one (31) more docket fees.
It is as well perhaps to state here as elsewhere in this opinion that in connection
with these appeals, petitioner has assigned a total of seventy-eight (LXXVIII)
alleged errors, the respective discussions and arguments under all of them
covering also the fundamental issues raised in respect to the petition
for certiorari and prohibition, thus making it feasible and more practical for the
Court to dispose of all these cases together. 4
The assignments of error read thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I to IV
THE ORDER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR
OF THE APPELLEES, PEPITO G. IYULORES, ESPIRIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO
C. ESPADA AND ROSARIO ALINGASA, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A.
MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES
NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE
EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
V to VIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF
THE APPELLEES, PEPITO G. IYULORES, ESPIRIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C.
ESPADA AND ROSARIO ALINGASA, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND FOR WHICH
THEY HAVE NEVER PAID IN FULL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORIGINAL
CONTRACTS TO SELL.
IX to XII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP
OVER REAL PROPERTY OF THE APPELLEES, PEPITO G. IYULORES, ESPIRIDION
PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C. ESPADA AND ROSARIO ALINGASA, WHILE ACTING AS
A PROBATE COURT.
XIII to XV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR
OF THE APPELLEES ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO PACAONSIS,
AND ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104), EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE,
AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH
WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.

XVI to XVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF
THE APPELLEES ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO PACAONSIS,
AND ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104) COVERING PARCELS OF LAND FOR
WHICH THEY HAVE NEVER PAID IN FULL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORIGINAL
CONTRACTS TO SELL.
XIX to XXI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP
OVER REAL PROPERTY OF THE APPELLEES ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 102),
SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104) WHILE ACTING
AS A PROBATE COURT.
XXII to XXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR
OF THE APPELLEES LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND
SALVADOR S. GUZMAN, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO,
COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON
HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY
HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
XXVI to XXIX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEED OF SALE EXECUTED
IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO
CATEDRAL AND SALVADOR S. GUZMAN PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO SELL
WHICH WERE CANCELLED AND RESCINDED.
XXX to XXXIV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP
OVER REAL PROPERTY OF THE APPELLEES, LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO,
ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND SALVADOR S. GUZMAN, WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE
COURT.
XXXV to XXXVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR
OF THE APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO AND PURIFICACION CORONADO,
EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF
LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES AND THE
Page 33 of 100
CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS
LIFETIME.
XXXVII to XXXVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF
THE APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO AND PURIFICACION CORONADO,
ALTHOUGH THEY WERE IN ARREARS IN THE PAYMENTS AGREED UPON IN THE
ORIGINAL CONTRACT TO SELL WHICH THEY EXECUTED WITH THE DECEASED,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, IN THE AMOUNT OF P10,680.00 and P4,428.90,
RESPECTIVELY.
XXXIX to XL
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON
HODGES, OF THE CONTRACTUAL RIGHT, EXERCISED THROUGH HIS
ADMINISTRATOR, THE INSTANT APPELLANT, TO CANCEL THE CONTRACTS TO
SELL OF THE APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO AND PURIFICACION CORONADO.
XLI to XLIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR
OF THE APPELLEES, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND
MELQUIADES BATISANAN, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO,
COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON
HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY
HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
XLIV to XLVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEED OF SALE IN FAVOR
OF THE APPELLEES, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND
MELQUIADES BATISANAN, PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO SELL EXECUTED BY
THEM WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, THE TERMS AND
CONDITIONS OF WHICH THEY HAVE NEVER COMPLIED WITH.
XLVII to XLIX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON
HODGES, OF HIS RIGHT, EXERCISED THROUGH HIS ADMINISTRATION, THE
INSTANT APPELLANT, TO CANCEL THE CONTRACTS TO SELL OF THE
APPELLEES, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND MELQUIADES
BATISANAN, AND IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF THE SAID APPELLEES OVER
REAL PROPERTY WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.

L 1965, ON NOVEMBER 23, 1965, WHEN THE NOTICE FOR THE HEARING THEREOF
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR
OF THE APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA
A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES
NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE
EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
LI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF
THE APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING, ALTHOUGH HE WAS IN ARREARS IN THE
PAYMENTS AGREED UPON IN THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT TO SELL WHICH HE
EXECUTED WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, IN THE AMOUNT
OF P2,337.50.
LII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEED OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING, ALTHOUGH THE SAME WAS NOT EXECUTED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES OF COURT.
LIII to LXI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK TO SURRENDER THE OWNER’S
DUPLICATE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE OVER THE RESPECTIVE LOTS COVERED BY
THE DEEDS OF SALE EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, IN
FAVOR OF THE OTHER APPELLEES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL,
SALVADOR S. GUZMAN, FLORENIA BARRIDO, PURIFICACION CORONADO,
BELCESAR CAUSING, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR, MAXIMA BATISANAN AND
GRACIANO L. LUCERO.
LXII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RESOLVING THE MOTION OF THE APPELLEE,
WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, DATED NOVEMBER 3, 1965, WITHOUT
ANY COPY THEREOF HAVING BEEN SERVED UPON THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL BANK.
LXIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HEARING AND CONSIDERING THE MOTION OF
Page 34 of 100
THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, DATED NOVEMBER 3rd,
WAS FOR NOVEMBER 20, 1965.
LXIV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY A RELIEF OTHER THAN THAT PRAYED FOR IN ITS MOTION,
DATED NOVEMBER 3, 1965, IN THE ABSENCE OF A PRAYER FOR GENERAL
RELIEF CONTAINED THEREIN.
LXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY, TO CONTINUE PAYMENTS UPON A CONTRACT TO SELL THE
TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF WHICH IT HAS FAILED TO FULFILL.
LXVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF THE APPELLEE,
WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY OVER THE REAL PROPERTY SUBJECT
MATTER OF THE CONTRACT TO SELL IT EXECUTED WITH THE DECEASED,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
LXVII
LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE CONTINUATION OF PAYMENTS BY
THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, UPON A CONTRACT TO
SELL EXECUTED BY IT AND THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, TO A
PERSON OTHER THAN HIS LAWFULLY APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR.
LXVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF RETAINER’S FEES
FROM THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, WHEN
THERE IS NEITHER SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.
LXIX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF RETAINER’S FEES
OF LAWYERS OF ALLEGED HEIRS TO THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED,
LINNIE JANE HODGES.
LXX

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPLEMENTING THE ALLEGED AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE HEIRS OF THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE
JANE HODGES, AND THEIR LAWYERS.
LXXI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PREMATURE DISTRIBUTION OF
ESTATE ASSETS TO ALLEGED HEIRS OR BENEFICIARIES THEREOF, BY WAY OF
RETAINER’S FEES.
LXXII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT ALL FINAL DEEDS OF SALE
EXECUTED PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO SELL ENTERED INTO BY THE
DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, DURING HIS LIFETIME, BE SIGNED
JOINTLY BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, AND THE APPELLANT,
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, AND NOT BY THE LATTER
ONLY AS THE LAWFULLY APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OF HIS ESTATE.
LXXIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF LEGAL EXPENSES
FROM THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, WHEN
THERE IS NEITHER SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.
LXXIV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF LEGAL EXPENSES
OF LAWYERS OF ALLEGED HEIRS TO THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED,
LINNIE JANE HODGES.
LXXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PREMATURE DISTRIBUTION OF
ESTATE ASSETS TO ALLEGED HEIRS OR BENEFICIARIES THEREOF, BY WAY OF
LEGAL EXPENSES.
LXXVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION TO
THE PURPORTED ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, THE INSTANT APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO,
WHEN THERE IS NEITHER SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.
Page 35 of 100
LXXVII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE FUNDS OF THE TESTATE
ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, BE PLACED IN A JOINT
ACCOUNT OF THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL
BANK, AND THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO WHO IS A COMPLETE
STRANGER TO THE AFORESAID ESTATE.
LXXVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A.
MAGNO, BE GIVEN EQUAL ACCESS TO THE RECORDS OF THE TESTATE ESTATE
OF THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, WHEN SHE IS A COMPLETE
STRANGER TO THE AFORESAID ESTATE." (Pp. 73-83, Appellant’s Brief.)
To complete this rather elaborate, and unavoidably extended narration of the
factual setting of these cases, it may also be mentioned that an attempt was made
by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges to have respondent Magno removed as administratrix,
with the proposed appointment of Benito J. Lopez in her place, and that
respondent court did actually order such proposed replacement, but the Court
declared the said order of respondent court violative of its injunction of August 8,
1967, hence without force and effect (see Resolution of September 8, 1972 and
February 1, 1973). Subsequently, Atty. Efrain B. Trenas, one of the lawyers of said
heirs, appeared no longer for the proposed administrator Lopez but for the heirs
themselves, and in a motion dated October 26, 1972 informed the Court that a
motion had been filed with respondent court for the removal of petitioner PCIB as
administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges in Special Proceedings 1672, which
removal motion alleged that 22.968149% of the share of C. N. Hodges had already
been acquired by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges from certain heirs of her husband.
Further, in this connection, in the answer of PCIB to the motion of respondent
Magno to have it declared in contempt for disregarding the Court’s resolution of
September 8, 1972 modifying the injunction of August 8, 1967, said petitioner
annexed thereto a joint manifestation and motion, appearing to have been filed
with respondent court, informing said court that in addition to the fact that 22% of
the share of C. N. Hodges had already been bought by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, as
already stated, certain other heirs of Hodges representing 17.343750% of his
estate were joining cause with the heirs of Mrs. Hodges as against PCIB, thereby
making somewhat precarious, if not possibly untenable, petitioners’ continuation
as administrator of the Hodges estate.
RESOLUTION OF ISSUES IN THE CERTIORARI AND

PROHIBITION CASES
I common basic issues raised in all of them, despite the conceded availability of
As to the Alleged Tardiness
of the Present Appeals
The priority question raised by respondent Magno relates to the alleged tardiness
of all the aforementioned thirty-three appeals of PCIB. Considering, however, that
these appeals revolve around practically the same main issues and that it is
admitted that some of them have been timely taken, and, moreover, their final
results herein below to be stated and explained make it of no consequence
whether or not the orders concerned have become final by the lapsing of the
respective periods to appeal them, We do not deem it necessary to pass upon the
timeliness of any of said appeals.
II
The Propriety Here of Certiorari and
Prohibition instead of Appeal
The other preliminary point of the same respondent is alleged impropriety of the
special civil action of certiorari and prohibition in view of the existence of the
remedy of appeal which it claims is proven by the very appeals now before Us.
Such contention fails to take into account that there is a common thread among
the basic issues involved in all these thirty-three appeals which, unless resolved in
one single proceeding, will inevitably cause the proliferation of more or less
similar or closely related incidents and consequent eventual appeals. If for this
consideration alone, and without taking account anymore of the unnecessary
additional effort, expense and time which would be involved in as many individual
appeals as the number of such incidents, it is logical and proper to hold, as We do
hold, that the remedy of appeal is not adequate in the present cases. In
determining whether or not a special civil action of certiorari or prohibition may
be resorted to in lieu of appeal, in instances wherein lack or excess of jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion is alleged, it is not enough that the remedy of appeal
exists or is possible. It is indispensable that taking all the relevant circumstances
of the given case, appeal would better serve the interests of justice. Obviously, the
longer delay, augmented expense and trouble and unnecessary repetition of the
same work attendant to the present multiple appeals, which, after all, deal with
practically the same basic issues that can be more expeditiously resolved or
Page 36 of 100
determined in a single special civil action, make the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition, pursued by petitioner, preferable, for purposes of resolving the
appeal. Besides, the settling of such common fundamental issues would naturally
minimize the areas of conflict between the parties and render more simple the
determination of the secondary issues in each of them. Accordingly, respondent
Magno’s objection to the present remedy of certiorari and prohibition must be
overruled.
We come now to the errors assigned by petitioner-appellant, Philippine
Commercial & Industrial Bank, (PCIB, for short) in the petition as well as in its
main brief as Appellant.
III
On Whether or Not There is Still Any Part of the Testate
Estate of Mrs. Hodges that may be Adjudicated to her brothers
and sisters as her estate, of which respondent Magno is the
unquestioned Administratrix in special Proceedings 1307.
In the petition, it is the position of PCIB that the respondent court exceeded its
jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion in further recognizing after December
14, 1957 the existence of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and in
sanctioning purported acts of administration therein of respondent Magno. Main
ground for such posture is that by the aforequoted order of respondent court of
said date, Hodges was already allowed to assert and exercise all his rights as
universal heir of his wife pursuant to the provisions of her will, quoted earlier,
hence, nothing else remains to be done in Special Proceedings 1307 except to
formally close it. In other words, the contention of PCIB is that in view of said
order, nothing more than a formal declaration of Hodges as sole and exclusive heir
of his wife and the consequent formal unqualified adjudication to him of all her
estate remain to be done to completely close Special Proceedings 1307, hence
respondent Magno should be considered as having ceased to be Administratrix of
the Testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges since then.
After carefully going over the record, We feel constrained to hold that such pose is
patently untenable from whatever angle it is examined.
To start with, We cannot find anywhere in respondent court’s order of December
14, 1957 the sense being read into it by PCIB. The tenor of said order bears no

suggestion at all to such effect. The declaration of heirs and distribution by the
probate court of the estate of a decedent is its most important function, and this
Court is not disposed to encourage judges of probate proceedings to be less than
definite, plain and specific in making orders in such regard, if for no other reason
than that all parties concerned, like the heirs, the creditors, and most of all the
government, the devisees and legatees, should know with certainty what are and
when their respective rights and obligations ensuing from the inheritance or in
relation thereto would begin or cease, as the case may be, thereby avoiding
precisely the legal complications and consequent litigations similar to those that
have developed unnecessarily in the present cases. While it is true that in
instances wherein all the parties interested in the estate of a deceased person have
already actually distributed among themselves their respective shares therein to
the satisfaction of everyone concerned and no rights of creditors or third parties
are adversely affected, it would naturally be almost ministerial for the court to
issue the final order of declaration and distribution, still it is inconceivable that the
special proceeding instituted for the purpose may be considered terminated, the
respective rights of all the parties concerned be deemed definitely settled, and the
executor or administrator thereof be regarded as automatically discharged and
relieved already of all functions and responsibilities without the corresponding
definite orders of the probate court to such effect.
Indeed, the law on the matter is specific, categorical and unequivocal. Section 1 of
Rule 90 provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. — When the debts,
funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and
inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been
paid, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person
interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of
the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions,
or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover
their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person
having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to
who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to
which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and
decided as in ordinary cases.
"No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above
mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them,
give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs."cralaw virtua1aw library
These provisions cannot mean anything less than that in order that a proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of a deceased may be deemed ready for final
Page 37 of 100
closure, (1) there should have been issued already an order of distribution or
assignment of the estate of the decedent among or to those entitled thereto by will
or by law, but (2) such order shall not be issued until after it is shown that the
"debts, funeral expenses, expenses of administration, allowances, taxes, etc.
chargeable to the estate" have been paid, which is but logical and proper. (3)
Besides, such an order is usually issued upon proper and specific application for
the purpose of the interested party or parties, and not of the court.
". . . it is only after, and not before, the payment of all debts, funeral charges,
expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax shall have
been effected that the court should make a declaration of heirs or of such persons
as are entitled by law to the residue. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 2nd
ed., Vol. II, p. 397, citing Capistrano v. Nadurata, 49 Phil., 726; Lopez v. Lopez, 37
Off. Gaz., 3091.)" (JIMOGA-ON v. BELMONTE, 84 Phil. 545, 548) (p. 86, Appellee’s
Brief)
x       x       x
"Under Section 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure, (corresponding to Section 1,
Rule 90) what brings an intestate (or testate) proceeding to a close is the order of
distribution directing delivery of the residue to the persons entitled thereto after
paying the indebtedness, if any, left by the deceased." (Santiesteban v.
Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367, 370.)
In the cases at bar, We cannot discern from the voluminous and varied facts,
pleadings and orders before Us that the above indispensable prerequisites for the
declaration of heirs and the adjudication of the estate of Mrs. Hodges had already
been complied with when the order of December 14, 1957 was issued. As already
stated, We are not persuaded that the proceedings leading to the issuance of said
order, constituting barely of the motion of May 27, 1957, Annex D of the petition,
the order of even date, Annex E, and the motion of December 11, 1957, Annex H,
all aforequoted, are what the law contemplates. We cannot see in the order of
December 14, 1957, so much relied upon by the petitioner, anything more than an
explicit approval of "all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all the
properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the Executor
Charles N. Hodges" (after the death of his wife and prior to the date of the motion),
plus a general advance authorization to enable said "Executor — to execute
subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left the said
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with wishes conveyed in the last will
and testament of the latter", which, certainly, cannot amount to the order of
adjudication of the estate of the decedent to Hodges contemplated in the law. In
fact, the motion of December 11, 1957 on which the court predicated the order in

question did not pray for any such adjudication at all. What is more, although said
motion did allege that "herein Executor (Hodges) is not only part owner of the
properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the properties left by the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges", it significantly added that "herein Executor, as
Legatee (sic), has the right to sell, convey, lease or dispose of the properties in the
Philippines — during his lifetime", thereby indicating that what said motion
contemplated was nothing more than either the enjoyment by Hodges of his rights
under the particular portion of the dispositions of his wife’s will which were to be
operative only during his lifetime or the use of his own share of the conjugal
estate, pending the termination of the proceedings. In other words, the authority
referred to in said motions and orders is in the nature of that contemplated either
in Section 2 of Rule 109 which permits, in appropriate cases, advance or partial
implementation of the terms of a duly probated will before final adjudication or
distribution when the rights of third parties would not be adversely affected
thereby or in the established practice of allowing the surviving spouse to dispose
of his own share of the conjugal estate, pending its final liquidation, when it
appears that no creditors of the conjugal partnership would be prejudiced thereby,
(see the Revised Rules of Court by Francisco, Vol. V-B, 1970 ed. p. 887) albeit, from
the tenor of said motions, We are more inclined to believe that Hodges meant to
refer to the former. In any event, We are fully persuaded that the quoted
allegations of said motions read together cannot be construed as a repudiation of
the rights unequivocally established in the will in favor of Mrs. Hodges’ brothers
and sisters to whatever have not been disposed of by him up to his death.
Indeed, nowhere in the record does it appear that the trial court subsequently
acted upon the premise suggested by petitioner. On the contrary, on November 23,
1965, when the court resolved the motion of appellee Western Institute of
Technology by its order We have quoted earlier, it categorically held that as of said
date, November 23, 1965, "in both cases (Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672)
there is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties to
whomsoever are entitled thereto." In this connection, it may be stated further
against petitioner, by way of some kind of estoppel, that in its own motion of
January 8, 1965, already quoted in full on pages 54-67 of this decision, it prayed
inter alia that the court declare that "C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges", which it would not have done if it were really
convinced that the order of December 14, 1957 was already the order of
adjudication and distribution of her estate. That said motion was later withdrawn
when Magno filed her own motion for determination and adjudication of what
should correspond to the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges does not alter the
indubitable implication of the prayer of the withdrawn motion.
It must be borne in mind that while it is true that Mrs. Hodges bequeathed her
whole estate to her husband and gave him what amounts to full powers of
dominion over the same during his lifetime, she imposed at the same time the
Page 38 of 100
condition that whatever should remain thereof upon his death should go to her
brothers and sisters. In effect, therefore, what was absolutely given to Hodges was
only so much of his wife’s estate as he might possibly dispose of during his
lifetime; hence, even assuming that by the allegations in his motion, he did intend
to adjudicate the whole estate to himself, as suggested by petitioner, such
unilateral act could not have affected or diminished in any degree or manner the
right of his brothers and sisters-in-law over what would remain thereof upon his
death, for surely, no one can rightly contend that the testamentary provision in
question allowed him to so adjudicate any part of the estate to himself as to
prejudice them. In other words, irrespective of whatever might have been Hodges’
intention in his motions, as Executor, of May 27, 1957 and December 11, 1957, the
trial court’s orders granting said motions, even in the terms in which they have
been worded, could not have had the effect of an absolute and unconditional
adjudication unto Hodges of the whole estate of his wife None of them could have
deprived his brothers and sisters-in-law of their rights under said will. And it may
be added here that the fact that no one appeared to oppose the motions in
question may only be attributed, firstly, to the failure of Hodges to send notices to
any of them, as admitted in the motion itself, and, secondly, to the fact that even if
they had been notified, they could not have taken said motions to be for the final
distribution and adjudication of the estate, but merely for him to be able, pending
such final distribution and adjudication, to either exercise during his lifetime
rights of dominion over his wife’s estate in accordance with the bequest in his
favor, which, as already observed, may be allowed under the broad terms of
Section 2 of Rule 109, or make use of his own share of the conjugal estate. In any
event, We do not believe that the trial court could have acted in the sense
pretended by petitioner, not only because of the clear language of the will but also
because none of the interested parties had been duly notified of the motion and
hearing thereof. Stated differently, if the orders of May 21, 1957 and December 4,
1957 were really intended to be read in the sense contended by petitioner, We
would have no hesitancy in declaring them null and void.
Petitioner cites the case of Austria v. Ventenilla, G. R. No. L-10018, September 19,
1956, (unreported but a partial digest thereof appears in 99 Phil. 1069) in support
of its insistence that with the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957, the closure
of Mrs. Hodges’ estate has become a mere formality, inasmuch as said orders
amounted to the order of adjudication and distribution ordained by Section 1 of
Rule 90. But the parallel attempted to be drawn between that case and the present
one does not hold. There the trial court had in fact issued a clear, distinct and
express order of adjudication and distribution more than twenty years before the
other heirs of the deceased filed their motion asking that the administratrix be
removed, etc. As quoted in that decision, the order of the lower court in that
respect read as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"En orden a la mocion de la administradora, el juzgado la encuentra procedente

bajo la condicion de que no se hara entrega ni adjudicacion de los bienes a los
herederos antes de que estos presten la fianza correspondiente y de acuerdo con
lo prescrito en el Art. 754 del Codigo de Procedimientos: pues, en autos no aparece
que hayan sido nombrados comisionados de avaluo y reclamaciones. Dicha fianza
podra ser por un valor igual al de los bienes que correspondan a cada heredero
segun el testamento. Creo que no es obice para la terminacion del expediente el
hecho de que la administradora no ha presentado hasta ahora el inventario de los
bienes; pues, segun la ley, estan exentos de esta formalidad los administradores
que son legatarios del residuo o remanente de los bienes y hayan prestado fianza
para responder de las gestiones de su cargo, y aparece en el testamento que la
administradora Alejandra Austria reune dicha condicion.
"POR TODO LO EXPUESTO, el juzgado declara, 1.o: no haber lugar a la mocion de
Ramon Ventenilla y otros; 2.o, declara asimismo que los unicos herederos del
finado Antonio Ventenilla son su esposa Alejandra Austria, Maria Ventenilla,
hermana del testador, y Ramon Ventenilla, Maria Ventenilla, Ramon Soriano,
Eulalio Soriano, Jose Soriano, Gabriela Ventenilla, Lorenzo Ventenilla, Felicitas
Ventenilla, Eugenio Ventenilla y Alejandra Ventenilla, en representacion de los
difuntos Juan, Tomas, Catalino y Froilan, hermanos del testador, declarando,
ademas, que la heredera Alejandra Austria tiene derecho al remanente de todos
los bienes dejados por el finado, despues de deducir de ellos la porcion que
corresponde a cada uno de sus coherederos, conforme esta mandado en las
clausulas 8.a, 9.a, 10.a, 11.a, 12.a y 13.a del testamento; 3.o, se aprueba el pago
hecho por la administradora de los gastos de la ultima enfermedad y funerales del
testador, de la donacion hecha por el testador a favor de la Escuela a Publica del
Municipio de Mangatarem, y de las misas en sufragio del alma del finado; 4.o, que
una vez prestada la fianza mencionada al principio de este auto, se haga la entrega
y adjudicacion de los bienes, conforme se dispone en el testamento y se acaba de
declarar en este auto; 5.o, y, finalmente, que verificada la adjudicacion, se dara por
terminada la administracion, revelandole toda responsabilidad a la
administradora, y cancelando su fianza.
ASI SE ORDENA."cralaw virtua1aw library
Undoubtedly, after the issuance of an order of such tenor, the closure of any
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person cannot be but
perfunctory.
In the case at bar, as already pointed out above, the two orders relied upon by
petitioner do not appear ex-facie to be of the same tenor and nature as the order
just quoted, and, what is more, the circumstances attendant to its issuance do not
suggest that such was the intention of the court, for nothing could have been more
violative of the will of Mrs. Hodges.
Page 39 of 100
Indeed, to infer from Hodges’ said motions and from his statements of accounts for
the years 1958, 1959 and 1960, Annexes I, K and M, respectively, wherein he
repeatedly claimed that "herein executor (being) the only devisee or legatee of the
deceased, in accordance with the last will and testament already probated," there
is "no (other) person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of
examining herein account to be given notice", an intent to adjudicate unto himself
the whole of his wife’s estate in an absolute manner and without regard to the
contingent interests of her brothers and sisters, is to impute bad faith to him, an
imputation which is not legally permissible, much less warranted by the facts of
record herein. Hodges knew or ought to have known that, legally speaking, the
terms of his wife’s will did not give him such a right. Factually, there are enough
circumstances extant in the records of these cases indicating that he had no such
intention to ignore the rights of his co-heirs. In his very motions in question,
Hodges alleged, thru counsel, that the "deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving
no descendants and ascendants, except brothers and sisters and herein petitioner,
as surviving spouse, to inherit the properties of the decedent", and even promised
that "proper accounting will be had — in all these transactions" which he had
submitted for approval and authorization by the court, thereby implying that he
was aware of his responsibilities vis-a-vis his co-heirs. As alleged by respondent
Magno in her brief as appellee:chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
"Under date of April 14, 1959, C. N. Hodges filed his first ‘Account by the Executor’
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the ‘Statement of Networth of Mr. C. N.
Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges’ as of December 31, 1958 annexed
thereto, C. N. Hodges reported that the combined e tax return’ for calendar year
1958 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as
having earned income of P164,201.31, exactly one-half of the net income of his
combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges." (p. 91,
Appellee’s Brief.)
"Under date of July 21, 1960, C. N. Hodges filed his second ‘Annual Statement of
Account by the Executor’ of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the ‘Statement of
Net worth of Mr. C. N Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges’ as of December
31, 1959 annexed thereto. C. N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate
earned a net income of P270,623.32, divided evenly between him and the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an ‘individual income tax return’ for
calendar year 1959 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the
said estate as having earned income of P135,311.66, exactly one-half of the net
income of his combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. (pp. 91-92, Id.)
"Under date of April 20, 1961, C. N. Hodges filed his third ‘Annual Statement of
Account by the Executor for the year 1960’ of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In
the ‘Statement of Net Worth of Mr. C. N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane

Hodges’ as of December 31, 1960 annexed thereto, C. N. Hodges reported that the
combined conjugal estate earned a net income of P314,857.94, divided of Linnie
Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an ‘individual evenly between him and the
estate income tax return’ for calendar year 1960 on the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned income of
P157,428.97, exactly one-half of the net income of his combined personal assets
and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges." (pp. 92-93, Id.)
"In the petition for probate that he (Hodges) filed, he listed the seven brothers and
sisters of Linnie Jane as her ‘heirs’ (see p. 2, Green ROA). The order of the court
admitting the will to probate unfortunately omitted one of the heirs, Roy Higdon
(see p. 14, Green ROA). Immediately, C. N. Hodges filed a verified motion to have
Roy Higdon’s name included as an heir, stating that he wanted to straighten the
records ‘in order (that) the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may not think or believe
they were omitted, and that they were really and are interested in the estate of
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges’."cralaw virtua1aw library
Thus, he recognized, if in his own way, the separate identity of his wife’s estate
from his own share of the conjugal partnership up to the time of his death, more
than five years after that of his wife. He never considered the whole estate as a
single one belonging exclusively to himself. The only conclusion one can gather
from this is that he could have been preparing the basis for the eventual
transmission of his wife’s estate, or, at least, so much thereof as he would not have
been able to dispose of during his lifetime, to her brothers and sisters in
accordance with her expressed desire, as intimated in his tax return in the United
States to be more extensively referred to anon. And assuming that he did pay the
corresponding estate and inheritance taxes in the Philippines on the basis of his
being sole heir, such payment is not necessarily inconsistent with his recognition
of the rights of his co-heirs. Without purporting to rule definitely on the matter in
these proceedings, We might say here that We are inclined to the view that under
the peculiar provisions of his wife’s will, and for purposes of the applicable
inheritance tax laws, Hodges had to be considered as her sole heir, pending the
actual transmission of the remaining portion of her estate to her other heirs, upon
the eventuality of his death, and whatever adjustment might be warranted should
there be any such remainder then is a matter that could well be taken care of by
the internal revenue authorities in due time.
It is to be noted that the lawyer, Atty. Leon P. Gellada, who signed the motions of
May 27, 1957 and December 11, 1957 and the aforementioned statements of
account was the very same one who also subsequently signed and filed the motion
of December 26, 1962 for the appointment of respondent Magno as
"Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs. Linnie Jane Hodges" wherein it was alleged
that "in accordance with the provisions of the last will and testament of Linnie
Jane Hodges, whatever real properties that may remain at the death of her
Page 40 of 100
husband, Charles Newton Hodges, the said properties shall be equally divided
among their heirs." And it appearing that said attorney was Hodges’ lawyer as
Executor of the estate of his wife, it stands to reason that his understanding of the
situation, implicit in his allegations just quoted, could somehow be reflective of
Hodges’ own understanding thereof.
As a matter of fact, the allegations in the motion of the same Atty. Gellada dated
July 1, 1957, a "Request for Inclusion of the Name of Roy Higdon in the Order of
the Court dated July 19, 1957, etc.", reference to which is made in the above
quotation from respondent Magno’s brief, are over the oath of Hodges himself,
who verified the motion. Said allegations read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. That the Hon. Court issued orders dated June 29, 1957, ordering the probate of
the will.
2. That in said order of the Hon. Court, the relatives of the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges were enumerated. However, in the petition as well as in the testimony of
Executor during the hearing, the name Roy Higdon was mentioned, but deceased.
It was unintentionally omitted the heirs of said Roy Higdon, who are his wife Aline
Higdon and son David Higdon, all of age, and residents of Quinlan, Texas, U.S.A.
3. That to straighten the records, and in order the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon
may not think or believe they were omitted, and that they were really and are
interested in the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, it is requested of the Hon
Court to insert the names of Aline Higdon and David Higdon, wife and son of
deceased Roy Higdon, in the said order of the Hon. Court dated June 29, 1957."
(pars. 1 to 3 Annex 2 of Magno’s Answer — Record, p. 260)
As can be seen, these italicized allegations indicate, more or less, the real attitude
of Hodges in regard to the testamentary dispositions of his wife.
In connection with this point of Hodges’ intent, We note that there are documents,
copies of which are annexed to respondent Magno’s answer, which purportedly
contain Hodges’ own solemn declarations recognizing the right of his co-heirs,
such as the alleged tax return he filed with the United States Taxation authorities,
identified as Schedule M, (Annex 4 of her answer) and his supposed affidavit of
renunciation, Annex 5. In said Schedule M, Hodges appears to have answered the
pertinent question thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"2a. Had the surviving spouse the right to declare an election between (1) the
provisions made in his or her favor by the will and (11) dower, courtesy, or a
statutory interest? (X) Yes () No
"2d. Does the surviving spouse contemplate renouncing the will and electing to

take dower, courtesy, or a statutory interest? (X) Yes () No.
"3. According to the information and belief of the person or persons filing the
return, is any action described under question 1 designed or contemplated? () Yes
(X) No"
(Annex 4, Answer — Record, p. 263)
and to have further stated under the item, "Description of property interests
passing to surviving spouse" the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"None, except for purposes of administering the Estate, paying debts, taxes and
other legal charges. It is the intention of the surviving husband of deceased to
distribute the remaining property and interest of the deceased in their Community
Estate to the devisees and legatees named in the will when the debts, liabilities,
taxes and expenses of administration are finally determined and paid." (Annex 4,
Answer — Record, p. 263)
In addition, in the supposed affidavit of Hodges, Annex 5, it is
stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I, C. N. Hodges, being duly sworn, on oath affirm that at the time the United States
Estate Tax Return was filed in the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on August 8, 1958,
I renounced and disclaimed any and all right to receive the rents, emoluments and
income from said estate, as shown by the statement contained in Schedule M at
page 29 of said return, a copy of which schedule is attached to this affidavit and
made a part hereof.
"The purpose of this affidavit is to ratify and confirm and I do hereby ratify and
confirm the declaration made in Schedule M of said return and hereby formally
disclaim and renounce any right on my part to receive any of the said rents,
emoluments and income from the estate of my deceased wife, Linnie Jane Hodges.
This affidavit is made to absolve me or my estate from any liability for the
payment of income taxes on income which has accrued to the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges since the death of the said Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957." (Annex 5,
Answer — Record, p. 264)
Although it appears that said documents were not duly presented as evidence in
the court below, and We cannot, therefore, rely on them for the purpose of the
present proceedings, still, We cannot close our eyes to their existence in the record
nor fail to note that their tenor jibes with Our conclusion discussed above from the
circumstances related to the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957. 5
Somehow, these documents, considering they are supposed to be copies of their
originals found in the official files of the governments of the United States and of
Page 41 of 100
the Philippines, serve to lessen any possible apprehension that Our conclusion
from the other evidence of Hodges’ manifest intent vis-a-vis the rights of his co-
heirs is without basis in fact.
Verily, with such eloquent manifestations of his good intentions towards the other
heirs of his wife, We find it very hard to believe that Hodges did ask the court and
that the latter agreed that he be declared her sole heir and that her whole estate be
adjudicated to him without so much as just annotating the contingent interest of
her brothers and sisters in what would remain thereof upon his demise. On the
contrary, it seems to us more factual and fairer to assume that Hodges was well
aware of his position as executor of the will of his wife and, as such, had in mind
the following admonition made by the Court in Pamittan v. Lasam, Et Al., 60 Phil.
908, at pp. 913-914:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Upon the death of Bernarda in September, 1908, said land continued to be
conjugal property in the hands of the defendant Lasam. It is provided in article
1418 of the Civil Code that upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, an
inventory shall immediately be made and this court in construing this provision in
connection with section, 685 of the Code of Civil Procedure (prior to its
amendment by Act No. 3176 of November 24, 1924) has repeatedly held that in
the event of the death of the wife, the law imposes upon the husband the duty of
liquidating the affairs of the partnership without delay (desde luego). (Alfonso v.
Natividad, 6 Phil. 240; Prado v. Lagera, 7 Phil., 395; De la Rama v. De la Rama, 7
Phil., 745; Enriquez v. Victoria, 10 Phil., 10; Amancio v. Pardo, 13 Phil., 297; Rojas
v. Singson Tongson, 17 Phil., 476; Sochayseng v. Trujillo, 31 Phil., 153; Molera v.
Molera, 40 Phil., 586; Nable Jose v. Nable Jose, 41 Phil., 713.)
"In the last mentioned case this court quoted with approval the case of
Leatherwood v. Arnold (66 Texas, 414, 416, 417), in which that court discussed
the powers of the surviving spouse in the administration of the community
property. Attention was called to the fact that the surviving husband, in the
management of the conjugal property after the death of the wife, was a trustee of
unique character who is liable for any fraud committed by him with relation to the
property while he is charged with its administration. In the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership, he had wide powers (as the law stood prior to Act No. 3176)
and the high degree of trust reposed in him stands out more clearly in view of the
fact that he was the owner of a half interest in his own right of the conjugal estate
which he was charged to administer. He could therefore no more acquire a title by
prescription against those for whom he was administering the conjugal estate than
could a guardian against his ward or a judicial administrator against the heirs of
estate. Section 38 of Chapter III of the Code of Civil Procedure, with relation to
prescription, provides that ‘this chapter shall not apply . . . in the case of a
continuing and subsisting trust.’ The surviving husband in the administration and
liquidation of the conjugal estate occupies the position of a trustee of the highest

order and is not permitted by the law to hold that estate or any portion thereof
adversely to those for whose benefit the law imposes upon him the duty of
administration and liquidation. No liquidation was ever made by Lasam — hence,
the conjugal property which came into his possession on the death of his wife in
September, 1908, still remains conjugal property, a continuing and subsisting
trust. He should have made a liquidation immediately (desde luego). He cannot
now be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. One of the conditions of
title by prescription (section 41, Code of Civil Procedure) is possession ‘under a
claim of title exclusive of any other right’. For a trustee to make such a claim would
be a manifest fraud."cralaw virtua1aw library
And knowing thus his responsibilities in the premises, We are not convinced that
Hodges arrogated everything unto himself leaving nothing at all to be inherited by
his wife’s brothers and sisters.
PCIB insists, however, that to read the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957,
not as adjudicatory, but merely as approving past and authorizing future
dispositions made by Hodges in a wholesale and general manner, would
necessarily render the said orders void for being violative of the provisions of Rule
89 governing the manner in which such dispositions may be made and how the
authority therefor and approval thereof by the probate court may be secured. If
We sustained such a view, the result would only be that the said orders should be
declared ineffective either way they are understood, considering We have already
seen it is legally impossible to consider them as adjudicatory. As a matter of fact,
however, what surges immediately to the surface, relative to PCIB’s observations
based on Rule 89, is that from such point of view, the supposed irregularity would
involve no more than some non-jurisdictional technicalities of procedure, which
have for their evident fundamental purpose the protection of parties interested in
the estate, such as the heirs, its creditors, particularly the government on account
of the taxes due it; and since it is apparent here that none of such parties are
objecting to said orders or would be prejudiced by the unobservance by the trial
court of the procedure pointed out by PCIB, We find no legal inconvenience in nor
impediment to Our giving sanction to the blanket approval and authority
contained in said orders. This solution is definitely preferable in law and in equity,
for to view said orders in the sense suggested by PCIB would result in the
deprivation of substantive rights to the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges,
whereas reading them the other way will not cause any prejudice to anyone, and,
withal, will give peace of mind and stability of rights to the innocent parties who
relied on them in good faith, in the light of the peculiar pertinent provisions of the
will of said decedent.
Now, the inventory submitted by Hodges on May 12, 1958 referred to the estate of
his wife as consisting of "One-half of all the items designated in the balance sheet,
copy of which is hereto attached and marked as ‘Annex A’." Although, regrettably,
Page 42 of 100
no copy of said Annex A appears in the records before Us, We take judicial notice,
on the basis of the undisputed facts in these cases, that the same consists of
considerable real and other personal kinds of properties. And since, according to
her will, her husband was to be the sole owner thereof during his lifetime, with full
power and authority to dispose of any of them, provided that should there be any
remainder upon his death, such remainder would go to her brothers and sisters,
and furthermore, there is no pretension, much less any proof that Hodges had in
fact disposed of all of them, and, on the contrary, the indications are rather to the
effect that he had kept them more or less intact, it cannot truthfully be said that,
upon the death of Hodges, there was no more estate of Mrs. Hodges to speak of it is
Our conclusion, therefore, that properties do exist which constitute such estate,
hence Special Proceedings 1307 should not yet be closed.
Neither is there basis for holding that respondent Magno has ceased to be the
Administratrix in said proceeding. There is no showing that she has ever been
legally removed as such, the attempt to replace her with Mr. Benito Lopez without
authority from the Court having been expressly held ineffective by Our resolution
of September 8, 1972. Parenthetically, on this last point, PCIB itself is very
emphatic in stressing that it is not questioning said respondent’s status as such
administratrix. Indeed, it is not clear that PCIB has any standing to raise any
objection thereto, considering it is a complete stranger insofar as the estate of Mrs.
Hodges is concerned.
It is the contention of PCIB, however, that as things actually stood at the time of
Hodges’ death, their conjugal partnership had not yet been liquidated and,
inasmuch as the properties composing the same were thus commingled pro
indiviso and, consequently, the properties pertaining to the estate of each of the
spouses are not yet identifiable, it is PCIB alone, as administrator of the estate of
Hodges, who should administer everything, and all that respondent Magno can do
for the time being is to wait until the properties constituting the remaining estate
of Mrs. Hodges have been duly segregated and delivered to her for her own
administration. Seemingly, PCIB would liken the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges to a party having a claim of ownership to some properties included in the
inventory of an administrator of the estate of a decedent, (here that of Hodges)
and who normally has no right to take part in the proceedings pending the
establishment of his right or title; for which as a rule it is required that an ordinary
action should be filed, since the probate court is without jurisdiction to pass with
finality on questions of title between the estate of the deceased, on the one hand,
and a third party or even an heir claiming adversely against the estate, on the
other.
We do not find such contention sufficiently persuasive. As We see it, the situation
obtaining herein cannot be compared with the claim of a third party the basis of
which is alien to the pending probate proceedings. In the present cases, what gave

rise to the claim of PCIB of exclusive ownership by the estate of Hodges over all
the properties of the Hodges spouses, including the share of Mrs. Hodges in the
community properties, were the orders of the trial court issued in the course of
the very settlement proceedings themselves, more specifically, the orders of May
27 and December 14, 1957 so often mentioned above. In other words, the root of
the issue of title between the parties is something that the court itself has done in
the exercise of its probate jurisdiction. And since in the ultimate analysis, the
question of whether or not all the properties herein involved pertain exclusively to
the estate of Hodges depends on the legal meaning and effect of said orders, the
claim that respondent court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and decide
the said issue is incorrect. If it was within the competence of the court to issue the
root orders, why should it not be within its authority to declare their true
significance and intent, to the end that the parties may know whether or not the
estate of Mrs. Hodges had already been adjudicated by the court, upon the
initiative of Hodges, in his favor, to the exclusion of the other heirs of his wife
instituted in her will?
At this point, it bears emphasis again that the main cause of all the present
problems confronting the courts and the parties in these cases was the failure of
Hodges to secure, as executor of his wife’s estate, from May, 1957 up to the time of
his death in December, 1962, a period of more than five years, the final
adjudication of her estate and the closure of the proceedings. The record is bare of
any showing that he ever exerted any effort towards the early settlement of said
estate. While, on the one hand, there are enough indications, as already discussed,
that he had intentions of leaving intact her share of the conjugal properties so that
it may pass wholly to his co-heirs upon his death, pursuant to her will, on the other
hand, by not terminating the proceedings, his interests in his own half of the
conjugal properties remained commingled pro-indiviso with those of his co-heirs
in the other half. Obviously, such a situation could not be conducive to ready
ascertainment of the portion of the inheritance that should appertain to his co-
heirs upon his death. Having these considerations in mind, it would be giving a
premium for such procrastination, and rather unfair to his co-heirs, if the
administrator of his estate were to be given exclusive administration of all the
properties in question, which would necessarily include the function of promptly
liquidating the conjugal partnership, thereby identifying and segregating without
unnecessary loss of time which properties should be considered as constituting
the estate of Mrs. Hodges, the remainder of which her brothers and sisters are
supposed to inherit equally among themselves.
To be sure, an administrator is not supposed to represent the interests of any
particular party and his acts are deemed to be objectively for the protection of the
rights of everybody concerned with the estate of the decedent, and from this point
of view, it maybe said that even if PCIB were to act alone, there should be no fear
of undue disadvantage to anyone. On the other hand, however, it is evidently
Page 43 of 100
implicit in section 6 of Rule 78 fixing the priority among those to whom letters of
administration should be granted that the criterion in the selection of the
administrator is not his impartiality alone but, more importantly, the extent of his
interest in the estate, so much so that the one assumed to have greater interest is
preferred to another who has less. Taking both of these considerations into
account, inasmuch as, according to Hodges’ own inventory submitted by him as
Executor of the estate of his wife, practically all their properties were conjugal
which means that the spouses have equal shares therein, it is but logical that both
estates should be administered jointly by the representatives of both, pending
their segregation from each other. Particularly is such an arrangement warranted
because the actuations so far of PCIB evince a determined, albeit groundless,
intent to exclude the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges from their inheritance. Besides, to
allow PCIB, the administrator of his estate, to perform now what Hodges was duty
bound to do as executor is to violate the spirit, if not the letter, of Section 2 of Rule
78 which expressly provides that "The executor of an executor shall not, as such,
administer the estate of the first testator." It goes without saying that this
provision refers also to the administrator of an executor like PCIB here.
We are not unmindful of the fact that under Section 2 of Rule 73, "When the
marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community
property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof
paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both
spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or
intestate proceedings of either." Indeed, it is true that the last sentence of this
provision allows or permits the conjugal partnership of spouses who are both
deceased to be settled or liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of
either, but precisely because said sentence allows or permits that the liquidation
be made in either proceeding, it is a matter of sound judicial discretion in which
one it should be made. After all, the former rule referring to the administrator of
the husband’s estate in respect to such liquidation was done away with by Act
3176, the pertinent provisions of which are now embodied in the rule just cited.
Thus, it can be seen that at the time of the death of Hodges, there was already the
pending judicial settlement proceeding of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, and, more
importantly, that the former was the executor of the latter’s will who had, as such,
failed for more than five years to see to it that the same was terminated earliest,
which was not difficult to do, since from ought that appears in the record, there
were no serious obstacles on the way, the estate not being indebted and there
being no immediate heirs other than Hodges himself. Such dilatory or indifferent
attitude could only spell possible prejudice of his co-heirs, whose rights to
inheritance depend entirely on the existence of any remainder of Mrs. Hodges’
share in the community properties, and who are now faced with the pose of PCIB
that there is no such remainder. Had Hodges secured as early as possible the
settlement of his wife’s estate, this problem would not arisen. All things

considered, We are fully convinced that the interests of justice will be better
served by not permitting or allowing PCIB or any administrator of the estate of
Hodges exclusive administration of all the properties in question. We are of the
considered opinion and so hold that what would be just and proper is for both
administrators of the two estates to act conjointly until after said estates have
been segregated from each other.
At this juncture, it may be stated that we are not overlooking the fact that it is
PCIB’s contention that, viewed as a substitution, the testamentary disposition in
favor of Mrs. Hodges’ brothers and sisters may not be given effect. To a certain
extent, this contention is correct. Indeed, legally speaking, Mrs. Hodges’ will
provides neither for a simple or vulgar substitution under Article 859 of the Civil
Code nor for a fideicommissary substitution under Article 863 thereof. There is no
vulgar substitution therein because there is no provision for either (1) predecease
of the testator by the designated heir or (2) refusal or (3) incapacity of the latter to
accept the inheritance, as required by Article 859; and neither is there a
fideicommissary substitution therein because no obligation is imposed thereby
upon Hodges to preserve the estate or any part thereof for anyone else. But from
these premises, it is not correct to jump to the conclusion, as PCIB does, that the
testamentary dispositions in question are therefore inoperative and invalid.
The error in PCIB’s position lies simply in the fact that it views the said disposition
exclusively in the light of substitutions covered by the Civil Code section on that
subject, (Section 3, Chapter 2, Title IV, Book III) when it is obvious that
substitution occurs only when another heir is appointed in a will "so that he may
enter into inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted," (Article 857, Id.)
and, in the present case, no such possible default is contemplated. The brothers
and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not substitutes for Hodges because, under her will,
they are not to inherit what Hodges cannot, would not or may not inherit, but what
he would not dispose of from his inheritance; rather, therefore, they are also heirs
instituted simultaneously with Hodges, subject, however, to certain conditions,
partially resolutory insofar as Hodges was concerned and correspondingly
suspensive with reference to his brothers and sisters-in-law. It is partially
resolutory, since it bequeaths unto Hodges the whole of her estate to be owned
and enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir with absolute dominion over them 6
only during his lifetime, which means that while he could completely and
absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself,
he was not free to do so mortis causa, and all his rights to what might remain upon
his death would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that contingency, inasmuch
as the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law to the inheritance, although vested
already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges, would automatically become operative
upon the occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of actual existence of any
remainder of her estate then.
Page 44 of 100
Contrary to the view of respondent Magno, however, it was not the usufruct alone
of her estate, as contemplated in Article 869 of the Civil Code, that she bequeathed
to Hodges during his lifetime, but the full ownership thereof, although the same
was to last also during his lifetime only, even as there was no restriction
whatsoever against his disposing or conveying the whole or any portion thereof to
anybody other than himself. The Court sees no legal impediment to this kind of
institution, in this jurisdiction or under Philippine law, except that it cannot apply
to the lifetime of Hodges as the surviving spouse, consisting of one-half of the
estate, considering that Mrs. Hodges had no surviving ascendants nor descendants.
(Arts. 872, 900, and 904, New Civil Code.)
But relative precisely to the question of how much of Mrs. Hodges’ share of the
conjugal partnership properties may be considered as her estate, the parties are in
disagreement as to how Article 16 of the Civil Code 7 should be applied. On the one
hand, petitioner claims that inasmuch as Mrs. Hodges was a resident of the
Philippines at the time of her death, under said Article 16, construed in relation to
the pertinent laws of Texas and the principle of renvoi, what should be applied
here should be the rules of succession under the Civil Code of the Philippines, and,
therefore, her estate could consist of no more than one-fourth of the said conjugal
properties, the other fourth being, as already explained, the legitime of her
husband (Art. 900, Civil Code) which she could not have disposed of nor burdened
with any condition (Art. 872, Civil Code). On the other hand, respondent Magno
denies that Mrs. Hodges died a resident of the Philippines, since allegedly she
never changed nor intended to change her original residence of birth in Texas,
United States of America, and contends that, anyway, regardless of the question of
her residence, she being indisputably a citizen of Texas, under said Article 16 of
the Civil Code, the distribution of her estate is subject to the laws of said State
which, according to her, do not provide for any legitime, hence, the brothers and
sisters of Mrs. Hodges are entitled to the remainder of the whole of her share of
the conjugal partnership properties consisting of one-half thereof. Respondent
Magno further maintains that, in any event, Hodges had renounced his rights
under the will in favor of his co-heirs, as allegedly proven by the documents
touching on the point already mentioned earlier, the genuineness and legal
significance of which petitioner seemingly questions. Besides, the parties are
disagreed as to what the pertinent laws of Texas provide. In the interest of settling
the estates herein involved soonest, it would be best, indeed, if these conflicting
claims of the parties were determined in these proceedings. The Court regrets,
however, that it cannot do so, for the simple reason that neither the evidence
submitted by the parties in the court below nor their discussion, in their
respective briefs and memoranda before Us, of their respective contentions on the
pertinent legal issues, of grave importance as they are, appear to Us to be adequate
enough to enable Us to render an intelligent, comprehensive and just resolution.
For one thing, there is no clear and reliable proof of what in fact the possibly
applicable laws of Texas are. 7* Then also, the genuineness of documents relied

upon by respondent Magno is disputed. And there are a number of still other
conceivable related issues which the parties may wish to raise but which it is not
proper to mention here. In Justice, therefore, to all the parties concerned, these
and all other relevant matters should first be threshed out fully in the trial court in
the proceedings hereafter to be held therein for the purpose of ascertaining and
adjudicating and/or distributing the estate of Mrs. Hodges to her heirs in
accordance with her duly probated will.
To be more explicit, all that We can and do decide in connection with the petition
for certiorari and prohibition are: (1) that regardless of which corresponding laws
are applied, whether of the Philippines or of Texas, and taking for granted either of
the respective contentions of the parties as to provisions of the latter, 8 and
regardless also of whether or not it can be proven by competent evidence that
Hodges renounced his inheritance in any degree, it is easily and definitely
discernible from the inventory submitted by Hodges himself, as Executor of his
wife’s estate, that there are properties which should constitute the estate of Mrs.
Hodges and ought to be disposed of or distributed among her heirs pursuant to
her will in said Special Proceedings 1307; (2) that, more specifically, inasmuch as
the question of what are the pertinent laws of Texas applicable to the situation
herein is basically one of fact, and, considering that the sole difference in the
positions of the parties as to the effect of said laws has reference to the supposed
legitime of Hodges — it being the stand of PCIB that Hodges had such a legitime
whereas Magno claims the negative — it is now beyond controversy for all future
purposes of these proceedings that whatever be the provisions actually of the laws
of Texas applicable hereto, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is at least, one-fourth of the
conjugal estate of the spouses; the existence and effects of foreign laws being
questions of fact, and it being the position now of PCIB that the estate of Mrs.
Hodges, pursuant to the laws of Texas, should only be one-fourth of the conjugal
estate, such contention constitutes an admission of fact, and consequently, it
would be in estoppel in any further proceedings in these cases to claim that said
estate could be less, irrespective of what might be proven later to be actually the
provisions of the applicable laws of Texas; (3) that Special Proceedings 1307 for
the settlement of the testate estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be closed at this stage
and should proceed to its logical conclusion, there having been no proper and legal
adjudication or distribution yet of the estate therein involved; and (4) that
respondent Magno remains and continues to be the Administratrix therein. Hence,
nothing in the foregoing opinion is intended to resolve the issues which, as already
stated, are not properly before the Court now, namely, (1) whether or not Hodges
had in fact and in law waived or renounced his inheritance from Mrs. Hodges, in
whole or in part, and (2) assuming there had been no such waiver, whether or not,
by the application of Article 16 of the Civil Code, and in the light of what might be
the applicable laws of Texas on the matter, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is more than
the one-fourth declared above. As a matter of fact, even our finding above about
the existence of properties constituting the estate of Mrs. Hodges rests largely on a
Page 45 of 100
general appraisal of the size and extent of the conjugal partnership gathered from
reference made thereto by both parties in their briefs as well as in their pleadings
included in the records on appeal, and it should accordingly yield, as to which
exactly those properties are, to the more concrete and specific evidence which the
parties are supposed to present in support of their respective positions in regard
to the foregoing main legal and factual issues. In the interest of justice, the parties
should be allowed to present such further evidence in relation to all these issues in
a joint hearing of the two probate proceedings herein involved. After all, the court
a quo has not yet passed squarely on these issues, and it is best for all concerned
that it should do so in the first instance.
Relative to Our holding above that the estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be less than
the remainder of one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties, it may be
mentioned here that during the deliberations, the point was raised as to whether
or not said holding might be inconsistent with Our other ruling here also that,
since there is no reliable evidence as to what are the applicable laws of Texas,
U.S.A. "with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional
rights" that may be willed by a testator which, under Article 16 of the Civil Code,
are controlling in the instant cases, in view of the undisputed Texan nationality of
the deceased Mrs. Hodges, these cases should be returned to the court a quo, so
that the parties may prove what said law provides, it is premature for Us to make
any specific ruling now on either the validity of the testamentary dispositions
herein involved or the amount of inheritance to which the brothers and sisters of
Mrs. Hodges are entitled. After nature reflection, We are of the considered view
that, at this stage and in the state of the records before Us, the feared inconsistency
is more apparent than real. Withal, it no longer lies in the lips of petitioner PCIB to
make any claim that under the laws of Texas, the estate of Mrs. Hodges could in
any event be less than that We have fixed above.
It should be borne in mind that as above-indicated, the question of what are the
laws of Texas governing the matters herein issue is, in the first instance, one of
fact, not of law. Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may not be taken judicial
notice of and have to be proven like any other fact in dispute between the parties
in any proceeding, with the rare exception in instances when the said laws are
already within the actual knowledge of the court, such as when they are well and
generally known or they have been actually ruled upon in other cases before it and
none of the parties concerned do not claim otherwise. (5 Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, p. 41, 1970 ed.) In Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610, it was
held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is the theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in Elkins, West
Virginia, on November 3, 1985, by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction,
and that the laws of West Virginia govern. To this end, there was submitted a copy
of section 3868 of Acts 1882, c. 84 as found in West Virginia Code, Annotated, by

Hogg, Charles E., vol. 2, 1914, p. 1960, and as certified to by the Director of the
National Library. But this was far from a compliance with the law. The laws of a
foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The courts of the
Philippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the
various States of the American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. (In re
Estate of Johnson [1918], 39 Phil., 156.) Here the requirements of the law were not
met. There was no showing that the book from which an extract was taken was
printed or published under the authority of the State of West Virginia, as provided
in section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law
attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the
seal of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of
West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed."cralaw
virtua1aw library
No evidence of the nature thus suggested by the Court may be found in the records
of the cases at bar. Quite to the contrary, the parties herein have presented
opposing versions in their respective pleadings and memoranda regarding the
matter. And even if We took into account that in Aznar v. Garcia, the Court did
make reference to certain provisions regarding succession in the laws of Texas, the
disparity in the material dates of that case and the present ones would not permit
Us to indulge in the hazardous conjecture that said provisions have not been
amended or changed in the meantime.
On the other hand, in In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156, We
held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Upon to other point — as to whether the will was executed in conformity with the
statutes of the State of Illinois — we note that it does not affirmatively appear
from the transcription of the testimony adduced in the trial court that any witness
was examined with reference to the law of Illinois on the subject of the execution
of will. The trial judge no doubt was satisfied that the will was properly executed
by examining section 1874 of the Revised Statutes of Illinois, as exhibited in
volume 3 of Starr & Curtis’s Annotated Illinois Statutes, 2nd ed., p. 426; and he
may have assumed that he could take judicial notice of the laws of Illinois under
section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If so, he was in our opinion mistaken.
That section authorizes the courts here to take judicial notice, among other things,
of the acts of the legislative department of the United States. These words clearly
have reference to Acts of the Congress of the United States; and we would hesitate
to hold that our courts can, under this provision, take judicial notice of the
multifarious laws of the various American States. Nor do we think that any such
authority can be derived from the broader language, used in the same section,
where it is said that our courts may take judicial notice of matters of public
knowledge "similar" to those therein enumerated. The proper rule we think is to
Page 46 of 100
require proof of the statutes of the States of the American Union whenever their
provisions are determinative of the issues in any action litigated in the Philippine
courts.
Nevertheless, even supposing that the trial court may have erred in taking judicial
notice of the law of Illinois on the point in question, such error is not now available
to the petitioner, first, because the petition does not state any fact from which it
would appear that the law of Illinois is different from what the court found, and,
secondly, because the assignment of error and argument for the appellant in this
court raises no question based or such supposed error. Though the trial court may
have acted upon pure conjecture as to the law prevailing in the State of Illinois, its
judgment could not be set aside, even upon application made within six months
under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, unless it should be made to
appear affirmatively that the conjecture was wrong. The petitioner, it is true,
states in general terms that the will in question is invalid and inadequate to pass
real and personal property in the State of Illinois, but this is merely a conclusion of
law. The affidavits by which the petition is accompanied contain no reference to
the subject, and we are cited to no authority in the appellant’s brief which might
tend to raise a doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion of the trial court. It is
very clear, therefore, that this point cannot be urged as of serious moment."cralaw
virtua1aw library
It is implicit in the above ruling that when, with respect to certain aspects of the
foreign laws concerned, the parties in a given case do not have any controversy or
are more or less in agreement, the Court may take it for granted for the purposes
of the particular case before it that the said laws are as such virtual agreement
indicates, without the need of requiring the presentation of what otherwise would
be the competent evidence on the point. Thus, in the instant cases wherein it
results from the respective contentions of both parties that even if the pertinent
laws of Texas were known and to be applied, the amount of the inheritance
pertaining to the heirs of Mrs. Hodges is as We have fixed above, the absence of
evidence to the effect that, actually and in fact, under said laws, it could be
otherwise is of no longer of any consequence, unless the purpose is to show that it
could be more. In other words, since PCIB, the petitioner-appellant, concedes that
upon application of Article 16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, the
amount of the estate in controversy is just as We have determined it to be, and
respondent-appellee is only claiming, on her part, that it could be more, PCIB may
not now or later pretend differently.
To be more concrete, on pages 20-21 of its petition herein, dated July 31, 1967,
PCIB states categorically:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Inasmuch as Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that ‘intestate and testamentary
successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of

successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the
country wherein said property may be found’, while the law of Texas (the Hodges
spouses being nationals of U.S.A., State of Texas), in its conflicts of law rules,
provides that the domiciliary law (in this case Philippine law) governs the
testamentary dispositions and successional rights over movables or personal
properties, while the law of the situs (in this case also Philippine law with respect
to all Hodges properties located in the Philippines), governs with respect to
immovable properties, and applying therefore the ‘renvoi doctrine’ as enunciated
and applied by this Honorable Court in the case of In re Estate of Christensen (G.R.
No. L-16749, Jan. 31, 1963), there can be no question that Philippine law governs
the testamentary dispositions contained in the Last Will and Testament of the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as the successional rights to her estate, both
with respect to movables, as well as to immovables situated in the
Philippines."cralaw virtua1aw library
In its main brief dated February 26, 1968, PCIB asserts:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The law governing successional rights.
As recited above, there is no question that the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, was
an American citizen. There is also no question that she was a national of the State
of Texas, U.S.A. Again, there is likewise no question that she had her domicile of
choice in the City of Iloilo, Philippines, as this has already been pronounced by the
above cited orders of the lower court, pronouncements which are by now res
adjudicata (par. [a], Sec. 49, Rule 39, Rules of Court; In re Estate of Johnson, 39
Phil. 156).
"Article 16 of the Civil Code provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order
of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity
of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.’
Thus the aforecited provision of the Civil Code points towards the national law of
the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, which is the law of Texas, as governing
succession ‘both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions . . .’. But
Page 47 of 100
the law of Texas, in its conflicts of law rules, provides that the domiciliary law
governs the testamentary dispositions and successional rights over movables or
personal property, while the law of the situs governs with respect to immovable
property. Such that with respect to both movable property, as well as immovable
property situated in the Philippines, the law of Texas points to the law of the
Philippines.
Applying, therefore, the so called "renvoi doctrine", as enunciated and applied by
this Honorable Court in the case of "In re Christensen" (G.R. No. L-16749, Jan. 31,
1963), there can be no question that Philippine law governs the testamentary
provisions in the Last Will and Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as
well as the successional rights to her estate, both with respect to movables, as well
as immovables situated in the Philippines.
The subject of successional rights.
Under Philippine law, as it is under the law of Texas, the conjugal or community
property of the spouses, Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges, upon the
death of the latter, is to be divided into two, one-half pertaining to each of the
spouses, as his or her own property. Thus, upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges,
one-half of the conjugal partnership property immediately pertained to Charles
Newton Hodges as his own share, and not by virtue of any successional rights.
There can be no question about this.
Again, Philippine law, or more specifically, Article 900 of the Civil Code
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-
half of the hereditary estate of the deceased spouse, and the testator may freely
dispose of the other half.
If the marriage between the surviving spouse and the testator was solemnized in
articulo mortis, and the testator died within three months from the time of the
marriage, the legitime of the surviving spouse as the sole heir shall be one-third of
the hereditary estate, except when they have been living as husband and wife for
more than five years. In the latter case, the legitime of the surviving spouse shall
be that specified in the preceding paragraph."cralaw virtua1aw library
This legitime of the surviving spouse cannot be burdened by an fideicommissary
substitution (Art. 864, Civil code), nor by any charge, condition, or substitution
(Art. 872, Civil code). It is clear, therefore, that in addition to one-half of the
conjugal partnership property as his own conjugal share, Charles Newton Hodges
was also immediately entitled to one-half of the half conjugal share of the
deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, or one-fourth of the entire conjugal property, as his

legitime.
One-fourth of the conjugal property therefore remains at issue."cralaw virtua1aw
library
In the summary of its arguments in its memorandum dated April 30, 1968, the
following appears:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Briefly, the position advanced by the petitioner is:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a. That the Hodges spouses were domiciled legally in the Philippines (pp. 19-20,
petition). This is now a matter of res adjudicata (p. 20, petition).
b. That under Philippine law, Texas law, and the renvoi doctrine, Philippine law
governs the successional rights over the properties left by the deceased, Linnie
Jane Hodges (pp. 20-21, petition).
c. That under Philippine as well as Texas law, one-half of the Hodges properties
pertains to the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges (p. 21, petition). This is not
questioned by the respondents.
d. That under Philippine law, the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, automatically
inherited one-half of the remaining one-half of the Hodges properties as his
legitime (p. 21, petition).
e. That the remaining 25% of the Hodges properties was inherited by the
deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, under the will of his deceased spouse (pp. 22-
23, petition). Upon the death of Charles Newton Hodges, the substitution provision
of the will of the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, did not operate because the same is
void (pp. 23-25, petition).
f. That the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, asserted his sole ownership of the
Hodges properties and the probate court sanctioned such assertion (pp. 25-29,
petition). He in fact assumed such ownership and such was the status of the
properties as of the time of his death (pp. 29-34, petition)."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Of similar tenor are the allegations of PCIB in some of its pleadings quoted in the
earlier part of this option.
On her part, it is respondent-appellee Magno’s posture that under the laws of
Texas, there is no system of legitime, hence the estate of Mrs. Hodges should be
one-half of all the conjugal properties.
Page 48 of 100
It is thus unquestionable that as far as PCIB is concerned, the application to these
cases of Article 16 of the Civil Code in relation to the corresponding laws of Texas
would result in that the Philippine laws on succession should control. On that
basis, as We have already explained above, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is the
remainder of one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties, considering that
We have found that there is no legal impediment to the kind of disposition ordered
by Mrs. Hodges in her will in favor of her brothers and sisters and, further, that the
contention of PCIB that the same constitutes an inoperative testamentary
substitution is untenable. As will be recalled, PCIB’s position that there is no such
estate of Mrs. Hodges is predicated exclusively on two propositions, namely (1)
that the provision in question in Mrs. Hodges’ testament violates the rules on
substitution of heirs under the Civil Code and (2) that, in any event, by the orders
of the trial court of May 27, and December 14, 1957, the trial court had already
finally and irrevocably adjudicated to her husband the whole free portion of her
estate to the exclusion of her brothers and sisters, both of which poses, We have
overruled. Nowhere in its pleadings, briefs and memoranda does PCIB maintain
that the application of the laws of Texas would result in the other heirs of Mrs.
Hodges not inheriting anything under her will. And since PCIB’s representations in
regard to the laws of Texas virtually constitute admissions of fact which the other
parties and the Court are being made to rely and act upon, PCIB is "not permitted
to contradict them or subsequently take a position contradictory to or inconsistent
with them." (5 Moran, id, p. 65, citing Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Sta. Ana v.
Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018).
Accordingly, the only question that remains to be settled in the further
proceedings hereby ordered to be held in the court below is how much more than
as fixed above is the estate of Mrs. Hodges, and this would depend on (1) whether
or not the applicable laws of Texas do provide in effect for more, such as, when
there is no legitime provided therein, and (2) whether or not Hodges has validly
waived his whole inheritance from Mrs. Hodges.
In the course of the deliberations, it was brought out by some members of the
Court that to avoid or, at least, minimize further protracted legal controversies
between the respective heirs of the Hodges spouses, it is imperative to elucidate
on the possible consequences of dispositions made by Hodges after the death of
his wife from the mass of the unpartitioned estates without any express indication
in the pertinent documents as to whether his intention is to dispose of part of his
inheritance from his wife or part of his own share of the conjugal estate as well as
of those made by PCIB after the death of Hodges. After a long discussion, the
consensus arrived at was as follows: (1) any such dispositions made gratuitously
in favor of third parties, whether these be individuals, corporations or
foundations, shall be considered as intended to be of properties constituting part
of Hodges’ inheritance from his wife, it appearing from the tenor of his motions of
May 27 and December 11, 1957 that in asking for general authority to make sales

or other disposals of properties under the jurisdiction of the court, which include
his own share of the conjugal estate, he was not invoking particularly his right
over his own share, but rather his right to dispose of any part of his inheritance
pursuant to the will of his wife; (2) as regards sales, exchanges or other
remunerative transfers, the proceeds of such sales or the properties taken in by
virtue of such exchanges, shall be considered as merely the products of "physical
changes" of the properties of her estate which the will expressly authorizes
Hodges to make, provided that whatever of said products should remain with the
estate at the time of the death of Hodges should go to her brothers and sisters; (3)
the dispositions made by PCIB after the death of Hodges must naturally be deemed
as covering only the properties belonging to his estate considering that being only
the administrator of the estate of Hodges, PCIB could not have disposed of
properties belonging to the estate of his wife. Neither could such dispositions be
considered as involving conjugal properties, for the simple reason that the
conjugal partnership automatically ceased when Mrs. Hodges died, and by the
peculiar provision of her will, under discussion, the remainder of her share
descended also automatically upon the death of Hodges to her brothers and
sisters, thus outside of the scope of PCIB’s administration. Accordingly, these
construction of the will of Mrs. Hodges should be adhered to by the trial court in
its final order of adjudication and distribution and/or partition of the two estates
in question.
THE APPEALS
A cursory examination of the seventy-eight assignments of error in appellant
PCIB’s brief would readily reveal that all of them are predicated mainly on the
contention that inasmuch as Hodges had already adjudicated unto himself all the
properties constituting his wife’s share of the conjugal partnership, allegedly with
the sanction of the trial court per its order of December 14, 1957, there has been,
since said date, no longer any estate of Mrs. Hodges of which appellee Magno could
be administratrix, hence the various assailed orders sanctioning her actuations as
such are not in accordance with law. Such being the case, with the foregoing
resolution holding such posture to be untenable in fact and in law and that it is in
the best interest of justice that for the time being the two estates should be
administered conjointly by the respective administrators of the two estates, it
should follow that said assignments of error have lost their fundamental reasons
for being. There are certain matters, however, relating peculiarly to the respective
orders in question, if commonly among some of them, which need further
clarification. For instance, some of them authorized respondent Magno to act alone
or without concurrence of PCIB. And with respect to many of said orders, PCIB
further claims that either the matters involved were not properly within the
probate jurisdiction of the trial court or that the procedure followed was not in
accordance with the rules. Hence, the necessity of dealing separately with the
merits of each of the appeals.
Page 49 of 100
Indeed, inasmuch as the said two estates have until now remained commingled
pro-indiviso, due to the failure of Hodges and the lower court to liquidate the
conjugal partnership, to recognize appellee Magno as Administratrix of the Testate
Estate of Mrs. Hodges which is still unsegregated from that of Hodges is not to say,
without any qualification, that she was therefore authorized to do and perform all
her acts complained of in these appeals, sanctioned though they might have been
by the trial court. As a matter of fact, it is such commingling pro-indiviso of the two
estates that should deprive appellee of freedom to act independently from PCIB, as
administrator of the estate of Hodges, just as, for the same reason, the latter
should not have authority to act independently from her. And considering that the
lower court failed to adhere consistently to this basic point of view, by allowing
the two administrators to act independently of each other, in the various instances
already noted in the narration of facts above, the Court has to look into the
attendant circumstances of each of the appealed orders to be able to determine
whether any of them has to be set aside or they may all be legally maintained
notwithstanding the failure of the court a quo to observe the pertinent procedural
technicalities, to the end only that graver injury to the substantive rights of the
parties concerned and unnecessary and undesirable proliferation of incidents in
the subject proceedings may be forestalled. In other words, We have to determine,
whether or not, in the light of the unusual circumstances extant in the record,
there is need to be more pragmatic and to adopt a rather unorthodox approach, so
as to cause the least disturbance in rights already being exercised by numerous
innocent third parties, even if to do so may not appear to be strictly in accordance
with the letter of the applicable purely adjective rules.
Incidentally, it may be mentioned, at this point, that it was principally on account
of the confusion that might result later from PCIB’s continuing to administer all the
community properties, notwithstanding the certainty of the existence of the
separate estate of Mrs. Hodges, and to enable both estates to function in the
meantime with a relative degree of regularity, that the Court ordered in the
resolution of September 8, 1972 the modification of the injunction issued pursuant
to the resolutions of August 8, October 4 and December 6, 1967, by virtue of which
respondent Magno was completely barred from any participation in the
administration of the properties herein involved. In the September 8 resolution,
We ordered that, pending this decision, Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672 should
proceed jointly and that the respective administrators therein "act conjointly -
none of them to act singly and independently of each other for any purpose." Upon
mature deliberation, We felt that to allow PCIB to continue managing or
administering all the said properties to the exclusion of the administratrix of Mrs.
Hodges’ estate might place the heirs of Hodges at an unduly advantageous position
which could result in considerable, if not irreparable, damage or injury to the
other parties concerned. It is indeed to be regretted that apparently, up to this
date, more than a year after said resolution, the same has not been given due

regard, as may be gleaned from the fact that recently, respondent Magno has filed
in these proceedings a motion to declare PCIB in contempt for alleged failure to
abide therewith, notwithstanding that its repeated motions for reconsideration
thereof have all been denied soon after they were filed. 9
Going back to the appeals, it is perhaps best to begin first with what appears to
Our mind to be the simplest, and then proceed to the more complicated ones in
that order, without regard to the numerical sequence of the assignments of error
in appellant’s brief or to the order of the discussion thereof by counsel.
Assignments of error Numbers
LXXII, LXXVII and LXXVIII.
These assignments of error relate to (1) the order of the trial court of August 6,
1965 providing that "the deeds of sale (therein referred to involving properties in
the name of Hodges) should be signed jointly by the PCIB, as Administrator of
Testate Estate of C.N. Hodges, and Avelina A. Magno, as Administratrix of the
Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, and to this effect, the PCIB should take the
necessary steps so that Administratrix Avelina A. Magno could sign the deeds of
sale," (p. 248, Green Rec. on Appeal) (2) the order of October 27, 1965 denying the
motion for reconsideration of the foregoing order, (pp. 276-277, id.) (3) the other
order also dated October 27, 1965 enjoining inter alia, that" (a) all cash collections
should be deposited in the joint account of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and
estate of C. N. Hodges, (b) that whatever cash collections (that) had been deposited
in the account of either of the estates should be withdrawn and since then (sic)
deposited in the joint account of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and the estate of
C. N. Hodges; . . . (d) (that) Administratrix Magno — allow the PCIB to inspect
whatever records, documents and papers she may have in her possession, in the
same manner that Administrator PCIB is also directed to allow Administratrix
Magno to inspect whatever records, documents and papers it may have in its
possession" and" (e) that the accountant of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges shall
have access to all records of the transactions of both estates for the protection of
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges; and in like manner, the accountant or any
authorized representative of the estate of C. N. Hodges shall have access to the
records of transactions of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate for the protection of the
estate of C. N. Hodges", (pp. 292-295, id.) and (4) the order of February 15, 1966,
denying, among others, the notion for reconsideration of the order of October 27,
1965 last referred to. (pp. 455-456, id.)
As may be readily seen, the thrust of all these four impugned orders is in line with
the Court’s above-mentioned resolution of September 8, 1972 modifying the
injunction previously issued on August 8, 1967, and, more importantly, with what
We have said the trial court should have always done pending the liquidation of
Page 50 of 100
the conjugal partnership of the Hodges spouses. In fact, as already stated, that is
the arrangement We are ordering, by this decision, to be followed. Stated
differently, since the questioned orders provide for joint action by the two
administrators, and that is precisely what We are holding out to have been done
and should be done until the two estates are separated from each other, the said
orders must be affirmed. Accordingly, the foregoing assignments of error must be,
as they are hereby overruled.
Assignments of error Numbers LXVIII
to LXXI and LXXIII to LXXVI.
The orders complained of under these assignments of error commonly deal with
expenditures made by appellee Magno, as Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs.
Hodges, in connection with her administration thereof, albeit additionally,
assignments of error Numbers LXIX to LXXI put into question the payment of
attorneys fees provided for in the contract for the purpose, as constituting, in
effect, premature advances to the heirs of Mrs. Hodges.
More specifically, assignment Number LXXIII refers to reimbursement of overtime
pay paid to six employees of the court and three other persons for services in
copying the court records to enable the lawyers of the administration to be fully
informed of all the incidents in the proceedings. The reimbursement was approved
as proper legal expenses of administration per the order of December 19, 1964,
(pp. 221-222, id.) and repeated motions for reconsideration thereof were denied
by the orders of January 9, 1965, (pp. 231-232, id.) October 27, 1965, (p. 277, id.)
and February 15, 1966, (pp. 455-456, id.) On the other hand, Assignments
Numbers LXVIII to LXXI, LXXIV and LXXV question the trial court’s order of
November 3, 1965 approving the agreement of June 6, 1964 between
Administratrix Magno and James L. Sullivan, attorney-in-fact of the heirs of Mrs.
Hodges, as Parties of the First Part, and Attorneys Raul Manglapus and Rizal R.
Quimpo, as Parties of the Second Part, regarding attorneys fees for said counsel
who had agreed "to prosecute and defend their interests (of the Parties of the First
Part) in certain cases now pending litigation in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
—, more specifically in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672 —", (pp. 126-129, id.)
and directing Administratrix Magno "to issue and sign whatever check or checks
maybe needed to implement the approval of the agreement annexed to the
motion" as well as the "administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges — to
countersign the said check or checks as the case maybe." (pp. 313-320, id.),
reconsideration of which order of approval was denied in the order of February
16, 1966, (p. 456, id.) Assignment Number LXXVI imputes error to the lower
court’s order of October 27,1965, already referred to above, insofar as it orders
that "PCIB should countersign the check in the amount of P250 in favor of
Administratrix Avelina A. Magno as her compensation as administratrix of Linnie

Jane Hodges estate chargeable to the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges only."
(p. 294, id.)
Main contention again of appellant PCIB in regard to these eight assigned errors is
that there is no such estate as the estate of Mrs. Hodges for which the questioned
expenditures were made, hence what were authorized were in effect expenditures
from the estate of Hodges. As We have already demonstrated in Our resolution
above of the petition for certiorari and prohibition, this posture is incorrect.
Indeed, in whichever way the remaining issues between the parties in these cases
are ultimately resolved, 10 the final result will surely be that there are properties
constituting the estate of Mrs. Hodges of which Magno is the current
administratrix. It follows, therefore, that said appellee had the right, as such
administratrix, to hire the persons whom she paid overtime pay and to be paid for
her own services as administratrix. That she has not yet collected and is not
collecting amounts as substantial as that paid to or due appellant PCIB is to her
credit.
Of course, she is also entitled to the services of counsel and to that end had the
authority to enter into contracts for attorney’s fees in the manner she had done in
the agreement of June 6, 1964. And as regards to the reasonableness of the amount
therein stipulated, We see no reason to disturb the discretion exercised by the
probate court in determining the same. We have gone over the agreement, and
considering the obvious size of the estate in question and the nature of the issues
between the parties as well as the professional standing of counsel, We cannot say
that the fees agreed upon require the exercise by the Court of its inherent power
to reduce it.
PCIB insists, however, that said agreement of June 6, 1964 is not for legal services
to the estate but to the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, or, at most, to both of them, and such
being the case, any payment under it, insofar as counsels’ services would redound
to the benefit of the heirs, would be in the nature of advances to such heirs and a
premature distribution of the estate. Again, We hold that such posture cannot
prevail.
Upon the premise We have found plausible that there is an existing estate of Mrs.
Hodges, it results that juridically and factually the interests involved in her estate
are distinct and different from those involved in her estate of Hodges and vice
versa. Insofar as the matters related exclusively to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, PCIB,
as administrator of the estate of Hodges, is a complete stranger and it is without
personality to question the actuations of the administratrix thereof regarding
matters not affecting the estate of Hodges. Actually, considering the obviously
considerable size of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, We see no possible cause for
apprehension that when the two estates are segregated from each other, the
amount of attorney’s fees stipulated in the agreement in question will prejudice
Page 51 of 100
any portion that would correspond to Hodges’ estate. And as regards the other
heirs of Mrs. Hodges who ought to be the ones who should have a say on the
attorney’s fees and other expenses of administration assailed by PCIB, suffice it to
say that they appear to have been duly represented in the agreement itself by their
attorney-in-fact, James L. Sullivan and have not otherwise interposed any
objection to any of the expenses incurred by Magno questioned by PCIB in these
appeals. As a matter of fact, as ordered by the trial court, all the expenses in
question, including the attorney’s fees, amy be paid without awaiting the
determination and segregation of the estate of Mrs. Hodges.
Withal, the weightiest consideration in connection with the point under discussion
is that at this stage of the controversy among the parties herein the vital issue
refers to the existence or non-existence of the estate of Mrs. Hodges. In this
respect, the interest of respondent Magno, as the appointed administratrix of the
said estate, is to maintain that it exists, which is naturally common and identical
with and inseparable from the interest of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges,
Thus it should not be wondered why both Magno and these heirs have seemingly
agreed to retain but one counsel. In fact, such an arrangement should be more
convenient and economical to both. The possibility of conflict of interest between
Magno and the heirs of Mrs. Hodges would be, at this stage, quite remote and, in
any event, rather insubstantial. Besides should any substantial conflict of interest
between them arise in the future, the same would be a matter that the probate
court can very well take care of in the course of the independent proceedings in
Case No. 1307 after the corresponding segregation of the two subject estates. We
cannot perceive any cogent reason why, at this stage the estate and the heirs of
Mrs. Hodges cannot be represented by a common counsel.
Now, as to whether or not the portion of the fees in question that should
correspond to the heirs constitutes premature partial distribution of the estate of
Mrs. Hodges is also a matter in which neither PCIB nor the heirs of Hodges have
any interest. In any event, since, as far as the records show, the estate has no
creditors and the corresponding estate and inheritance taxes, except those of the
brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, have already been paid. 11 no prejudice can
caused to anyone by the comparatively small amount of attorney’s fees although
strictly speaking, the attorney’s fees of the counsel of an administrator is in the
first instance his personal responsibility, reimbursable later on by the estate, in
the final analysis, when, as in the situation on hand, the attorney-in-fact of the
heirs has given his conformity thereto, it would be idle effort to inquire whether or
not the sanction given to said fees by the probate court is proper.
For the foregoing reasons, Assignments of Error LXVIII to LXXI and LXXVI should
be as they are hereby overruled.
Assignments of error I to IV,

XIII to XV, XXII to XXV, XXXV
to XXXVI, XLI to XLIII and L.
These assignments of error deal with the approval by the trial court of various
deeds of sale of real properties registered in the name of Hodges but executed by
appellee Magno, as Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs. Hodges, purportedly in
implementation of corresponding supposed written "Contracts to Sell" previously
executed by Hodges during the interim between May 23, 1957, when his wife died,
and December 25, 1962, the day he died. As stated on pp. 118-120 of appellant’s
main brief, "These are: the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton
Hodges, and the appellee, Pepito G. Iyulores, executed on February 5, 1961; the
contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellant
Esperidion Partisala, executed on April 20, 1960; the contract to sell between the
deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Winifredo C. Espada,
executed on April 18, 1960; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles
Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Rosario Alingasa, executed on August 25, 1958;
the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the
appellee, Lorenzo Carles, executed on June 17, 1958; the contract to sell between
the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Salvador S. Guzman,
executed on September 13, 1960; the contract to sell between the deceased,
Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Florenia Barriod, executed on February
21, 1958; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and
the appellee, Pruficacion Coronado, executed on August 14, 1961; the contract to
sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Graciano
Lucero, executed on November 27, 1961; the contract to sell between the
deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Ariteo Thomas Jamir,
executed on May 26, 1961; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles
Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Belcezar Causing, executed on February 10,
1959; and the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and
the appellee, Adelfa Premaylon, executed on October 31, 1959, re Title No.
13815."cralaw virtua1aw library
Relative to these sales, it is the position of appellant PCIB that, inasmuch as
pursuant to the will of Mrs. Hodges, her husband was to have dominion over all
her estate during his lifetime, it was as absolute owner of the properties
respectively covered by said sales that he executed the aforementioned contracts
to sell, and consequently, upon his death, the implementation of said contracts
may be undertaken only by the administrator of his estate and not by the
administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges. Basically, the same theory is involked
with particular reference to five other sales, in which the respective "contracts to
sell" in favor of these appellees were executed by Hodges before the death of his
wife, namely those in favor of appellee Santiago Pacaonsis, Alfredo Catedral, Jose
Page 52 of 100
Pablico, Western Institute of Technology and Adelfa Premaylon.
Anent those deeds of sale based on promises or contracts to sell executed by
Hodges after the death of his wife, those enumerated in the quotation in the
immediately preceding paragraph, it is quite obvious that PCIB’s contention
cannot be sustained. As already explained earlier, 11* all proceeds of
remunerative transfers or dispositions made by Hodges after the death of his wife
should be deemed as continuing to be parts of her estate and, therefore, subject to
the terms of her will in favor of her brothers and sisters, in the sense that should
there be no showing that such proceeds, whether in cash or property, have been
subsequently conveyed or assigned subsequently by Hodges to any third party by
acts inter vivos, with the result that they could not thereby belong to him anymore
at the time of his death, they automatically became part of the inheritance of said
brothers and sisters. The deeds here in question involve transactions which are
exactly which are exactly of this nature. Consequently, the payments to the estate
of Mrs. Hodges which is to be distributed and partitioned among her heirs
specified in the will.
The five deeds of sale predicated on contracts to sell executed by Hodges during
the lifetime of his wife, present a different situation. At first blush, it would appear
that as to them, PCIB’s position has some degree of plausibility. Considering,
however, that the adoption of PCIB’s theory would necessarily have tremendous
repurcussions and would bring about considerable disturbance of property rights
that have somehow accrued already in favor of innocent third parties, the five
purchasers aforenamed, the Court is inclined to take a pragmatic and practical
view of the legal situation involving them by overlooking the possible
technicalities in the way, the non-observance of which would not, after all, detract
materially from what should substantially correspond to each and all of the parties
concerned.
To start with, these contracts can hardly be ignored. Bona fide third parties are
involved; as much as possible, they should not be made to suffer any prejudice on
account of judicial controversies not of their own making. What is more, the
transactions they rely on were submitted by them to the probate court for
approval, and from already known and recorded actuations of said court then,
they had reason to believe that it had authority to act on their motions, since
appellee Magno had, from time to time prior to their transactions with her, been
allowed to act in her capacity as administratrix of one of the subject estates either
alone or conjointly with PCIB. All the sales in question were executed by Magno in
1966 already, but before that, the court had previously authorized or otherwise
sanctioned expressly many of her acts as administratrix involving expenditures
from the estate made by her either conjoinly with or independently from PCIB, as
Administrator of the Estate of Hodges. Thus, it may be said that said buyers-
appellees merely followed precedents in previous orders of the court. Accordingly,

unless the impugned orders approving those sales indubitably suffer from some
clearly fatal infirmity the Court would rather affirm them.
It is quite apparent from the record that the properties covered by said sales are
equivalent only to a fraction of what should constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges,
even if it is assumed that the same would finally be held to be only one-fourth of
the conjugal properties of the spouses as of the time of her death or, to be more
exact, one-half of her estate as per the inventory submitted by Hodges as executor,
on May 12, 1958. In none of its numerous, varied and voluminous pleadings,
motions and manifestations has PCIB claimed any possibility otherwise. Such
being the case, to avoid any conflict with the heirs of Hodges, the said properties
covered by the questioned deeds of sale executed by appellee Magno may be
treated as among those corresponding to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, which would
have been actually under her control and administration had Hodges complied
with his duty to liquidate the conjugal partnership. Viewing the situation in that
manner, the only ones who could stand to be prejudiced by the appealed orders
referred to in the assignment of errors under discussion and who could, therefore,
have the requisite interest to question them would be only the heirs of Mrs.
Hodges, definitely not PCIB.
It is of no moment in what capacity Hodges made the "contracts to sell’ after the
death of his wife. Even if he had acted as executor of the will of his wife, he did not
have to submit those contracts to the court nor follow the provisions of the rules,
(Sections 2, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9 of Rule 89 quoted by appellant on pp. 125 to 127 of its
brief) for the simple reason that by the very orders, much relied upon by appellant
for other purposes, of May 27, 1957 and December 14, 1957, Hodges was "allowed
or authorized" by the trial court "to continue the business in which he was
engaged and to perform acts which he had been doing while the deceased was
living", (Order of May 27) which according to the motion on which the court acted
was "of buying and selling personal and real properties", and "to execute
subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the
said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes conveyed in the
last will and testament of the latter." (Order of December 14) In other words, if
Hodges acted then as executor, it can be said that he had authority to do so by
virtue of these blanket orders, and PCIB does not question the legality of such
grant of authority; on the contrary, it is relying on the terms of the order itself for
its main contention in these cases. On the other hand, if, as PCIB contends, he acted
as heir-adjudicatee, the authority given to him by the aforementioned orders
would still suffice.
As can be seen, therefore, it is of no moment whether the "contracts to sell" upon
which the deeds in question were based were executed by Hodges before or after
the death of his wife. In a word, We hold, for the reasons already stated, that the
properties covered by the deeds being assailed pertain or should be deemed as
Page 53 of 100
pertaining to the estate of Mrs. Hodges; hence, any supposed irregularity attending
the actuations of the trial court may be invoked only by her heirs, not by PCIB, and
since the said heirs are not objecting, and the defects pointed out not being strictly
jurisdictional in nature, all things considered, particularly the unnecessary
disturbance of rights already created in favor of innocent third parties, it is best
that the impugned orders are not disturbed.
In view of these considerations, We do not find sufficient merit in the assignments
of error under discussion.
Assignments of error V to VIII,
XVI to XVIII, XXVI to XXIX, XXXVII
to XXXVIII, XLIV to XLVI and LI.
All these assignments of error commonly deal with alleged non-fulfillment by the
respective vendees, appellees herein, of the terms and conditions embodied in the
deeds of sale referred to in the assignments of error just discussed. It is claimed
that some of them never made full payments in accordance with the respective
contracts to sell, while in the cases of the others, like Lorenzo Carles, Jose Pablico,
Alfredo Catedral and Salvador S. Guzman, the contracts with them had already
been unilaterally cancelled by PCIB pursuant to automatic rescission clauses
contained in them, in view of the failure of said buyers to pay arrearages long
overdue. But PCIB’s posture is again premised on its assumption that the
properties covered by the deeds in question could not pertain to the estate of Mrs.
Hodges. We have already held above that, it being evident that a considerable
portion of the conjugal properties, much more than the properties covered by said
deeds, would inevitably constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges, to avoid unnecessary
legal complications, it can be assumed that said properties form part of such
estate. From this point of view, it is apparent again that the questions, whether or
not it was proper for appellee Magno to have disregarded the cancellations made
by PCIB, thereby reviving the rights of the respective buyers-appellees, and,
whether or not the rules governing new dispositions of properties of the estate
were strictly followed, may not be raised by PCIB but only by the heirs of Mrs.
Hodges as the persons designated to inherit the same, or perhaps the government
because of the still unpaid inheritance taxes. But, again, since there is no pretense
that any objections were raised by said parties or that they would necessarily be
prejudiced, the contentions of PCIB under the instant assignments of error hardly
merit any consideration.
Assignments of error IX to XII, XIX
to XXI, XXX to XXIV, XXXLX to XL,

XLVII to XLLX, LII and LIII to LXI.
PCIB raises under those assignments of error two issues which according to it are
fundamental, namely: (1) that in approving the deeds executed by Magno pursuant
to contracts to sell already cancelled by it in the performance of its functions as
administrator of the estate of Hodges, the trial court deprived the said estate of the
right to invoke such cancellations it (PCIB) had made and (2) that in so acting, the
court "arrogated unto itself, while acting as a probate court, the power to
determine the contending claims of third parties against the estate of Hodges over
real property," since it has in effect determined whether or not all the terms and
conditions of the respective contracts to sell executed by Hodges in favor of the
buyers-appellees concerned were complied with by the latter. What is worse, in
the view of PCIB, is that the court has taken the word of the appellee Magno, "a
total stranger to his estate as determinative of the issue."
Actually, contrary to the stand of PCIB, it is this last point regarding appellee
Magno’s having agreed to ignore the cancellations made by PCIB and allowed the
buyers-appellees to consummate the sales in their favor that is decisive. Since We
have already held that the properties covered by the contracts in question should
be deemed to be portions of the estate of Mrs. Hodges and not that of Hodges, it is
PCIB that is a complete stranger in these incidents. Considering, therefore, that the
estate of Mrs. Hodges and her heirs who are the real parties in interest having the
right to oppose the consummation of the impugned sales are not objecting, and
that they are the ones who are precisely urging that said sales be sanctioned, the
assignments of error under discussion have no basis and must accordingly be as
they are hereby overruled.
With particular reference to assignments LIII to LXI, assailing the orders of the
trial court requiring PCIB to surrender the respective owner’s duplicate
certificates of title over the properties covered by the sales in question and
otherwise directing the Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel said certificates and to
issue new transfer certificates of title in favor of the buyers-appellees, suffice it to
say that in the light of the above discussion, the trial court was within its rights to
so require and direct, PCIB having refused to give way, by withholding said
owners’ duplicate certificates, of the corresponding registration of the transfers
duly and legally approved by the court.
Assignments of error LXII to LXVII.
All these assignments of error commonly deal with the appeal against orders
favoring appellee Western Institute of Technology. As will be recalled, said
institute is one of the buyers of real property covered by a contract to sell
executed by Hodges prior to the death of his wife. As of October, 1965, it was in
Page 54 of 100
arrears in the total amount of P92,691.00 in the payment of its installments on
account of its purchase, hence it received under date of October 4, 1965 and
October 20, 1965, letters of collection, separately and respectively, from PCIB and
appellee Magno, in their respective capacities as administrators of the distinct
estates of the Hodges spouses, albeit, while in the case of PCIB it made known that
"no other arrangement can be accepted except by paying all your past due
account", on the other hand, Magno merely said she would "appreciate very much
if you can make some remittance to bring this account up-to-date and to reduce
the amount of the obligation." (See pp. 295-311, Green R. on A.) On November 3,
1965, the Institute filed a motion which, after alleging that it was ready and willing
to pay P20,000 on account of its overdue installments but uncertain whether it
should pay PCIB or Magno, it prayed that it be "allowed to deposit the aforesaid
amount with the court pending resolution of the conflicting claims of the
administrators." Acting on this motion, on November 23, 1965, the trial court
issued an order, already quoted in the narration of facts in this opinion, holding
that payment to both or either of the two administrators is "proper and legal", and
so "movant — can pay to both estates or either of them", considering that "in both
cases (Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672) there is as yet no judicial declaration
of heirs nor distribution of properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The arguments under the instant assignments of error revolve around said order.
From the procedural standpoint, it is claimed that PCIB was not served with a copy
of the Institute’s motion, that said motion was heard, considered and resolved on
November 23, 1965, whereas the date set for its hearing was November 20, 1965,
and that what the order grants is different from what is prayed for in the motion.
As to the substantive aspect, it is contended that the matter treated in the motion
is beyond the jurisdiction of the probate court and that the order authorized
payment to a person other than the administrator of the estate of Hodges with
whom the Institute had contracted.
The procedural points urged by appellant deserve scant consideration. We must
assume, absent any clear proof to the contrary, that the lower court had acted
regularly by seeing to it that appellant was duly notified. On the other hand, there
is nothing irregular in the court’s having resolved the motion three days after the
date set for hearing the same. Moreover, the record reveals that appellants’ motion
for reconsideration wherein it raised the same points was denied by the trial court
on March 7, 1966 (p. 462, Green R. on A.). Withal, We are not convinced that the
relief granted is not within the general intent of the Institute’s motion.
Insofar as the substantive issues are concerned, all that need be said at this point
is that they are mere reiterations of contentions WE have already resolved above
adversely to appellants’ position. Incidentally, We may add, perhaps, to erase all
doubts as to the priority of not disturbing the lower court’s orders sanctioning the

sales questioned in all these appeals by PCIB, that it is only when one of the parties
to a contract to convey property executed by a deceased person raises substantial
objections to its being implemented by the executor or administrator of the
decedent’s estate that Section 8 of Rule 89 may not apply and, consequently, the
matter has, to be taken up in a separate action outside of the probate court; but
where, as in the cases of the sales herein involved, the interested parties are in
agreement that the conveyance be made, it is properly within the jurisdiction of
the probate court to give its sanction thereto pursuant to the provision of the rule
just mentioned. And with respect to the supposed automatic rescission clauses
contained in the contracts to sell executed by Hodges in favor of herein appellees,
the effect of said clauses depend on the true nature of the said contracts, despite
the nomenclature appearing therein, which is not controlling, for if they amount to
actual contracts of sale instead of being mere unilateral accepted "promises to
sell", (Art. 1479, Civil Code of the Philippines, 2nd paragraph) the pactum
commissorium or the automatic rescission provision would not operate, as a
matter of public policy, unless there has been a previous notarial or judicial
demand by the seller (10 Manres 263, 2nd ed.), neither of which have been shown
to have been made in connection with the transactions herein involved.
Consequently, We find no merit in the assignments of error Number LXII to LXVII.
SUMMARY
Considering the fact that this decision is unusually extensive and that the issues
herein taken up and resolved are rather numerous and varied, what with
appellant making seventy-eight assignments of error affecting no less than thirty
separate orders of the court a quo, if only to facilitate proper understanding of the
import and extent of our rulings herein contained, it is perhaps desirable that a
brief restatement of the whole situation be made together with our conclusions in
regard to its various factual and legal aspects.
That instant cases refer to the estate left by the late Charles Newton Hodges as
well as that of his wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, who predeceased him by about five
years and a half. In their respective wills which were executed on different
occasions, each one of them provided mutually as follows: "I give, devise and
bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder (after funeral and administration
wherever situated or located, to my beloved (spouse) to have and to hold unto
(him/her) — during (his/her) natural lifetime", subject to the condition that upon
the death of whoever of them survived the other, the remainder of what he or she
would inherit from the other is "give(n), devise(d) and bequeath(ed)" to the
brothers and sisters of the latter.
Mrs. Hodges died first, on May 23, 1957. Four days later, on May 27, Hodges was
appointed special administrator of her estate, and in a separate order of the same
Page 55 of 100
date, he was "allowed or authorized to continue the business in which he was
engaged, (buying and selling personal and real properties) and to perform acts
which he had been doing while the deceased was living." Subsequently, on
December 14, 1957, after Mrs. Hodges’ will had been probated and Hodges had
been appointed and had qualified as Executor thereof, upon his motion in which
he asserted that he was "not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but
also, the successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges",
the trial court ordered that "for the reasons stated in his motion dated December
11, 1957, which the Court considers well taken, . . . all the sales, conveyances,
leases and mortgages of all properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges
executed by the Executor, Charles Newton Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The
said Executor is further authorized to execute subsequent sales, conveyances,
leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges in consonance with the wishes contained in the last will and testament of
the latter."cralaw virtua1aw library
Annually thereafter, Hodges submitted to the court the corresponding statements
of account of his administration, with the particularity that in all his motions, he
always made it a point to urge that "no person interested in the Philippines of the
time and place of examining the herein accounts be given notice, as herein
executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the last
will and testament already probated by the Honorable Court." All said accounts
were invariably approved as prayed for.
Nothing else appears to have been done either by the court a quo or by Hodges
until December 25, 1962. Importantly to be noted, despite the provision in the will
of Mrs. Hodges that her share of the conjugal partnership was to be inherited by
her husband "to have and to hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural
lifetime" and that "at the death of my said husband, I give, devise and bequeath all
the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and personal, wherever
situated or located, to be equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share
and share alike", which provision naturally made it imperative that the conjugal
partnership be promptly liquidated, in order that the "rest, residue and
remainder" of his wife’s share thereof, as of the time of Hodges’ own death, may be
readily known and identified, no such liquidation was ever undertaken. The record
gives no indication of the reason for such omission, although relatedly, it appears
therein:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. That in his annual statement submitted to the court of the net worth of C. N.
Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, Hodges repeatedly and consistently
reported the combined income of the conjugal partnership and then merely
divided the same equally between himself and the estate of the deceased wife, and,
more importantly, he also, as consistently, filed corresponding separate income
tax returns for each calendar year for each resulting half of such combined income,

thus reporting that the estate of Mrs. Hodges had its own income distinct from his
own.
2. That when the court a quo happened to inadvertently omit in its order
probating the will of Mrs. Hodges, the name of one of her brothers, Roy Higdon,
then already deceased, Hodges lost no time in asking for the proper correction "in
order that the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may not think or believe they were
omitted, and that they were really interested in the estate of the deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges."
3. That in his aforementioned motion of December 11, 1957, he expressly stated
that "deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no descendants or ascendants
except brothers and sisters and herein petitioner as the surviving spouse, to
inherit the properties of the decedent", thereby indicating that he was not
excluding his wife’s brothers and sisters from the inheritance.
4. That Hodges allegedly made statements and manifestations to the United States
inheritance tax authorities indicating that he had renounced his inheritance from
his wife in favor of her other heirs, which attitude he is supposed to have
reiterated or ratified in an alleged affidavit subscribed and sworn to here in the
Philippines and in which he even purportedly stated that his reason for so
disclaiming and renouncing his rights under his wife’s will was to "absolve (him)
or (his) estate from any liability for the payment of income taxes on income which
has accrued to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges", his wife, since her death.
On said date, December 25, 1962, Hodges died. The very next day, upon motion of
herein respondent and appellee, Avelina A. Magno, she was appointed by the trial
court as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, in Special
Proceedings No. 1307 and as Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles
Newton Hodges, "in the latter case, because the last will of said Charles Newton
Hodges is still kept in his vault or iron safe and that the real and personal
properties of both spouses may be lost, damaged or go to waste, unless Special
Administratrix is appointed," (Order of December 26, 1962, p. 27, Yellow R. on A.)
although, soon enough, on December 29, 1962, a certain Harold K. Davies was
appointed as her Co-Special Administrator and when Special Proceedings No.
1672, Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, was opened, Joe Hodges, as next
of kin of the deceased, was in due time appointed as Co-Administrator of said
estate together with Atty. Fernando P. Mirasol, to replace Magno and Davies, only
to be in turn replaced eventually by petitioner PCIB alone.
At the outset, the two probate proceedings appear to have been proceeding jointly,
with each administrator acting together with the other, under a sort of modus
operandi. PCIB used to secure at the beginning the conformity to and signature of
Magno in transactions it wanted to enter into and submitted the same to the court
Page 56 of 100
for approval as their joint acts. So did Magno do likewise. Somehow, however,
differences seem to have arisen, for which reason, each of them began acting later
on separately and independently of each other, with apparent sanction of the trial
court. Thus, PCIB had its own lawyers whom it contracted and paid handsomely,
conducted the business of the estate independently of Magno and otherwise acted
as if all the properties appearing in the name of Charles Newton Hodges belonged
solely and only to his estate, to the exclusion of the brothers and sisters of Mrs.
Hodges, without considering whether or not in fact any of said properties
corresponded to the portion of the conjugal partnership pertaining to the estate of
Mrs. Hodges. On the other hand, Magno made her own expenditures, hired her
own lawyers, on the premise that there is such an estate of Mrs. Hodges, and dealt
with some of the properties, appearing in the name of Hodges, on the assumption
that they actually correspond to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. All of these
independent and separate actuations of the two administrators were invariably
approved by the trial court upon submission. Eventually, the differences reached a
point wherein Magno, who was more cognizant than anyone else about the ins and
outs of the businesses and properties of the deceased spouses because of her long
and intimate association with them, made it difficult for PCIB to perform normally
its functions as administrator separately from her. Thus, legal complications arose
and the present judicial controversies came about.
Predicating its position on the tenor of the orders of May 27 and December 14,
1957 as well as the approval by the court a quo of the annual statements of
account of Hodges, PCIB holds to the view that the estate of Mrs. Hodges has
already been in effect closed with the virtual adjudication in the mentioned orders
of her whole estate to Hodges, and that, therefore, Magno had already ceased since
then to have any estate to administer and the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges
have no interests whatsoever in the estate left by Hodges. Mainly upon such
theory, PCIB has come to this Court with a petition for certiorari and prohibition
praying that the lower court’s orders allowing respondent Magno to continue
acting as administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges in Special Proceedings 1307
in the manner she has been doing, as detailed earlier above, to set aside.
Additionally, PCIB maintains that the provision in Mrs. Hodges’ will instituting her
brothers and sisters in the manner therein specified is in the nature of a
testamentary substitution, but inasmuch as the purported substitution is not, in its
view, in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code, it is ineffective
and may not be enforced. It is further contended that, in any event, inasmuch as
the Hodges spouses were both residents of the Philippines, following the decision
of this Court in Aznar v. Garcia, or the case of Christensen, 7 SCRA 95, the estate
left by Mrs. Hodges could not be more than one-half of her share of the conjugal
partnership, notwithstanding the fact that she was a citizen of Texas, U.S.A., in
accordance with Article 16 in relation to Articles 900 and 872 of the Civil Code.
Initially, We issued a preliminary injunction against Magno and allowed PCIB to
act alone.

At the same time, PCIB has appealed several separate orders of the trial court
approving individual acts of appellee Magno in her capacity as administratrix of
the estate of Mrs. Hodges, such as, hiring of lawyers for specified fees and
incurring expenses of administration for different purposes and executing deeds
of sale in favor of her co-appellees covering properties which are still registered in
the name of Hodges, purportedly, pursuant to corresponding "contracts to sell"
executed by Hodges. The said orders are being questioned on jurisdictional and
procedural grounds directly or indirectly predicated on the principal theory of
appellant that all the properties of the two estates belong already to the estate of
Hodges exclusively.
On the other hand, respondent-appellee Magno denies that the trial court’s orders
of May 27 and December 14, 1957 were meant to be finally adjudicatory of the
hereditary rights of Hodges and contends that they were no more than the court’s
general sanction of past and future acts of Hodges as executor of the will of his
wife in due course of administration. As to the point regarding substitution, her
position is that what was given by Mrs. Hodges to her husband under the
provision in question was a lifetime usufruct of her share of the conjugal
partnership, with the naked ownership passing directly to her brothers and
sisters. Anent the application of Article 16 of the Civil Code, she claims that the
applicable law to the will of Mrs. Hodges is that of Texas under which, she alleges,
there is no system of legitime, hence, the estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be less than
her share or one-half of the conjugal partnership properties. She further maintains
that, in any event, Hodges had as a matter of fact and of law renounced his
inheritance from his wife and, therefore, her whole estate passed directly to her
brothers and sisters effective at the latest upon the death of Hodges.
In this decision, for the reasons discussed above, and upon the issues just
summarized, We overrule PCIB’s contention that the orders of May 27, 1957 and
December 14, 1957 amount to an adjudication to Hodges of the estate of his wife,
and We recognize the present existence of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, as consisting
of properties, which, while registered in the name of Hodges, do actually
correspond to the remainder of the share of Mrs. Hodges in the conjugal
partnership, it appearing that pursuant to the pertinent provisions of her will, any
portion of said share still existing and undisposed of by her husband at the time of
his death should go to her brothers and sisters share and share alike. Factually, We
find that the proven circumstances relevant to the said orders do not warrant the
conclusion that the court intended to make thereby such alleged final adjudication.
Legally, We hold that the tenor of said orders furnish no basis for such a
conclusion, and what is more, at the time said orders were issued, the proceedings
had not yet reached the point when a final distribution and adjudication could be
made. Moreover, the interested parties were not duly notified that such
disposition of the estate would be done. At best, therefore, said orders merely
Page 57 of 100
allowed Hodges to dispose portions of his inheritance in advance of final
adjudication, which is implicitly permitted under Section 2 of Rule 109, there
being no possible prejudice to third parties, inasmuch as Mrs. Hodges had no
creditors and all pertinent taxes have been paid.
More specifically, We hold that, on the basis of circumstances presently extant in
the record, and on the assumption that Hodges’ purported renunciation should not
be upheld, the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her brothers and sisters consists
of one-fourth of the community estate of the spouses at the time of her death,
minus whatever Hodges had gratuitously disposed of therefrom during the period
from, May 23, 1957, when she died, to December 25, 1962, when he died provided,
that with regard to remunerative dispositions made by him during the same
period, the proceeds thereof, whether in cash or property, should be deemed as
continuing to be part of his wife’s estate, unless it can be shown that he had
subsequently disposed of them gratuitously.
At this juncture, it may be reiterated that the question of what are the pertinent
laws of Texas and what would be the estate of Mrs. Hodges under them is basically
one of fact, and considering the respective positions of the parties in regard to said
factual issue, it can already be deemed as settled for the purposes of these cases
that, indeed, the free portion of said estate that could possibly descend to her
brothers and sisters by virtue of her will may not be less than one-fourth of the
conjugal estate, it appearing that the difference in the stands of the parties has
reference solely to the legitime of Hodges, PCIB being of the view that under the
laws of Texas, there is such a legitime of one-fourth of said conjugal estate and
Magno contending, on the other hand, that there is none. In other words, hereafter,
whatever might ultimately appear, at the subsequent proceedings, to be actually
the laws of Texas on the matter would no longer be of any consequence, since PCIB
would anyway be in estoppel already to claim that the estate of Mrs. Hodges
should be less than as contended by it now, for admissions by a party related to
the effects of foreign laws, which have to be proven in our courts like any other
controverted fact, create estoppel.
In the process, We overrule PCIB’s contention that the provision in Mrs. Hodges’
will in favor of her brothers and sisters constitutes ineffective hereditary
substitutions. But neither are We sustaining, on the other hand, Magno’s pose that
it gave Hodges only a lifetime usufruct. We hold that by said provision, Mrs.
Hodges simultaneously instituted her brothers and sisters as co-heirs with her
husband, with the condition, however, that the latter would have complete rights
of dominion over the whole estate during his lifetime and what would go to the
former would be only the remainder thereof at the time of Hodges’ death. In other
words, whereas they are not to inherit only in case of default of Hodges, on the
other hand, Hodges was not obliged to preserve anything for them. Clearly then,
the essential elements of testamentary substitution are absent; the provision in

question is a simple case of conditional simultaneous institution of heirs, whereby
the institution of Hodges is subject to a partial resolutory condition the operative
contingency of which is coincidental with that of the suspensive condition of the
institution of his brothers and sisters-in-law, which manner of institution is not
prohibited by law.
We also hold, however, that the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her brothers
and sisters could be more than just stated, but this would depend on (1) whether
upon the proper application of the principle of renvoi in relation to Article 16 of
the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, it will appear that Hodges had no
legitime as contended by Magno, and (2) whether or not it can be held that Hodges
had legally and effectively renounced his inheritance from his wife. Under the
circumstances presently obtaining and in the state of the record of these cases, as
of now, the Court is not in a position to make a final ruling, whether of fact or of
law, on any of these two issues, and We, therefore, reserve said issues for further
proceedings and resolution in the first instance by the court o quo, as hereinabove
indicated. We reiterate, however, that pending such further proceedings, as
matters stand at this stage, Our considered opinion is that it is beyond cavil that
since, under the terms of the will of Mrs. Hodges, her husband could not have
anyway legally adjudicated or caused to be adjudicated to himself her whole share
of their conjugal partnership, albeit he could have disposed any part thereof
during his lifetime, the resulting estate of Mrs. Hodges, of which Magno is the
uncontested administratrix, cannot be less than one-fourth of the conjugal
partnership properties, as of the time of her death, minus what, as explained
earlier, have been gratuitously disposed of therefrom, by Hodges in favor of third
persons since then, for even if it were assumed that, as contended by PCIB, under
Article 16 of the Civil Code and applying renvoi the laws of the Philippines are the
ones ultimately applicable, such one-fourth share would be her free disposable
portion, taking into account already the legitime of her husband under Article 900
of the Civil Code.
The foregoing considerations leave the Court with no alternative than to conclude
that in predicating its orders on the assumption, albeit unexpressed therein, that
there is an estate of Mrs. Hodges to be distributed among her brothers and sisters
and that respondent Magno is the legal administratrix thereof, the trial court acted
correctly and within its jurisdiction. Accordingly, the petition for certiorari and
prohibition has to be denied. The Court feels, however, that pending the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership and the determination of the specific
properties constituting her estate, the two administrators should act conjointly as
ordered in the Court’s resolution of September 8, 1972 and as further clarified in
the dispositive portion of this decision.
Anent the appeals from the orders of the lower court sanctioning payment by
appellee Magno, as administratrix, of expenses of administration and attorney’s
Page 58 of 100
fees, it is obvious that, with our holding that there is such an estate of Mrs. Hodges,
and for the reasons stated in the body of this opinion, the said orders should be
affirmed. This We do on the assumption We find justified by the evidence of
record, and seemingly agreed to by appellant PCIB, that the size and value of the
properties that should correspond to the estate of Mrs. Hodges far exceed the total
of the attorney’s fees and administration expenses in question.
With respect to the appeals from the orders approving transactions made by
appellee Magno, as administratrix, covering properties registered in the name of
Hodges, the details of which are related earlier above, a distinction must be made
between those predicated on contracts to sell executed by Hodges before the
death of his wife, on the one hand, and those premised on contracts to sell entered
into by him after her death. As regards the latter, We hold that inasmuch as the
payments made by appellees constitute proceeds of sales of properties belonging
to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, as may be implied from the tenor of the motions of
May 27 and December 14, 1957, said payments continue to pertain to said estate,
pursuant to her intent obviously reflected in the relevant provisions of her will, on
the assumption that the size and value of the properties to correspond to the
estate of Mrs. Hodges would exceed the total value of all the properties covered by
the impugned deeds of sale, for which reason, said properties may be deemed as
pertaining to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. And there being no showing that thus
viewing the situation, there would be prejudice to anyone, including the
government, the Court also holds that, disregarding procedural technicalities in
favor of a pragmatic and practical approach as discussed above, the assailed
orders should be affirmed. Being a stranger to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, PCIB has
no personality to raise the procedural and jurisdictional issues raised by it. And
inasmuch as it does not appear that any of the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges or the
government has objected to any of the orders under appeal, even as to these
parties, there exists no reason for said orders to be set aside.
DISPOSITIVE PART
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES, judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING the petition in G. R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896, and AFFIRMING, in G.
R. Nos. L-27936-37 and the other thirty-one numbers hereunder ordered to be
added after payment of the corresponding docket fees, all the orders of the trial
court under appeal enumerated in detail on pages 35 to 37 and 80 to 82 of this
decision; the existence of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, with
respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno, as administratrix thereof is recognized,
and it is declared that, until final judgment is ultimately rendered regarding (1)
the manner of applying Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines to the
situation obtaining in these cases and (2) the factual and legal issue of whether or
not Charles Newton Hodges had effectively and legally renounced his inheritance
under the will of Linnie Jane Hodges, the said estate consists of one-fourth of the

community properties of the said spouses, as of the time of the death of the wife
on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the husband had already gratuitously disposed
of in favor of third persons from said date until his death, provided, first, that with
respect to remunerative dispositions, the proceeds thereof shall continue to be
part of the wife’s estate, unless subsequently disposed of gratuitously to third
parties by the husband, and second, that should the purported renunciation be
declared legally effective, no deductions whatsoever are to be made from said
estate; in consequence, the preliminary injunction of August 8, 1967, as amended
on October 4 and December 6, 1967, is lifted, and the resolution of September 8,
1972, directing that petitioner-appellant PCIB, as Administrator of the Testate
Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in Special Proceedings 1672, and respondent-
appellee Avelina A. Magno, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges, in Special Proceedings 1307, should act thenceforth always conjointly,
never independently from each other, as such administrators, is reiterated, and
the same is made part of this judgment and shall continue in force, pending the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership of the deceased spouses and the
determination and segregation from each other of their respective estates,
provided, that upon the finality of this judgment, the trial court should
immediately proceed to the partition of the presently combined estates of the
spouses, to the end that the one-half share thereof of Mrs. Hodges may be properly
and clearly identified; thereafter, the trial court should forthwith segregate the
remainder of the one-fourth herein adjudged to be her estate and cause the same
to be turned over or delivered to respondent for her exclusive administration in
Special Proceedings 1307, while the other one-fourth shall remain under the joint
administration of said respondent and petitioner under a joint proceedings in
Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672, whereas the half unquestionably pertaining to
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 113725               June 29, 2000
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA,1 petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA2 COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA
VILLACARLOS, respondents.
Civil Law; Succession; Wills; Successional rights are transmitted from the
moment of death of the decedent and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by
operation of law.—It is a general rule under the law on succession that
successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and
compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate
children and descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or
widower, are compulsory heirs. Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as
compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by
Page 59 of 100
Hodges shall be administered by petitioner exclusively in Special Proceedings
1672, without prejudice to the resolution by the trial court of the pending motions
for its removal as administrator 12; and this arrangement shall be maintained
until the final resolution of the two issues of renvoi and renunciation hereby
reserved for further hearing and determination, and the corresponding complete
segregation and partition of the two estates in the proportions that may result
from the said resolution.
Generally and in all other respects, the parties and the court a quo are directed to
adhere henceforth, in all their actuations in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672, to
the views passed and ruled upon by the Court in the foregoing opinion.
Appellant PCIB is ordered to pay, within five (5) days from notice hereof, thirty-
one additional appeal docket fees, but this decision shall nevertheless become final
as to each of the parties herein after fifteen (15) days from the respective notices
to them hereof in accordance with the rules.
Costs against petitioner-appellant PCIB.
Zaldivar, Castro, Esguerra and Fernandez, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., concurs on the basis of the procedural pronouncements in the
opinion.
Makasiar, Antonio, Muñ oz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur in the result.
operation of law, without need of further proceedings, and the successional rights
were transmitted to them from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla.
Same; Same; Same; Inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death.—Under Article 776 of the
New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a
person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at
the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form
part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the
Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his
compulsory heirs upon his death.
Same; Same; Same; Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person
or persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first instituted.—Substitution is the
designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir or
heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1)
provide for the designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in

case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be
incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution, or (2) leave his/her property
to one person with the express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to
another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution.
Same; Same; Same; In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the
inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or
renunciation.—In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in
default of the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation. In the
case under consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that
should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation,
the testatrix’s near descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil provides is
that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the
Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix’s
near descendants.
Same; Same; Same; In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly
mandated to preserve the property and to transmit the same later to the second heir;
Without the obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will, there is
no fideicommissary substitution.—In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir
is strictly mandated to preserve the property and to transmit the same later to the
second heir. In the case under consideration, the instituted heir is in fact allowed
under the Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the near
descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a
fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the obligation clearly imposing upon the
first heir the preservation of the property and its transmission to the second heir.
“Without this obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will,
there is no fideicommissary substitution.” Also, the near descendants’ right to
inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The property will only pass to them
should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of
the usufruct to private respondent.
Same; Same; Same; A fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first
heir is not related by first degree to the second heir.—Another important element of
a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here. Under Article 863, the second
heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted must not be
beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A fideicommissary
substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not related by first degree to the
second heir. In the case under scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all related
to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
Same; Same; Same; Distinction between modal institution and conditional
testamentary disposition.—The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in
Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or
a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the, object of the
institution, the purpose or application of the property left by the testator, or the
charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. A “mode” imposes an obligation
upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the
Page 60 of 100
succession. On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the
condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed
the testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate; and the mode obligates
but does not suspend. To some extent, it is similar to a resolutory condition.
Same; Same; Same; In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as
modal and not conditional.—Then too, since testamentary dispositions are
generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir should not be
considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such was
the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered
as modal and not conditional.
Same; Same; Same; In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises
on the face of the Will, the testator’s intention is to be ascertained from the words of
the Will, taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was made.—In
the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as to
the application of any of its provisions, the testator’s intention is to be ascertained
from the words of the Will, taking into consideration the circumstances under
which it was made. Such construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in all its
parts must be adopted.
Same; Same; Same; A Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by
which a person disposes of his property, to take effect after his death.—Suffice it to
state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person
disposes of his property, to take effect after his death. Since the Will expresses the
manner in which a person intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and
desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the subject
of a compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose of
making a Will.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, 3 dated
December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555, which set aside the decision of
Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, and ordered the defendants-
appellees (including herein petitioner), as heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey
title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja
Belleza.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S.
Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of

land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil, which was
duly probated and admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046 before the then Court
of First Instance of Negros Occidental, contained the following provisions:
"FIRST
I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla resident of 141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City:
(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), which is registered in
my name according to the records of the Register of Deeds of
Negros Occidental.
(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the
aforementioned property and the rights which I shall set forth
hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged by the
children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla.
xxx
FOURTH
(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die and
Jorge Rabadilla shall have already received the ownership of the said Lot No. 1392
of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002
(10942), and also at the time that the lease of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the said lot
shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to
give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export
sugar and Twenty Five (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza dies.
FIFTH
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392 of the
Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10492),
shall have the obligation to still give yearly, the sugar as specified in the Fourth
paragraph of his testament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of
December of each year.
SIXTH
Page 61 of 100
I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the event that
the one to whom I have left and bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell, lease,
mortgage this said Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation
to respect and deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to Maria
Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, on each month of December, SEVENTY FIVE (75)
piculs of Export and TWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic, until Maria Marlina
shall die, lastly should the buyer, lessee or the mortgagee of this lot, not have
respected my command in this my addition (Codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela y
Belleza, shall immediately seize this Lot No. 1392 from my heir and the latter's
heirs, and shall turn it over to my near desendants, (sic) and the latter shall then
have the obligation to give the ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until Maria
Marlina shall die. I further command in this my addition (Codicil) that my heir and
his heirs of this Lot No. 1392, that they will obey and follow that should they
decide to sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others than my near
descendants and my sister."4
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his
name.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children
Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 5588, before Branch 52 of the Regional Trial
Court in Bacolod City, against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to
enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the
defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil, in that:
1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and the
Republic Planters Bank in disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction
to sell, lease, or mortgage only to the near descendants and sister of the
testatrix.
2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one
hundred (100) piculs of sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs
domestic sugar) to plaintiff Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza from
sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of the complaint as mandated by the
Codicil, despite repeated demands for compliance.
3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil which
provided that in case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the property, the

buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall likewise have the obligation to deliver
100 piculs of sugar per crop year to herein private respondent.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to
reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the
cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and
the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the surviving heirs of the
late Aleja Belleza.
On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in default but on March
28, 1990 the Order of Default was lifted, with respect to defendant Johnny S.
Rabadilla, who filed his Answer, accordingly.
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:
On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a certain Alan
Azurin, son-in-law of the herein petitioner who was lessee of the property and
acting as attorney-in-fact of defendant-heirs, arrived at an amicable settlement
and entered into a Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation to deliver one
hundred piculs of sugar, to the following effect:
"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry No. 49074 of TCT No.
44489 will be delivered not later than January of 1989, more specifically, to wit:
75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then existing in any of our
names, Mary Rose Rabadilla y Azurin or Alan Azurin, during December of each
sugar crop year, in Azucar Sugar Central; and, this is considered compliance of the
annuity as mentioned, and in the same manner will compliance of the annuity be
in the next succeeding crop years.
That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, 1986-87, and 1987-88, will
be complied in cash equivalent of the number of piculs as mentioned therein and
which is as herein agreed upon, taking into consideration the composite price of
sugar during each sugar crop year, which is in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P105,000.00).
That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on a staggered cash
installment, payable on or before the end of December of every sugar crop year, to
wit:
For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos,
payable on or before December of crop year 1988-89;
Page 62 of 100
For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos,
payable on or before December of crop year 1989-90;
For 1987-88, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos,
payable on or before December of crop year 1990-91; and
For 1988-89, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos,
payable on or before December of crop year 1991-92."5
However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement
except for a partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop
year 1988 -1989.
On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a decision, dismissing the
complaint and disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings, the Court finds that the
action is prematurely filed as no cause of action against the defendants has as yet
arose in favor of plaintiff. While there maybe the non-performance of the
command as mandated exaction from them simply because they are the children
of Jorge Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in question, does not warrant
the filing of the present complaint. The remedy at bar must fall. Incidentally, being
in the category as creditor of the left estate, it is opined that plaintiff may initiate
the intestate proceedings, if only to establish the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla and in
order to give full meaning and semblance to her claim under the Codicil.
In the light of the aforegoing findings, the Complaint being prematurely filed is
DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED."6
On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court; ratiocinating and ordering thus:
"Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellant's right to
receive 100 piculs of sugar annually out of the produce of Lot No. 1392;
defendants-appellee's obligation under Aleja Belleza's codicil, as heirs of the
modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to deliver such amount of sugar to plaintiff-appellant;
defendants-appellee's admitted non-compliance with said obligation since 1985;
and, the punitive consequences enjoined by both the codicil and the Civil Code, of
seizure of Lot No. 1392 and its reversion to the estate of Aleja Belleza in case of
such non-compliance, this Court deems it proper to order the reconveyance of title
over Lot No. 1392 from the estates of Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja Belleza.

However, plaintiff-appellant must institute separate proceedings to re-open Aleja
Belleza's estate, secure the appointment of an administrator, and distribute Lot
No. 1392 to Aleja Belleza's legal heirs in order to enforce her right, reserved to her
by the codicil, to receive her legacy of 100 piculs of sugar per year out of the
produce of Lot No. 1392 until she dies.
Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one entered
ordering defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over
Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
SO ORDERED."7
Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of Appeals, petitioner
found his way to this Court via the present petition, contending that the Court of
Appeals erred in ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of the testatrix
Aleja Belleza on the basis of paragraph 6 of the Codicil, and in ruling that the
testamentary institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a modal institution within the
purview of Article 882 of the New Civil Code.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving the appeal in
accordance with Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions and in
deviating from the sole issue raised which is the absence or prematurity of the
cause of action. Petitioner maintains that Article 882 does not find application as
there was no modal institution and the testatrix intended a mere simple
substitution - i.e. the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to be substituted by
the testatrix's "near descendants" should the obligation to deliver the fruits to
herein private respondent be not complied with. And since the testatrix died single
and without issue, there can be no valid substitution and such testamentary
provision cannot be given any effect.
The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for the
reason that the substituted heirs are not definite, as the substituted heirs are
merely referred to as "near descendants" without a definite identity or reference
as to who are the "near descendants" and therefore, under Articles 843 8 and
8459 of the New Civil Code, the substitution should be deemed as not written.
The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to his supposition that the
Court of Appeals deviated from the issue posed before it, which was the propriety
of the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prematurity of cause of action,
there was no such deviation. The Court of Appeals found that the private
respondent had a cause of action against the petitioner. The disquisition made on
Page 63 of 100
modal institution was, precisely, to stress that the private respondent had a legally
demandable right against the petitioner pursuant to subject Codicil; on which
issue the Court of Appeals ruled in accordance with law.
It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent10 and compulsory heirs are
called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and descendants, in
relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory
heirs.11 Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the
instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law,
without need of further proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted
to them from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property,
rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably,
whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were
transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not
extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the
obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were
likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to
the herein private respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title over the said property, and
they also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot
involved to herein private respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir
reciprocally corresponds to the right of private respondent over the usufruct, the
fulfillment or performance of which is now being demanded by the latter through
the institution of the case at bar. Therefore, private respondent has a cause of
action against petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint
below.
Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal
institutions is not applicable because what the testatrix intended was a
substitution - Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was to be substituted by the testatrix's near
descendants should there be noncompliance with the obligation to deliver the
piculs of sugar to private respondent.
Again, the contention is without merit.
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the
place of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the

testator may either (1) provide for the designation of another heir to whom the
property shall pass in case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce
the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution, 12 or (2)
leave his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be
transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary
substitution.13 The Codicil sued upon contemplates neither of the two.
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first
heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation. 14 In the case under
consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the
testatrix's near descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil provides is
that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the
Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix's
near descendants.
Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point, petitioner is
correct. In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to
preserve the property and to transmit the same later to the second heir.15 In the
case under consideration, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to
alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the
sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a fideicommissary
substitution is lacking; the obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the
preservation of the property and its transmission to the second heir. "Without this
obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will, there is no
fideicommissary substitution."16 Also, the near descendants' right to inherit from
the testatrix is not definite. The property will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of the usufruct to
private respondent.
Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here.
Under Article 863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property is
transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A
fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not related by
first degree to the second heir.17 In the case under scrutiny, the near descendants
are not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
under subject Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article
882 of the New Civil Code is the provision of law in point. Articles 882 and 883 of
the New Civil Code provide:
Page 64 of 100
Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the application of the
property left by the testator, or the charge imposed on him, shall not be
considered as a condition unless it appears that such was his intention.
That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that the
instituted heir or his heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of the
testator and for the return of anything he or they may receive, together with its
fruits and interests, if he or they should disregard this obligation.
Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the
preceding article cannot take effect in the exact manner stated by the testator, it
shall be complied with in a manner most analogous to and in conformity with his
wishes.
The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known
in the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a
modal institution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the
purpose or application of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge
imposed by the testator upon the heir.18 A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the
heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession. 19 On
the other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must
happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator.
The condition suspends but does not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not
suspend.20 To some extent, it is similar to a resolutory condition. 21
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that
the testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It
is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said
instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of
sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the
lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's
inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the
performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be
not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near
descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil
is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir
without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.
Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an
obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it
clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In
case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not conditional. 22

Neither is there tenability in the other contention of petitioner that the private
respondent has only a right of usufruct but not the right to seize the property itself
from the instituted heir because the right to seize was expressly limited to
violations by the buyer, lessee or mortgagee.
In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as
to the application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be
ascertained from the words of the Will, taking into consideration the
circumstances under which it was made.23 Such construction as will sustain and
uphold the Will in all its parts must be adopted.24
Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver One
Hundred (100) piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation
is imposed on the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer,
lessee, or mortgagee should they sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise negotiate the
property involved. The Codicil further provides that in the event that the
obligation to deliver the sugar is not respected, Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall
seize the property and turn it over to the testatrix's near descendants. The non-
performance of the said obligation is thus with the sanction of seizure of the
property and reversion thereof to the testatrix's near descendants. Since the said
obligation is clearly imposed by the testatrix, not only on the instituted heir but
also on his successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed by the testatrix in case of
non-fulfillment of said obligation should equally apply to the instituted heir and
his successors-in-interest.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40789 February 27, 1987
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C. ROSALES, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX ROSALES
and ANTONIO ROSALES, respondents.
Jose B. Echaves for petitioner.
Page 65 of 100
Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by virtue of the amicable
settlement, the said obligation imposed by the Codicil has been assumed by the
lessee, and whatever obligation petitioner had become the obligation of the lessee;
that petitioner is deemed to have made a substantial and constructive compliance
of his obligation through the consummated settlement between the lessee and the
private respondent, and having consummated a settlement with the petitioner, the
recourse of the private respondent is the fulfillment of the obligation under the
amicable settlement and not the seizure of subject property.
Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which
a person disposes of his property, to take effect after his death. 25 Since the Will
expresses the manner in which a person intends how his properties be disposed,
the wishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot
be the subject of a compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very
purpose of making a Will.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555 AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs
SO ORDERED.
Melo, J., (Chairman), concur in the separate opinion of Justice Vitug.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Panganiban, J., join the separate opinion of Justice Vitug.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., no part.
Jose A. Binghay and Paul G. Gorres for respondents.
Civil Law; Succession; A surviving spouse is not an intestate heir of his or her
parent-in-law.—There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow
(surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire code is
devoid of any provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in-law
either by her own right or by the right of representation. The provisions of the
Code which relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014)
enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the
State as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of a provision which
makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the deceased all the more confirms
our observation. If the legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an
intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code.
Same; Same; Neither is a widow (surviving spouse) a compulsory heir of her
parent-in-law in accordance with the provisions of Article 887 of the Civil Code.—
The aforesaid provision of law refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which

case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not
apply to the estate of a parent in law. Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a
third person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law. We had occasion to make
this observation in Lachenal v. Salas, 71 SCRA 262; 265, L-42257, June 14, 1976, to
wit: "We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil Case
No. 3597 (not in the intestate proceeding) because it affects the lessee thereof,
Lope L. Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-law, who, although married to his daughter
or compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person with respect to his estate. x x x."
GANCAYCO, J.:
In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
the question raised is whether the widow whose husband predeceased his mother
can inherit from the latter, her mother-in-law.
It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V.
Rosales, a resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived by her husband
Fortunate T. Rosales and their two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio
Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a child,
Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The
estate of the dismissed has an estimated gross value of about Thirty Thousand
Pesos (P30,000.00).
On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The
case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3204-R. Thereafter, the trial court
appointed Magna Rosales Acebes administratrix of the said estate.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated
June 16, 1972 declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the deceased
and prescribing their respective share of the estate —
Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes
(daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales
son, 1/4.
This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated February 4,
1975.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the
estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of
the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together
with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.
Page 66 of 100
Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned Orders.
The trial court denied her plea. Hence this petition.
In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution petition. First —
is a widow (surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law? Second —
are the Orders of the trial court which excluded the widow from getting a share of
the estate in question final as against the said widow?
Our answer to the first question is in the negative.
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who
inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of
representation. 1 Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit either by his own
right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for in the Civil Code, 2 or by
the right of representation provided for in Article 981 of the same law. The
relevant provisions of the Civil Code are:
Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from
him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of
other children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in
their own right, and the latter by right of representation.
Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag inherit
by right of representation, and if any one of them should have
died, leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be
divided among the latter in equal portions.
Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate
children or their descendants and illegitimate children or their
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or
widower shall be entitled to the same share as that of a legitimate
child.
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving
spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any
provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in- law either by her own
right or by the right of representation. The provisions of the Code which relate to
the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with
meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final
intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-
law an intestate heir of the deceased all the more confirms Our observation. If the

legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-
in-law, it would have so provided in the Code.
Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions
of Article 887 of the Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their
legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants,
with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal
fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287;
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded
by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly
proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes
mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the
extent established by this Code.
The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in
which case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does
not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of
the parent-in-law. We had occasion to make this observation in Lachenal v.
Salas, 4 to Wit:
We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in
Civil Case No. 3597 (not in the intestate proceeding) because it
affects the lessee thereof, Lope L. Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-
Page 67 of 100
law, who, although married to his daughter or compulsory heir, is
nevertheless a third person with respect to his estate. ... (Emphasis
supplied).
By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited does
not support petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said Article confirms
that the estate contemplated therein is the estate of the deceased spouse. The
estate which is the subject matter of the intestate estate proceedings in this case is
that of the deceased Petra V. Rosales, the mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from
the estate of Petra V. Rosales that Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the
inheritance by the right of representation as provided by Article 981 of the Code.
The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles 970
and 971 of the Civil Code, viz —
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by
virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the
degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which
the latter would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law
and not by the person represented. The representative does not
succeed the person represented but the one whom the person
represented would have succeeded. (Emphasis supplied.)
Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession by
law because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio
Rosales (the person represented) who predeceased his grandmother, Petra
Rosales, but the latter whom his father would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot
assert the same right of representation as she has no filiation by blood with her
mother-in-law.
Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio
Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales
as compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of her husband was extinguished
by his death that is why it is their son Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from
Petra Rosales by right of representation. He did not succeed from his deceased
father, Carterio Rosales.
On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it unnecessary
to pass upon the second question posed by the petitioner.

Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving spouse
is not an intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit, with costs against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded to the trial-
court for further proceedings.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
 
G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972
CARMEN LAPUZ SY, represented by her substitute MACARIO
LAPUZ, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY, respondent-appellee.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner-appellant.
D. G. Eufemio for respondent-appellee.
Persons and family relations:  Legal separation; Action abated by death of one
of the spouses before final decree.—An action for legal separation which involves
nothing more than bed-and-board separation of the spouses is purely personal.
The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only
the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article
108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the
proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being
personal in character, it follows that the death of the action itself—actio personalis
moritur cum persona.
Same; Same; Same; Even if action involves property rights; Article 106 of the
Civil Code explained.—A review of the result ing changes in property relations
between spouses shows that they are solely the effect of the decree of legal
separation: hence, they can not survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to
the decree. Article 107 makes it apparent that
178
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Page 68 of 100
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Sarmiento, JJ.,
concur.
Lapuz vs. Eufemio
the right to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains (or of the
absolute community of property ), the loss of right by the offending spouse to any
share of the profits earned by the partnership or community , or his
disqualification to inherit by intestacy from the innocent spouse as well as the
revocation of testamentary provisions in favor of the offending spouse made by
the innocent one, are all rights and disabilities that, by the very terms if the Civil
Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and by their
nature and intent, such claims and disabilities are difficult to conceive as
assignable or transmissible.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Nature of property rights.—These rights are mere
effects of a decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the
decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a
decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during
the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more
radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims
would necessarily remain unborn.
Same; Declaration of nullity of marriage; Effect of death of one of the spouses.
—Such action became moot and academic upon the death of one of the spouses,
and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise,
that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired
by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines could
be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the surviving
spouse or by the heirs of the deceased spouse.
Remedial law; Substitution of the deceased party in an action for legal
separation involving property rights.—A claim to the rights provided for by Article
106 of the Civil Code is not a claim that “is not thereby extinguished” after a party
dies, under Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, to warrant a continuation of
the action through a substitute of the deceased party. The same result flows from a
consideration of the enumeration of the actions that survive for or against
administrators in Section 1, Rule 87, of the Revised Rules of Court, Neither actions
for legal separation or for annulment of marriage can be deemed fairly included in
the enumeration.
REYES J.B.L., J.:p

Petition, filed after the effectivity of Republic Act 5440, for review by certiorari of
an order, dated 29 July 1969, of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Manila, in its Civil Case No. 20387, dismissing said case for legal separation on the
ground that the death of the therein plaintiff, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, which occurred
during the pendency of the case, abated the cause of action as well as the action
itself. The dismissal order was issued over the objection of Macario Lapuz, the heir
of the deceased plaintiff (and petitioner herein) who sought to substitute the
deceased and to have the case prosecuted to final judgment.
On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against
Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging, in the main, that they were married civilly on 21
September 1934 and canonically on 30 September 1934; that they had lived
together as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when her husband
abandoned her; that they had no child; that they acquired properties during their
marriage; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman
named Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa Street, Manila, on or about March 1949. She prayed
for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which, among others, would order
that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the
conjugal partnership profits.
In his second amended answer to the petition, herein respondent Eufemio S.
Eufemio alleged affirmative and special defenses, and, along with several other
claims involving money and other properties, counter-claimed for the declaration
of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his
prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and customs,
with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok.
Issues having been joined, trial proceeded and the parties adduced their
respective evidence. But before the trial could be completed (the respondent was
already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence on 9 and 18 June 1969),
petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular accident on 31 May 1969.
Counsel for petitioner duly notified the court of her death.
On 9 June 1969, respondent Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for legal
separation"1 on two (2) grounds, namely: that the petition for legal separation was
filed beyond the one-year period provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code; and
that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation.
On 26 June 1969, counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the
deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. Counsel for Eufemio opposed the
motion.
Page 69 of 100
On 29 July 1969, the court issued the order under review, dismissing the case. 2 In
the body of the order, the court stated that the motion to dismiss and the motion
for substitution had to be resolved on the question of whether or not the plaintiff's
cause of action has survived, which the court resolved in the negative. Petitioner's
moved to reconsider but the motion was denied on 15 September 1969.
After first securing an extension of time to file a petition for review of the order of
dismissal issued by the juvenile and domestic relations court, the petitioner filed
the present petition on 14 October 1969. The same was given due course and
answer thereto was filed by respondent, who prayed for the affirmance of the said
order.3
Although the defendant below, the herein respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio, filed
counterclaims, he did not pursue them after the court below dismissed the case.
He acquiesced in the dismissal of said counterclaims by praying for the affirmance
of the order that dismissed not only the petition for legal separation but also his
counterclaim to declare the Eufemio-Lapuz marriage to be null and void ab initio.
But petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy (through her self-assumed substitute — for the
lower court did not act on the motion for substitution) stated the principal issue to
be as follows:
When an action for legal separation is converted by the
counterclaim into one for a declaration of nullity of a marriage,
does the death of a party abate the proceedings?
The issue as framed by petitioner injects into it a supposed conversion of a legal
separation suit to one for declaration of nullity of a marriage, which is without
basis, for even petitioner asserted that "the respondent has acquiesced to the
dismissal of his counterclaim" (Petitioner's Brief, page 22). Not only this. The
petition for legal separation and the counterclaim to declare the nullity of the self
same marriage can stand independent and separate adjudication. They are not
inseparable nor was the action for legal separation converted into one for a
declaration of nullity by the counterclaim, for legal separation pre-supposes a
valid marriage, while the petition for nullity has a voidable marriage as a pre-
condition.
The first real issue in this case is: Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree,
in an action for legal separation, abate the action? If it does, will abatement also
apply if the action involves property rights? .
An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-
board separation of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this

jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in
its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim
legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their
reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal
separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death
of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself — actio personalis
moritur cum persona.
... When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for divorce,
because the marriage is dissolved. The heirs cannot even
continue the suit, if the death of the spouse takes place during the
course of the suit (Article 244, Section 3). The action is absolutely
dead (Cass., July 27, 1871, D. 71. 1. 81; Cass. req., May 8, 1933, D.
H. 1933, 332.")4 .
Marriage is a personal relation or status, created under the
sanction of law, and an action for divorce is a proceeding brought
for the purpose of effecting a dissolution of that relation. The
action is one of a personal nature. In the absence of a statute to
the contrary, the death of one of the parties to such action abates
the action, for the reason that death has settled the question of
separation beyond all controversy and deprived the court of
jurisdiction, both over the persons of the parties to the action and
of the subject-matter of the action itself. For this reason the
courts are almost unanimous in holding that the death of either
party to a divorce proceeding, before final decree, abates the
action. 1 Corpus Juris, 208; Wren v. Moss, 2 Gilman, 72; Danforth
v. Danforth, 111 Ill. 236; Matter of Grandall, 196 N.Y. 127, 89 N.E.
578; 134 Am St. Rep. 830; 17 Ann. Cas. 874; Wilcon v. Wilson, 73
Mich, 620, 41 N.W. 817; Strickland v. Strickland, 80 Ark. 452, 97 S.
W. 659; McCurley v. McCurley, 60 Md. 185, 45 Am. Rep. 717;
Begbie v. Begbie, 128 Cal. 155, 60 Pac. 667, 49 L.R.A. 141. 5
The same rule is true of causes of action and suits for separation and maintenance
(Johnson vs. Bates, Ark. 101 SW 412; 1 Corpus Juris 208).
A review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses shows
that they are solely the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they can not
survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree. On the point,
Article 106 of the Civil Code provides: .
Art. 106. The decree of legal separation shall have the following
effects:
Page 70 of 100
(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each
other, but the marriage bonds shall not be severed; .
(2) The conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute conjugal
community of property shall be dissolved and liquidated, but the
offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the profits
earned by the partnership or community, without prejudice to
the provisions of article 176;
(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the
innocent spouse, unless otherwise directed by the court in the
interest of said minors, for whom said court may appoint a
guardian;
(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting
from the innocent spouse by intestate succession. Moreover,
provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the
innocent one shall be revoked by operation of law.
From this article it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains (or of the absolute community of property), the loss of right
by the offending spouse to any share of the profits earned by the partnership or
community, or his disqualification to inherit by intestacy from the innocent spouse
as well as the revocation of testamentary provisions in favor of the offending
spouse made by the innocent one, are all rights and disabilities that, by the very
terms of the Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses;
and by their nature and intent, such claims and disabilities are difficult to conceive
as assignable or transmissible. Hence, a claim to said rights is not a claim that "is
not thereby extinguished" after a party dies, under Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules
of Court, to warrant continuation of the action through a substitute of the
deceased party.
Sec. 17. Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice,
the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be
substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days,
or within such time as may be granted...
The same result flows from a consideration of the enumeration of the actions that
survive for or against administrators in Section 1, Rule 87, of the Revised Rules of
Court:

SECTION 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought
against executor or administrator. No action upon a claim for the
recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be
commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to
recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the
estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover
damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal,
may be commenced against him.
Neither actions for legal separation or for annulment of marriage can be deemed
fairly included in the enumeration..
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the
plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects
of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree
such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these
claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency
of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and
definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would
necessarily remain unborn.
As to the petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio for a declaration of nullity ab
initio of his marriage to Carmen Lapuz, it is apparent that such action became
moot and academic upon the death of the latter, and there could be no further
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 82233 March 22, 1990
JOSE BARITUA and EDGAR BITANCOR, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, NICOLAS NACARIO and VICTORIA RONDA
NACARIO, respondents.
Domingo Lucenario for petitioners.
Page 71 of 100
interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the
questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of
Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined
in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the
appellant.
In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable
under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the second marriage had
been contracted with the first wife having been an absentee for seven consecutive
years, or when she had been generally believed dead, still the action for annulment
became extinguished as soon as one of the three persons involved had died, as
provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the action for
annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties
involved. And furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might
have resulted from such voidable marriage must be carried out "in the testate or
intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse", as expressly provided in Section 2
of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the Manila Court of Juvenile and
Domestic Relations is hereby affirmed. No special pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Ernesto A. Atienza for private respondents.
Civil Law; Succession; Surviving Spouse; Mere estrangement is not a legal
ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased
spouse.—It is patently clear that the parents of the deceased succeed only when
the latter dies without a legitimate descendant. On the other hand, the surviving
spouse concurs with all classes of heirs. As it has been established that Bienvenido
was married to Alicia and that they begot a child, the private respondents are not
successors-in-interest of Bienvenido; they are not compulsory heirs. The
petitioners therefore acted correctly in settling their obligation with Alicia as the
widow of Bienvenido and as the natural guardian of their lone child. This is so
even if Alicia had been estranged from Bienvenido. Mere estrangement is not a
legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the
deceased spouse.
Same; Same; Same; The purchase price of the damaged tricycle loaned to
Bienvenido (private respondents’ deceased son) and the latter’s funeral expenses
shouldered by private respondents are not liabilities of petitioners. They are but
money claims against the estate of private respondents’ deceased son.—Neither

could the private respondents, as alleged creditors of Bienvenido, seek relief and
compensation from the petitioners. While it may be true that the private
respondents loaned to Bienvenido the purchase price of the damaged tricycle and
shouldered the expenses for his funeral, the said purchase price and expenses are
but money claims against the estate of their deceased son. These money claims are
not the liabilities of the petitioners who, as we have said, had been released by the
agreement of the extra-judicial settlement they concluded with Alicia Baracena
Vda. de Nacario, the victim’s widow and heir, as well as the natural guardian of
their child, her co-heir. As a matter of fact, she executed a “Release Of Claim” in
favor of the petitioners.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails as erroneous and contrary to existing
relevant laws and applicable jurisprudence the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
dated December 11, 1987 which reversed and set aside that of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch XXXII, at Pili, Camarines Sur. 2 The challenged decision adjudged the
petitioners liable to the private respondents in the total amount of P20,505.00 and
for costs.
The facts are as follows:
In the evening of November 7, 1979, the tricycle then being driven by Bienvenido
Nacario along the national highway at Barangay San Cayetano, in Baao, Camarines
Sur, figured in an accident with JB Bus No. 80 driven by petitioner Edgar Bitancor
and owned and operated by petitioner Jose Baritua. 3 As a result of that accident
Bienvenido and his passenger died 4 and the tricycle was damaged. 5 No criminal
case arising from the incident was ever instituted. 6
Subsequently, on March 27, 1980, as a consequence of the extra-judicial
settlement of the matter negotiated by the petitioners and the bus insurer —
Philippine First Insurance Company, Incorporated (PFICI for brevity) —
Bienvenido Nacario's widow, Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario, received
P18,500.00. In consideration of the amount she received, Alicia executed on March
27, 1980 a "Release of Claim" in favor of the petitioners and PFICI, releasing and
forever discharging them from all actions, claims, and demands arising from the
accident which resulted in her husband's death and the damage to the tricycle
which the deceased was then driving. Alicia likewise executed an affidavit of
desistance in which she formally manifested her lack of interest in instituting any
case, either civil or criminal, against the petitioners. 7
On September 2, 1981, or about one year and ten months from the date of the
accident on November 7, 1979, the private respondents, who are the parents of
Page 72 of 100
Bienvenido Nacario, filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners with the
then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. 8 In their complaint, the private
respondents alleged that during the vigil for their deceased son, the petitioners
through their representatives promised them (the private respondents) that as
extra-judicial settlement, they shall be indemnified for the death of their son, for
the funeral expenses incurred by reason thereof, and for the damage for the
tricycle the purchase price of which they (the private respondents) only loaned to
the victim. The petitioners, however, reneged on their promise and instead
negotiated and settled their obligations with the long-estranged wife of their late
son. The Nacario spouses prayed that the defendants, petitioners herein, be
ordered to indemnify them in the amount of P25,000.00 for the death of their son
Bienvenido, P10,000.00 for the damaged tricycle, P25,000.00 for compensatory
and exemplary damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, and for moral damages. 9
After trial, the court a quo dismissed the complaint, holding that the payment by
the defendants (herein petitioners) to the widow and her child, who are the
preferred heirs and successors-in-interest of the deceased Bienvenido to the
exclusion of his parents, the plaintiffs (herein private respondents), extinguished
any claim against the defendants (petitioners). 10
The parents appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the judgment of the
trial court. The appellate court ruled that the release executed by Alicia Baracena
Vda. de Nacario did not discharge the liability of the petitioners because the case
was instituted by the private respondents in their own capacity and not as "heirs,
representatives, successors, and assigns" of Alicia; and Alicia could not have
validly waived the damages being prayed for (by the private respondents) since
she was not the one who suffered these damages arising from the death of their
son. Furthermore, the appellate court said that the petitioners "failed to rebut the
testimony of the appellants (private respondents) that they were the ones who
bought the tricycle that was damaged in the incident. Appellants had the burden of
proof of such fact, and they did establish such fact in their testimony . . . 11 Anent
the funeral expenses, "(T)he expenses for the funeral were likewise shouldered by
the appellants (the private respondents). This was never contradicted by the
appellees (petitioners). . . . Payment (for these) were made by the appellants,
therefore, the reimbursement must accrue in their favor. 12
Consequently, the respondent appellate court ordered the petitioners to pay the
private respondents P10,000.00 for the damage of the tricycle, P5,000.00 for
"complete" funeral services, P450.00 for cemetery lot, P55.00 for oracion adulto,
and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees. 13 The petitioners moved for
a reconsideration of the appellate court's decision 14 but their motion was
denied. 15 Hence, this petition.

The issue here is whether or not the respondent appellate court erred in holding
that the petitioners are still liable to pay the private respondents the aggregate
amount of P20,505.00 despite the agreement of extrajudicial settlement between
the petitioners and the victim's compulsory heirs.
The petition is meritorious.
Obligations are extinguished by various modes among them being by payment.
Article 1231 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
Art. 1231. Obligations are extinguished:
(1) By payment or performance;
(2) By the loss of the thing due;
(3) By the condonation or remission of the debt;
(4) By the confusion or merger of the rights of creditor and
debtor;
(5) By compensation;
(6) By novation.
(Emphasis ours.)
There is no denying that the petitioners had paid their obligation petition arising
from the accident that occurred on November 7, 1979. The only question now is
whether or not Alicia, the spouse and the one who received the petitioners'
payment, is entitled to it.
Article 1240 of the Civil Code of the Philippines enumerates the persons to whom
payment to extinguish an obligation should be made.
Art 1240. Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the
obligation has been constituted, or his successor in interest, or
any person authorized to receive it.
Certainly there can be no question that Alicia and her son with the deceased are
the successors in interest referred to in law as the persons authorized to receive
payment. The Civil Code states:
Page 73 of 100
Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
1. Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their
legitimate parents and ascendants;
2. In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants
with respect to their legitimate children and decendants;
3. The widow or widower;
4. Acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal
fiction;
5. Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded
by those in Nos. 1 and 2. Neither do they exclude one another.
(Emphasis ours.)
Article 985. In default of legitimate children and descendants of
the deceased, his parents and ascendants shall inherit from him,
to the exclusion of collateral relatives.
(Emphasis ours.)
It is patently clear that the parents of the deceased succeed only when the latter
dies without a legitimate descendant. On the other hand, the surviving spouse
concurs with all classes of heirs. As it has been established that Bienvenido was
married to Alicia and that they begot a child, the private respondents are not
successors-in-interest of Bienvenido; they are not compulsory heirs. The
petitioners therefore acted correctly in settling their obligation with Alicia as the
widow of Bienvenido and as the natural guardian of their lone child. This is so
even if Alicia had been estranged from Bienvenido. Mere estrangement is not a
legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the
deceased spouse.
Neither could the private respondents, as alleged creditors of Bienvenido, seek
relief and compensation from the petitioners. While it may be true that the private
respondents loaned to Bienvenido the purchase price of the damaged tricycle and
shouldered the expenses for his funeral, the said purchase price and expenses are
but money claims against the estate of their deceased son. 16 These money claims
are not the liabilities of the petitioners who, as we have said, had been released by

the agreement of the extra-judicial settlement they concluded with Alicia Baracena
Vda. de Nacario, the victim's widow and heir, as well as the natural guardian of
their child, her co-heir. As a matter of fact, she executed a "Release Of Claim" in
favor of the petitioners.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
 
G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990
CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCORDIA JAVELLANA
VILLANUEVA, respondents.
Rex Suiza Castillon for petitioner.
Salas & Villareal for private respondent.
Special Proceedings;  Settlement of Estate; Courts; Jurisdiction; Trial court has
no jurisdiction to entertain an action for partition and recovery of properties
belonging to the estate of a deceased person, while the probate proceedings for the
settlement of said estate are still pending in another branch of the same court. —
After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the petitioner’s contention
that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia
Villanueva’s action for partition and recovery of her share of the estate of Esteban
Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings (Spl. Proc. No. 2540) for the settlement
of said estate are still pending in Branch 23 of the same court, there being as yet no
orders for the submission and approval of the administratrix’s inventory and
accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and terminating the
proceedings (p. 31, Record) x x x In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid
confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedent’s estate, a court should not
interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal court. Thus, did we rule
in Guilas v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, L-26695, January 31,
Page 74 of 100
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby
REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
1972, 43 SCRA 111, 117, where a daughter filed a separate action to annul a project
of partition executed between her and her father in the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of her mother: “The probate court loses jurisdiction of an
estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts and the
remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of
the approval of the project of partition by itself alone does not terminate the
probate proceeding (Timbol v. Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276, L-15445, April 29, 1961;
Siguiong v. Tecson, 89 Phil. pp. 28, 30). As long as the order of the distribution of
the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed
closed and terminated (Siguiong v. Tecson, supra); because a judicial partition is
not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heirs from bringing an action to
obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefore has not elapsed (Mari
v. Bonilla, 83 Phil. 137). The better practice, however, for the heir who has not
received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same
probate or administration proceedings, or for reopening of the probate or
administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an
independent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which may
thus reverse a decision or order of the probate or intestate court already final and
executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of.” (Ramos
v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol v. Cano, supra; Jingco v. Daluz, L-5107,
April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic v. Agustines, L-14710, March 29,
1960, 107 Phil. 455, 460-461; Italics supplied)
Same; Same; Probate proceedings are proceedings in rem, publication of the
notice of the proceedings is constructive notice to the whole world.—The probate
proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice of the time and place of hearing of the
petition is required to be published (Sec. 3, Rule 76 in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 79,
Rules of Court). Notice of the hearing of Celedonia’s original petition was
published in the “Visayan Tribune” on April 25, May 2 and 9, 1977 (Exh. 4, p. 197,
Record). Similarly, notice of the hearing of her amended petition of May 26, 1977
for the settlement of the estate was, by order of the court, published in “Bagong
Kasanag” (New Light) issues of May 27, June 3 and 10, 1977 (pp. 182-305, Record).
The publication of the notice of the proceedings was constructive notice to the
whole world. Concordia was not deprived of her right to intervene in the
proceedings for she had actual, as well as constructive notice of the same.
Same; Same; Same; Annulment of judgment; Extrinsic fraud; Failure to
disclose to the adverse party, or to the court, matters which will defeat one’s own

claim or defense does not constitute extrinsic fraud that will justify vacation of
judgment.—Celedonia’s allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir of
Esteban within the third degree on his mother’s side was not false. Moreover, it
was made in good faith and in the honest belief that because the properties of
Esteban had come from his mother, not his father, she, as Esteban’s nearest
surviving relative on his mother’s side, is the rightful heir to them. It would have
been self-defeating and inconsistent with her claim of sole heirship if she stated in
her petition that Concordia was her co-heir. Her omission to so state did not
constitute extrinsic fraud. “Failure to disclose to the adversary, or to the court,
matters which would defeat one’s own claim or defense is not such extrinsic fraud
as will justify or require vacation of the judgment.” (49 C.J.S. 489, citing Young v.
Young, 2 SE 2d 622; First National Bank & Trust Co. of King City v. Bowman, 15 SW
2d 842; Price v. Smith, 109 SW 2d 1144, 1149)
Wills and Succession; Reserva Troncal; Reserva troncal does not apply to
property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant.—Clearly, the property of
the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was
not an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom
he inherited the properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance
subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative
within the third degree on his mother’s side. The reserva troncal applies to
properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from
another ascendant or a brother or sister. It does not apply to property inherited by
a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Article
891.
Evidence; Judicial Admissions;  Judicial admissions are conclusive and no
evidence is required to prove the same.—However, inasmuch as Concordia had
agreed to deliver the estate of the deceased to the foundation in honor of his
mother, Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana (from whom the estate came), an
agreement which she ratified and confirmed in her “Motion to Reopen and/or
Reconsider Order dated April 3, 1978” which she filed in Spl. Proceeding No. 2540:
“4. That x x x prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and
movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the decedent a
foundation, besides they have closely known each other due to their filiation to the
decedent and they have been visiting each other’s house which are not far away
for (sic) each other.” (p. 234, Record; emphasis supplied) she is bound by that
agreement. It is true that by that agreement, she did not waive her inheritance in
favor of Celedonia, but she did agree to place all of Esteban’s estate in the “Salustia
Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation” which Esteban, Jr., during his lifetime,
planned to set up to honor his mother and to finance the education of indigent but
deserving students as well. Her admission may not be taken lightly as the lower
court did. Being a judicial admission, it is conclusive and no evidence need be
presented to prove the agreement (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Granada v.
Philippine National Bank, L-20745, Sept. 2, 1966, 18 SCRA 1; Sta. Ana v. Maliwat, L-
23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018; People v. Encipido, G.R. 70091, Dec. 29, 1986,
Page 75 of 100
146 SCRA 478; and Rodillas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 58652, May 20, 1988, 161
SCRA 347).
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 26, 1988 of the Court of
Appeals in CA GR CV No. 09010 (Concordia Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio)
affirming the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 13207 for partition,
reconveyance of ownership and possession and damages, the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and against
defendant:
a) Ordering that the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. be divided into two
(2) shares: one-half for the plaintiff and one-half for defendant. From both
shares shall be equally deducted the expenses for the burial, mausoleum and
related expenditures. Against the share of defendants shall be charged the
expenses for scholarship, awards, donations and the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de
Javellana Memorial Foundation;'
b) Directing the defendant to submit an inventory of the entire estate property,
including but not limited to, specific items already mentioned in this decision
and to render an accounting of the property of the estate, within thirty (30)
days from receipt of this judgment; one-half (1/2) of this produce shall belong
to plaintiff;
c) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation;
P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees plus costs.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 42-43, Rollo)
This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of
the first post-war Filipino novel "Without Seeing the Dawn," who died a bachelor,
without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only
surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the
spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private respondent,
Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.
He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after his
marriage in December, 1916 to Salustia Solivio and four months before Esteban, Jr.
was born.

Salustia and her sister, Celedonia (daughter of Engracio Solivio and his second
wife Josefa Fernandez), a teacher in the Iloilo Provincial High School, brought up
Esteban, Jr.
Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of land
in Calinog, Iloilo covered by 24 titles) which she had inherited from her mother,
Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first wife (p. 325, Record), but no conjugal
property was acquired during her short-lived marriage to Esteban, Sr.
On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child,
Esteban, Jr., including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her son, and
her sister lived. In due time, the titles of all these properties were transferred in
the name of Esteban, Jr.
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt
Celedonia and some close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to
honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a college
education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack on February 26,1977 without
having set up the foundation.
Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do
with Esteban's properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire to
place his estate in a foundation to be named after his mother, from whom his
properties came, for the purpose of helping indigent students in their schooling.
Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased. This fact was admitted by
her in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider the Order dated April 3, 1978"
which she filed on July 27, 1978 in Special Proceeding No. 2540, where she stated:
4. That petitioner knew all along the narrated facts in the immediately
preceding paragraph [that herein movant is also the relative of the deceased
within the third degree, she being the younger sister of the late Esteban
Javellana, father of the decedent herein], because prior to the filing of the
petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have
agreed to make the estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they have
closely known each other due to their filiation to the decedent and they have
been visiting each other's house which are not far away for (sic) each other. (p.
234, Record; Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings
leading to the formation of the foundation, Celedonia in good faith and upon the
advice of her counsel, filed on March 8, 1977 Spl. Proceeding No. 2540 for her
appointment as special administratrix of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. (Exh.
2). Later, she filed an amended petition (Exh. 5) praying that letters of
Page 76 of 100
administration be issued to her; that she be declared sole heir of the deceased; and
that after payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting, the
estate be adjudicated to her (p. 115, Rollo).
After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her amended petition,
she was declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. She explained that
this was done for three reasons: (1) because the properties of the estate had come
from her sister, Salustia Solivio; (2) that she is the decedent's nearest relative on
his mother's side; and (3) with her as sole heir, the disposition of the properties of
the estate to fund the foundation would be facilitated.
On April 3, 1978, the court (Branch II, CFI, now Branch 23, RTC) declared her the
sole heir of Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate to pay the
taxes and other obligations of the deceased and proceeded to set up
the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA FOUNDATION" which she caused to be
registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 17,1981 under Reg.
No. 0100027 (p. 98, Rollo).
Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a
motion for reconsideration of the court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir"
of Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the deceased. On October 27, 1978,
her motion was denied by the court for tardiness (pp. 80-81, Record). Instead of
appealing the denial, Concordia filed on January 7, 1980 (or one year and two
months later), Civil Case No. 13207 in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 26,
entitled "Concordia Javellana- Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio" for partition,
recovery of possession, ownership and damages.
On September 3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case No.
13207, in favor of Concordia Javellana-Villanueva.
On Concordia's motion, the trial court ordered the execution of its judgment
pending appeal and required Celedonia to submit an inventory and accounting of
the estate. In her motions for reconsideration of those orders, Celedonia averred
that the properties of the deceased had already been transferred to, and were in
the possession of, the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation." The trial
court denied her motions for reconsideration.
In the meantime, Celedonia perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA GR CV
No. 09010). On January 26, 1988, the Court of Appeals, Eleventh Division,
rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court in toto. Hence, this
petition for review wherein she raised the following legal issues:

1. whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case
No. 13207 for partition and recovery of Concordia Villanueva's share of the
estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. even while the probate proceedings (Spl. Proc.
No. 2540) were still pending in Branch 23 of the same court;
2. whether Concordia Villanueva was prevented from intervening in Spl. Proc.
No. 2540 through extrinsic fraud;
3. whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva troncal in favor of
Celedonia, his relative within the third degree on his mother's side from whom
he had inherited them; and
4. whether Concordia may recover her share of the estate after she had agreed
to place the same in the Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation, and
notwithstanding the fact that conformably with said agreement, the Foundation
has been formed and properties of the estate have already been transferred to
it.
I. The question of jurisdiction—
After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the petitioner's contention
that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia
Villanueva's action for partition and recovery of her share of the estate of Esteban
Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings (Spl, Proc. No. 2540) for the settlement
of said estate are still pending in Branch 23 of the same court, there being as yet no
orders for the submission and approval of the administratix's inventory and
accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and terminating the
proceedings (p. 31, Record).
It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to
the persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the intestate proceedings, puts
an end to the administration and thus far relieves the administrator from his
duties (Santiesteban v. Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367, Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank v. Escolin, et al., L-27860, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 266).
The assailed order of Judge Adil in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 declaring Celedonia as the
sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. did not toll the end of the
proceedings. As a matter of fact, the last paragraph of the order directed the
administratrix to "hurry up the settlement of the estate." The pertinent portions of
the order are quoted below:
2. As regards the second incident [Motion for Declaration of Miss Celedonia
Solivio as Sole Heir, dated March 7, 1978], it appears from the record that
Page 77 of 100
despite the notices posted and the publication of these proceedings as required
by law, no other heirs came out to interpose any opposition to the instant
proceeding. It further appears that herein Administratrix is the only claimant-
heir to the estate of the late Esteban Javellana who died on February 26, 1977.
During the hearing of the motion for declaration as heir on March 17, 1978, it
was established that the late Esteban Javellana died single, without any known
issue, and without any surviving parents. His nearest relative is the herein
Administratrix, an elder [sic] sister of his late mother who reared him and with
whom he had always been living with [sic] during his lifetime.
xxxxxxxxx
2. Miss Celedonia Solivio, Administratrix of this estate, is hereby declared as
the sole and legal heir of the late Esteban S. Javellana, who died intestate on
February 26, 1977 at La Paz, Iloilo City.
The Administratrix is hereby instructed to hurry up with the settlement of this
estate so that it can be terminated. (pp, 14-16, Record)
In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Branch 11 of the Court of
First Instance (now RTC, Branch 23), Concordia's motion to set aside the order
declaring Celedonia as sole heir of Esteban, and to have herself (Concordia)
declared as co-heir and recover her share of the properties of the deceased, was
properly filed by her in Spl. Proc. No. 2540. Her remedy when the court denied her
motion, was to elevate the denial to the Court of Appeals for review on certiorari.
However, instead of availing of that remedy, she filed more than one year later, a
separate action for the same purpose in Branch 26 of the court. We hold that the
separate action was improperly filed for it is the probate court that
has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate.
In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting
dispositions of a decedent's estate, a court should not interfere with probate
proceedings pending in a co-equal court. Thus, did we rule in Guilas v. Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga, L-26695, January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 111, 117,
where a daughter filed a separate action to annul a project of partition executed
between her and her father in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
her mother:
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only
after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the
heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the approval of the project of
The probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to make distribution, has

power to determine the proportion or parts to which each distributed is
entitled. ... The power to determine the legality or illegality of the testamentary
provision is inherent in the jurisdiction of the court making a just and legal
distribution of the inheritance. ... To hold that a separate and independent
action is necessary to that effect, would be contrary to the general tendency of
the jurisprudence of avoiding multiplicity of suits; and is further, expensive,
dilatory, and impractical. (Marcelino v. Antonio, 70 Phil. 388)
A judicial declaration that a certain person is the only heir of the decedent is
exclusively within the range of the administratrix proceedings and can not
properly be made an independent action. (Litam v. Espiritu, 100 Phil. 364)
A separate action for the declaration of heirs is not proper. (Pimentel v.
Palanca, 5 Phil. 436)
partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding (Timbol v.
Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276, L-15445, April 29, 1961; Siguiong v. Tecson, 89 Phil.
pp. 28, 30). As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been
complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and
terminated Siguiong v. Tecson, supra); because a judicial partition is not final
and conclusive and does not prevent the heirs from bringing an action to obtain
his share, provided the prescriptive period therefore has not elapsed (Mari v.
Bonilia, 83 Phil. 137). The better practice, however, for the heir who has not
received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same
probate or administration proceedings, or for reopening of the probate or
administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an
independent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which may
thus reverse a decision or order of the probate or intestate court already final
and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of.
(Ramos v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol v. Cano, supra; Jingco v. Daluz,
L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic v. Agustines, L-14710,
March 29, 1960, 107 Phil. 455, 460-461; Emphasis supplied)
In Litam et al., v. Rivera,  100 Phil. 364, where despite the pendency of the special
proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Rafael Litam
the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which they claimed that they were
the children by a previous marriage of the deceased to a Chinese woman, hence,
entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal properties acquired during his
marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in the civil case declared that the
plaintiffs-appellants were not children of the deceased, that the properties in
question were paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the
latter was his only heir. On appeal to this Court, we ruled that "such declarations
(that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is improper, in Civil Case
No. 2071, it being within the exclusive competence of the court in Special
Page 78 of 100
Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily,
in issue until the presentation of the project of partition. (p. 378).
However, in the Guilas case, supra, since the estate proceedings had been closed
and terminated for over three years, the action for annulment of the project of
partition was allowed to continue. Considering that in the instant case, the estate
proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless, Concordia had lost her right to have
herself declared as co-heir in said proceedings, We have opted likewise to proceed
to discuss the merits of her claim in the interest of justice.
The orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. 13207 setting
aside the probate proceedings in Branch 23 (formerly Branch 11) on the ground of
extrinsic fraud, and declaring Concordia Villanueva to be a co-heir of Celedonia to
the estate of Esteban, Jr., ordering the partition of the estate, and requiring the
administratrix, Celedonia, to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate,
were improper and officious, to say the least, for these matters he within the
exclusive competence of the probate court.
II. The question of extrinsic fraud—
Was Concordia prevented from intervening in the intestate proceedings
by extrinsic fraud employed by Celedonia? It is noteworthy that extrinsic fraud
was not alleged in Concordia's original complaint in Civil Case No. 13207. It was
only in her amended complaint of March 6, 1980, that extrinsic fraud was alleged
for the first time.
Extrinsic fraud, as a ground for annulment of judgment, is any act or conduct of
the prevailing party which prevented a fair submission of the controversy
(Francisco v. David, 38 O.G. 714). A fraud 'which prevents a party from having a
trial or presenting all of his case to the court, or one which operates upon
matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but to the manner by which such
judgment was procured so much so that there was no fair submission of the
controversy. For instance, if through fraudulent machination by one [his
adversary], a litigant was induced to withdraw his defense or was prevented
from presenting an available defense or cause of action in the case wherein the
judgment was obtained, such that the aggrieved party was deprived of his day
in court through no fault of his own, the equitable relief against such judgment
may be availed of. (Yatco v. Sumagui, 44623-R, July 31, 1971). (cited in
Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 Ed. by Moreno; Varela v. Villanueva, et al., 96
Phil. 248)
A judgment may be annulled on the ground of extrinsic or collateral fraud, as
distinguished from intrinsic fraud, which connotes any fraudulent scheme

executed by a prevailing litigant 'outside the trial of a case against the defeated
party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is
prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case. ... The overriding
consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented
a party from having his day in court or from presenting his case. The fraud,
therefore, is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the court.
(Libudan v. Gil, L-21163, May 17, 1972, 45 SCRA 17, 27-29; Sterling Investment
Corp. v. Ruiz, L-30694, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 318, 323)
The charge of extrinsic fraud is, however, unwarranted for the following reasons:
1. Concordia was not unaware of the special proceeding intended to be filed by
Celedonia. She admitted in her complaint that she and Celedonia had agreed that
the latter would "initiate the necessary proceeding" and pay the taxes and
obligations of the estate. Thus paragraph 6 of her complaint alleged:
6. ... for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of the estate of the late Esteban
Javellana, Jr. at the lowest possible cost and the least effort, the plaintiff and the
defendant agreed that the defendant shall initiate the necessary proceeding, cause
the payment of taxes and other obligations, and to do everything else required
by law, and thereafter, secure the partition of the estate between her and the
plaintiff, [although Celedonia denied that they agreed to partition the estate, for
their agreement was to place the estate in a foundation.] (p. 2, Record; emphasis
supplied)
Evidently, Concordia was not prevented from intervening in the proceedings. She
stayed away by choice. Besides, she knew that the estate came exclusively from
Esteban's mother, Salustia Solivio, and she had agreed with Celedonia to place it in
a foundation as the deceased had planned to do.
2. The probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice of the time and
place of hearing of the petition is required to be published (Sec. 3, Rule 76 in
relation to Sec. 3, Rule 79, Rules of Court). Notice of the hearing of Celedonia's
original petition was published in the "Visayan Tribune" on April 25, May 2
and 9, 1977 (Exh 4, p. 197, Record). Similarly, notice of the hearing of her
amended petition of May 26, 1977 for the settlement of the estate was, by
order of the court, published in "Bagong Kasanag" (New Light) issues of May
27, June 3 and 10, 1977 (pp. 182-305, Record). The publication of the notice of
the proceedings was constructive notice to the whole world. Concordia was
not deprived of her right to intervene in the proceedings for she had actual, as
well as constructive notice of the same. As pointed out by the probate court in
its order of October 27, 1978:
Page 79 of 100
... . The move of Concordia Javellana, however, was filed about five months
after Celedonia Solivio was declared as the sole heir. ... .
Considering that this proceeding is one in rem and had been duly published as
required by law, despite which the present movant only came to court now,
then she is guilty of laches for sleeping on her alleged right. (p. 22, Record)
The court noted that Concordia's motion did not comply with the requisites of a
petition for relief from judgment nor a motion for new trial.
The rule is stated in 49 Corpus Juris Secundum 8030 as follows:
Where petition was sufficient to invoke statutory jurisdiction of probate
court and proceeding was in rem no subsequent errors or irregularities are
available on collateral attack. (Bedwell v. Dean 132 So. 20)
Celedonia's allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir of Esteban within
the third degree on his mother's side was not false. Moreover, it was made in good
faith and in the honest belief that because the properties of Esteban had come
from his mother, not his father, she, as Esteban's nearest surviving relative on his
mother's side, is the rightful heir to them. It would have been self-defeating and
inconsistent with her claim of sole heirship if she stated in her petition that
Concordia was her co-heir. Her omission to so state did not constitute extrinsic
fraud.
Failure to disclose to the adversary, or to the court, matters which would defeat
one's own claim or defense is not such extrinsic fraud as will justify or require
vacation of the judgment. (49 C.J.S. 489, citing Young v. Young, 2 SE 2d 622;
First National Bank & Trust Co. of King City v. Bowman, 15 SW 2d 842; Price v.
Smith, 109 SW 2d 1144, 1149)
It should be remembered that a petition for administration of a decedent's estate
may be filed by any "interested person" (Sec. 2, Rule 79, Rules of Court). The filing
of Celedonia's petition did not preclude Concordia from filing her own.
III. On the question of reserva troncal—
We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased was
subject to reserva troncal and that it pertains to her as his only relative within the
third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal provision of the Civil Code is
found in Article 891 which reads as follows:

ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property
which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may
have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within
the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor  (reservista)—the ascendant who
inherits by operation of law property from his descendants.
2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the
reservees (reservatarios)—relatives within the third degree counted from the
descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line from which the property
came.
3. The propositus—the descendant who received by gratuitous title and died
without issue, making his other ascendant inherit by operation of law. (p. 692,
Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable
property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother,
Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the properties in question. Therefore, he
did not hold his inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia
Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree on his mother's side.
The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from a
descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or 9 brother or sister. It does
not apply to property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of
the situation covered by Article 891.
Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces, what
should apply in the distribution of his estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the
Civil Code which provide:
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with
the following articles.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor
children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall
succeed to the estate.
Page 80 of 100
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference
among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that:
Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives of
the decedent within the third degree in the collateral line, each,
therefore, shall succeed to the subject estate 'without distinction
of line or preference among them by reason of relationship by the
whole blood,' and is entitled one-half (1/2) share and share alike
of the estate. (p. 57, Rollo)
IV. The question of Concordia's one-half share—
However, inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the estate of the deceased
to the foundation in honor of his mother, Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana (from
whom the estate came), an agreement which she ratified and confirmed in her
"Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider Order dated April 3, 1978" which she filed
in Spl. Proceeding No. 2540:
4. That ... prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner
Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed to
make the estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they have
closely known each other due to their filiation to the decedent
and they have been visiting each other's house which are not far
away for (sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis supplied)
she is bound by that agreement. It is true that by that agreement, she did not waive
her inheritance in favor of Celedonia, but she did agree to place all of Esteban's
estate in the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" which Esteban, Jr.,
during his lifetime, planned to set up to honor his mother and to finance the
education of indigent but deserving students as well.
Her admission may not be taken lightly as the lower court did. Being a judicial
admission, it is conclusive and no evidence need be presented to prove the
agreement (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Granada v. Philippine National Bank,
L-20745, Sept. 2, 1966, 18 SCRA 1; Sta. Ana v. Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24
SCRA 1018; People v. Encipido, G.R.70091, Dec. 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 478; and
Rodillas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 58652, May 20, 1988, 161 SCRA 347).
The admission was never withdrawn or impugned by Concordia who, significantly,
did not even testify in the case, although she could have done so by deposition if
she were supposedly indisposed to attend the trial. Only her husband, Narciso, and

son-in-law, Juanito Domin, actively participated in the trial. Her husband
confirmed the agreement between his wife and Celedonia, but he endeavored to
dilute it by alleging that his wife did not intend to give all, but only one-half, of her
share to the foundation (p. 323, Record).
The records show that the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" was
established and duly registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission under
Reg. No. 0100027 for the following principal purposes:
1. To provide for the establishment and/or setting up of scholarships for such
deserving students as the Board of Trustees of the Foundation may decide of at
least one scholar each to study at West Visayas State College, and the University
of the Philippines in the Visayas both located in Iloilo City.
2. To provide a scholarship for at least one scholar for St. Clements
Redemptorist Community for a deserving student who has the religious
vocation to become a priest.
3. To foster, develop, and encourage activities that will promote the
advancement and enrichment of the various fields of educational endeavors,
especially in literary arts. Scholarships provided for by this foundation may be
named after its benevolent benefactors as a token of gratitude for their
contributions.
4. To direct or undertake surveys and studies in the community to determine
community needs and be able to alleviate partially or totally said needs.
5. To maintain and provide the necessary activities for the proper care of the
Solivio-Javellana mausoleum at Christ the King Memorial Park, Jaro, Iloilo City,
and the Javellana Memorial at the West Visayas State College, as a token of
appreciation for the contribution of the estate of the late Esteban S. Javellana
which has made this foundation possible. Also, in perpetuation of his Roman
Catholic beliefs and those of his mother, Gregorian masses or their equivalents
will be offered every February and October, and Requiem masses every
February 25th and October llth, their death anniversaries, as part of this
provision.
6. To receive gifts, legacies, donations, contributions, endowments and financial
aids or loans from whatever source, to invest and reinvest the funds, collect the
income thereof and pay or apply only the income or such part thereof as shall
be determined by the Trustees for such endeavors as may be necessary to carry
out the objectives of the Foundation.
Page 81 of 100
7. To acquire, purchase, own, hold, operate, develop, lease, mortgage, pledge,
exchange, sell, transfer, or otherwise, invest, trade, or deal, in any manner
permitted by law, in real and personal property of every kind and description
or any interest herein.
8. To do and perform all acts and things necessary, suitable or proper for the
accomplishments of any of the purposes herein enumerated or which shall at
any time appear conducive to the protection or benefit of the corporation,
including the exercise of the powers, authorities and attributes concerned upon
the corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines in general, and
upon domestic corporation of like nature in particular. (pp. 9-10, Rollo)
As alleged without contradiction in the petition' for review:
The Foundation began to function in June, 1982, and three (3) of
its eight Esteban Javellana scholars graduated in 1986, one (1)
from UPV graduated Cum Laude and two (2) from WVSU
graduated with honors; one was a Cum Laude and the other was a
recipient of Lagos Lopez award for teaching for being the most
outstanding student teacher.
The Foundation has four (4) high school scholars in Guiso
Barangay High School, the site of which was donated by the
Foundation. The School has been selected as the Pilot Barangay
High School for Region VI.
The Foundation has a special scholar, Fr. Elbert Vasquez, who
would be ordained this year. He studied at St. Francis Xavier
Major Regional Seminary at Davao City. The Foundation likewise
is a member of the Redemptorist Association that gives yearly
donations to help poor students who want to become
Redemptorist priests or brothers. It gives yearly awards for
Creative writing known as the Esteban Javellana Award.
Further, the Foundation had constructed the Esteban S. Javellana
Multi-purpose Center at the West Visayas State University for
teachers' and students' use, and has likewise contributed to
religious civic and cultural fund-raising drives, amongst other's.
(p. 10, Rollo)
Having agreed to contribute her share of the decedent's estate to the Foundation,
Concordia is obligated to honor her commitment as Celedonia has honored hers.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of the trial court and
the Court of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. Concordia J. Villanueva is declared an
heir of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. entitled to one-half of his estate. However,
comformably with the agreement between her and her co-heir, Celedonia Solivio,
the entire estate of the deceased should be conveyed to the "Salustia Solivio Vda.
de Javallana Foundation," of which both the petitioner and the private respondent
shall be trustees, and each shall be entitled to nominate an equal number of
trustees to constitute the Board of Trustees of the Foundation which shall
Padura vs. Baldovino
G. R. No. L-11960
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal on a pure question of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna in its Special Proceedings No. 4551.
The facts are simple and undisputed.  Agustin Padura contracted two marriages
during his lifetime. With his first wife, Gervacia Landig, he had one child whom
they named Manuel Padura, and with his second, Benita Garing; he had two
children named Fortunato Padura and Candelaria Padura.
Agustin Padura died on April 26, 1908, leaving a last will and testament, duly
probated in Special Proceedings No, 664 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
wherein he bequeathed his properties among his children, Manuel, Candelaria and
Fortunato, and his surviving spouse, Benita Garing. Under the probate
proceedings, Fortunate was adjudicated four parcels of land covered under Decree
No. 25960 issued In Land Registration Case No. 86 G. L. R. O. No. 10818, object of
this appeal.
Fortunato Padura died unmarried on May 28, 1908, without having executed a
will; and not having any issue, the said parcels of land were inherited exclusively
by her mother, Benita Garing.  She applied for and later was issued a Torrens
Certificate of Title in her name, but subject to the condition that the properties
were reservable in favor of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line
from which said property came, in accordance with the applicable provision of
law, under a decree of the court dated August 25, 1916, in Land Registration Case
No. G. L. R. O. No. 10818.
On August 26, 1934, Candelaria Padura died leaving as her only heirs, her four
legitimate children, the appellants herein, Cristeta, Melania, Anicia and Pablo, all
surnamed Baldovino, Six years later, on October 6, 1940, Manuel Padura also died.
Surviving him are his legitimate children, Dionisia, Felisa, Flora, Gornelio,
Page 82 of 100
administer the same for the purposes set forth in its charter. The petitioner, as
administratrix of the estate, shall submit to the probate court an inventory and
accounting of the estate of the deceased preparatory to terminating the
proceedings therein.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Francisco, Juana, and Severino, all surnamed Padura, the appellees herein.
Upon the death of Benita Garing (the reservista), on October 15, 1952, appellants
and appellees took possession of the reservable properties.  In a resolution, dated
August 1, 1953, of the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Special Proceedings No.
4551, the legitimate children of the deceased Manuel Padura and Candelaria
Baldovino were declared to be the rightful reservees, and as such, entitled to the
reservable properties (the original reserveess Candelaria Padura and Manuel
Padura, having predeceased the reservista).  The instant petition, dated October
22, 1956, filed by appellants Baldovino seeks to have these properties partitioned,
such that one-half of the same be adjudicated to them, and the other half to the
appellees, allegedly on the basis that they inherit by right of representation from
their respective parents, the original reservees.  To this petition, appellees filed
their opposition, maintaining that they should all (the eleven reservees) be
deemed as inheriting in their own right, under which, they claim, each should have
an equal share.
Based on the foregoing finding of facts, the lower court rendered judgment
declaring all the reservees (without distinction) "co-owners, pro-indiviso, equal
shares of the parcels of land" subject matter of the suit.
The issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows: In a case of reserva troncal,
where the only reservatarios (reservees) surviving the reservista, and belonging
to the line of origin, are nephews of the descendant (prepositus), but some are
nephews of the half blood and the others are nephews of the whole blood, should
the reserved properties be apportioned among them equally, or should the
nephews of the whole blood take a share twice as large as that of the nephews of
the half blood?
The appellants contend that notwithstanding the reservable character of the
property under Art, 891 of the new Civil Code (Art. 811 of the Code of 1889)
the reservatarios nephews of the whole blood are entitled to a share twice as large
as that of the others, in conformity with Arts, 1006, 1008 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (Arts. 949 and 951 of the Code of 1889) on intestate succession.

"Art. 1006.  Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together with
brothers and sisters of the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a share double
that of the latter.(949)n
"Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall succeed per
capita or per stripes, in accordance with the rules laid down for brothers and
sisters of the full blood, (951)"
The case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish commentators on
the subject.  After mature reflection, we have concluded that the position of the
appellants is correct.  The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to
assure the return of the reservable property to the third degree relatives
belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its being
dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant (reservista).  To
this end, the Code provides:
"Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the
latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother
or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation
of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong
to the line from which said property came. (811)"
It is well known that the reserva troncal had no direct precedent in the law of
Castile.  The President of the Spanish Code Commission, D. Manuel Alonso
Martinez, explained the motives for the formulation of the reserva troncal in the
Civil Code of 1889 in his book "El Codigo Civil en sus relaciones con las
Legislaciones Forales" (Madrid, 1884, Vol. 1, pp. 226-228, 233-235) in the
following words:
"La base cuarta, á má s de estar en pugna con la legislacion españ ola, es una
desviacion del antiguo derecho romano y del moderno derecho europeo,
perfectamente conformes ambos con el tradicional sistema de Castilla.  En qué se
fundó , pues, la Comision para semejante novedad? Que razones pudieron moverla
á establecer la sucesion lineal, separá ndose del cá uce secular?
"Lo diré en breves frases.  Hay un case, no del todo raro, que subleva el
sentimiento de cuantos lo imaginan ó lo ven: el hijo mayor de un magnate sucede á
su padre en la mitad Integra de pingues mayorazgos, tocando á sus hermanos un
lote modestisimo en la division de la herencia paterna; aquel hijo se casa y fallece
al poco tiempo dejando un tierno vá stago; la viuda, todavia jó ven, contrae
segundas bodas y tiene la desdicha de perder al hijo del primer matrimonio
heredando toda su fortuna con exclusion de la madre y los hermanos de su primer
marido.  No hay para qué decir que, si hay descendientes del segundo matrimonio,
á ellos se trasmite en su dia la hereticia. Por donde resulta el irritante espectá culo
de que los vá stagos directos del magnate viven en la estrechez y tal vez en la
Page 83 of 100
miseria, mientras gozan de su rico patrimonio personas extrañ as á su familia y
que, por un ó rden natural, la son profundamente antipá ticas. Esta hipó tesis se
puede realizar y se realize, aunque por lo general en menor escala, entre
propietarios, banqueros é industriales. labradores y comerciantes, sin necesidad
de vinculaciones ni titulos nobiliarios.
"Pues bien, la mayoria de la Comision se preocupó vivamente de esto,
considerando el principio de familia como superior al del afecto presumible del
difunto.  A esta impresion obedecia la propuesta del Sr. Garcia Goyena, para que á
los ascendientes se les diera su legitima tan só lo en usufructo: en idéntica razon se
apoyaba el Sr. Franco para pedir con insistencia se declarase que, si un
ascendiente tenia hecha una donacion á su descendiente, bien fuese al contraer
matrinionio ó bien con cualquiera otro motivo, y muriese el donatario sin
sucesion, volvieran los bienes donados al donante, sin perjuicio de la legitima que
pudiera corresponderle en su calidad de ascendiente.  La Comision no se atrevió a
ir tan allá como estos dos Sres. Vocales; pero, para eludir las consecuencias que á
las veces produce el principio de la proximidad del parentesco y que he puesto de
relieve poco há , proclamó , no sin vacilar, la doctrina de la sucesion lineal."
(pp.226-227)
"Y este fué el temperamento que, por indicacion mia, adoptó la Comision
Codificadora, norabrando una Sub-comision que redactara las bases é que habia de
sujetarse esta especie de reversion de los bienes inmuebles al tronco de donde
procedan, lo mismo en la sucesion testamentaria que en la intestada, sin perjuicio
del derecho sacratisimo de los padres al disfrute de la herencia de sus hijos
malogrados prematuramente.
"Dicha Subcomision, compuesta de los Sres. Durá n y Bá s y Franco como
defensores del régimen f oral, y de los Sres. Manresa y Garcia Goyena en
representacion de la legislacion castellana, sometieron á la deliberacion de la
Comision Codificadora la proposicion siguiente:
'El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente bienes que este hubiese
adquirido por titulo lucrativo de_ otro ascendiente ó de un hermano, se halla
obligado á reservar los que hubiese adquirido por ministerio de la ley en favor de
los parientes del difunto que se hallaran comprendidos dentro del tercer grado y
que lo sean por la parte de donde proceden los bienes.'
"No voy á discutir ahora si esta fó rmula es má s ó ménos feliz, y si debe aprobarse
tal cual está redactada ó si há menester de enmienda ó adicion.  Aplazo este
examen para cuando trate de la sucesion intestada, á la cual tiene mayor
aplicacion.  Por el momento me limito á reconocer. primero: que con esta base
desaparece el peligro de que bienes poseidos secularmente por una familia pasen
bruscamente y á titulo gratuito á manos extrañ as por el azar de los enlaces y de

muertes prematuras; segundo: que sin negar que sea una novedad esta base del
derecho de Castllla, tiene en rigor en su abono la autoridad de los Có digos má s
niveladores y el ejemplo de las naciones má s democrá ticas de Europe, si no en la
extension en que lo presenta la Comision Codificadora, á lo ménos en el principio
generador de la reforma." (pp.233-235)
The stated purpose o£ the reserva is accomplished once property has devolved to
the specified relatives of the line of origin.  But from this time on, there is no
further occasion for its application.  In the relations between one reservatario and
another of the same degree, there is no call for applying Art. 891 any longer;
wherefore, the respective share of each in the reversionary property should be
governed by the ordinary rules of intestate succession.  In this spirit the
jurisprudence of this Court and that of Spain has resolved that upon the death of
the ascendant reservista, the reservable property should pass, not to all
the reservatorios as a class, but only to those nearest in degree to the descendant
(prepositus) , excluding those reservatarios of more remote degree (Florentine vs.
Florentine, 40 Phil. 489-490; T. S. 8 Nov. 1894; Dir. Gen. de los Registros, Resol. 20
March 1905).  And within the third degree of relationship from the descendant
(prepositus), the right of representation operates in favor of nephews (Florentino
vs. Florentino, supra).
"Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are
re1atives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest
relative, called reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person
holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one
more remote.  The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one
claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the
relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property
came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the
highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of designated persons who
are within the third degree of the person from whom the reservable property
came.  Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be
considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of
one alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the third degree of
relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of
reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of
nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property came. x x x."
(Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 489-490) (Emphasis supplied) (see also
Nieva and Alacala vs. Alcala and de Ocampo, 41 Phil. 915)
Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary
intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are
entitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews of half-blood.  If in
Page 84 of 100
determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the
right of representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of double share for
immediate collaterals of the whole blood should be likewise operative.
In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives
(reservatarios) to whom the property should be returned; but within that group,
the individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable rules of
ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. This
conclusion is strengthened by the circumstance that the reserva being an
exceptional case, its application should be limited to what is strictly needed to
accomplish the purpose of the law. As expressed by Manresa in his Commentaries
(Vol. 6, 6th Ed., p. 250):
"creá ndose un verdadero estado excepcipnal del derecho, no debe ampliarse, sino
má s bien restringirse, el alcance del precepto, manteniendo la excepció n mientras
fuere necesaria y estuviese realmente contenida en la disposicion, y aplicando las
reglas generales y fundamentals del Có digo en materia de sucesió n, en aquellos
extremos no resueltos de un raodo expreso, y que quedan fuera de la propia esfera
de acciá n de la reserva que se crea."
The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of the new Civil
Code's hostility to successional reservas and reversions, as exemplified by the
suppression of the reserve viudal and the  reversion legal of the Code of 1889
(Arts. 812 and 968-980).
There is a third point that deserves consideration. Even during
the reservista's lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate acquirers of the
property, can already assert the right to prevent the reservista from doing
anything that might frustrate their reversionary right: and for this purpose they
can compel the annotation of their right in the Registry of Property even while the
reservista is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs. Sablan,
25 Phil. 295).  This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that
corresponds to the natural heirs of the reservista. It is likewise clear that the
reservable property is no part of the estate of the reservista, who may not dispose
of them by will, so long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58
Phil. 237).  The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservist, but from the
descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa,
subject to the condition that they must survive the reservista. (Sanchez Roman,
Vol. VI, Torao 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310)  Had
the nephews of whole and half-blood succeeded the prepositus directly, those of
full-blood would undoubtedly receive a double share compared to those of the
half-blood (Arts. 1008 and 1006, jam cit.) Why then should the latter receive equal
shares simply because the transmission of the property was delayed by the
interregnum of the reserva? The decedent (causante) the heirs and their

relationship being the same, there is no cogent reason why the hereditary portions
should vary.
It should be stated, in justice to the trial court, that its opinion is supported by
distinguished commentators of the Civil Code of 1889, among them Sanchez
Romá n (Estudios, Vol. 65 Tomo 2, p. 1008) and Mucius Scaevola (Có digo Civil, Vol
14, p. 342).  The reason given by these authors is that the reservatarios are called
by law to take the reservable property because they belong to the line of origin;
and not because of their relationship.  But the argument, if logically pursued,
would lead to the conclusion that the property should pass to any and all
the reservatarios, as a class, and in equal shares, regardless of lines and degrees.  succession mortis causa.
In truth, such is the thesis of Scaevola, that later became known as the theory
of reserva integral (14 Scaevola, Cod. Civ. p. 332 et seq.).  But, as we have seen, the
Supreme Courts of Spain and of the Philippines have rejected that view, and
consider that the reservable property should be succeeded by
the reservatario who is nearest in degree, according to the basic rules of intestacy.  remanded to the court below for further proceedings in accordance with this
The refutation of the trial court's position is found in the following, passage of
Manresa's Commentaries (Vol. 6, 7th Ed., p. 346):
"A esto se objeta que el derecho consignado en el articulo 811 es un derecho
propio que nace de la mera calidad de pariente; no un derecho que se adquiere por
sucesió n. Ciertamente, el derecho se concede a los parientes lineales dentro del
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14856            November 15, 1919
ENCARNACION FLORENTINO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MERCEDES FLORENTINO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Ramon Querubin, Simeon Ramos and Orense and Vera for appellants.
Vicente Foz, Jose Singsong Tongson and Angel Encarnacion for appellees.
RESERVABLE PROPERTY.—The property proceeding from an ascendant or from a
brother of a deceased descendant—who may have acquired same by lucrative title
and from whom afterwards another ascendant of deceased will inherit—is by law
invested with the character of reservable property in favor of said deceased's
Page 85 of 100
tercer grado; pero se les concede con motivo de la muerte de un descendiente y en
la sucesió n de este. Ellos suceden por la procedencia especial de los bienes
después de ser éstos disfrutados por el ascendiente; pero suceden a titulo
lucrativo y por causa de muerte y ministerio de la ley, lo cual es dificil poderlo
negar.  Hasta podrlan estimarse esos parientes legitimarios o herederos forzosos,
como el mismo autor reconoce en otro lugar de su obra. De modo que este
argumento no es convincente."
All told, our considered opinion is that reason and policy favor keeping to a
minimum the alterations introduced by the reserva in the basic rules of
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of November 5, 1956 is reversed and set aside,
and the reservatarios who are nephews of the whole blood are declared entitled to
a share twice as large as that of the nephews of the half-blood.  Let the records be
decision.
So Ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, and Endencia, JJ., concur
relatives, within the third degree, of the line from whence such property proceeds.
(Art. 811 of the Civil Code.)
ID.; WHEN IT LOSES THIS CHARACTER.—The ascendant, who inherits property of
a reservable character from his deceased descendant who has a relative within the
third degree still living, is no more than a life usufructuary or a fiduciary of said
reservable property. But if, during the lifetime of the said ascendant, all the
relatives, within the third degree, of his predecessor in interest should die or
disappear, according to law the condition of reservation with which the property
had been burdened ceases to exist, and said property now becomes a part of the
legitimate legitime of the ascendant who had inherited same through the death of
those for whom it had been reserved (reservatarios).
ID.; RIGHTS OF SUCCESSION.—According to the order of succession prescribed by
law for legitimes, when there are relatives within the third degree of the deceased
descendant, the right of the relative's nearest reservative (reservatario) to the
property excludes that of the one more remote. Wherefore the property ought to
be handed over to said relative by the reservist (reservista), without it being
possible to allege a right of representation when he who attempts the same is not
comprehended within the third degree, among the predecessor-in-interest's
relatives. Inasmuch as the right conceded by the aforementioned article 811 of the

Civil Code is, in the highest degree, for the personal and exclusive benefit of the
persons pointed out by law, in no manner can there be included relatives of the
fourth and succeeding degrees, not recognized by law.
4.ID. ; NATURE OF.—Reservable property neither comes nor falls under the
absolute dominion of the ascendant who inherits and receives same from his
deceased descendant and; therefore, neither forms part of his estate nor integrates
the legitime of his forced heirs. It becomes the ascendant's own property, received
as an inheritance, only under the condition that all of the deceased descendant's
relatives, within the third degree, shall have died. Under these circumstances the
property, transmitted by the predecessor in interest to his ascendant, has lost its
character of reservation.
5.ID. ; ID.—Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the death of
ascendant (reservista) together with his own property in favor of another of his
descendants as forced heir, forms no part of the latter's lawful inheritance nor of
the legitime, for the reason that, as said property continued to be reservable, the
heir receiving same as an inheritance from his ascendant has the strict obligation
of its delivery to the relatives, within the third degree, of the predecessor in
interest, without prejudicing the right of the heir to an aliquot part of property, if
he has at the same time the right of a reservatario.
TORRES, J.:
On January 17, 1918, counsel for Encarnacion (together with her husband Simeon
Serrano), Gabriel, Magdalena, Ramon, Miguel, Victorino, and Antonino of the
surname Florentino; for Miguel Florentino, guardian ad litem of the minor Rosario
Florentino; for Eugenio Singson, the father and guardian ad litem of Emilia, Jesus,
Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores of the surname Singson y Florentino; and for
Eugenio Singson, guardian of the minors Jose and Asuncion Florentino, filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, against Mercedes Florentino
and her husband, alleging as follows:
That Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II married the first time Antonia Faz de Leon;
that during the marriage he begot nine children called, Jose, Juan, Maria,
Encarnacion, Isabel, Espirita, Gabriel, Pedro, and Magdalena of the surname
Florentino y de Leon; that on becoming a widower he married the second time
Severina Faz de Leon with whom he had two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III
of the surname Florentino y de Leon; that Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II died on
February 13, 1890; that he was survived by his second wife Severina Faz de Leon
and the ten children first above mentioned; that his eleventh son, Apolonio III, was
born on the following 4th of March 1890.
Page 86 of 100
That of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo's aforementioned eleven children, Juan,
Maria and Isabel died single, without leaving any ascendants or descendants; that
Ramon, Miguel, Victorino, Antonio, and Rosario are the legitimate children of the
deceased Jose Florentino who was one of the children of the deceased Apolonio
Isabelo; that Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores are the legitimate
children of Espirita Florentino, now deceased, and her husband Eugenio Singson;
that Jose and Asuncion are the children of Pedro Florentino, another son of the
deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino.
That on January 17 and February 13, 1890, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino executed a
will before the notary public of Ilocos Sur, instituting as his universal heirs his
aforementioned ten children, the posthumos Apolonio III and his widow Severina
Faz de Leon; that he declared, in one of the paragraphs of said will, all his property
should be divided among all of his children of both marriages.
That, in the partition of the said testator's estate, there was given to Apolonio
Florentino III, his posthumos son, the property marked with the letters A, B, C, D,
E, and F in the complaint, a gold rosary, pieces of gold, of silver and of table
service, livestock, palay, some personal property and other objects mentioned in
the complaint.
That Apolonio Florentino III, the posthumos son of the second marriage, died in
1891; that his mother, Severina Faz de Leon, succeeded to all his property
described in the complaint; that the widow, Severina Faz de Leon died on
November 18, 1908, leaving a will instituting as her universal heiress her only
living daughter, Mercedes Florentino; that, as such heir, said daughter took
possession of all the property left at the death of her mother, Severina Faz de
Leon; that among same is included the property, described in the complaint, which
the said Severina Faz de Leon inherited from her deceased son, the posthumos
Apolonio, as reservable property; that, as a reservist, the heir of the said Mercedes
Florentino deceased had been gathering for herself alone the fruits of lands
described in the complaint; that each and every one of the parties mentioned in
said complaint is entitled to one-seventh of the fruits of the reservable property
described therein, either by direct participation or by representation, in the
manner mentioned in paragraph 9 of the complaint.
That several times the plaintiffs have, in an amicable manner, asked the
defendants to deliver their corresponding part of the reservable property; that
without any justifiable motive the defendants have refused and do refuse to
deliver said property or to pay for its value; that for nine years Mercedes
Florentino has been receiving, as rent for the lands mentioned, 360 bundles of
palay at fifty pesos per bundle and 90 bundles of corn at four pesos per bundle;
that thereby the plaintiffs have suffered damages in the sum of fifteen thousand
four hundred and twenty-eight pesos and fifty-eight centavos, in addition to three

hundred and eight pesos and fifty-eight centavos for the value of the fruits not
gathered, of one thousand pesos (P1,000) for the unjustifiable retention of the
aforementioned reservable property and for the expenses of this suit. Wherefore
they pray it be declared that all the foregoing property is reservable property; that
the plaintiffs had and do have a right to the same, in the quantity and proportion
mentioned in the aforementioned paragraph 9 of the complaint; that the
defendants Mercedes Florentino and her husband be ordered to deliver to the
plaintiffs their share of the property in question, of the palay and of the corn above
mentioned, or their value; and that they be condemned to pay the plaintiffs the
sum of one thousand pesos (P1,000) together with the costs of this instance.
To the preceding complaint counsel for the defendants demurred, alleging that the
cause of action is based on the obligation of the widow Severina Faz de Leon to
reserve the property she inherited from her deceased son Apolonio Florentino y
de Leon who, in turn, inherited same from his father Apolonio Isabelo Florentino;
that, there being no allegation to the contrary, it is to be presumed that the widow
Severina Faz de Leon did not remarry after the death of this husband nor have any
natural child; that the right claimed by the plaintiffs is not that mentioned in
article 968 and the following articles, but that established in article 811 of the Civil
Code; that the object of the provisions of the aforementioned articles is to avoid
the transfer of said reservable property to those extraneous to the family of the
owner thereof; that if the property inherited by the widow Severina Faz de Leon
from her deceased son Apolonio Florentino y Faz de Leon (property which
originated from his father and her husband) has all passed into the hands of the
defendant, Mercedes Florentino y Encarnacion, a daughter of the common
ancestor's second marriage (said Apolonio Isabelo Florentino with the deceased
Severina Faz de Leon) it is evident that the property left at the death of the
posthumos son Apolonio Florentino y Faz de Leon did not pass after the death of
his mother Severina, his legitimate heirs as an ascendant, into the hands of
strangers; that said property having been inherited by Mercedes Florentino y
Encarnacion from her mother (Severina), article 811 of the Civil Code is absolutely
inapplicable to the present case because, when the defendant Mercedes, by
operation law, entered into and succeeded to, the possession, of the property
lawfully inherited from her mother Severina Faz de Leon, said property had, while
in the possession of her mother, lost the character of reservable property — there
being a legitimate daughter of Severina Faz de Leon with the right to succeed her
in all her rights, property and actions; that the restraints of the law whereby said
property may not passed into the possession of strangers are void, inasmuch as
the said widow had no obligation to reserve same, as Mercedes Florentino is a
forced heiress of her mother Severina Faz de Leon; that, in the present case, there
is no property reserved for the plaintiffs since there is a forced heiress, entitled to
the property left by the death of the widow Severina Faz de Leon who never
remarried; that the obligation to reserve is secondary to the duty of respecting the
legitime; that in the instant case, the widow Severina Faz de Leon was in duty
Page 87 of 100
bound to respect the legitime of her daughter Mercedes the defendant; that her
obligation to reserve the property could not be fulfilled to the prejudice of the
legitime which belongs to her forced heiress, citing in support of these statements
the decision of the supreme court of Spain of January 4, 1911; that, finally, the
application of article 811 of the Civil Code in favor of the plaintiffs would
presuppose the exclusion of the defendant from here right to succeed exclusively
to all the property, rights and actions left by her legitimate mother, although the
said defendant has a better right than the plaintiffs; and that there would be
injustice if the property claimed be adjudicated to the plaintiffs, as well as
violation of section 5 of the Jones Law which invalidates any law depriving any
person of an equal protection. Wherefore they prayed that the demurrer be
sustained, with costs against the plaintiffs.
After the hearing of the demurrer, on August 22, 1918, the judge absolved the
defendants from the complaint and condemned the plaintiffs to pay the costs.
Counsel for the plaintiffs excepted to this order, moved to vacate it and to grant
them a new trial; said motion was overruled; the plaintiffs expected thereto and
filed the corresponding bill of exceptions which was allowed, certified and
forwarded to the clerk of this court.
On appeal the trial judge sustained the demurrer of the defendants to the
complaint of the plaintiffs, but, instead of ordering the latter to amend their
complaint within the period prescribed by the rules — undoubtedly believing that
the plaintiffs could not alter nor change the facts constituting the cause of action,
and that, as both parties were agreed as to the facts alleged in the complaint as
well as in the demurrer, every question reduced itself to one of the law, already
submitted to the decision of the court — the said judge, disregarding the ordinary
procedure established by law, decided the case by absolving the defendants from
the complaint and by condemning the plaintiffs to pay the costs of the instance.
There certainly was no real trial, inasmuch as the defendants, instead of answering
the complaint of the plaintiffs, confined themselves to filing a demurrer based on
the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute a cause of
action. However, the judge preferred to absolve the defendants, thereby making an
end to the cause, instead of dismissing the same, because undoubtedly he believed,
in view of the controversy between the parties, that the arguments adduced to
support the demurrer would be the same which the defendants would allege in
their answer — those dealing with a mere question of law which the courts would
have to decide — and that, the demurrer having been sustained, if the plaintiffs
should insist — they could do no less — upon alleging the same facts as those set
out in their complaint and if another demurrer were afterwards set up, he would
be obliged to dismiss said complaint with costs against the plaintiffs — in spite of

being undoubtedly convinced in the instant case that the plaintiffs absolutely lack
the right to bring the action stated in their complaint.
Being of the opinion that the emendation of the indicated defects is not necessary
— as in this case what has been done does not prejudice the parties — the
appellate court will now proceed to decide the suit according to its merits, as
found in the record and to the legal provisions applicable to the question of law in
controversy so that unnecessary delay and greater expense may be avoided,
inasmuch as, even if all the ordinary proceedings be followed, the suit would be
subsequently decided in the manner and terms that it is now decided in the
opinion thoughtfully and conscientiously formed for its determination.
In order to decide whether the plaintiffs are or are not entitled to invoke, in their
favor, the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code, and whether the same article
is applicable to the question of law presented in this suit, it is necessary to
determine whether the property enumerated in paragraph 5 of the complaint is of
the nature of reservable property; and if so, whether in accordance with the
provision of the Civil Code in article 811, Severina Faz de Leon (the widow of the
deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino) who inherited said property from her son
Apolonio Florentino III (born after the death of his father Apolonio Isabelo) had
the obligation to preserve and reserve same for the relatives, within the third
degree, of her aforementioned deceased son Apolonio III.
The above mentioned article reads:
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired
by the latter gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a brother or
sister, is obliged to reserve such of the property as he may have acquired
by operation of law for the benefit of relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which such property came.
During the marriage of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II and Severina Faz de Leon
two children were born, namely the defendant Mercedes Florentino and Apolonio
Florentino III (born after the death of his father). At the death of Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino under a will, his eleven children succeeded to the inheritance he left,
one of whom, the posthumos son Apolonio III, was given, as his share, the
aforementioned property enumerated in the complaint. In 1891 the said
posthumos son Apolonio Florentino III died and was succeeded by his legitimate
mother Severina Faz de Leon, who inherited the property he left and who on
dying, November 18, 1908, instituted by will as her sole heiress her surviving
daughter, Mercedes Florentino, the defendant herein, who took possession of all
property left by her father, same constituting the inheritance. Included in said
inheritance is the property, specified in by the posthumos son Apolonio Florentino
Page 88 of 100
III from his father Apolonio Isabelo Florentino, and which, at the death of the said
posthumos son, had in turn been inherited by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon.
Even if Severina left in her will said property, together with her own, to her only
daughter and forced heiress, Mercedes Florentino, nevertheless this property had
not lost its reservable nature inasmuch as it originated from the common ancestor
of the litigants, Apolonio Isabelo; was inherited by his son Apolonio III; was
transmitted by same (by operation of law) to his legitimate mother and ascendant,
Severina Faz de Leon.
The posthumos son, Apolonio Florentino III, acquired the property, now claimed
by his brothers, by a lucrative title or by inheritance from his aforementioned
legitimate father, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II. Although said property was
inherited by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon, nevertheless, she was in duty
bound, according to article 811 of the Civil Code, to reserve the property thus
acquired for the benefit of the relatives, within the third degree, of the line from
which such property came.
According to the provisions of law, ascendants do not inherit the reservable
property, but its enjoyment, use or trust, merely for the reason that said law
imposes the obligation to reserve and preserve same for certain designated
persons who, on the death of the said ascendants reservists, (taking into
consideration the nature of the line from which such property came) acquire the
ownership of said property in fact and by operation of law in the same manner as
forced heirs (because they are also such) — said property reverts to said line as
long as the aforementioned persons who, from the death of the ascendant-
reservists, acquire in fact the right of reservatarios (person for whom property is
reserved), and are relatives, within the third degree, of the descendant from whom
the reservable property came.
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property, while there are
living, within the third degree, relatives of the latter, is nothing but a life
usufructuary or a fiduciary of the reservable property received. He is, however, the
legitimate owner of his own property which is not reservable property and which
constitutes his legitime, according to article 809 of the Civil Code. But if,
afterwards, all of the relatives, within the third degree, of the descendant (from
whom came the reservable property) die or disappear, the said property becomes
free property, by operation of law, and is thereby converted into the legitime of
the ascendant heir who can transmit it at his death to his legitimate successors or
testamentary heirs. This property has now lost its nature of reservable property,
pertaining thereto at the death of the relatives, called reservatarios, who belonged
within the third degree to the line from which such property came.lawphil.net
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are
relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest

relative, called reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person
holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one
more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming
same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives within
the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch
as the right granted by the Civil Code in article 811 is in the highest degree
personal and for the exclusive benefit of designated persons who are the relatives,
within the third degree, of the person from whom the reservable property came.
Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be
considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of
one alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the third degree of
relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the part
of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case
of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property came.
These reservatarios have the right to represent their ascendants (fathers and
mothers) who are the brothers of the said deceased person and relatives within
the third degree in accordance with article 811 of the Civil Code.
In this case it is conceded without denial by defendants, that the plaintiffs
Encarnacion, Gabriel and Magdalena are the legitimate children of the first
marriage of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II; that Ramon, Miguel,
Ceferino, Antonio, and Rosario are both grandchildren of Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino II, and children of his deceased son, Jose Florentino; that the same have
the right to represent their aforementioned father, Jose Florentino; that Emilia,
Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores are the legitimate children of the deceased
Espirita Florentino, one of the daughters of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino II, and represent the right of their aforementioned mother; and that the
other plaintiffs, Jose and Asuncion, have also the right to represent their legitimate
father Pedro Florentino one of the sons of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino II. It is a fact, admitted by both parties, that the other children of the
first marriage of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II died without issue so
that this decision does not deal with them.
There are then seven "reservatarios" who are entitled to the reservable property
left at the death of Apolonio III; the posthumos son of the aforementioned
Apolonio Isabelo II, to wit, his three children of his first marriage — Encarnacion,
Gabriel, Magdalena; his three children, Jose, Espirita and Pedro who are
represented by their own twelve children respectively; and Mercedes Florentino,
his daughter by a second marriage. All of the plaintiffs are the relatives of the
deceased posthumos son, Apolonio Florentino III, within the third degree (four of
whom being his half-brothers and the remaining twelve being his nephews as they
are the children of his three half-brothers). As the first four are his relatives within
Page 89 of 100
the third degree in their own right and the other twelve are such by
representation, all of them are indisputably entitled as reservatarios to the
property which came from the common ancestor, Apolonio Isabelo, to Apolonio
Florentino III by inheritance during his life-time, and in turn by inheritance to his
legitimate mother, Severina Faz de Leon, widow of the aforementioned Apolonio
Isabelo Florentino II.
In spite of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code already cited, the trial
judge refused to accept the theory of the plaintiffs and, accepting that of the
defendants, absolved the latter from the complaint on the ground that said article
is absolutely inapplicable to the instant case, inasmuch as the defendant Mercedes
Florentino survived her brother, Apolonio III, from whom the reservable property
came and her mother, Severina Faz de Leon, the widow of her father, Apolonio
Isabelo Florentino II; that the defendant Mercedes, being the only daughter of
Severina Faz de Leon, is likewise her forced heiress; that when she inherited the
property left at the death of her mother, together with that which came from her
deceased brother Apolonio III, the fundamental object of article 811 of the Code
was thereby complied with, inasmuch as the danger that the property coming
from the same line might fall into the hands of strangers had been avoided; and
that the hope or expectation on the part of the plaintiffs of the right to acquire the
property of the deceased Apolonio III never did come into existence because there
is a forced heiress who is entitled to such property.
The judgment appealed from is also founded on the theory that article 811 of the
Civil Code does not destroy the system of legitimate succession and that the
pretension of the plaintiffs to apply said article in the instant case would be
permitting the reservable right to reduce and impair the forced legitimate which
exclusively belongs to the defendant Mercedes Florentino, in violation of the
precept of article 813 of the same Code which provides that the testator cannot
deprive his heirs of their legitime, except in the cases expressly determined by law.
Neither can he impose upon it any burden, condition, or substitution of any kind
whatsoever, saving the provisions concerning the usufruct of the surviving spouse,
citing the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of January 4, 1911.
The principal question submitted to the court for decision consists mainly in
determining whether they property left at the death of Apolonio III, the posthumos
son of Apolonio Isabelo II, was or was not invested with the character of
reservable property when it was received by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon.
The property enumerated by the plaintiffs in paragraph 5 of their complaint came,
without any doubt whatsoever, from the common ancestor Apolonio Isabelo II,
and when, on the death of Apolonio III without issue the same passed by operation
of law into the hands of his legitimate mother, Severina Faz de Leon, it became
reservable property, in accordance with the provision of article 811 of the Code,

with the object that the same should not fall into the possession of persons other
than those comprehended within the order of person other than those
comprehended within the order of succession traced by the law from Apolonio
Isabelo II, the source of said property. If this property was in fact clothed with the
character and condition of reservable property when Severina Faz de Leon
inherited same from her son Apolonio III, she did not thereby acquire the
dominion or right of ownership but only the right of usufruct or of fiduciary with
the necessary obligation to preserve and to deliver or return it as such reservable
property to her deceased son's relatives within the third degree, among whom is
her daughter, Mercedes Florentino.
Reservable property neither comes, nor falls under, the absolute dominion of the
ascendant who inherits and receives same from his descendant, therefore it does
not form part of his own property nor become the legitimate of his forced heirs. It
becomes his own property only in case that all the relatives of his descendant shall
have died (reservista) in which case said reservable property losses such
character.
With full right Severina Faz de Leon could have disposed in her will of all her own
property in favor of her only living daughter, Mercedes Florentino, as forced
heiress. But whatever provision there is in her will concerning the reservable
property received from her son Apolonio III, or rather, whatever provision will
reduce the rights of the other reservatarios, the half brothers and nephews of her
daughter Mercedes, is unlawful, null and void, inasmuch as said property is not her
own and she has only the right of usufruct or of fiduciary, with the obligation to
preserve and to deliver same to the reservatarios, one of whom is her own
daughter, Mercedes Florentino.
It cannot reasonably be affirmed, founded upon an express provision of law, that
by operation of law all of the reservable property, received during lifetime by
Severina Faz de Leon from her son, Apolonio III, constitutes or forms parts of the
legitime pertaining to Mercedes Florentino. If said property did not come to be the
legitimate and exclusive property of Severina Faz de Leon, her only legitimate and
forced heiress, the defendant Mercedes, could not inherit all by operation of law
and in accordance with the order of legitimate succession, because the other
relatives of the deceased Apolonio III, within the third degree, as well as herself
are entitled to such reservable property.
For this reason, in no manner can it be claimed that the legitime of Mercedes
Florentino, coming from the inheritance of her mother Severina Faz de Leon, has
been reduced and impaired; and the application of article 811 of the Code to the
instant case in no way prejudices the rights of the defendant Mercedes Florentino,
inasmuch as she is entitled to a part only of the reservable property, there being
no lawful or just reason which serves as real foundation to disregard the right to
Page 90 of 100
Apolonio III's other relatives, within the third degree, to participate in the
reservable property in question. As these relatives are at present living, claiming
for it with an indisputable right, we cannot find any reasonable and lawful motive
why their rights should not be upheld and why they should not be granted equal
participation with the defendant in the litigated property.
The claim that because of Severina Faz de Leon's forced heiress, her daughter
Mercedes, the property received from the deceased son Apolonio III lost the
character, previously held, of reservable property; and that the mother, the said
Severina, therefore, had no further obligation to reserve same for the relatives
within the third degree of the deceased Apolonio III, is evidently erroneous for the
reason that, as has been already stated, the reservable property, left in a will by
the aforementioned Severina to her only daughter Mercedes, does not form part of
the inheritance left by her death nor of the legitimate of the heiress Mercedes. Just
because she has a forced heiress, with a right to her inheritance, does not relieve
Severina of her obligation to reserve the property which she received from her
deceased son, nor did same lose the character of reservable property, held before
the reservatarios received same.
It is true that when Mercedes Florentino, the heiress of the reservista Severina,
took possession of the property in question, same did not pass into the hands of
strangers. But it is likewise true that the said Mercedes is not the only reservataria.
And there is no reason founded upon law and upon the principle of justice why the
other reservatarios, the other brothers and nephews, relatives within the third
degree in accordance with the precept of article 811 of the Civil Code, should be
deprived of portions of the property which, as reservable property, pertain to
them.
From the foregoing it has been shown that the doctrine announced by the
Supreme Court of Spain on January 4, 1911, for the violation of articles 811, 968
and consequently of the Civil Code is not applicable in the instant case.
Following the provisions of article 813, the Supreme Court of Spain held that the
legitime of the forced heirs cannot be reduced or impaired and said article is
expressly respected in this decision.
However, in spite of the efforts of the appellee to defend their supposed rights, it
has not been shown, upon any legal foundation, that the reservable property
belonged to, and was under the absolute dominion of, the reservista, there being
relatives within the third degree of the person from whom same came; that said
property, upon passing into the hands of the forced heiress of the deceased
reservista, formed part of the legitime of the former; and that the said forced
heiress, in addition to being a reservataria, had an exclusive right to receive all of

said property and to deprive the other reservatarios, her relatives within the third
degree of certain portions thereof.
Concerning the prayer in the complaint relative to the indemnity for damages and
the delivery of the fruits collected, it is not proper to grant the first for there is no
evidence of any damage which can give rise to the obligation of refunding same. As
to the second, the delivery of the fruits produced by the land forming the principal
part of the reservable property, the defendants are undoubtedly in duty bound to
deliver to the plaintiffs six-sevenths of the fruits or rents of the portions of land
claimed in the complaint, in the quantity expressed in paragraph 11 of the same,
from January 17, 1918, the date the complaint was filed; and the remaining
seventh part should go to the defendant Mercedes.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 6878           September 13, 1913
MARCELINA EDROSO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
PABLO and BASILIO SABLAN, opponents-appellees.
Francisco Dominguez for appellant.
Crispin Oben for appellees.
ESTATES; DUTY OF ASCENDANT, WHO INHERITS THROUGH A DECENDANT, TO
RESERVE THE PROPERTY IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW; ARTICLE 811, CIVIL
CODE.—Property which an ascendant inherits by operation of law from his
descendant and which was inherited by the latter f rom another ascendant of his,
must be reserved by the ascendant heir in favor of uncles of the descendant from
whom the inheritance proceeded, who are his father's brothers, because they are
relatives within the third degree, if they belong to the line whence the property
proceeded, according to the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.
2.ID.; ID.; RIGHTS OF PERSONS FOR WHOM SUCH PROPERTY IS RESERVED.—
Since the reservation does not imply coö wnership of any kind between the
reservor and the reservees, that is, between the ascendant who is the immediate
Page 91 of 100
For the foregoing reasons it follows that with the reversal of the order of decision
appealed from we should declare, as we hereby do, that the aforementioned
property, inherited by the deceased Severina Faz de Leon from her son Apolonio
Florentino III, is reservable property; that the plaintiffs, being relatives of the
deceased Apolonio III within the third degree, are entitled to six-sevenths of said
reservable property; that the defendant Mercedes is entitled to the remaining
seventh part thereof; that the latter, together with her husband Angel Encarnacion,
shall deliver to the plaintiffs, jointly, six-sevenths of the fruits or rents, claimed
from said portion of the land and of the quantity claimed, from January 17, 1918,
until fully delivered; and that the indemnity for one thousand pesos (P1,000)
prayed for in the complaint is denied, without special findings as to the costs of
both instances. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Street, Malcolm and Avanceña, JJ., concur.
heir of the person from whom the inheritance proceeded and who is the actual
owner of the property to be reserved and the relatives within the third degree of
such person, who are merely in their turn and eventually his possible heirs in
second place, if they outlive the heir who .must make the reservation, such
reservees, with only the expectation of inheriting, are not in law entitled to act and
be regarded as though they actually participated in the ownership of the property
to be registered by taking part or pretending to take part in the application for
registration which the reservor presents; the fact being that with such expectation
of inheriting, which is neither a real nor a personal right, but at most a legitimate
expectation of a right, they cannot be better off than a mortgagee who has a real
right to the property that his debtor attempts to register, and yet the Land
Registration Act (No. 496, sec. 19 b) only grants him the right that the application
of the mortgagor cannot be presented without his consent in writing.
3.ID. ; ID. ; RIGHT OF ASCENDANT TO DISPOSE OF OR REGISTER THE PROPERTY
IN His OWN NAME.—The heir of real property who has beyond any doubt the
rights of using and enjoying it, and even of alienating it, is not prevented from
himself alone registering the title to the property he has inherited, merely because
to his right of disposal there is annexed a condition subsequent arising from the
expectation of a right, when the reservees who have that expectation of a right
agreed thereto, provided that, in accordance with the law, the reservable character
of such property in their favor be entered in the record.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
The subject matter of this appeal is the registration of certain property classified
as required by law to be reserved. Marcelina Edroso applied for registration and
issuance of title to two parcels of land situated in the municipality of Pagsanjan,

Province of Laguna, one of 1 hectare 77 ares and 63 centares, and the other 1
hectare 6 ares and 26 centares. Two applications were filed, one for each parcel,
but both were heard and decided in a single judgment.
Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on September
22, 1882. In this marriage they had a son named Pedro, who was born on August 1,
1881, and who at his father's death inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also died
on July 15, 1902, unmarried and without issue and by this decease the two parcels
of land passed through inheritance to his mother, Marcelina Edroso. Hence the
hereditary title whereupon is based the application for registration of her
ownership.
Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan — that is, two uncles german of
Pedro Sablan — appeared in the case to oppose the registration, claiming one of
two things: Either that the registration be denied, "or that if granted to her the
right reserved by law to the opponents be recorded in the registration of each
parcel." (B. of E., 11, 12.)
The Court of Land Registration denied the registration and the application
appealed through a bill of exceptions.
Registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels of land in
question partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved and that
in such a case application could only be presented jointly in the names of the
mother and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.
The appellant impugns as erroneous the first idea advanced (second assignment of
error), and denies that the land which are the subject matter of the application are
required by law to be reserved — a contention we regard as indefensible.
Facts: (1) The applicant acquired said lands from her descendant Pedro Sablan by
inheritance; (2) Pedro Sablan had acquired them from his ascendant Victoriano
Sablan, likewise by inheritance; (3) Victoriano Sablan had likewise acquired them
by inheritance from his ascendants, Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez,
they having been adjudicated to him in the partition of hereditary property had
between him and his brothers. These are admitted facts.
A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without a
valuable consideration [gratuitous title], and it is so characterized in article 968 of
the Civil Code, for he who acquires by inheritance gives nothing in return for what
he receives; and a very definite conclusion of law also is that the uncles german
are within the third degree of blood relationship.
Page 92 of 100
The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the
latter acquired without a valuable consideration from another ascendant,
or from a brother or sister, is under obligation to reserve what he has
acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are within the third
degree and belong to the line whence the property proceeded. (Civil Code,
art. 811.)
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two
parcels of land which he had acquired without a valuable consideration — that is,
by inheritance from another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having acquired
them by operation of law, she is obligated to relatives within the third degree and
belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands
proceeded. The trial court's ruling that they partake of the nature property
required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with the law.
But the appellant contends that it is not proven that the two parcels of land in
question have been acquired by operation of law, and that only property acquired
without a valuable consideration, which is by operation of law, is required by law
to reserved.
The appellees justly argue that this defense was not alleged or discussed in first
instance, but only herein. Certainly, the allegation in first instance was merely that
"Pedro Sablan acquired the property in question in 1882, before the enforcement
of the Civil Code, which establishes the alleged right required by law to be
reserved, of which the opponents speak; hence, prescription of the right of action;
and finally, opponents' renunciation of their right, admitting that it existed and
that they had it" (p. 49).
However that be, it is not superflous to say, although it may be unnecessary, that
the applicant inherited the two parcels of land from her son Pedro, who died
"unmarried and without issue." The trial court so held as a conclusion of fact,
without any objection on the appellant's part. (B. of E., 17, 20.) When Pedro Sablan
died without issue, his mother became his heir by virtue of her right to her son's
legal portion under article 935 of the Civil Code:
In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his
ascendants shall from him, to the exclusion of collaterals.
The contrary could only have occurred if the heiress had demonstrated that any of
these lands had passed into her possession by free disposal in her son's will; but
the case presents no testamentary provision that demonstrate any transfer of
property from the son to the mother, not by operation of law, but by her son's
wish. The legal presumption is that the transfer of the two parcels of land was

abintestate or by operation of law, and not by will or the wish of the predecessor
in interest. (Act No. 190, sec. 334, No. 26.) All the provision of article 811 of the
Civil Code have therefore been fully complied with.
If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal heiress of his
property, all he left at death would not be required by law to be reserved, but only
what he would have perforce left her as the legal portion of a legitimate ascendant.
The legal portion of the parents or ascendants is constituted by one-half of
the hereditary estate of the children and descendants. The latter may
unrestrictedly dispose of the other half, with the exception of what is
established in article 836. (Civil Code, art. 809.)
In such case only the half constituting the legal portion would be required by law
to be reserved, because it is what by operation of law could full to the mother from
her son's inheritance; the other half at free disposal would not have to be reserved.
This is all that article 811 of the Civil Code says.
No error has been incurred in holding that the two parcels of land which are the
subject matter of the application are required by law to be reserved, because the
interested party has not proved that either of them became her inheritance
through the free disposal of her son.
Proof testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress who alleges it. It must
be admitted that a half of Pedro Sablan's inheritance was acquired by his mother
by operation of law. The law provides that the other half is also presumed to be
acquired by operation of law — that is, by intestate succession. Otherwise, proof to
offset this presumption must be presented by the interested party, that is, that the
other half was acquired by the man's wish and not by operation of law.
Nor is the third assignments of error admissible — that the trial court failed to
sustain the renunciation of the right required by law to be reserved, which the
applicant attributes to the opponents. Such renunciation does not appear in the
case. The appellant deduces it from the fact that the appellees did not contradict
the following statement of hers at the trial:
The day after my brother-in-law Pablo Sablan  dies and was buried, his brother
came to my house and said that those rice lands were mine, because we had
already talked about making delivery of them. (p. 91).
The other brother alluded to is Basilio Sablan, as stated on page 92. From the fact
that Basilio Sablan said that the lands belong to the appellant and must be
delivered to her it cannot be deduced that he renounced the right required by law
Page 93 of 100
to be reserved in such lands by virtue of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil
Code, for they really belong to her and must be delivered to her.
The fourth assignments of error set up the defense of prescription of the right of
action. The appellant alleges prescription of the opponent's right of action for
requiring fulfillment of the obligation they attribute to her recording in the
property registry the right required by law to be reserved, in accordance with the
provisions of the Mortgage Law; and as such obligation is created by law, it
prescribed in the time fixed in No. 2 of section 43 of Act No. 190. She adds:
"Prescription of the right alleged to the reserved by force of law has not been
invoked." (Eight allegation.)
The appellant does not state in her brief what those provisions of the Mortgage
Law are. Nor did she do so in first instance, where she says only the following,
which is quoted from the record: "I do not refer to the prescription of the right
required by law to be reserved in the property; I refer to the prescription of the
right of action of those who are entitled to the guaranty of that right for seeking
that guaranty, for those who are entitled to that right the Mortgage Law grants a
period of time for recording it in the property registry, if I remember correctly,
ninety days, for seeking entry in the registry; but as they have not exercised that
right of action, such right of action for seeking here that it be recorded has
prescribed. The right of action for requiring that the property be reserved has not
prescribed, but the right of action for guaranteeing in the property registry that
this property is required by law to be reserved" (p. 69 of the record).
The appellees reply: It is true that their right of action has prescribed for requiring
the applicant to constitute the mortgage imposed by the Mortgage Law for
guaranteeing the effectiveness of the required by law to be reserved; but because
that right of action has prescribed, that property has not been divested of its
character of property required by law to be reserved; that it has such character by
virtue of article 8112 of the Civil Code, which went into effect in the Philippine in
December, 1889, and not by virtue of the Mortgage Law, which only went into
effect in the country by law of July 14, 1893; that from December, 1889, to July,
1893, property which under article 811 of the Civil Code acquired the character of
property reserved by operation of law was such independently of the Mortgage
Law, which did not yet form part of the positive legislation of the country; that
although the Mortgage Law has been in effect in the country since July, 1893, still it
has in no way altered the force of article 811 of the Civil Code, but has operated to
reinforce the same merely by granting the right of action to the persons in whose
favor the right is reserved by operation of law to require of the person holding the
property a guaranty in the form of a mortgage to answer for the enforcement, in
due time, of the right; that to lose the right of action to the guaranty is not to lose
the right itself; that the right reserved is the principal obligation and the mortgage

the accessory obligation, and loss of the accessory does not mean loss of the
principal. (Fifth and sixth allegations.)
The existence of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land
in question being indisputable, even though it be admitted that the right of action
which the Mortgage Law grants as a guaranty of final enforcement of such right
has prescribed, the only thing to be determined by this appeal is the question
raised in the first assignment of error, that is, how said two parcels of land can and
ought to be registered, not in the property registry newly established by the
Mortgage Law, but in the registry newly organized by Act No. 496. But as the have
slipped into the allegations quoted some rather inexact ideas that further obscure
such an intricate subject as this of the rights required to be reserved in Spanish-
Philippine law, a brief disgression on the most essential points may not be out of
place here.
The Mortgage Law of July 14, 1893, to which the appellees allude, is the amended
one of the colonies, not the first enforced in the colonies and consequently in the
Philippines. The preamble of said amended Mortgage Law states:
The Mortgage Law in force in Spain for thirty years went into effect, with
the modifications necessary for its adaptation, in the Antilles on May 1,
1880, and in the Philippines on December 1, 1889, thus commencing in
those regions the renovation of the law on real property, and
consequently of agrarian credit.
The Civil Code went into effect in the Philippines in the same year, 1889, but on
the eight day.
Two kinds of property required by law to be reserved are distinguished in the Civil
Code, as set forth in article 968 thereof, where it says:
Besides the reservation imposed by article 811, the widow or widower contracting
a seconds marriage shall be obliged to set apart for the children and descendants
of the first marriage the ownership of all the property he or she may have required
from the deceased spouse by will, by intestate succession, by gift, or other transfer
without a valuable consideration."
The Mortgage Law of Spain and the first law that went into effect in the Philippines
on December 1, 189, do not contain any provision that can be applied to the right
reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code, for such right is a creation of the Civil
Code. In those laws appear merely the provisions intended to guarantee the
effectiveness of the right in favor of the children of the first marriage when their
father or mother contracts a second marriage. Nevertheless, the holding of the
Page 94 of 100
supreme court of Spain, for the first time set forth in the decision on appeal of
November 8, 1894, has been reiterated:
That while the provisions of articles 977 and 978 of the Civil Code that
tend to secure the right required to be reserved in the property refer
especially to the spouses who contract second or later marriages, they do
not thereby cease to be applicable to the right establishes in article 811,
because, aside from the legal reason, which is the same in both cases, such
must be the construction from the important and conclusive circumstance
that said provisions are set forth in the chapter that deals with
inheritances in common, either testate or intestate, and because article
968, which heads the section that deals in general with property required
by law to be reserved, makes reference to the provisions in article 811;
and it would consequently be contradictory to the principle of the law and
of the common nature of said provisions not to hold them applicable to
that right.
Thus it was again stated in a decision on appeal, December 30, 1897, that: "As the
supreme court has already declared, the guaranties that the Code fixes in article
977 and 978 for the rights required by law to the reserved to which said articles
refer, are applicable to the special right dealt with in article 811, because the same
principle exists and because of the general nature of the provisions of the chapter
in which they are found."
From this principle of jurisprudence it is inferred that if from December, 1889, to
July, 1893, a case had occurred of a right required to be reserved by article 811,
the persons entitled to such right would have been able to institute, against the
ascendant who must make the reservation, proceedings for the assurance and
guaranty that article 977 and 978 grant to the children of a first marriage against
their father or mother who has married again. The proceedings for assurance,
under article 977; are: Inventory of the property subject to the right reserved,
annotation in the property registry of such right reserved in the real property and
appraisal of the personal property; and the guaranty, under article 978, is the
assurance by mortgage, in the case of realty, of the value of what is validly
alienated.
But since the amended Mortgage Law went into effect by law of July 14, 1893, in
the Philippines this is not only a principle of jurisprudence which may be invoked
for the applicability to the right reserved in article 811 of the remedies of
assurance and guaranty provided for the right reserved in article 968, but there is
a positive provision of said law, which is an advantage over the law of Spain, to
wit, article 199, which read thus:

The special mortgage for guaranteeing the right reserved by article 811 of
the Civil Code can only be required by the relatives in whose favor the
property is to be reserved, if they are of age; if minors, it will be require by
the person who should legally represent them. In either case the right of
the persons in whose favor the property must be reserved will be secured
by the same requisites as set forth in the preceding article (relative to the
right reserved by article 968 of the Civil Code), applying to the
person obligated to reserve the right the provisions with respect to
the father.
In article 168 of the same law the new subsection 2 is added in connection with
article 199 quoted, so that said article 168 reads as thus:
Legal mortgage is established:
1. . . .
2. In favor of the relatives to whom article 811 of the Civil Code refers, for
the property required to be reserved, upon the property of the person
obliged to reserve it.
This being admitted, and admitted also that both the litigating parties agree that
the period of ninety days fixed for the right of action to the guaranty, that is, to
require the mortgage that guarantees the effectiveness of the right required by law
to be reserved, has prescribed, it is necessary to lay down a principle in this
matter. Now it should by noted that such action has not prescribed, because the
period of ninety days fixed by the Mortgage Law is not for the exercise of the right
of action of the persons entitled to the right reserved, but for the fulfillment of the
obligation of the person who must make the reservation.
Article 191 of the reads thus: "If ninety days pass without the father's instituting in
court the proceeding to which the foregoing article refers, the relatives themselves
may demand fulfillment, etc., . . . applying, according to said article 199, to the
person obligated to reserve the right the provisions with respect to the father."
Article 203 of the regulation for the application of the Mortgage Law says: "In the
case of article 199 of the law the proceedings to which article 190 thereof refers
will be instituted within the ninety days succeeding the date of the date of the
acceptation of the inheritance by the person obligated to reserve the
property; after this period has elapsed, the interested parties may require the
institution of such proceedings, if they are of age; and in any other case, their legal
representatives."
Page 95 of 100
Thus it clearly appears that the lapse of the ninety days is not the expiration by
prescription of the period for the right must be reserved, but really the
commencement thereof, enables them to exercise it at any time, since no limits is
set in the law. So, if the annotation of the right required by law to be reserved in
the two parcels of land in question must be made in the property registry of the
Mortgage Law, the persons entitled to it may now institute proceedings to that
end, and an allegation of prescription against the exercise of such right of action
cannot be sustained.
Since the applicant confesses that she does not allege prescription of the right of
action for requiring that the property be reserved, for she explicitly so stated at the
trial, and as the case presents no necessity for the proceedings that should be
instituted in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law, this prescription
of the right of action cannot take place, because such right of action does not exist
with reference to instituting proceedings for annotation in the registry of Act No.
496 of the right to the property required by law to be reserved. It is sufficient, as
was done in the present case, to intervene in the registration proceedings with the
claim set up by the two opponents for recording therein the right reserved in
either parcel of land.
Now comes the main point in the appeal. The trial court denied the registration
because of this finding set forth in its decision:
Absolute title to the two parcels of land undoubtedly belongs to the
applicant and the two uncles of the deceased Pedro Sablan, and the
application cannot be made except in the name of all of them in common.
(B. of E., p. 20.)
It must be remembered that absolute title consists of the rights to use, enjoy,
dispose of, and recover. The person who has in himself all these rights has the
absolute or complete ownership of the thing; otherwise, the person who has the
right to use and enjoy will have the usufruct, and the person who has the rights of
disposal and recovery the direct title. The person who by law, act, or contract is
granted the right of usufruct has the first two rights or using an enjoying, and then
he is said not to have the fee simple — that is, the rights of disposal and recovery,
which pertain to another who, after the usufruct expires, will come into full
ownership.
The question set up in the first assignment of error of the appellant's brief is this:
What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to the
reservation of article 811 of the Civil Code?

There are not lacking writers who say, only those of a usufructuary, the ultimate
title belonging to the person in whose favor the reservation is made. If that were
so, the person holding the property could not apply for registration of title, but the
person in whose favor it must be reserved, with the former's consent. This opinion
does not seem to be admissible, although it appears to be supported by decisions
of the supreme court of Spain of May 21, 1861, and June 18, 1880, prior to the Civil
Code, and of June 22, 1895, somewhat subsequent to the enforcement thereof.
Another writer says: "This opinion only looks at two salient points — the usufruct
and the fee simple; the remaining features of the arrangement are not perceived,
but become obscure in the presence of that deceptive emphasis which only brings
out two things: that the person holding the property will enjoy it and that he must
keep what he enjoys for other persons." (Manresa, VII, 189.)
In another place he says: "We do not believe that the third opinion can now be
maintained — that is, that the surviving spouse (the person obliged by article 968
to make the reservation) can be regarded as a mere usufructuary and the
descendants immediately as the owner; such theory has no serious foundation in
the Code." (Ibid., 238.)
The ascendants who inherits from a descendants, whether by the latter's wish or
by operation of law, requires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly
transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes of the right of ownership
belong to him exclusively — use, enjoyment, disposal and recovery. This absolute
ownership, which is inherent in the hereditary title, is not altered in the least, if
there be no relatives within the third degree in the line whence the property
proceeds or they die before the ascendant heir who is the possessor and absolute
owner of the property. If there should be relatives within the third degree who
belong to the line whence the property proceeded, then a limitation to that
absolute ownership would arise. The nature and scope of this limitation must be
determined with exactness in order not to vitiate rights that the law wishes to be
effective. The opinion which makes this limitation consist in reducing the
ascendant heir to the condition in of a mere usufructuary, depriving him of the
right of disposal and recovery, does not seem to have any support in the law, as it
does not have, according to the opinion that he has been expressed in speaking of
the rights of the father or mother who has married again. There is a marked
difference between the case where a man's wish institutes two persons as his
heirs, one as usufructuary and the other as owner of his property, and the case of
the ascendant in article 811 or of the father or mother in article 968. In the first
case, there is not the slightest doubt that the title to the hereditary property
resides in the hereditary owner and he can dispose of and recover it, while the
usufructuary can in no way perform any act of disposal of the hereditary property
(except that he may dispose of the right of usufruct in accordance with the
provisions of article 480 of the Civil Code), or any act of recovery thereof except
Page 96 of 100
the limited one in the form prescribed in article 486 of the Code itself, because he
totally lacks the fee simple. But the ascendants who holds the property required
by article 811 to be reserved, and the father of mother required by article 986 to
reserve the right, can dispose of the property they might itself, the former from his
descendant and the latter from his of her child in first marriage, and recover it
from anyone who may unjustly detain it, while the persons in whose favor the
right is required to be reserved in either case cannot perform any act whatsoever
of disposal or of recovery.
Article 975 states explicitly that the father or mother required by article 9687 to
reserve the right may dispose of the property itself:
Alienation of the property required by law to be reserved which may be
made by the surviving spouse after contracting a second marriage shall be
valid only if at his or her death no legitimate children or descendants of
the first marriage survive, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Mortgage of Law.
It thus appears that the alienation is valid, although not altogether effective, but
under a condition subsequent, to wit: "If at his or her death no legitimate children
or descendants of the first marriage survive."
If the title did not reside in the person holding the property to be reserved, his
alienation thereof would necessarily be null and void, as executed without a right
to do so and without a right which he could transmit to the acquirer. The law says
that the alienation subsists (to subject is to continue to exist) "without prejudice to
the provisions of the Mortgage Law." Article 109 of this Law says:
The possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent that are still
pending may mortgage or alienate it, provided always that he preserve
the right of the parties interested in said conditions by expressly
reserving that right in the registration.
In such case, the child or legitimate descendants of the first marriage in whose
favor the right is reserved cannot impugn the validity of the alienation so long as
the condition subsequent is pending, that is, so long as the remarried spouse who
must reserve the right is alive, because it might easily happen that the person who
must reserve the right should outlive all the person in whose favor the right is
reserved and then there would be no reason for the condition subsequent that
they survive him, and, the object of the law having disappeared, the right required
to be reserved would disappear, and the alienation would not only be valid but
also in very way absolutely effective. Consequently, the alienation is valid when
the right required by law to be reserved to the children is respected; while the

effects of the alienation depend upon a condition, because it will or will not
become definite, it will continue to exist or cease to exist, according to
circumstances. This is what the law establishes with reference to the reservation
of article 968, wherein the legislator expressly directs that the surviving spouse
who contracts a second marriage shall reserve to the children or descendants of
the first marriage ownership. Article 811 says nothing more than that the
ascendants must make the reservation.
Manresa, with his recognized ability, summarizes the subject under the heading,
"Rights and obligations during the existence of the right required by law to be
reserved," in these words:
During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of the right
required by law to be reserved and the extinction thereof, the relatives within the
third degree, after the right that in their turn may pertain to them has
been assured, have only an expectation, and therefore they do not even have the
capacity to transmit that expectation to their heirs.
The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary who should use and enjoy the
things according to their nature, in the manner and form already set forth in
commenting upon the article of the Code referring to use and usufruct.
But since in addition to being the usufructuary he is, even though conditionally,
the owner in fee simple of the property, he can dispose of it in the manner
provided in article 974 and 976 of the same Code. Doubt arose also on this point,
but the Direccion General of the registries, in an opinion of June 25, 1892, declared
that articles 974 and 975, which are applicable by analogy, for they refer to
property reserved by law, reveal in the clearest manner the attitude of the
legislator on this subject, and the relatives with the third degree ought not to be
more privileged in the right reserved in article 811 than the children in the right
reserved by article 975, chiefly for the reason that the right required to be
reserved carries with it a condition subsequent, and the property subject to those
conditions can validly be alienated in accordance with article 109 of the Mortgage
Law, such alienation to continue, pending fulfillment of the condition." (Civil Code,
VI, 270.)
Another commentator corroborates the foregoing in every way. He says:
The ascendants acquires that property with a condition subsequent, to
wit, whether or not there exists at the time of his death relatives within
the third degree of the descendants from whom they inherit in the line
whence the property proceeds. If such relatives exist, they acquire
ownership of the property at the death of the ascendants. If they do not
Page 97 of 100
exist, the ascendants can freely dispose thereof. If this is true, since the
possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent can alienate and
encumber it, the ascendants may alienate the property required by law to
be reserved, but he will alienate what he has and nothing more because
no one can give what does not belong to him, and the acquirer will
therefore receive a limited and revocable title. The relatives within the
third degree will in their turn have an expectation to the property while
the ascendant lives, an expectation that cannot be transmitted to their
heirs, unless these are also within the third degree. After the person who
is required by law to reserve the right has died, the relatives may rescind
the alienation of the realty required by law to be reserved and they will
complete ownership, in fee simple, because the condition and the usufruct
have been terminated by the death of the usufructuary. (Morell, Estudios
sobre bienes reservable, 304, 305.)
The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve the right has,
beyond any doubt at all, the rights of use and usufruct. He has, moreover, for the
reasons set forth, the legal title and dominion, although under a condition
subsequent. Clearly he has, under an express provision of the law, the right to
dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a
condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who possesses or
should possess it and have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a
word, the legal title and dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him
while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been assured, he
can do anything that a genuine owner can do.
On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the right
is reserved cannot dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either
actually, constructively or formally, in their possession; and, moreover, because
they have no title of ownership or of the fee simple which they can transmit to
another, on the hypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the right
should die before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and only
then will they take their place in the succession of the descendants of whom they
are relatives within the third degree, that it to say, a second contingent place in
said legitimate succession in the fashion of aspirants to a possible future legacy. If
any of the persons in whose favor the right is reserved should, after their rights
has been assured in the registry, dare to dispose of even nothing more than the fee
simple of the property to be reserved his act would be null and void, for, as was
definitely decided in the decision on appeal of December 30, 1897, it is impossible
to determine the part "that might pertain therein to the relative at the time he
exercised the right, because in view of the nature and scope of the right required
by law to be reserved the extent of his right cannot be foreseen, for it may
disappear by his dying before the person required to reserve it, just as may even
become absolute should that person die."

Careful consideration of the matter forces the conclusion that no act of
disposal inter vivos of the person required by law to reserve the right can be
impugned by him in whose favor it is reserved, because such person has all,
absolutely all, the rights inherent in ownership, except that the legal title is
burdened with a condition that the third party acquirer may ascertain from the
registry in order to know that he is acquiring a title subject to a condition
subsequent. In conclusion, it seems to us that only an act of disposal mortis
causa in favor of persons other than relatives within the third degree of the
descendants from whom he got the property to be reserved must be prohibited to
him, because this alone has been the object of the law: "To prevent persons
outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life, property that
would otherwise have remained therein." (Decision of December 30, 1897.)
Practically, even in the opinion of those who reduce the person reserving the right
to the condition of a mere usufructuary, the person in whose favor it must be
reserved cannot attack the alienation that may be absolutely made of the property
the law requires to be reserved, in the present case, that which the appellant has
made of the two parcels of land in question to a third party, because the
conditional alienation that is permitted her is equivalent to an alienation of the
usufruct, which is authorized by article 480 of the Civil Code, and, practically, use
and enjoyment of the property required by law to be reserved are all that the
person who must reserve it has during his lifetime, and in alienating the usufruct
all the usefulness of the thing would be transmitted in an incontrovertible manner.
The question as to whether or not she transmits the fee simple is purely
academic, sine re, for it is not real, actual positive, as is the case of the institution of
two heirs, one a usufructuary and the other the owner, by the express wish of the
predecessor in interest.
If the person whom article 811 requires to reserve the right has all the rights
inherent in ownership, he can use, enjoy, dispose of and recover it; and if, in
addition to usufructuary, he is in fact and in law the real owner and can alienate it,
although under a condition, the whole question is reduced to the following terms:
Cannot the heir of the property required by law to reserved, merely because a
condition subsequent is annexed to his right of disposal, himself alone register the
ownership of the property he has inherited, when the persons in whose favor the
reservation must be made degree thereto, provided that the right reserved to
them in the two parcels of land be recorded, as the law provides?
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
Page 98 of 100
It is well known that the vendee under pacto de retracto acquires all the rights of
the vendor:
The vendee substitutes the vendor in all his rights and actions. (Civil Code,
art. 1511.)
If the vendor can register his title, the vendee can also register this same title after
he has once acquired it. This title, however, in its attribute of being disposable, has
a condition subsequent annexed — that the alienation the purchaser may make
will be terminated, if the vendor should exercise the right granted him by article
1507, which says:
Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor reserves to himself the
right to recover the thing sold, with the obligation to comply with article 1518, and
whatever more may have been agreed upon," that is, if he recovers the thing sold
by repaying the vendee the price of the sale and other expenses. Notwithstanding
this condition subsequent, it is a point not at all doubtful now that the vendee may
register his title in the same way as the owner of a thing mortgaged — that is to
say, the latter with the consent of his creditor and the former with the consent of
the vendor. He may alienate the thing bought when the acquirer knows by well
from the title entered in the registry that he acquires a title revocable after a fixed
period, a thing much more certain and to be expected than the purely contingent
expectation of the person in whose favor is reserved a right to inherit some day
what another has inherited. The purpose of the law would be defeated in not
applying to the person who must make the reservation the provision therein
relative to the vendee under pacto de retracto, since the argument in his favor is
the more power and conclusive; ubi eadem ratio, eadem legis dispositivo.
Therefore, we reverse the judgment appealed from, and in lieu thereof decide and
declare that the applicant is entitled to register in her own name the two parcels of
land which are the subject matter of the applicants, recording in the registration
the right required by article 811 to be reserved to either or both of the opponents,
Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, should they survive her; without special findings
as to costs.
Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12957             March 24, 1961

CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Proceso R. Remollo for plaintiffs-appellants.
Leonardo D. Mancao for defendants-appellees.
Succession; Reserva troncal; Reservor has legal title over property subject to a
resolutory condition.—In reserva troncal the reservor has the legal title and
dominion over the reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition. He
may alienate the same but subject to the reservation, i.e., the rights acquired by the
transferee are revoked upon the survival of reservees at the time of death of the
reservor.
Same; Eight of reservee is alienable, subject to a resolutory condition.—
The reserva instituted by law in favor of the heirs within the third degree
belonging to the line from which the reservable property came constitutes a real
right which the reservee may alienate and dispose of, although conditionally, the
condition being that the alienation would transfer ownership to the vendee only if
and when the reservee survives the reservor.
When reservee becomes exclusive owner.—-Upon the death of the reservor,
there being a surviving reservee, the reservable property passes in exclusive
ownership to the latter.
DIZON, J.:
Appellants commenced this action below to secure judgment (1) declaring null
and void the sale executed by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of appellees, the
spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes; (2) ordering the Esparcia spouses to
reconvey to appellants Lot 3368 of the Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan (now
Amlan), Oriental Negros; and (3) ordering all the appellees to pay, jointly and
severally, to appellants the sum of P500.00 as damages, plus the costs of suit. In
their answer appellees disclaimed any knowledge or information regarding the
sale allegedly made on April 20, 1951 by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellants and
alleged that, if such sale was made, the same was void on the ground that Andrea
Gutang had no right to dispose of the property subject matter thereof. They further
alleged that said property had never been in possession of appellants, the truth
being that appellees, as owners, had been in continuous possession thereof since
the death of Francisco Yaeso. By way of affirmative defense and counterclaim, they
further alleged that on July 30, 1951, Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso, as the only
surviving heirs of Francisco Yaeso, executed a public instrument of sale in favor of
the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes, the said sale having been registered
together with an affidavit of adjudication executed by Paulina and Cipriana on July
Page 99 of 100
18, 1951, as sole surviving heirs of the aforesaid deceased; that since then the
Esparcias had been in possession of the property as owners.
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the lower court rendered judgment as
follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
(1) that the sale of Lot No. 3368 made by Andrea Gutang to the plaintiff
spouses Constancio Sienes and Genoveva Silay is void, and the
reconveyance prayed for by them is denied; (2) that the sale made by
Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of defendants Fidel Esparcia and
Paulina Sienes involving the same lot is also void, and they have no valid
title thereto; and (3) that the reservable property in question is part of
and must be reverted to the estate of Cipriana Yaeso, the lone surviving
relative and heir of Francisco Yaeso at the death of Andrea Gutang as of
December 13, 1951. No pronouncement as to the costs.
From the above decision the Sienes spouse interposed the present appeal, their
principal contentions being, firstly, that the lower court erred in holding that Lot
3368 of the Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan was a reservable property; secondly, in
annulling the sale of said lot executed by Andrea Gutang in their favor; and lastly,
in holding that Cipriana Yaeso, as reservee, was entitled to inherit said land.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife, Teresa Ruales,
he had four children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana, while with
his second wife, Andrea Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco. According to
the cadastral records of Ayuquitan, the properties left by Saturnino upon his death
— the date of which does not clearly appear of record — were left to his children
as follows: Lot 3366 to Cipriana, Lot 3367 to Fernando, Lot 3375 to Agaton, Lot
3377 (southern portion) to Paulina, and Lot 3368 (western portion) to Francisco.
As a result of the cadastral proceedings, Original Certificate of Title No. 10275
covering Lot 3368 was issued in the name of Francisco. Because Francisco was a
minor at the time, his mother administered the property for him, declared it in her
name for taxation purposes (Exhs A & A-1), and paid the taxes due thereon (Exhs.
B, C, C-1 & C-2). When Francisco died on May 29, 1932 at the age of 20, single and
without any descendant, his mother, as his sole heir, executed the public
instrument Exhibit F entitled EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND SALE whereby,
among other things, for and in consideration of the sum of P800.00 she sold the
property in question to appellants. When thereafter said vendees demanded from
Paulina Yaeso and her husband Jose Esparcia, the surrender of Original Certificate
of Title No. 10275 — which was in their possession — the latter refused, thus
 Page 100 of 100

giving rise to the filing of the corresponding motion in the cadastral record No.
507. The same, however, was denied (Exhs. 8 & 9).
Thereafter, or more specifically, on July 30, 1951, Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the
surviving half-sisters of Francisco, and who as such had declared the property in
their name, on January 1, 1951 executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel
Esparcia and Paulina Sienes (Exh. 2) who, in turn, declared it in their name for tax
purposes and thereafter secured the issuance in their name of Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-2141 (Exhs. 5 & 5-A).
As held by the trial court, it is clear upon the facts already stated, that the land in
question was reservable property. Francisco Yaeso inherited it by operation of law
from his father Saturnino, and upon Francisco's death, unmarried and without
descendants, it was inherited, in turn, by his mother, Andrea Gutang. The latter
was, therefore, under obligation to reserve it for the benefit of relatives within the
third degree belonging to the line from which said property came, if any survived
her. The record discloses in this connection that Andrea Gutang died on December
13, 1951, the lone reservee surviving her being Cipriana Yaeso who died only on
January 13, 1952 (Exh. 10).
In connection with reservable property, the weight of opinion is that the reserve
creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged
to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third
degree belonging to the line from which the property came (6 Manresa 268-269; 6
Sanchez Roman 1934). This Court has held in connection with this matter that the
reservista has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject
to a resolutory condition; that he is like a life usufructuary of the reservable
property; that he may alienate the same but subject to reservation, said alienation
transmitting only the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservists, the
rights acquired by the transferee being revoked or resolved by the survival of
reservatarios at the time of the death of the reservista (Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil.
295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; and
Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 65 Phil. 279).
On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters Paulina and
Cipriana Yaeso in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was
subject to a similar resolutory condition. The reserve instituted by law in favor of
the heirs within the third degree belonging to the line from which the reservable
property came, constitutes a real right which the reservee may alienate and
dispose of, albeit conditionally, the condition being that the alienation shall
transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the reservee survives the
person obliged to reserve. In the present case, Cipriana Yaeso, one of the
reservees, was still alive when Andrea Gutang, the person obliged to reserve, died.
Thus the former became the absolute owner of the reservable property upon
Andrea's death. While it may be true that the sale made by her and her sister prior
to this event, became effective because of the occurrence of the resolutory
condition, we are not now in a position to reverse the appealed decision, in so far
as it orders the reversion of the property in question to the Estate of Cipriana
Yaeso, because the vendees — the Esparcia spouses did — not appeal therefrom.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision — as above modified — is affirmed, with
costs, and without prejudice to whatever action in equity the Esparcia spouses
may have against the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso for the reconveyance of the
property in question.
Bengzon, Actg. C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Barrera and Paredes, JJ., concur.

The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to
the condition that the vendees would definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the
alienation, only if the vendor died without being survived by any person entitled
to the reservable property. Inasmuch much as when Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana
Yaeso was still alive, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the previous sale
made by the former in favor of appellants became of no legal effect and the
reservable property subject matter thereof passed in exclusive ownership to
Cipriana.