Early Buddhist Kingship

Author(s): Balkrishna G. Gokhale

Source: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Nov., 1966), pp. 15-22
Published by: Association for Asian Studies
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Early Buddhist Kingship

BALKRISHNA G. GOKHALE

M ONARCHY was the dominant political institution of the Buddha's time.

The Enlightened One was on very cordial terms with some of the leading
monarchs of the times, whose interest and patronage early Buddhism appreciated a
great deal. Many a rule of the Vinaya code was discreetly amended in deference to
the convenience of kings such as Bimbisara and Pasendi, the Kosalan. And quite a
few scions of royal families joined the order of monks and nuns and played a leading
part in the propagation of the creed during its early critical years.'
The Buddha came from a world of tribal oligarchs and had nostalgic sympathies
for that form of organization whose spirit he attempted to infuse into the structure of
his own Samgha. This world, however, was in a state of disintegration, and his ad-
vice to the Vajjians, threatened as they were by the expansionist parricide Ajatasattu,2
almost sounds like a requiem for the tribal republics of the fifth century B. C. India.
Whatever his personal choice in the matter of forms of political organization, the
Buddha was realist enough to recognize that monarchy had come to stay and, as
far as he could see into the future, would remain the dominant form of political or-
ganization. He and the early Buddhists, therefore, came to terms with the institution
of monarchy and proceeded to formulate their own political philosophy in an en-
deavor to influence its development and final form.
The early Buddhist philosophy of kingship is a compound of three distinct atti-
tudes. Although the early Buddhists betray feelings of disquiet, bordering on fear,
about the nature and functions of kingship as it existed in their times, they see no al-
ternative to it and declare it to be absolutely essential to prevent humanity from
lapsing into a state of anarchy. Finally, confronted with the fact of kingship and the
absolute necessity for it for orderly human existence, they attempt to tame absolute
political power by infusing into it a spirit of higher morality.
Before going into the details of the early Buddhist philosophy of kingship in its
three different aspects, it is necessary to state the chronological limits of this study. By
early Buddhism we mean that creed whose texts are preserved in the Pali language
and especially in the Vinaya and Nikaya sections of the Pali Tipitaka. The chrono-
logical boundaries of this early Buddhism are necessarily based on the generally ac-
cepted dates for the compilation of Canonical Pali Literature. Assuming that the
parinibbana of the Buddha occurred in 486 B.C.,3 the terminus ad quo for this litera-

Balkrishna G. Gokhale is Professor of History and Director of the Asian Studies Program at Wake
Forest College.
1 See Mahdvagga, I, 23, 39, 40-48.
2Digha Nikdya (London, I890-I9II) II, pp. 73-75; all the Pali texts used in this paper are from the
Pali Text Society's series unless otherwise indicated. The following abbreviations are used: Digha Nikdya-
DN; Majjhima Nikdya-MN; Samyutta Nikdya-SmN; Anguttara Nikdya-AN; Idtaka-I; Sutta
Nipata-SN; and Milinda Panha-MP.
3 For a summary of various theories on the date of Buddha's parinibbdna see Madan Moh
journal of Indian History, XXXIX, iii (December, I96I) pp. 359-363.

15

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 16 BALKRISHNA G. GOKHALE

ture cannot be set earlier than

Barhut and Samchi clearly indicates4 that by ioo B.C. the Pali Canon was already
organized into Nikayas and Pitakas, that it had emerged, more or less, in its com-
pleted form at least no later than 5o B.C. This canonical literature, therefore, repre-
sents a compilatory and editorial activity largely of the fourth to first centuries B.C.
and the Buddhism revealed in the pages of this literature is essentially a pre-Asokan
creed. Although this is an age of expansionist kingdoms, it is not yet an age of em-
pires, properly called, and this agrees with the general tenor of some of the philo-
sophical and organizational ideas of the Arthasadstra of Kautalya.

In order to understand the specific Buddhist variations on the common theories of

ancient Indian polity, we must first examine the early Buddhist view of kingship as it
actually functioned during this age. The first, and perhaps the most important, char-
acteristic of kingship that the early Buddhist texts point out is its overwhelming
power. In its destructive aspects, royal power is often thought to have the calamitous
potential of a conflagration or a flood.5 It was often exercized arbitrarily, resulting in
unpredictable violence and expropriation6 of people's property. Moreover, the kings
are always greedy, whatever the extent of their own oppulence, and are always search-
ing for pretexts allowing them to acquire more wealth or territory.7 They are gen-
erally intolerant of dissent from their own views,8 their wayward wrath often result-
ing in the death or deportation of some of their subjects." Finally, the fear of their
tyranny is so constant and great that some people are compelled to flee to the wilds or
repair to the sanctuary of a monastic order for their own safety.'0
However undesirable the propensities of some of the kings may have been, king-
ship as an institution was considered absolutely essential to orderly human life. The
early Buddhists had their own theory of the origin of the state. According to this
theory, in the very beginning, in the pristine state of humanity, all men were vir-
tuous. Each respected the rights of others and fulfilled his own obligations con-
scientiously. There was no theft, there was no lying or cheating and there was no
violence. WVith such idyllic conditions, the state was superfluous as a regulatory agency
and hence did not exist. But later, we are told, the standard of human behavior
deteriorated. Untruth, deceit, theft and violence ruled the lives of men as every man's
hand was against his fellow beings and might prevailed over right. This was the
state of anarchy, the state of mdtsyanynya in Kautalyan parlance. The law of the
jungle made life impossible and humans then decided to elect one among them to be
the king and to entrust to him the task of enforcing law and order. Thus was created
the first king, called "acclaimed by the many"-mahdsammata. In return for his labors
toward the establishment of law and order, justice and harmony, the king was paid
one-sixth of the produce of each of the subjects. The establishment of kingship then

4-T. W. Rhys Davids, Buddhist India (Calcutta, I959) pp. 73-74.

5SmN (London, I884-I894), IV, pp. 324-325.
6 Ibid, I, pp. 89-go; on p. 32 in dem is an implied comparison between kings and thieves in th
tendencies to deprive persons of their property. In MP (London, I928) p. I92, the kings are described as
taking the best of everything.
7 J (London, I962) p. 450; also MP, p. I43.
8MP, p. 29.
9MN (London, I888-I925) I, p. 23I.
10 MP, p. 32.

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 EARLY BUDDHIST KINGSHIP 17

ended the anarchy into which societ

sible."
But, ifthe first king was elected on
an institution passed far beyond tha
king was no longer based on any overt
sion of certain tangibles and intang
commonly mentioned-one is a full t
large, strong and well-equipped arm
over territory, the concrete basis of s
stated as comprising the capital (rajadhani), towns (nigama), villages (gdma),
countryside (janapada) and border areas (paccanta)."4 Over all these the king had
control and the right to tax the people resident therein. It was this wealth that
enabled a king to maintain his armed forces, which enabled him to defend his own
position. The army is generally described as four-fold (caturangini) consisting of the
elephant corps, cavalry, the chariot corps and infantry.15
The Tesakuna Jataka contains some very interesting material on early Buddhist
political ideas, among which is the concept of the five powers (baldni) which are
the bases of kingship.'6 These five powers are described as strength of arms (baha-
ba/am), strength of wealth (bhogabalam), strength of ministers (amaccaba/am),
prestige of high birth (abhijaccabalam) and strength of intellect (paniiabalam), the
last being the greatest of royal strengths. It is interesting to compare these constit-
uents of royal power with the Kautalyan list of the prakritis'7 and find that three ele-
ments-ministers, army and treasury-are common to both. We have already referred
to the importance of the land (janapada) as one of the constituents of sovereignty.
In another text there is a reference to subordinate princes who follow a mighty king
(kuttaraiano or kuddaradano)18 and these may be regarded as the equivalent of the
Kautalyan ally. There is no reference to forts or fortifications being regarded as a
distinct element in kingship in Buddhist literature, although references to fortified
capitals, towns and frontier places are fairly frequent.'9 We have, thus, in Pali litera-
ture most of the ideas on constituents of sovereignty enumerated in such a well-
organized fashion by Kautalya.

Kingship is generally regarded as a reward for meritorious actions performed in

past births.20 The Pali texts generally insist that a king be a khattiya and belong to a
family with a hoary lineage. This is in keeping with the early Buddhist view that the
khattiyas are the highest among classes and castes.21 Nor is a woman favored as a

1 DN, III, pp. 84-93; also see J, II, pp. 352-353, III, p. 454, IV, p. 296, V, pp. 462-464; for the
phussaratha ceremony indicating the survival of an elective monarchy see , III, pp. 238-239, IV, pp. 39-
46, V, p. 248, VI, pp. 39ff.
12DN, I, p. 134.
13 SmN, I, p. 84.
14See J, II, p. 2, III, p. 3; AN (London, i885-i888), V, p. Ioi.
15 SN, I, p. 84.
16 J, V, pp. I20-I2I.
17 Kautiliya Arthas'astra, VI, I, I.
18 AN, V, p. 22; also see DN, II, p. 235.
19 SmN, IV, p. I94; DN, II, p. 83; MP, p. 58.
20 SmN, I, p. 222.
21 See Ibid., I, p. 69; AN, V, p. 327.

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 18 BALKRISHNA G. GOKHALE

ruler.22 A good king is expected to be charitable, moral, sacrificing, just, humble,

penitent, nonwrathful, nonviolent, patient and harmless.23 In short, the ideal king
should be pre-eminently a moral being.
A good king, however, should also subserve the traditions of attha and dhamma.24
The terms attha and dhamma may be rendered, in our present context, as actions
conducive to prosperity and righteousness.25 The Jatakas mention a specific officer
whose task it was to advise the king on attha and dhamma (atthadhammanusasaka-
macco).26 Dhamma is often equated with sama which may be translated as impar-
tiality and a sense of justice.27 In fact the ideal king is often called dhammiko dham-
-- 28

marala.
When a king is endowed with the aforeme
sovereignty. The concept of sovereignty is
terms,-vasa, adhipacca, dnubhdva, siri and i
thority, control and influence; adhipacca
lordship and sovereignty; anubhdva stand
splendor, glory and majesty; and issariya
All of them collectively imply a conditio
orders to all and receiving orders from
power relationships which carries along
which are the duties of the office of kings
power for there is invariably associated
risma." This spiritual power is variously acq
symbols.

The association of quasi-divine powers with kingship is a tradition going back to

Vedic literature. This divinity of the king derived from the performance of certain
mystical sacrifices.31 The Buddhists, with their antipathy to sacrificial ritual involving
slaughter, naturally cannot be expected to base the charisma of their ideal king on his
performance of sacrifices, and a text denounces a king performing Vedic sacrifices as
guilty of tormenting himself as well as others.32 They are, however, not averse to us-
ing non-ratiocinative elements in their concept of the royal charisma. The ideal king
is described as a "holy" person, a person in whom resides some mystic power. The
Cakkavatti (Universal Monarch) has almost all the characteristics of a Bodhisattva
like the marks of great men (mahapurisalakkhanani), and on death his funeral is
conducted in the same fashion as that of a Buddha.33 As in the case of a Buddha there

22J, I, p. I53*
23 III, p. 274; SmN, I, p. 222.
24 DN, III, p. 6I.
25 See T. W. Rhys Davids and William Stede (Eds.), Pdli Dictionary (London, I959), pp. 23, 335-
339.
26 J, II, p. 30; an officer called atthacaraka is also mentioned but his duties were judicial (cf. at-
thakarana), 1, IV, p. 230.
27 1, III, p. 2.
28 See the author's paper on Dhammiko DhammarCijd in Indica (Bombay, I953), pp. I6I-I65.
29 SmN, I, pp. 43-44, 222; IV, p. 246.
30 Pdli Dictionary, pp. I00, I23, 604, 711.
31 U. N. Ghoshal, A History of Indian Political Ideas (Bombay, I959), pp. 24-25.
32 MN, I, p. 344.
33 See SN, Sela Sutta; MN, II, p. 134; DN, II, pp. I4I-I42.

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 EARLY BUDDHIST KINGSHIP 19

cannot be more than one Cakkava

dead Cakkavatti resides in his s
scribed as an act of merit which m
of a stupa over the remains of a "
merit, has parallels with the cu
Siva as practiced in classical Ang
the existence, in an embryonic for
To all appearances, therefore, kingship is endowed with mystical power or a
charisma which makes obedience on the part of subjects to the ruler a quasi-religious
duty. This charisma is made manifest in a number of things associated with the king.
It resides in his flag37 or in the conch with the spiral turning rightwise used during
his coronation.38 It is definitely associated with the insignia of kingship such as the
slippers, sword, diadem, fan, throne and the white umbrella.39 It is even associated
with the place where he was born, the place where he was crowned and the place
where he wins his most significant victory, which are declared as "memorable"
spots.40
But the most important symbols of sovereignty are the wheel, the white umbrella,
the jewel, the magic elephant and the magic horse.4' The wheel is likened to the disc
of the sun and is more a mystical symbol than a material object.42 In order that it may
appear before him, a Cakkavatti has to keep the uposatha (fast and penance) on
the full moon day, purify himself and meditate.43 It is his personal acquisition and
cannot be handed down in succession and it sinks or slips down a little as the king
approaches the end of his life.44 The umbrella is pure white and stainless, with a
handle of firm wood and with many hundreds of ribs.43 The jewel is bright and
beautiful, eight-faced, well-cut, four cubits in thickness and in circumference like the
nave of a cart-wheel. Its brilliance is such that it surpasses all and spreads around for
a league on every side.46 The elephant (uposatho ndgardja) is described as all white,
sevenfold strong, with a strength equal to that of I0,OOO men, firm, wonderful in
power and capable of flying through the air. The horse is also all white with a crow-
black head and a dark mane and able to fly.47 It is evident that the whole symbolism is
in some ways associated with powers of nature, especially the sun. This parapher-
nalia is secured not through the performance of any Vedic sacrifices but through
piety, morality and mystic contemplation. It is not necessarily a gift from some

34 MN, III, pp. 65 if.

35DN, II, p. I43-
36 See L. P. Briggs, The Ancient Khmer Empire (Philadelphia, I951), p. 90.
37 Indra asks the gods to look at his flag for inspiration in their war against the demons, SmN, I,
p. 219.

18 1, IV, p- 349.
39 SmN, I, p. 226; MP, p. 330.
40 AN, I, p. io6; these spots are declared as memorable or saraniyani.
41 See SmN, V, p. 99.
42 T. W. and C. A. Rhys Davids (Trans.), Dialogues of the Buddha (London, I956-I959), II, p. 202,
Note 3; MP, p. 107.
43 DN, II, p. I72.
44Ibid., III, pp. 59-60.
45 MP, p. 226.
46 Ibid, pp. I7 I8 282
47 DN, II, p. 174; also MP, pp. I 41, 282.

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 20 BALKRISHNA G. GOKHALE

divine source but may be obtained by anyone who is morally elevated, spiritually
pure and intellectually and mentally dedicated to morality or dhamma.

It is in the concept of dhamma that the Buddhist ideas on kingship find their ulti-
mate conclusion. The Cakkavatti is dhammiko dhammardja. He is devoted to
dhamma, honors it, is deferential towards it, worships it, makes it his banner and
treats it as his overlord.48 In another text dhamma is declared to be the ruler of rulers,
the highest in the world.49 This dhamma, as pointed out earlier, is equated with jus-
tice (ndya) and equity (sama) rectitude and the highest morality.
In this line of reasoning, then, the state is never an end in itself but rather a means
to an end. As an instrument, it is possessed of total power that encompasses within its
jurisdiction all areas of human activity. It is an awesome power and it is per se
neither moral nor immoral. But it cannot exist outside of human beings for it is
not just an abstraction or a thought-construct; it can be exercised only through hu-
man agencies. It is this association of total power with human beings that creates the
dilemma of power. Orderly human existence is not possible without power but
power is easily misused and often is misused. The Buddhists set themselves to find
an answer to this problem of total power. Divine retribution as a punishment for
the misuse of power, as a theory of deterrance, did not appeal to them. For the early
Buddhists the world was a rational structure wherein rational laws should prevail
and where the iron law of cause and effect, with its concomitant of personal moral
responsibility, held sway. For them the state was not merely a punitive instrument
but primarily an agency for the moral transformation of man as a political animal.
They found in morality of a higher order the solution to the dilemma of power.
This higher morality began with the king observing the Five Commandments.50
But the ideal king was expected to do much more than observe the basic precepts. He
was to cleanse his mind of all traces of avarice (lobha), ill-will (dosa) and intellectual
error (moha). He was also expected to cultivate the virtue of noninjury (avihimsa)
and rule without the aid of force (danda) and weapons of destruction (sattha).5' His
functions were not restricted to the establishment of orderly social, economic and
political relationships among his subjects but extended to bring about a moral trans-
formation in the nature of his subjects. This he was to achieve through setting the
highest personal example by living a life of contemplation, purity and moral en-
deavor. If he fails in these tasks then his power is weakened and social disintegration
follows. For the kingdom is then threatened by bandits and lawless elements and
there is no security of life and property.52 Furthermore, if a king acts immorally, his
actions interfere with the functions of nature, such as timely rain, and there arise the
three dangers of famine, epidemics and armed conflicts.53
Morality, thus, stands not only between anarchy and orderly human relations, but
immorality also leads to a dislocation of natural functions and catastrophic conse-
quences. If there is no morality there can be no state which promises order and secu-
rity for life and property. Without morality even the progression of the functions of

48AN, I, pp. IO9-IIO.

49 Ibid., III, p. i5i; DN, III, p. 95.
50 See DN, II, p. I74.
51 Ibid., II, p. i86.
52 AN, I, p. 68.
53 , II, p. I24; also see J, IIL p. 368 where the role of the king as rain-maker is referred to.

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 EARLY BUDDHIST KINGSHIP 21

nature is seriously affected for the

find the Vedic Rta equated with d
moral opportunities and equity in punishments (sama) (which is another word for
justice [ftdya]). When such a just and moral state rules it tends to increase the good
and welfare of the subjects.54

This concept of a political society is that of a great family presided over by a

morally elevated being with a father image.55 The Buddha explains this by stating that
even as a father is near and dear unto his sons the Cakkavatti is beloved of all of his
subjects. It is this very sentiment that is echoed by Asgoka (circa 273-232 B. C.) when
he says, "All men are my children. Just as in the case of my own children I desire
that they may get welfare and happiness in this and the next world so do I also de-
sire for all."5"
In this great family the interests of its members are complementary rather than
conflicting. There is an insistence on equality of spiritual opportunities, although
hierarchical economic and social relations are almost taken for granted. The goal is to
prevent hierarchical relations from restricting equal opportunities for moral and
spiritual development and in the administration of justice. It is emphasized that the
entire effort of the state be inspired by a moral earnestness and that all values of life
be strictly interpreted in moral terms. Furthermore, this morality must be universal in
its scope and the nature of offenses and the intensity of punishments must be or-
dered by impartial ethical considerations. This was a distinct advance on the emergent
Brahmanical theories of justice and punishment based on the ritual status of persons
graded into a hierarchy of castes.
In another dimension, too, early Buddhist political thought differs from the
Kautalyan concepts. Of the two schools of thought in ancient India, namely artha and
dharma, early Buddhist political thought deviated in significant measure from both,
although its emphasis on the primordial importance of dharma in political relations
would tempt one to include it in the dharma school. The symbolism used is also
distinct for whereas a sceptre or rod (danda) is the common symbol used for the
authority of the state in Kautalyan and Dharmasastra theories, in early Buddhist po-
litical thought it is the wheel (cakka). Then there is the principle of nonviolence
(ahimsa). The Buddha himself admits the difficulty of ruling without the use of force
in any manner and under all circumstances,57 and the history of Buddhist kingship
in India and elsewhere shows as much use of violence in internal and external rela-
tions as in other systems. Nor is it known that the Buddha advised total disarmament
by a state. One measure that the Buddha took in expressing his disapproval of the
institution of war was to forbid the monks from witnessing army parades and re-
views. In spite of these seeming compromises in practice, early Buddhist political
thought insists on the principle of nonviolence and noninjury as the ideal basis of
statecraft and hopes to minimize the violence inherent in the power of the state by
ordaining that this power be, at all times, restrained by morality.

54AN, I, P. 76; bahujana hitaya . .. atthdya, hitaiya, sukhdya.

55 MN, III, p. I76.
56 First Separate Kalinga Edict; S. Bhattacharya, Select As'okan Epigraphs (Calcutta, I960), p. 97;
there are so many similarities between political ideals of the Early Buddhists and those of As'oka that it
seems that Asoka followed the Early Buddhist political tradition rather than that laid down by Kautalya.
-57 SmN, I, p. I I6.

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 22 BALKRISHNA G. GOKHALE

What then, were the distinct co

in ancient India? The most important element introduced was the acceptance of a
higher morality as the guiding spirit behind the state. The state is created through a
demand for the rule of morality and it is this morality that stands between social order
and incipient or actual anarchy. Secondly, the early Buddhists also put forward the
theory of two "wheels," two distinct realms of action by positing two separate but
equally important ideals of a Cakkavatti, the leader of the temporal realm, and the
Bodhisattva, pre-eminent in the spiritual domain. The theory of the two domains
is well expressed by a putative statement of Ajatasattu (circa 493-462 B.C.) at the
commencement of the First Buddhist Council held in Rajagaha when he said to
the assembled monks, "Yours is the authority of the spirit as mine is of power"
(dhammacakka and dndcakka).58
This theory of two domains was in a process of evolution even during the life-
time of the Buddha himself as is indicated by the growth of the rules of the Buddhist
code of monastic discipline. There was no rivalry between these two domains for each
was expected to reinforce the other. In this context the Buddhist Order (Samgha) be-
came the repository of the conscience of the state. In Brahmanical political thought
we have practically no such theory of separation of powers and for obvious reasons.
Finally there was the early Buddhist argument that morality exists for and by itself
and cannot be associated with notions of ritual purity and impurity; the state must
function as an instrument of this higher and universal morality for the transforma-
tion of man from being a merely political creature into a wholly moral being.

58 Samantapasadika-Commentary on DN (London, I924-I938), I, p. IO; Mahdvagga, V, i.

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