HAZOP

HAZARD AND OPERABILITY

STUDY
 What Is HAZOP?
It is the application of a formal systematic
rigorous examination to the process and
engineering facets of a production facility
for identifying and assessing the
consequences of perceived maloperations
of equipment and associated operator.
 Why needs HAZOP?
To identify hazards
To look on failure probability/problem
To study on consequences in case of
failures.
 When HAZOP Is Required
For new design
For existing design
For modified plants
 HAZOP Objective
To identify how process deviations could
be prevented or minimised.
- HAZOPs manage to identify almost all
possible deviations.
- HAZOPs manage to suggest changes
and corrective actions which need to be
taken.
 What needs for HAZOP
Process drawings and instrumentation –
flowsheet description and overview;
Mass and energy balance;
Safety procedure documents;
Information on raw materials used;
Piping specifications; and
Previous HAZOP report
 HAZOP Team
2 groups:-
Detailed technical knowledge about
the process
good experience in HAZOP and
knowledgeable
HAZOP members:
Leader
Secretary
Process engineer
Control engineer
electrical engineer
Operations specialist
Outline of HAZOP Technique
This is based on the assumptions that the plant:
will perform as designed in the absence of
unintended events which affect the plant
behaviour.
will be managed in a competent manner.
will be operated and maintained in
accordance with good practice and in line
with the design intent.
protective systems will be tested regularly
and kept in good working order.
 HAZOP Procedure
Take a full description of process
Systematically question every part to discover
how deviations from design intent can occur
Consider items relating to plant operability and
safety
Divide plant into sections
Use guide words to identify possible deviations
Deviations are analyzed to determine the
consequences of event.
 Guide Words
Guide words cover every parameter
relevant to the system under review:
FLOW
TEMPERATURE
PRESSURE
VISCOSITY
COMPONENTS, etc.
Guide words:
No
More (High)
Less (Low)
Reverse
Part of
Other than
Definition on Guide Words
NO - no flow when there should be flow;
REVERSE – flow in the opposite direction to
normal operation;
MORE OF (HIGH) – more of any relevant
physical parameter than there should be; e.g.
more flow, more temperature, more pressure,
more viscosity;
LESS OF (LOW) – as for more than but less of
the physical parameter;
PART OF – system composition different
from what it should be;
MORE THAN – More things present than
there should be; e.g. Extra phase,
impurities;
OTHER – what needs to happen other
than in normal operation; e.g. start-up,
shut-down, maintenance, service failure,
etc.
 HAZOP Procedure

Select line

Select deviation e.g. more flow

Go to next deviation NO Is more flow possible?

YES
Is it hazardous? Consider other causes
NO

Is there a solution? Action for outside meeting

Recommendation
In summary:

GUIDE WORDS

Possible Causes Deviation From Consequences

Standard Conditions

Recommendations
 HAZOP Disciplines
The prime objective is to identify problems not to
redesign plant.
Recommend obvious solutions but do not spend
excessive time developing solutions.
Be creative – points offer suggestions
Flowsheet description and overview required
Carry out line by line HAZOP using guide words
Overall flowsheet HAZOP using guide words
 Instrument Notation
Flow

FCV Flow control valve

FI Flow indicator (local)

FIC Flow controller with

indicator in control
room
Level

LI Level indicator (local)

LCV Level control valve

LIC Level controller with indicator in control room

LS Level switch

LAH High level alarm in control room

LAHH Extra high level alarm in control room

Continued

LALL Extra low level alarm in control room

LZHH Extra high level trip switch

LAZHH Extra high level trip with alarm in control room

Pressure

PCV Pressure control valve

PSV Pressure safety valve

PI Pressure indicator

PAH High pressure alarm (local)

PAL Low pressure alarm (local)

PAHH Pressure alarm high high

Temperature

TI Temperature indicator (local)

TIC Temperature controller with indicator in control room

TZLL Extra low temperature trip switch

Expansion of Guide Words
No Flow: Wrong routing, blockage, burst
pipe, large leak, equipment failure, etc.
Reverse flow: Incorrect operation,
defective N.R.V, etc.
More Flow: Increased pumping capacity,
control faults, cross connection of
systems, etc.
Less flow: Line restriction, filter blockage,
defective pumps, fouling of vessels, etc.
More Pressure: Gas breakthrough,
isolation procedures for relief valves
defective, etc.
Less Pressure: Undetected leakage,
vessel drainage, etc.
More Temperature: Fouled or failed
exchanger tubes, fire situation, cooling
water failure, defective control, etc.
Less Temperature: Reducing pressure,
Fouled or failed exchanger tubes, loss of
heating, etc.
 HAZOP REPORT FORM
Study Title: Project No.:

Prepared By: Line Diagram No.:

Study Team: Date:

Deviation Causes Consequences Action Action By

Recommendations
 Objections to HAZOP?
The main objection to hazop is that it
results in expensive additions to plant cost
– results in the project being overspent.
The main objection to visiting the doctor is
that it may result in expensive bills for
treatment.
Hazop is a technique for identifying
problems. If the remedy is too expensive
and we cannot find the cheaper one, then
we can, if we wish, decide to live with the
problem.
Here the remedy is not `reasonably
practicable’. In practice experience shows
that there is always, or nearly always, a
reasonably practicable way of meeting the
targets!
If the obvious remedy is too expensive,
ability of engineers to find a simple
solution; - start hazop with a very small
team, applying hazop to one or two
designs- see on benefits.
Another objection of hazop – it takes up
the time of the designers and prevents
them getting on with the design; not going
to see the doctor because we do not have
time to do so. If we wait until we become
seriously ill we may lose more time in the
end.
Experience has shown the time spent in
carrying out hazop, though it may delay
completion of the design, is well repaid in
a smoother start-up, earlier achievement
of flowsheet output and trouble-free
operation!
 Hazard Categories
Area at Descripti Hzd. Hzd. Hzd. Hzd. Hzd.
risk on of Cat. Cat. Cat. Cat. Cat.
risk 1 2 3 4 5

Plant Damage Minor Appreciable Major Severe Total

lost
£2000 £20 000 £200000 £2 M > £2 M

Effect on Minor Injuries 1 in 10 Fatality Multiple

personn injuries chance of fatalities
el only a fatality
 continued
Area at Descripti Hzd. Hzd. Hzd. Hzd. Cat. Hzd. Cat.
risk on of risk Cat. Cat. Cat. 4 5
1 2 3

Works Damage None None Minor Appreciable Severe

Business Business None None Minor Severe Total loss

loss of
business
 continued
Area at Descripti Hzd. Hzd. Hzd. Hzd. Hzd.
risk on of Cat. Cat. Cat. Cat. Cat.
risk 1 2 3 4 5

Public Damage None Very Minor Appreciab Severe

minor le

Effects None Minor Some 1 in 10 Fatality

on (smells) hospitali chance of
people zation public
fatality
 continued
Area at risk Descrip Hzd. Hzd. Hzd. Hzd. Hzd.
tion of Cat. Cat. Cat. Cat. Cat.
risk 1 2 3 4 5

Relative 1 10-1 10-2 10-3 10-4

guide
frequency
of
occurrence