Title: Tabuena vs.

Sandiganbayan
Citation: G.R. Nos. 103501-03 / 268 SCRA 332
Prepared by: SANTOS, Mary Rose

Facts: Manila International Airport Authority’s former General Manager Tabuena and
Finance Services Manager Peralta were charged with malversation. They were tried before the
Sandiganbayan. At the taking of the testimony of a witness, the Sandiganbayan interjected 27
questions, which is more than the combined total of direct and cross-examination questions
asked by the counsels. After the defense opted not to conduct any re-direct examination, the
court further asked a total of 10 questions. The Sandiganbayan Justices’ questions after
Tabuena’s cross-examination totaled 67, which is more than 5 times the prosecutor's
questions on cross-examination. In Peralta's case, the Justices, after his cross-examination,
propounded a total of 41 questions. These questions from the court were in the nature of
cross-examination’s characteristic of confrontation, probing and insinuation.

Tabuena and Peralta appealed before the Supreme Court and while they did not raise this
error, the Supreme Court, while reviewing their case, noticed the excessive volume and nature
of the questions hurled by the Sandiganbayan in the examination of the witnesses in the case.

Issue: Whether or not Tabuena and Peralta’s right to due process was denied because of the
conduct of the Sandiganbayan Justices, and thus, should be acquitted – YES.

Decision of the Court: Tabuena and Peralta are acquitted of the crime of malversation.

The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge" requirement of due process was certainly denied in
this case when the Sandiganbayan, with its overzealousness, assumed the dual role of
magistrate and advocate.

Truly, a trial judge has the right to question witnesses with a view to satisfy his mind upon
any material point which presents itself during the trial of a case over which he presides. But
not only should his examination be limited to asking "clarificatory" questions, the right should
be sparingly and judiciously used; for the rule is that the court should stay out of it as much as
possible, neither interfering nor intervening in the conduct of the trial. Here, these limitations
were not observed. The Sandiganbayan made an impression that it had taken the cudgels for
the prosecution in proving the case against Tabuena and Peralta when the Justices cross-
examined the witnesses, their cross-examinations supplementing those made by the
prosecutor and far exceeding the latter's questions in length.

The court’s questions were in the interest of the prosecution and which thus depart from that
common standard of fairness and impartiality. The interference by the Sandiganbayan Justices
was too excessive that it cannot be justified under the norm applied to a jury trial, or even
under the standard employed in a non-jury trial where the judge is admittedly given more
leeway in propounding questions to clarify points and to elicit additional relevant evidence.

A trial judge should not participate in the examination of witnesses as to create the impression
that he is allied with the prosecution. It is never proper for a judge to discharge the duties of a
prosecuting attorney. However anxious a judge may be for the enforcement of the law, he
should always remember that he is as much judge in behalf of the defendant accused of crime,
and whose liberty is in jeopardy, as he is judge in behalf of the state, for the purpose of
safeguarding the interests of society.

It is not good practice for the presiding judge himself to examine witnesses at length. The
examination of witnesses is the more appropriate function of counsel, and the instances are
rare and the conditions exceptional which will justify the presiding judge in conducting an
extensive examination. Then, in conducting a lengthy examination, it would be almost
impossible for the judge to preserve a judicial attitude.
The judge may properly intervene in a trial of a case to promote expedition, and prevent
unnecessary waste of time, or to clear up some obscurity, but he should bear in mind that his
undue interference, impatience, or participation in, the examination of witnesses, or a severe
attitude on his part toward witnesses, especially those who are excited or terrified by the
unusual circumstances of a trial, may tend to prevent the proper presentation of the cause, or
the ascertainment of the truth in respect thereto.

The impartiality of the judge — his avoidance of the appearance of becoming the advocate of
either one side or the other of the pending controversy is a fundamental and essential rule of
special importance in criminal cases.

Our courts should refrain from showing any semblance of one-sided or more or less partial
attitude in order not to create any false impression in the minds of the litigants. For obvious
reasons, it is the bounden duty of all to strive for the preservation of the people's faith in our
courts.

Due process requires no less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The judge must not
only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial, to give added assurance to the parties
that his decision will be just. The parties are entitled to no less than this, as a minimum
guaranty of due process.