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RAYRAY VS KYUNG LEE (GR NO. L-18176 OCTOBER 26,  1966)
Rayray vs Kyung Lee
GR No. L-18176 October 26, 1966
Facts: Plaintiff Lazaro Rayray seeks the annulment of his marriage to defendant Chae
Kyung Lee. Inasmuch as, the latter’s whereabouts is unknown, and she was formerly a
resident of Pusan, Korea, summons was served by publication, as provided in the Rules
of Court. Thereafter, plaintiff moved that defendant be declared in default, she not having
filed an answer, and that a date be set for the reception of his evidence. Before acting on
this motion, the lower court referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila pursuant to
Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, for the purpose of determining
whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. Said officer having found no such
collusion, the case was heard on the merits. In due course, thereafter, decision was
rendered dismissing plaintiff’s complaint, without costs, upon the ground: (1) that the
court could not nullify a marriage contracted abroad; and (2) that the facts proven do not
warrant the relief prayed for. A reconsideration of this decision having been denied,
plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to the Supreme Court,
the jurisdiction of the lower court being in issue in the appeal.
Issues: Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to grant the annulment.
Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled for the relief prayed for.
Held: Yes. The subject-matter of the present case is the annulment of plaintiff’s marriage
to the defendant, which is within the jurisdiction of our courts of first instance,  and, in
Manila, of its Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations.
The same acquired jurisdiction over plaintiff herein by his submission thereto in
consequence of the filing of the complaint herein. Defendant was placed under the
jurisdiction of said court, upon the service of summons by publication.
This is an action in rem, for it concerns the status of the parties herein, and status affects
or binds the whole word. The res in the present case is the relation between said parties,
or their marriage tie. Jurisdiction over the same depends upon the nationality or domicile
of the parties, not the place of celebration of marriage, or the locus celebrationis. Plaintiff
here is a citizen of the Philippines, domiciled therein. His status is, therefore, subject to
our jurisdiction, on both counts. True that defendant was and — under plaintiff’s — theory
still is a non-resident alien. But, this fact does not deprive the lower court of its jurisdiction
to pass upon the validity of her marriage to plaintiff herein.
Indeed, marriage is one of the cases of double status, in that the status therein involves
and affects two persons. One is married, never in abstract or a vacuum, but, always to
somebody else. Hence, a judicial decree on the marriage status of a person necessarily
reflects upon the status of another and the relation between them. The prevailing rule is,
accordingly, that a court has jurisdiction over the res, in an action for annulment of
marriage, provided, at least, one of the parties is domiciled in, or a national of, the forum.
Since plaintiff is a Filipino, domiciled in the Philippines, it follows that the lower court had
jurisdiction over the res, in addition to its jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the
parties. In other words, it could validly inquire into the legality of the marriage between
the parties herein.
No. Plaintiff cannot possibly secure the relief prayed for unless full faith and credence are
given to his testimony, but we cannot believe him for the records show that he would not
hesitate to lie when it suits his purpose. Thus, for instance, when plaintiff contracted
marriage with the defendant, he said that he was single, although, he admitted, this was
a lie, because, sometime in 1940, he married in Baguio, one Adelaida Melecio or Valdez.
But, then he would, also, have us believe that his marriage with the latter was illegal or
fictitious, because Adelaida and he did no more than sign, on a small window in the City
Hall of Baguio, certain documents the contents of which he did not read.
KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO., LTD.,
vs 
MINORU KITAMURA
G.R. No. 149177
November 23, 2007
 
FACTS:
Nippon Engineering Consultants (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm providing
technical and management support in the infrastructure projects national permanently
residing in the Philippines. The agreement provides that Kitamaru was to
extend professionalservices to Nippon for a year. Nippon assigned Kitamaru to work as
the project manager of the Southern TagalogAccess Road (STAR) project. When the
STAR project was near completion, DPWH engaged the consultancy servicesof Nippon,

this time for the detailed engineering & construction supervision of the Bongabon-Baler
Road Improvement (BBRI) Project. Kitamaru was named as the project manger in the
contract.
Hasegawa, Nippon’s general manager for its International Division, informed Kitamaru
that the company had no more intention of automatically renewing his ICA.
Hisservices would be engaged by the company only up to the substantial completion of
the STAR Project.
Kitamaru demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon insisted that
Kitamaru’s contract was for a fixed term that had expired. Kitamaru then filed for specific
performance & damages w/ the RTC of Lipa City. Nippon filed a MTD.
Nippon’s contention: The ICA had been perfected in Japan & executed by & between
Japanese nationals. Thus, the RTC of Lipa City has no jurisdiction. The claim for
improper pre-termination of Kitamaru’s ICA could only be heard & ventilated in the proper
courts of Japan following the principles of lex loci celebrationis & lex contractus.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled hat the principle of lex loci
celebrationis was not applicable to the case, because nowhere in the pleadings was the
validity of the written agreement put in issue. It held that the RTC was correct in applying
the principle of lex loci solutionis.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific
performance & damages involving contracts executed outside the country by foreign
nationals may be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus,
“the state of the most significant relationship rule,” or forum non conveniens.
HELD:
NO. In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, 3consecutive phases are involved:
jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Jurisdiction &
choice of law are 2 distinct concepts.Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a
defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether
the application of a substantive law w/c will determine the merits of the case is fair to both
parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give
a state constitutional authority to applyforum law. While jurisdiction and the choice of
the lex foriwill often coincide, the “minimum contacts” for one do not always provide the
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necessary “significant contacts” for the other. The question of whether the law of
a state can be applied to a transaction is different from the question of whether the courts
of that state have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.
In this case, only the 1st phase is at issue—jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, however, has various
aspects. For a court to validly exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy, it must have
jurisdiction over the plaintiff/petitioner, over the defendant/respondent, over the subject
matter, over the issues of the case and, in cases involving property, over the res or the
thing w/c is the subject of the litigation. In assailing the trial court's jurisdiction herein,
Nippon is actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign
authority w/c establishes and organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the
manner prescribed by law. It is further determined by the allegations of the complaint
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted
therein. To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the claim, the movant must show that the court or tribunal cannot
act on the matter submitted to it because no law grants it the power to adjudicate the
claims.
In the instant case, Nippon, in its MTD, does not claim that the RTC is
not properly vested by law w/ jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for a civil case
for specific performance & damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation &
is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City. What they rather raise as grounds to
question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex
contractus,  and the “state of the most significant relationship rule.” The Court finds the
invocation of these grounds unsound.
Lex loci celebrationis relates to the “law of the place of the ceremony” or the law of the
place where a contract is made. The doctrine of lex contractus  or lex loci
contractus  means the “law of the place where a contract is executed or to be
performed.” It controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract and it may
pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them
either expressly or implicitly.Under the “state of the most significant relationship rule,” to
ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should determine which state has
the most substantial connection to the occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a
contract, the court should consider where the contract was made, was negotiated, was to
be performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of incorporation of the
parties. This rule takes into account several contacts and evaluates them according to
their relative importance with respect to the particular issue to be resolved.

Since these 3 principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to a
dispute, they are rules proper for the 2 nd phase, the choice of law. They determine which
state's law is to be applied in resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts
problem. Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law
rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called for.
Further, Nippon’s premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed by the fact that
they have not yet pointed out any conflict between the laws of Japan and ours. Before
determining which law should apply, 1st there should exist a conflict of laws situation
requiring theapplication of the conflict of laws rules. Also, when the law of a foreign
country is invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the existence of
such law must be pleaded and proved.
It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought
before a court or administrative agency, there are 3 alternatives open to the latter in
disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to
assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the
internal law of the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take into account
orapply the law of some other State or States. The court’s power to hear cases and
controversies is derived from the Constitution and the laws. While it may choose to
recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign sovereign law short of
treaties or other formal agreements, even in matters regarding rights provided by foreign
sovereigns.
Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be used to deprive the RTC
of its jurisdiction. 1st, it is not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule
16 of the Rules of Court does not include it as a ground. 2nd, whether a suit should be
entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine depends largely upon the facts
of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the RTC. In this case,
the RTC decided to assume jurisdiction. 3rd, the propriety of dismissing a case based on
this principle requires a factual determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more
properly considered a matter of defense.
Han over Tust vs Guerrero
FACTS:
1. Respondent Guerrero filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Bank
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for allegedly: (a) illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his
checking account with the Bank; (b) a returned check worth USS18,000.99 due to
signature verification problems; and (c) unauthorized conversion of his
account.
2. The Bank claimed that by stipulation Guerrero’s account is governed by New York and
this law does not permit any claim except actual damages. The Bank filed a Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment seeking to dismiss the
claims for consequential, nominal, temperate, moral and exemplary damages.
3. The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a New York attorney, supported the Bank’s
claim that Guerrero’s bank account stipulated that the governing law is New
York law and that this law bars all of the claims except actual damages. The
Philippine Consular Office in NY authenticated the Walden affidavit.
4. CA: Even if the Walden affidavit is used for purpose of summary judgment,
the Bank must still comply with the procedure prescribed by the Rule 132, Sec.
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ISSUE: WoN there are genuine issues of fact that necessitate formal trial—YES.
RULING: Petition DENIED. There being substanstial triable issues, motion for
partial summary judgment is denied.
RATIO:
1.1.1.A genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation
of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived so as
not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Walden affidavit shows that the
facts and material allegations as pleaded by the parties are disputed and
there are substantial triable issues necessitating a formal trial. Resolution
of whether a foreign law allows only the recovery of actual damages is a
question of fact as far as the trial court is concerned since foreign laws do not
prove themselves in our courts
CITIBANK vs. SABENIANO Case Digest
CITIBANK vs. SABENIANO 
G.R.No. 156132, October 16, 2006 
FACTS: Petitioner Citibank is a banking corporation duly authorized under the laws of the
USA to do commercial banking activities n the Philippines. Sabeniano was a client of
both Petitioners Citibank and FNCB Finance. Respondent filed a complaint against
petitioners claiming to have substantial deposits, the proceeds of which were supposedly

deposited automatically and directly to respondent’s account with the petitioner Citibank
and that allegedly petitioner refused to despite repeated demands. Petitioner alleged that
respondent obtained several loans from the former and in default, Citibank exercised its
right to set-off respondent’s outstanding loans with her deposits and money. RTC
declared the act illegal, null and void and ordered the petitioner to refund the amount plus
interest, ordering Sabeniano, on the other hand to pay Citibank her indebtedness. CA
affirmed the decision entirely in favor of the respondent. 
ISSUE: Whether petitioner may exercise its right to set-off respondent’s loans with her
deposits and money in Citibank-Geneva  entire estate torespondent, save for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc.
RULING: Petition is partly granted with modification.  Pena & Nolasco Law Offices, as ancillary administrator.On October 19, 1987, petitioner
1. Citibank is ordered to return to respondent the principal amount of P318,897.34 and
P203,150.00 plus 14.5% per annum 
2. The remittance of US $149,632.99 from respondent’s Citibank-Geneva account is
declared illegal, null and void, thus Citibank is ordered to refund said amount in Philippine
currency or its equivalent using exchange rate at the time of payment.  land, “a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the
3. Citibank to pay respondent moral damages of P300,000, exemplary damages for
P250,000, attorney’s fees of P200,000.  that since Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard, then itshould be wholly
4. Respondent to pay petitioner the balance of her outstanding loans of P1,069,847.40
inclusive off interest.
ANCHETA vs GUERSEY-DALAYGON
FACTS:
Spouses Audrey O
’
Neil and W. Richard Guersey were American Citizens with an adopteddaughter named
Kylie Guersey Hill, and have lived in the Philippines for 30 years. Audrey died leaving
awill bequeathing her entire estate to Richard, who was also designated as executor. The
will wasadmitted probate before the Orphan
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’
s Court of Baltimore, Mary Land, U.S.A. which named James N.Philips as executor due
to Richard
’
s renunciation of his appointment. Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta, hereinpetitioner, of the
Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law offices was likewise designated by
thecourt as ancillary administrator.In 1981 Richard married herein respondent Candelaria
Guersey-Dalaygon with whom he has twochildren. Subsequently, Audrey’s will was
admitted probate by then Court of First Instance of Rizal. As administrator of Audrey’s
estate in the Philippines, petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of  Audrey s
properties.On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his
shares, which he left to Kyle. The will was also admitted to probate by the Orphan’s Court of Ann
Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N.Phillips was likewise appointed as executor, who
in turn, designated Atty. William Quasha or anymember of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta
filed in Special Proceeding No.9625 before the Makati RTC, amotion to declare Richard
and Kyle as heirs of Aubrey and apportioned to them ¾ and ¼ of all theestate,
respectively. This motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial
court inits Order dated February 12, 1988. This was opposed by respondent on the
ground that under the law of the State of Mary
propertysubject of the legacy
.” Respondent argued
adjudicated to him and not merely ¾ thereof, and since Richard left his entire estate tothe
respondent, except for the A/G Interior Inc. shares, then the entire property should now
pertain torespondent. The Court of Appeals annul
led the trial court’s Orders in
Speacial Proceeding No. 9625 andlater denied the appeal of the petitioner, thus the
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary duty when he disregarded the
lawsof the State of Maryland on the
distribution of Audrey’s estate in accorda
nce with her will?
RULING:
Well-
intentioned though it may be, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s action appears to have

breached his duties and responsibilities as ancillary administrator of the subject estate.
While suchbreach of duty admittedly cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary
circumstances, the
fiduciary nature of the said defendant’s position, as well as the resultant frustration of the
decedent’s
last will, combine to create a circumstance that is tantamount to extrinsic fraud.
Beam and Beam vs. Yatco
FACTS: On or before April 26, 1937, the Collector of Internal Revenue declared and
assessed items of property of A. W. Beam and Lydia McKee Beam at the time of the
death of the latter on October 18, 1934 at P8, 100,544.91. One-half thereof, appraised at
P4, 050,272.46, was the estate to the deceased Lydia McKee Beam located in the
Philippines and transmitted to plaintiffs by virtue of inheritance, devise, or bequest, gifts
mortis causa or advance in anticipation of inheritance and the collector assessed and
demanded inheritance taxes aggregating P343, 698.72 which the plaintiffs paid under
protest that was overruled by the collector. Plaintiffs filed a complaint praying that the
amount paid by them be refunded, but the lower court dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in finding that appellant became a resident
and citizen of California in 1923.
RULING: NO. The finding of the lower court is fully supported by the testimonies of A. W.
Beam and John W. Haussermann, wherein the first stated that in 1923 he bought a
house in Oakland, California, and used it as a residence until December, 1930, when he
built another in Piedmont, California, which he has used and occupied as a residence
since then, and his children were in school in California and Mrs. Beam wanted to be with
them and made a home for them, and it was his intention to live in California and from
1923 on, his family spent most of their time in California, where he himself used to take
long vacations, and that he never really intended to live permanently in the Philippines,
while Haussermann testified that A. W. Beam left the Philippines somewhere along 1923
and 1924 when he established a home for his wife and children on Kenmore Avenue,
Oakland, and he went there frequently. Also, because the burden of proof is on the
plaintiffs to establish their right to recover, in view of the fact that they had failed to
establish that right based on their alleged Utah citizenship to invoke the laws of the state
which, it is alleged, to the effect that properties acquired by the spouses during marriage
belong to them separately,  the dismissal of the complaint is fully justified, and the
defendant is entitled to take advantage of the plaintiff's failure to present sufficient proof
and of the evidence adduced by themselves. Where plaintiffs themselves show a state of
facts upon which they should not recover, whether defendant pleaded such fact as a
defense or not, their claim should be dismissed. Evidence introduced without objection
becomes property of the case and all the parties are amenable to any favorable or
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unfavorable effects resulting from the evidence .As correctly stated by Yatco, even
granting appellant's contention that the deceased became a resident of California only in
1934, she was a citizen of that state at the time of her death and her national law
applicable to the case, in accordance with article 10 of the Civil Code, is the law of
California which, in the absence of contrary evidence, is to be presumed to be the same
as the Philippine law.
REPUBLIC VS ORBECIDOG.R. No. 154380October 5, 2005
FACTS:
In 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III
m a r r i e d   L a d y   M y r o   V i l l a n u e v a   i n   L a m - a n , Ozamis
City.I n   1 9 8 6 ,   O r b e c i d o   d i s c o v e r e d   t h a t   h i s   w i f e   h a d   h a d   b e e n  
n a t u r a l i z e d   a s   a n American citizen.Sometime in 2000, Orbecido learned
from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and married an
American.O r b e c i d o   f i l e d   w i t h   t h e   T r i a l   C o u r t   a   p e t i t i o n   f o r   “ A u t
h o r i t y   t o   R e m a r r y ” invoking Article 26 Paragraph 2 of the Family Code, the Court
granted
the petition.T h e   R e p u b l i c ,   h e r e i n   p e t i t i o n e r ,   t h r o u g h   t h e   O f f i c e   o f   t h e  
S o l i c i t o r   G e n e r a l , sought for reconsideration but it was denied by the Trial Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the allegations of the respondent was proven as a fact accordingto the
rules of evidence.
HELD:
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading
it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreignlaw
allowing it. Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take
judicialn o t i c e o f f o r e i g n l a w s . L i k e a n y o t h e r f a c t , s u c h l a w s m u s t b e
a l l e g e d a n d p r o v e d . Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce
decree allows his former wife toremarry as specifically required in Article 26.
Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to
enter into another marriage.However, in the present petition there is no sufficient
evidence submitted and onrecord, we are unable to declare, based on
respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, w h o w a s n a t u r a l i z e d a s a n
A m e r i c a n c i t i z e n , h a d o b t a i n e d a d i v o r c e d e c r e e a n d h a d remarried an
American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declarationcould only be
made properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence inhis
favor.ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED.The
assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of
theRegional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET
ASID

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.
G.R. No. L-68470              October 8, 1985
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Facts:  During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the United States. They were married in
Hongkong in 1972 and established their residence in the Philippines. They begot two
children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively. But the parties were
divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982 and the petitioner had remarried also in
Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
On July 8, 1983, Richard Upton filed a suit against petitioner, asking that Alice Van Dorn
be ordered to render an accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila and be declared
with right to manage the conjugal property.
Issue:
Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in
Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.
Held:
As to Richard Upton, the divorce is binding on him as an American Citizen. Owing to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to
our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. The divorce is likewise valid as to the petitioner.
As such, pursuant to his national law, private respondent Richard Upton is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue Alice Van Dorn to exercise
control over conjugal assets. He was bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court,
which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he did not repudiate, he
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is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property.
San Luis v San Luis
2007
FACTS:
Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo,
Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased
Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he
had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed
a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii,
United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and
Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married
respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr.
William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from
the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his
first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss  on the grounds of improper venue and failure to
state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration
should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of
residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality
to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the
time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial Court: denied the motion to dismiss, ruled that respondent, as widow of the
decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly
laid. Mila filed a motion for inhibition against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994.
Thus, a new trial ensued.
(2) Trial Court (new): dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the

time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province
of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in
Makati City. It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage
to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a
Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate
children.
(3) CA: reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court
ISSUES:
(1) Whether venue was properly laid, and  may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under
(2) Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry
under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized
on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
(3) Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration.
RULING:
(1) Yes, the venue was proper. Section 1,  Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for
letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial
Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death."
For purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his
personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may
not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency. While petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in
Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang,
Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. From the foregoing, we find that
Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate.
(2) Yes. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien
spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to
remarry under Philippine law. As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving
a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the
enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers
codified the law already established through judicial precedent.
The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo
to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present
petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is
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insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as
the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California,
U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text  of
the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in
accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.Therefore, this case
should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce
decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
(3) Yes. Respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration
Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,
nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for
letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards
the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas Case Digest
G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010
FACTS:
Gerbert Corpuz, a former Filipino citizen but now a naturalized Canadian, married
Daisylyn Sto. Tomas, a Filipina. He soon left to Canada after their wedding due to work
commitments. He returned to Philippines on April 2005 only to find out Daisylyn has an
affair with another man. Gerbert returned to Canada to file a divorce that took effect on
January 2006.
Two years later, he found another Filipina and wanted to marry her in the Philippines. He
went to Pasig City Registrar's Office to register his Canadian divorce decree but was
denied considering that his marriage with Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law, that
the foregin divorce must be recognized judicially by the Philippine court.
Gerbert subsequently filed at the Regional Trial Court a judicial recognition of foreign
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divorce but was subsequently denied since he is not the proper party and according to
Article 26 of the Civil Code, only a Filipino spouse can avail the remedy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 26 can also be applied to Corpuz' petition of recognition of the
foreign divorce decree

HELD:

The Court held that alien spouses cannot claim the right as it is only in favor of Filipino
spouses. The legislative intent of Article 26 is for the benefit of the clarification of the
marital status of the Filipino spouse.

However, aliens are not strip to petition to the RTC for his foreign divorce decree as it is a
conclusive presumption of evidence of the authenticity of foreign divorce decree with
confirmity to the alien's national law.

The Pasig City Registrar's Office acted out of line when it registered the foreign divorce
decree without judicial order recognition. Therefore, the registration is still deemed to be
void.