ST.

SCHOLASTICA’S COLLEGE V TORRES

FACTS:

On 20 July 1990, petitioner St. Scholastica’s College (COLLEGE, for brevity) and
private respondent Samahan ng Manggagawang Pang-Edukasyon sa Sta. Eskolastika
— NAFTEU (UNION, for brevity) initiated negotiations for a first-ever collective
bargaining agreement. A deadlock in the negotiations prompted the UNION to file on 4
October 1990 a Notice of Strike with the Department of Labor and Employment.

The UNION declared a strike which analyzed the operations of the COLLEGE. Affecting
as it did the interest of the students, public respondent SECRETARY immediately
assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and issued on the same day, 5 November
1990, a return-to-work order. The following day, 6 November 1990, the UNION was
served the Order. On 7 November 1990, instead of returning to work, the UNION filed a
motion for reconsideration of the return-to-work order questioning inter alia the
assumption of jurisdiction by the SECRETARY over the labor dispute.

On 16 November 1990, the COLLEGE manifested to respondent SECRETARY that the

UNION continued to defy his return-to-work order of 5 November 1990 so that
"appropriate steps under the said circumstances" may be undertaken by him. On 5
December 1990, a Complaint for Illegal Strike was filed against the UNION, its officers
and several of its members before the National Labor Relations Commission.
The UNION moved for the enforcement of the return-to-work order before respondent
SECRETARY, citing "selective acceptance of returning strikers" by the COLLEGE. It
also sought dismissal of the complaint. Since then, no further hearings were conducted.

Respondent SECRETARY issued the assailed Order which, inter alia directed the
reinstatement of striking UNION members, premised on his finding that no violent or
otherwise illegal act accompanied the conduct of the strike and that a fledgling UNION
like private respondent was "naturally expected to exhibit unbridled if inexperienced
enthusiasm, in asserting its existence." Nevertheless, the aforesaid Order held UNION
officers responsible for the violation of the return-to-work orders of 5 and 9 November
1990 and, correspondingly, sustained their termination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Labor has jurisdiction to decide on termination
disputes.
HELD:
Yes. The issue on whether respondent SECRETARY has the power to assume
jurisdiction over a labor dispute and its incidental controversies, causing or likely to
cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, was
already settled in International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Secretary of Labor and
Employment. Therein, We ruled that:
". . . [T]he Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code the
authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or
lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, and decide the same
accordingly. Necessarily, this authority to assume jurisdictional over the said labor
dispute must include and extend to all questions and controversies arising therefrom,
including cases over which the Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction."

And rightly so, for, as found in the aforesaid case, Article 217 of the Labor Code did
contemplate of exceptions thereto where the SECRETARY is authorized to assume
jurisdiction over a labor dispute otherwise belonging exclusively to the Labor Arbiter.

The submission of an incidental issue of a labor dispute, in assumption and/or

certification cases, to the Secretary of Labor and Employment for his resolution is thus
one of the instances referred to whereby the latter may exercise concurrent jurisdiction
together with the Labor Arbiters.

In the instant petition, the COLLEGE in its Manifestation, dated 16 November 1990,
asked the "Secretary of Labor to take the appropriate steps under the said
circumstances." It likewise prayed in its position paper that respondent SECRETARY
uphold its termination of the striking employees. Upon the other hand, the UNION
questioned the termination of its officers and members before respondent SECRETARY
by moving for the enforcement of the return-to-work orders. There is no dispute then
that the issue on the legality of the termination of striking employees was properly
submitted to respondent SECRETARY for resolution.

Such an interpretation will be in consonance with the intention of our labor authorities to
provide workers immediate access to their rights and benefits without being
inconvenienced by the arbitration and litigation process that prove to be not only nerve-
wracking, but financially burdensome in the long run.

Private respondent UNION maintains that the reason they failed ko immediately comply
with the return-to-work order of 5 November 1990 was because they questioned the
assumption of jurisdiction of respondent SECRETARY. They were of the impression
that being an academic institution, the school could not be considered an industry
indispensable to national interest, and that pending resolution of the issue, they were
under no obligation to immediately return to work.

This position of the UNION is simply flawed. Article 263 (g) Labor Code provides that if
a strike has already taken place at the time of assumption, "all striking . . . employees
shall immediately return to work." This means that by its very terms, a return-to-work
order is immediately effective and executory notwithstanding the filing of a motion for
reconsideration. It must be strictly complied with even during the pendency of any
petition questioning its validity. After all, the assumption and/or certification order is
issued in the exercise of respondent SECRETARY’s compulsive power of arbitration
and, until set aside, must therefore be immediately complied with.
The respective liabilities of striking union officers and members who failed to
immediately comply with the return-to-work order is outlined in Art. 264 of the Labor
Code which provides that any declaration of a strike or lockout after the Secretary of
Labor and Employment has assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute is considered
an illegal act. Any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in a strike defying
a return-to-work order may, consequently, "be declared to have lost his employment
status."

It is clear that from the moment a worker defies a return-to-work order, he is deemed to
have abandoned his job. It is already in itself knowingly participating in an illegal act.
Otherwise, the worker will just simply refuse to return to his work and cause a standstill
they refused to discharge or allow the management to fill
In fine, respondent SECRETARY gravely abused his discretion when he ordered the
reinstatement of striking union members who refused to report back to work after he
issued two (2) return-to-work orders, which in itself is knowingly participating in an illegal
act. The Order in question is, certainly, contrary to existing law and jurisprudence.