SANTA ROSA COCA-COLA PLANT EMPLOYEES UNION, DONRICO V.

SEBASTIAN, EULOGIO G. BATINO, SAMUEL A. ATANQUE ET. AL. vs. COCA-

COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC.
G.R. Nos. 164302-03 January 24, 2007

FACTS:
Petitioner is the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the regular daily paid workers
and the monthly paid non-commission-earning employees of the herein respondent in its Sta.
Rosa, Laguna plant. The individual petitioners are Union officers, directors, and shop stewards.

The Union and the Company had entered into a three-year Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) Upon its expiration, the Union desired to continue the CBA and to renegotiate its terms.
The CBA meetings commenced where The Union insisted that representatives from the Alyansa
ng mga Unyon sa Coca-Cola be allowed to sit down as observers in the CBA meetings. The
Union officers and members also insisted that their wages be based on their work shift rates. For
its part, the Company was of the view that the members of the Alyansa were not members of the
bargaining unit. The Alyansa was a mere aggregate of employees of the Company in its various
plants; and is not a registered labor organization. Thus, an impasse ensued.

The Union, filed a Notice of Strike, as amended, on the grounds of: (a) unfair labor practice for
the companys refusal to bargain in good faith; and (b) interference with the exercise of their right
to self-organization. Union members, officers and members of the Board of Directors, and shop
stewards, individually filed applications for leave of absence but they were not granted by reason
that operations in the plant would come to a complete stop since there were no sufficient trained
contractual employees who would take over. A day before the mass action, some Union
members wore gears, red tag cloths stating YES KAMI SA STRIKE as headgears and on the
different parts of their uniform, shoulders and chests.

The Office of the Mayor issued a permit to the Union, allowing it to conduct a mass protest
action within the perimeter of the Coca-Cola plant. Thus, the Union officers and members held a
picket along the front perimeter of the plant resulting to absence of a number of company
employees and personnel. As a result, only one of the three bottling lines operated during the day
shift. The volume of production for the day was short by 60,000 physical cases versus budget.

Respondent allege that because of the slowdown in the work, the Company suffered losses; the
mass/protest action conducted was clearly a strike and since the Union did not observe the
requirements mandated by law the strike was therefore illegal and there being a direct violation
of the CBA, the Unions action constituted an unfair labor practice; and the officers who
knowingly participated in the commission of illegal acts during the strike should be declared to
have lost their employment status.
Petitioner countered that the mass action conducted by its officers and members was not a strike
but just a valid exercise of their right to picket, which is part of the right of free expression as
guaranteed by the Constitution. The workers, including the petitioners, merely marched to and
fro at the side of the highway near one of the gates of the Sta. Rosa Plant. After 3 hours,
everyone returned to work according to their respective shifting schedules. Lastly, petitioners
aver that even assuming that they had indeed staged a strike, the penalty of dismissal is too
harsh. They insist that they acted in good faith.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the herein respondent and declared that the mass leave was
actually a strike by reason that did not report for their usual work. Instead, they all assembled in
front of the Sta. Rosa Plant and picketed the premises. Very clearly, there was a concerted action
here on the part of the respondents brought about a temporary stoppage of work at two out of
three bottling lines at the Sta. Rosa Plant. Also, the strike conducted by the Union was illegal
since there was no showing that the Union complied with requirement of a valid strike. Such
decision was sustained by the NLRC and the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether the mass action staged by the Union was a strike

RULING:

YES. The mass action staged by the Union was a strike and not merely a picket. Article 212(o)
of the Labor Code defines strike as a temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of
employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. The fact that the conventional term
‘strike’ was not used by the striking employees to describe their common course of action is
inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be
controlling. The term "strike" encompasses not only concerted work stoppages, but also
slowdowns, mass leaves, sit-downs, attempts to damage, destroy or sabotage plant equipment
and facilities, and similar activities.

Picketing involves merely the marching to and fro at the premises of the employer, usually
accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making known the facts involved in a
labor dispute. As applied to a labor dispute, to picket means the stationing of one or more
persons to observe and attempt to observe. The purpose of pickets is said to be a means of
peaceable persuasion.

A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of

employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.

That there was a labor dispute between the parties, in this case, is not an issue. Petitioners
notified the respondent of their intention to stage a strike, and not merely to picket. Petitioners’
insistence to stage a strike is evident in the fact that an amended notice to strike was filed even as
respondent moved to dismiss the first notice. The basic elements of a strike are present in this
case: 106 members of petitioner Union, whose respective applications for leave of absence on
September 21, 1999 were disapproved, opted not to report for work on said date, and gathered in
front of the company premises to hold a mass protest action. Petitioners deliberately absented
themselves and instead wore red ribbons, carried placards with slogans such as: "YES KAMI SA
STRIKE," "PROTESTA KAMI," "SAHOD, KARAPATAN NG MANGGAGAWA
IPAGLABAN," "CBA-‘WAG BABOYIN," "STOP UNION BUSTING." They marched to and
fro in front of the company’s premises during working hours. Thus, petitioners engaged in a
concerted activity which already affected the company’s operations. The mass concerted activity
constituted a strike.

The bare fact that petitioners were given a Mayor’s permit is not conclusive evidence that their
action/activity did not amount to a strike. The Mayor’s description of what activities petitioners
were allowed to conduct is inconsequential. To repeat, what is definitive of whether the action
staged by petitioners is a strike and not merely a picket is the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the situation.

A strike is the most powerful of the economic weapons of workers which they unsheathe to force
management to agree to an equitable sharing of the joint product of labor and capital. It is a
weapon that can either breathe life to or destroy the Union and its members in their struggle with
management for a more equitable due to their labors. The decision to declare a strike must
therefore rest on a rational basis, free from emotionalism, envisaged by the tempers and tantrums
of a few hot heads, and finally focused on the legitimate interests of the Union which should not,
however, be antithetical to the public welfare, and, to be valid, a strike must be pursued within
legal bounds. The right to strike as a means of attainment of social justice is never meant to
oppress or destroy the employer.

Since strikes cause disparity effects not only on the relationship between labor and management
but also on the general peace and progress of society, the law has provided limitations on the
right to strike. For a strike to be valid, the following procedural requisites provided by Art. 263
of the Labor Code must be observed: (a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before
the intended date thereof, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (b) strike vote approved by
a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret
ballot in a meeting called for that purpose, (c) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the
voting at least seven days before the intended strike. These requirements are mandatory and the
failure of a union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal. It is clear in this case that
petitioners totally ignored the statutory requirements and embarked on their illegal strike. 

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION (PBMEO) ET AL.

VS. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. AND COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS
NO. L-31195 June 5, 1973

FACTS:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate
labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.,
and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon,
Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and
members of the petitioner Union. Petitioners decided to stage a mass demonstration at
Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be
participated in by the workers in the first shift as well as those in the regular second and third
shifts; and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed demonstration. Upon
knowledge of the same, the Company called a meeting where PBMEO confirmed the mass
demonstration and explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company
because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management. The Management informed
PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the
Constitution but emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly
prejudice the normal operation of the Company. For which reason, the Company, warned the
PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without
previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers present who are
the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning shall
be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA, particularly Article XXIV:
'NO LOCKOUT - NO STRIKE, and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike.

The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course of
their business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the
possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the rally.

Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the
demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not
be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts
should be utilized for the demonstration, respondent Company filed with the respondent Court, a
charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, charging them with
a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of
Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.'

The lower court found PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and held petitioners Florencio
Padrigano, Rufino Roxas Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin
Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for perpetrating the said
unfair labor practice and were, as a consequence, considered to have lost their status as
employees of the respondent Company. 

ISSUE:

Whether the mass demonstration staged by the petitioner amounts to a strike

RULING: 

No. The mass demonstration staged by the petitioner is not a strike. The demonstration held by
petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacañang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig
policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent firm, said demonstration was
purely and completely an exercise of their freedom of expression in general and of their right of
assembly and of petition for redress of grievances in particular before the appropriate
governmental agency, the Chief Executive, against the police officers of the municipality of
Pasig. They exercised their civil and political rights for their mutual aid and protection from what
they believe were police excesses. As a matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private
respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its members from the harassment of local
police officers. It was to the interest of herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of,
and to take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from
harassment, vexation or peril and as a consequence perform more efficiently their respective
tasks to enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even
offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. Was it securing peace for itself at the
expense of its workers? Was it also intimidated by the local police or did it encourage the local
police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its failure to defend its own employees all the more
weakened the position of its laborers vis-a-vis the alleged oppressive police, who might have
been all the more emboldened thereby to subject its lowly employees to further indignities.

As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights— freedom of expression, of peaceful

assembly and of petition for redress of grievances—over property rights has been sustained.
Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon—at once the shield and armor of the
dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-consuming ideal of our enlightened
civilization—becomes Our duty, if freedom and social justice have any meaning at all for him
who toils so that capital can produce economic goods that can generate happiness for all. To
regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad
faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a
cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the
compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is a potent means of inhibiting speech" and
therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.

The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been legally
enjoined by any court, for such an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom of expression
of the workers, even if it legally appears to be an illegal picketing or strike. The respondent
Court of Industrial Relations in the case at bar concedes that the mass demonstration was not a
declaration of a strike as the same is not rooted in any industrial dispute although there is a
concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work.

CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER, INC. vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION, JAIME IBABAO, JOSE BALLESTEROS, ET. AL.

G.R. No. 147080. April 26, 2005

FACTS:
The Union filed a Notice of Strike with the (NCMB) which alleged as grounds for the projected
strike the following acts of the petitioner: (a) refusal to bargain; (b) coercion on employees; and
(c) interference/ restraint to self-organization. A series of conferences was conducted before the
NCMB but no agreement was reached.  The petitioner even filed a Letter with the Board
requesting that the notice of strike be dismissed by reason the Union had apparently failed to
furnish the Regional Branch of the NCMB with a copy of a notice of the meeting where the
strike vote was conducted.

On November 20, 1997, the Union submitted to the NCMB the minutes of the alleged strike vote
purportedly held on November 10, 1997 at the parking lot in front of the petitioner’s premises. It
appears that 178 out of the 300 union members participated therein, and the results were as
follows: 156 members voted to strike; 14 members cast negative votes; and eight votes were
spoiled.

On November 28, 1997, the officers and members of the Union staged a strike.  Subsequently,
the Union filed an ex parte motion with the DOLE, praying for its assumption of jurisdiction
over the dispute.  The SOLE  assumed jurisdiction over the labor disputes, Consequently, all
striking workers are directed to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours from the receipt of
this Order and the management to resume normal operations and accept back all striking workers
under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. In obedience to the order of the
SOLE, the officers and members of the Union stopped their strike and returned to work.
 
The Regional Director of the DOLE rendered a Decision denying the petition for the cancellation
of the respondent Union’s certificate of registration. In a parallel development, the Labor Arbiter
rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioner, and declared the strike staged by the respondents
illegal. 
 
The Labor Arbiter ruled that no voting had taken place on November 10, 1997 and that no notice
of such voting was furnished to the NCMB at least twenty-four (24) hours prior to the intended
holding of the strike vote. According to the Labor Arbiter, the affidavits of the petitioner’s 17
employees who alleged that no strike vote was taken, and supported by the affidavit of the
overseer of the parking lot and the security guards, must prevail as against the minutes of the
strike vote presented by the respondents. The Labor Arbiter also held that in light of Article
263(9) of the Labor Code, the respondent Union should have filed a motion for a writ of
execution of the resolution of Undersecretary Laguesma which was affirmed by this Court
instead of staging a strike.
 
The respondents appealed the decision to the NLRC which granted their appeal and reversing the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. 

On appeal, the NLRC reversed the ruling of the LA and petitioner’s MR was likewise denied.
Petitioner elevated its cause to the CA which in turn dismissed the petition and affirmed the
ruling of the NLRC.
In the present action, petitioner asserts that the NLRC and the CA erred in holding that the
submission of a notice of a strike vote to the Regional Branch of the NCMB as required by
Section 7, Rule XXII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, is merely directory
and not mandatory. The use of the word “shall” in the rules, the petitioner avers, indubitably
indicates the mandatory nature of the respondent Union’s duty to submit the said notice of strike
vote.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the strike staged by the union is legal

RULING:
NO. The strike staged by the union is illegal. Aside from the mandatory notices embedded in
Article 263, paragraphs (c) and (f) of the Labor Code, a union intending to stage a strike is
mandated to notify the NCMB of the meeting for the conduct of strike vote, at least twenty-four
(24) hours prior to such meeting. Unless the NCMB is notified of the date, place and time of the
meeting of the union members for the conduct of a strike vote, the NCMB would be unable to
supervise the holding of the same, if and when it decides to exercise its power of supervision.
In National Federation of Labor v. NLRC, the Court enumerated the notices required by Article
263 of the Labor Code and the Implementing Rules, which include the 24-hour prior notice to
the NCMB.

A union is mandated to notify the NCMB of an impending dispute in a particular bargaining

unit via a notice of strike. Thereafter, the NCMB, through its conciliator-mediators, shall call the
parties to a conference at the soonest possible time in order to actively assist them in exploring
all possibilities for amicable settlement. In the event of the failure in the conciliation/mediation
proceedings, the parties shall be encouraged to submit their dispute for voluntary arbitration.
However, if the parties refuse, the union may hold a strike vote, and if the requisite number of
votes is obtained, a strike may ensue. The purpose of the strike vote is to ensure that the decision
to strike broadly rests with the majority of the union members in general and not with a mere
minority, and at the same time, discourage wildcat strikes, union bossism and even corruption. A
strike vote report submitted to the NCMB at least seven days prior to the intended date of strike
ensures that a strike vote was, indeed, taken. In the event that the report is false, the seven-day
period affords the members an opportunity to take the appropriate remedy before it is too late.
The 15 to 30 day cooling-off period is designed to afford the parties the opportunity to amicably
resolve the dispute with the assistance of the NCMB conciliator/mediator, while the seven-day
strike ban is intended to give the DOLE an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike
really carries the imprimatur of the majority of the union members.

The requirement of giving notice of the conduct of a strike vote to the NCMB at least 24 hours
before the meeting for the said purpose is designed to (a) inform the NCMB of the intent of the
union to conduct a strike vote; (b) give the NCMB ample time to decide on whether or not there
is a need to supervise the conduct of the strike vote to prevent any acts of violence and/or
irregularities attendant thereto; and (c) should the NCMB decide on its own initiative or upon the
request of an interested party including the employer, to supervise the strike vote, to give it
ample time to prepare for the deployment of the requisite personnel, including peace officers if
need be. Unless and until the NCMB is notified at least 24 hours of the union’s decision to
conduct a strike vote, and the date, place, and time thereof, the NCMB cannot determine for
itself whether to supervise a strike vote meeting or not and insure its peaceful and regular
conduct. The failure of a union to comply with the requirement of the giving of notice to the
NCMB at least 24 hours prior to the holding of a strike vote meeting will render the subsequent
strike staged by the union illegal.

In this case, the respondent Union failed to comply with the 24-hour prior notice requirement to
the NCMB before it conducted the alleged strike vote meeting on November 10, 1997. As a
result, the petitioner complained that no strike vote meeting ever took place and averred that the
strike staged by the respondent union was illegal.

Conformably to Article 264 of the Labor Code of the Philippines and Section 7, Rule XXII of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, no labor organization shall declare a strike unless
supported by a majority vote of the members of the union obtained by secret ballot in a meeting
called for that purpose. The requirement is mandatory and the failure of a union to comply
therewith renders the strike illegal.

EDEN GLADYS ABARIA, ROMULO ALFORQUE, ET. AL. vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, METRO CEBU
COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, INC., ET. AL.

G.R. No. 154113               December 7, 2011

FACTS:

The National Federation of Labor (NFL) is the exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-
and-file employees of Metro Cebu Community Hospital, Inc. (MCCHI, presently known as
Visayas Community Medical Center).

 Nava (President of Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa MCCH  NAMA-MCCH-NFL) wrote Rev. Iyoy

(Hospital Administrator) expressing the union’s desire to renew the CBA. However, MCCHI
returned the CBA proposal for Nava to secure first the endorsement of the legal counsel of NFL
as the official bargaining representative of MCCHI employees.

Meanwhile, Atty. Alforque (NFL legal counsel) informed MCCHI that the proposed CBA
submitted by Nava was never referred to NFL and that NFL has not authorized any other legal
counsel or any person for collective bargaining negotiations. In a letter addressed to Nava et al,
Atty. Alforque suspended their union membership for serious violation of the Constitution and
By-Laws.

On February 26, 1996, upon the request of Atty. Alforque, MCCHI granted one-day union leave
with pay for 12 union members.The next day, several union members led by Nava and her group
launched a series of mass actions such as wearing black and red armbands/headbands, marching
around the hospital premises and putting up placards, posters and streamers. Atty. Alforque
immediately disowned the concerted activities being carried out by union members which are not
sanctioned by NFL.

The DOLE Regional Office issued certifications stating that there is nothing in their records
which shows that NAMA-MCCH-NFL is a registered labor organization, and that said union
submitted only a copy of its Charter Certificate on January 31, 1995. NAMA-MCCH-NFL filed
a Notice of Strike but the same was deemed not filed for want of legal personality on the part of
the file. Despite such rebuff, Nava and her group still conducted a strike vote on April 2, 1996
during which an overwhelming majority of union members approved the strike.

 On March 30, 1996, MCCHI sent termination letters to union leaders and other members who
participated in the strike and picketing activities. For their continued picketing activities despite
the said warning, more than 100 striking employees were dismissed effective April 12 and 19,
1996.

Unfazed, the striking union members held more mass actions. With the volatile situation
adversely affecting hospital operations and the condition of confined patients, MCCHI filed a
petition for injunction in the NLRC on July 9, 1996. Thereafter, several complaints for illegal
dismissal and unfair labor practice were filed by the terminated employees against MCCHI, Rev.
Iyoy, UCCP and members of the Board of Trustees of MCCHI.

On August 4, 1999, Executive Labor Arbiter Reynoso A. Belarmino rendered his decision
dismissing the complaints for unfair labor practice filed by Nava and 90 other complainants.
Executive Labor Arbiter Belarmino found no basis for the charge of unfair labor practice and
declared the strike and picketing activities illegal having been conducted by NAMA-MCCH-
NFL which is not a legitimate labor organization. The termination of union leaders Nava,
Alsado, Bañez, Bongcaras, Canen, Gerona and Remocaldo were upheld as valid but MCCHI was
directed to grant separation pay equivalent to one-half month for every year of service, in the
total amount of P3,085,897.40 for the 84 complainants.

 ISSUE: Whether or not the strike and picketing activities conducted by union officers and
members were illegal

RULING:

1. Yes. Strike and picketing activities conducted

by union officers and members were illegal

Art. 263 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:

“Strikes, picketing and lockouts.—x x x 263. ART.

Workers shall have the right to engage in concerted activities for purposes of collective
bargaining or for their mutual benefit and protection. The right of legitimate labor organizations
to strike and picket and of employers to lockout, consistent with the national interest, shall
continue to be recognized and respected. However, no labor union may strike and no employer
may declare a lockout on grounds involving inter-union and intra-union disputes.x x x x (b)”

As borne by the records, NAMA-MCCH-NFL was not a duly registered or an independently

registered union at the time it filed the notice of strike on March 13, 1996 and when it conducted
the strike vote on April 2, 1996. It could not then legally represent the union members.
Consequently, the mandatory notice of strike and the conduct of the strike vote report were
ineffective for having been filed and conducted by NAMA-MCCH-NFL which has no legal
personality as a legitimate labor organization, in violation of Art. 263 (c), (d) and (f) of the Labor
Code and Rule XXII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.

Furthermore, the strike was illegal due to the commission of the following prohibited activities:
(1) violence, coercion, intimidation and harassment against non-participating employees; and (2)
blocking of free ingress to and egress from the hospital, including preventing patients and their
vehicles from entering the hospital and other employees from reporting to work, the putting up of
placards with a statement advising incoming patients to proceed to another hospital because
MCCHI employees are on strike/protest. As shown by photographs submitted by MCCHI, as
well as the findings of the NCMB and Cebu City Government, the hospital premises and
sidewalk within its vicinity were full of placards, streamers and makeshift structures that
obstructed its use by the public who were likewise barraged by the noise coming from strikers
using megaphones. On the other hand, the affidavits executed by several hospital employees and
patients narrated in detail the incidents of harassment, intimidation, violence and coercion, some
of these witnesses have positively identified the perpetrators. The prolonged work stoppage and
picketing activities of the striking employees severely disrupted hospital operations that MCCHI
suffered heavy financial losses.

Consequences of illegal strike to union officers and members

Art. 264 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended, provides for the consequences of an illegal strike to
the participating workers.

The above provision makes a distinction between workers and union officers who participate in
an illegal strike: an ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an
illegal strike. There must be proof that he or she committed illegal acts during a strike. A union
officer, on the other hand, may be terminated from work when he knowingly participates in an
illegal strike, and like other workers, when he commits an illegal act during a strike.

Considering their persistence in holding picketing activities despite the declaration by the NCMB
that their union was not duly registered as a legitimate labor organization and the letter from
NFL’s legal counsel informing that their acts constitute disloyalty to the national federation, and
their filing of the notice of strike and conducting a strike vote notwithstanding that their union
has no legal personality to negotiate with MCCHI for collective bargaining purposes, there is no
question that NAMA-MCCH-NFL officers knowingly participated in the illegal strike. The CA
therefore did not err in ruling that the termination of union officers Perla Nava, Catalina Alsado,
Albina Bañez, Hannah Bongcaras, Ernesto Canen, Jesusa Gerona and Guillerma Remocaldo was
valid and justified.

With respect to the dismissed union members, although MCCHI submitted photographs taken at
the picket line, it did not individually name those striking employees and specify the illegal act
committed by each of them. As to the affidavits executed by non-striking employees, they
identified mostly union officers as the persons who blocked the hospital entrance, harassed
hospital employees and patients whose vehicles were prevented from entering the premises. Only
some of these witnesses actually named a few union members who committed similar acts of
harassment and coercion. Consequently, we find no error committed by the CA in CA-G.R. SP
No. 66540 when it modified the decision of the NLRC and ruled that the dismissal of union
members who merely participated in the illegal strike was illegal. On the other hand, in CA-G.R.
SP No. 84998, the CA did not err in ruling that the dismissal of Yballe, et al. was illegal;
however, it also ordered their reinstatement with full back wages.