2017 International Conference on High Voltage Engineering and Power Systems (ICHVEPS) TS16-7

FMECA DEVELOPMENT IN PLN TRANS-JBTB

R. Y. Trianto, M. R. Pahlevi, B. Z. Bardani.

Asset Management – Planning Department
PT PLN (Persero)
Surabaya, Indonesia
rachmatyoga@gmail.com

Abstract— A Reliable power transmission is one of the asset

management objective of PLN Trans-JBTB as a Power
58
Transmission Utility. This objective is measured by frequency and
duration outages of transmission line and transformer (TLOD,
TROD, TLOF, and TROF) that occur every year. In order to 30
improve reliability, fault history data in 2014-2017 is evaluated
using FMECA and risk matrix to obtain a failure mode with the 8 11
4 4 1
most seriousness effect. This paper discussed about developing
FMECA in PLN Trans-JBTB as a method for decision making and
prioritizing to achieve a reliable power transmission. Risk Priority
Lightning Tree Animal
Number (RPN) is then calculated to get the top 5 failure mode with
the highest RPN value. 20 KV System Third Parties External Object
Force Majeure
Keywords—Asset Management; FMECA; risk matrix; RPN;

I. INTRODUCTION Figure 2. Detailed External Causes in PLN Trans-JBTB 2014-2017

As a power transmission utility that aim to be a world class CT

utility, PLN Trans-JBTB is implementing Asset Management. One 43 PT/CVT
of Asset Management requirement is that every plan to achieve LA
asset management objective has method and criteria for a decision PMS
making and prioritizing. One of Asset Management Objective in PMT
PLN Trans-JBTB is a reliable power transmission, reflected in a PMT INCOMING
little occurrence of transmission line and transformer outages KONDUKTOR (SWITCHYARD)
(TLOF TROF) and by short outages duration (TLOD TROD). 18 19 SUTT/SUTET
Based on fault history data in the last 4 years, as shown in figure
KABEL 20 KV
1, the highest outages cause by equipment failure. The detailed 1110 SISTEM PROTEKSI
outages cause are shown in fig 2 and fig 3. 6
8 8
TRAFO
4 3
2 2 1 GIS
135 KABEL POWER TT

116 Figure 3. Detailed Equipment Failure Causes in PLN Trans-JBTB

2014-2017

the method and criteria for decision making and prioritizing, is

developed by using FMECA. FMECA used to calculate the Risk
Priority Number (RPN) of every failure mode.
The top 5 RPN value is then choose and prioritized for further
1 analysis in order to obtain a reliable power transmission.

II. FMECA
External Equipment SAS Failure Mode, Effects and Critically Analysis (FMECA) is a
technique used to examine the potential failure mode within a
Figure 1. Outage causes in PLN Trans-JBTB 2014-2017 system in order to determine the effects [1]. This paper use PLN
Trans-JBTB risk matrix as a guidance for determine the
occurrence and severity factor used in FMECA calculation. Fig
4 showed risk matrix that used in PLN Trans-JBTB [2].

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2017 International Conference on High Voltage Engineering and Power Systems (ICHVEPS) TS16-7

4 Permanent disability > 1 - 10 billion

5 Fatality More than 10 billion

• Extra Fuel Cost

Cost that occurs when a more expensive fuel is used to
substitute the cheaper fuel. Calculated based on the
maximum cost used in the previous year. Extra fuel
classification is described as shown in Table III.

TABLE III. EXTRA FUEL COST CLASSIFICATION

Score Quantitative Description
1 ≤ 10 million
2 > 10 million – 100 million
3 > 100 million – 1 billion
Figure 4. Risk Matrix PT PLN (Persero) 4 > 1 - 10 billion
5 More than 10 billion
A. Occurence • Energy not served
Occurrence or probability to happen is how often a failure cause Total amount of energy that not delivered due to
by a specific failure mode could occur. Occurrence data for this outages. Maximum value is calculated from 50% of
paper is obtained from fault history data of PLN Trans-JBTB in peak load (load factor 0,8) with 10 hours outages
2014-2017 [3]. duration. Quantitative description based on MWh and
Rupiah cost are shown in Table IV.
PLN Trans-JBTB risk framework guide use 10 years data to
obtain occurrence value of “1” to “5”, because this paper use TABLE IV . ENERGY NOT SERVED CLASSIFICATION
data of 4 years span then an equivalent classification is used to
obtain occurrence value. The qualitative description and its Description
Score
Quantitative (MWh) Quantitative (Rp)
equivalent is describe in Table I. 1 < 4 MWh ≤ 4 million
2 4 – 40 MWh 4 million – 40 million
TABLE I. OCCURANCE CLASSIFICATION 3 > 40 – 400 MWh 40 million – 400 million
Description 4 > 400 – 4000 MWh 400 million – 4 billion
Probability Equivalent for 4 years 5 > 4000 MWh More than 4 billion
10 years data
data
> 90% Happen every year Happen every year for the • Equipment Cost
for 10 years last 4 years Equipment cost is sum of Cost that occurs during the
70% – 90% Happen in 8-9 years Happen in 3 years for the recovery of the outages. Equipment cost include
in the last 10 years, last 4 years (once very
≥ 1 every year year) personnel cost, component cost, equipment cost,
> 30% - < 70% Happen in 4-7 years Happen in 2 years for the material cost and compensation cost for customer, and
in the last 10 years, last 4 years (once very disposal cost. The maximum value is calculated from
≥ 1 every year year) the price of 3 phase IBT 500/150 kV.
10% - 30% Happen in 2-3 years Happen in 1 year for the
in the last 10 years, last 4 years (once very TABLE V. EQUIPMENT COST CLASSIFICATION
≥ 1 every year year)
< 10% Happen at least 1 in Not yet happened in the Score Quantitative Description
the same year for the last 4 years. 1 < 25 million
last 10 years 2 25 – 250 million
3 250 million – 2,5 billion
B. Severity 4 2,5 – 25 billion
Severity is the classification of the seriousness of the effect 5 > 25 billion
of a failure if it occurs. Severity then scored from “1” to “5” with
5 different categories in business perspective as [4]: • Environment
The maximum value is calculated based on the
• Safety environment contamination using Minister of
Calculated cost of accident that occur. Safety factor is Environment standard and the time that took to handle
divided into 5 scored of classifications as shown in the effect on environment. The qualitative and
Table II. quantitative description of environment classification
TABLE II. SAFETY CLASSIFICATION
are shown in Table VII.
Description
Score
Qualitative Quantitative
1 Near miss ≤ 10 million TABLE VII. ENVIRONMENT CLASSIFICATION
2 First aid injury, > 10 million – 100 million Description
medical aid injury Score Quantitative
3 Lost time injury / > 100 million – 1 billion Qualitative
(Rp)
temporary disability

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2017 International Conference on High Voltage Engineering and Power Systems (ICHVEPS) TS16-7

1 Environment pollutant under < 3 million IV. CONCLUSIONS

Environment ministry regulation
and can be handle immediately
2 Warning from environment
ministry for pollutant under the
regulation which can be handle <
1 month
3 Warning from environment
ministry for pollutant more than
regulation which can be handle >
1 month
4 Fined from environment ministry
for pollutant more than regulation
which effect environment
permanently, can’t be handle
immediately
5 Location shutdown by
environment ministry for
pollutant more than regulation
which effect environment
permanently, can’t be handle
FMECA is a useful method to asses a potential failure mode
3 – 30 million that may occur in the system and its equipment. In PLN Trans-
JBTB factors that used to calculate the risk priority number are
occurrence and severity based on PLN Trans-JBTB risk
framework.
30 – 300 million
5 failure mode that have serious impact in system and its
equipment based on the calculations are Lightning, Wiring and
300 million – 3 termination in protection system, tree, Flying kite and anomaly
billion in CB aux contact. These failure modes either has high
frequency occurrence or huge impacts based on fault history
data of PLN Trans-JBTB in 2014-2017.
More than 3 Likelihood and impact factor applied in PLN risk matrix to
billion obtain the priority scale for CB refreshment. Even has the same
technical condition result, if the location has high impact toward
the system, then becomes main priority to do CB refreshment.

III. RISK PRIORITY NUMBER REFERENCES

In order to obtain failure mode with the highest effect of [1] Reliability Analysis Center, “”ailure Mode, Effects and Criticality
seriousness, every failure mode is calculated its risk priority Analysis (FMECA)” Rome, 1993.
number using the following formula [2] Peraturan Direksi PT PLN (Persero) 0355.K/DIR2014, “Penerapan
Manajemen Risiko di Lingkungan PT PLN (Persero)”, Jakarta, 2014.
= [3] Sydney Water, “Failure Mode Effects and Criticallity Analysis (FMECA)
Procedure”, BMIS, 2010.
where, [4] PT PLN (Persero) , “”edoman Umum Manajemen Risiko PT PLN
O = Occurrence; (Persero)” Jakarta, 2014.
S = Severity;
Severity value obtained by summing 6 categories as following
formula
= + + + + +
Where
Sf = Safety
EFC = Extra Fuel Cost
ENS = Energy not Served
EC = Equipment Cost
Env = Environment
A standard RPN should consists of Occurrence, Severity, and
Detection. However, PLN Trans-JBTB hasn’t found a clear
formula to obtain a good data of Detection thus RPN is calculated
using only Occurrence and Severity.
RPN result then sorted descending to obtain 5 failure mode
with the highest effect of seriousness if occur, as shown in table
VIII.

TABLE VIII. RPN RESULT

Failure Failure
Outage Cause RPN
Mode 1 Mode 2
External 50
Lightning Lightning
Equipment Protection Wiring and
Failure system termination 45
External Tree Tree
40
External External Flying kite
Object 40
Equipment CB Anomaly in
Failure CB aux
contact 35

IEEE 978-1-5386-0944-6 640