Multiple Modernities in Eisenstadt and Habermas:

Religious-Secular dynamics in the history of reflexivity

Andrés Felipe Barrero Salinas

Matriculation no. 6759207

Prof. Dr. Peter Niesen

Supervisor

M.Sc. Politics, Economics and Philosophy

Date of Submission:
December 21, 2017

Universität Hamburg
Germany

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A mi familia: por el cariño incondicional,
por la perpetua paciencia,
por el legado

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Table of Contents

Introduction…………………………………………………………………………….4
Chapter I
1.1 Getting hold of modernity……………………………………………..…10
1.2 The Axial Civilizations: a world open to reconstruction………………12
1.2.1 Ontological tensions, reflexivity, elites, and center periphery
formation……………………………………………………….13
1.2.2 The Second Axial breakthrough, multiple modernities and
religion…………………………………………………………17
1.3 Religions, Secularization and Multiple Modernities…………………...20
1.3.1 In search of new approaches…………………………………...20
1.3.2 Multiple modernities, Multiple secularities……………………22
1.4 Between multiplicity and unity: global modernities……………………28
Chapter II
2.1 Transitioning to normative considerations……………………………..33
2.2 From Secularization to a post-secular project………………………….34
2.2.1 The evolutionary theory of society and religion……………….34
2.2.2 Revitalization of religion and the post-secular project…...……39
2.2.3 Multiple Modernities and the post-secular turn: hegemony
contested……………………………………………………….44
2.3 Postmetaphysical thinking and Axiality: Jaspers and Eisenstadt…….48
2.3.1 Habermas genealogy of axiality………………………………..48
2.3.2 From Jaspers to Eisenstadt: including non-axial societies……..51
2.4 Religion, Secularization and deliberative democracy…………………56
2.4.1 Theory of deliberative democracy: legitimacy and communicative
power…………………………………………………………………..57
2.4.2 Postsecular model of deliberative democracy…………………..60
Final Considerations.....................................................................................................66
Literature……………………………………………………………………………...69

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Introduction

The present investigation is a reconstruction of the theory of multiple modernities and an

examination of the normative implications that can be drawn when reflecting upon the
secular-religious relation within the context of modernity. The sociological innovation of
Shmuel N. Eisenstadt and the philosophical insights of Jürgen Habermas are central to
this enterprise, both because of the shared commitment to the study of modernity and for
the potential contributions that comparative sociology could bring to normative
discussions. They are the theoretical backbone of this thesis. I will now make explicit in
which sense such a conceptual task replies to a problem and how a connection between
Eisenstadt and Habermas can be discovered.

The theory of multiple modernities was the result of a long research endeavor in
comparative sociology initiated by the Israeli scholar Eisenstadt (2000a, 2003, 2006).
Paying close attention to empirical findings and being historically sensitive, he arrived at
the conclusion that modernity had several versions, i.e. modernity was a constructed
experience inherently entangled with historical trajectories and cultural backgrounds. He
argued against the standard conviction that societies all over the globe would inevitably
end up developing the same social structures, systems, and general characteristics. For
him, the belief that the basic institutional constellations of West Europa would eventually
replicate in all societies proved, under historical scrutiny, untenable. Thus, Eisenstadt
distanced himself from two important sociological trends, namely, evolutionist1 and
convergence theories, to instead explore the diversity of institutional arrangements
stemming from varied cultural programs (Eisenstadt, 2004, pp. 6–7; Koenig, 2005, p. 47).

Evolutionist theories shared, sometimes implicitly, a stage-driven conception of history

which, in turn, was entangled with the doctrine of progress. Sequences of directional
social change were explained as part of a unilinear and teleological narrative of history
(Sanderson, 2016, p. 30). In opposition, Eisenstadt´s work emphasizes the fragile,
contingent, contradictory and even antinomian nature of modernization and modernity.
Among other things that is the reason why his work has been denoted as “heterodox”

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Following Stephen Toulmin, Stephan Sanderson makes a sharp distinction between evolutionary and
evolutionist theories: “evolutionist formulations are those that account for long-term societal changes ‘in
some mysterious way, as the conclusions of a cosmic argument, which unfolds logical implications
operative throughout the whole history of society’ (Toulmin, 1972:329). Evolutionary formulations, on the
other hand, are those that […] attempt to explain changes as responses to the particular requirements
imbedded in specific historical situations” (Sanderson, 2016, p. 3) In its latter meaning, one can even regard
Eisenstadt theory as evolutionary.
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(Spohn, 2011, p. 283). If the perspective of multiple modernities were to be adopted,
evolutionist assumptions needed to be dropped. The immediate consequence is that many
areas and concepts of classical modern theory -from the functional and structural
differentiation, democratization theory, the development of capitalism, to processes of
secularization- had to be revisited under new lenses.

An especially suggestive idea, within the multiplicity of modernity outlook, was that in
some versions of modernity a sort of combination of traditional forms of legitimation and
modern forms of organization occurred. A core postulate reads: “[…] that tradition is
conceived not as a stagnant pre-stage but as a historical basis and structural component
of modernization and modernity” (Spohn, 2011, p. 5). This meant that tradition and
modernity were not mutually exclusive; the advent of modernity was not to be necessarily
accompanied by the abatement of traditional dimensions. The stadium-base conception
of social change where old forms of legitimation and social organization -mainly
constructed around religious and cultural beliefs/practices- was to be progressively
abandoned was tested. Of course, Eisenstadt did not have in mind a static appreciation of
tradition; processes of exchange and diffusion in a global context and internal tensions do
shape it (Laubmeier, 2016, p. 33). The value of Eisenstadt intuition lies in the elution of
old dichotomies by presenting a more complex and contingent dynamic between tradition
and modernity. The mechanic division between modern and pre-modern societies, as
described by Comte, Durkheim, Spencer, and the structural functionalism of Talcott
Parsons -among others-, could not hold anymore (Appelrouth & Edles, 2012, p. 92;
Roland, 2011, p. 306).

These changes in perspective were warmly welcomed by scholars that, already in the 70´s
and 80´s, began to question the claim that religion and traditional forms of life would
inevitably undergo processes of secularization. The decline of religion in the advent of
modernity was now a contested idea belonging to a biased secularization paradigm
(Berger, 1999; Casanova, 1994, pp. 11–39; Sachsenmaier, Riedel, & Eisenstadt, 2002,
pp. 3–4). The framework of multiple modernities presented a plethora of advantages for
persistence of religion research: it disentangle the hitherto inherent connection between
modernization and secularization processes; it offered a less rigid structure than classic
modernization theory; it seemed to avoid the ideological biases that slanted the
sociological investigation; and finally, it attributed reflectivity and creativity to non-
western cultures (Stoeckl & Rosati, 2016, sec. 1).

Nevertheless, the disentanglement of modernity and secularization theories still

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constitutes a much-debated subject, insofar as the role of religion, culture, and tradition
within modernity must be accounted for -making sense of empirical findings-. As it has
been pointed out, “While criticisms to conventional theories of modernization and
secularization abound, it is less clear how scholars might theorize the contemporary
condition without relying on inherent concepts of modernity and secularity” (Koenig,
2015, p. 286). One can go even further and question the necessity of speaking of
modernity at all.

The issue at hand is not trivial: the secularization thesis remains central to most of social
theories of Modernity. Many argue that is not necessary, nor wise, to abandon the
observations (even the gains) enabled by this paradigm and that a sort of pluralist strategy
can be defended where secularization processes could be elucidated alongside the
persistence of religion (Berger, 2014, pp. 51–53); a corollary being that a manifold
conception of the dynamics religious-secular emerges where secularities are context-
informed and could mobilize in the name of different collective projects (Burchardt &
Wohlrab-Sahr, 2013). Overall, the intention is to rethink modernity such that the role of
religion and cultural traditions is not homogenized and where experiences of modernity
beyond the west are effectively integrated. Eisenstadt´s oeuvre addressed this challenge
in an effort to make patent the diversity of modernity´s programs without discarding the
idea of modernity altogether, which would lead prima facie to postmodern roads.
Civilizations do face similar tensions, particularly during the Axial Age, that forced them
to differentiate between transcendental and mundane forms of legitimation and
organization, but the manner in which these tensions are resolved vary (Eisenstadt, 2011).

Consequently, the first chapter constitutes a reconstruction of the theory of multiple

modernities having as hermeneutical guidance the role of religion/tradition and the
resulting conception of modernitywhich appears when the decoupling between
secularization and modernity befalls. I ask: to what extent does Eisenstadt successfully
explain this decoupling and what are the consequences of a civilizational comparative
approach for the general narrative of modernity? In terms of literature, I will focus on his
work after 2000 when the article Multiple Modernities was published in Daedalus.

The second chapter carries the Eisenstadt´s thoughts to a normative ground. This is a
natural step if one considers that Modernity -more than a description of reality- was a
normative project that “[…] focused on universal values, and drew nourishment from the
belief that history is a progress of advancement towards the realization of those values”
(Dodd, 2005, p. 1). Being a sociologist mainly interested in institutional changes and
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civilizational comparisons, Eisenstadt was not fully engaged with normative concerns,
yet significant normative implications follow from his ideas. The normative value of the
multiple modernities vantage point can be initially aligned with the de-centralization of
modernity from western European experiences, and the rejection of universalistic
aspirations. In this sense, some have regarded his theory as an “anti-totalitarian project”
(Koenig, 2005, p. 56). Nonetheless, when discerning the normative side of modernity, I
turn to one of the most influential and important representatives of the project itself:
Jürgen Habermas. I analyze the way he interprets the persistence and vitality of religion
-and its consequences- in the context of Modernity and ask which are the normative
implications of such post-secular societies for the general project of modernity.

Habermas has himself admitted that central notions of his theory of modernity were based
on the secularization paradigm - and to a certain degree in evolutionist assumptions-. This
is no wonder if one remembers that the sociological sources of Habermas -especially
Parsons- were embedded in such tradition (Sanderson, 2016, p. 219). Abundant criticism
has rightly pointed to this fact. Nevertheless, much water has flowed under the bridge.
Since then, Habermas has initiated a fertile conversation with the persistence of religion
literature and has reexamined the project of modernity under these new conditions in an
effort to ameliorate his previous theory.

He agrees that the prognostic statements of the secularization theory were mistaken and
that comparative research on civilization (multiple modernities) is a promising program
(Habermas, 2017, p. 59). Yet, a revision of the sociological fundaments does not
automatically contradict normative aspirations, as if a multiple understanding of
modernity would per se undermine the search for universalizable principles. First, there
are no motives to believe that diversity connotes normative incommensurability;
communicative reason could, in theory, embrace pluralism (Dodd, 2005, pp. 124–25).
Secondly, the abandonment of conventional secularization theories does not entail giving
up the paramount idea of “learning processes”. Habermas writes (responding to
Casanova): “not every attempt to uncover learning processes and advances or ‘stages’ in
the genealogy of worldviews leads eo ipso to a questionable de-valuation of religious
forms of thought” (Habermas, 2013, p. 348). Within the grammar of Modernity religious
discourses, and social organizations where religion constantly plays a determining role,
can be recognized and included while striving for normative ideas (like in his axial
reconstruction and the modifications he makes to the deliberative model).

How Habermas includes these reasonings when linking post-metaphysical thinking to the
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post-secular condition constitutes the focal point here. He clarifies: “postmetaphysical
thinking as I conceive it also remains secular in a situation depicted as ‘post-secular’; but,
in this different situation, it may become aware of a secularistic self-misunderstanding”
(Habermas, 2017, p. 62). Purifying modern theory from the secularization biases is,
essentially, an exercise of modern self-reflexivity; in which a higher-level appears to be
achieved, and the self-understanding of Modernity expands (Renner, 2017, pp. 203–14).
From the stand point of deliberate democracy, the question that in the context of a
postsecular consciousness surfaces is: “What is the proper response of a constitutional
democracy to the religious beliefs and claims of society in such a way that they are not
adversely disadvantaged in relation to secular citizens?” (Craig Calhoun, Mendieta, &
VanAntwerpen, 2013, p. 404). Habermas´s Between Naturalization and Religion (1996)
is a response to such issue.

These claims are, of course, debatable and some academics like Amy Allen argue that
Habermas has “yet to work through the implications that this postsecular insight has for
his reliance on theories of social evolution and modernity” and that his theory has still a
Eurocentric kernel (Allen, 2016, p. 73). To what degree does Habermas fruitfully embrace
the refinements in the relation secular-religious, and simultaneously maintains his
normative views, will constitute a chief part of the second chapter.

What I have tried to show is that there is a thought-provoking association between

Eisenstadt´s multiple modernities and Habermas´s awareness of the normative
implications that a sociological revision of secularization brings. The possible cross-
fertilizations motivate the research question: what are the normative implications of
adopting a multiple understanding of modernity, especially when discerning the relation
secular-religious?2

2
I analyze the normative implications in the macro discussion of modernity and secularization. From other
specific dimensions, such as politics and morality, only the political dimension will be addressed.
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 CHAPTER

What else is sociology, if not the systematic attempt to come to an

understanding of modern society?
Peter Wagner

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1.1 Getting hold of Modernity: Eisenstadt´s research program

It has been said that Eisenstadt´s comparative civilizational approach to modernity must
be contextualized as a response to classical modernization (development theory) and
convergence theories prevalent in the 1950s. For him, the best way to explain history and
modernity is to “see it as a story of continual constitutions and reconstitution of a
multiplicity of cultural programs” (2000a, p. 2). Different programs of modernity are
carried forward by specific actors and permeated by singular historical and cultural
coordinates. There are two main questions to be addressed: a. How is diversity explained
(not only by pointing to the current data regarding institutional divergence among
societies but rather in genealogical terms); b. what are the essential characteristics that a
society is required to have in order to be designated as modern. Both questions allude
ultimately to a tension between multiplicity and unity, heterogeneity and homogeneity;
or, formulated in a different way: to a successful reformulation of modernity that does not
lead to the collapse of modernity itself. Such subject is analyzed in the context of the
linkage amid modernity, secularization, and religion where the tension becomes explicit
and palpable.

Eisenstadt tackles this double requirement by recognizing key events that societies face
in their history in which different paths are taken. He explains the commonalities of
modern societies and their dissimilar settings in a same sociological narrative. The
recognition of common marks -through which a society can be designated as modern-
does not entail homogeneity. On the contrary, common existential problems and events
open the social world to possibility. Institutional designs and ideological roads are
unlocked and then realized during these events, or as a response to common hindrances.
One can borrow the idea of critical junctures to clarify, to some extent, this point. Within
historical institutionalism literature, the standard view postulates a dual model in which
institutional stability is punctuated by brief phases of institutional flux (Capoccia &
Kelemen, 2007, p. 314). Critical junctures allude to a determined period (relatively short)
“(…) during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents' choices will
affect the outcome of interest.” (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007, p. 348). Critical junctures
mark the relationship between stability and change. Going back to Eisenstadt, and saving
the proportions, one can say that a society can be designated as modern once it has
experience certain “critical junctures” common to modern societies. Is not exactly about
the institutional or economic path they take, but about the arrival at points where structural

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changes are in order. It is in this way (that we will explore in more detail) that the Israeli
sociologist access the challenge of unveiling diversity within unity.

Central to the definition of modernity is the idea that human agency has an active and
conclusive role in the constitution of society i.e. in the choosing and implementation of
different institutional and ideological paths. For Eisenstadt, modernity is mainly
characterized by the acknowledgment that the ontological order lies in the hands of
autonomous agents. He writes:

The cultural program of modernity entailed some very distinct shifts in the conception
of human agency (…). It carried a conception of the future characterized by a number
of possibilities realizable through autonomous human agency. The premises on which
the social, ontological, and political order were based, and the legitimation of that
order, were no longer taken for granted. An intensive reflexivity developed around
the basic ontological premises of structures of social and political authority
(Eisenstadt, 2000a, p. 3).
Eisenstadt is using Weber´s sociological intuition that the rise of modernity is related to
a human suspicion that the world is no longer a god-ordained cosmos, this is, to the
decline of the unquestioned legitimacy of divinely preordain social order. As written in
the quote, the realization of human autonomy lead to reflexivity and exploration. In this
sense, modernity creates an emphasis on the participation of members of society in the
constitution of different social and political orders. The additional crucial points of
modern societies -as described by Eisenstadt- are derived from the previous idea: the role
of the elites in materializing visions, protest movements, the incorporation of heterodox
ideas in the political Center, the emancipation from the rule of tradition, the ability for
change, Inter Alia. All dependent on the awareness of autonomy (Laubmeier, 2016, p.
151).

At this point, it could be observed that Eisenstadt is very close to the classical theories of
modernity insofar as important Enlightenment concepts -such as autonomy- are
positioned at the center of the modern modus. Moreover, the transition from a god-given
world to one where human autonomy constitutes the generalized order of things is one of
the departing points of the secularization theory and the sociological models that
Eisenstadt is criticizing. Indeed, some scholars read Eisenstadt´s definition of modernity
as a clear allusion to the decline of legitimation forms stemming from religious and
transcendent sources (Laubmeier, 2016, p. 135). Viewed from this angle, Eisenstadt is
agreeing, to some extent, with the “disenchantment of the world” orientation formulated
by Weber, where the weakening of religious beliefs and the rationalization of religious
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practices themselves takes place (Dodd, 2005, p. 42). Significant nuances must,
nevertheless, be made. For Eisenstadt, one must go back to the concept of Axiality (Axial
Age/ Axial civilizations) in order to understand the roots of modernity and address the
concept in such a way that allows the researchers to depict the different paths that
civilizations took when solving the tension between transcendental and mundane orders.
Hence, the analysis of the Axial Age is of interest for Eisenstadt insofar as it opens a new
perspective of modernity (Koenig, 2005, p. 56).

Once again, the aim is to successfully account for diversity and unity in the description
of paramount events and changes, in this case, revolving around axiality. This step is
essential to, later, assess Eisenstadt´s ability (or even desire) to disentangle secularization
progresses from modernization, or at least offer a different portrayal of their relation. In
the following section, I will revise the concept of Axially having in mind ultimately these
pairs: unity-diversity, secularization-modernity. Then, the secular-religious dispute
among sociologist will be reviewed with the purpose of underlying how Eisenstadt´s
research program offers a more complex and pertinent entry to it. The intuitions of some
chief sociologists (Berger and Casanova) will be analyzed. Finally, some comments
around the multiplicity and unity tension in the global era will be made.

1.2 The Axial Civilizations: a world open to reconstruction

The crystallization of Axial civilizations constitutes one of the most fascinating developments in
the history of mankind, a revolutionary process that has shaped the course of history
dramatically
Shmuel N. Eisenstadt

The term ´Axial Age´ was coined and developed by the German philosopher Karl Jaspers
in 1942 in his book The Origin and Goal of History. The initial idea was that a pivotal
change occurred in many civilizations and societies (e.g. Greeks, China, Israel, India,
Israel); a sort of awakening that gave rise to the great intellectual, philosophical and
religious systems that would shape human society to come. Jasper´s work was greatly
influential through the 1960´s and begun a long-lasting discussion. Eisenstadt is one of
the intellectuals that, in an effort to start a dialogue between world history and
comparative sociology, used and problematized the concept. A revision of the axial
transformations can shed light “(…) on the ultimate sources and long term prehistory of
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modernity [and] serve to put modernizing processes in perspective by comparing them
with other world-historical mutations” (Arnason, Eisenstadt, & Wittrock, 2005, p. 9). The
axial age involves capital shifts in human existence in terms of historicity, reflexivity,
agentiality, and institutional design, similar changes to those experienced in modernity.
Indeed, Eisenstadt recognized its importance; since 1982 until his last writing in 2010
(The Axial Conundrum) he was fervently engaged in the discussion. As such, the concept
of axiality carries out a central role in the theory of multiple modernities -which is what
I aim to unveil in the following text-. As a caveat it is worth saying that, being part of
civilizational studies, an immense volume of literature surrounds the issue. Eisenstadt´s
work gives an exceptional importance to data and world historiography (examples are the
case studies of Japan, India, Islam, China, Latin-America, inter alia). Here I focus only
on the theoretical and abstract implications of such investigations in the formation of the
concept itself.

1.2.1 The Axial civilizations: ontological tensions, reflexivity, elites, and center-
periphery formation

Up front, let us develop three general conceptual refinements. (1) The first clarification
to make is that Eisenstadt moves between a historical and a typological understanding of
Axiality. The reason is that the concept cannot be used only in a chronological sense i.e.
within a time lapse from c. 800 B.C to c. 100 A.C. Various cases, such as the foundation
of Islam, show traits of axiality although they are located outside the proper Axial Age.
A typological path is recommended where a shift from ´Axial age´ to ´axial civilizations´
is made. Here there is no “mysterious synchrony” among civilizations; rather, each
civilization has central axial features in their own historical trajectory (Arnason et al.,
2005, pp. 11–12). (2) Secondly, the concept of axiality is not trying to homogenize
societies. Here much is debated, because early models of the axial age presupposed and
related many of the “breakthroughs” to western frameworks. Instead, Eisenstadt writes:

Is better to conceive the axial complex as an important component in the history

of human societies which developed in different ways and contexts, giving rise
to different, multiple axialities which interacted continually among themselves
and with non-axial civilizations in the shaping of different patterns of world
history or histories (Eisenstadt, 2005, p. 531).
Thus, the ´multiple´ of modernity started with multiple of axialities. The effort to
elaborate a comparative sociology has to admit this unavoidable distance among
civilizations (axial and non-axial -as Japan-). Such a stance on the subject seeks to lay
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down the foundations for a critique of evolutionist paradigms related to the axial model
(2005, 7)4. What is meant is that the crystallization of axial civilizations does not coincide
with the arrival of a uniform axial age. (3) Lastly, modifications to society’s order
(ontological, institutional, etc.) should not be considered as abrupt. Although there are
key events (as pointed out before) the implications and institutional derivations of such
happenings take time. Moreover, Eisenstadt is able to investigate the ultimate sources of
modernity in the concept of axiality due to the longue durée of its consequences.

Having made those refinements, one can proceed to define and point out the main
characteristics of axial civilizations. In Axiality two tendencies are combined: a radical
distinction between ultimate and derivate reality (transcendental and mundane realities)5,
and a profound problematization of cosmological and social orders. These tendencies
would lead to the crystallization of axial civilizations. Before the appearance of modernity
these civilizations represent the most radical decoupling of structural and cosmological
dimensions of social and cultural order. Tensions (or antinomies) where developed as a
product of such changes. The most central one relates to the chasm between the two orders
(transcendental and mundane) and the following difficulty of trying to bridge them
(Eisenstadt, 1982, p. 297). Axiality is, thus, defined in terms of an experienced,
comprehensive rupture and problematization of social order. To specify, Eisenstadt
summarizes three central features: “(…) a broadening of horizons, or an opening up of
potentially universal perspectives, in contrast to (…) particularism (..); an ontological
distinction between higher and lowers levels of reality; and normative subordination of
the lower level to the higher” (2011, p. 203). Axiality entails the recognition that many
paths can be taken both in the implementation of visions and in the design of institutional
frameworks.

Let us examine in more detail what Eisenstadt means with transcendental and mundane
orders. Some scholars argue that the idea can be contrasted with Durkheim’s distinction
between the sacred and the profane (Arnason, 2005, p. 39). One could only grasp the
sacred/profane typology in their exclusive relation in which, nevertheless-in the
explanations of religious belief systems- the sacred is considered an orientation for the

4
Some scholars nevertheless argue that even Eisenstadt depiction of axial processes cannot escape a
western bias. I will explore this critique on the closing remarks of the present chapter.
5
In his first writings Eisenstadt uses the concepts of transcendental and transmundane worlds/orders (1982).
At the ends one can note a shift to the use of terms ´ultimate´ and ´derivate´. This could be initially explained
as his intent to further de-westernalize the terminology. Here I will mostly use transcendental and mundane
orders.
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profane. In a similar way, Eisenstadt´s concepts are mutually defining. The transcendental
is a higher order only imperfectly mirrored by the lower; a source of normative projects
of reordering. In a broad sense, the transcendental dimension is a matter of the overall
worldview. As has been correctly pointed out, the transcendental level is not per se a
universalistic orientation, but rather a potential opening to it: “ The question of
universalism remains latent, and the most plausible interpretation of the argument is that
the transcendental dimension (…) represents a potential opening to universalism, but it
depends on the cultural context as well as the broader historical circumstances whether -
or to what extent- the potential is realized” (Arnason, 2005, p. 40). As has been stressed
before: the resolution of the tension is multiple and depends on the cultural orientations
that each society (through the elites) chooses to implement and follow. On the other hand,
that the tension between the two order appears during the axial turn does not entail that
these realities belong only to axial civilizations. Eisenstadt thinks the two levels were to
be found in pre-axial societies, but that the boundaries were blurry (1982, pp. 296–297).
This is in line with the previous refinement that changes take time. The tension between
distinct ontological levels must be regarded more as an explicitness and radicalization
rather than an ex nihilo creation.

The above antinomies can only sprout under some sort of reflexivity. Eisenstadt links
axiality with a growing reflexivity and second-order thinking i.e. complex thought (1982,
p. 306). Grosso modo, reflexivity consist in a revision of the basic premises on which
cultural and social order is based upon. Here he agrees with Robert Bellah: the core
breakthrough of the axial civilizations is the arrival at a stage of human thinking,
reflexivity (Bellah, 2005, p. 69). The revision of premises can be described, according to
Eisenstadt, as a critical examination of the status quo- that would even open the door for
the revolutionary transformations of institutions-. In other words, reflexivity surfaces as
the awareness that the world is open to reconstruction by human agency.

These changes are not exclusively theoretical, but they expressed themselves in a political
and cultural struggle. The ways in which the chasm between transcendental and mundane
orders could be solved were carried about by intellectual and political elites. Elites in the
axial age -and more decidedly in modernity- try to implement specific social and cultural
orders. Elite groups that are successful locate themselves at the center of society (in a
center/periphery schema). Agentiality is crucial for the theory of multiple modernities; it
is up to elite groups to choose and implement visions of social order. Nonetheless, the
order remains always contested, which means that there is always a possibility for new
15
groups stationed at the periphery (secondary elites) to gain access to the center. This
property is radicalized in modernity, where social movements and protest voices
divergent from the elites are continuously in struggle.3

The “first modernity” is, sensu strictu, the consequence of one of the roads taken by elites
(great traditions) which then expanded in colonial and imperialistic modes through the
world. Some distance is already present here in relation to Parsons and classical modern
theory, namely, that modernity is not the product of an unavoidable and inherent progress
of society, but the crystallization and then expansion of cultural and social visions in
gestation since the Axial Age. There are other nuances that allow us to put Eisenstadt
aside from classical theory. For him, the development of reflexivity, as seen, is central to
axiality. He relates reflexivity to openness expressed as a decoupling of the different
dimensions of social order (structural and symbolic). Following the traditional jargon:
structural differentiation. The decoupling brings about specific and organizationally
distinct organizations, collectivities, and roles -including religious groups- (2005, p. 545).
His description of structural differentiation is, yet, not fully comparable to that of Parsons.
Structural differentiation is not an inherent component of change, but rather a product of
a disposition of political elites (Preyer, 2016b, p. 31).

Extending this intuition to the idea of modernities: structural differentiation can variate
in nature and reach depending on the cultural and political orientations that were
implemented since the axial age. Eisenstadt is criticizing (and simultaneously renovating)
the evolutionist presumptions of structural functionalism. In a nutshell: Social change
does not necessarily lead to structural differentiation, and even when it does, institutional
formations are multi-directional. This being true, Eisenstadt is still not completely
breaking with his structural influences. As some scholars highlight, even if uncertainty
and agentic volition are added he had not altered the paradigm in any decisive way:

Eisenstadt shifted the epicentre of social change from systemic needs in general
to political elites who satisfy their need for power by establishing new and more
specialized, or focused, political institutions. But while there is a relief in the
system, the status and power struggles of these new elites create new conflicts
over scarce resources. Notwithstanding the significance of his critical
comments, the Empires remained well embedded in the Parsonian framework as

3
In the case of the axial civilizations, competing traditions find themselves in this continual dynamic.
Eisenstadt refers to great and little traditions located at the center and periphery respectively (Eisenstadt,
1982, p. 302).
16
 he remained committed to the problématique of adaptiveness, flexibility,
systemic boundaries and productive capacity (Marangudakis, 2016, p. 50).
To be sure, I claim that Eisenstadt transitions from an evolutionist to an evolutionary
conception of social change and modernizing processes (adopting Sandersons' and
Toulmin´s terminology). Structural differentiation and the organization of society in a
center-periphery schema is part of the “´evolutionary´ potentialities” of civilizations
(locating the term in quotation marks). The nature of structural differentiation is shaped
by particular elite constellations and their respective characteristics and behaviors (like in
making coalitions), rather than disregarding the historical context and defending changes
that occur behind the backs of agents. Eisenstadt´s reformulation of structural
differentiation using the axial lenses lead him to rearrange the sociological problem of
change to the relation between agency (creativity) and structure, between culture and
social-structure. He takes a distinctive approach to structural evolution6 described as
multi-dimensional. Structural change (i.e. socio-structural innovations) is represented as
continuously modifying belief systems and the implementation of orientation mainly by
social interactions and processes of translations (Preyer, 2013, p. 203, 2016a, p. 15).

1.2.2 Second Axial breakthrough, Multiple modernities, and religion

I would like now to delve into the kind of extrapolation that is made from the axiality to
western modernity (as the trigger of a second axial breakthrough) and explore what
consequences it has as an antecedent framework of the relation modernity-religion.

The cultural and political program designated as Modernity (in its historical meaning) is
firstly located in western and central Europe; is the consequence of one of the roads
opened during the structural innovations of the first axial age. In principle, this entails
that the development of the first modernity is not historically/ontologically necessary, but
the product of contingent possibilities that were realized (furthermore, modernization
processes are distinct within the European context: Great Britain, Germany, France, etc.).
There is, in this sense, a decentralization within the concept of Modernity. Eisenstadt does
refer to the western modernization process as the original, but not as the authentic one7
(2011, p. 212). Accordingly, West Europa´s structure evolution triggered a second axial

6
Social structural evolution is simultaneously an order-transforming and order-maintaining process.
7
One must specify further, even within Europe and Western civilizations diversity is present. An effort to
translate Eisenstadt´s intuitions (often applied only to non-western cases) to Europe itself has been done
(Delanty, 2015).
17
age characterized by different modernizations and institutional complexes (Preyer, 2011,
p. 99). Eisenstadt writes:

it was the combination of the awareness of the existence of different ideological

and institutional possibilities with the tensions and contradictions inherent in the
cultural and political program of modernity that constituted the core of modernity
as the Second Global axial age. this combination gave rise—through the activities
of multiple cultural and political activists who promulgated and attempted to
implement different visions of modernity in their interactions with broader strata
of society, and through the continual contestations between them—to the
crystallization of different patterns of modernity, of multiple modernities (2003, p.
501).
Thus, like the first one, this axial age opened new tensions and could be regarded as
constituting a next step in the development of reflexivity, one that went beyond what was
crystallized in the axial civilizations making more explicit the contested nature of
institutions and visions. Now, what would be the effect of the development of reflexivity
in terms of religious discourses and the role of religion in societies?

Eisenstadt retains the perception that both the first and the second axial breakthroughs
bring about significant formations and dynamics between the centers and the peripheries
of society. In principle, the elites and the visions or ideologies that they implement can
have a wide range i.e. they can be secular or religious, conservative or liberal, defenders
of autonomy or supporters of totalitarian movements. Initially, the contents of the visions
are not so important as the dynamics that are established between Great and Little
traditions, Orthodox and heterodox groups, those at the center, and the social movements
that revolve around the periphery seeking access. All these elements constitute his
conception of institutional building. From this vantage point, the type of cosmological
order (the foundation of the cultural orientation of a society), and the nature of the elite
and institutional entrepreneurs (which mobilize resources) are open i.e. not determined in
content (Preyer, 2013, pp. 18–19).

This being the case, is also true that Eisenstadt writes that modernity (as a second axial
age) has generated a change at the political centers, namely, their secularization (2003, p.
263). The remark, nonetheless, lacks development and the author does not spend much
time on it. When referring to the changes that the center-periphery schema undergoes in
modernity, Eisenstadt focuses much more on the inclusion of symbols and premises of
protests (initiated by the Great Revolutions) at the center, and the loss of “sanctity” of the
past as a major symbolic regulator of social, political and cultural change. the main idea

18
consists is that with the arrival of modernity the tension is radicalized, and the contested
nature of any vision is accentuated. This would explain why Eisenstadt also identifies
modernity with changes between the boundaries of the center and the periphery (where
the first becomes less independent from the second). In any case, Eisenstadt maintains
the idea that those tensions are resolved in accordance with each civilization historical
trajectories and cultural orientations. In the case of western modernity (having the
Enlightenment tradition as background) rationality and reason were highlighted. In other
coordinates, sacral codes were more prominent. The same is valid in the political
dimension, where societies “chose”, more or less, among mainly pluralistic, Jacobin, and
totalitarian roads (Laubmeier, 2016, pp. 102–104).

Eisenstadt remains superficial regarding the impact that the second axial breakthrough
had on religious consciousness. As will be shown later, he only focuses on the
institutional implications of it (marginally); unlike Peter Berger, he does not analyze the
subjective realm. Eisenstadt is more interested in the political formation of centers and
peripheries in order to explain change and stability in societies. He is criticizing, without
fully abandoning, structural differentiation and defending a more civilizational approach,
where many roads are possible: multiple modernities. Indirectly, and this constitutes one
of the reasons why his approach has been the object of further development, he is not
depriving collective identities (religion among them) of a noteworthy place in modernity.
In other words, collective identifies are not regarded as residuals or epiphenomena -as in
classical theories of modernity-.

One can extend Eisenstadt´s reasoning of the increase of contestation and reflexivity (the
antinomian nature of modernity) to religious studies in the second Axial Age. There is, in
this sense, an upsurge of flexibility (and revisability in religious consciousness under
conditions of plurality (Lambert, 1999, p. 310). Easily put, things are not taken for
granted8. Leaving aside a more precise periodization of modernization processes (from
Enlightenment to industrialization) flexibility and revisability are part of the massive
encounter between a myriad of cultural and religious traditions. Pluralism is seen, by
some, as a keystone of secularization and the relativization of religions (Bondarenko,
2011, p. 123). Yet, how can these ideas be interpreted from the notion of multiple

8
How can one equate flexibility with orthodox and fundamentalist modern expressions of religion is a topic
for the next segment.

19
modernities? Is Eisenstadt indirectly still maintaining some universalist ideas linked with
secularism?

1.3 Religions, Secularization and Multiple Modernities

Das jähe Ende des Postmodernediskurses zu Beginnen des neuen Jahrtausends hat der
Modernetheorie lehrreich gezeigt, dass es wenig glaubwürdig ist, den „Moderne“
Ausgangspunkt konzeptionellen Denkens zu verleugnen. Klar ist, dass eine
Gesellschaftstheorie der Gegenwart, ob Postmoderne- oder multiple-modernities-
Konzeption, den Boden der Moderne nicht verlassen können
Boris Krause

As already established in the main introduction, the relation between modernization

and secularization viewed from the understanding of modernity that Eisenstadt has is
of predominant interest. Following other authors, my intuition is that his work serves
as a possible solution to an otherwise stagnated debate among different sociological
perspectives (all trying to make sense of the persistence of religion), and that an
important variation of the sociological paradigm has noteworthy normative
implications (second chapter). In the following segment, I examine to what extent is
Eisenstadt´s theory is valuable in this respect. Later, the receptions of his scheme by
Peter Berger and José Casanova are studied. Both because they attest for the
adaptability of his research program to the matter of religion and, secondly because
they make even more explicit the theoretical connection between Eisenstadt´s legacy
and Habermas´s approach to postsecular societies.

1.3.1 In search of new approaches: return of religions and modernity

Within the sociology of religion, a handful of empirical evidence suggested that the
prognosis of the “disappearance of religious forms” in modern society was mistaken or
at least misguided. This seemed to apply in two relevant dimensions. Secularization
theory explained that both the institutional as well as the subjective pertinence of belief-
systems were going to fade with time and with the advent of science. But sociological
observations pointed to the opposite, both institutional robustness and subjective aspects
of religion were healthy. For a while, a narrative around the “return” of religions appeared
which intended to criticize and discontinue the theory of secularization. The matter was,
at some point, formulated in an either/or schema, namely: between secularization and the
return of religions.

20
For the proponents of the return of religions, one did not have to look far to find examples
that showed the influence of religions and beliefs in politics and society. The
revitalization of the Catholic church, the influence of the Zionist party in the Israeli
Parliament, the propagation of Pentecostalism in Latin America, the foundation of the
Islamic Republic of Iran were among some of the many signs of it (Kepel, 1994). To the
return of traditional or historic religions (especially Islam and Christianity), scholars
added also the formation of new spiritualities focus often on the westernization of eastern
religious currents like Hinduism and Buddhism. These new religious forms were (and
are) highly eclectic, mystic, and esoteric in nature making their analysis even more
difficult. Having such empirical evidence Berger will later famously write: “The world
today is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some place more so than ever”(Berger,
1999, p. 2). How could sociology enlighten these mutations and comebacks? Did it all
entail that the secularization thesis was completely wrong and that a new paradigm was
needed?

One leading interpretation sees the return of religions as the consequence of a failed
modernity. Religions reappeared only as a symptom, a retroactive effect of unkept
promises made by modernity and its discourse (Kasper & Sloterdijk, 2007, p. 42). In the
context of the post Second World War and the end of the Cold War, it made sense that
the Modern narrative, deeply associated with the aspirations of Enlightenment and
rationality was seen with suspicious eyes. Modernity and the so-called development and
progress it preached was contrasted with a dreadful state of affairs like planet pollution,
the demographic explosion, and the energy crisis. It seemed that religions were accusing
modernity of such headaches, consequence of a society that bragged about leaving faith
aside. That attitude of coping with social and political issues without the help of god
turned out to be expensive and painful (Bauman, 2001, p. 2010).The revitalization of
religions was, therefore, identified as satisfying an existential void left by old promises.
Faced with uncertainty and the ever-changing society, religions offered a sort of
ontological insurance (using anthropological philosophy terminology).

I believe that the Manichaean distinction between religion and secularization is an old
discussion. It is only necessary to refresh the conversation in order to understand why
sociology needed to explore innovative formulations of secularization and modernity
simultaneously. Already the term “return” resulted problematic and ambiguous; religions
were never out of the picture (this is the reason why the word ´persistence´ is preferred).
On the other hand, the new spiritual systems of belief and the arrival of somatic religious
21
practices gushed as something rather different from historical traditions; it made little
sense to assign them the “return” label. In my opinion, what constituted the major problem
of the ´return´ interpretation was its reactive nature which was still maintaining -in a
negative way- the premises of the classical theories of modernization.

That reactive mood was, to some extent, embedded as well in the postmodern discussion.
To put it more clearly: if modernity had secularization, postmodernity was backed by the
return of religions; if the first was conjoined with universal and hegemonic intentions and
orientations, the second one defended that one could only speak of micro-narratives where
the word ´project´ was useless9. Scholars reached a dead end when taking this approach
to the issue. It can be argued that the notion of multiple modernities is Janus-faced
because it addresses both the complaints of totalizing narratives and the pitfall of
relativism. For Eisenstadt, the quandary cannot be resolved just by saying that one only
had petites histories (as the advocates of postmodernism claimed)10, but at the same time,
he is not willing to reproduce a doctrine of classical modernity (universal, unilinear, etc.).
The comparative effort is, more or less, an intermediate point, a research program that is
sober in getting rid of prognostic statements while preserving the historical value of
axiality and modernity.

The multiple modernities point of vantage accepted many of the critics that the return of
religions formulated in order to re-think the genealogical account of Modernity. In his
explanation of modernity, therefore, one finds contingency, discontinuity, variation,
tradition mutations, etc. (Krause, 2012, p. 276). It is my perception that reading the
empirical evidence for the persistence of religion using Eisenstadt’s comparative research
program has the additional benefit of revising religious movements and identities not only
as a reactive defense to a failing modernity but as the long lasting (from the Axial Age)
consequence of agents and traditions locating themselves at the center of the
implementation of visions and institutional designs, which is a richer view on the matter.

1.3.2 Multiple modernities, multiple secularities

The notion of multiple modernities attracted much attention because it untangled the
hitherto inherent connection between modernization and secularization processes; it
offered a less rigid structure than classic modernization theory; it seemed to avoid the

9
The term ´posmodern´ is problematic and often includes a myriad of different positions and theoretical
assumptions. At most, it serves as a provisional term (Küng, 2000, pp. 35–36).
10
Having in mind the crudest formulation of the micro-narrative concept.
22
ideological biases that slanted the sociological research; and finally, it attributes
reflectivity and creativity to non-western cultures (Stoeckl & Rosati, 2016, pt. 1). Main
scholars within the discussion saw in Eisenstadt´s work an acute insight with much
potential for further development. Let us now inspect how Eisenstadt´s research program
was received particularly by (a) Peter Berger and (b) José Casanova, and examine to what
extent did it really meet the expectations that sociologist of religions had.

(a) Peter Berger is an interesting example of paradigm change inside secularization

studies. Although he tried to avoid an ideological use of the term ´secularization´ and
made an afford to adopt it as an explanatory instrument, he eventually realized that parts
of his research were stain with biases (Berger, 2006, p. 153). He initially formulated that,
in conditions of plurality, religious forms lose plausibility and legitimacy; this would
affect the institutional and the subjective realms of religions in a consistent manner. With
Luckman, he alleged that pluralistic waves were going to have a relativization effect of
value systems (Berger & Luckmann, 1991, p. 142 & ff).

The discussion of the persistence of religion allowed Peter to revise his own postures, and
in doing so, he discovered that religions were still robust. This did it not meant that the
secularization thesis was totally mistaken, but that significant propositions and
assumptions had to be challenged. The inflection of his thinking brought as a consequence
a keen investigation regarding contra-secularization movements identified in all major
and minor religions, from Christianity to Shinto, from Islam to Sikhism (Berger, 1999, p.
6). As we saw in the last segment, for Eisenstadt a society is continually being
transformed (a competition among traditions, elites, and visions is always occurring).
Religious collectivities are, therefore, present either at the center or the periphery of
societies seeking to implement their visions and institutional designs. If one adds this idea
to the notion of contra-secularization movements one can better understand why religions
activities were not dwindling in the face of secularization. A great example is Poland
where state secularism was imposed but, howbeit, during such period of communist
leadership religious resistance grew (Davie, 2011, p. 73).

Berger, hence, also seeks to also to separate modernity from secularization without giving
up the plurality phenomena. Religious pluralism did have a serious weight on the religious
consciousness and behavior of individuals in the one hand, and in collective institutions
on the other. He explains:

(…) I made an important mistake: Pluralism undermines religious certainty and

opens up a plenitude of cognitive and normative choices. In much of the world,
23
 however, many of these choices are religious (…) Modernity does not
necessarily lead to secularization; where it does, this development cannot be
assumed but must be explained. Modernity necessarily leads to pluralism. This
does indeed present faith with a significant challenge, but it is different from
the challenge of secularization (2014, p. 20).
In focusing on plurality rather than secularization, the US-American sociologist was able
to take some distance from the second to observe it in relation to religious discourses and
practices. The complex relationship between religion and secularization is thus explained
in terms of a condition of pluralism. In the realm of individual faith, pluralism means that
religious belief-systems cannot be taken for granted. The individual is confronted with a
religious international marketplace i.e. a plethora of belief-sets and spiritual institutions
available for choosing. The direct consequence is that faith is no longer a matter of
tradition and unquestioned acceptance, but of choosing (Berger, 2014, p. 28).The
encounter with people who think, believe, and behave differently has an immense effect
on the individual mind. This is true not only among religious discourses but also for
secular ones. Berger argues that in conditions of plurality, the mind itself becomes plural.
Notwithstanding the persistence of religion, there are existential and practical dimensions
of individuals that deal with the reality “as if God did not exist”. For him, people apply
religious and secular definitions of reality without this being contradictory (Berger, 2014,
p. 56). The study of the Axial Age is once more in order. The compact nature of the world
(following Voegelin: where reality is experienced as one unified whole) shatters in the
Axial Age when processes of differentiation begin. The dawn of Modernity and
pluralization accentuates furthermore this differentiation, to the extent that consciousness
itself ends up coping simultaneously with secular and religious ideas.

In the institutional domain, something similar happens. The empirical fact that religious
institutions seem to be ubiquitous, does not mean that significant changes have taken
place in their constitution. Religious institutions are based now on voluntary membership,
a membership that is not taken for granted. In addition, major areas of society manage
without religion (regardless of the status of belief of the individuals within the institution).
As an example, modern societies depend on organizational and technological
infrastructures that are based on secular discourse. Where does religion end and
secularization begin is an empirical matter that is resolved in social practices and legal
quarrels (courts). What is important in Berger´s suitable and pertinent observation is that:
in conditions of plurality there is also a complex relationship between secular and
religious institutions.

24
It is easy to see why Berger is fond of the notion of multiple modernities. His formulation
of plurality and plausibility structures4 is not only compatible but shares insights with
Eisenstadt´s endeavor. Secular-modern interactions in modern societies are complex,
meaning that the boundaries between religion and secularity can be drawn in diverse
ways. Eisenstadt considers seriously the role of a vast array of collectivities (including
believers) in the formation and implementation of visions and institutions. But, in a
similar vein to Berger, he does so without denying that a paramount distinction takes
place in the first and second axial age, namely, that the social order is no longer taken for
granted and that a perception of the necessity to re-construct it surfaces. A reconstruction
in terms of continual contestations that ultimately lead “to the crystallization of different
patterns of modernity, of multiple modernities” (Eisenstadt, 2003, p. 519).

An additional study inspired by Eisenstadt´s comparative sociology is that of multiple

secularities11. Their claim is that leaving aside universalistic conceptions of secularization
requires scholars to “grasp religious-secular dynamics on societies' own terms”
(Burchardt, Wohlrab-Sahr, & Middell, 2015, p. 4). Indeed, the terminology around
secularization was developed having in mind western European experiences and the
Christian tradition. Although there are formulations of it that go back to the Axial Age, it
was especially within the Christian tradition and in the context of the Protestant Reform
that the backbone of secularization theories was formulated. It does not mean that each
civilization or culture is completely isolated and, thus, no effort for cross understanding
can be initiated (this would lead to complications regarding cultural and historical
incommensurability). Circumstances of global interconnectedness and historical
intercivilizational learnings and encounters testify against any isolation. The idea of
multiple secularities draws on Eisenstadt´s strategy of solving the unity-plurality issue of
modernity and extends its consequences to the secularization discussion:

We think that the discussion of secularization in sociology could be profitably

linked to recent debates in the theory of modernity, in particular to the `multiple
modernities´ approach and to the perspectives of cultural sociology. The ´multiple
modernities´ approach insists on the indispensability of the concept of modernity,
but without persisting in its one-side orientation to a seemingly universalistic

4
“A Plausibility structure is the social context in which any cognitive or normative definition of reality is
plausible” (Berger, 2014, p. 31).
11
The authors make the following clarification “For reasons of analytical clarity, in what follows we
propose to reserve the concept of secularism for the ideological-philosophical program – hence, for the
explicit ideology of separation – and related political practices, and the concept of secularity, by contrast,
for the culturally and symbolically as well as institutionally anchored forms and arrangements of
differentiation between religion and other social spheres”. (Burchardt et al., 2015, p. 4).
25
 western model. Focusing on the intertwinements of universality and difference, it
contends that all modern societies have been confronted with the European
model”. (Wohlrab-Sahr & Burchardt, 2012, p. 880).

The nuance to be made is that basic assumptions concerning the nature of the religious-
secular relation should depend on the historical and cultural trajectories of each nation.
Japan´s modernization experience, for example, where Shinto resources were mobilized
during the Meiji Reformation seeking to counter the lack of integration left by the
Tokugawa period, shows a whole different story of secularization processes but includes
the later western influences (Mullins, 2015). Comparable examples can be found for the
Arab Middle East, South Asia, and Africa.

(b) José Casanova is a Spanish-US chief sociologist who has also embraced Eisenstadt’s
ideas. Already in this case, more explicitly and extendedly than in Berger, there exist a
clear normative side to the revision of modernity and secularization theories. That is why
his position is worth mentioning; not only because of his direct involvement in the
sociological debate but because Casanova’s theory of de-privatization is considered by
Habermas’s enterprise of rethinking religion and its place on the public sphere.

From the explanatory side, Casanova agrees with Eisenstadt’s observation that sociology
needs to historicize and contextualize all categories used in the secularization theory. This
inevitability means the adoption of a more global perspective. A transition to new and
innovative paradigms must be made, one that escapes the “fruitless secularization debate
into comparative historical analysis that could account for different patterns of
secularization (…) across societies and civilizations” (Casanova, 2006a, p. 8). Here refers
to debate mainly between US-American and European sociologists of religion. While in
Europe the thesis of secularization was defended and supported with local empirical data,
US-American scholars were analyzing religious mutations and their persistence using a
supply-demand model i.e. rational choice.

The rational choice (RC) study of religion was rich when it came to clarifying the
alterations of religion in the American case. In Latin America, for example, where a
religious diversity and the subsequent competition between them validated the
pluralization postulate (Davie, 2011, p. 108). For some representatives of this school of
thought, secular movements occurred principally where a monopolistic market of creeds
was to be found. Prima facie, there are two difficulties with the RC model. In the one
hand, some cases like Poland (were monopolistic conditions were present) did not lead to
secularization but rather to the strengthening of religion as resistance. In the other hand,
26
such a model failed to perceive that in conditions of pluralization the secular narrative is
included and mixed with other discourses and that the nature of belief and institutional
organization are deeply transformed. Therefore, the Spanish-sociologist claims that an
impasse was reached and that each model was only marginally successful in explaining
the religious-secular dynamics.

Casanova offers a three-dimension definition of secularization and intends to establish

which of the three dimensions can be validated – in the context of a comparative effort -
in a global perspective, and which are falsified or only applicable to local European-US
American experiences. The dimensions are: a. Secularization as a differentiation of the
secular spheres from religious institutions and norms; b. secularization as a decline of
religious beliefs and practices; c. secularization as the marginalization of religion to
private sphere (Casanova, 2006b, p. 12). From his perspective, the only defensible -
keeping some nuances- dimension is (a), were societal modernization lead to the
emancipation of secular spheres (primarily the state and the market economy). The other
two (b, c) are falsified outside the western and European experience. Is clear why point
(b) is rejected, related to the critique of the return/persistence of religion literature that we
have exhibit above.

In a similar vein, point (c) is falsified. Casanova presents his deprivatization theory where
he questions the idea that democratic formations are only possible once the separation
from state and religion takes place. Furthermore, even when such separation occurs, the
privatization of religion is not an unavoidable consequence; religion is still part of the
political public sphere and of civil society. Casanova takes an extra step: in some
historical experiences -like the US- the State and church separation intended to protect
and bestow more liberty to religious communities. Hence, to argue that sacred movements
are (and should normatively be) totally privatized could be counterproductive for
democracy itself, being that one of the reasons why he heavily criticizes liberal
democratic theories that normatively include secularism and privatization of religion as
an institutional requirement of democracy (Casanova, 2009, p. 3). It should be
emphasized that in the center-periphery schema and in the characterization of elites,
Eisenstadt includes religious movements and collectives. Although the centers are
described as secular, the role of religion as a carrier of visions and as an agent of public
contestation is never overlooked.

Casanova agrees once more with Eisenstadt: many of the above issues are permanent
effects of correlating modernization and secularization theories; of maintaining the
27
supposition that in modernity traditional forms of social organization, participation, and
legitimation are long elapsed. The strength of the multiple modernities approach is that,
for example, modern traits are not developed in detriment of traditional ones, but rather
that a transformation of tradition is concomitant to modernization. Casanova writes: “The
multiple modernities position rejects both the notion of a modern radical break with
traditions as well as the notion of an essential modern continuity with tradition. All
traditions and civilizations are radically transformed (…) but they also have the
possibility of shaping in particular ways the institutionalization of modern traits”
(Casanova, 2006a, p. 14). Eisenstadt is positioned, thus, in the middle of secular
cosmopolitanism (rigid sacred-secular divide) and the clash of civilizations (pure
continuity of tradition).

Both Berger and Casanova recognize the innovative insights of the comparative endeavor
initiated by Eisenstadt and his research program. As it is already evident, not only because
of its contributions but, more significantly, because it opened new paths of reflection on
the topic. This is not to say, that relevant distances are taken and that, in some aspect, the
theory must be perfected and nuanced (like in the problematic relation that Casanova
identifies between Eisenstadt and Bella around the evolutionary nature of axiality). Some
of these issues are going to be mentioned once we arrive at the closing remarks of the
chapter.

1.4 Between multiplicity and unity: global modernities

Eisenstadt´s investigations on the expansion of modernity suggest that modernity

Is not an evolutionary pathway to a global civilization. On the contrary, we live in a
time of global modernities or, a next society beyond modernity.

Gerhard Preyer

Before closing the chapter, let us go back to an early problem: the tension between unity
and multiplicity. At the end of the last section, we saw how Casanova recognizes the
virtue of Eisenstadt´s theory in so far as it defends a middle ground between hitherto
contradictory angles. When it comes to the convergence-divergence debate (most
prominently in the global contemporary world) a similar position is taken. Convergence
mindsets à la Fukuyama and their obverse as in Huntington's clash of civilizations are

28
incorrect, in Eisenstadt opinion, in understanding our current scene.512 He, instead,
retreats to his own sociological insight: what we “(…) witness in the contemporary world
is the development -not always peaceful and indeed often confrontational- of multiple
modernities” (Eisenstadt, 1999, p. 284). Notwithstanding the innovative character of his
ideas, one should be able to identify some key institutions and behavioral patterns of
modernity in order not to end up with a trivial middle point. In sec. 1.1 and 1.2 I argued
that such key elements exist in Eisenstadt´s work and that, in the context of Axial
civilizations, an effort to explain the genealogy of divergence while displaying common
traits is also present. Now, an appraisal of the theory of multiple modernities in conditions
of globalization is in order.

The problem is to interpret globalization. Convergence (or homogenizers) theories

observe a general standardization of factors, while divergence (heteregenizers) emphasize
the religious, cultural, social differences that create distance between civilizations. There
are also, writes Gerhard Preyer, “in-between accounts” which focus on ideas such as
glocalizations and hybridizations. According to Preyer the multiple modernities approach
is sophisticated because it takes elements from “in between accounts” with the core of
Eisenstadt´s research program, this is, that particular paths of modernization cannot be
generalized (Preyer, 2016a, p. 5).

Modernity (the second Axial age-and the first modernity i.e. western) did spread to the
rest of the world but was modified according to the own cultural and historical resources
of societies. Paramount in this line of thinking is that the political and cultural program
of the first modernity was not homogeneous per se. Already the modernity that was
exported had tensions and antinomies. In other words, although some basic ideological,
economic, and politic traits were more or less homogeneous, the seed of multiplicity was
present in the polemic and reflexive nature of modernity -which would explain variations
even within the western case-. The “critical discourse of modernity” -i.e. the continual
confrontation of claims- taking place around the world was, in a way, enabled by
modernity itself and would constitute one of its meta-characteristics(Eisenstadt, 1999, p.
286). The Israeli sociologist is not blind to the fact that western expansion was imperialist
and colonialist, which is why the first modernization had, at first, a homogenizing effect.

12
“(…) The process of globalization on the contemporary scene entail neither the “end of history” -in the
sense of an end of ideological confrontational clashes between different cultural programs of modernity-
nor a “clash of civilizations” engaging a secular West in confrontation with societies that appear to opt out
of, or deny, the program of modernity. They do not even constitute a return to the problems of premodern
axial civilizations, as though such a thing were possible.” (Eisenstadt, 1999, p. 283).

29
Yet the development of reflexivity and critical thinking, and the antinomies inherent to
modernity, allowed different programs and constellation to be formed (both for axial and
non-axial civilization confronted with the first modernity). Tensions between control and
autonomy, discipline and freedom, universalistic and pluralistic rationalities, and
different conceptions of the common good and the moral order became burning issues
(Eisenstadt, 2000a, pp. 7–8).

In this sense, the terrestrial and maritime globalization -i.e., that characterized by
colonialism and imperialism- did not entail [necessarily] convergence. It began a new
type of mutation, translation and contestation of traditions, visions, and institutional
constellations. Moreover, Eisenstadt describes this historical epoch not exclusively as one
of domination -physical and symbolic- from the west to non-west but also as a ceaseless
appropriation of themes: “the continuous selection, reinterpretation, and reformulation
of (…) imported ideas. These brought about continual innovation, with new cultural and
political programs emerging, exhibiting novel ideologies and institutional patterns”
(Eisenstadt, 2000a, p. 15). Historically speaking, the scale of the interactions from within
and outside the “original” modernity lead to the decomposition of major structural
characteristics of hitherto hegemonic agents (the nation-state). It lead additionally, to the
appropriation of core modernization tendencies (mass media and technology, the
consolidation of social movements in civil society, the rise of human rights and a
generalized ecological worries).

Tensions are, however, maintained and never fully resolved. Fundamental religious
movements or closed cultural identities that heavily promulgate a rejection to
globalization and the simultaneous rise of global trends, pluralistic identities, and
hegemonic cultural centers attest that one cannot expect total convergence nor complete
divergence; there are only particularistic and cosmopolitan tendencies. This sociological
fact implies, says Eisenstadt, that our epoch has not gone beyond the basic problems of
modernity, but rather that they express the antinomian nature of modernity already present
(but not so explicitly) in Axial civilizations (Eisenstadt, 2000a, p. 21)

It is, to some extent, a meta approach: there are ultimately no institutional or behavioral
patterns. The very antinomian and contradicting character of modernity (although some
key actors and structures are identified e.g. elites and the center-periphery schema) should
rather be the focus of reflection. Extrapolating this deep insight to the discussion in sec.
1.3, even the disentanglement or -better- the specification of the secular-religious
dynamics in multiple secularities is a modern gesture. Thinking of the same idea, the
30
shameful experiences of modernity (that are often pointed out as failings) are historical
realizations of potential roads inherent to modernity. Eisenstadt identified the destructive
forces of the tensions and internal contradictions of modernity (Eisenstadt, 2011, p. 214).
Having in mind the apparent outburst of fundamentalisms and anti-modern movements,
he believes that one should not locate them outside modernity (as destructive forces), but
inside it, as a normal characteristic of the ongoing dialogue between modern
reconstructions and traditional impulses (2000a, p. 26).

By introducing contingency, and the incessant confrontation and appropriation of the first
modernity (in itself a contingent result of an axial path), Eisenstadt is able to, grosso
modo, overcome the convergence-divergence dissension (Krause, 2012, pp. 285, 309).
One could say that unity and multiplicity are observable at different levels: in terms of
institutional design, implementation of visions, confrontation or appropriation of western
ideas, the rule of specific elites, the role of religious collectives and broad identities, inter
alia, multiplicity is found (even when homogenization processes are recognized, these
belong still to diversity insofar as they are framed in contingency). When it comes to the
dynamics in which these confrontations and appropriations advance, the mode elites
mobilize ideas, the axial heritage (or non-axial for others), and the basic tensions and
contradictions, among other elements, unity appears. There are more nuances to be made.
From the above, it is entailed, most importantly, that there is no single global modernity
or world society. Multiplicity is present not only at the local level but in the continual
interaction of global modernities. Eisenstadt´s legacy still prevails in globalization
studies. In a similar strain to Berger, Casanova, and the literature around multiple
secularities, fundamental intuitions are taken, modified and explored in search of
theoretical innovations. An important example is that of the Third Research Program of
Multiple Modernities which accepts as a starting point the disentanglement between
westernization and modernization and goes beyond the universalism-particularism
dilemma (Preyer, 2016a, p. 23).

31
 CHAPTER

II

The persistent deconstructivist suspicion of Eurocentric prejudices invites a

counter-question: why should the hermeneutic model of understanding,
which is derived from everyday conversation and, since Humboldt, has
been methodologically refined from the practice of textual interpretation,
suddenly break down at the boundaries of our own culture, of our own way
of life and traditions? Interpretations always have to bridge the gap
between the hermeneutic pre-understanding of each side, whether the
cultural and spatiotemporal distances are shorter or longer and the
semantic differences smaller or larger. All interpretations are translations
in nuce.

Jürgen Habermas

32
2.1 Transitioning to normative considerations

In the previous chapter, the sociological research program of multiple modernities was
dissected in hope of clarifying the obscure and knotty relationship between modernity
and secularization. Investigating this association in a multiple fashion, permits -in the
explanatory realm- a broader and deeper comprehension of the societal role of religious
collectivities, identities, and ideas in a way that is historically informed and does not -
automatically- contradict key hallmarks of modern society. As mentioned in the
introduction, my attention now shifts to the normative implications that adopting a
multiple conception of modernity brings.

The concept of ´modernity´ is not only a matter of factual description but -as already
evident in the Enlightenment- is a type of social theory and a normative project. In this
sense, sociological difficulties, insights and assumptions are translated into social theories
and inform the debate about which direction (moral, political) should human collectivities
take -sometimes even extending these normative orientations to humanity as a species.
Explanatory -i.e. positive and descriptive claims- are never only constative (accepting
that no theory alleges a God point of view), they enclose evaluating assertions.

Here the normative implications of embracing the multiple modernities point of vantage
will be considered having as main reference some of the work of Jürgen Habermas. There
are reasons for it. Firstly, he is one of the scholars that has more deeply and extensively
research modernity as a normative project, including -among many others- his concern
for thinking the public sphere (functioning and composition) in democracy, in an effort
to find the sources of normativity within a postmetaphysical paradigm. Secondly, in
Habermas oeuvre the complex connection between sociological approaches and its
normative derivations is evident (like in his account of social evolution as a way of
explaining the development of communicative competences). And finally, being of
paramount importance to this paper, his ideas are located at the center of the sociological
and political debate regarding the relation between modernity and religion. As known, his
position has notably changed since the 2000´s when a postsecular turn occurred in his
philosophical and political writings. This being true, for Habermas a revision of the
prognostic statements of sociology does not have to entail the abdication of normative
ideas. Much on the contrary, a wider conception of the historical and cultural resources
that are available to modernity should be deemed as the arrival and growth of a higher
reflexivity, one that is emancipated from ethnocentric, unilinear and teleological biases.

33
In what follows I will (2.2) review Habermas´s theory of social evolution, focusing on
the role that he grants to religion in the context of the “linguistification of the sacred”.
Here he reveals a heavily criticized account of the roots of modernity. This early position
will serve as an antecedent for the postsecular turn. Habermas seeks to reread his own
sociological comprehension of secularization and, then, take seriously the relevance of
religion both in philosophy and in the political arena (deliberative democracy). After that
(2.3) Habermas´s way of appropriating Kasper´s concept of axiality -as a decisive part of
his postsecular project- will be analyzed and evaluated. Some drawbacks with his
reconstruction will be discussed as well as some conceivable remedies. Lastly (2.4),
Habermas´s model of deliberative democracy will be recalled, and the modifications that
he makes to his it followed. Here we will find not only normative challenges for the
deliberative model but also to philosophy.

2.2 From secularization to a post-secular project

Derartige Verschiebungen brachten jedoch nicht einfach eine Widerkehr von traditionellen
Formen religiöser Organisationen, Autoritäten oder Praktiken mit sich, sondern führten
vielmehr zu einer weitreichenden Re-konstituierung der religiösen Komponenten in den
umfassenden Kulturellen und Institutionellen Formationen

Shmuel Eisenstadt

2.2.1 Evolutionary theory of society and religion

One can place Habermas (having his early texts in mind) within an
evolutionary/evolutionist tradition that relates to parsonian inheritances. In manuscripts
such as The Communication and Evolution of Society and History and Evolution, one can
undeniably notice Parsons´s influence mixed with cognitive-developmental psychology
(mainly from Piaget and Kohlberg), Chomsky linguistics, and classical sociological
traditions stemming from Durkheim and Weber. From Parsons a strong stadial
appreciation of social trajectories is maintained, ideas like the pattern variables (with the
later AGIL paradigm) are continued in their core belief, namely, that a kind of social
adaptive capacity and upgrading is to be discovered in human history (Sanderson, 2016,
p. 219 & ). Societies upgrade to the extent as they learn to deal with endogenous and
exogenous hurdles. In Parsons, the stages of social evolution are distinguished: from
primitive through intermediate societies and finally reaching modern ones. Habermas
34
adverts comparable progressive logic in the cognitive development of children as a “logic
of arranged learning levels” (1979b, p. 29). From psychology, the idea of individual
normative learnings (as the maturation of moral consciousness) is extracted and extended
to the normative (moral and legal) development of societies.

To the social and psychological thoughts Habermas adds language as a way of separating
between evolutionary stages. Early communicative competences are rudimentary
inasmuch that they are symbolically mediated interactions. This initial mode of speech is
the most undeveloped because it does not distinguish the propositional and illocutionary
components of language. In other words, is not propositionally differentiated (Habermas,
1979a, p. 36). Developed societies do make the distinction (maybe without being aware
of it), which means that the higher the state of social evolution the higher the
communicative competences, that in turn, enable discourse and moral advances
(Habermas, 1979a, p. 82).6

Therefore, Habermas describes the evolution of societies by using sociological,

psychological and linguistic concepts in tandem. Similar to Parsons he identifies three
forms of societies: primitive, traditional and modern; and assigns to each a corresponding
prevalent worldview: mythical (primitive), religious-metaphysical (traditional) modern
post-traditional (modern) (1979a, pp. 103–4). By virtue of the level of communicative
competence the moral development is known e.g. in symbolically mediated interaction
the matching moral level is pre-conventional i.e. norms are obeyed because of sanctions
and rewards. By contrast, in modern societies (due to propositionally differentiated
speech) morality is post-conventional, this is, norms are followed because they can be
justified by legitimate arguments (Rees, 2015, p. 30).

Again, parallels with Parson can be effortlessly recognized: “each successive societal
worldview is not only an adequate structure for integrating society and solving its
adaptive problems but indeed for Habermas seems to arise precisely because it enhances
the adaptive capacity of society” (Sanderson, 2016, p. 220). The German philosopher
designates this adaptive capacity as a “steering capacity” understood as the ability of a
system to cope with complexity (Habermas, 1979b, pp. 31–32). Therefore, modernity has
a higher steering capacity than both primitive and traditional societies.

6
Habermas remains faithful to the rational reconstruction method because morality does not have a
universal or a-historical nature, it is rather immanent to language and its evolution (Rees, 2015, p. 28).

35
There are of course many distances that Habermas takes with parsonian sources. One of
the most noteworthy being that, unlike Parsons, he is aware of the unsavory elements of
modernity. Even if modernity can be treated as the highest point of communicative
competence (retrospectively speaking) there are colossal problems that emerge around
solidarity and the colonization of the lifeworld by the non-normative mechanism of
money and power i.e. system (Renner, 2017, p. 43). Habermas is carrying out a critique
of the functionalist reason, he is advancing a critique of the consequences of the spread
of instrumental reason in modern societies. In effect, he is not blind to the pathologies
that gestate in the two-level configuration (lifeworld- system) of modernity. In modernity,
the dual potential of emancipation and pathologies is simultaneously latent. However,
social pathologies are not an inescapable consequence of rationalization but the result of
the market and the administrative state displacing modes of communicative reason
integration (Baynes, 2016, p. 53). Thus, Habermas has a more sober and acute
understanding of modernity (especially in the normative dimension) that Parsons.

This being the case, vestiges of Parsons´s theory have costly consequences for Habermas.
Crucial issues have been pointed out in the way that the connection between evolutionary
ideas and the theory of modernity is presented. Being more specific, issues regarding the
description of modernity as the outcome of a process of social evolution. Amy Allen
contents that this connection is deeply Eurocentric. For her, there exist a meta-normative
and theoretical commitment to the idea of historical progress that reproduces ethnocentric
discriminations (Allen, 2016, p. 39). This entails that the normative footing that is offered
is already stained with Eurocentrism. To be sure, Habermas as attempted to go beyond
traditional pitfalls of the philosophy of history (like in Hegel´s version) by dispatching
the idea of history as a totality and the concomitant implications: unilinearity, necessity
of historical developments, and global unity (1979a, p. 139).

By separating the logic and dynamics of social evolution (that are rationally
reconstructed) Habermas integrates contingency in his historical account. Expressed
differently, the empirical reality in which societies experience the logic of social evolution
can include regressions and take, in principle, various directions (1979a, pp. 140–141).
Even when these qualifications are made, Amy Allen thinks that the notion of a
cumulative learning process that exhibit direction is still being defended (2016, p. 47). Is
opportune already at this point to ask to what extent is Habermas ‘multilinear’ conception
of historical development equivalent to the multiple perspective elaborated by Eisenstadt
in comparative sociology. It is my position that the Israeli scholar standpoint uses the
36
adjective ‘multiple’ in more than a superficial manner. Social realities are not multiple
only in their factual manifestation. The abstract understanding of multiple modernities
does not interpret divergent historical trajectories as merely empirically diverse roads of
achieving the logical developmental unity. The model is in itself multiple (or at least it
claims to be so). As I will display later, however, at the normative level ‘multiplicity’
cannot be translated as incommensurability. One can observe in Eisenstadt (both in his
theory of axiality and modernity) a potential for universal reflexivity (context-
transcending in Habermas terminology). Thus, in the frame of multiple modernities
normativity is not vanished or ignored.

Returning to Allen´s critique, the criterion by which one can judge the progressive or
regressive quality of historical change are, withal, shadowy; no clear normative
foundation is revealed (although Habermas has identified the criterion of social progress
in the justification of universal validity claims). Accordingly, the connection between
societal evolution and modernity is still decidedly problematic:

Even as Habermas jettisons the metaphysical trappings of the traditional philosophy

of history -its objectivistic assumptions about necessity, unilinearity, and
uninterruptibility of historical progress- he retains what is arguably its most
controversial core: namely, the idea of historical progress itself and the assumption
that European modernity can and should be understood as the result of a process of
progressive historical development (Allen, 2016, p. 49).
It is still to be discerned if a precise and comprehensive appropriation of the theory of
multiple modernities is enough (to at least substantially relieve) the normative difficulties
that critics have underlined. A consideration of this kind must be divided into two
unescapable matters: (a) one of compatibility between Habermas and Eisenstadt; and (b)
an examination of the strength that Eisenstadt´s research program has when trying to
overcome Allen´s critique. To formulated in a broader way: one must eventually ask to
what extent does Eisenstadt presuppose an idea of progress. Let us come back to these
matters in the final considerations. For the moment, the relevant insight is that early
reports of social evolution present obstacles when liberating modernization theory from
its ethnocentric biases.

I will show, now, how such problems presupposed a tacit validation of an almost inherent
linkage between social evolution and secularization. As mentioned before, in Habermas
stadial conception of evolution, the transition from one state to the next is related
ultimately to its capacity of coping with problems. Thus, for example, the primitive state
(and its corresponding mythical worldview) is, at some point, unable to keep up with the
37
communication level that begins to develop. When the communicative capacity advances
from symbolically mediated interaction to propositionally differentiated speech, then the
continuation of the mythical worldview becomes structurally impossible (Habermas,
1979a, p. 120).

due to this fact, the mythical way of relating to the world loses its efficacy to accomplish
consensus i.e. the hitherto identities and collective coordination can no longer function,
are no longer taken for granted. This prepares the conditions for the second stage and its
corresponding worldview: the religious-metaphysical level. Although the second stage is
an advance vis-á-vis the first one, it is only an intermediate point. Indeed, some
communicative improvements befall, but speech competencies are nor fully improved.
Despite such improvements, like in the differentiation of nature from society (mixed in
the mythical worldview), the religious state is unable to separate ontic questions from
normative ones. Furthermore, the differentiation of claims takes place in a profane
domain, but continue to be adjoined in the sacred one: “Attitudes, words and validity
claims differentiate in the profane realm of life; but in the sacred they remain entangled,
just as they were in the myth. The sacred is, in fact, a pocket of myth which survives in
later eras”(Rees, 2015, p. 65). Approached in this way, religion is an epiphenomenon of
the maturing process of communicative competences.

Consequently, the full development of communicative capacities cannot take place under
the religious worldview. In this state, the sources of normativity are metaphysical,
extramundane and extra-discursive i.e. there is a pre-established normative consensus.
For Habermas, normativity should finally find its footing in a generated discourse where
language not only transmits normative consensus (religion) but allows interlocutors to
bring one about; this is only possible once the shift from traditional to modern societies
materializes (Rees, 2015, p. 77). The decrease of religion is not only, then, necessary for
normative maturing but, in addition, unavoidable from a sociological perspective. Here
Durkheim´s and Weber´s influence shines: modernization and rationalization are aligned
to processes where cultural spheres of society are differentiated, and disenchantments
start to operate. Religion losses significance as a cultural resource, as a source of political
rule, and as an existential orientation.7 All things considered, is safe to say that Habermas

7
The process of disenchantment can be defined as the gradual disappearance of magical thought and
practice from the world. This process implies not only a decline of religious belief but the rationalization
of the religious practice itself- The disenchantment shatters traditional worldviews into distinctive specialist
areas of expertise (Dodd, 2005, p. 42). The full meaning of the concept has been, nonetheless, open to
interpretation. Disenchantment has been pinpointing as a cause of secularization. Against such
interpretation, some argue that it really means “demagicization”, this is, the process by which the world
38
(at this point in his academic career) subscribed to sociological trends that entangled
modernization, social evolution, and secularization in a tight knot. This makes even more
astonishing the fact that in 2001 the term ‘postsecular societies’ was introduced to his
theory.

2.2.2 The revitalization of religion and the postsecular project

What became known as the “postsecular turn” in Habermas´s late work must be explained
above all because of the consequences that the inclusion of religion -as a legitimate
political and philosophical resource- has in his previous ideas8. Following many
academics, I believe that the postsecular turn is not just a small addendum to his work,
but rather a point of entry to (a) improve his theory vis-á-vis non-wester experiences of
modernity, and (b) as a way of replying to biotechnological challenges. It is in the context
of the postsecular project that, as I see it, the multiple modernities research program could
offer relevant and helpful insights.

(a). In the first case, Habermas decodes the revitalization (persistence) of religion as a
clear sign that the theory of secularization was miscarried to other regions of the globe
(from the European experience). This means that the fading of religion could not be
generalized, but instead, relativized according to the socio-cultural realities of societies
i.e. core elements of secularization cannot be reproduced indiscriminately (2009a, p. 390).
To be sure, he is not stating that all the intuitions developed by the secularization theories
should be entirely discredited, but that the predictions (Voraussagen) made by a biased
reading of it must be carefully amended (2009a, p. 392).

In view of these observations, the western European case is not the rule but the exception
when it comes to dealing with the religious-secular dynamics in modernity. In Europe´s
Sonderweg the modernization process was undoubtedly linked to secularization in both
the organization of society and the emergence of the Rechsstaat (Renner, 2017, p. 115).
In addition, there are other hermeneutical significances for the persistence of religion: it
not only hinted at the biases nested in sociological paradigms, but it signalized ongoing
transformations inside religious phenomena. The increase of religiosity is related to the
formation of orthodoxies and fundamentalist movements. The integration of religious

losses magical meaning, it does not necessarily insinuate that secularization follows, but that even when
religious phenomena persists, they don´t “mean” anything (Joas, 2012, p. 20).
8
The original postsecular concept was introduced in the context of the terror attack of 9/11 (Mendieta,
2013, p. 403 & ff).
39
motives with political rule is also perceived by Habermas as a key factor of these
transformations (2009a, p. 388).9

Having the aforementioned points in sight, Habermas concludes that both in the
sociological (explanatory) and in the political-philosophical (normative) lines of
modernity religion has an increasing weight. He, consequently explains his concept of a
‘postsecular society’:

By this is meant not only the fact that religion must maintain its position in an
increasingly secular environment and that society must anticipate that religious
communities will continue to exist. In addition, the expression “postsecular” does
not merely grant religious communities public recognition for their functional
contribution to the reproduction of desirable motives and attitudes. The public
consciousness of a postsecular society reflects, rather, a normative insight that has
implications for political interactions between religious and nonreligious citizens
[…] both sides can then take each other’s contributions to controversial public
debates seriously for cognitive reasons as well, assuming that they share an
understanding of the secularization of society as complementary learning process.
(2008, p. 111).
Accordingly, with ‘postsecular society’ Habermas does not allude to a contra-
secularization wave or attitude, nor that the state should withdraw secular ideas that
maintain a kind of religious neutrality. The key point here is that secular reason should
take religious resources and identities seriously. For a democratic a state, that new attitude
towards religion is reflected in the validation of complementary learnings and
deliberations between faith users and secular citizens. Moreover, going beyond local
democracies, the postsecular turn is a “plea for greater humility on the part of western
liberal democracies in their confrontation with traditions that have different views about
the role of religion in public life” (Baynes, 2016, p. 209). The details about how are sacred
identities and arguments included in liberal democracies will be specified later (sec. 2.4).
For now, it is appropriate to highlight that Habermas discovers in the debate circling the
revitalization of religion an opportunity to formulate a better and non-Eurocentric
apprehension of secular reason and democracy. It is an opportunity to further the maturing
of deliberative democracy ideas found mainly in Between Facts and Norms (1996) where
the matter of religion was virtually absent. Indirectly, what lies at the heart of the

9
The complication of distinguishing what is political from what is religions belongs to the mutations that
religions undergoes in the current time. Sociological literature spoke of political religions which included
paradoxically secular religiosities (Pascal, 2013, pp. 15–17). Havin in mind political religions
(fundamentalism in particular) Habermas seems to share the reactionary hypothesis that beholds religious
violence and radicalization as que consequence of modernity leaving outside and disregarding devout
voices (Welton, 2014, p. 59).
40
postsecular worries is the intention to, as Rees has noted, decolonize his own
philosophical concepts (Rees, 2017, p. 1).

There are many interrogations waiting for clarification. One of the most urgent reads the
postsecular turn in light of Habermas´s social theory of evolution and arises compatibility
concerns. As we saw, in his account of social evolution there is a structural connection
between the abandonment of religion and the maturation of communicative competences.
There is a necessary link between secularization and progress. Eduardo Mendieta sharply
asks: “if we can no longer explain modernization in terms of secularization, how can we
speak of societal progress” (Habermas, 2017, p. 60). Before examining Habermas´s
response I consider useful to adopt Amy Allen´s qualification of progress. To begin, a
distinction is made between techno-scientific progress and moral-political progress (a
separation that Habermas embraces). Allen proposes a further distinction between two
definitions of normative progress: a forward-looking orientation -where progress in an
imperative (a normative goal) one can strive to achieve-, and a backward-looking
conception where progress is a judgment about the learning process that has lead up to
“our” institutions, social practices, inter alia. (progress as a fact) (2016, p. 12). Is clear
that in his theory of social evolution the notion of progress “as a fact” is defended.
Western modernity is the result of cumulative historical learnings. What I wish to stress
is that in this description of progress secularization played a major role indirectly when
grounding normativity. Under this remark, the question formulated by Mendieta strikes
at the core of the postsecular project and its compatibility with a normative stand on
progress.

Let us remember, again, that Habermas is not willing to dispatch the kernels of
secularization. Postsecular modern societies assume the persistence of religious traditions
as relevant even when they are themselves largely secularized. Furthermore, the
secularization of state power should be regarded as a liberal accomplishment that does
not have to (agreeing with Casanova) entail the negation of participation of believers in
the public sphere (2017, p. 60). The conviction that in history one can observe how human
beings learn cannot be so easily dismissed. There are manifest ladders of self-reflection
that cannot be forgotten; cognitive advances that allow the researcher to think about
progress. The best example is the postsecular turn itself, where a self-reflecting secular
reason understands its own limits (postmetaphysical thinking) and turns its gaze towards
religious resources; evidence of higher reflexivity. The inclusion of religious arguments
in public debate (though translated once they leave weak publics) is the achievement of a
41
mature reflexivity; the opening of -as quoted above- “complementary learning
processes”. Some evolutionary tonalities are maintained but freed from evolutionist
assumptions. Habermas relates all this to postcolonial and decolonial manifestations:
“Even though there are certain evolutionary thresholds, we should not […] view this as a
linear development. The postcolonial encounter with other cultures during the twentieth
century brought to our attention the wounds of colonization and the devastating
consequences of decolonization, and thus also the shocking dialectic of higher-level
reflexivity” (2017, p. 69).

There are two things I would like now to accentuate concerning the complementary
learning process occurring between religion and secular reason, between believers and
secular citizens. The first is that an evolutionary standing of religion itself is behind this
idea. Meaningful complementary learning can only happen with religious communities
that, to some degree, have become more or less reflexive, and have the ability to translate
their more significant contributions in a language that is accessible to all. Only when some
sort of awakening of reflexivity inside religious consciousness comes about are
translations possible (Habermas, 2013, p. 351). As a second comment, trying to bridge
the gap between secular reason and the cognitive resources of religion requires a different
account of their relation, one that avoids secularist points of departure. Habermas is aware
of this task. The connection between philosophical reason and faith must be shown. He
will confront this requirement by appropriating Jasper´s concept of Axial Age. I will
examine his effort in the next section (2.3).

(b). There is yet another factor that explains the postsecular turn: as a way of salvaging
semantic contents from religious discourse that could assist postmetaphysical thinking
when responding to the challenges put forward by advances in biotechnology.10 Some
authors, like Rees, have argue that a crucial aspect behind the postsecular turn is the
failure of postmetaphysical thinking in replying to the treats to the ethical understanding
of the human species made by hard naturalism and genetic modification (2015, p. 83).
Postmetaphysical thinking cannot make legitimate use of some resources due to its own
nature and methodological approach. Habermas formulated postmetaphysical thinking
when criticizing metaphysics and philosophies of consciousness. His method gives up a
god-eye pretension and instead locates itself in the lifeworld i.e. is contextual, procedural
and historically conditioned (1998, p. 35). Is not, nonetheless, relativist. There is some

10
Because the emphasis of the present thesis dwells more on the previous point I will describe this second
reason briefly.
42
kind of weak transcendentalism insofar as the concept of context-transcending validity is
employed11. Using the postmetaphysical method (rational reconstruction) there is no
absolute certainty, there are only quasi-transcendental and falsifiable claims (Habermas,
1998, p. 38). What Rees explains is that these limitations mean that some type of matters
are outside the theoretical jurisdiction of postmetaphysical thinking. In the midst of the
debate with hard naturalism and genetic modification these constraints appear as
problematic. He writes: “Habermas´s postmetaphysical paradigm is depended on an
unstated account of human nature […] the emergence of hard naturalism and
biotechnology suggested […] that human nature could change. Such changes undermine
his entire philosophical project […] the only way to counteract these changes would be
to engage in a debate about which form of life is best for the human species” (Rees, 2015,
p. 126). The puzzle is that arguing in favor of a particular form of life implies entering
the realm of ethical discourse, which Habermas believes is out of reach for his paradigm.
He sees in religion useful cognitive and semantic resources that eventually could be
appropriated. There is something similar happening in relation to point (a) since the
process of translation from religious to secular reason is also being suggested. He is
salvaging contents to solidify his methodological proposal. In this, postmetaphysical
thinking is also undergoing a self-understanding process that leads to complementary
learnings (Habermas, 2017, p. 67).

One finds, then, two factors that explain the postsecular turn and the postsecular project.
One is exogenous and the other endogenous to Habermas´s work. The external one is
affiliated to the sociological revision of secularization as a response to changing
paradigms and post-decolonial criticisms. This factor is mainly reflected in his
rectification/improvement of the deliberative democracy proposal that had initially (and
silently) formed a cognitive asymmetry between secular and faith user citizens. The
endogenous factor, on the other hand, consists on the incapability of dealing with species-
ethical discussions from a postmetaphysical paradigm. I am more interested in Habermas
strategy of salving religious resources for this purpose. In both cases, albeit at different
levels, the idea of complementary learning process is essential. As mentioned before, a
persuasive transformation of his work demands a new genealogy of secular reason that is

11
For Melissa Yates there are five key ideas that constitute Habermas´s postmetaphysical approach to
philosophy: “i) the detranscendentalized use of reason, (ii) rational reconstruction, (iii) weak
transcendentalism, (iv) context-transcending validity, and (v) soft naturalism” (Yates, 2014, p. 38).
43
clever enough to connect reason with the potentials of religion. Different to his theory of
social evolution, one that places religion in a better condition.

2.2.3 Multiple modernities and the postsecular turn: hegemony contested

Before occupying ourselves with the genealogical argument given by Habermas I would
like to explore the relationship between multiple modernities and the postsecular project.
I argue that the modification that Habermas makes of his ideas can be read as the
normative response to the crystallization of multiple modernities -in a broad sense- and
to the formation of a new religious constellation -in a narrower manner-. Additionally,
the question for the compatibility between Eisenstadt and Habermas will be present as a
secondary objective.

Eisenstadt was mindful of the construction of new religious constellations both in local
and in global scenarios. The magnitude of this phenomenon must be interpreted within
the own coordinates of modernity (as described by Eisenstadt): its antinomian, dialectic
dynamics (tensions between the centers and the peripheries), and contingent character.
Inspected under this light, the persistence of religion and the establishment of new
religious types could be regarded as part of anti-hegemonic tendencies (Eisenstadt, 2008,
pp. 25 & 29). For him, a variety of heterogeneities (incarnated among others in religious
collective identities) begun to defy hegemonic establishments by using a plethora of
symbolic, politic, and sometimes violent (like. fundamentalisms) resources. Hegemonic
tendencies were present since the beginning of the first modernity (western) and,
originally, in the dawn of axial civilizations. New collectivities contest strong and
hegemonic cultural premises, especially when it comes to the role that classical modernity
gave to religion. Therefore, the contemporary international scene is characterized as a
tension between totalizing and pluralist tendencies in general, some of which are already
in power -politically and symbolically- (hegemonic) and others at the margins
(Eisenstadt, 2000b, p. 595). Three observations can be made in relation to anti-hegemonic
movements: a. in terms of religious formations, not all the spectrum is equally challenging
in a normative sense; b. they are not anti-modern tendencies, but rather anti-western
impulses; c. they are reflexive.

(a) The first observation alludes to the vast array of old/new religious formations.
Eisenstadt finds this diversity as a sign of the reconstruction/reconstitution of religious
identities instead of associating it with the mere return of old configurations. As
mentioned in Sec. 1.3.1, the mutation of religion, both in its inner dynamics and the

44
relation to other social dimensions, cannot be overlooked (2013, p. 357). Furthermore,
within religious systems a tension between homogenizing and heteregenizing forces is
also present; there is a growing contestation of meaning and existential orientations amid
organizations, leaders, and believers i.e. the ‘correct’ or ‘authentic’ interpretation of
primary values, and their relation to modern world is open to discussion and reevaluation
(in more than theological ways). Paying attention to the internal struggles and the ongoing
reinterpretation of core elements within religious traditions gives a more acute vision of
the current Zeitgeist; it shows that not only exogenous forces matter (e.g. state
secularization) and that religion -as a sociological phenomenon- stays in a perpetual
exercise of reinvention. The sociological outcomes of the struggles are numerous in terms
of religious diversity and relate uniquely to normative concerns. Fundamentalisms,
orthodoxies, liberal religions, mystic cults, spiritual movements are just some examples
of these formations. Each behaves distinctly in political, economic, and cultural
dimensions. The political demands of an orthodox community are, by far, different to
those put forward by fundamentalist and new age movements. New age spirituality (at
least those with low institutional density) do not present rigid moral or political codes,
they lack dogmatic foundation in a normative sense. They are often hybrid and exemplify
the mixing of secular ideas with deep spiritual and transcendental inclinations (as
suggested by Berger). In new age religions (including liquid alterations of traditional
religions) a process of somatization of spiritual practices turns them more into dietiologies
of existence12; there is no strong structuration of reality under totalizing lenses. Prima
facie, this type of formation does not represent normative challenges to deliberative
democracy.

Fundamentalisms, on the other hand, are found on the opposite part of the spectrum: they
construct rigid moral and behavioral codes, institutional complexes, and have clear
universalistic intentions. For deliberative democracy, the challenge is different in the
latter case because fundamentalism negates the democratic framework itself. That said,
Habermas reconsideration of religion (and his effort to maintain normative insights while
enlarging the range of religious agency) is addressed neither to fundamentalist nor new
spiritualist formations, but to most of the configurations in between. He suggested these
important distinctions while conversing with Eduardo Mendieta (2017, p. 61)13.

12
Peter Sloterdijk has tracked the religious mutations related to the somatization of asceticism (Sloterdijk,
2009, p. 133 & ff).
13
In the same line, the interview named Fundamentalism and Terror (2006) offers a more sharp vison of
Habermas´s perception on religious fanaticisms.
45
(b) This observation leads us to the second point, namely, that Habermas is ultimately not
responding to the normative demands of a revitalized religion, but to the normative
challenges brought about by the crystallization of multiple modernities. Reflection upon
religion is a point of access (though important in itself) to decolonize his philosophy and,
ideally, find a foothold for normativity that is compatible with a multiple understanding
of modernity. This goal cannot be reached using only sources western resources. Hence
the crystallization of multiple modernities starts with the decoupling of modernization
and westernization (Eisenstadt, 2000b, p. 600, 2008, p. 30). To put it another way,
multiplicity is not about incorporating non-western tradition to the western experience
but a matter of following the paths that each society takes, and in doing so, investigating
the normative consequences. A dynamic and contingent-sensitive approach to modernity
is then inherently multiple.

In my interpretation, the ‘contingent’ qualification is significantly different in Eisenstadt

and in Habermas. As noted in Sec. 2.2.1, Habermas´s idea of contingency consists of
accepting the historical possibility of regressions and discontinuities, deviations from the
logic of societal evolution (in some sort of developmental line). In Eisenstadt, the
introduction of contingency means that there are many logical lines. Even supposing that
one historical mode of modernity becomes totally hegemonic (comparable to the first
modernity), the unavoidable nature of that path is not preached. It could be for this reason
that Eisenstadt relates the formation of a new religious constellation to the general
dynamics of multiple modernities, to the appropriation and elaboration of the hitherto
hegemonic cultural program of western modernity. He writes:

All these developments attest to the continual reinterpretation, reconstruction of the

cultural program of modernity, of the construction of multiple modernities and
multiple interpretations of modernity; to attempts by various groups and
movements to reappropriate modernity and redefine the discourse of modernity […]
European or western modernity or modernities are not seen as the only real
modernity, but as one of multiple modernities (Eisenstadt, 2000b, p. 609).
The destructive potentials of those appropriations (fundamentalisms) are also
concomitant to modernity. Evidently, it would be unfair to hold Eisenstadt vantage point
as more suitable than that of Habermas. Whereas the first one remains in the explanatory
dimension the second is dealing with the normative ramifications of such description.
Furthermore, the fact that Eisenstadt decides to keep talking about modernity implies that
he defends the existence of hallmarks that modern societies share. This ‘commitment’ is
clearer in the next point.

46
(c) Critiques of the cultural program of the first modernity were enabled by reflexivity.
The contestation of programs is a long-lasting consequence of axial civilizations: the
awareness that a multiplicity of patterns and visions are available for implementation.
With the dawn of modernity, the awareness becomes stronger. Reflexivity is the conditio
sine qua non for the disputation of cultural-political monopolies by new collective
identities, protest/social movements, and other marginalized groups. The potentialities
initiated in the axiality persist in late modernity. In this view, the ‘new’ religious
constellations have not gone beyond the edges of modernity: “they all are deeply
reflexive, aware that no answer to the tensions inherent to modernity is final” (Eisenstadt,
2000b, p. 606). It is still to be discussed if Eisenstadt notion of ‘reflexivity’ is comparable
to that of Habermas. In the later, reflexivity is tied to progress. The inclusion of religious
resources and the opening of modernity to multiple cultural trajectories is understood as
a process of complementary learnings that represent a higher level of reflexivity. I think
that the use of the concept has more similarities that distances in both theoretical frames,
although one is more normatively charge than the other. This observation makes questions
of compatibility less worrisome. The downside is that they are both prone to parallel
criticisms.

Notwithstanding some distances regarding the interpretation of the persistence of

religion, Habermas and Eisenstadt share significant points, especially when it continues
the notion of modernity and reflexivity. The multiple modernities research program is
compatible with the postsecular turn, and it can serve as a source of sociological insight
for Habermas.

47
2.3 Postmetaphysical thinking and Axiality: Jaspers and Eisenstadt

A return to the original claims of the Axial Age can be seen as a prophetic plea for a
forceful liberation from latter attenuated versions of the fundamental impulses of post-Axial
religion and philosophy -or as a dangerous regression to obsolete fanaticism […] There
can also be nostalgia for pre-axial myths and cosmologies or a radical modernism that sees
the heritage of the Axial Age as a mere preparation for a modernity that is in its core
independent from it. This affects the implicit views on our relationship to the Axial turn-
whether we think of it in terms of replacement and suppression or in terms of addition and
integration.

Hans Joas

2.3.1 Habermas genealogy of axiality

It is time to return to the genealogy of secular reason made by Habermas using the Axial
Age. His main objective is to show that modern philosophical reason and religious belief
can be historically and conceptually connected, traced up to common roots. By doing so
he expects to dissolve the thorny presumption of identifying philosophy and reason as
exclusively secular in nature14. Broadly speaking this will allow Habermas to ground the
post-secular project: salvaging religious resources and discovering the conditions for
secular-religious translations within the deliberative democracy setting. After a
reconstruction of his position, some problems lurking in Jasper´s account of axiality will
be brought up; they endanger not only Habermas´s genealogical argument but the
postsecular project in general. I believe that these problems can be sorted out and
alleviated by widening the sources for axial reconstruction.

Habermas appreciates Jasper´s project because it displaces some Eurocentric biases while
maintaining the history of reflexivity. The context of Jasper´s work in The Origin and
Goal of History was the aftermath of the Second World War and the subsequent “search
for order in the midst of the possibly most extreme hopelessness” (Thomassen, 2010, p.
331). Jaspers wanted to avoid relativism while simultaneously elaborate a broader
genealogy of reason. In contrast to Eisenstadt Jaspers understands Axiality along the lines
of a “proper period”; for him, the intellectual and spiritual revolution is bordered within
a particular time (between 800-200 BC). This same periodization is followed by

14
“The perspective from which postmetaphysical thinking approaches religion shifts once secular reason
takes seriously the shared origin of philosophy and religion in the revolution in worldviews of the axial
age” (Habermas, 2010, p. 17).
48
Habermas. The revolution consisted in a transition from mythos to logos i.e. from
mythology to the rise of reflexivity when transcendental perspectives arose and a slight
awareness of historical contingency entered the scene (Habermas, 2010, p. 17)15.

In the birth of reflexivity and the parallel foundation of major religions, Habermas finds
the historical moment in which philosophical reason and faith share roots. The cognitive
achievements of the axial age belong to religions and their reflexivity. The point is that
Habermas is aiming at finding a genealogy -using the theoretical-historical concept of
axiality- in which learning process can be anchored. That both secular reason and
religious faith have common origins means that they can participate in the same (or at
least similar) learning dynamics. Only in this way can one gaze the postsecular turn as
the result of learning process in which secular reason is confronted with is own biases;
and simultaneously, religions are open to modify their transcendental claims i.e. they
become increasingly reflexive. Thereupon, the road for cross-fertilization is opened and
the conditions for further translations solidified.

Although Habermas intents well with his genealogy some difficulties can be found. For
starters, from the point of view of modernity, Habermas does not estimate faith and
secular reasoning to be at the same ‘level’; a kind of developmental hierarchy is still
operative in his reasoning. He indirectly maintains the idea that secular reason is more
advanced than its theological sister (Allen, 2013). One is reminded of the social theory of
evolution logic where the religious worldview constitutes (although it showed some lines
of reflexivity) only an intermediate state before the full development of communicative
(secular) competences. Under these lenses, the reconstruction of axiality in Habermas
appeals to an evolutionary account of rituals that trace out the biological origins of
communicative action. Historical modes of socialization begin, therefore, during the axial
period.

One can go deeper in the critique. Rees contends that even if those difficulties are tacked,
the genealogy itself is not enough to ground Habermas´s postsecular project. Essentially,
due to the fact that Jaspers´s reconstruction excludes many civilizations that are before or
outside the definition of axiality (both in nature and periodization). Put in other worlds:
although Jaspers makes an effort to abandon Eurocentric conceptions of reason he still
describes pre-axial civilizations (like cultures from Mesopotamia) and non-axial societies
(Sub-Saharan Africa, the Americas, and Australasia) as lacking any significant

15
For Eisenstadt this implies the need for reconstruction (Rekonstruierungbedürfnis) of the social world.
49
development in terms of “abstract thought, depth of subjectivity and ethical sensibility”
(Rees, 2017, p. 5). Habermas is captivated by Jaspers´s reconstruction mainly because of
his normative intentions. Jaspers wanted to address Eurocentric obstacles while
presenting a defense of universalism. Joas explains:

Jaspers’ plea was to recognize the plurality of existing universalisms and to develop
a philosophical conception of the possibilities of their mutual understanding […]
his way out of the seemingly aporetic situation of a plurality of and the threats to
universalism was not the claim that philosophers could reconstruct everything that
is reasonable in the faith of believes, but that philosophy could serve as the mediator
in the communication of believers (Joas, 2012, p. 22)
Hence, a normative project is upheld while opening the doors for the construction of a
postsecular project á la Habermas. In my opinion, the exclusion of pre-axial societies is
not so challenging as the negation of any kind or reflexivity in non-axial civilizations.
One could still defend Habermas´s overall argument while accepting that pre-axial
cultures lacked cognitive advancements (as understood as Jaspers), which precisely
makes interesting the advent of reflexivity as a subsequent event in human history. More
serious is the claim according to which non-axial civilization did not present any
contribution to the construction of reflexivity. From the anthropological point of vantage,
Jaspers reproduces discredited dichotomies that distinguished between pre-logical and
rational societies; he also extrapolates similar intuitions to affirm that non-axial
civilizations have no history (Thomassen, 2010, p. 327). Jaspers´s account is riddled with
glitches of this sort.

While Thomassen is more condescending to Jaspers´s preconceptions, Rees recognizes

the danger his position represents for the habermasian project of bridging religion and
secular reason.16Jaspers´s image of non-axial civilization as not contributing to the
intellectual development of humanity, and as only gaining historical status once
encountering axial civilizations echoes the missionary and civilizational hymns of
colonization: “The axial age hypothesis may not be Eurocentric in the traditional sense.
But even if we count it as merely ‘Eurasia-centric’ it still excludes most of the non-
western world from the cognitive and ethical history of human race” (Rees, 2017, p. 6).
In following Jaspers, Habermas relapses into hegelian dilemmas where the Spirit appears
in some peoples but not in others. The matter is by no means simple. Rees observation

16
“The normative function of the axial age can be questioned because, like any identity claim, it exhibits
an exclusionary logic. Hence, Habermas also refers to the period as a line of demarcation in order to exclude
philosophical positions that lack a reference to transcendence, which he labels ‘neo-pagan’” (Smith, 2015,
p. 328).
50
not only undermines Habermas´s reconciliatory intentions between religion and secular
reason (and the concomitant inclusion of believers in process of democratic deliberation)
but by extension the whole idea of axiality, which is crucial in the multiple modernities
paradigm.

2.3.2 From Jaspers to Eisenstadt: axial civilizations and multiple modernities

Wittrock suggests that axial theorizing is prone to two traps: a. ethnocentrism, as a

tendency to focus on a particular religion (usually western, like Greek or Christian), where
other non-western spiritual experiences are indirectly labeled as not fully axial; b. a
proclivity to describe axiality as terminating in ‘our’ own modernity. Here axiality is
relevant only as an antecedent of modernity. In other words, axial innovations are not
appreciated in themselves; they are merely a glimpse of what is yet to arrive (Wittrock,
2005). We saw that Habermas falls into the first trap when following Jaspers because
some religious traditions and the philosophical appropriations of these ethnicities are
mainly related to the Judeo-Christian legacy of axial civilizations (Smith, 2015, p. 318).
Prima facie, Habermas also falls into the second issue due to the whole intention of his
reconstruction: unveiling the origins of communicative action in a way that can be linked
with religious resources. The question is whether one can find some way out of the
conundrum that, nonetheless, safeguards the postsecular project.

For Rees, major genealogies should be dismissed as problematic; instead, a series of

micro genealogies could be better fitting. There are no general claims to be made about
which religions are morally and communicatively advance (axial) and which are not (non-
axial). What micro genealogies would do is trace out the theoretical appropriations (in the
history of ideas) of religious concepts into philosophy (2017, p. 11). As a way of example,
one can recall that major notions, later crystallized in modernity and Enlightenment, were
taken from Christian motifs. They shaped the philosophy of history sometimes in
problematic ways (as with the eschatological ideas). No world-wide genealogy is
defended, only the historical translations between religious and secular streams.
Moreover, and in order to avoid the first trap, such examples do not have to be reduced
to western traditions. Rees indicates that similar minor genealogies are to be found with
Islam, pagan traditions, oriental sources, and so on. He writes: “they imply [these smaller
genealogies] a situation in which (any) philosophical tradition is open to the exchange of
concepts with (any) religious tradition -a glimpse, perhaps, of the postsecular condition
that Habermas hopes to achieve” (2017, p. 11).

51
Others, like Jonathan Bowman, argue that one can only dispatch Habermas´s major
genealogical argument by conducting a series of ‘tests’. Following some specific criteria,
one could verify if Habermas has an overly western version of history. The criteria are
three generalizable principles that guide the assessment of universality of Habermas´s
species-ethic assumptions (2015, p. 59). Though his approach is worth considering as a
sharp solution, there are two reasons I won´t inspect his approach. The first one being that
the criteria used to test Habermas´s genealogy come from the German philosopher
himself (from his writings on The Future of Human Nature). Secondly, Bowman does not
directly deal with non-axial civilizations. To be clearer, the criteria are analyzed
especially in non-wester axial civilizations (like China) leaving non-axial societies in a
kind of purgatory. Maybe one should conclude, as Bowman later writes, that there are
(yet) no criteria “sufficient to encompass the global proliferation of multiple modernities”
(2015, p. 60). Should Habermas account of axiality be deemed unsatisfactory for his
project? Are micro genealogies the best alternative? I think that a major genealogical
argument can still be conducted if one widens the concept of axiality to a miscellaneous
of sources. Habermas could enrich his perspective and simultaneously avoid the pitfalls
attached to Jaspers. The idea behind Jasper´s term of ‘axiality’ is much older than himself
and different reconstructions can be unearthed in a range of sociologist and
anthropologist. 17

The ways axiality can be conceptualized and accounted for in historiographic terms vary,
and there are many debates around it.18 Although there are some relatively accepted
claims, most of the reconstruction is, withal, contested. Jasper´s does not have the last
word when it comes to axiality. This shows that Habermas is part of a vast conversation
that continues to qualify the nature of axiality and the long-lasting consequences it has
for modernity. I argue that this project can be elaborated using other sources.

Robert Bellah and Eisenstadt are of much help arrived at this point, because in their
account of axiality the sociological bases for normativity are not lost. Robert Bellah
employs developmental, cognitive, and evolutionary psychology in his book Religion in
Human Evolution (2011), to reconstruct axiality. He makes important nuances: the
evolution of religion does not necessarily mean the progress of religion (Casanova, 2012,
p. 194). He critically reads claims (like that of Weber) that assign superiority to the west

17
Elkana, Voegelin, Lasaulx, Casanova, Taylor, Bellah, Wittrock, Assmann, Arnason, Momgliano, and of
course Eisenstadt are just some examples of the scholarship around axiality.
18
One example is he distinction between axial age and axial civilizations i.e. chronological and typological
views on the matter, as observed in the first chapter.
52
by considering Calvinist Protestantism as the final point of religious evolution -even over
Catholicism-. Therefore, he evades the tendency to consider one religious tradition
superior over others (first trap). Bellah shields a sober understanding of evolution related
to reflexivity, agentiality, and the emergence of a theoretical culture (2011, Chapter 7).
Furthermore, Bellah´s later work goes along the lines of the multiple axialities/ multiple
modernities conception that Eisenstadt defends (Casanova, 2012, p. 202). Most
importantly, both Bellah and Eisenstadt make a non-reductionist connection between
axiality and modernity (as I wrote in the first chapter) seeing in axiality the sources of
reflexivity in general.

I would like to argue that Eisenstadt´s work on multiple axialities can help to respond
Rees´s remark of the exclusion of non-axial civilizations. The three refinements to
axial theory made in Sec. 1.2.1 are particularly useful: a typological position, the
multiple character (not a homogenizing effect) of breakthroughs, and the gradual
nature of ontological and institutional modifications. One of Eisenstadt´s biggest and
extensive projects revolves around Japan, a non-axial civilization. Japan is non-axial
because it did not experience a drastic tension between transcendental and mundane
orders, but even so he identifies reflexivity as a core element in Japan´s trajectory.
According to Eisenstadt, the low transcendental-mundane tension implies that
institutional changes and social struggles were not so intense as in axial episodes; they
are rather responsible for distinct formations of modernity. In the Japanese case, there
was no marked distinction between orthodoxies and heterodoxies, centers and
peripheries, nor disputation amid elites (Yu-Ting, 2011, p. 154). When the first
modernity began to be propagated during the Meiji government, it did so by avoiding
confrontation and by reinventing traditional political symbols. Reflexivity is to be
noticed in the latter ability to integrate (resist/appropriate) western ideas by resorting
to traditional symbols. Thus, Japan was characterized by a high level of flexibility and
adaptability. In this way, Japan serves as “the best example for Eisenstadt´s self-
conscious incorporation of tradition into modernity” (Yu-Ting, 2011, p. 156). Of
course, his work on Japan is much more exhaustive and precise, is no coincidence that
he is regarded as one of the early fathers of Japanese Studies. What I am trying to
punctuate is his way of including non-axial civilizations in the history of reflexivity;
is just that the virtual lack of tensions between transcendental and mundane orders and
the subsequent development of reflexivity was even more gradual and specific.

53
Eisenstadt´s approach is richer than that of Jasper´s even when talking about axial
civilizations. General theories of axiality share a tacit consensus that non-axial and
pre-axial societies lived under an ontological monism. Only with axiality ontological
monism became ontological dualism. In Eisenstadt´s case, axial civilizations that
experienced such tension resolved it by harboring their own cultural resources, in
which reflexivity operated differently. To go further, scholars such as Matthias Jung
argue that the emergence of transcendence is a matter of context and contingency, and
he rather considers that what is vital is the increase in human reflexivity (2012, p. 93
& ff). When adopting the multiple axialities/modernity point of vantage creativity is
more interesting than ontological disruptions i.e. how are changes handle and not so
much disruptions themselves. Can this perspective rescue Habermas major
genealogical argument?

I think that the argument could be complemented using Eisenstadt´s work without
depriving axiality of normative contemplations, and what is normatively valuable for
Habermas´s postsecular project. Borrowing core arguments from Eisenstadt and
Bellah would only strengthen Habermas reconstruction. However, there are two
observations that cannot be ignored. First, a typological standing on axiality and the
inclusion of non-axial civilizations in the history of reflexivity could have the effect of
decreasing the significance of axiality altogether. If is not about an epochal
crystallization nor about specific ontological tensions, why even talk of axiality? I
think that the multiple modernities paradigm deals more broadly with this issue. One
can indeed extrapolate: if all civilizations are estimated modern in their own way, then
modernity itself is rendered meaningless. But relativistic positions are very far from
Eisenstadt sociological program. This is precisely the reason why there is an emphasis
on reflexivity and the development of agenciality, as the awareness that the world is
open to reconstruction.

The second obstacle recalls the second trap mentioned by Wittrock: a tendency to
describe axiality as conducive to our “own modernity”. Focusing so much on
reflexivity can be deemed as a symptom of particularly western interests lurking
behind the genealogical endeavor. Expressed in another way: it would not be an
authentic genealogy but a type of philosophical and sociological cherry-picking
(paying attention only to those traits that relate to the present). Casanova summarizes
this problem: “Obviously, such ‘significance’ or ‘relevance’ is one that emerges only
from ‘our’ present global age. For that very reason, it is not possible to separate
54
‘evaluations’ and ‘understandings’, that is, the meaning of the axial age from our own
‘modern self-understandings’ (2012, p. 203). The observation can be rightly directed
to Eisenstadt´s comparative oeuvre: which elements are to be pondered relevant when
comparing two civilizations? What type of standards (in principle neutral and
unbiased) are involved in a comparative reconstruction? Why reflexivity above other
traits? Eisenstadt´s work on Japan Studies is an interesting example. For his research
he never consulted literature in Japanese, his sources were chiefly western. Others
quarrel that he did not study Japan in itself but only the way Japan related to
modernization waves using the comparative tools of axiality, a paradigm based on
Israeli and Greek experiences (Yu-Ting, 2011, p. 157)19.

For the Israeli sociologist, the complications linked to civilizational comparisons were
not unknown. In his later work, he changes the terms of ‘transcendence and mundane
orders’ to ‘other-worldly and this-worldly orders’, in an effort to make his jargon
friendlier to non-western ways of structuring reality. Nevertheless, having similar
critiques in mind he wrote: “at the same time these very developments -above all the
tendency toward constant self-correction characteristic of modernity- make all the
more pressing the great difficulty of how to answer the question about the limits of
modernity. It is not that such limits do not exist, but the very posing of this questions
puts the questions within the discourse of modernity” (Eisenstadt, 2000a, p. 25). By
entering the exercise of critical revision of axiality and modernity (as a second axial
breakthrough), reflexivity is operating at its bests. Here the distance between
Eisenstadt and Habermas is almost non-existing. For Habermas, one could turn around
the burden and ask: “why should the hermeneutic model of understanding […]
suddenly break down at the boundaries of our own culture, of our own way of life and
traditions?” (2006, p. 17).

There is one last comment in relation to Rees recommendation of abandoning major

genealogical arguments and embracing Petites Histories about the appropriation of
religious content by philosophy. The suggestion is powerful. Even if a major
genealogy could overcome Jaspers´s biases and the obstacles nested in comparative
sociology, one could ask: is it worth it? Is the major argument really necessary for
Habermas post-secular project? Can he ground the necessary translations to strengthen
the post-metaphysical paradigm without drawing upon grandiose narratives? Maybe

19
These observations relate essentially to Amy Allen´s critique of progress as a fact.
55
some of the answers can be found in his forthcoming writing Essay on Faith and
Knowledge. For the time being, these severe questions remain.

2.4 Religion, Secularization and deliberative democracy

A state cannot encumber its citizens, to whom it guarantees freedom of

religion, with duties that are incompatible with pursuing a devout life- it
cannot expect something impossible of them

Jürgen Habermas

I will now briefly examine some of the normative consequences that a new paradigm
of secularization brings to the political dimension, specifically in Habermas´s
deliberative democracy model. The purpose of doing so are two-folded. Habermas´s
later work deals with the normative challenges that arise when religion is included in
the modern political design. Secondly, the description of his way of ‘solving’ the issue
serves an example of the similar endeavors that should take place in other non-western
contexts where secularization was experienced with different tonalities. At the surface,
is a matter of the political management of pluralism, where, on the one hand, citizens
ask themselves how to be spiritually inclined and simultaneously be modern, and
where, on the other hand, the state copes with the variety of belief systems that are
present in society. Being more profound, is about responding to the normative
challenges of multiple modernities in the political realm, and enabling not only a way
of “practical tolerance” for coexistence purposes but much more, a normative
understanding of the way citizens can effectively interact to build democratic societies.
Is not only a matter of coexistence is one of positive political participation. Thus, the
present section is divided into two parts. In the first one, some relevant remarks of
Habermas´s deliberative democracy (including the sluice model) will be revisited. In
the second, the question of how devout citizens participate in such model will be
addressed. Two main difficulties -identity-splitting and legitimacy shortfalls- will be
reviewed following Habermas´s remedies.

56
2.4.1 Theory of deliberative democracy: legitimacy and communicative power 20

Habermas´s deliberative conception of democracy is into a middle ground between

political liberalism and republicanism, where the emphasis lies on the interaction
occurring between citizens (seen as actively participating in public discussions), the
administration, and parliamentary complexes. Legitimate power appears in the
interaction of the network of public spheres with state institutions (Habermas, 1996,
p. 299 & ff). There is, at first glance, a type of division of labor that requires that the
two poles of the model operate under constant communication. Political power is
legitimate insofar as it preserves this connection to an active citizenry; and the citizenry
demands a political power with the capacity to enforce collectively binding-decisions
(Baynes, 2016, p. 142).

It is necessary to introduce the concepts of communicative power and administrative

power that Habermas presents when explaining the genesis of the legitimate law.
Power is understood as a scarce resource that appears when men act together. The first
alludes to the more or less spontaneous emergence of informal power in the public
sphere and civil society. This power can be characterized as a pressure force that
citizens exert upon the state when engaging in deliberative processes. Yet, the
formulation and enactment of laws are exerted by the administrative power (Edgar,
2006, pp. 3, 23). Habermas writes: “with the concept of communicative power, we get
hold of only the emergence of political power, not the administrative employment of
already constituted power…the process of exercising power” (1996, p. 149). Power
has been differentiated, bringing about a decentered conception of society. The
political system is the only one that can act but remains tied to the communicative
structures of the public sphere that perceives problems affecting society. The division
implies that communicative power cannot rule, but rather it points to the use of
administrative power in specific directions (1996, p. 300). Taking distance from
republican models, neither legitimation nor sovereignty rests on a single macro
subject. This explains why Habermas refers to the “subjectless forms of
communication”, meaning that legitimation and sovereignty are not totally
concentrated in a specific part of the political circuit. Such posture requires the
specification of an active civil society that functions as a sensor to conflicts that,

20
Some of the paragraphs were part of my previous essay The Sluice model in Habermas´ Deliberative
democracy conception: national and transnational considerations presented for a seminar in Hamburg
University.
57
through mutual reflexive efforts and argumentation, ends up creating a communicative
power that must be transformed into administrative power.

However, not all power that is produced in the civil society is legitimate, which means
it must be filtered and tested before it enters the administrative area. The sources of
legitimacy and power sprout from the debates and deliberation procedures that take
place, initially, in the public sphere. This activity is permanent to the model for
important reasons: conflicts of interests and worldviews never cease to exist.
Democracy must incessantly suppose that the civil society participates in process of
opinion formation. Finally, because in the public sphere non-governmental discourses
are mobilized to serve as “counterweight” to the state, thus promoting accountability
(Fraser, 1990, p. 50).

Deliberative democracy must explain how the political and legal systems depend on
the communicative power generated in informal spaces of the society. The sluice
model (borrowed from Bernhard Peters) replies both to the legitimation and the
steering deficits i.e. the absence of coordination between systems in complex societies.
For Habermas, all subsystems (family, education, science, etc.) are connected through
the shared code of ordinary language. In the lifeworld, there already exists a network
of communicative action that conforms the private sphere and from which the public
sphere emerges. He is not claiming that the lifeworld is shared and uncontested -which
would contradict the premise of plurality and the conditions of modernity-. Social
integration, from the participant points of view, depends on the linguistic
understanding or interpretations of social actors. The lifeworld is not merely an
undisputed resource but contains additionally a negotiation between people (Edgar,
2006, p. 224). In a way, the economic and administrative subsystems are also anchored
in the lifeworld interactions through the transformation of ordinary language into
specific codes by the legal medium (1996, p. 354).

In this context, the process of communication and decision-making is organized along

a center-periphery axis. In contrast to a hierarchical structure of society, where the
public sphere is at the bottom and the administration at the top, the center-periphery
arrangement permits a better depiction of a complex society and the two-way relation
between strong and weak publics -to use Nancy Fraser´s terminology- (1990, p. 74 &
ff). The core is an aggrupation of complexes arranged in a polycentric fashion.
Parliamentary complexes (including committees, parliamentary business, expert
commissions, etc.), the judiciary, the government and the administration belong to the
58
core (Peters, 2008, p. 23). Habermas correlates organizational density with the
capacity to act, which means the closer one gets to the center, the denser it becomes.
Farther away from it, there is less capacity to act, i.e. to make decisions. However, the
ability to perceive and detect problems increases.21 The real periphery is constituted
by civil society in the public sphere. The public sphere is a social space generated by
communicative action, where problems are identified and organized. Due to its
limitation to solve conflicts, it pressures the core area with the intent of obtaining
political solutions (1996, pp. 359–360). In this aspect, the public sphere is like a
sounding board.

The interaction between periphery and center is mediated through a system of sluices,
it fulfills two purposes. (a) It connects the discovery of problems and conflicts with
the decision-making department, that can allocate resources, conduct formal debates,
and enact binding laws. The legitimacy of these decisions derives from the outside of
the center. A chief idea of his legal theory echoes: citizens are simultaneously
legislators and addresses of law (1996, Chapter 3). Communication flows pass through
the periphery (to be legitimate) and through the center (to be binding). According to
Peters changes can originate both at the center and the periphery. In either case, they
refer to each other (2008, pp. 25 & 26).22

(b) The second aspect of the sluice model is that it filters the flow of communication.
This filtering is composed of two elements. First of all, public opinion is not per se
legitimate. The public sphere is in itself an aggregation of spaces where actors struggle
to acquire influence (Habermas, 1996, p. 363). With the intention of avoiding the entry
of social power and asymmetry of influences into the core, one has to ensure a type of
“quality” of the communication flow. The structure and nature of the public sphere
control the influence of social power thanks to the procedure through which opinion-
formation comes about. In this regard, the ‘how’ is more relevant than the ‘what’. The
procedure must contain public debates and areas of discussions where actors mobilize

21
In the outer periphery of the core area a distinction between “customers” and “suppliers” takes place. The
crucial difference is that the primer tries to influence the core in an instrumental-oriented way. Normally,
Habermas refers to them as organizations or output oriented agents (interest groups, lobby groups, private
organizations, and so on). Different to them one has associations or input-oriented actors. They give voice
to social problems and articulate public needs (1996, 355). The normative inputs reside in the associations
and not in the organizations that are driven by particular interests.
22
As a way of example, one can think about some of the direct and representative democracy instruments
of decision making and legitimation. In direct democracies, “initiatives” originate in civil society, i.e. it is
the citizenry who makes the proposals and translates them, using the legal medium, into the administration.
The plebiscite, on the other side, comes from the incumbent government and flows in the opposite direction.
This would apply to other types of referendums (Matsusaka, 2005, p. 187).
59
convincing reasons coming from their rationalized lifeworld. The quality is then
measured “by the formal criteria governing how a qualified public opinion comes
about” (Habermas, 1996, p. 362). The rational acceptability of opinions ensures that
the discourses are filtered. The laundering would filter irrational or morally repugnant
preferences (Baynes, 2016, p. 145).

Once problems have been filtered and synthesized in the weak public sphere, they are
launched to other instances. In other words, opinions crystallize, gain support, and
demand the translation of these opinions into policies. The second filter, so to put it, is
found in a strong public sphere within the institutional complexes of deliberation,
where these opinions end up. Discourses must be tested and purified normatively, and
interpretation of the law and the constitution must be considered and revised. The
system does not only search for solutions but can also look for an interpretation and
re-formulation of the problem itself (Peters, 2008, p. 32). To be sure, the political-
administrative power cannot handle all demands. For the sake of efficiency, the strong
public must concentrate on some problems and leave others aside or at least pause
them. Social, economic, and political reflections establish the urgency of conflicts. It
is a matter of dealing with issues and decisions under time and budget constraints.

2.4.2 Postsecular model of deliberative democracy

In the above description of deliberative democracy, there is no reference to the public

discussion of religious arguments or convictions, nor the role that religious
contributions could have in a democracy. Two reasons can be pointed out as to explain
this apparent lack of interest in religion within the public sphere. The first one goes
back to Habermas´s distinction between moral and ethical discourses. For him, moral
discourse relates to the justification and application of norms that aim towards
universalizability. Ethical discourses, on the other hand, remain tied to an exercise of
hermeneutical self-understanding, this is, a clarification of the self in individual and
collective dimensions (Habermas, 1996, pp. 8 & 9). Only validity claims that are
capable of being universalizable fit the overall deliberative democracy project. The
conundrum is that religious discourse could be both: “Habermas´s silence in Between
Facts and Norms regarding public discussion of religious convictions may be
connected with the fact that religious validity claims do not fit easily into either the
category of moral discourses or the category of ethical discourses” (Cooke, 2007, p.
191).

60
The second reason is exogenous. At the time (1992), Habermas still assumed what
Casanova disapproved in many liberal theories of democracy, namely, that the
separation of the state and religion was followed by a marginalization of religion to
the private sphere; it did not have any place in modern democratic systems, at least in
respect to public deliberation. Habermas will later agree with Casanova; liberal
theories of democracy should not normatively include secularism (a strict version of
it) and privatization of religion as an institutional requirement. Changes in Habermas
appreciation of religion (i.e. the postsecular turn) brought up crucial questions about
the place that religious groups and arguments had in democratic procedures. Questions
not considered in Between Facts and Norms. Habermas now asks: “How does the
constitutional separation of state and church influence the role that religious traditions,
communities, and organizations are permitted to play in civil society and the political
public sphere, that is, in the political opinion and will-formation of the citizens” (2008,
p. 119).

The design of a whole new theory is not in mind, but rather a critical examination of
the deliberative model under the light of new sociological conditions and challenges.
Habermas´s response must be revised in the framework of his previous deliberative
model, having as prime focus the way religious and non-religious citizens participate
in will formation without abandoning their own identities, and without feeling that
their democratic inputs are not being attended (legitimacy problems).

Habermas carries out the modifications to the deliberative model by initially engaging
Rawls´s Political Liberalism, particularly in the way Rawls deals with comprehensive
doctrines in conditions of belief pluralism. According to Habermas, Rawls´s tactic
creates an unfair division within religious citizens self-understanding (identity)
because it asks of them to refrain from bringing doctrines that are metaphysically
charged and considered absolute truths from the subjective view of the believer. In
other words, some comprehensive doctrines are incompatible with the political
exercise where only reasonable doctrines are welcomed (Rees, 2015, p. 176).
Religious comprehensive doctrines remain bound to a non-public set of reasons. Even
if one maintains that religious belief systems are not being directly targeted by Rawls
(many non-religious reasons and arguments can be also excluded from public reason),
Habermas perceives his general project as excluding mainly sacred possible
contributions.

61
The division of identity is, therefore, the first challenge that deliberative democracy
must address. Belief is not a superficial matter in identity formation, nor a garment
that can be easily taken off when entering the public sphere: “many religious citizens
would not be able to undertake such an artificial division within their own minds
without jeopardizing the pious conduct of their lives” (Habermas, 2008, p. 127) . The
state cannot expect all citizens to justify political standings without appealing to
existential convictions. If this were the case, all religious citizens would be excluded
from the deliberative process that befalls at the peripheries of the circulation of power
i.e. the weak publics. In other words: the state would indirectly negate their
participation in will-formation dynamics.

The unequal burden that Habermas claims is present in Rawls´s political liberalism
conduces to a second worry, namely, that faith-users (being excluded of democratic
will-formation procedures) fell that secular laws and policies are not legitimate. In the
deliberative model, the sources of legitimacy sprout precisely from public discussion
and deliberation. The circulation of power (from communicative to administrative)
incarnates the guiding principle that citizens are both legislators and addresses of
norms and laws. If some citizens do not perceive themselves as part of the circulation
of power, and the state keeps expecting of them to leave their identities behind in order
to be included, then they will never be legislators of the laws that rule them. They will
relate to the law in a heteronomous fashion. The principle of democracy is in danger:
“only those statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent of all citizens
in a discursive process of legitimation that in turn has been legally constituted”
(Habermas, 1996, p. 110).

There are some qualifications to be made. When Habermas refers to the authorship of
laws (citizens as legislators) he is normatively including all citizens, but within the
model, the enactment of biding laws really takes place at the center of the schema. It
must come from the periphery to be legitimate and it must pass through the center to
be binding. Let us remember that the voices that arise in the weak publics are not per
se legitimate. A filtering process (sluice model) allows only some arguments to
continue their way to parliamentary complexes and other institutions located at the
center. It is at the center where one finds the sufficient institutional density and the
capacity to ‘act’ that enables lawmaking. Secondly, Habermas as in mind a weak
meaning of ‘authorship’. He is undoubtedly not alluding to universal assent, which is
improbable in a democratic setting. The key here is, rather, that the participation of
62
citizens in democratic procedure is ensured: “it is enough to acknowledge that the
dispute to which you contributed went on to influence the process of lawmaking, even
though you came out on the losing side” (Rees, 2015, p. 192). Therefore, when
Habermas tackles the problem of inclusion, is not defending that religious ideas should
per se constitute law. He is claiming that faith-users are to be taken seriously when
they participate in deliberative spaces. If religious citizens do not contribute (without
being deprived of their identities) then the legitimation course cannot be completed;
their relation to the law will remain heteronomous. In this manner, Habermas is
objecting to strictly secular versions of democracy and recognizing the challenges that
his postsecular model must confront.

His method out of these hitches resides in the aforementioned ‘complementary

learning process’ notion. To achieve it changes are required both in non-religious and
their fellow spiritually inclined citizens attitude and epistemic standing. Changes that
pave the road for authentic democratic participation. On the side of the religious users,
Habermas is unwilling to including all the religious spectrum in the model. As adverted
before (sec. 2.2.3), fundamentalisms are the best example of ideas that exceed the
inclusion task. They are outside normative considerations because they contradict the
core elements on which democracy is based. In seeking to avoid such hazardous
inclusions, certain conditions must be demanded.

He elaborates: a minimum of cognitive adjustments are to be made. Religions must

fine-tune themselves to the modern context. There are three cognitive dissonances to
be accepted, namely, pluralism of worldviews, the internal logic of secular (scientific)
knowledge, and the secular nature of the politic arena (Habermas, 2008, p. 137). Each
of these dissonances becomes an epistemic stance consequence of internal hermeneutic
endeavors of self-reflection within religious traditions. Again, the purpose of
demanding the acceptance of cognitive dissonances is to block and filter any
totalitarian and hegemonic attitude that hides in discourse. Totalitarian views (in an
epistemic, political, and religious sense) cannot be maintained once the plurality of
beliefs, the relevance and importance of scientific knowledge, and the need for a
language accessible for all in public discussion is accepted. To make it shorter:
religions must become reflexive. As suggested before, only when a sort of awakening
of reflexivity inside religious consciousness comes about, are complementary
learnings possible. At the same time, Habermas is addressing the initial problem of not
being able to qualify religious discourse as either moral or ethical. In this ‘reflexive
63
requirement’ he is guaranteeing that only those validity claims that fit his conceptual
apparatus are recognized. On the side of non-religious citizens, a change in their
political attitude when interacting with religious reasons and arguments is also
required. Religious arguments are not to be deemed irrational. Their fellow citizen’s
right to contribute to public discussion using devout resources must be recognized and
respected. Additionally, secular citizens should “take part in the efforts to translate
relevant contributions from religious language into publically intelligible language”
(Habermas, 2008, p. 113).

Arrived at this point some issues with Habermas´s proposal arise, more specifically
two. To begin with, the cognitive dissonance requirement forces a rough alteration of
personal belief. Habermas is condemning the identity-splitting that he observes in
Rawls but ends up also affecting identities: “he thinks that identity-splitting is
objectionable because pre-political identities […] must not be interfered with by the
norms of the political system. And yet [the] postsecular model requires citizens to
make dramatic changes to their beliefs, and therefore to their identities” (Rees, 2015,
p. 198). Habermas is asking from everyday believers a level of reflexivity that, when
it comes to natural sciences and factual knowledge, even theologians struggle with.
Secondly, the participation of those reflexive religions in public debate only takes
place in weak publics, at the periphery of Peters´s model. When the system of sluices
is considered, Habermas defends that untranslated sacral reasons must also be filtered;
enforceable laws must be justified in a language intelligible to all (Habermas, 2009b,
p. 76). Untranslated arguments never enter strong publics, and public officials are
required to leave their beliefs behind (similar to identity-splitting). The whole model
depends on the possibility of successful sacred-secular translations that Habermas does
not specify in depth. If sacral reasons are translated in a way that faith users agree with
and in which they do not feel that the original meaning is being betrayed, then citizens
will fell part of the democratic process. If the notion of translation is, however, obscure
and difficult to practically implement in everyday believers and democratic practices,
then the postsecular model of deliberative democracy shudders.

There is one last observation regarding the relationship between Habermas´s proposal
and the Eisenstadt´s research program of multiple modernities. At this point, Habermas
is not thinking globally but concentrating in western societies. The postsecular
democratic model applies especially to societies that have experienced a period of
strong secularism (2009b, p. 59). In this sense, he is reflecting upon the normative
64
implications that a new understanding of the relation between modernity and religion
have. However, in the political dimension he is calculating those implications in the
context of plural and western experiences. This is not reproachable, one must start
somewhere. The question is to what extent can these normative considerations be
theorized in other modernities, in other societies that have experienced secularization
in multiple ways. This will, without a doubt, bring once more to the table the matter of
universalizability of norms and its relation to historical contingency.

65
Final considerations

This thesis has been about the religious-secular dynamics in the history of reflexivity.
Not in a historiographic sense but from the locus of modernity and it self-
understanding as a sociological (descriptive) and philosophical (normative)
construction. My initial question regarding the normative implications of adopting a
multiple understanding of modernity only gains value within such history.

In the first chapter, the sociological paradigm of multiple modernities was analyzed
and discussed. As shown in Sec. 1.4 this paradigm is, withal, still being improved to
better react to its original inadequacies. I believe that Eisenstadt´s work constitutes a
sociological pillar insofar as it clearly addresses the issue of historical contingency and
institutional diversity while avoiding the pitfall of relativization and social
incommensurability. It can continue to be a sociological foundation that normative
theories use when pondering on multiplicity.

The place that progress (as an imperative and as a fact) plays in Eisenstadt´s writings
is more difficult to elucidate. Above all, because one must differentiate his normative
commitments from his sociological oeuvre. In his work, there is no explicit nor
detailed elaboration of such matter. Some intuitions can, nevertheless, be pointed out.
Many of his texts identify some variations of modernity as destructive. The adjective
‘destructive’ is not detailed, but it could be conceptually similar to the habermasian
notion of ‘regressions’. In nuce: is normatively charge. Nonetheless, there are
discrepancies, because the adjective ‘destructive’ does not entail a path as ‘regressions’
does. For Eisenstadt destructive forces are, in addition, inherent to modernity,
characterized by fluxing in constant tensions, contestations, and struggles. Therefore,
independently of Eisenstadt´s personal normative commitments, his sociological
model is indeed multiple.

In relation to secularization, I do think that Eisenstadt does not completely decouple

modernization processes from secularization theory. One of his core arguments,
already mentioned in the axial theory, is that the world is open to reconstruction as a
consequence of an ontological division (transcendence – mundane orders). The
mundane order constitutes the birth of the profane realm, and the possibility of human

66
autonomy liberated from the ‘above’. This does not have to be deemed as a shortfall
of his theory. One does not solve anything by jealously negating all the insights that
the theory of secularization developed. Both Casanova and Berger argue that the
imperative matter is to contemplate secularization processes in situ. In this sense,
Casanova believes that one definition of secularization is valid (from his three
delimitations) and Berger chooses to designate our time as plural, where secular and
religious discourses navigate society and consciousness simultaneously. Eisenstadt´s
contribution is then, precisely, to highlight the multiple character of the secular. That
idea continues to be developed by the ‘multiple secularities beyond the west’ and the
‘third research program’ projects. Therefore, although Eisenstadt has some vestiges of
secular ideas, they are not adverse. What is noteworthy in his work is that the narrative
of modernity changes dramatically. Most importantly because his civilizational
comparative approach fights the monopoly of ‘modernity’ by the west, and it opens it
to appropriations from other cultures and societies.

In the second chapter, the normative implications of those changes were examined.
The reader should understand that the use of Habermas is not compulsory. I could have
analyzed the normative dimension of multiplicity via other theories like Rawls,
Kymlicka, Taylor, or even other authors within the critical theory tradition. I expressed
in that chapter the reasons why I selected Habermas. In his case, he interprets the
persistence and vitality of religion as an opportunity to rethink the place of religious
discourse in the political arena and in its relation to postmetaphysical philosophy. The
postsecular project is the response to that challenge. I argued that embracing more
insights from Eisenstadt´s work would help Habermas´s project, especially in his
genealogy of secular reason through axiality. In the political arena, Habermas serves
more as an example of the normative difficulties that arise when the new sociological
model is extended. However, Habermas´s democratic model remains directed to
western societies. There are many detractors of Habermas´s way of dealing with
religion (in his later work) and his notion of translation. Again, the point here is that
Habermas constitutes the best example of the effort to normatively respond to a new
understanding of religion and modernity; which was from the beginning my research
interest.

Habermas and Eisenstadt share a defense of reflexivity. They both see that, although
a new concept of modernity must be elaborated, reflexivity cannot be abandoned.
Instead of submerging myself in criticisms that the protection of reflexivity has, I
67
would like to close meditating on the response that Habermas and Eisenstadt gave:
namely, that criticizing the old secularization paradigm and the traditional theories of
modernity is evidence of the development of a higher reflexivity, in which its own
shortcomings are being addressed. Moreover, why should reflexivity be considered as
the monopoly of the west? Why should reflexivity “suddenly break down at the
boundaries of our own culture?”.

68
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 Declaration of Originality

I certify that the present work is entirely my own and not of any other person,

unless explicitly acknowledged (including citation of published sources).

The present work has not been previously submitted in Hamburg University

or any other institution.

Andrés Felipe Barrero Salinas

Colombian ID: 1018444561
December 20 2017
Bogotá

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