Strict or Liberal Construction

A. Statutes Strictly Construed

Penal Laws

Intestate Estate of Manolita Carungcong, represented by Mediatrix Carungcong vs. People of the Philippines and William
Sato

Facts:

 William Sato was accused of the complex crime of estafa through falsification by the heirs of the deceased, who
was made to sign a document supposedly about taxes, but which in fact gave William's daughter Wendy Mitsuko
Sato special power of attorney to sell, assign, or transfer 4 properties in Tagaytay City. The old lady was blind and
79 years old already then. Wendy Sato was only 20 years old then. The deceased eventually died in 1994.
 Sato moved to quash the information, based on Art 332 of the Revised Penal Code, saying that because the
deceased Manolita was his mother-in-law, he may avail of the exempting circumstance mentioned in the provision.
 Zenaida, William's wife who was the daughter of Manolita, died before Manolita did, and the prosecution argues that
this already severed the affinity between the accused and the deceased.
 The RTC granted William's motion, saying that in addition to Art. 332 making no distinctions between living and
deceased spouses, penal laws should be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.
 The CA upheld this decision, hence the appeal.

Issue:

 May Sato avail of the exempting circumstance provided by Art. 332?

Held:

 No.
 Art. 332 provides that the only offenses in which the exempting circumstance of relationship may be considered are
theft, swindling (estafa), and malicious mischief. It does not mention complex crimes such as estafa through
falsification.
 It is the text of the information that controls, and not the title of the information. In this case, while the title
reads that accused William is being charged of estafa, the contents of the information clearly show that this is a
complaint for estafa through falsification, because the falsification of public documents was used to defraud Manolita
of her property.
 The case is remanded to the trial court.

Elvira Yu Oh vs. People

Facts:

 Elvira Yu Oh purchased jewelry from Solid Gold International Traders. She failed to pay. The company filed civil
cases for specific performance against the petitioner. As part of the compromise agreement, Oh had to write
postdated checks in favor of Solid Gold. Dishonor slips were issued for each check given.
 On Oct. 5, 1992, Solid Gold filed ten criminal cases of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) against Oh. The QC RTC
found accused guilty of ten counts of violations of BP 22.
 The CA upheld the RTC's decision.
 The petitioner assails the decision on 3 grounds: that RA 7691, taken with Art. 22 of the RPC, should be applied
retroactively in favor of the accused, that no notice of dishonor as expressly provided by BP 22 was not given to the
respondent, and that the lower court construed BP 22 not liberally in favor of the accused and strictly against the
State.

Issue:

 Did lower court err in its construction of BP 22?

Held:

 Yes.
 The Court of Appeals, in construing that BP 22 embraces cases of no funds or closed accounts when the
express language of BP 22 penalizes only the issuance of checks which are subsequently dishonored by
the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, has enlarged by implication the meaning of the statute
 which amounts to judicial legislation.
 In this case, the lower court erred by including postdated checks, while the law clearly states that only checks with
insufficient funds are covered by the law.

Villasenor vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts:

 Petitioners are officials of the Quezon City Engineering Office. On Aug. 18, 2001, the Manor Hotel caught fire.
Criminal charges of multiple homicide through reckless imprudence, and administrative charges of gross negligence
and misconduct were filed against them.
 The petitioners were preventively suspended for 6 months with regard to the administrative charges against them. 5
years later, respondent prosecutor filed for suspension pendente lite of the petitioners with respect to the criminal
case against them.
 Respondent court granted 90 days of suspension against petitioners.
 Petitioners file petition by Rule 65, saying that Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion by allowing
preventive suspension, saying that they have already been previously suspended in the administrative case based
on the same cause.

Issue:

 Did respondent court commit grave abuse of discretion by allowing the preventive suspension against petitioners
with respect to the criminal case?

Held:

 No.
 Sec. 13 of RA 3019 is mandatory. It is not a penalty but a means of precaution. Criminal cases are separate from
administrative cases.
 Sec. 13 of RA 3019 is procedural and not penal in nature, because it is not a penalty. While penal laws are
construed strictly against the State, procedural rules are construed liberally.

Philacor vs. CIR

Facts:

 Petitioner company is engaged in retail financing. It is protesting the assessment upon it by the BIR on
Documentary Stamp Taxes for the year 1993, specifically on promissory notes.
 The CTA affirmed in toto the tax on Philacor.
 Philacor argues that it is not liable because the word “using” is not included in Sec. 173 of the 1997 National Internal
Revenue Code.

Issue:

 Is Philacor liable for the documentary stamp tax?

Held:

 No.
 Stamp taxes upon documents in Sec. 173 include making, signing, issuing, accepting, or transferring those
documents. Philacor did not make, sign, issue, accept, or transfer such taxable documents. Philacor did “accept”
such documents, but the tax here only applies to bills of exchange, not promissory notes.
 The settled rule is that in case of doubt, tax laws must be construed strictly against the State, and liberally
in favor of the taxpayer. The reason for this ruling is not hard to grasp. Taxes, which are burdens upon the
taxpayer, must not go beyond what the law expressly and clearly declares.

CIR vs. Kudos Metal Corp.

Facts:

 Respondent failed to comply with 3 Notices of Presentation of Records petitioner issued against them.
 Repondent on 2001, and 2003, executed Waivers of the Defense of Prescription in favor of the petitioner.
 Petitioner, on Aug. 25, 2003, issued a Preliminary Asessment Notice against the respondent for the tax year 1998.
This was followed by a Letter of Demand.
  Respondent filed a protest on Dec. 3 of the same year.
 On June 22, 2004, the BIR rendered a Final Decision, assessing respondent's liabilities at P25, 624,048.76.
 The CTA 2nd Division reversed the BIR's decision, saying that the 3-year prescription period has already finished.
 The CTA en banc affirmed the division's decision.
 Petitioner argues that the waivers are valid, and that respondent is barred by estoppel because it acquiesced to the
audit.

Issue:

 Are waivers valid?

 Is respondent barred by estoppel?

Held:

 No.
 This is beacause the waivers were executed without the notarized written authority of Pasco to sign the waiver on
respondent's behalf, the waivers failed to indicate the date of acceptance, and the receipt of the file copy was not
indicated in the original copies of the waivers, pursuant to RMO 20-90.
 No.
 In another case (CIR vs. Suyoc Mining), the Court decided to recognize estoppel, but this was applied as an
exception to the statute on the collection of taxes, not the assessment of taxes. However, in that case, the
assessment was made within the prescribed period. In this case, assessment was made beyond the prescribed
period.
 Having caused defects in the waivers, the BIR must bear the consequence, not the taxpayers. To stress, a waiver
of the statute of limitations, being a derogation of the taxpayers right to security against prolonged and
unscrupulous investigations, must be carefully and strictly construed.

Mapulo Mining and Eliseo Chavez & Associates vs. Sec. Lopez of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Projects &
Ventures, Inc. (PROVEN)

Facts:

 Eliseo Chavez located a limestone mining claim in Bo. Mapulo, Taysan, Batangas. Using a temporary permit, he
and his spouse were able to extract limestone.
 Due to a failure to comply with requirements, the Bureau of Mines declared this claim as abandoned. Petitioner
Mapulo Mining moved into the area in 1963 and applied for a mining lease on it.
 In 1966, respondent PROVEN located mining claims over an area which includes petitioner's claims.The notices of
application were published thrice in the Official Gazette and in 2 newspapers of national circulation. They were not
published in Batangas publications, however.
 Petitioner later filed an order of lease survey with the Bureau of Mines. This was denied as the bureau said it would
come into conflicet with private respondent's claims.
 Petitioner argues that there was no valid and sufficient publication of the private respondent's application for a
mining lease over its claims.

Issue:

 Was there valid and sufficient publication?

Held:

 No.
 Sec. 72 of the Mining Act provides that the Director of the Bureau of Mines shall publish a notice that such
application has been made, once a week for a period of three consecutive weeks, in the Official Gazette and in two
newspapers, one published in Manila either in English or Spanish, and the other published in the municipality or
province in which the mining claim is located, if there is such newspaper, otherwise, in the newspaper published in
the nearest municipality or province.
 In this case, publication in the municipality or province was not complied with, and therefore, the Bureau of Mines
was in error.
 Failure to file an adverse claim in time will result to petitioner forever being barred from filing such a claim, as
mentioned in the Mining Act, and this is why publication is important. Publication gives the petitioner sufficient notice
of a claim.
 In view of its adverse consequence on the rights of others, nothing short of strict compliance is demanded.
Statutes in derogation of rights must be construed strictly.
CIR vs. PLDT

Facts:

 For importing machinery and equipment from Oct. 1, 1992 to Mar. 31, 1994, the PLDT was assessed taxes of
P164,590,953.00 and P116,041,333.00.
 On Mar. 15, 1994, PLDT sought clarification from the BIR on its tax exemption privilege.
 The BIR replied, saying that in view of Sec. 12 of RA 7082, PLDT should be exempted.
 Armed with this ruling, PLDT filed for a refund on Dec. 2, 1994. With the claim not being acted upon, PLDT filed a
case before the CTA for its claim.
 The CTA, and later, the CA ruled in favor of the respondent.
 Petitioner filed for review before the SC, but later changed its mind and dropped the case.
 The Court, however, decided to take cognizance anyway (the Court is not estopped by the errors on the application
of laws by its agents such as the BIR, and it may change the decision of the lower courts).
 Respondents argue that the “in lieu of all taxes” clause found in Sec. 12 of RA 7082 covers all taxes (meaning it
exempts PLDT from all taxes on its imports), while petitioner argues it covers only direct taxes (meaning PLDT is
only exempted from direct taxes).

Issue:

 Is PLDT exempt from paying VAT, compensating taxes, advanced sales taxes, and internal revenue taxes on its
importations of machinery?

Held:

 No.
 VAT, compensating taxes, etc. are indirect taxes.
 PLDT must pay these taxes on its imports. Time and time again, the Court has stated that taxation is the rule,
exemption is the exception. Statutes granting TAX EXEMPTIONS must be construed STRICTLY AGAINST
THE TAXPAYER, and LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF THE TAXING AUTHORITY.

Del Mar vs. Pagcor

Facts:

 In Opinon No. 67, Series of 1996, the Secretary of Justice opined that the authority of PAGCOR to operate and
maintain games of chance or gambling extends to jai-alai.
 On May 6, 1999, petitioner Del Mar filed a petition for prohibition to prevent PAGCOR from operating jai-alai or
Basque pelota games.

Issue:

 May PAGCOR legally operate and maintain jai-alai games?

Held:

 No.
 PD 1869 only mentions gambling casinos, and makes no mention of jai-alai. It is not an express grant of a franchise
to operate jai-alai. Granting franchises must be explicitly made by a charter. Acts of incorporation, and other
statutes granting other franchises or special benefits or privileges to corporations, are to be construed
strictly against the corporations.

Republic vs. Kerry Lao Ong

Facts:

 Respondent, 38 y/o, filed for naturalization. He was born in Cebu City to Chinese parents.
 Ong alleged in his petition that he had been a businessman/business manager since 1989, and earning P150,000
on average per year. 2 character witnesses
 Cebu RTC granted his petition.
 Petitioner argues that respondent failed to prove that he possesses a known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
occupation as required by Sec. 2 of Par. 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law.

Issue:
  Has respondent proven that he possesses a known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation as required by
Sec. 2 of Par. 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law?

Held:

 No.
 Neither Ong nor his witnesses presented any evidence that he had any occupation. He only relied on general
assertions.
 The courts must always be mindful that naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest public
interest. Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government
and against the applicant.

CIR vs. Central Visayas (CENVOCO) and CTA

Facts:

 Respondent protests against deficiency miller's tax levied against it by BIR in 1986.
 CENVOCO argues that based on Sec. 168 of the Tax Code, taxes paid on materials used for containers such as
tetrapaks and cans are not allowed against the miller's tax due.
 CTA ruled in favor of CENVOCO, hence the petition.

Issue:

 Can the sales tax paid by CENVOCO on containers be credited against the miller's tax?

Held:

 No.
 Sec. 168 provides that “credit for any sales, miller's or excise taxes paid on raw materials or supplies used in the
milling process shall not be allowed against the miller's tax due.”
 Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably
construed. All doubts should be construed in favor of the general rule, and not the exception.

Geologistics vs. Gateway Electronics and First Lepanto Taisho

Facts:

 Petitioner is a forwarding business. On Oct. 17, 1997, it filed an action for recovery against respondent Gateway
Electronics. The RTC of Paranaque issued a writ of attatchment against respondent's properties, which caused it to
move for dissolution.
 Respondent surety First Lepanto filed a counter-bond of P5 Million to secure the payment of any judgment that
petitioner could recover from Gateway.
 RTC ruled in favor of petitioner.
 First Lepanto filed a for certiorari in the CA to return the amounts garnished from Gateway from petitioner to
respondent surety.
 The CA granted respondent surety's petition.

Issue:

 Is there sufficient ground for the RTC to warrant discretionary execution of respondent's funds?

Held:

 No.
 The rule on execution pending appeal, which is now termed discretionary execution under Rule 39, Section 2 of the
Rules of Court, must be strictly construed as an exception to the general rule.

B. Statutes Liberally Construed

Application for Survivorship Benefits Under RA 9946 by Pacita Gruba, surviving spouse of a CTA Judge

Facts:
  On June 25, 1996, CTA Judge Manuel Gruba died while still in service.
 Mrs. Gruba applied for death gratutity under RA 910, which the SC approved on Sept. 24, 1996.
 On Jan. 13, 2010, RA 9946 amended RA 910, granting more benefits. It has a retroactivity clause.
 On Jan. 11, 2012, Mrs. Gruba applied for survivorship pension under RA 9946.
 In a resolution dated Jan. 27, 2012, the Court granted survivorship benefits to Mrs. Gruba, which she was able to
get.
 On Nov. 17, 2012, the Court revoked the resolution, but did not require Mrs. Gruba to refund the money she
received.
 The Office of the Chief Attorney commented May 14, 2013 that the heirs of Judge Gruba are eligible for the 10-year
lump sum under RA 9946. The Court adopts this resolution because of the Chief Attorney's comments.

Issues:

 Does RA 9946 apply to Judge Gruba?

 Are the heirs entitled to the 10-year lump sum under RA 9946?
 Is Mrs. Gruba entitled to surviorship benefits under RA 9946?

Held:

 Yes.
 Retirement benefits for judges serve as incentives for talented lawyers to serve in the government, instead of
working in lucrative private practices.
 Retirement laws are social legislation. Retirement laws, in particular, are liberally construed in favor of the
retirees because their objective is to provide for the retiree's substenance, and hopefully, even comfort
when he no longer has the capacity to earn a livelihood.
 Death while in actual service was interpreted by the Court as falling under “permanent physical disability”, because,
as Justice Teehankee said, there is no more permanent disability than death. When the law has gaps which tend
to get in the way of achieving its purpose, thus resulting in injustice, this Court is allowed to fill the open
spaces therein.
 Yes.
 An initial look suggests that the retroactivity of RA 9946 covers only those who have retired prior to the enactment of
the law. However, it should not be construed strictly in its dictionary definition, but in its more rational sense of
discontinuance of service due to causes beyond one's control.
 No.
 When a justice is neither retired nor eligible to retire (60 years old), the spouse may not avail of the survivorship
benefits. However, Mrs. Gruba is not required to refund them.

Maria Buena Obra vs. SSS

Facts:

 Juanito, petitioner's husband, was a driver for 24 years and 5 months. He was employed at Jollar Industrial Sales
and Services, Inc. as a dump truck driver from January 1980 to June 1988. He died of a heart attack while driving a
dump truck on June 27, 1988.
 Petitioner started receiving benefits from the SSS on Nov. 1988. 10 years later, she learned that she also has
benefits under PD 626 through the TV program of Ted Failon.
 On April 1999, she applied for the other benefits provided in PD 626 at the SSS. The SSS denied this application on
July 1999 because she failed to prove that there was a causal relationship between his death and his work.
 The CA ruled in favor of the SSS, saying that her action has prescribed, not only within the Employee's
Compensation Commission's Rules of Procedure (3 years), but also in the Civil Code (10 years). Furthermore, it
was not established that Juanito's death was work-related.

Issues:

 Has petitioner's action prescribed?

 Did her husband die of work-related causes?

Held:

 No.
 Her application for the other benefits under PD 626 has to be considered part of her earlier application in 1988,
because it is of the same nature, and was filed before the same agency.
 It is the avowed policy of the State to construe labor provisions liberally in favor of the beneficiaries. This
 court has time and again upheld the policy of liberality of the law in favor of labor.
 Yes.
 The nature of the husband's work was physically strenuous, and he died on the job. He has been working for so
many years on his job.

In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim

Facts:

 Monina Lim (petitioner) married Primo Lim on Jun. 23, 1974. They were childless. 2 children, registered as Michelle
and Michael Jude, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban when they were 11 days old, in separate
occassions. They were born on 1977 and 1983, respectively.
 In 1998, Primo died. In 2000, she married Angel Olario, an American citizen.
 In 2002, she decided to adpot the children under the amnesty provided in RA 8852. By then, Michelle was 25 years
old and married, and Michael Jude was 18 years and 7 months old. The DSWD certified them both as abandoned
children.
 The RTC denied the adoption, saying that she mere consent by the husband does not suffice because Sec. 7 of Art.
III of RA 8852 requires that the husband be made a party in a joint adoption.
 Petitioner argues before the SC that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed in view of the State's paramount duty
to protect the interest and welfare of the child. Dura lex sed lex, petitioner argues, does not apply to adoption cases.
She also argues that joint parental authority is no longer necessary because both children are already emancipated.

Issue:

 May petitioner adopt the 2 children under these conditions?

Held:

 No.
 Sec. 7 of Art. III of RA 8852 is very clear. The husband and wife shall adopt jointly the children. This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the children. The use of the word “shall”
means that this provision is mandatory. The rule also insures harmony between the husband and the wife.
Since petitioner has already remarried, it is but natural to include the husband.
 Petitioner argues that husband has already filed for divorce. The Court says that until that divorce has been proven
here in the Philippines, she has no other recourse but to file for adoption jointly.

Coca-Cola Export Corp. vs. Clarita Gacayan

Facts:

 Respondent worked for petitioner from 1985 to 1995. She was terminated for alleged loss of trust and confidence.
She was holding the position of Senior Financial Accountant by then.
 The company had a policy of reimbursing food and transport expenses when the employee worked overtime for 4
hours on a Saturday, Sunday, and holiday, or 2 hours of overtime on a weekday. Petitioner called respondent's
attention regarding the alteration of dates on 3 receipts, 1 for McDonalds and 2 for Shakey's. Petitioner talked to the
Assistant Branch Manager of McDonalds in Makati Cinema Square, who verified that the receipt date has been
altered from Oct. 2 to Oct. 1, 1994.


Mandatory and Directory Statutes

In Re: Application of Mario Guarina to the Bar

Facts:

 Applicant took bar exam on Mar. 23, 1907. He failed, scoring only 71 percent, 4 points below the required 75
percent.
 Applicant argues that by virtue of being provincial fiscal of Batanes, he may be admitted into the bar in accordance
with Sec. 2 of Art. 1597, which amends Sec. 13 of Art. 190.
 The original provision in Art. 190 says that certain candidates “may be allowed to practice law in the Courts of the
Philippines without an examination”.
 Applicant argues that it should be construed as mandatory, meaning “may” means “shall”.

Issue:
  Is the provision mandatory or directory?

Held:

 It is merely directory.
 While it is well settled that “may” should be read “shall” where such construction is necessary to give effect
to the apparent intention of the legislator, in this case, to construe it as mandatory would bring it in direct
conflict with the Act of Congress.
 Looking only at the intent of the particular law as a whole, it may seem that it was mandatory, construing the law as
such will bring it into conflict with the powers given to the judiciary to regulate the legal profession.

Adasa vs. Abalos

Facts:

 Respondent filed 2 cases of estafa against petitioner, based on 2 checks issued in respondent's name received and
encashed by petitioner through deceit. Respondent says petitioner failed to pay the proceeds of the checks despite
repeated demands.
 Petitioner admits having encashed the checks, but 6 days later, recants, saying that a certain Bebie Correa has
instead encashed the checks, and that she has already fled the country.
 This case concerns only one of the cases. The RTC of Iligan City directed the City Prosecutor to conduct a
reinvestigation. On Aug. 30, 2001, the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution affirming the finding of probably cause
against petitioner, and on Oct. 1, 2001, DURING ARRAIGNMENT, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty before the
court.
 Petitioner, dissatisfied with the investigation, filed a Petition for Review before the DOJ.
 The DOJ directed the Office of the City Prosecutor to withdraw the information, saying that Sec. 7 of DOJ Circular
No. 70 disallows the office from further proceeding with the case.
 Petitioner, dissatisfied, appeals before the CA, which upheld the lower court.
 Petitioner argues that Sec. 7, which says that “If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed
resolution, the petition SHALL not be given due course if the accused has been arraigned”, is only directory, in light
of Sec. 12, which says the Secretary of Justice MAY dismiss an appeal if the accused had already been arraigned
when the appeal was taken.

Issue:

 Is the over-all language of Sec. 7 and Sec. 12 of DOJ Circular No. 70 merely directory?

Held:

 No. It is mandatory.
 The all too-familiar rule in statutory construction, in this case, an administrative rule of procedure, is that
when a statute or rule is clear or unambiguous, interpretation need not be resorted to. Section 7 of the
circular clearly and categorically directs the DOJ to dismiss outright an appeal filed after arraignment.
 To give the word “may” in Sec. 12 a directory meaning subverts the objective of the Circular, which is the
expeditious and efficient administration of justice. The language of the Circular as a whole must be taken
into context.

Philippine Registered Electrical Practitioners (PREPI) vs. Julio Francia (Commissioner of the Professional Regulation
Commission)

Facts:

 Petitioner is an association of electrical engineers and electricians. It sought to declare unconstitutional Resolution
No. 1, Series of 1986 adopting guidelines for the Continuing Professional Education (CPE) for electrical engineers.
Petitioner argues that the resolution is violative of the equal protection and due process clauses, prohibition on bills
of attainder and ex post facto laws, and mandate for the protection of the rights of workers.
 The Manila RTC ruled in respondent's favor, saying that the resolution is a valid implementation of RA 184 and PD
223.
 Sec. 6 of PD 223 gives the various professional boards “the power to look from time to time into the conditions
affecting the practice of the profession or occupation under their respective jurisdictions and whenever necessary,
adopt such measures as may be deemed proper for the enhancement of the profession or occupation and/or the the
maintenance of high professional, ethical and techincal standards.”
  For said purposes, “the members of a Board... may conduct ocular inspections”.
 Petitioner argues that the authority of the Board is limited to conducting ocular inspections.

Issue:

 Is the Electoral Enginering Board authorized to conduct only ocular inspections?

Held:

 No.
 Nothing in said provision says so. The Board may in fact, even do away with ocular inspections, as can be gleaned
by the use of the word “may”, implying that the conduct of ocular inspections is merely directory, not
mandatory.
 In any case, the case has been rendered moot by the passage of Resolution No. 507, Series of 1997.

Guerrero vs. RTC of Ilocos Norte and Pedro Hernando

Facts:

 Petitioner and private respondent are brothers-in-law.

 Petitioner filed a civil case against private respondent. The RTC Judge, Bello, gave petitioner 5 days to file a motion
and amended complaint, saying that petitioner needs to show that efforts towards compromise have already been
exhausted.
 Petitioner failed to do so, and the judge dismissed the case.
 Petitioner argues that 1) brothers-in-law are not considered members of the family in Art. 217 and 224 of the Family
Code, and in Sec. 1, par. (j) or Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, and that 2) the absence in the complaint of an
allegation that earnest efforts towards compromise have been made does not constitute grounds for dismissal.

Issues:

 Is it mandatory to allege that efforts towards compromise have been made in cases between family members?
 Are brothers-in-law considered family members in the cited provisions?

Held:

 Yes. Art. 151, which says no suit between family members shall prosper unless it should appear in the complaint
that efforts have been made towards compromise, is mandatory. Considering that the quoted provision starts
with “No”, it is mandatory.
 However, in this case, Art. 151 does not apply, because brothers-in-law are not considered family members in the
above-cited provisions. Brothers or sisters-in-law are not listed in the members of the family mentioned in Art. 150 of
the Family Code. Therefore, the petition is granted, and the answer to the second question is No.

Luis Lokin vs. Comelec, Joel Villanueva, Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales, Armi Jane Borje

Facts:

 Citizens' Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) registered for participation in the May 14, 2007 elections. It listed 5
nominees, with private respondent Emmanuel Joel Villanueva (current TESDA secretary, hehehehe) as 1 st nominee
and president, and petitioner Luis Lokin as 2nd nominee.
 On May 7, 2007, days before the elections, private respondent Villanueva filed for substitution of nominees,
replacing the 2nd, 4th, and 5th nominees with private respondent Borje.
 On June 20, 2007, Villanueva sent the COMELEC a letter transmitting the signed petitions of 81% of CIBAC
members confirming the substitution.
 Lokin filed multiple cases of certiorari and mandamus against COMELEC (to which COMELEC says Lokin is guilty
of forum shopping). In the certiorari case, Lokin assails Sec. 13 of Resolution No. 7804 dated Jan. 12, 2007, saying
that it expands Sec. 8 of RA 7941, the law which the COMELEC seeks to implement.

Issue:

 Is Sec. 13 of Resolution No. 7804 unconstitutional?

Held:

 Yes.
  Sec. 8 of RA 7941 says that “No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the
same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing
his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed in the list”.
 The provision is daylight clear. The law only allows party-list organizations to change their nominees a)
when they die, b) when they resign, or c) when they are incapacitated.
 The usage of “No” renders Sec. 8 a negative law. Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be
directory, for there is but one way to obey the command “thou shall not”, and that is to completely refrain
from doing the forbidden act.

Boardwalk vs. Heirs of Elvira Villareal

Facts:

 On Oct. 20, 2005, petitioner, an RTW seller, filed an Amended Complaint for Replevin in the MeTC of Manila against
respondent, regarding a 1995 Tamaraw FX, for the latter's failure to pay a car loan obtained from the former.
 The MeTC ruled in favor of the petitioner.
 The RTC reversed the ruling in favor of the respondent. The CA confirmed.
 In dismissing the petitioner's petition for review, the CA held that Boardwalk erred by paying the docket fees and
filing the Motion for Extension with the RTC and not the CA, in violation of Sec. 125 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
Furthermore, Boardwalk's prayer for a 30-day extension in the Motion for Extension is irregular, because only 15
days maximum are allowed pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 42. The Petition for Review also failed to include a board
resolution authorizing Ma. Victoria Lo to sign the petition, thus rendering the Verification and Certification Against
Forum Shopping defective.
 Petitioner argues before the SC that the case should be decided on the substantive issues and not the
technicalities.

Issue:

 Will petitioner's case prosper?

Held:

 No.
 The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. It is merely a statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.
 This Court in several cases exercised leniency and relaxed the Rules. However, in this case, petitioner
committed multiple violations of the Rules which should sufficiently militate against its plea for leniency. As
will be shown below, petitioner failed to perfect its appeal by not filing the Petition within the reglementary
period and paying the docket and other lawful fees before the proper court. These requirements are
mandatory and jurisdictional.

Quizon vs. Comelec and Puno

Facts:

 Petitioner and private respondent are candidates for the House of Representatives in the May 14, 2007 elections.
 Petitioner seeks the disqualification of private respondent, first by saying that Puno actually resides in Quezon City,
then in a Supplement alleging that Puno indicated in his CoC that he is running in the First District of Rizal, but is
instead conducting his campaign in the First District of Antipolo City, which is a different legislative district.
 On Jun. 5, 2007, Quizon filed a writ of mandamus before the SC, saying that COMELEC failed to render a judgment
on his petitions on time, and that the unreasonable delay deprived him of his right to be declared as the winner and
assume his position in the House of Representatives.
 On Jul. 31, 2007, COMELEC dismissed the petition of Quizon.

Issue:

 Did COMELEC err in resolving Quizon's petition later than 15 days before the elections, pursuant to Sec. 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code?

Held:

 No. Sec. 78 is merely directory.

 If for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment and subsequently wins the election, the COMELEC
may still continue with the trial, and thereof suspend the proclamation of a candidate. This means that COMELEC
 does not absolutely have to decide at most 15 days before the elections.
 Furthermore, mandamus is not the proper recourse, because it is an action to compel an administrative body to act,
not to compel a quasi-judicial body to act one way or another.
 The Jul. 31 resolution also renders this petition moot.