Special Issue on the Circular Economy

Stakeholder Views on
California Management Review
2018, Vol. 60(3) 45–70
© The Regents of the
University of California 2018

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DOI: 10.1177/0008125617752694
https://doi.org/10.1177/0008125617752694

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Circular Economy
Nathan Kunz1, Kieren Mayers2,3, and Luk N. Van Wassenhove3

SUMMARY
Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) regulations require that producers organize
and pay for treatment and recycling of waste arising from their products at end of
life. EPR has been effective in implementing some aspects of circular economy. In
Europe, 35% of e-waste and 65% of packaging waste have already been recycled
(or reused in some cases). This article analyzes the challenges of implementing EPR
and provides useful insights for what has worked well and what challenges remain.
Identifying and addressing these challenges will be crucial for framing legislation that
will move industry and society toward a more circular economy.

KEYWORDS: circular economy, recycling, sustainability, policy making

O
ne of the key aims of the circular economy approach is to reduce
society’s dependence on scarce natural resources by retaining
and maximizing the utility of materials already in use and by
minimizing the loss of utility and downgrading of materials,
such as by refurbishing an end-of-life phone rather than shredding it to recover
raw materials.1 Various approaches are employed to this end, including reuse,
repair, refurbishment, leasing, cascading, capacity sharing, or “dematerialization.”
The majority of products are not presently designed to be easily reused or
recycled, and in many cases must be specially treated to remove hazardous mate-
rials at end of life.2 If products are designed to enable and optimize reuse and
recycling at end of life, such as ease of removal of critical components for reuse,
or such as identification of plastics by polymer type, however, it becomes easier to
recover valuable components and resources and put them to new uses.3

1Universityof North Florida, Jacksonville, FL, USA

2Sony Interactive Entertainment Europe, London, UK
3INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France

45
46 CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW 60(3)

This study focuses on the role of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR).

Initially conceived in the early 1990s,4 EPR transfers the responsibility to pay for
collection and recycling of waste from municipal authorities to producers. It has
largely been focused on improving recycling of materials, which from a circular
economy perspective is considered the “last resort” if reuse and repair are not pos-
sible. Nevertheless, enabling increased and improved material recycling and treat-
ment will be important in moving toward a more circular economy, once products
have reached their final end of life and have no further use.5 In addition, EPR is
not only a tool used for waste recycling: for example, in the case of e-waste, EPR
collection and recycling targets include products dedicated for reuse. Furthermore,
the intention of EPR is also to provide incentives for producers to design their
products with end of life in mind and thus take a “cradle to cradle” approach to
product life cycles. This article discusses the role EPR plays as the European Union
(EU) attempts to move toward a more circular economy.6
Studying EPR implementation can provide a number of useful insights
from over 20 years of operation. For example, there is still much uncertainty on
how circular economy activities at the level of individual companies could be
adopted within wider society. The same question was addressed regarding EPR in
the late 1990s, where industry could not reach agreement on voluntary EPR mea-
sures as part of the EU “priority waste streams” initiative, and the EU conse-
quently decided to implement mandatory EPR regulations.7 Ultimately, EPR
requires important stakeholders involved in implementing circular economy
approaches to work together—in particular, producers, retailers, trade associa-
tions, consumers, recyclers, municipalities, and national authorities.
Collecting unwanted end-of-life products and transforming them back into
raw materials involve numerous complex technical, organizational, and logistical
challenges. For example, the electrical and electronic equipment industry has
faced particular issues. Lower prices, shorter innovation cycles, and faster tech-
nology evolution are only some of the numerous factors that led to increasing
demand for electrical and electronic equipment over the last decades. Increased
consumption has led to increasing volumes of waste. Disposing waste of electrical
and electronic equipment—which we will call e-waste—requires special treat-
ment. First, e-waste such as TVs, cooling appliances, and lighting contain hazard-
ous materials that cannot be landfilled or burned. Second, e-waste contains
valuable resources that can be recovered and transformed into new raw material.
However, the revenues from recovering valuable resources from e-waste often do
not cover the costs of collection and recycling. This constrained collection and
recycling rates in the past, particularly for smaller consumable items such as
mobile phones.8
EPR was also intended to provide incentives for producers to design prod-
ucts that are easier to recycle, with fewer and less hazardous materials to discard
at end of life; thus, EPR aims to reduce downgrading (loss of utility) of materials
from end-of-life products. In addition, the funding raised through EPR supports
improved collection, recycling, and treatment of end-of-life products. EPR
Stakeholder Views on Extended Producer Responsibility and the Circular Economy 47

legislation has been recognized as part of the market environment that will
encourage companies to move to a more circular economy in which products and
services are developed and designed to maximize and even improve the utility of
goods (as a first priority) and materials (once products finally become waste) to
reduce the environmental impact from virgin natural resources extraction and
manufacturing as well as end-of-life disposal.9
We use the case of EPR for e-waste in Europe as an illustration of how
environmental policy has evolved in this area, and then explore wider issues for
e-waste, packaging, and batteries, and how EPR can support the transition to a
more circular economy. In 2012, 35% of the volume of e-waste disposed of in
Europe was collected and recycled under EPR.10 The remaining 65% were either
recycled under noncompliant conditions (33%), exported illegally to developing
countries where there are concerns regarding pollution caused by material extrac-
tion (16%), scavenged for valuable parts (8%), or disposed in household waste
(8%).11 This high level of leakages from official EPR recycling channels shows that
there are still a number of deficiencies with current approaches to EPR. We pres-
ent opinions and concerns of different stakeholder groups about the evolution of
EPR in Europe. We collected these insights from interviews with 27 specialists
from the electronic industry, waste operators, trade associations, municipalities,
or national authorities. From these interviews, we identify a number of key find-
ings that should be taken into account for any future EPR systems. An efficient
EPR system will support the transition to a more circular economy.
Stakeholder surveys and case studies have been used effectively in EPR
research already. A report commissioned by the European Commission used a
series of 36 case studies of EPR schemes to identify possible common principles or
rules within the EU.12 Other researchers conducted a survey of a wide range of
over 400 EPR stakeholders worldwide to ascertain understanding and views on
the purpose of EPR internationally.13 Our study uses wide multi-stakeholder anal-
ysis to focus more specifically on the evolution of EPR with respect to future EU
policy on the circular economy.

EPR in Europe
EPR was first implemented for packaging in Germany in 1992.14
Subsequently, EU Member States followed suite and implemented EPR for pack-
aging waste in their national legislation, transposing the EU directive on collec-
tion and recycling targets.15 After a number of EU Member States also extended
EPR to other waste streams, the EU attempted to harmonize obligations by
implementing Directives on End-of-Life Vehicles in 2000,16 Waste Electrical and
Electronic Equipment (WEEE) in 2003,17 and Batteries in 2006.18 Under various
EU Directives and their Member States’ national implementing laws, the consum-
ers can return any e-waste, packaging, or batteries to a municipal collection point
or to a retail outlet free of charge.19 Producers20 are then responsible for financ-
ing collection, recycling, and recovery from collection points onward.21 Producers
48 CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW 60(3)

do not necessarily have to organize the collection and recycling directly; they are
responsible for paying costs. EU EPR directives set minimum requirements for all
Member States but allow flexibility for national transposed regulations to go fur-
ther. As a consequence, national EPR legislation and enforcement can differ sub-
stantially between Member States.
Following the example set originally in the EU for packaging, EPR contin-
ues to be applied using a number of different approaches to different waste
streams, such as chemicals, furniture, clothing, tires, paper, and oils,22 and imple-
mented throughout the world, for example, the United States, Canada, Japan,
Taiwan, China, Australia, and multiple countries in South America. Thirty-two
states in the United States currently have some form of e-waste legislation on TVs
and monitors. There is, however, no regulation at the federal level.23 Different
take-back laws exist in the United States for paint, pharmaceuticals, lamps, batter-
ies, and some mercury containing-devices.
Under the new “Circular Economy” package,24 which includes numerous
measures addressing product recycling and reuse, the EU now plans to harmonize
rules for EPR systems to ensure consistent implementation between EU Member
States, consolidating and building upon experience gained over the last two
decades. This package proposes to strengthen measures introduced under the EU’s
eco-design working plan covering repairability, durability, and recyclability.
Legislation and standards are already in development in this respect (e.g., see pro-
posed EU regulation for televisions and displays,25 as well as the official mandate
from the European Commission for general material efficiency standards26). The
package also proposes a review of the EU Waste Framework Directive27 to address
implementation of EPR as well as waste collection and recycling targets, a process
that is also currently underway between the EU Parliament and Council.28 A limi-
tation of this approach so far with respect to the circular economy is that the EU
strategy on waste and the circular economy design requirements are not linked up.
Product development and design are addressed separately from end-of-life man-
agement, which means a whole lifestyle or systems design and innovation approach
of the type needed for circular economy solutions is not implicitly encouraged or
expected. The question remains how to better use EPR to reward and incentivize
products designed to reduce environmental impact, such as by reducing depen-
dency on virgin raw materials and using less hazardous materials.

The Role of Producer Responsibility Organizations (PROs)

The transfer of responsibility for waste collection and recycling from
municipal authorities to producers is complex. It requires producers to collect
and recycle waste from thousands of mixed waste collection points within each
country. Producers can obviously not fulfill this obligation individually, which
led to the emergence of a collective approach to waste collection and recycling.
Consequently, PROs have been established to act as middlemen between collec-
tion points and recycling operators, and to organize waste collection and recy-
cling on behalf of producers.29
Stakeholder Views on Extended Producer Responsibility and the Circular Economy 49

Because of this collective approach, producers do not collect and recycle

their own end-of-life products. This is at odds with the general preference for
“closed loop” recycling and closed supply chains advocated by circular economy
principles, in which a producer recycles and transforms materials from its own
end-of-life products for use within the same products again in order to retain
value and material quality for the longest time.30 Open-loop recycling systems,
such as EPR, have therefore been criticized in the past as they are associated with
downgrading of materials or losing utility through recycling.31 Recent research in
industrial ecology, however, has demonstrated that closed-loop recycling does not
necessarily have higher environmental benefits than open-loop recycling, and
that the utility of recycled materials can be maintained and even improved
through open-loop recycling.32 For example, polyethylene recovered from pack-
aging can be used to produce clothing. As such, a circular economy is not limited
to prescriptive or narrow closed-loop approaches where producers take back only
their own products. Opportunities to move toward a circular economy can stem
from changes and innovations that maximize the overall utility of products and
ultimately the materials they are made from by taking an overall systems perspec-
tive. Environmentally speaking, it may be preferable to reuse and recycle materi-
als locally to where they are collected in order to reduce transport, even if used by
different companies for different products than the original product. Recent
research argues that the distinction between closed- and open-loop recycling is
not necessarily useful, because both can have similar environmental impacts.33 In
addition, bulk collection of products from different companies is much more effi-
cient than collection or take-back of products on an individual product-by-prod-
uct basis. The collective nature of EPR and dependence on open-loop recycling
does not necessarily hinder the principles of a circular economy, because recycled
materials can be reused in advanced industrial networks without necessarily los-
ing their inherent utility (e.g., industrial symbiosis).34 The risk of downgrading
could be reduced by developing products that are easier to recycle and by process-
ing end-of-life products in a way that improves the quality of recycled materials.35
The aim of EPR is to encourage both.
The PROs established to manage recycling on behalf of producers typically
finance their collection and recycling operations by charging producers a fee pro-
portional to their market shares of equipment, battery, or packaging material
they sell. This leads to complex reporting obligations for producers. Given the
lack of legislative harmonization across EU Member States, producers have to
work with different PROs in each country. Hundreds of PROs have been estab-
lished for collecting and recycling packaging, batteries, and e-waste worldwide.
There were more than 250 PROs in Europe in 2007.36 As more EU Member
States have implemented EPR legislation since then, this number has undoubt-
edly increased.
Many countries started with just one PRO for each waste type (e-waste,
batteries, and packaging). Over the last decade, however, competition between
PROs has been introduced in many Member States. For example, European
50 CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW 60(3)

producers may choose between different PROs in the United Kingdom, Poland,
Portugal, and Germany for packaging waste. Competing PROs have also been
established in most EU Member States for e-waste and batteries. In these coun-
tries, producers can select the PRO they want to work with. Competition between
PROs has improved efficiency and reduced costs to producers. The introduction of
a competing PRO in Austria led to an 80% reduction of the e-waste recycling fees
charged to producers.37 Similarly, the introduction of competing PROs in Germany
resulted in a 54% reduction of the recycling fees paid by producers for packaging
waste.38 Despite its positive impact on cost reduction, PRO competition also led to
a number of issues. For example, in some Member States, PROs have to compete
for access to e-waste. This created the astonishing situation in which PROs were
not able to get access to the amount of waste they were obliged to recycle, and had
to buy waste on the market to fulfill their obligations. These issues can be solved
by a central coordination mechanism—called a clearing house—that allocates
waste flows to each PRO proportionally to the market shares of their members.
This coordination mechanism can also assign the collection responsibilities for dif-
ferent geographic areas to each PRO.
Alternative approaches to PROs exist, for example, when governments
charge fees or taxes to producers and then pay for waste collection and recycling
(e.g., for e-waste in Taiwan, Korea, and Hungary).39 In other cases, waste contains
enough value to finance treatment and recycling without intervention by produc-
ers or the government. This situation has been observed with automobiles and
lead-acid batteries in the EU, where the positive net value of the collected end-of-
life products is high enough to finance collection and treatment operations. In
these examples, the recycling industry organized take-back schemes on its own,
with very limited regulatory involvement. More such market-driven systems are
desirable in the circular economy, but less likely for end-of-life products without
positive net value (i.e., the value recovered from the end-of-life product does not
cover the collection and treatment costs). In such cases, regulatory approaches
like EPR are employed to make sure that end-of-life products with negative net
collection and recycling costs are paid for.

Collection and Recycling Requirements

In an effort to increase waste collection and recycling rates, the EU has
imposed increasing collection targets in its different EPR directives over the
years. These targets are most often expressed as a percentage of the volume of
new products put on the market by producers. For example, a target of 60%
means that producers are collectively responsible to collect and recycle (through
their PROs) a waste volume of at least 60% of the weight of all products sold in a
country in a given year.
Reasonable progress has been made in meeting targets for packaging waste.
Packaging recycling increased from 54.6% in 2005 to 65.4% in 2013,40 exceeding
the target of 60% since 2008. Similarly, a collection rate of 32% was achieved for
batteries in 2012 against a collection target of 25%.41 A collection rate of 35% was
Stakeholder Views on Extended Producer Responsibility and the Circular Economy 51

achieved for e-waste in 2012,42 and the collection target of 4 kg per capita stated
in the EU e-waste directive was reached in 23 of 28 EU Member States in 2013.43
All EU EPR directives require higher targets in coming years. Whether
these higher future targets can be met is questionable as a substantial amount of
waste leaks out of the system and is simply unavailable to PROs. As a consequence
of these leakages, it is estimated that about $52 billion worth of copper and $34
billion worth of gold are still lost every year.44 For example, e-waste can leak from
the EPR system in a number of ways.45 First, householders are not legally required
to separate waste for recycling; it is more convenient for them to throw small
items away in their waste bins. Second, waste operators working on a private
basis outside the EPR systems also collect waste that is profitable to recycle (such
as large domestic appliances), which further reduces the e-waste available to pro-
ducers and their PROs. For example, the amount of e-waste with positive net
value recycled outside of EPR systems in Germany has more than tripled between
2006 and 2013.46 These actors were not covered under EPR legislation, until the
recent recast of the EU e-waste directive, which now requires reporting of all
flows of e-waste by all waste operators. Third, much e-waste is collected and sent
illegally to developing countries, where valuable materials are typically extracted
through substandard and health damaging methods.47 Due to limited border con-
trol within the EU, Member States have not been able to effectively enforce waste
export restrictions.
Finally, the original EU e-waste directive did not impose clear waste man-
agement requirements beyond basic recycling and recovery rates.48 In the case of
simple metal shredding and separation, precious and valuable metals can be
extracted and sold as commodities, whereas residual materials containing poten-
tially hazardous substances may continue to end up in landfills or incinerators. As
a result, PROs, producers, and waste operators have contributed to the develop-
ment of recycling standards in recent years.49 These standards define how the
recycling should be done, what technology should be used, and which materials
have to be recovered. Establishing standards and guidelines will support moves
toward a more circular economy.50

Incentives for Improved Design

Product design has an important impact on recycling costs. Recycling an
LCD screen with a mercury backlight, for example, costs more than recycling
mercury-free LCDs.51 In particular, the EU e-waste directive was intended to
give incentives for producers to change the design of their products so that they
are easier to recycle and allow recovering more value. This is in line with the
principles underpinning circular economy.52 The EU e-waste directive assigned
producers an individual responsibility to treat and recycle waste from their
own products.53 The original assumption of the e-waste directive was that “this
financial or physical responsibility creates an economic incentive for produc-
ers to adapt the design of their products to the prerequisites of sound waste
management.”54
52 CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW 60(3)

Due to logistical constraints for collection, waste cannot practically be

sorted per brand or by producer (it is collected as “mixed waste”). As a conse-
quence, PROs collect all waste together, and then charge average collection and
recycling costs to the different producers.55 Because of this, EPR has not yet fully
succeeded in creating the incentives for producers to adapt the design of their
products for easier recycling.56 Separate collection of end-of-life products by each
producer directly from a consumer’s location would be highly complex to orga-
nize considering their weekly waste volumes. In addition, it is not environmen-
tally beneficial or cost-effective if each item of waste is collected or shipped
individually. Most waste materials are, therefore, disposed of as mixed waste.
Under the new “Circular Economy” package, the EU proposes to require
better differentiation of producer’s recycling costs to reflect the real cost of treat-
ment and recycling of their products, such that producers would be financially
rewarded by adapting the design of their products for easier treatment and recy-
cling. PROs for e-waste and packaging in France already differentiate their fees
depending on the design for recycling criteria,57 and other EU Member States
have also considered such approaches.58

EPR and the Circular Economy

As demonstrated by the achievements of EPR in Europe, waste collection
and recycling have increased, and valuable materials have been recovered and
diverted from landfill and incineration. These achievements have been financed
by producers (and ultimately the consumer) rather than municipalities and their
local taxpayers. By providing a robust framework of requirements for collection
and recycling, EPR has already moved entire industries toward a more circular
economy, as opposed to a more limited company-by-company approach.
Sustaining these achievements requires a well-functioning EPR system.
Based on our interviews, we found that despite positive results of EPR so far, a
number of challenges remain and have to be addressed, including

•• how to ensure proper enforcement of recycling standards,

•• what to do about waste with positive net value,
•• the role of competition between PROs,
•• how to ensure incentives for improved design for recyclability,
•• the need for harmonized legislation between EU Member States,
•• development of a coordinating framework for EPR, and
•• how to achieve increased waste collection targets.

Through our interviews, we investigated where there may be agreement,

ambivalence, or conflicting interests between stakeholders on each of these issues.
Such empirical research can help shed light on the impact of different policy and
implementation choices on different stakeholders. Our findings contribute to the
Stakeholder Views on Extended Producer Responsibility and the Circular Economy 53

development of EPR systems that are more effective at capturing unwanted end-
of-life products that have no potential for further use or repair, and that trans-
forming the resulting recovered waste materials into reusable resources. These
findings reveal the role EPR can play within the EU’s new proposed “Circular
Economy” package, which will provide an overarching policy framework for the
future development of EPR approaches in Europe.

Method: Stakeholder Analysis

We built our research design as a multiple case study, using interviews
with practitioners as main source of data. Our analysis examined the seven main
stakeholder groups involved in EPR in the EU: producers, PROs, waste operators,
national authorities, municipalities, trade associations, and clearing houses. We
provide an overview of these stakeholder groups below.

Stakeholders
We selected the stakeholder groups based on expert recommendation
from two practitioners and two academics. We validated this choice by conduct-
ing a stakeholder mapping showing the influences of each group on EPR.59 We
briefly describe our stakeholder groups below:

•• Producers—EPR legislation in Europe defines producers as all manufacturers,

sellers, and importers of products falling under the scope of EPR legislation.
•• PROs—PROs organize the collection, treatment, and recycling activities under
EPR on behalf of producers.60 PROs cover their operating costs by charging a
fee to the producers they represent.
•• Waste operators—Waste operators carry out waste collection, transport, treat-
ment, and recycling of waste on behalf of PROs. Some waste operators also
conduct these activities outside the EPR system. This stakeholder group is
commonly referred to as “recyclers.”
•• National authorities—National authorities are the regulatory bodies responsible
for transposing EU directives into national legislation and ensuring targets
imposed by the directives are achieved. National authorities are also respon-
sible for enforcement of national EPR legislation.
•• Municipalities—Municipalities are local authorities providing and organizing
waste collection activities within their area. Municipalities play a central
role in EPR because they receive and therefore control most of the waste
streams.
•• Trade associations—Under this name, we group all professional associations
that represent a given sector. Our sample includes one association of battery
producers, one association of e-waste PROs, and one association of retailers.
We always mention the sector being represented when quoting a statement
from a trade association.
54 CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW 60(3)

Figure 1.  Interactions between EPR stakeholders.

Note: EPR = Extended Producer Responsibility; PRO = Producer Responsibility Organization.

•• Clearing houses—Clearing houses are organizations created by national

authorities to register producers and collect data on their sales volumes. They
also compile information on waste collection from PROs and determine the
obligations for each producer. Clearing houses also allocate waste collection
responsibilities to different PRO, and sometimes manage the data reporting
to national authorities. When they only have a registering role (i.e., register
producers and collect information on their sales volume) without allocating
waste collection responsibilities to PROs, these organizations are also referred
to as “national registers.”

We present the interactions between the different stakeholder groups in

Figure 1. The gray arrows represent the physical flows of products and resources
between stakeholder groups. The black arrow depicts the share of waste that is lost
(i.e., cannot be reused for manufacturing new products). The blue dashed arrows rep-
resent the financing of the recycling activity through PROs. The gray and blue boxes
depict the supervision responsibility of clearing houses and national authorities.

Sampling
We selected our case organizations following clear sampling rules. First,
we wanted to interview multiple organizations in each stakeholder group in
Stakeholder Views on Extended Producer Responsibility and the Circular Economy 55

Table 1.  Number of Stakeholders in Sample from Each Group.

Stakeholder Group Number of Stakeholders

Producer 5

PRO 5

Waste operator 3

National authority 3

Municipality 5

Trade association 3

Clearing house 3

Note: PRO = Producer Responsibility Organization.

order to ensure we collected a variety of opinion from each group. Interviewing

three to five organizations per stakeholder group seemed to give a pretty good
insight of the general opinion in each group (Table 1). Second, we followed a
theoretical sampling mechanism61 by deliberately choosing organizations repre-
senting different waste flows (e-waste, packaging, and batteries) and different
Member States (stratified sampling). Interviewing stakeholders from different
categories and countries ensured differences in context and approaches could be
captured. We selected a proportionally larger number of electronics producers
compared with packaging or batteries producers, as electronics producers typi-
cally place a combination of batteries, packaging, and electronics on the market.
We identified multiple organizations in each stakeholder group based on the rec-
ommendations by four experts (two practitioners and two academics) and from
contacts in our network (convenience sampling). We also added organizations
that were recommended as key informants during the interviews if they pro-
vided additional value (snowballing sampling).
Our sampling process resulted in a well-balanced set of organizations pro-
viding broad views and opinions of the EPR system in Europe. Since case study
research relies on analytical generalization, it does not require large samples to
build theory.62 Based on case study research literature, the 27 interviews we con-
ducted with seven stakeholder groups are enough to generate theory.63

Data Collection
Two of the authors of this article have been involved in EPR in Europe
since its beginning and are well-recognized experts in this sector. This enabled us
to get access to the most knowledgeable person in each of the organizations we
selected. Respondents include CEOs of PROs, general secretaries of trade associa-
tions, and heads of the unit in charge of EPR at producers such as Dell, Toshiba,
HP, Samsung, and P&G. We used a semistructured interview protocol to guide
our interviews.64 After a number of general questions about the respondent’s
organization, we asked how the respondent’s organization was affected by a
56 CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW 60(3)

number of challenges identified by experts. We then asked what were the major
risks affecting the organization, and how they impact the objectives of EPR. We
asked the respondent’s vision of the future of EPR, and what issues are advocated
by the organization. We also asked the respondent’s opinion about the need for
PROs in the future. We concluded the interview by asking the respondent’s per-
sonal opinion about the biggest issues and most needed developments for EPR.
Using a semistructured interview not only enabled us to address a number of
points we wanted to discuss with each interviewee but also provided enough
space for additional discussions.
We conducted all but two interviews by phone,65 and we made audio
recordings in order to ensure reliable transcription of the respondents’ answers.
The researcher conducting the interviews took notes of the answers during the
interview and cleaned up the notes on the same day, using the records for clarifi-
cation when needed. When requested by the interviewees, we sent them the
interview notes for respondent validation. We did a verbatim transcription of the
statements that we cite in this article. The interviews lasted between 25 and 57
minutes, with an average of 38 minutes per interview. The total time of interview
is 16 hours.

Analysis
After multiple readings of the interview notes by all authors, we developed
an initial set of categories of key issues affecting EPR. We then coded responses
from interviewees into these categories. We refined the categories as the coding
progressed, following an inductive category development process (i.e., categories
are split, refined, or combined as the coding progresses).66 We conducted this
process until we came to a consensus about the most important issues and con-
cerns from the interviews (see issues listed in “EPR and the Circular Economy”
section). For each of these issues and concerns, we compared the opinions stated
by stakeholders. We identified not only the concerns that are common but also
the opinions that diverge between respondents. We then identified a number of
illustrative quotations from the interview notes for each category and provided
them as supporting statements. Geographic location is omitted deliberately below
to protect the anonymity of the respondents.

Results
Analysis of stakeholder responses reveals a number of key issues and con-
cerns over the future effectiveness of EPR systems, as presented in the following
subsections.

How to Ensure Proper Enforcement of Recycling Standards

There appeared to be general agreement across stakeholder groups that
harmonized recycling standards were necessary for EPR, particularly for e-waste.
Although new treatment and recycling standards will be implemented under
Stakeholder Views on Extended Producer Responsibility and the Circular Economy 57

the EU’s most recent recast of the e-waste directive,67 a cross-section of different
stakeholders was concerned that they were unlikely to be enforced properly:

All producers agree that all actors have to apply the same recycling standards. The
question is how can we achieve this? The answer is that we need more effective
enforcement. (Trade Association representing PROs, e-waste)

I have doubts that recycling standards will be transposed into national legislation
in all European countries. At the moment, the verbal commitment is quite prom-
ising but we have some doubts. And even if they did transpose the standards, they
would have no legal enforcement. (Waste Operator, e-waste)

Without proper enforcement of harmonized recycling standards, waste

operators working at lower standards may be in a position to offer better prices for
waste materials, which can divert waste away from proper treatment and recy-
cling under EPR systems. Enforcing recycling standards will ensure that valuable
resources are recovered from waste streams and can be reused, which is an impor-
tant step toward a more circular economy.

What to Do about Waste with Positive Net Value

The fact that some types of waste have positive net value (such as alumi-
num cans, paper, automobiles, or lead-acid batteries) does not appear to have
been considered during the initial implementation of EPR in Europe. This creates
two major issues for producers. First, a substantial volume of waste is collected
and treated outside of EPR without being reported, and PROs may struggle to
collect enough waste to fulfill the producers’ legal obligations. Second, since the
portion of waste with value leaks out of the system, producers end up financ-
ing only the recycling of the waste with net cost. Although various stakeholders
believed loss of waste with positive net value from EPR systems was problematic,
some pointed out it is possible that higher material values can lead to higher col-
lection rates overall:

For me it is a positive element that people want to have this waste [with positive
net value], this leads to higher collection rates. (Municipality, e-waste, batteries,
and packaging)

We see the increasing value of waste rather as an opportunity towards a more effi-
cient system. (PRO, packaging)

Conversely, some PROs and waste operators reported that the recent
decrease of commodity prices has impacted EPR systems in the opposite direction.
Some types of e-waste that had a positive net value are no longer profitable to
recycle, as revenues gained from recovered material do not cover the cost of col-
lection and recycling. PROs may experience increased volumes in future as a
result:
58 CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW 60(3)

Everybody speaks about increasing value of waste, but if you look at prices of gold,
silver, steel, it is going down over the last two years. (PRO, e-waste)

This demonstrates that the volumes of waste to be recycled under EPR are
stimulated both up and down by prevailing economic conditions. Consequently,
PROs must be resilient to fluctuations in collection volumes, and producers must
budget for significant variations in the costs of EPR compliance from year to year.

For any e-waste where the material value is higher than the treatment cost, the
waste disappears before arriving in the EPR system. The volume of waste goes up
and down depending on economic market conditions. (Producer, e-waste)

The variability of collection volumes will also affect the circular economy,
and manufacturers may lose control over a significant share of waste. In other
words, when commodity prices are high, end-of-life products will disappear from
closed-loop recycling systems. Although stakeholders perceived loss of valuable
waste either as an opportunity or threat, possibly depending on how it impacted
their business model, there appeared to be general consensus that waste collected
outside EPR systems should be treated and reported to the same equivalent stan-
dards to ensure EPR is not undermined by improper waste management
practices.

The Role of Competition between PROs

A number of stakeholders we interviewed acknowledged that competition
can help ensure cost-effective recycling by PROs:

I believe that having competition in [our country] has kept recycling cost down
for producers. . . . In [our country] the PROs have a geographical allocation of
areas based on their market shares. (Clearing house, e-waste)

Generally, PRO Competition reduces costs and makes the market more dynamic in
what concerns EPR regulation. This gives companies better and more competitive
solutions. (Trade Association representing retailers, e-waste, batteries, and packag-
ing)

We are strongly in favor of compliance being a competitive market. We have expe-

rience from several markets where the introduction of competition led to cheaper
compliance costs. (Producer, e-waste)

We have very good examples that show that when you introduce competition in
countries in which there was formerly a monopoly, you see a quick decrease of
prices [for producers], but no decrease of collection performance. (PRO, e-waste,
batteries, and packaging)

A number of stakeholders highlighted that single PROs offered a better

approach for organizing waste collection. Indeed, a single PRO could benefit from
Stakeholder Views on Extended Producer Responsibility and the Circular Economy 59

economies of scale when operating a collection network at the country level,

instead of multiple PROs operating parallel collection networks. Concerns were
also raised that competing PROs could lead to cost competition at the expense of
quality of recycling. Finally, it appears that in some Member States, PROs were
not able to collect enough waste to cover the obligation of the producers they
represented, which led to a fierce competition between PROs for access to waste.

The challenge is to define on what the competition among PROs plays. Is it only
cost? Then it may be detrimental to the recycling quality . . . or public awareness.
(PRO, packaging, e-waste)

In my opinion, there can be too many competitive players on the market and if
there is no clearing house this can lead to problems. A PRO that happens to be a
monopoly in a market can also lead to a number of risks. But all these risks can be
mitigated. (Trade Association representing PROs, e-waste)

The statements from stakeholders show that there are multiple and often
contradictory views on the issue of competition between PROs. What tends to
emerge from these views is that while competition is beneficial in terms of costs,
it also has a number of drawbacks that have to be addressed in order to achieve
an effective EPR system. First, where PROs do compete it should be based on a
“level playing field” of requirements for PROs, meaning that all actors are subject
to the same rules. This has been recognized within the EU’s proposed “Circular
Economy” package that proposes to establish common rules for the operation of
PROs. The competition for access to waste is another drawback of competition.
Several countries with more than one PRO have solved this problem by establish-
ing a national clearing house that reconciles and addresses imbalances in the
amount of waste collected by different PROs compared with their producer mem-
bers’ collective share of recycling and treatment obligations.

How to Ensure Incentives for Improved Design for Recyclability

Producers of electric and electronic equipment interviewed highlighted
the issue that EPR has failed to provide incentives for improved design to date:

I am not aware of any example of any sector where EPR has incentivized differ-
ent design. . . . If this was an objective of EPR, it has completely failed. (Producer,
e-waste)

. . . from a practical point of view, currently this objective is close to zero because
no producer is able to get back its products. The return on investment for design
for recyclability is also close to zero. (Producer, e-waste)

The cost of collection and logistics is about two-thirds of compliance cost. There-
fore, the possible savings that you make on recycling are not that high. So there
are not high incentives to improve design for reducing recycling costs. (Producer,
e-waste)
60 CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW 60(3)

Some stakeholders point to better differentiation of recycling costs by PROs

as a possible solution to providing financial incentives for improved product
design. Others, however, are concerned about how such differentiation could be
applied for waste streams that are technically complex, such as e-waste. Cost dif-
ferentiation could also have limited effects as it would not reward producers
directly in the case of importers:

. . . we have lot of difficulties to apply this in our country, because we have only
few manufacturers. The majority of our producers are importers, they have no
influence in the product design. (National Authority, e-waste, batteries, and pack-
aging)

Modular fee depending on the recyclability is a very good idea, that could be the
beginning of a solution, that tablets that are glued and you cannot reach the bat-
tery will be charged a higher price. (Waste Operator, e-waste)

There will clearly be an increasing focus on differentiation of recycling

costs with the launch of the EU’s new “Circular Economy” package. At present, it
appears to be the only option under consideration within the EU, which has the
potential to reward producers for improved designs with respect to end-of-life
treatment and recycling. This will, however, only work if the incentives and the
criteria for defining good design are harmonized across EU Member States, since
no producer will change the design of its products to satisfy the requirements of
one single Member State.

As there are more and more global companies, the influence of legislation of a
particular country on product design is limited. EPR compliance should be orga-
nized at a European level. (PRO, e-waste)

Although stakeholders disagreed on the extent to which EPR may or may

not provide incentives for improved design, further work is needed in this area to
identify changes needed in EPR to offer better incentives to producers to make
design changes or to adapt their business models for a circular economy approach.
Ultimately, without effective incentives for improved design, EPR is at risk of
being used simply as system to finance waste management, which is far from its
intended purpose.

The Need for Harmonized Legislation between EU Member States

Stakeholders were divided on the level of harmonization versus localiza-
tion needed for implementing EPR. A number of stakeholders were concerned
that a lack of harmonization resulted in high administrative burdens for produc-
ers and a dilution of any possible financial incentives for improved design:

There is a big variety within the EU member states. The [e-waste] directive is the
same and the national transposition is similar but a little bit different in each coun-
try, which causes a lot of administrative work. (Producer, e-waste)
Stakeholder Views on Extended Producer Responsibility and the Circular Economy 61

We currently have 57 different transpositions of the e-waste legislation in

Europe.68 In Spain, in every region you have a different transposition. This is a
disaster. If you are a company like Apple, Dell or Samsung, you have to manage
the compliance in every single country, you are not able to register on a European
level, you are not able to finance recycling on a European level, everything has to
be done locally. (Waste operator, e-waste)

Other stakeholders were concerned, however, that EPR must be imple-

mented and organized at a national level in order to work effectively:

How is somebody in an office in Brussels going to find out [that a producer did not
register]? Enforcement is best done when you are aware of local traditions, when
you are familiar with the people in the marketplace, and you cannot do that from
a central location somewhere in Europe.(Clearing house, e-waste)

Recycling is a territorial, local activity, not an international one. It requires local

systems; it is not possible to have the same system all over the world. (PRO, pack-
aging)

A number of stakeholders suggested that harmonized reporting and regis-

tration procedures as well as improved EU guidance could be possible solutions,
allowing flexibility for each country while helping to harmonize approaches:

Currently we establish conditions for PROs, and we don’t know if it is too much
or not, so if the EU could produce a document with some golden rules, that would
help us in our work [of transposing the directive to national legislation]. (National
Authority, e-waste, batteries, and packaging)

Similarly, any policy development related to the circular economy, such as

the EU’s new “Circular Economy” package, will have to be harmonized across
multiple countries or states in order to generate strong enough incentives for pro-
ducers. Stakeholders arguing the need for local consideration of transport and
waste infrastructure, as well as differences in behavior of households and con-
sumers between countries, make an important point. Some degree of flexibility is
needed for local implementation. That said, however, it is difficult to imagine why
technical aspects cannot be harmonized, such as producer’s reporting of volume
of products placed on the market or environmental protection standards for treat-
ment operations. Such harmonization could help EPR to be a more effective tool.

Development of a Coordinating Framework for EPR

Many stakeholders think PROs will continue to play an important role in
the coordination of the EPR systems, particularly in the development and imple-
mentation of recycling standards:

When we made the WEEELABEX69 project, we did quite a number of technical

studies and very often they were paid for by PROs. In a world without PROs, there
62 CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW 60(3)

would be less focus on the environmental issue. If you have a fragmented mar-
ket [i.e., without PROs], who would take care of the recycling standards?” (Trade
Association representing PROs, e-waste)

PROs do also contribute to monitoring the compliance of producers. Some

stakeholders even believe that this function will become more important in the
future:

In the future, producers and PROs will have to oversee the market, in the sense
of checking and controlling people who are involved in EPR, like waste operators,
retailers, municipalities. . . . In the future, I see this control tower function, sort
of radar function to oversee all kinds of operations of other actors on the market.
(Producer, e-waste)

Many of the PROs take on the issue of enforcement, so they spot free-riders and
inform the authorities. It is important that you have this in place. (Trade Associa-
tion representing PROs, e-waste)

PROs bring value to the system because they control waste operators’ work, and
ensure that the money of producers is well spent. They have an interest that EPR
is reliable and efficient. (Waste Operator, e-waste, batteries, and packaging)

PROs also play an important role in raising public awareness by financing

and conducting information campaigns, or by making producers more aware of
the end-of-life stage of products.

Most PROs spend huge sums of money for consumer awareness raising campaigns,
which would not happen if there were not such collective structures. (Trade Asso-
ciation representing PROs, e-waste)

PROs ensure that manufacturers who make the items actually consider what hap-
pens to them at the end. It focuses everyone’s thinking on that and this really
helps now as we talk about the circular economy, about closing the loop and mak-
ing sure we reclaim the items at the end. PROs are a good way of addressing this.
(Municipality, e-waste, batteries, and packaging)

Several stakeholders highlighted that PROs can only achieve these impor-
tant functions in EPR if they are coordinated by a central clearing house. Otherwise,
PROs may start fighting for access to waste, which is detrimental to the EPR
system.

As long as you have at least two competing PROs, you need some clearing func-
tion. Having such an organization which gives each PRO the responsibility of what
they have to take back is necessary. (Waste Operator, e-waste)

There must be an allocation mechanism to fairly allocate the responsibilities

among producers. (Producer, e-waste)
Stakeholder Views on Extended Producer Responsibility and the Circular Economy 63

The most important thing is that all the competitors follow the same rules. The
objective of the coordination center [clearing house] is to maintain the observa-
tion of the rules . . . and to let them be in competition but with clear rules. . . . We
control that every player on the market [PROs] run their business according to the
rules that were established by the law and the internal rules of the coordination
center. (Clearing House, e-waste)

The transition toward a more circular economy might also require the cre-
ation of such central coordination framework that will ensure that a set of rules
are applied by the different actors involved and regulate activities of competing
entities. In any case, it appears that stakeholders agree that PROs provide impor-
tant services, without which producers would find it much more difficult to orga-
nize waste collection and recycling, covering all their products in all waste arising
across EU Member States.

How to Achieve Increased Waste Collection Targets

Some stakeholders expressed concerns that increased collection targets
will have high marginal costs and diminishing environmental returns. Collecting
the extra percent of waste might require significant investment in new collection
infrastructure:

The future target set in packaging waste is very hard to achieve, we are currently
at 67%, and all actors agree that we are reaching the limit. We agree for maximiz-
ing recycling, but the marginal cost of recycling the last tons will be very high.
(PRO, packaging)

When we are increasing the collection target by x%, what benefit is that for the
environment? . . . I am worried that when we get to a certain point, by increasing
targets we are actually going to increase environmental burden. We are just mov-
ing the burden from packaging going into landfills to collection infrastructure. This
will lead to diminishing returns. (Producer, packaging and batteries)

Stakeholders suggested the most effective ways to improve collection rates

would be to stop illegal export of e-waste, encourage and incentivize good dis-
posal behavior, and include e-waste collected and recycled legitimately outside of
EPR systems in national reporting:

In our country [outside the EU] the consumers are not allowed to put e-waste in
the garbage. . . . Awareness of citizens is important, but they also have a responsi-
bility to act correctly on their own, this is very important. (PRO, e-waste)

Citizens do not win anything from recycling, apart from the satisfaction of
being environmental friendly. But not all people are motivated by this. From
our estimates, we think that we could increase recycled waste by around 20%
with a Pay-As-You-Throw system. (Municipality, e-waste, packaging, and bat-
teries)
64 CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW 60(3)

Legislators should recognize forces outside of PROs as valid actors for handling
waste. The benefit of this is that they are driven by profit, they really capture the
essence of the waste, treat it as a resource, which is how it should be seen. (Pro-
ducer, e-waste)

Overall waste collection and recovery targets within the EU Waste

Framework Directive70 are currently under review, as planned as part of the EU’s
“Circular Economy” package.71 The exact level of targets is subject to continued
discussion among EU Member States concerned that they are carefully designed
and set at levels that are achievable.72

Discussion and Conclusions: Future Policy Implications

This study presents a number of key issues facing EPR in Europe, and ana-
lyzes opinions and insights from a wide range of stakeholders (summarized in
Table 2). These findings offer insight into the role EPR can play within future
Circular Economy policies in Europe and in the rest of the world. These insights
are also useful as EPR is applied to additional categories of waste materials.
The process of national transposition of directives is part of the European
political landscape and cannot be changed. Nevertheless, stakeholders suggested a
number of areas that could benefit from greater harmonization, common guid-
ance, and coordination between Member States regarding EPR implementation:

•• There was a clear consensus among stakeholders about the need for harmo-
nized recycling standards for all recycling activities, whether financed under
EPR or not. The recast of the EU e-waste directive already imposes recycling
standards on all waste operators working within or outside EPR. National
authorities, however, must ensure that these standards are enforced if they
are to be effective, such that EPR systems are able to compete on a level play-
ing field with private waste operators collecting waste outside of EPR systems,
based on the same treatment and recycling standards. Recycling standards
will increase the quality of recycled materials and make it easier to reuse
recovered resources for manufacturing new products. This is crucial for the
transition to the circular economy. Unfortunately, enforcement of standards
remains low for e-waste, and until this is addressed, EPR systems will be
undermined by commercial recycling operating at lower standards. This is an
issue recyclers have raised as part of the EU review of the Waste Framework
Directive,73 and as yet it remains unclear if this will be taken up as a priority
issue by EU Member States.
•• The EU could provide guidelines and best practices for helping national
authorities with transposition. This is particularly the case for harmonization
of PRO requirements, which is likely to be closely debated between the Euro-
pean Commission and Member States as the “Circular Economy” package is
finalized.
Stakeholder Views on Extended Producer Responsibility and the Circular Economy 65

Table 2.  Summary of Stakeholder Opinions on Key Issues in EPR.

Key Issue Major Stakeholder Opinions

How to ensure proper Harmonized standards and enforcement are an absolute

enforcement of recycling necessity, but stakeholders doubt that enforcement will be
standards done successfully in the future.

What to do about waste with
positive net value
EPR policy did not consider that some waste could have a
positive net value, which led to substantial volumes of waste
leaking out of the EPR system. Stakeholders see it as not only
an opportunity for increased collection but also a challenge
because of high volatility in volumes collected by PROs. All
stakeholders agree that waste treated outside EPR channels
should be reported and recycled according to the same
standards.

The role of competition between Stakeholders have contradictory views. Some see competition
PROs as a way to ensure cost-effective recycling. Others find that a
single PRO can run a more effective collection network thanks
to economies of scale. Competition requires a level playing field
and a clearing house to organize access to waste.

How to ensure incentives for
improved design for recyclability
EPR has failed to provide incentives for improved design for
recyclability. This shortcoming is due to the collective nature of
EPR, the fact that recycling costs only represent a third of the
total collection and treatment cost, and a lack of harmonization
across Member States in the incentives for better design.

The need for harmonized The current lack of harmonization across Member States results
legislation between EU Member in higher costs for producers and limited impact of incentives
States for improved design. Harmonized procedures for registration
and reporting would make EPR more effective.

Development of a coordinating Several stakeholders think that EPR has to be coordinated by a

framework for EPR central mechanism such as a clearing house that supervises EPR
by monitoring compliance of producers, allocating waste to
PROs, and regulating the competition between them.

How to achieve increased waste
collection targets
Some stakeholders are concerned that further increase of waste
collection target will have diminishing environmental returns.
Stakeholders warn that increased targets can only be achieved
if illegal exports are stopped and all waste treated outside EPR
is counted toward targets.

Note: EPR = Extended Producer Responsibility; PROs = Producer Responsibility Organizations; EU = Euro-
pean Union.

•• Most stakeholders agree that EPR has not yet succeeded in the objective of
incentivizing producers to change their designs for easier recycling. Differenti-
ation of recycling costs has the potential to address this failure and to become
an important concept for the future of EPR. Rewarding producers for designs
that enable easy and cheap recovery of material is intended, ultimately, to
lead to higher recovery of material from waste. This will benefit the circular
economy. One stakeholder in particular highlighted that criteria for cost dif-
ferentiation should be harmonized across multiple countries in order to create
66 CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW 60(3)

enough incentives for producers to change their designs. It is worth consider-

ing whether the EU should develop a framework for recycling costs differen-
tiation (“fee modulation”) under the EU Ecodesign Framework Directive,74
which provides uniform harmonized requirements for energy using products
within the EU. Although stakeholders disagreed on the extent to which dif-
ferentiation of recycling fees could influence design, EPR fees have already
been modulated with good effect in France, particularly for packaging.75 For
example, under such financing schemes, packaging producers must pay more
for packaging materials that are glued together versus separable, thus pro-
viding a clear financial incentive for improved design for recyclability. “Fee
modulation” is now being considered as a new requirement under the EU’s
Waste Framework Directive.76

Recycling by private enterprises outside of EPR systems, particularly when

commodity prices are high, need not be seen as problematic as this form of recy-
cling can also contribute toward increased national collection and recycling rates
(provided recycling is at the same recycling standards as EPR). Opening up the
waste collection and recycling system to market forces outside of EPR are likely to
drive innovation in recycling technology. All recycling should, however, be
counted toward collection targets imposed by legislation, and policy makers
should not ignore the impacts of operators operating outside of EPR channels
when setting recycling targets and standards. PROs should, therefore, plan and
prepare to be resilient to changing waste volumes and to provide an important
“safety-net” for recycling waste that is a net cost to treat.
Even considering volumes recycled by private companies outside of EPR,
stakeholders believed that future EPR collection and recycling targets are too
ambitious. They suggested that citizens would need to be targeted to increase col-
lection rates further, either through public awareness campaigns, pay-as-you-
throw systems for nonrecyclable waste, or by making recycling mandatory. These
actions could, however, require policy makers to enact a number of sensitive
rules, which may not be accepted by the general populace. Policy makers should
use the opportunity of the EU “Circular Economy” package to consider what level
of recovery and recycling is practically and politically feasible. How to incentivize
citizens to bring back their end-of-life products is also an important discussion in
the context of the circular economy.
Finally, debate between supporters and opponents of PRO competition is
clearly divided. Competition between PROs can bring a number of advantages,
including more efficient and effective PROs. Stakeholders did agree, however,
about risks of PROs competing for “access to waste” without a clear coordination
framework. Competition should, therefore, be facilitated via a central coordina-
tion mechanism, such as a clearing house, which sets some rules and allocates
the waste collection responsibilities to each PRO. In addition, stakeholders sug-
gested that clearing houses and PROs could both help national authorities with
enforcement—for example, by spotting producers who do not register or waste
Stakeholder Views on Extended Producer Responsibility and the Circular Economy 67

operators that do not comply with applicable environmental standards. Clearing

houses and PROs are, therefore, likely to continue to be important for the future
development and implementation of EPR. As the EU considers common require-
ments for PROs, recycling cost differentiation, and enforcement of recycling stan-
dards, their consideration inevitably should extend to the role that clearing
houses provide.
Under the EU’s proposed “Circular Economy” package, a number of mea-
sures may be considered to improve the effectiveness of EPR. Harmonized stan-
dards and guidance on EPR cost differentiation, recycling standards, and
enforcement are seen as important by a wide range of stakeholders. With
increased competition between PROs, national coordination bodies such as clear-
ing houses are seen as essential and could additionally support implementation
of EU future plans. To be effective, policy makers should also carefully reconsider
the feasibility of collection and recycling targets, and to take into consideration
waste collected by private waste operators alongside EPR systems. Finally, stake-
holders did not refer to product reuse within EPR, which demonstrates how
material recycling is still a key focus. In view of the circular economy, it may be
useful to examine the extent of reuse within EPR activities in future research,
which, where possible, brings revenue to PROs. The role of EPR in encouraging
reuse of products, as opposed only to recycling and recovery of materials, may be
interesting in future.
In this article, we have discussed a number of issues and challenges per-
taining to EPR. Addressing these issues will lead to a more effective EPR system—
and in the end, more valuable resources recovered and reused. An effective EPR
system will therefore contribute to the objectives of the circular economy by mini-
mizing downgrading of materials and increasing the share of reused resources in
the manufacturing of products. The issues we identified for EPR, such as variation
of collection volumes because of economic conditions, illegal export of waste, or
lack of harmonized legislation, are likely to affect the transition to a more circular
economy. It is therefore important to consider and address these issues when
designing circular economy policy.

Authors’ Note
The views and opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those
of Sony Interactive Entertainment Europe, and no such association should be
inferred. The authors would like to thank Atalay Atasu (Georgia Institute of
Technology, Atlanta, GA) for his contribution to the initial stage of this research
project.

Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article: The authors would like to thank
68 CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW 60(3)

the European Recycling Platform (ERP) for providing part of the funding that
allowed them to conduct this study.

Author Biographies
Nathan Kunz is Assistant Professor of Operations Management at University of
North Florida, Jacksonville (email: nathan.kunz@unf.edu).
Kieren Mayers is Executive in Residence at INSEAD, Fontainebleau and Director
of Environment and Technical Compliance at Sony Interactive Entertainment
Europe, London (email: kieren.mayers@insead.edu).
Luk N. Van Wassenhove is the Henry Ford Chaired Professor of Manufacturing
and Professor of Technology and Operations Management at INSEAD,
Fontainebleau (email: luk.van-wassenhove@insead.edu).

Notes
 1. M. Esposito, T. Tse, and K. Soufani, “Is the Circular Economy a New Fast-Expanding
Market?” Thunderbird International Business Review, 59/1 (January/February 2015): 9-14.
 2. Ellen MacArthur Foundation, “Towards the Circular Economy,” 2013, https://www.
ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/assets/downloads/publications/Ellen-MacArthur-Foundation-
Towards-the-Circular-Economy-vol.1.pdf.
 3. Ellen MacArthur Foundation, “Intelligent Assets: Unlocking the Circular Economy
Potential,” 2016, https://www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/assets/downloads/publica-
tions/EllenMacArthurFoundation_Intelligent_Assets_080216.pdf.
  4. R. J. Lifset, “Take It Back: Extended Producer Responsibility as a Form of Incentive-Based
Environmental Policy,” Journal of Resource Management and Technology, 21/1 (1993): 163-175;
T. Lindhqvist and R. Lifset, “Can We Take the Concept of Individual Producer Responsibility
from Theory to Practice?” Journal of Industrial Ecology, 7/2 (April 2003): 3-6.
 5. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Working Party on Resource
Productivity and Waste,” Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris,
France, 2015.
 6. COM/2015/0614.
 7. K. Mayers and C. France, “Meeting the ‘Producer Responsibility Challenge’: The
Management of Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment in the UK,” Green Management
International, 25 (Spring 1999): 51-66.
  8. Ellen MacArthur Foundation, “Towards the Circular Economy.”
  9. Ellen MacArthur Foundation, “Towards the Circular Economy.”
10. J. Huisman et al., “Summary Report, Market Assessment, Legal Analysis, Crime Analysis and
Recommendations Roadmap,” Countering WEEE Illegal Trade (CWIT), Lyon, France, 2015.
11. Ibid.
12. V. Monier, M. Hestin, J. Cavé, I. Laureysens, E. Watkins, H. Reisinger, and L. Porsch,
“Development of Guidance on Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR),” European
Commission Report, Neuilly-sur-Seine, France, 2014.
13. T. Tasaki, N. Tojo, and T. Lindhqvist, “International Survey on Stakeholders’ Perception of
the Concept of Extended Producer Responsibility and Product Stewardship,” Report of Joint
Research of IIIEE and NIES, Lund, Sweden, 2015.
14. Federal Republic of Germany, Verordnung über die Vermeidung von Verpackungsabfällen
[Ordinance on the Avoidance of Packaging Waste], Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl
and Federal Minister for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety,
Klaus Töpfer, 1991, http://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?startbk=Bundesanzeiger_
BGBl&jumpTo=bgbl191s1234.pdf.
15. 94/62/EC.
16. 2000/53/EC.
17. 2002/96/EC in 2002 and its recast version 2012/19/EU in 2012.
Stakeholder Views on Extended Producer Responsibility and the Circular Economy 69

18. 2006/66/EC, through a revision to the original 1991 Batteries Directive.

19. Although for packaging, arrangements differ between countries.
20. Including both manufactures and importers placing products or packaging on the market
within any European Union (EU) Member State.
21. Although there are shared responsibilities for financing packaging between supply-chain
actors in some countries.
22. European Commission and Bio Intelligence Service, “Use of Economic Instruments and
Waste Management Performances: Final Report,” European Commission (DG ENV), 2012, p.
102, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/pdf/final_report_10042012.pdf.
23. Electronics TakeBack Coalition, “Brief Comparison of State Laws on Electronics Recycling,”
Electronics TakeBack Coalition, Tides Center, Oakland, 2013, http://www.electronicstake-
back.com/wp-content/uploads/Compare_state_laws_chart.pdf.
24. COM/2015/0614 and COM/2017/0033.
25. EU433 EN 1.1 and 1.2.
26. C[2015]9096.
27. 2008/98/EC.
28. See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/target_review.htm.
29. C. K. Mayers, “Strategic, Financial, and Design Implications of Extended Producer
Responsibility in Europe: A Producer Case Study,” Journal of Industrial Ecology, 11/3 (July
2007): 113-131.
30. Ellen MacArthur Foundation, “Towards the Circular Economy.”
31. C. Koffler and J. Florin, “Tackling the Downcycling Issue—A Revised Approach to Value-
Corrected Substitution in Life Cycle Assessment of Aluminum (VCS 2.0),” Sustainability, 5/1
(October 2013): 4546-4560.
32. R. Geyer, B. Kuczenski, T. Zink, and A. Henderson, “Common Misconceptions about
Recycling,” Journal of Industrial Ecology, 20/5 (October 2016): 1010-1017.
33. Ibid.
34. Z. Yuan, J. Bi, and Y. Moriguichi, “The Circular Economy: A New Development Strategy in
China,” Journal of Industrial Ecology, 10/1-2 (January 2006): 4-8.
35. Geyer et al., op. cit.
36. Mayers, op. cit.
37. N. Kunz, A. Atasu, K. Mayers, and L. N. Van Wassenhove, “Extended Producer Responsibility:
Stakeholder Concerns and Future Developments,” INSEAD White Paper, 2014, http://centres.
insead.edu/social-innovation/what-we-do/documents/extendedproducerresponsibility_stake-
holderconcernsandfuturedevelopments_web.pdf.
38. Federal Republic of Germany, “Sektoruntersuchung duale Systeme - Zwischenbilanz der
Wettbewerbsöffnung” (B4-62/12), Federal Republic of Germany, Bundeskartellamt, 2012,
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/DE/Sektoruntersuchungen/
Sektoruntersuchung%20Duale%20Systeme%20-%20Abschlussbericht.pdf;jsessionid=2945
B28A79F5C68129B4FE81B0B248C4.2_cid371?__blob=publicationFile&v=7.
39. S.-W. Chung and R. Murakami-Suzuki, “A Comparative Study of E-Waste Recycling Systems
in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan from the EPR Perspective: Implications for Developing
Countries,” in Promoting 3Rs in Developing Countries: Lessons from the Japanese Experience, ed. M.
Kojima (Chiba-shi, Japan: Institute of Developing Economies, 2008), 125-145.
40. EU-27 average based on Eurostat, 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/
index.php/Packaging_waste_statistics#Recycling_and_recovery_targets.
41. European Portable Battery Association, “The Collection of Waste Portable Batteries in Europe
in View of the Achievability of the Collection Targets Set by Batteries Directive 2006/66/
EC,” European Portable Battery Association, Brussels, 2013, https://www.epbaeurope.net/
wp-content/uploads/2017/03/OF_Reportontheportablebatterycollectionrates-UpdateDec-16-
SummaryofChanges_final_13500.pdf.
42. Huisman et al., “Summary Report, Market Assessment, Legal Analysis, Crime Analysis and
Recommendations Roadmap.”
43. Eurostat, 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/waste/key-waste-streams/weee.
44. Ellen MacArthur Foundation, “Towards the Circular Economy.”
45. J. Huisman, M. Van der Maesen, R. Eijsbouts, F. Wang, C. Baldé, and C. Wielenga, “The
Dutch WEEE Flows,” United Nations University, Bonn, Germany, 2012.
46. stiftung elektro-altgeräte register [Stiftung Elektro-Altgeräte Register], National Register
for Waste Electric Equipment, 2016, https://www.stiftung-ear.de/service/kennzahlen/
optierungen-oere/.
70 CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW 60(3)

47. J. Huisman et al., “Countering WEEE Illegal Trade (CWIT) Summary Report, Market
Assessment, Legal Analysis, Crime Analysis and Recommendations Roadmap”, Lyon, France,
August 31, 2015.
48. 2002/96/EC.
49. European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization, “Collection, Logistics and
Treatment Requirements for WEEE,” 2013 http://www.cenelec.eu/dyn/www/f?p=104:110:
974893448379001::::FSP_PROJECT,FSP_LANG_ID:24707,25.
50. Ellen MacArthur Foundation, “Towards the Circular Economy.”
51. K. Mayers, R. Lifset, K. Bodenhoefer, and L. N. Van Wassenhove, “Implementing Individual
Producer Responsibility for Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment through Improved
Financing,” Journal of Industrial Ecology, 17/2 (April 2013): 186-198.
52. Ellen MacArthur Foundation, “Towards the Circular Economy.”
53. 2002/96/EC; 2006/66/EC.
54. COM/2000/0347.
55. K. Mayers, R. Peagam, C. France, L. Basson, and R. Clift, “Redesigning the Camel,” Journal of
Industrial Ecology, 15/1 (February 2011): 4-8, V. Bell, “Better by Design,” Recycling Today, May
2013, http://www.recyclingtoday.com/rt0513-extended-producer-responsibility-programs.aspx.
56. Mayers et al., “Implementing Individual Producer Responsibility.”
57. Eco-Emballages, Nouveau tarif Point Vert: plus précis, plus équitable et plus axé sur l’éco-conception [Point
Vert Contributory Scale: A More Accurate, Fairer and Ecofriendly Rate], 2013, http://www.eco-
emballages.fr/entreprises/nouveau-tarif-point-vert-plus-precis-plus-equitable-et-plus-axe-sur-
leco-conception.
58. The United Kingdom and Denmark.
59. Kunz et al., op. cit.
60. K. Mayers and S. Butler, “Producer Responsibility Organizations Development and
Operations,” Journal of Industrial Ecology, 17/2 (April 2013): 277-289.
61. N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln, Handbook of Qualitative Research (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage,
1994).
62. R. K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2009).
63. K. M. Eisenhardt, “Building Theories from Case Study Research,” Academy of Management
Review, 14/4 (October 1989): 532-550.
64. Interview protocol is available upon request.
65. Two respondents preferred to answer in writing.
66. P. Mayring, “Qualitative Content Analysis,” Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum:
Qualitative Social Research, 1/2 (June 2000): 1-143.
67. European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization, op. cit.
68. This number is higher than the number of Member States (28) because e-waste legislation is
the responsibility of regional authorities in some countries.
69. WEEELABEX is the name of the project that developed the e-waste recycling standards in
Europe.
70. 2008/98/EC.
71. COM/2015/0614.
72. See http://www.endswasteandbioenergy.com/article/1433971/eu-countries-collision-course-
meps-waste.
73. European Electronics Recyclers Association, “EERA Position Paper on the New WEEE Directive,”
2012, http://www.eera-recyclers.com/news/eera-position-paper-new-weee-directive.
74. 2005/32/EC.
75. Eco-Emballages, op. cit.
76. 2008/98/EC. For a more extensive discussion on EPR incentives, see Mayers et al.,
“Implementing Individual Producer Responsibility.”
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