“Climate Refugees” and the Role of

International Law
Alasdair McKay

Sumudu Atapattu

12 September 2018

Despite huge numbers of people being forced to leave their homes a

result of climate change, the governance of climate refugees
represents a gaping hole in international law.

Author's note: This piece is based on the author’s chapter titled “A New

Category of Refugees? ‘Climate Refugees’ and a Gaping Hole in International
Law” in ‘Climate Refugees’: Beyond the Legal Impasse? (Simon Behrman &
Avidan Kent, eds., 2018, Routledge).

People rarely move solely for climate-related reasons.  It is often the last
resort when all other efforts have failed.  The term “climate refugees” is
increasingly being used to describe those who are being displaced due to
adverse consequences related to climate change.  Although used by scholars
and laymen alike, it is not a legal term and its use in the legal context is
misleading.  This piece discusses the current legal lacuna governing climate
refugees and the proposals that have been advanced to address the
protection gap.  It concludes with some recommendations for future action. 

Climate change and forced human migration

We are living through a time when states are increasingly paranoid about
borders and threats to their national security.  At the same time, displacement
associated with climate change could make current borders superfluous.  Both
severe weather events and slow onset events such as sea level rise can give
rise to displacement.  Inhabitants of small island states will be the hardest hit. 
From islands in the Caribbean to those in the Pacific are all affected by severe
weather events as well as sea level rise.  These populations will have to be
relocated eventually and some have already moved to safer grounds.  Low-
lying and coastal cities are also affected.  Sadly, many people will lose their
homes permanently. 
Because climate change is not the only trigger that makes people move, it is
hard to find precise numbers of those who will be forced to move because of
climate change. Predictions range from 20 million to 200 million of
environmental refugees by 2050 but these figures are contested.  A common
myth surrounding forcible displacement is that these hapless people will flock
to countries in the Global North in search of a better life.  In fact, some
politicians in the Global North paint this picture to instill fear in their people
that refugees will take their resources away.  The truth cannot be any further
from this.  The countries that host the greatest number of refugees and
displaced persons are, in fact, in the Global South (Turkey, Pakistan and
Lebanon were the top three hosts of refugees in 2015) - countries that can
barely support their own populations. 

The legal landscape

Contemporary international law governs only political refugees – those who

are fleeing persecution – and does not extend to climate refugees. The legal
definition is clear.  According to the 1951 Geneva Convention on
Refugees adopted in the aftermath of World War II, a refugee is a person
who:

owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,

nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a
result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to
it.

While the definition of internally displaced persons under the UN Guiding

Principles and the Kampala Convention (a regional treaty based on the
Guiding Principles applicable to Africa) is wider and covers those who are
fleeing situations of generalized violence and natural or human-made
disasters, there is currently no legal framework governing “climate refugees.”
Given the projected numbers of people who may be displaced due to climate
change, this legal lacuna is quite worrying. 

For a long time, the UN Agency in charge of refugees, the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), refused to acknowledge that
environmental/climate refugees needed to be recognized as a distinct
category needing protection.  In fact, former High Commissioner for Refugees,
Sadako Ogata, believed the term “environmental refugee” was a misnomer. 
Since then, the UNHCR has changed its position drastically, presumably in
light of the increasing incidence of climate-related severe weather events and
the influx of climate refugees.  It even established an Advisory Group on
Climate Change and Human Mobility.  The International Organisation for
Migration, on the other hand, always addressed the issue of environmental
migrants and when it become a related agency of the UN in 2016, it provided
the organisation with  the opportunity to work with the UNHCR to address the
plight of climate refugees. Despite the narrow definition of refugees, the
UNHCR has helped victims of disasters and those fleeing violence even
though they do not strictly fall within its mandate.

Proposals that have been advanced

Many proposals have been advanced to address climate refugees, although

none of them comprehensively addresses the issue of cross-border
movement of people associated with climate change.  The Nansen Initiative,
based upon a pledge made by the governments of Switzerland and Norway,
recognizes that forced displacement related to disasters is a reality and
among the biggest humanitarian challenges facing the international
community. The Nansen Initiative has gained considerable traction and is the
only framework that seeks to govern cross border displacement.  However,
confining the framework to climate displacement due to severe weather
events is rather restrictive as those who are displaced due to other
consequences associated climate change, such as sea level rise, will not fall
within this framework.

The Peninsula Principles on Climate Displacement proposed by Displacement

Solutions cover both sudden and slow-onset event but are limited to internal
displacement.  ‘Climate displacement’ is defined as: “Movement of people
within a State due to the effects of climate change, including sudden and
slow-onset environmental events and processes, occurring either alone or in
combination with other factors.”  However, since these principles are confined
to internal displacement, the existing UN Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement would be applicable. 

On the other hand, the Draft Convention on the International Status of

Environmentally-Displaced Persons, proposed by the University of Limoges,
purports to be all-inclusive and is not limited to climate refugees.  It defines
“environmentally-displaced persons” as:
 

“Environmentally-displaced persons” are individuals, families, groups and

populations confronted with a sudden or gradual environmental disaster that
inexorably impacts their living conditions, resulting in their forced
displacement, at the outset or throughout, from their habitual residence. 

According to the Draft, parties should undertake measures “to protect

environmentally-displaced persons in conformity with human rights law
guaranteed by international law and to ensure the full exercise of those rights
specifically set forth by the present text.”  They purport to cover both internal
and cross border displacement.  While this seems to be the best attempt to
cover all environmentally displaced persons including climate refugees,
confining the definition to “sudden or gradual environmental disasters” is too
restrictive.  These principles recognise that climate displacement is a matter of
global responsibility and that states have the right to seek assistance from
other states and relevant international agencies.  Most proposals are reluctant
to address the elephant in the room – cross-border displacement due to
climate change, very likely to be in large numbers.

Recent developments

For the first time in the history of climate negotiations, climate displacement
was mentioned in climate documents at COP21.  The Executive Committee
on Loss and Damage was instructed to establish a taskforce on climate
displacement and to develop recommendations for integrated approaches to
avert, minimize and address climate displacement.

The taskforce was established in March 2017 and a stakeholder meeting was
held in May 2018 to make recommendations for integrated approaches to
address climate displacement.  Several organisations, including the Mary
Robinson Foundation-Climate Justice and Oxfam, made submissions.
According to a press release issued after the meeting the taskforce has
undertaken nine mapping exercises, covering policy, practice and data related
to human mobility in the context of climate change.  The taskforce has
identified several gaps related to international law, operational
implementation, funding, and data collection and analysis. The taskforce plans
to present their report at COP24 in Poland.
The way forward

Despite a slow start and considerable lethargy, climate negotiators seem to

have finally woken up to the reality of climate displacement.  Establishing a
taskforce on the issue was an important step forward. Recognizing migrants
as a category to be protected as well as the inclusion of a provision on human
rights and climate justice in the Paris Agreement were significant milestones. 

There are several simple steps that states can take to address the protection
gap relating to climate displacement.  Since most of the displacement will
likely be internal, the easiest step is to expand the UN Guiding Principles on
Internal Displacement to cover situations other than disasters. While these are
non-binding guidelines (except for Africa which has adopted the Kampala
Convention based on the Guiding Principles), they enjoy wide support and will
trigger involvement of the UNHCR and the Red Cross.  Second, states should
consider expanding the Nansen Initiative to cover slow onset events but the
reluctance to do so is understandable.

Of course, the best approach to avoid mass movements of people is to invest

in mitigation measures to minimize the catastrophic consequences that give
rise to displacement.  Because we have locked in a certain amount of adverse
consequences due to the greenhouse gases that we have already emitted,
the next best option is to provide adaptation assistance to the most vulnerable
nations that are likely to generate large numbers of climate refugees.

Addressing climate displacement within the UNFCCC framework makes

sense – after all, these displacement scenarios are largely the result of
climate change.  This would avoid the need to design a new legal framework
or to amend the existing refugee framework which many scholars have
cautioned against.  We can use the same principle that underlies the legal
framework governing political refugees to protect climate refugees – the
collective responsibility of the international community when individuals are no
longer able to avail themselves of the protection of their own state, because it
is overwhelmed with severe weather events, lacks resources or because the
state itself may be disappearing. Due to the inverse relationship between
contributions and impacts, principles of justice and equity dictate that major
emitters should shoulder a greater share of the burden. Moreover, because
obligations under both the UNFCCC legal regime and human rights are
universal, these regimes provide us with a good framework to protect the
rights of climate displaced persons.  With regard to the inhabitants of small
island states, additional legal questions must be addressed, and we should
start planning now for the eventuality if we have to relocate them en masse.
No state will be able to insulate itself from the adverse consequences of
climate change.  By planning ahead, we will be able to address the protection
gap before we are faced with a humanitarian catastrophe. If we are serious
about protecting future generations and indeed our planet, we do not have
much time to lose. 

Sumudu Atapattu, PhD (Cambridge) is the Director of Research Centers

and International Programs at the University of Wisconsin Law School.
She teaches seminar classes on “International Environmental Law” and
“Climate Change, Human Rights and the Environment.”  She is affiliated
with UW-Madison's Nelson Institute for Environmental Studies and the
Center for South Asia and is the Executive Director of the Human Rights
Program.  She serves as the Lead Counsel for Human Rights at the
Center for International Sustainable Development Law, Montreal, and is
affiliated faculty at the Raoul Wallenberg Institute for Human Rights,
Sweden. 

                                   
Published: 11  September, 2018
th

Updated: 21  November, 2018

st

Author: Alasdair McKay

https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/climate-refugees-and-the-role-of-international-law

Oxford Research Group

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877042812007562
Environmental Migration
Quantifying environmental migration is challenging given the multiple drivers of such
movement, related methodological challenges and the lack of data collection standards.
Some quantitative data exist on population displacement within a country, and to a lesser
degree across borders, due to natural hazards. However, for migration due to slow-onset
environmental processes, such as drought or sea-level rise, most existing data are
qualitative and based on case studies, with few comparative studies. While data gaps
persist, research methodologies are constantly being improved.
Definition

Three key terms are important in the context of migration and environmental and
climatic changes:
  Environmental migrants are defined as “persons or groups of persons who,
predominantly for reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment
that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their
habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who
move within their country or abroad.” (IOM, 2011: 33 in IOM, 2014:13).
 Environmentally displaced person refers to “persons who are displaced within
their country of habitual residence or who have crossed an international border and
for whom environmental degradation, deterioration or destruction is a major cause
of their displacement, although not necessarily the sole one” (IOM, 2011:34 in IOM,
2014:13). The term disaster displacement “refers to situations, where people are
forced or obliged to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular
as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of disasters triggered by natural
hazards. Such displacement may take the form of spontaneous flight or an
evacuation ordered or enforced by authorities. Such displacement can occur within
a country, or across international borders. ” (The Nansen Protection Agenda, 2015)
 Planned relocation refers to persons whose livelihoods have been re-built in
another place (IOM, 2014a). Others have defined planned relocation as referring
solely to the collective movement of a community, the “permanent (or long-term)
movement of a community (or a significant part of it) from one location to another,
in which important characteristics of the original community, including its social
structures, legal and political systems, cultural characteristics and worldviews are
retained: the community stays together at the destination in a social form that is
similar to the community of origin” (Campbell, 2010:58–59).

Although the term “climate refugees” is often used in relation to forced migration in
the context of climate and environmental change, this is not a legally valid term as
the 1951 Refugee Convention does not recognize environmental factors as criteria
to define a refugee.

Recent trends
In 2018, 17.2  million people in 144  countries and territories  were newly displaced in the
context of disasters within their own country (IDMC, 2019a). The first half of 2019 saw 7
million new internal displacements due to disaster (IDMC, 2019b). The  Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre  (IDMC) records that worldwide, over a period of
eleven  years (2008-2018), about 265.3  million people were displaced internally as a
response to disasters. South and East Asia, and the Pacific were the most affected
regions. In particular, the Philippines, China and India  recorded the highest numbers of
disaster displacements in 2018. Small island developing states (SIDS) continued to be
disproportionately affected by natural hazards. In 2018, displacement has been caused
primarily by extreme weather events, especially storms (9.3  million) and cyclones,
hurricanes and typhoons (7.9  million). Particularly devastating were the southwest
monsoons in India and Typhoon Mangkhut in China and the Philippines (IDMC, 2019a).
While the majority of mobility in the context of environmental and climate change more
generally, including disaster displacement, occurs within the borders of countries, some
people are forced to move abroad. Global data on cross-border movement in the
context of disasters are, however, limited, with only a few notable cases being examined
so far (Nansen Initiative, 2015;  Ionesco, Mokhnacheva and Gemenne, 2017). In some
cases, official sources on humanitarian visas by countries such as the United States (US),
Brazil and Argentina for Haitians can be used.

Slow-onset processes such as droughts or sea level rise also increasingly affect people’s
mobility worldwide. Though specific data are not available, case studies are highlighted
by existing research, for example:  Foresight, 2011;  Piguet and Laczko, 2014;  Ionesco,
Mokhnacheva and Gemenne, 2017.

The relocation of communities in the context of environmental and climate change is

also increasingly implemented by governments (for a summary of recent relocation
programmes see Ionesco, Mokhnacheva and Gemenne, 2016;  Benton,
2017  and  Georgetown University, UNHCR and IOM, 2017). For instance, tens of
thousands of people have been relocated in Haiti (Pierre, 2015) and in Viet Nam (UN Viet
Nam, 2014;  Chun 2014;  Entzinger and Scholten, 2015); hundreds of thousands in
Ethiopia (Foresight, 2011: 177); about a million in the Philippines (Ranque and Quetulio-
Navarra, 2015;  Thomas, 2015;  Brookings and UNHCR, 2015: 3-4) and several millions in
China (Foresight, 2011: 177).

Data sources

Comprehensive datasets on environmental migration or planned relocation do not

yet exist at the global level, but several initiatives have started to collect information
across several countries. The following list provides an overview of the existing
available information, including more qualitative research.

Primary data collection:

National authorities collect information on displacement and evacuations linked

to disasters, in particular fast onset ones. Local-level disaster displacement data are
available from (international and national) humanitarian agencies (NGOs, UN
agencies) engaged in relief operations, which collect data in order to respond to the
needs of affected populations.

Administrative data sources, such as the numbers of humanitarian visas (such as

in the US, Brazil, Ecuador or Mexico) or residence permits granted (for instance, by
Argentina) linked to disasters, can provide information on cross-border
displacement and movements in the context of environmental events more
generally.

IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) is a system used to track and monitor

disaster displacement and population mobility. Data are regularly captured,
processed and disseminated to provide a better understanding of the movements
and evolving needs of displaced populations and migrants, whether in situ or en
route, before, during and in the aftermath of disasters. The data are presented in
the DTM Data Portal.

Innovative data sources include mobile phone-based sources such as call detail

records (CDRs). Big data generated by mobile phone users before and after
disasters, such as the 2010 earthquake in Haiti (Bengtsson et al., 2011) and several
typhoons in the Philippines and Bangladesh (Lu et al., 2016), can indicate where
displaced persons moved to and help deliver prompt and targeted humanitarian
assistance or to understand internal movements (Laczko and Rango, 2014; GMG,
2017). This can be a means to collect complementary quantitative data on
movements at small-scale and on seasonal patterns linked to adaptation to
environmental change and disasters that are difficult to account for in traditional
household survey tools (Lu et al., 2016). Other projects aim at using big data
sources, such as satellite images or social media data, to identify early the
environmental stressors that could lead to displacement (see for instance Isaacman
et al., 2017).

Several research projects have and are collecting new data on the links between
the environment and human mobility, but few with a comparative approach. There
are two notable exceptions. First, the Migration, Environment and Climate
Change: Evidence for Policy (MECLEP) project, implemented by IOM and six
research partners in 2014-2017, and funded by the EU, conducted a comparative
quantitative and qualitative study of six countries (Dominican Republic, Haiti,
Kenya, Papua New Guinea, Mauritius and Viet Nam). The methodology developed
for the project could easily be applied to other countries.
Second, the Pacific Climate Change and Migration (PCCM) project by ILO,
UNESCAP and UNDP focused on Tuvalu, Nauru and Kiribati. The United Nations
University Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS)
released findings detailing how climatic changes are impacting these Pacific island
states.

Secondary data sources and research:

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) has compiled data on

internal displacement in the context of disasters since 2008 globally (data are
generated by event, not by country) through its online Global Internal Displacement
Database (GIDD). The estimates are based on information by national authorities,
UN agencies such as IOM, the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) and
the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), non-
governmental organizations and in particular media reports. Figures are published
in the annual Global Report on Displacement (GRID), which also covers internal
displacement due to conflict and violence. IDMC is developing methodologies to
map and assess future disaster displacement risks and is starting to gather data on
cross-border displacement.

The HELIX project (High-End Climate Impacts and Extremes) provided research on

climate impacts and adaptation in relation to varying global warming scenarios (2, 4
and 6 degrees Celsius), using predictive analytics. Human migration was included in
the impact studies. The recent Groundswell: Preparing for internal climate
migration report (Rigaud et al., 2018) developed a model for future population
distribution in 2050 in three regions (sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Latin
America) if no action is taken.

The CLIMIG database of studies on environmental migration, both of qualitative

and quantitative nature, was developed by the University of Neuchatel
(Switzerland).
 

The Environmental Migration Portal by IOM, features a searchable research

database, initially based on the People on the Move in a Changing Climate: A
Bibliography, published by IOM in collaboration with University of Neuchatel. The
database also includes migration and environment country assessments published
by IOM.

The thematic working group on “Environmental change and migration” of the

Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD)
produced an annotated bibliography on Environmental Migration and developed
a toolkit on planned relocation with many case study examples (Georgetown
University, UNHCR and IOM, 2017).

The first “Atlas on Environmental Migration” was produced by IOM and Sciences

Po, Paris (published with Routledge in 2017). The publication brings together, for
the first time, existing knowledge on the links between migration and
environmental change, presented through comprehensive maps, diagrams and
case studies.

The Hugo Observatory at the University of Liége (Belgium) focuses on research on

environmental changes and Migration.

Data strengths & limitations

Over the past decade, important advances on methodologies and data collection
have been made. Academic researchers and specialized agencies are working on
improved methodologies for comparative cross-country or cross-region studies,
agent-based models and multi-factor simulators designed to predict future trends
(such as drought-induced displacement modelling, Ginnetti and Franck, 2014,
or IDMC’s Global Displacement Risk Model focused on sudden-onset disasters
based on housing destructions), and hotspot identification triangulating
environmental and social data, all of which can contribute greatly to improving
current evidence and future projections of environmental migration trends so as to
better inform policies and action.

Innovative data sources: Big data can provide opportunities that can further be
strengthened in trying to estimate the extent of movements in contexts of disasters
and degrading environments. These new methods can fill gaps in time series data,
indicate where people have moved from and to and enhance the timeliness of this
information. In some cases, these new methods could be used to inform life-saving
early warnings. At the same time, privacy safeguards and ethical considerations
need to be adhered to.

Nonetheless, difficulties remain.

 It is challenging to differentiate when the environment is the main factor

triggering migration, rather than or in combination with other factors: In most
cases, environmental factors are closely linked to socioeconomic, political,
 demographic, cultural and personal factors that play a role in leading to or
preventing mobility (Laczko and Aghazarm, 2009; Foresight, 2011), which makes
data collection beyond fast onset disasters leading to evacuations difficult.
Information on people moving due to more gradual, so-called slow-onset processes
like sea level rise or salinization, is scarce for methodological reasons.
 
 The most comprehensive data available only track people newly displaced
internally that year: Thanks to IDMC’s work, data on internal displacement due to
natural hazards are available for almost all countries. However, differing definitions
used by data providers and a lack of reporting by countries remains a challenge,
leading to media reports being an important source of events covered in the
estimates. IDMC’s data aggregates focus exclusively on people newly displaced
during the year of interest. This figure reflects the flows of people during one year (or
stocks by the end of the year) and does not capture the duration of people’s
displacement, their return home or relocation elsewhere, those not sheltered in
camps or people caught in long-term displacement, so-called protracted situations,
from year to year. Data collection on cross-border movements after disasters is only
starting and limited to localized case studies (IDMC, 2018 (a)).  Further research on
cross-border disaster displacement is being supported as part of the work of the
Data and Knowledge Working Group of the State-led Platform on Disaster
Displacement.
 
 Underreporting: The quality and the availability of data on displacement vary
between countries and from event to event: small-scale events or disasters that
occur in isolated and marginalized areas are under-reported and thus not included
in the available aggregate estimates (IDMC, 2017: 98; IDMC, 2018 (a)).
 
 Little information on links between conflict and disaster displacement: In
cases where conflict is linked to disasters information on movements is lacking, in
particular on displacement histories that could inform future predictions (IDMC data
for instance are only available since 2008 but since 2017 include drought figures).
 
 Comprehensive datasets on environmental migration or planned relocation
are needed: Data on environmental migration and planned relocation have
improved in recent years, as an increasing number of studies have been conducted
in affected areas. The research databases listed above are important tools providing
an overview of the existing available information. However, comparable
quantitative, longitudinal, disaggregated and georeferenced data are
needed to assess how different forms of mobility can be a beneficial adaptation
strategy and what potential risks need to be minimized. The majority of existing
surveys focus mainly on the links between migration and the environment as a
driver, and are mostly qualitative in nature. More information is needed on the
 impacts of those movements on adaptation to environmental and climate change.
 
 Few data on trapped populations: Some populations affected by environmental
degradation and disasters may not be able to move due to a lack of financial
resources or social networks. They are highly vulnerable populations, but data to
inform action and protection are scarce.
 
 Better predictive analytics are needed: When it comes to predicting future
trends, the disconnection between the environmental sciences and social sciences
communities constitutes an additional challenge, in a context where environmental
migration research would greatly benefit from multidisciplinary research and better
integration of climate and population data.

FURTHER READING
Ginnetti J. and S. Ponserre

      2019 Disaster Displacement: A global review, 2008-2018. IDMC, Geneva.

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC)

2019 (a) GRID 2019: Global Report on Internal Displacement. IDMC, Geneva.

2019 (b) Mid-Year Figures: Internal Displacement from January to June 2019. IDMC,  Geneva

2018 (a) GRID 2018: Global Report on Internal Displacement. IDMC, Geneva.

2018 (b) "Systematic data collection and monitoring of displacement and its impacts at local, national,
regional and international level to inform comprehensive needs and risk assessments for the
formulation of policy and plans.” Summary Report, Implementation of the Workplan of the Task
Force on Displacement under the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM)
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), May

Foresight

2011 Migration and Global Environmental Change. Final Project Report.  The Government Office for
Science, London.

Melde, S.

2016 “Data on environmental migration: How much do we know?” Global Migration Data Analysis Centre
Data Briefing Series Issue 2. IOM, Geneva.
Global Migration Group (GMG)

2017 Handbook for Improving the Production and Use of Migration Data for
Development. KNOMAD, World Bank, Washington, DC.

Ionesco, D., Mokhnacheva, D. and F. Gemenne

2017  Atlas of Environmental Migration. Routledge, Abingdon.

Gemenne, F. 

2011 “Why the numbers don’t add up: A review of estimates and predictions of people displaced by
environmental changes.” Global Environmental Change, 21S: 41‒49.

Georgetown University, UNHCR and IOM

2017 A toolbox: Planning relocations to protect people from disasters and environmental
change. Georgetown University, UNHCR and IOM, Washington, D.C.

Beton, G.

2017 Planned Relocations: Annotated Bibliography Update. Georgetown University, Walsh School of
Foreign Service, Institute for the Study of International Migration.

IOM

2013 Compendium of IOM Activities on Disaster Risk Reduction and Resilience. IOM, Geneva.

2014 Glossary - Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Evidence for Policy (MECLEP). IOM, Geneva.

2014 IOM Outlook on Migration, Environment and Climate Change. IOM, Geneva.

Laczko, F. and C. Aghazarm (eds.)

2009 Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Assessing the Evidence. IOM, Geneva.

Piguet, E. and F. Laczko (eds.)

2014 People on the Move in a Changing Climate. The Regional Impact of Environmental Change on
 Migration. Global Migration Issues 2. Springer, Dordrecht.

Campbell, J.

2010 “Climate-Induced Community Relocation in the Pacific: The Meaning and Importance of Land.” In:
Climate Change and Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (J. McAdam, ed.), pp. 57–79.

United Nations

1998  Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2.

Huggel, C., Raissig, A., Rohrer, M., Romero, G., Diaz, A. and Salzmann, N.

2015 "How useful and reliable are disaster databases in the context of climate and global change? A
comparative case study analysis in Peru." In: Natural Hazards and Earth Systems Sciences, pp. 475.
 

Last updated on

16 October 2019

Migration data portal

https://migrationdataportal.org/themes/environmental_migration
Environmental migrant
 Language

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 Edit

Drought refugees from Oklahoma camping by the roadside, California, 1936

Environmental migrants or climate refugees[a] are people who are forced to leave

their home region due to sudden or long-term changes to their local environment.
These are changes which compromise their well-being or secure livelihood. Such
changes are held to include increased droughts, desertification, sea level rise, and
disruption of seasonal weather patterns (i.e. monsoons[1]). Climate refugees may
choose to flee to or migrate to another country, or they may migrate internally within
their own country.[2]

Despite problems in formulating a uniform and clear-cut definition of 'environmental

migration', such a concept has increased as an issue of concern in the 2000s as policy-
makers, environmental and social scientists attempt to conceptualize the potential
societal effects of climate change and general environmental degradation. "Unless it is
assumed" in order to consider a person a climate refugee, nature or the environment
could be considered the persecutor.[5]
Contents

 1 Definition and concept

 2 Types

 3 Enumeration

o 3.1 Global statistics

o 3.2 Asia and the Pacific

o 3.3 North America

 3.3.1 Alaska

 3.3.2 Louisiana

 3.3.3 Washington state

o 3.4 South America

 4 Political and legal perspectives

o 4.1 Global perceptions from possible countries of asylum

o 4.2 Perspective of countries taking immigrants

 5 Popular culture

 6 Documentary films

 7 See also

 8 Notes

 9 References

o 9.1 Footnotes

o 9.2 Further reading
  10 External links

 11 External links

Definition and conceptEdit

Climate refugees do not really fit into any of the legal definitions of a refugee. Not all
climate refugees migrate from their home country, on occasion they are just displaced
within their country of origin. Moreover, the refugees aren't leaving their homes
because of fear they will be persecuted, or because of "generalized violence or events
seriously disturbing public order."[6] Even though the definition of who is a refugee
was expanded since its first international and legally binding definition in 1951 people
who are forced to flee due to environmental change are still not offered the same legal
protection as refugees.[7]

The term "environmental refugee" was first proposed by Lester Brown in 1976.
[8]
 The International Organization for Migration (IOM) proposes the following
definition for environmental migrants:[9]

"Environmental migrants are persons or groups of persons who, for compelling

reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect
their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to
do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or
abroad."

Climate refugees or climate migrants are a subset of environmental migrants who

were forced to flee "due to sudden or gradual alterations in the natural
environment related to at least one of three impacts of climate change: sea-level
rise, extreme weather events, and drought and water scarcity."[10]

TypesEdit

The International Organisation for Migration proposes three types of environmental

migrants:

 Environmental emergency migrants: people who flee temporarily due to an

environmental disaster or sudden environmental event. (Examples: someone
forced to leave due to a hurricane, tsunami, earthquake, etc.)
 Environmental forced migrants: people who have to leave due to deteriorating
environmental conditions. (Example: someone forced to leave due to a slow
 deterioration of their environment such as deforestation, coastal
deterioration, etc.)
 Environmental motivated migrants also known as environmentally induced
economic migrants: people who choose to leave to avoid possible future
problems. (Example: someone who leaves due to declining crop productivity
caused by desertification)

"those displaced temporarily due to local disruption such as an avalanche or

earthquake; those who migrate because environmental degradation has undermined
their livelihood or poses unacceptable risks to health; and those who resettle
because land degradation has resulted in desertification or because of other permanent
and untenable changes in their habitat".[11]

Other categorisations include:

Pressured environmental migrants[12] – slow onset

This type of migrant is displaced from their environment when an event is
predicted prior to when it would be imperative for the inhabitants to leave.
[13]
 Such events could be desertification or prolonged drought, where the
people of the region are no longer able to maintain farming or hunting to
provide a hospitable living environment.[14]
Imperative environmental migrants[15] – gradual onset
These are migrants that have been or will be "permanently displaced" from
their homes due to environmental factors beyond their control.
Temporary environmental migrants[15] – short term, sudden onset
This includes migrants suffering from a single event (i.e. Hurricane Katrina).
This does not go to say that their status of being temporary is any less severe
than that of the other, it simply means that they are able to go back to the
place they fled from (though it may be undesirable to do so) granted that they
are able to rebuild what was broken, and go on to maintain a similar quality of
life to the one prior to the natural disaster. This type of migrant is displaced
from their home state when their environment rapidly changes. They are
displaced when disastrous events occur, such as tsunamis, hurricanes,
tornadoes, and other natural disasters occur.[16]
EnumerationEdit
Global statisticsEdit

There have been a number of attempts over the decades to enumerate environmental
migrants and refugees. Jodi Jacobson (1988) is cited as the first researcher to
enumerate the issue, stating that there were already up to 10 million 'Environmental
Refugees'. Drawing on 'worst-case scenarios' about sea-level rise, she argued that all
forms of 'Environmental Refugees' would be six times as numerous as political
refugees.[17] By 1989, Mustafa Tolba, Executive Director of UNEP, was claiming that
'as many as 50 million people could become environmental refugees' if the world did
not act to support sustainable development.[18] In 1990, the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC 1990: 20) declared that the greatest single consequence of
climate change could be migration, 'with millions of people displaced by shoreline
erosion, coastal flooding and severe drought'.[19] In the mid-1990s, British
environmentalist, Norman Myers, became the most prominent proponent of this
'maximalist' school (Suhrke 1993). Noting, that "environmental refugees will soon
become the largest group of involuntary refugees".[20] Additionally, he stated that there
were 25 million environmental refugees in the mid-1990s, further claiming that this
figure could double by 2010, with an upper limit of 200 million by 2050 (Myers
1997).[21] Myers argued that the causes of environmental displacement would include
desertification, lack of water, salination of irrigated lands and the depletion of
biodiversity. He also hypothesised that displacement would amount to 30m in China,
30m in India, 15m in Bangladesh, 14m in Egypt, 10m in other delta areas and coastal
zones, 1m in island states, and with otherwise agriculturally displaced people totalling
50m by 2050.[22] More recently, Myers has suggested that the figure by 2050 might be
as high as 250 million.[23]

 
A map showing where natural disasters caused/aggravated by global warming may
occur, and thus where environmental refugees would be created [citation needed]

These claims have gained significant currency, with the most common projection
being that the world will have 150–200 million climate change refugees by 2050.
Variations of this claim have been made in influential reports on climate change by
the IPCC (Brown 2008: 11)[24] and the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate
Change (Stern et al. 2006: 3),[25] as well as by NGOs such as Friends of the Earth,
[26]
 Greenpeace Germany (Jakobeit and Methmann 2007)[27] and Christian Aid;[23] and
inter-governmental organisations such as the Council of Europe,[28] UNESCO,[29] IOM
(Brown 2008) and UNHCR.[30]
Norman Myers is the most cited researcher in this field, who found that 25 million
environmental migrants existed in 1995 in his work (Myers & Kent 1995),[22] which
drew upon over 1000 sources.[31] However, Vikram Kolmannskog has stated that
Myers' work can be 'criticized for being inconsistent, impossible to check and failing
to take proper account of opportunities to adapt' (2008: 9).[32] Furthermore, Myers
himself has acknowledged that his figures are based upon 'heroic extrapolation'
(Brown 2008: 12).[24] More generally, Black has argued that there is 'surprisingly little
scientific evidence' that indicates that the world is 'filling-up with environmental
refugees' (1998: 23).[33] Indeed, Francois Gemenne has stated that: 'When it comes to
predictions, figures are usually based on the number of people living in regions at risk,
and not on the number of people actually expected to migrate. Estimates do not
account for adaptation strategies [or] different levels of vulnerability' (Gemenne 2009:
159).[34]

In the first half of the year 2019, 7 million people was internally (e.g. in their country)
displaced by events of extreme weather, according to the Internal Displacement
Monitoring Centre. This is a record and the number is 2 times bigger that the number
displaced by violence and conflicts. Large part of the displaced people were evacuated
when the storm came, what saved many lives, but the price for the economy was very
big[35][36].

Asia and the PacificEdit

According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, more than 42 million

people were displaced in Asia and the Pacific during 2010 and 2011, more than twice
the population of Sri Lanka. This figure includes those displaced by storms, floods,
and heat and cold waves. Still others were displaced by drought and sea-level rise.
Most of those compelled to leave their homes eventually returned when conditions
improved, but an undetermined number became migrants, usually within their
country, but also across national borders.[37]

Climate-induced migration is a highly complex issue which needs to be understood as

part of global migration dynamics. Migration typically has multiple causes, and
environmental factors are intertwined with other social and economic factors, which
themselves can be influenced by environmental changes. Environmental migration
should not be treated solely as a discrete category, set apart from other migration
flows. A 2012 Asian Development Bank study argues that climate-induced migration
should be addressed as part of a country's development agenda, given the major
implications of migration on economic and social development. The report
recommends interventions both to address the situation of those who have migrated,
as well as those who remain in areas subject to environmental risk. It says: "To reduce
migration compelled by worsening environmental conditions, and to strengthen the
resilience of at-risk communities, governments should adopt policies and commit
financing to social protection, livelihoods development, basic urban infrastructure
development, and disaster risk management."[38]

Additionally, it is maintained that the poor populate areas that are most at risk for
environmental destruction and climate change, including coastlines, flood-lines, and
steep slopes. As a result, climate change threatens areas already suffering from
extreme poverty. "The issue of equity is crucial. Climate affects us all, but does not
affect us all equally," UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon told delegates at a climate
conference in Indonesia.[39] Africa is also one of the world regions where
environmental displacement is critical largely due to droughts and other climate-
related eventualities.[40]

In Minqin county, Gansu Province, "10,000 people have left the area and have
become shengtai yimin, 'ecological migrants'".[41]

In 2013 a claim of a Kiribati man of being a "climate change refugee" under

the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) was determined by the New
Zealand High Court to be untenable.[42][43] The Refugee Convention did not apply as
there is no persecution or serious harm related to any of the five stipulated convention
grounds. The Court rejected the argument that the international community itself (or
countries which can be said to have been historically high emitters of carbon dioxide
or other greenhouse gases) were the "persecutor" for the purposes of the Refugee
Convention.[42] This analysis of the need for the person to identify persecution of the
type described in the Refugee Convention does not exclude the possibility that a
people for countries experiencing severe impacts of climate change can come with the
Refugee Convention. However, it is not the climate change event itself, rather the
social and political response to climate change, which is likely to create the pathway
for a successful claim. The New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal and the
High Court, "there is a complex inter-relationship between natural disasters,
environmental degradation and human vulnerability. Sometimes a tenable pathway to
international protection under the Refugee Convention can result. Environmental
issues sometimes lead to armed conflict. There may be ensuing violence towards or
direct repression of an entire section of a population. Humanitarian relief can become
politicised, particularly in situations where some group inside a disadvantaged country
is the target of direct discrimination".[44] The New Zealand Court of Appeal also
rejected the claim in a 2014 decision. On further appeal, the New Zealand Supreme
Court confirmed the earlier adverse rulings against the application for refugee status,
with the Supreme Court also rejecting the proposition "that environmental degradation
resulting from climate change or other natural disasters could never create a pathway
into the Refugee Convention or protected person jurisdiction".[45]
In 2014 attention was drawn to an appeal to the New Zealand Immigration and
Protection Tribunal against the deportation of a Tuvaluan family on the basis that they
were "climate change refugees", who would suffer hardship resulting from the
environmental degradation of Tuvalu.[46] However the subsequent grant of residence
permits to the family was made on grounds unrelated to the refugee claim.[47] The
family was successful in their appeal because, under the relevant immigration
legislation, there were "exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature" that
justified the grant of resident permits as the family was integrated into New Zealand
society with a sizeable extended family which had effectively relocated to New
Zealand.[47]

North AmericaEdit
AlaskaEdit

There have been 178 Alaskan communities threatened by erosion of their land. The
annual temperature has steadily increased over the last fifty years, with Alaska seeing
it double (compared to the rate seen across the rest of the United States) to the rate of
3.4 degrees, with an alarming 6.3 degrees increase for the winters over the past fifty
years. Many of the communities residing in these areas have been living off the land
for generations. There is an eminent threat of loss of culture and loss of tribal identity
with these communities.[48]

LouisianaEdit

Isle de Jean Charles, Louisiana, home to the Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw First Nation,

is being depopulated with federal grant money, due to saltwater intrusion and sea level
rise. This Indigenous Nation residing on the Isle de Jean Charles is facing the effects
of climate change. The resettlement of this community of around 100, exists as the
first migration of a total community in the state of Louisiana. This state has lost
almost 2000 square miles of its coast within the last 87 years and now an alarming
rate of almost 16 square miles a year is disappearing. In early 2016, a 48-million-
dollar grant was the first allocation of federal tax dollars to aid a community suffering
from direct impact of climate change. Louisiana has lost land mass comparable to the
size of the state of Delaware revealing land mass loss that is at a rate faster than many
places in the world. The resettlement plan for the Isle de Jean Charles is at the
forefront of responding to climate change without destroying the community that
resides within.[49][50]

Washington stateEdit

The Quinault village of Taholah has requested $60 million to relocate away from the

encroaching Pacific Ocean.[51]
South AmericaEdit
Learn more

This section possibly contains original research. (December 2017)

Many peer-reviewed articles analyzing migration in South America have found

multiple types of linkages between climate change and its effect on migration.The
effects and results vary based on the type of climatic change, socioeconomic status
and demographic characteristics of migrants and the distance and direction of the
migration.[52] Since most climate migration studies are done in the developed world,
scientists have called for more quantitative research within the developing world,
including South America.[53] Migration in South America does not always increase as
a result of increased environmental threats but is affected by factors such as climate
variability and land suitability. These migrations happen either gradually or suddenly
but are typically directed from rural to urban areas. Inter-provincial migration is
shown to not be as heavily influenced by environmental changes whereas migration
outside of the home country is heavily influenced by environmental changes.[53] The
results of a climactic event catalyzing migration change depending on the onset of the
event, however, climate change related events such as drought and hurricanes
augment or increase youth migration. Youth are more likely to migrate as a response
to climate-related events. As a result, children who have been displaced are found to
travel shorter distances to find work in rural destinations versus further to an urban
area.[54] Researchers suggest a review of the terms that define who is an environmental
migrant since policy-making bodies and intergovernmental agencies most affect
responses when an environmental event causes people to migrate. Because of the
increase in interest in this topic in the past decade some people call for a measure
called preventive resettlement. The cases in which preventive resettlement appear
appropriate is typically discerned by local and governmental bodies. Others call for an
increase in social programs to both prevent and help in a migration event.[55]

Some Kuna people, such as those in the settlement of Gardi Sugdub, have decided to
relocate from islands to the mainland of Panama due to sea level rise.[56]

Political and legal perspectivesEdit

See also: Adaptation to global warming

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) expects the scale of global

migration to rise as a result of accelerated climate change.[57] It, therefore,
recommends policymakers around the world to take a proactive stance on the matter.
[58]
 The IOM is composed of 146 member states and 13 observer states and "works
closely with governments in promoting migration management that ensures humane
and orderly migration that is beneficial to migrants and societies."[58] Additionally,
when interviewing Oliver- Smith, an anthropologist and member of the UN
group, National Geographic Magazine noted that "there are at least 20 million
environmental refugees worldwide, the [UN] group says – more than those displaced
by war and political repression combined." Therefore, it is imperative that we begin to
recognize this recent division of refugee.[59][60]

The Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) has argued that the people who will be
forced to move due to climate change currently have no adequate recognition in
international law.[61] The EJF contends that a new multilateral legal instrument is
required to specifically address the needs of "climate refugees" in order to confer
protection to those fleeing environmental degradation and climate change.[62] They
have also asserted that additional funding is needed to enable developing countries to
adapt to climate change. Sujatha Byravan and Sudhir Chella Rajan have argued for the
use of the term 'climate exiles' and for international agreements to provide them
political and legal rights, including citizenship in other countries, bearing in mind
those countries' responsibilities and capabilities.[2][3][4]

In some cases, climate change may lead to conflict arising between countries that as a
result of flooding or other conditions produce a large number of refugees, and
bordering countries that build fences to keep out these refugees. The Bangladesh–
India border is largely separated via a fence, and case studies suggest the possibility of
violent conflict arising due to people fleeing from areas suffering from the destruction
of arable land. Current migration has already resulted in low-scale conflicts.[63]

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) predicts that sea levels will
increase with up to 0.6 meters by 2100. This will cause populations to wipe out
entirely. Small areas may have nothing left. This could lead to the loss of millions of
refugees. Refugee organizations have taken on cases of many different refugees. The
Organization for Refugees Asylum and Migration (ORAM) is designed to help
refugees in seeking status and resettlement. They are designed to help refugees
overcome the Refugee process. ORAM's main goal is to protect the vulnerable
refugees for the laws put on refugee and help end the refugee asylum process. There is
a ton of legal action taken against refugees. Political laws are put on the refugees to
either harm or hurt the refugees.[64]

Global perceptions from possible countries of asylumEdit

Reaction as for the possible acceptance of possible environmental migrants is mixed,

this is because of countries dealing with other domestic problems. For example, India,
which has a population of over 1 billion people, is building an India-Bangladesh
barrier. While the stated purpose of the barrier is to deter drug trade, the barrier may
also help prevent the possible refuge of 20 million Bangladeshis who may be
displaced by future climate change.[65] This is a contrast to Canada in which public
pressure is slowly building to create policies that will allow accommodation and better
planning.[66][67][68][69] On 20 September 2016, Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada told
the UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants that plans just for resettlement would not
be enough.[70] Sweden which had allowed refugees to seek asylum from areas of war
in an open door policy has changed to a policy that is more deterrent of asylum
seekers and is even offering money for asylum seekers to withdraw their requests.[71]
[72]
 The United States, which was warned under the Obama administration to prepare
for climate change and the refugees, may have more future difficulties being prepared
to do so under current President Donald Trump as he explicitly denies climate change.
[73][74]
 This can be seen as Trump denies the possibility of climate change, has signed
executive orders dismantling environmental protections, and has ordered the EPA to
remove climate change information from their public site, likely signaling America's
unwillingness to acknowledge the future possibility of increased environmental
refugees from climate change.[75][76][77]

Asylum is the freedom of prosecution in the country the people want to be in.
Different countries have their own rules and laws of asylum. The United States, for
example, has a system recognized by federal and international laws. France was the
first country to constitute the right to asylum. So the right to asylum differs in
different nations. There is a still fight for the right to asylum in some areas of the
world.[78]

Perspective of countries taking immigrantsEdit

In the UK, research is being done on how climate change's impact on countries that
are emigrated to will vary due to the infrastructure of those countries. They want to
put into place policies so that those who have to migrate could go throughout Europe,
and have solid emergency planning in place so that the people being displaced would
have a swift and quick plan of escape once their environment can no longer handle
inhabitants-slow or sudden onset.[79] The end goal of this work is to determine the best
course of action in the event of various environmental catastrophes.

Popular cultureEdit
 
German artist Hermann Josef Hack's World Climate Refugee Camp in Hannover
displaying 600 small climate refugee tents.

The notion of 'environmental migrant', and particularly 'climate refugee', has gained
traction in popular culture. A documentary entitled Climate Refugees has been
released. "Climate Refugees" is an Official Selection for the 2010 Sundance Film
Festival.[80] More recently, Short Documentary Academy Award Nominee, Sun Come
Up (2011), tells the story of Carteret islanders who are forced to leave their ancestral
land in response to climate change and migrate to war-torn Bougainville[81]

Since 2007, German artist Hermann Josef Hack has shown his World Climate
Refugee Camp in the centers of various European cities. The model camp, made of
roughly 1000 miniature tents, is a public art intervention that depicts the social
impacts of climate change.[82]

Documentary filmsEdit

 Climate Refugees (2010), Documentary movie directed by Michael P. Nash.

Starring: Lester Brown, Yvo de Boer, Paul R. Ehrlich ...
 Eco Migrants: The Case of Bhola Island (2013), Documentary movie directed
by Susan Stein. Starring Katherine Jacobsen, Nancy Schneider, Bogumil
Terminski
 Refugees of the Blue Planet (2006), Documentary movie directed by Hélène
Choquette & Jean-Philippe Duval.
 The Land Between (2014) documentary movie directed by David Fedele.[83]

See alsoEdit

 Alliance of Small Island States

 Climate change
 Climate change, industry and society
 Forced displacement
 Kiribati (President of Kiribati Anote Tong)
 Maldives (President of the Maldives Mohamed Nasheed)
 Managed retreat (a voluntary case, rather than a forced case)
 Refugee
 Small Island Developing States
 Space and survival (a hypothetical extreme case in science fiction)
 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
 Water crisis
 The Clash of Civilizations
NotesEdit

1. ^ "Environmental migrant" and "climate refugee" are used somewhat

interchangeably with a range of similar terms, such as ecological
refugee, environmental refugee, forced environmental
migrant, environmentally motivated migrant, climate change
refugee, environmentally displaced person (EDP), disaster
refugee, environmental displacee, eco-refugee, ecologically displaced
person, or environmental-refugee-to-be (ERTB).[1] The term climate exiles has
been used to refer to those climate migrants who may be in danger of
becoming stateless.[2][3][4] The distinctions between these terms are contested.

ReferencesEdit
FootnotesEdit

1. ^ Boano, C., Zetter, R., and Morris, T., (2008). Environmentally Displaced

People: Understanding the linkages between environmental change,
livelihoods and forced migration, Refugee Studies Centre Policy Brief No.1
(RSC: Oxford), pg.4
2. ^ a b "Before the Flood" Sujatha Byravan and Sudhir Chella Rajan, The
New York Times, 9 May 2005.
3. ^ a b "Warming up to Immigrants: An Option for US Climate
Policy"[permanent dead link] Sujatha Byravan and Sudhir Chella Rajan, Economic and
Political Weekly, 7 November 2009.
4. ^ a b "The Ethical Implications of Sea-Level Rise Due to Climate
Change" Archived 13 August 2011 at the Wayback Machine Sujatha Byravan
and Sudhir Chella Rajan, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 24.3 (Fall
2010).
5. ^ Renaud, Fabrice; et al. "Environmental Degradation and
Migration"  (PDF). Archived from the original  (PDF) on 5 July 2016.
6. ^ unhcr.org page 19
7. ^ Hartley, Lindsey. ( 16 February 2012). Treading Water: Climate
Change, the Maldives, and De-territorialization. Stimson Centre. Retrieved 25
April 2012.
8. ^ Brown, L., Mcgrath, P., and Stokes, B., (1976). twenty two dimensions
of the population problem, Worldwatch Paper 5, Washington DC: Worldwatch
Institute
9. ^ "DISCUSSION NOTE: MIGRATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT"  (PDF).
10. ^ Global Governance Project. (2012). Forum on Climate Refugees.
Retrieved on 5 May 2012.
11. ^ Renaud, Fabrice; et al. "Environmental Degradation and
Migration"  (PDF). Archived from the original  (PDF) on 5 July 2016.
12. ^ Marshall, Nicole (2015). "Politicizing Environmental Displacement: A
Four Category Approach". Refugee Review. 2: 96–112.
13. ^ Koubi, Vally; Stoll, Sebastian; Spilker, Gabriele (8 August 2016).
"Perceptions of environmental change and migration decisions". Climatic
Change. 138 (3–4): 439–451. doi:10.1007/s10584-016-1767-1. ISSN 0165-
0009.
14. ^ Marshall, Nicole. "Toward Special Mobility Rights for Climate
Migrants".
15. ^ a b Marshall, Nicole (2016). "Forced Environmental Migration: Ethical
Considerations for Emerging Migration Policy". Ethics, Policy and
Environment. 19 (1): 1–18. doi:10.1080/21550085.2016.1173284.
16. ^ "Understanding a slow disaster: getting to grips with slow-onset
disasters, and what they mean for migration and displacement -". Climate &
Migration Coalition. 4 February 2015. Retrieved 26 February 2017.
17. ^ Jacobson, J.L. (1988). Environmental Refugees: a Yardstick of
Habitability, Worldwatch paper 86, Worldwatch Institute, Washington DC,
page 38
18. ^ Tolba, M. K. (1989). Our biological heritage under siege. Bioscience
39, 725–728, page 25
19. ^ Warner K and Laczko F. (2008). ‘Migration, Environment and
Development: New Directions for Research’, in Chamie J, Dall’Oglio L (eds.),
International Migration and Development, Continuing the Dialogue: Legal and
Policy Perspectives, IOM, page 235
20. ^ Myers, Norman (2002). "Environmental refugees: A growing
phenomenon of the 21st century". Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences. 357 (1420): 609–
613. doi:10.1098/rstb.2001.0953. PMC 1692964. PMID 12028796.
21. ^ Myers, N. (1997). 'Environmental Refugees', Population and
Environment 19(2): 167–82
22. ^ a b Myers, N. and Kent, J. (1995). Environmental Exodus: an Emergent
Crisis in the Global Arena, (Climate Institute[who?]: Washington DC)
23. ^ a b Christian Aid (2007). ‘Human Tide: The Real Migration Crisis’ (CA:
London), page 6
24. ^ a b Brown, O (2008). 'Migration and Climate Change', IOM Migration
Research Series, paper no.31, www.iom.int
25. ^ Stern, N. (Ed.) (2006). The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern
Review, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
26. ^ Friends of the Earth, 'A Citizen's Guide to Climate Refugees, Fact Sheet
Four: Predictions of Climate Refugees to 2050' (FOTE: London), 2007: 10
27. ^ Jakobeit, C., and Methmann, C. (2007). Klimafluchtlinge – Die
Verleugnete Katastrophe, Greenpeace, Hamburg
28. ^ Parliamentary Assembly Doc. 11084, 23 October 2006, The Problem
of Environmental Refugees: 1
29. ^ UNESCO (2007)
30. ^ UNHCR (2002), ‘A critical time for the environment’, Refugees No.127.
Geneva.
31. ^ Friends of the Earth, A Citizen's Guide to Climate Refugees, Fact Sheet
Four: Predictions of Climate Refugees to 2050
32. ^ Kolmannskog, V (2008). Future Floods of Refugees, (Norwegian
Refugee Council: Oslo)
33. ^ Black, R. (1998). Refugees, Environment and Development, Harlow:
Longman
34. ^ Gemenne, F (2009). 'Environmental Migration: Normative
Frameworks and Policy Prescriptions', Doctoral Thesis, Sciences-Po, Paris
35. ^ Rosane, Olivia (13 September 2019). "Record 7 Million People
Displaced by Extreme Weather Events in First Half of 2019". Ecowatch.
Retrieved 15 September 2019.
36. ^ "INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT FROM JANUARY TO JUNE
2019"  (PDF). Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). Retrieved 15
September 2019.
37. ^ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) – Norwegian
Refugee Council. "Displacement due to natural hazard-induced disasters:
Global estimates for 2009 and 2010". Internal-displacement.org. Archived
from the original on 1 March 2014. Retrieved 23 February 2014.
38. ^ "Addressing Climate Change Migration in Asia & the Pacific
2012"  (PDF). Archived from the original  (PDF) on 6 April 2015. Retrieved 23
February 2014.
39. ^ "Environmental Refugees." World Vision Canada. N.p., n.d. Web. 15
March 2012.
40. ^ Adamo, S.; de Sherbinin, A. ( 2011) The impact of climate change on
the spatial distribution of populations and migration In: Population
Distribution, Urbanization, Internal Migration and Development: An
International Perspective (Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
Population Division, United Nations, New York)
41. ^ Hook, Leslie (14 May 2013). "China: High and dry: Water shortages
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Gender and climate change-induced

migration: proposing a framework for
analysis
Namrata Chindarkar
Published 22 June 2012 • 2012 IOP Publishing Ltd
Environmental Research Letters, Volume 7, Number 2

Abstract
This paper proposes frameworks to analyze the gender dimensions of climate change-
induced migration. The experiences, needs and priorities of climate migrants will vary
by gender and these differences need to be accounted for if policies are to be inclusive.
Among the vulnerable groups, women are likely to be disproportionately affected due to
climate change because on average women tend to be poorer, less educated, have a
lower health status and have limited direct access to or ownership of natural resources.
Both the process (actual movement) and the outcomes (rural–rural or rural–urban
migration, out-migration mainly of men) of climate change-induced migration are also
likely to be highly gendered.

1. Introduction
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Parry et al 2007) argues that climate
change will affect human settlements through its impacts on human health, food
security and decrease in the viability of natural resource-based economic activity.
Realizing the gravity of this phenomenon, the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) included climate change-induced displacement,
migration, and planned relocation in the 2010 and 2011 Conference of the Parties. In
fact, paragraph 14(f) of the Cancun Adaptation Framework calls for deeper examination
of human impacts of climate change and incorporation of migration policies and
measures to address displacement in national adaptation strategies.
It is believed that the effects of climate change on population movements are likely to
adversely and disproportionately impact poor and vulnerable population groups,
especially women (CIDA 2002, Hunter and David 2009). While research on climate
change-induced migration in itself is scarce, its impact on women is under-explored.
Climate change may not only directly impact women through environmental changes
such as rise in sea level or increases in temperature, but also make them more
vulnerable because of its interaction with socio-cultural factors (The Government Office
for Science 2011). For instance, unequal gender relations and access to resources may
make women more vulnerable to climate change than men (Masika 2002, p 4).
Furthermore, adaptation, that is, the ability to adapt to and cope with changes due to
climate change, is also gendered. Adaptive capacities of individuals greatly depend on
income, education, health and access to natural resources. Given that women tend to be
poorer, less educated, have a lower health status and have limited direct access to or
ownership of natural resources, they will be disproportionately affected by climate
change (Masika 2002, p 5, Demetriades and Esplen 2010). For instance, it is predicted
that climate change will negatively impact food production and availability of natural
resources such as water. Scarcity of food can worsen women's nutritional status due to
their marginalization within households. Also, as women are mainly responsible for
gathering water for the household, paucity of water might increase the burden on
women. The impact on women is likely to be worse in developing countries because of
the deeper economic and social gender divide.
One aspect of gender and climate change that remains a huge gap and requires attention
is that of climate change-induced migration. A United Nations Population Fund UNFPA
(2009, p 35) report argues that migration requires economic and physical capacities
that are not available to everyone. Due to issues pertaining to opportunities, capabilities
as well as security, women, children and elderly are usually the ones left behind in the
face of an environmental crisis. However, a more thorough analysis of women's
vulnerability to climate change-induced migration is required to understand the gender
dimensions of factors that lead to climate change-induced migration and the differential
impacts that the process and outcomes of climate change-induced migration have on
women. The questions that need to be examined are:
 (i)  
How does gender influence the vulnerabilities that increase the probability of or lead to
climate change-induced migration?
 (ii)  
What are the gender dimensions of the process of climate change-induced migration,
that is, actual movement of people; and outcomes of climate change-induced migration,
such as rural–rural or rural–urban migration, out-migration mainly of men?
Although studies on gender and climate change-induced migration are scarce, I draw
upon literature and studies on gender and climate change, gender and forced migration,
and gender and disasters from developing and developed countries to propose a
framework. Most literature deals with the impact of sudden climate disasters such as
floods, cyclones and hurricanes, and not with the gradual effects of climate change.
However, as the frequency and severity of sudden climate disasters is expected to
increase, the findings from these studies are pertinent. It should be emphasized that the
frameworks are intended to mainly examine the gendered nature of internal climate
change-induced migration. However, it may be applicable to cross-border climate
change-induced migration such as Nepal–India or Bangladesh–India, though there
would be additional legal and institutional constraints.

First, this paper reviews literature on how gender influences peoples' vulnerability to
climate change and subsequent migration, and proposes a framework which can be used
to conduct a gender-sensitive vulnerability assessment. Second, the paper reviews
literature to understand the gender dimensions of the actual process of climate change-
induced migration and specific migration outcomes, and proposes a framework to
examine gender and climate change-induced migration outcomes.

2. Gender and vulnerability to climate change-induced migration

2.1. Review of literature
Recently, a few studies have examined the linkages between climate change, migration,
and gender using empirical evidence. Besides empirically supporting the theories, these
studies are also methodologically relevant.
A series of studies were conducted using a monthly panel data collected in the Chitwan
Valley of Nepal that covers a period of ten years. (Shrestha and Bhandari 2007,
Massey et al 2007, Bohra-Mishra and Massey 2010). Though the primary objective was
only to study the effects of environmental degradation on out-migration, all the studies
disaggregate the effect by gender. The methods and results of these studies somewhat
differ. However, a common conclusion is that for women in the Chitwan Valley, an
increase in the collection time for fodder and firewood, and decline in agricultural
productivity increases the probability of local (within district) out-migration. Climate
change-induced migration for women is therefore closely linked with deterioration of
natural resources as they are both the primary collectors and users.
In addition to environmental degradation and reduced access to natural resources,
climate variability and natural disasters also have an impact on women's likelihood of
migration. Using a cross-sectional survey of North Carolina coastal residents conducted
in 1999 following the disastrous Hurricane Bonnie, Bateman and Edwards (2002) argue
that women are more likely than men to evacuate in the wake of a natural disaster. Their
findings indicate that women are more likely to evacuate than men because of socially
constructed gender differences such as family obligations and caregiving; greater
response to evacuation incentives such as availability of a vehicle and neighbor
evacuation; higher exposure to risk due to their low economic status and special medical
needs; and higher perceived risk due to caregiving responsibilities (Bateman and
Edwards 2002 p 107). In contrast however, in developing countries where women's
mobility is highly restricted such as Bangladesh, women are more likely to not evacuate
and die due to natural disasters (Fothergill 1996, p 41). Therefore, even voluntary
migration of women due to climate change is highly correlated to social contexts.
Women's ability to cope is another aspect of their vulnerability to climate change-
induced migration. Lambrou and Piana (2006) argue that women's ability to adapt to
climate change depends on their control over land and money; access to credit and
safeguards; low dependency ratios; good health; personal mobility; and household
entitlements. These arguments are supported by ethnographic evidence which was
collected by ActionAid and the Institute for Development Studies (IDS) in a report on
the impacts of climate change on poor South Asian women (India, Bangladesh and
Nepal) and their adaptation needs and priorities (Mitchell et al 2007). The study, which
was conducted in the Ganga river basin in the aftermath of massive riparian flooding,
also finds that poor women particularly from Nepal were forced to migrate locally due to
their low adaptive capacity (Mitchell et  al 2007, p 16). Furthermore, studies and surveys
conducted in post-Hurricane Katrina New Orleans find that poor women who lacked
home or renter's insurance were the ones who not only lost their shelter but also were
not re-housed during the post-disaster reconstruction process thus making it difficult
for them to return (Enarson 2006).

2.2. Conceptualizing climate change-induced migration

Climate change-induced migration, both voluntary and forced, is a gendered and
socially embedded process. To examine the linkages between climate change, migration
and gender more formally I propose a gender-sensitive vulnerability assessment
framework. Drawing upon previous literature on vulnerability to climate change, I
define vulnerability to climate change-induced migration as the exposure and sensitivity
of groups or individuals to stress as a result of the impacts of climate change which in
turn make them susceptible to migration due to their low levels of or absence of capacity
to adapt (Adger 1999, IPCC 2001, Brooks et al 2005, Adger 2006, Chambers 2006,
O'Brien et al 2008).
In terms of exposure the value attributes of the hazard, that is, its magnitude, frequency,
duration and areal extent will be important determinants of who will be affected and
thus, who will most likely be confronted with migration choices, when and for how long.
For instance, if the climatic disaster is sudden and high in magnitude, there might be a
sudden spike in climate change-induced migration from that particular affected region,
but it may only be temporary. However, if the climate change impact is gradual and
irreversible such as rising temperatures or sea levels over a relatively large area, then
migration might occur over a period of time and may be permanent, with those having
the capacity moving first and the poorest being left behind.

Similarly, in terms of sensitivity, certain regions and communities would be more

sensitive to climate change-induced migration as compared to others. For instance,
communities settled around river banks might be less sensitive to climate change-
induced migration as compared to those settled in low-elevation coastal zones (LECZs).
And in terms of adaptive capacity, communities, which have traditionally devised ways
and methods to adapt to climate change, or which are constantly and proactively
adapting themselves, might be less likely to migrate.

2.3. Framework to examine gender and vulnerability to climate change-induced

migration
Previous studies have used the indicator approach to operationalize the three
dimensions of vulnerability to climate change (Yohe and Tol 2002, Brenkert and
Malone 2005, Brooks et al 2005, Hanh et al 2009). I follow a similar approach and draw
upon the literature to propose a framework to operationalize and examine gender and
vulnerability to climate change-induced migration. Figure 1 lists these indicators and
potential gendered impact. A crucial advantage of the indicator approach is that it takes
into account the multi-dimensional nature of vulnerability. The framework also specifies
the phase during which women are most likely to be vulnerable. For instance, when a
high-intensity environmental disaster strikes, women in culturally conservative societies
could be more vulnerable before or during migration because they might feel ashamed
to leave the house or are less likely than men to know how to swim (Nelson et al 2002).
Further, women might be more vulnerable post-migration due to lack of education or
livelihood-generating skills.

3. Gender dimensions of the process of climate change-induced migration

There is very little research done on how women are affected during the actual process
of climate change-induced migration. However, some understanding can be gained from
the limited literature and research conducted in developed countries. The main issues
facing women during climate-induced displacement are security and adequate
emergency relief (Gururaja 2000, Enarson 2006, Mitchell et al 2007, Brown 2008,
Brody et  al 2008).
Brown (2008, p 34) states that just like other internally displaced women, climate-
induced women migrants are at a greater risk of sexual and gender-based violence.
Evidence on this can be found in the ActionAid and IDS report
(Mitchell et al 2007 p 10), where many women state lack of safe shelters upon being
evacuated or forced to migrate as one of their primary concerns. There are also other
issues of safety and security arising from women's health status and disintegration of
social networks. Mitchell et al (2007, p 10) observe that women suffer from psychosocial
impacts of natural disasters to a greater degree as compared to men. The extra burden
of looking after their family members even when they themselves were in great distress
resulted in many women to suffer from anxiety and post-traumatic stress. Further, the
breaking of social ties and separation of families also had a severe impact on these
women. Similar signs of stress were also observed among the women who were
displaced by Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans (Enarson 2006). In addition to these,
often women are not allowed direct access to relief aid because they are not the 'head of
the household' (Spring 2008). Such exclusion is likely to make them more vulnerable.
A related issue is that of providing timely and adequate emergency relief to women who
have been displaced due to climate change. A study by Enarson (1999) conducted in-
depth interviews and focus groups sessions with women who were displaced due to two
major natural disasters in the US—Hurricane Andrew that hit Miami in 1992, and the
1997 Red River Valley flood. She found that temporary trailer camps provided by
emergency relief workers were not designed for the needs of women and children. There
were no provisions for their safety, and mental and reproductive health (Enarson 1999,
p 16). Another qualitative survey of African American women displaced by Hurricane
Katrina found that they had difficulties in receiving timely emergency aid suggesting
that gender interacts with race to make some women even worse off (Murakami-
Ramalho and Durodoye 2008, as cited in Hunter and David 2009).

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Figure 1. Framework to operationalize and examine vulnerability to climate change-

induced migration and their gender dimensions.
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Though there is yet no research on this, a potential problem pertaining to security and
emergency relief is international climate change-induced migration and the debate over
whether climate migrants need to be given 'refugee' status. There is a clear division
amongst the development and human rights community. One side favors the inclusion
of climate migrants in the 1951 Refugee Convention in order to provide them with
protection similar to that provided to refugees. While the other side argues that the
existence of 'environmental migrants' itself is exaggerated and their need for refugee-
like protection is politically motivated (Stavropoulou 2008, p 11). This debate can have
serious repercussions for women who are already facing the adverse consequences of
climate change-induced migration and not receiving enough relief aid.
To understand the potential gravity of the problem let us take the example of the India–
Bangladesh migration corridor. A report by the US National Intelligence Council on
climate change and cross-border migration (US Office of the Director of National
Intelligence 2009) predicts that people affected by climate change in Bangladesh will
most likely migrate to India. Currently, there are about 15–20 million people who have
migrated to India from Bangladesh, most of them being illegal immigrants. India's anti-
immigration position and the fact that it has not ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention,
exposes the entire climate migrant population and particularly the women to high
personal security risks. There are numerous cases where illegal women migrants from
Bangladesh have been 'sold' as wives or trafficked because they were not provided any
protection due to their illegal status (Ramachandran 2005, p 7–8).
Thus, women are differentially impacted during the process of climate change-induced
migration. There are safety and security issues pertaining to internal as well as
international migration. Climate change policy aimed at climate migrants needs to be
sensitive to these issues and also incorporate legal and human rights frameworks
necessary to assist women climate migrants.

4. Gender dimensions of the outcomes of climate change-induced

migration
Climate change will result in different migration outcomes depending on the degree of
vulnerability. Specifically, there would be temporary versus permanent climate change-
induced migration. Even within these there are variations in adaptive strategies such as
internal (local) versus international, and rural–rural versus rural–urban. An important
sub-component of these from a gendered perspective is out-migration of men. Less is
known about climate change as a push factor for these migration outcomes, and even
less is known about their gender dimensions. Again however, we can draw upon the
limited literature, case studies, and experiences of countries in other regions.

Hunter and David (2009, p 21) argue that migration outcomes are not uniform across
men and women. This is especially true when the effects of climate change are felt
gradually and a member of the family, usually a male member, migrates in search of
alternative livelihoods. Even when women are not the ones who are forced to migrate in
search of livelihoods, climate change-induced migration has an impact on them. In a
study conducted in the Sonora state of Mexico, where many communities are engaged in
processing fruits and vegetables, it was found that declines in water availability due to
climate change reduced the prospects in the food processing industry forcing a lot of
men in the community to migrate. However, this increased the workload of women, as
many of them had to care for their families in addition to working part time in the food
processing industry (Buechler 2009, p 51). Similarly, in Nepal, as more and more males
migrate from mountainous regions and rural areas to newly developed cities, more and
more women are becoming heads of households, remaining in areas prone to flooding
and are therefore most vulnerable to climate-related disasters (UNFPA 2009, p 33). A
study on climate change and migration in Somalia and Burundi by Kolmannskog (2009)
found that men in many pastoral families migrated in search of work due to severe
drought conditions. Consequently, women who were left behind faced increasing risks of
expulsion from their families and communities, and sexual violence. In contrast,
drawing upon the literature on gender and migration, Brown (2008, p 34) posits that
male out-migration due to climate change can also have positive impacts such as
increased autonomy and decision-making power for the female members of the family.
Women who are forced to migrate due to climate change with their families or by
themselves also face unique problems. It was found that women from poor families in
rural Bangladesh, who migrate to cities such as Dhaka are often forced into long hours
and low-paying jobs such as domestic servants and sweatshops due to their lack of
education and skills (Kakissis 2010). Similar observations were made in the Philippines
where women from the fishing communities, who were grappling with the harsh
impacts of climate change, migrated locally to work as domestic helps for affluent
families (UNFPA 2009, p 3). In a report titled Katrina and the Women of New
Orleans, Willinger (2008) combined data from the US Census and the American
Community Survey to find that post-Katrina there was a decrease of approximately 60%
in the number of female-headed households, especially of those who were African
American and had children under age 18. She further finds that the main reasons due to
which many of them could not return were affordability of housing and health care, and
lack of employment opportunities. Thus, climate change-induced migration can
potentially push women into a poverty trap or permanently displace them from their
homes.
Drawing upon the broader literature on gender and international or cross-border
migration, it can be said that overcoming cultural barriers while maintaining their
identities will be a significant problem for women climate migrants. Ramachandran
(2005, p 9) finds that many women who migrated to India from Bangladesh had to or
were forced to assume Hindu religious markers, such as vermillion on their forehead, to
evade detection and deportation. The increasing threat of climate change in Bangladesh
and tightening of the immigration policy in India will only intensify these problems.
Concerns regarding loss of culture and identity were also observed among women in
Kiribati, where inhabitants are increasingly facing the risk of resettlement due to sea-
level rise (UNFPA 2009, p 30).
Thus, migration outcomes of climate change are also gendered. On one hand they may
seem to be empowering women, while on the other they may actually exacerbate their
socio-economic status and make them worse off. Gender distinctions in vulnerabilities
not only determine who migrates, but also, for who is it easier to return and restore their
lives.

The framework in figure 2 links vulnerabilities with migration outcomes and serves as a

guide to examine gender and climate change-induced migration decisions. For instance,
women facing high exposure but having very low adaptive capacities are likely to be
forced to migrate permanently such as the women affected by Hurricane Katrina, who
were not able to return due to lack of housing, relief aid, and employment opportunities.
Most migration decisions are likely to be internal or within country because of the lack
of resources to undertake international migration following a climate change disaster,
and social and economic ties (Bohra-Mishra and Massey 2010).

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Figure 2. Analytical framework to examine gender and climate change-induced

migration decisions.
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 5. Conclusion
In conclusion it can be said that the experiences, needs, and priorities of climate
migrants will vary by gender and these differences need to be accounted for if policies
are to be inclusive. Governments, donor organizations, and the civil society should
shoulder the responsibility to initiate efforts that promote women's education, health,
agricultural knowledge and rights that will reduce the impact of climate change on
women. In thinking about vulnerability to climate change-induced migration in
developing countries, researchers should focus on women as being one of the most
vulnerable groups. Inter-disciplinary studies on climate migrants explicitly delineating
the experiences of and effects on men and women are required for a more nuanced
understanding of the gender dimensions. The frameworks proposed in this paper are
intended to provide a way forward.

Acknowledgments
I would like to thank the Regional and Sustainable Development Department at the
Asian Development Bank for their support in conducting this research and their
valuable feedback.

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https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/7/2/025601/meta
House Democrats set to introduce first-of-its-
kind climate refugee bill
By Alexander C. Kaufman on Oct 26, 2019

This story was originally published by HuffPost and is reproduced here as part of

the Climate Desk collaboration.

House Democrats are set to introduce the first major piece of legislation to establish

protections for migrants displaced by climate change, ramping up a push for a long-
overdue framework for how the United States should respond to a crisis already
unfolding on its shores.

The bill, called the Climate Displaced Persons Act, would create a federal program
separate from the existing refugee program to take in a minimum of 50,000 climate
migrants starting next year.

The legislation, a copy of which HuffPost obtained, directs the White House to collect
data on people displaced by extreme weather, drought and sea level rise and submit an
annual report to Congress. It also requires the State Department to work with other
federal agencies to create a Global Climate Resilience Strategy that puts global
warming at the center of U.S. foreign policy.

The bill, set to be introduced by Representative Nydia Velázquez, a New York

Democrat, is a companion to legislation proposed by Massachusetts Democratic
Senator Ed Markey, one of the leading advocates for a Green New Deal. Its
introduction in the House of Representatives marks an escalation as Democrats start to
flesh out what a sweeping federal plan to eliminate emissions and prepare the country
for more climate catastrophe would look like.

The 21-page proposal looks unlikely to become law while Donald Trump, who rejects
climate science and slashed the country’s refugee cap to a historic low of 18,000 last
month, remains president.

But the bill lays the groundwork for how a future administration could deal with
what’s already forecast to be among the greatest upheavals global warming will cause.

Since 2008, catastrophic weather has displaced an average of 24 million people per
year, according to data from the Swiss-based nonprofit Internal Displacement
Monitoring Centre. That number could climb to anywhere from 140 million to 300
million to 1 billion by 2050. The World Bank estimated last year that climate change
effects in just three regions ― sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America ―
could force 143 million people to flee by the middle of the century.

Yet little to no legal infrastructure exists to classify and process climate refugees. Last
December, leaders from 164 countries formally adopted the U.N. Global Compact for
Migration, the first major international document to recognize the role of climate
change in causing displacement. But it’s a nonbinding and voluntary accord, and the
United States, Australia, and several European Union members refused to sign.

Meanwhile, the exodus is already underway. Within the United States, coastal
communities in Louisiana, Florida, and Alaska are abandoning their low-lying homes
in search of higher ground, albeit with limited federal support. The wave of foreign
migrants seeking safety in the world’s largest economy has begun lapping on U.S.
shores.

Thousands of Central American migrants making the treacherous journey to the U.S.
border with Mexico are farmers escaping lands so parched by drought crops won’t
grow. Last month, the Trump administration turned away at least 119 Bahamians
heading to Florida to flee the destruction Hurricane Dorian, the kind of Category 5
storm scientists project to be more frequent in a hotter world, left in its wake.

“America will continue to stand tall as a safe haven for immigrants,” Velázquez said
in a statement. “This legislation will not only reaffirm our nation’s longstanding role
as a home to those fleeing conflict and disasters, but it will also update it to reflect
changes to our world brought on by a changing climate.”

The nascent climate refugee crisis comes as the United Nations is already recording
more than 65 million people displaced worldwide ― a figure that, depending on how
it’s counted, amounts to the highest number of refugees ever. In Europe, the steady
stream of refugees escaping war, poverty, and drought in North Africa and the Middle
East has spurred a powerful new right-wing movement against immigrants, led by
some of the most brazenly ethnonationalist elected officials since the 1930s.

Absent any liberal alternatives, this European right is starting to pitch its hardline
immigration policies as a bulwark against climate disruption. Earlier this year, Marine
Le Pen, the leader of France’s far-right National Rally, criticized “nomadic” people
who “do not care about the environment” as “they have no homeland,” harkening to
Nazi-era “blood and soil” rhetoric. A spokesman for her party proposed a solution:
“Borders are the environment’s greatest ally.”
Climate Displaced Persons Act by Alexander Kaufman on Scribd

Grist.org https://grist.org/article/house-democrats-set-to-introduce-first-of-its-kind-
climate-refugee-bill/
Should the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change
recognize climate migrants?
Christine Gibb1 and James Ford2,3
Published 31 October 2012 • 2012 IOP Publishing Ltd
Environmental Research Letters, Volume 7, Number 4

Abstract
Climate change is expected to increase migration flows, especially from socially and
environmentally vulnerable populations. These 'climate migrants' do not have any
official protection under international law, which has implications for the human
security of migrants. This work argues that the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) can and should recognize climate migrants, and is the
most relevant international framework for doing so. While not legally binding, the
acknowledgment of climate displacement, migration and planned relocation issues in
the UNFCCC's Cancun Adaptation Framework indicates a willingness to address the
issue through an adaptation lens. Herein, the paper proposes a framework for setting
the institutional groundwork for recognizing climate migrants, focusing on the most
vulnerable, promoting targeted research and policy agendas, and situating policies
within a comprehensive strategy.

1. Introduction
Increasing attention is being paid to climate change as a driver of migration and
displacement in both scientific and international policy arenas [1, 2]. Warner [3, p 1]
credits the coordinated efforts of research and operational organizations for the relative
speed with which 'the human face of climate change' entered into the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations, culminating in
Decision 14(f) in the Cancun Adaptation Framework [4]. Decision 14(f)/CP.16 'invite(s)
all parties (...) to undertake (...) measures to enhance understanding, coordination and
cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and
planned relocation, where appropriate, at the national, regional and international
levels' [4, pp 4–5]. Although it neither obliges signatories to take action, nor specifies
how implementation should occur, this Decision is significant, representing a global
affirmation that climate change induced mobility takes on different forms and needs
diverse policy approaches [3, 5]. Moreover, it situates the UNFCCC as an appropriate
forum for pursuing climate displacement, migration and planned relocation (hereafter
climate migration) debates.
This letter investigates whether or not the UNFCCC should go a step further and
recognize climate migrants, whereby recognition entails a legal term or an
institutionalized mechanism in international law, a budget, identification of a
responsible agency, designation of persons to protect, and implementation of specific
measures to deal with the issue [6]. The letter does not imply that climate migration is
the most pressing, devastating or costly of all contemporary migration types, and thus
deserving of a special status vis-à-vis other migrants. Instead, it argues that recent
developments within the UNFCCC indicate that the international community is
receptive to addressing climate migration as an adaptation issue within the UNFCCC 4,
thereby providing an opportunity to address one component of the broader global
migration governance puzzle.
The letter begins by examining the complexity of defining climate migrants. It then
assesses the potential for the UNFCCC to officially recognize climate migrants, and
finishes by proposing a guiding framework that shows how the UNFCCC could achieve
recognition.

2. Who are climate migrants?

Definitional issues have implications for migration governance; for example, on the
scale of governance (e.g. local, regional or international), extent of the phenomenon,
and state and institutional responsibility [7], as well as on whose agendas are
served [8, 9]. Articulating a clear definition of persons displaced by climate change
would thus appear to be an essential starting point for international protection.
Differentiating among migrant types, however, poses a problem because no single
factor, event or process inevitably produces migration. Indeed, while environmental
change may be the proximate trigger of migration, the impetus to migrate or not is often
deeply embedded in underlying and interacting social, economic, political, cultural and
personal factors [7, 8, 10–28]. This complexity, compounded by the impossibility of
isolating climate change as a cause, is reflected in wide discrepancies in estimates of the
number of affected persons (cf [8, 20, 29–32]), in the absence of an internationally
agreed legal definition of a climate 'migrant', 'refugee' or 'displaced person' [29, 33], and
in the legally inaccurate and erroneous use of the term 'refugee' [5, 34, 35].
The lack of a formal legal definition, however, need not preclude international action,
and may permit more flexible responses. For example, even though 'terrorism' has no
uniform meaning, there are many terrorism-focused UN Security Council resolutions
and treaties [7]. As a starting point for advancing international policy discussions and in
guiding government policies, we suggest Kniveton et al's [35, p 31] definition of climate
migrants as 'persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or
progressive changes in the environment as a result of climate change that adversely
affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose
to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country
or abroad'. We do not, however, advocate its uncritical adoption as a legal definition
because it is impossible to attribute a decision to migrate exclusively to climate
change [26], and negotiating legally binding definitions can be a lengthy process (and
used as a technique to postpone concrete action) [34].

3. Should the UNFCCC recognize climate migrants?

Just as international and historical processes contributed to the creation of
environmental problems, long-term solutions will only be possible with significant
involvement of the international community [12, 20, 22]. While states are responsible
for planning, predicting and managing the impacts of climate migration [20], it is
through high level dialogue and coordination among national governments,
intergovernmental agencies and civil society that commitments, policy initiatives and
institutional roles will be determined. At this point, the only truly global institution is
the United Nations. As McNamara [21, p 21] explains, 'although imperfect, the United
Nations is still the only institution that has the capacity to develop multilateral solutions
to global problems, and defend and uphold basic human rights'. The UN framework
tasked with developing and implementing international climate change related rules
and programmes is the UNFCCC. Decisions taken at the UNFCCC COP 16 in Cancun
indicate a willingness of signatories to address the climate migration issue [3, 4], and we
examine below the suitability of the UNFCCC to this end. (A full examination of
alternative options for addressing climate migration issues is beyond the scope of this
letter. See [8, 22, 26, 36–39] for recent positions on the issue.)
To answer the question 'should the UNFCCC recognize climate migrants?', we first
establish that the UNFCCC can recognize climate migrants. This is so for two reasons.
Firstly, migration is widely regarded as an adaptation to climate change and should be
supported as such (cf [2, 5, 40])5. Secondly, the UNFCCC has a mandate to address
adaptation issues as articulated in Article 4 of the Convention, Decision 5/CP.7,
Decision 1/CP.10, and most recently, in the Cancun Adaptation Framework [4, 41–43].
Herein, the following sections examine if the UNFCCC should recognize climate
migrants, evaluating the benefits and trade-offs implied (see table 1 for summary).
Table 1.  Reasons why the UNFCCC should and should not recognize climate migrants.
Advantages
of UNFCCC
recognition Risks of UNFCCC recognition

Established
process and
near-
universal
membership Implementation suffers from a lack of enforcement

Fit with
adaptation
mandate of
UNFCCC The UNFCCC may not be the best place for adaptation policy

Mitigation
focus
addresses an
underlying
cause of
climate
migration Adaptation fallacya may marginalize the migration issue

Funding Restrictions on funding mechanisms may inhibit effective results

through
existing
 Advantages
of UNFCCC
recognition Risks of UNFCCC recognition

adaptation
funding
mechanisms

Climate
migration
relevant
debates are
already
underway in
UNFCCC
processes Inherent weaknesses of the UNFCCC may limit progress

Current
context is
supportive Risk of oversimplification

Ensure a
fairer cost
burden Inadvertent creation of unintended victims

a
The adaptation fallacy posits that acknowledging that climate change will induce migration
spurs policy makers to take adaptation measures, which then enables them to neglect migration
issues because adaptation will supposedly eliminate the projected migration [6].

3.1. Arguments for recognition

By May 2012, with 194 countries and the European Union signatories of the UNFCCC,
and the Holy See as an official observer, this intergovernmental process represents a
high profile global policy forum for climate policy. The methods for negotiation and
implementation are familiar to members and generally accepted. Thus, there could be
less delay in taking concrete global action as compared to creating an entirely new
mechanism. In a post-Kyoto context, enabling countries to choose policies that best suit
their particular circumstances is preferred over a singular unilaterally imposed
solution [44]. As states will be main implementers of policy, a forum that allows states
to control implementation, informed by a clear set of guiding principles, is
needed [5, 28, 45, 46]. The UNFCCC can fill this role: it encourages states to take action
within their borders [47], and to negotiate and act with other states at the global level
(e.g. Articles 3, 4, 5, 7, 15), without impinging on state sovereignty [48]. Moreover, it
provides a significant voice for the most vulnerable countries and opportunities to link
mitigation, development, humanitarian issues and security issues [3].
Building migration and mobility policies within existing adaptation strategies, laws,
policies and institutions will increase the effectiveness of both adaptation and broader
development goals [5, 22, 24], while ignoring the migration issue could undermine
other adaptation efforts, render such efforts maladaptive [28], and even permit
powerful actors to use forced migration for political and economic gain [25, 49]. Hence,
a good fit exists between the UNFCCC's mandate to address adaptation issues and
recognizing climate migrants. Moreover, by reducing greenhouse gas emissions and
avoiding dangerous interference with the climate system (Article 2) [41], UNFCCC
member states are tackling an underlying driver and ultimately helping to reduce future
migration pressures [25, 50].
Support for climate migration initiatives could be channelled through existing
adaptation funding mechanisms (supplementary data 1 available
at stacks.iop.org/ERL/7/045601/mmedia). The UNFCCC funds activities to build
resilience to climate change through voluntary pledges, bilateral contributions and
levies on carbon trading mechanisms [51, 52]. Newer funding opportunities through the
Copenhagen Accord and the Cancun Adaptation Framework address structural and
governance problems of earlier funding mechanisms [4, 53].
Timing and broad contextual factors can make or break the acceptance of an issue and
propel action [6, 21]. Given current levels of public awareness on climate change and
adaptation issues and public pressure from both the developed and developing world,
and climate change's positioning as a major global public policy issue, there is now
sufficient momentum and political will to advance the recognition of climate migrants
and end past stalemates [54, 55]. The integration of climate migration into ongoing
discussions on adaptation and vulnerability within the UNFCCC will minimize
duplication of efforts by working within existing processes instead of creating new
spaces for dialogue [56–58]. These efforts could be more effective if the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) also addressed the issue of
migration, which will be considered in the contexts of human security and of rural areas
in the forthcoming Fifth Assessment Report.
Equity and justice issues are pertinent to adaptation, and should be addressed at each of
the international legal framework and national adaptation policy levels [51, 58–61].
Inequality in income, human security and development between nations and regions is
among the most important factors driving migration [62]. Recognizing climate migrants
under the UNFCCC would ensure a fairer cost burden, with the concept of common but
differentiated responsibility foundational to the UNFCCC. The costs of climate
migration will be borne by someone; without recognition they will likely be borne by the
most vulnerable countries [63, 64], because most migrants do not travel far, especially if
they are poor [5, 24]. It is noteworthy here that Article 4.4 commits developed countries
to assist developing countries especially vulnerable to the negative effects of climatic
change in meeting costs of adaptation [31, 58, 65].

3.2. Arguments against recognition

Although Warner [3] notes that it is difficult to imagine the disadvantages of discussing
migration in the UNFCCC process, administering recognition through it is not without
risks. The original and ultimate intent of the UNFCCC is to facilitate the reduction of the
causes of anthropogenic climate change (Article 2), and not to address mobility issues
per se [26]. While the Convention is important insofar as it moulds climate change
discourse, maintains a high profile for climate change and stimulates national policy
responses, it has yielded limited results in resolving climate change issues at sub-
national levels [48], primarily because its role is to catalyse and not to implement [3].
The Convention has exacted negative repercussions on global environmental
governance [66], permitted a large disconnect between science and policy
responses [67], and produced what some scholars consider ineffective policy
instruments, notably the Kyoto Protocol [44, 67, 68]. These critiques, however, are
largely levelled against the mitigation initiatives of the Convention; the effectiveness of
the UNFCCC in enabling newer adaptation initiatives is largely untested but the
emerging consensus on the importance of adaptation in the Copenhagen Accord and
Cancun Agreement is encouraging [53, 69]. Additionally, the consensus-based decision-
making used in UNFCCC processes is slow, involves significant compromises, and of
late, has yielded largely political, not legal commitments [70]. Without a legal
component, there is no true recognition. Indeed, the invitation for parties to undertake
climate migration measures under the Cancun Adaptation Framework is voluntary [4].
Unlike other intergovernmental agencies and regional agreements, the UNFCCC cannot
impose sanctions for non-compliance. Instead, it relies on international peer pressure
and the good intentions of signatories, the success of which to date has been
limited [28], but can, however, motivate state action on controversial issues [71].
Restrictions of UNFCCC adaptation funding mechanisms may also inhibit effective
results. The current method for allocating adaptation funding is 'essentially a mixture
between project level appraisal and first-come-first-serve', but could be improved by
pairing adaptation funding with technical assistance in project
implementation [58, p 855]. The UNFCCC targets impacts directly attributable to
anthropogenic induced climate change (i.e. marginality) [54], but not activities to build
resilience to climate variability [51, 52]. It funds initiatives resulting in local but not
global benefits [54]. Herein, given that the majority of climate migration is expected to
have very localized impacts [24, 25], the added benefits of UNFCCC funding may be
limited.
Simplifying the migration problem is a necessary step in advancing a public policy
agenda [6]; however, if done incorrectly, UNFCCC recognition could result in further
marginalization. Increased attention to and protection of climate migrants may come at
the expense of other displaced people [6]. There is also a risk that key components of
climate migration will be neglected and/or that the adaptation fallacy will materialize,
whereby the climate migration issue will be dismissed once adaptation measures are
implemented. As climate migration is not solely an environmental issue, an exclusive
focus on the environment will not solve the problem [5, 72]. Herein recognition in an
environment-focused Convention could sideline relevant political, economic, cultural
and social factors.

4. How should the UNFCCC recognize climate migrants?

The first step of recognition is acknowledging an issue is a public problem [6]. The
climate migration issue has achieved this step, as shown in Decision 14(f)/CP.16 [4].
Adaptation, however, is not inevitable and thus needs devoted political and research
attention [73]. The Cancun Adaptation Framework is too weak to ensure that climate
migration is adaptive and does not become a humanitarian problem. These migrants
require systematic protection (cf [12, 26, 39]), which necessarily goes a step beyond a
regional approach. Recognition should come in the form of a Decision that builds on
Decision 14(f)/CP.16 that calls upon parties to implement the Nansen Principles
(supplementary data 2 available at stacks.iop.org/ERL/7/045601/mmedia), and is led
by an Ad Hoc Working Group on Climate Migration within the UNFCCC.
Governance interventions will play a critical role in determining whether climate
migration is an adaptation or a failure to adapt [28], thus it is imperative that in
establishing a framework the UNFCCC considers past failed recognition attempts and
addresses key procedural, policy, structural and research elements
(cf [6, 25, 28, 71, 74]). Moreover, proposed interventions should be politically feasible,
require minimal amounts of political capital to achieve, and match party needs [3]. The
following discussion elucidates these elements, a summary of which is provided in
table 2.
Table 2.  Summary of key elements for recognizing climate migrants in the UNFCCC.
General area Specific elements

Institutional
groundwork • Clear mandate and objectives

  • Participation of key stakeholders in processes

  • Appropriate unit of measurement

  • Source of permanent funding

Vulnerability
focus • Focus on assisting the most vulnerable and the most poor

  • Enhancement of adaptive capacity and reduction of vulnerability

  • Mechanism for identifying and prioritizing vulnerable places

Research and
policy • Consideration for migration patterns and 'non-migration'

  • Rights for climate migrants

Comprehensive • Situation of efforts within the broader global migration issue and in concert with
strategy other processes

  • Focus on underlying causes of climate migration

4.1. Institutional groundwork
Several elements are necessary in structuring an institutional framework. A clear
mandate and objectives are essential as UN agencies have limited leeway to act upon
non-mandated activities [21]. The mandate for the UNFCCC with regard to climate
migration should be articulated in a COP Decision, and the specific objectives developed
by an Ad Hoc Working Group on Climate Migration. The working group should involve
actual and potential climate migration victims in policy and programme formation, and
coordinate with other UN and non-UN agencies working on relevant issues. Although it
is neither cost-effective nor desirable to create an enormous but representative working
group for all stages of international level decision-making, the participation of affected
people at key stages, in particular during the initial development and testing stages, is
more likely to achieve good policies and lasting results [13, 22, 28, 40, 59], confer
legitimacy [75], and instil procedural justice [61]. Such broad-based participation could
be modelled on the UNHCR-convened Dialogue on Protection Challenges meeting in
December 2007 that studied gaps in the protection for non-refugees and how to fill
these gaps [46]. Unlike other official UN forums in which non-party stakeholders are
limited to observer status, all stakeholders at the dialogue—governments, UN
organizations, NGOs, civil society representatives and individual experts—participated
on equal footing.
Issues of scale and units of measurement must be agreed upon. Because climate change
generally affects groups of people and not just individuals, addressing climate migration
requires the collective protection of villages, cities or affected areas [15, 76]. This
perspective could be conceptually difficult for states to accept because the Refugee
Convention, to which they are accustomed, focuses on individuals [15]. Clarifying an
appropriate scale of analysis is critical as its absence hinders an understanding of
migration and an ability to generate predictions [14], and prevents research conclusions
consistent among studied groups [25]. Indeed, policy mismatches at different political
scales have constrained mitigation efforts of the UNFCCC [48]. Scale is also important
for selecting vulnerability indicators and prioritizing vulnerable people and places [77],
as discussed in section 4.2.
Securing permanent funding is the final component of the institutional framework. The
UNFCCC projects that adaptation investments will cost $44–166 billion annually,
including $27–67 billion for developing countries; the World Bank's estimate is higher—
$75–100 billion in developing countries [58, p 844]. Neither estimate includes the costs
of migration, for which no assessment exists, thus some additional monies are likely
required. Parry et al [78] further contend these figures are underestimates and could
jump to one trillion dollars per year if action is delayed. To be effective, adaptation
funding must be adequate, accessible to developing countries and available to be used
comprehensively on the ground [52], including for national level humanitarian
responses [72]. Allocation of funds should be transparent, efficient and equitable, and
based on empirical research [58]. The climate migration portion of adaptation funding
should reduce the costs of moving money and people between sending and receiving
areas, and target both migrants and host communities so that all people in the receiving
areas benefit [25]. Funding could be sought from one of the UNFCCC adaptation
funding mechanisms, the UN Central Emergency Response Fund and/or official
development assistance [15, 25, 50].
4.2. Vulnerability focus
Because climate migration will occur primarily in developing countries [18, 25], and the
most vulnerable will be less able or likely to migrate [5], targeting vulnerable nations is
ethically and practically justifiable [13, 59, 61]. Vulnerable populations are often
exposed and must adapt to multiple stresses simultaneously, such as climatic change
and globalization [49, 73, 79, 80]. They often live in marginal ecosystems and high risk
locations, depend on natural resources for their livelihoods and have a limited ability to
adapt to the impacts of climate change [18, 58, 81]. During displacement, these
vulnerable groups may be further marginalized as pre-existing patterns of
discrimination are exacerbated [22]. As such, efforts should be aimed at increasing
social capital [17], ensuring acceptable, diversified livelihoods and income
sources [24, 64], and avoiding involuntary resettlement [5, 25, 27]. Most importantly,
adaptive capacity—defined as the ability of human systems to address, plan for, or adapt
to climate change impacts and take advantage of new opportunities [82, 83]—must be
enhanced [13, 16–18, 72]. Migrant networks facilitate capacity building of both sending
and receiving areas through remittances, social infrastructure and informational
exchange [25, 28]. More generally, adaptive capacity is improved through the
availability and equitable distribution of economic resources, technology, information
and skills, infrastructure, institutions and management capabilities [73, 84]. Supported
by strong inter-agency coordination, capacity-building efforts should extend to
vulnerable governance systems, vulnerable regional and international emergency
response systems, and vulnerable decision-making processes [20, 25, 28, 58, 81].
A vulnerability focus requires a mechanism to identify and prioritize places and peoples
vulnerable to climate migration [58, 63, 65], and dynamic pressures shaping
vulnerability [77]. The mechanism could be based on the identification of eight regions
of concern [25], environmental pressure points—locations that are especially susceptible
to environmental migration [10], or migration hot spots and existing migration
channels [36]. Models that accurately predict the underlying drivers of vulnerability,
likelihood of migration, offsetting effect of adaptive capacity, and number of climate
migrants would be immensely useful to policy makers [13, 16, 17, 25, 77]. Existing
vulnerability indices are inadequate however, challenged by conceptual and
methodological difficulties [65, 75]. In a recent article, Gemenne [32] points to
promising models and methodological improvements that can yield more robust and
reliable predictions on the number of people displaced by environmental changes.

4.3. Research and policy

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Climate Migration should prioritize strengthening an
empirical understanding of climate migration and best practices for pre-emption and,
when it does occur, ensuring its adaptiveness. Research into the diverse scenarios of
climate migration [7, 23, 85], the spatial and temporal patterns of climate
migration [5, 20, 25, 27], the humanitarian consequences of climate change [72], and
the relationship between climate change and other drivers of population movements [5]
is still in its infancy. Case study and analogue work can fill this gap (cf [17, 24, 86]).
Better exchange of knowledge across disciplines, especially concerning institutional
efforts on disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation, would further improve
climate migration research [20].
Not all people in a position to migrate will automatically do so; therefore careful study of
patterns of non-migration should be examined. Different factors underlying non-
migration of various groups will necessitate different policy responses [2, 17, 87]. For
example, the incidence of migration can be reduced by positive factors such as enhanced
human agency and adaptation, or by negative factors including a lack of financial,
informational, social and institutional support [14, 20, 24, 25, 87]. Non-migrants of the
latter type may suffer livelihood erosion, deteriorating health and reduced life
expectancy, and may far outnumber climate migrants, thereby precipitating a greater
humanitarian problem, albeit one more spatially and temporally diffuse than those
brought about by acute catastrophic events [25].
Climate migrants are entitled to rights because they are (1) human and thus protected
under international human rights laws and (2) migrants and thus protected under
existing treaties guaranteeing rights to migrants [7, 22, 34, 38, 45]. These protections
are insufficient, and their effectiveness may be eroded by climate change. For example,
prevailing refugee law will not automatically apply to people whose states cease to exist
due to sea level rise, nor is there any certainty that the (transplanted) government of the
submerged state can ensure rights flowing from citizenship [34, 37, 72]. This situation
explains the urgency with which UN agencies, scholars and activists call for an explicit
focus on the rights of climate migrants (cf [5, 40]). While many of these rights are
enshrined in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement [5, 18, 88], and the Inter-
Agency Standing Committee Operations and Guidelines on the Protection of Persons
Affected by Natural Disasters [72], the existing guidelines cannot account for all possible
climate change scenarios [22]. Moreover, while the guidelines provide the normative
framework for dealing with climate migration and displacement within a country, they
are inadequate for overcoming operational hurdles [22]. Hence, the protection of rights
is integral to the recognition of climate migrants.

4.4. A comprehensive strategy

For climate migrant recognition to succeed, it must be situated within a comprehensive
strategy. Climate migration is expected to affect agriculture, gender equity, health, state
sovereignty, human rights, human security, development and resource availability and
management [17, 23, 24, 72]. Involving non-environment-oriented agencies specialized
in these areas can improve policy effectiveness and help to overcome an overemphasis
on environment-based solutions. Indeed, mainstreaming adaptation measures into
specialized policy and decision-making areas can accelerate and improve the
effectiveness of the process of adapting [89], and is endorsed by relevant UN agencies
(cf [72, 81, 90]).
Recognition must be done in concert with other initiatives advancing global migration
governance, or, as outlined earlier, risk further marginalizing and increasing the
vulnerability of people who may not otherwise receive protection. The various initiatives
should be managed within an overarching programme that coordinates the responses of
UN agencies, governments and non-governmental organizations [10, 11, 25]. The
current lack of an overarching framework, however, should not preclude immediate
action on climate migration issues at lower levels [6]. Indeed, Betts' [36] recent edited
collection, for example, examines the rich plurality and coexistence of diverse
approaches to global migration governance. The collection analyzes institutional,
political and normative challenges, including the duplication of efforts by UN and non-
UN agencies, and offers options to avoid excessive repetition. Such a collaborative
approach would adhere to the guiding principle of precaution pronounced in Article 3.3
of the UNFCCC.
A real and lasting response to climate migration must address not only the displacement
itself but also its underlying causes [18, 71]. For climate migration these are often not
environmental but related to the causes of vulnerability such as wider political,
economic, social and demographic processes [10–14, 17, 25, 64]. Therefore, tackling the
climate migration issue necessarily includes poverty alleviation [11, 12, 20, 63],
improvements to sexual and reproductive health, sustainable development and full cost
accounting [11–13], improved social capital and access to basic social services [17],
environment-proofing development [20, 52], debt relief and increased levels of foreign
aid, and enhancing the management of proximate environmental problems [12, 63]. As
such, adaptation is not merely a future problem, but one concerned with addressing
present day challenges within which interventions can be 'mainstreamed' or
'normalized' [20, 58, 89, 91–93].

5. Conclusion
Policy intervention at a global level can prevent climate migration from escalating into a
humanitarian crisis by ensuring that people faced with climate change induced
environmental pressures have viable options. Such policy intervention, however, could
easily be stymied by political obstacles, notably competing national and international
priorities (e.g. resolving financial crises) that divert extensive political will and
resources. Until the world's most influential nations truly acknowledge climate change
as an urgent issue and commit to take action—be it within or outside UN processes—the
proposed strategy for recognition will likely fail.

In framing migration as an adaptation to climate change, and not a threat to national

security, identity or sovereignty, these obstacles can be minimized. This framing shifts
the focus to finding solutions that address both proximate and ultimate causes of
climate migration, while offering benefits to both sending and receiving communities.
To ensure the protection of climate migrants, legal international recognition is required.
Such recognition is best placed within the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, and should build on the 'climate migration and displacement' clause of
the Cancun Adaptation Framework. This letter has outlined key components required to
operationalize recognition. By setting the institutional groundwork, focusing on the
most vulnerable, promoting targeted research and policy agendas, and situating policies
within a comprehensive strategy, UNFCCC recognition will tackle both displacement
and its underlying drivers. As such, climate migration presents the UNFCCC with an
opportunity to leverage its strengths in engaging the scientific, governmental and NGO
communities and in providing a respected forum for international negotiation to tackle
an emerging humanitarian issue. In acknowledging the primacy of human rights in
environmental policy, the UNFCCC can radically reframe climate migration by inviting
local, national and international institutions help make mobility a part of the solution.
 Acknowledgments
We thank Robert McLeman for constructive and insightful comments on earlier
versions of this paper. We acknowledge the financial support from the Canada Chair of
Asian Research and the Department of Geography at the University of Montreal to
Christine Gibb.

Footnotes
 4 
The 2007 IPCC Assessment Report defines climate change adaptation as 'adjustments
in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climactic stimuli or their
effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities'.
 5 
Migration can also result from the failure of adaptation efforts. This letter focuses on
migration streams that can be addressed through adaptation policies.

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https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/7/4/045601/pdf
The Nansen Initiative (Disaster-Induced Cross-Border Displacement)

Southeast Asia is one of the world’s most vulnerable regions to natural hazards, experiencing numerous
disasters annually. Such disasters, including typhoons, earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanos, floods, droughts forest
fires, and landslides, often trigger displacement and migration, primarily within national borders but also
abroad. Given many countries’ high exposure and current adaptive capacity, Southeast Asia is also
increasingly facing the negative impact of climate change through rising sea levels and rainfall variability that
threaten human settlements, infrastructure, natural resources and associated livelihoods. While recognizing that
natural hazards contribute to human mobility in Southeast Asia, in many circumstances such movements occur
within a complex environment impacted by wide variety of social, political and economic factors including
poverty, a growing demand for foreign labour, increased urbanization, violence, and conflict.

This background paper informs the Nansen Initiative Southeast Asian Regional Consultation to be
held in Manila, Philippines from 15-17 October 2014, which will explore the issue of human mobility
(displacement, migration and planned relocation) in the context of disasters and climate change in
the Southeast Asia. Launched by the Governments of Norway and Switzerland in October 2012, the
Nansen Initiative is a state-led, bottom-up consultative process intended to build consensus on the
development of a protection agenda addressing the needs of people displaced across international
borders in the context of natural hazards, including those linked to the effects of climate change.  To
feed the Nansen Initiative process with practical experiences and build consensus, inter-
governmental Regional Consultations and Civil Society Meetings are taking place in the Pacific,
Central America, the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia, and South Asia over the course of 2013 to
2015. The Southeast Asian Civil Society meeting was held in Bangkok, Thailand from 30 June to 1
July 2014.  Outcome documents from all of the Regional Consultations contain recommendations for
further action at the community, national, regional and international levels.

More than 100 participants representing governments of nine countries from Southeast Asia,
including Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, Timor-Leste,
and Viet Nam, as well as representatives from Australia, Germany, Haiti, Japan, the Nansen
Initiative and its Chairmanship, and representatives from regional and international organizations,
UN Agencies, civil society and research institutions, met in Manila, Philippines from 15-17 October
2014 for the fourth Nansen Initiative Regional Consultation under the theme “Human Mobility in the
Context of Disasters and Climate Change in Southeast Asia.” The participants expressed their
appreciation to the Government of the Philippines for hosting and the Chairmanship of the Nansen
Initiative for supporting this important consultation.

The overall objectives of the Nansen Initiative Southeast Asian Regional Consultation were to
identify specific challenges and opportunities that the region faces related to disasters, climate
change, and human mobility and to develop practical, policy and programmatic recommendations on
how to address these challenges at national, regional and international levels. The
Consultation brought together more than 100 participants representing governments of nine
countries from Southeast Asia, including Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR,
Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Viet Nam, as well as representatives from
Australia, Germany, Haiti, Japan, the Nansen Initiative and its Chairmanship, and representatives
from regional and international organizations, UN Agencies, civil society and research institutions.
On the third day, participants presented the Summary of Conclusions, which contains
recommendations that require action at the community, national, regional and international level
(Chapter I.2) to enhance regional and international efforts to address the needs and
challenges associated with human mobility in the context of disasters
and climate change.

CLUSTERS AND HUBS: TOWARD A REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE FOR VOLUNTARY ADAPTIVE

MIGRATION IN THE PACIFIC
Bruce Burson and Richard Bedford
Pacific peoples have had to contend with and adapt to a multiplicity of disruptive and destructive geological
and extreme weather events for centuries. While temporary internal migration and displacement have featured
as a response to the events in many instances, the current concern about the effects of climate change in the
region has generated discussion about the extent to which future disasters or slow-onset environmental
degradation will lead to increased cross-border mobility or displacement. This research was commissioned to
follow up on recommendations from the Nansen Initiative’s Pacific Regional Consultation held in May 2013
which concluded that, while having to leave one’s country was the least preferred option for Pacific peoples,
cross-border mobility in the context of natural disasters and environmental degradation was a reality in the
Pacific region which demanded that states begin to plan for movement now. It was recognized that voluntary
migration abroad was only one way, within a set of broader policy options, to prevent future displacement and
adapt to climate change.

DISASTER RELATED HUMAN MOBILITY WITHIN RELEVANT PACIFIC REGIONAL LAWS, POLICIES
AND FRAMEWORKS
A. Gero, Institute for Sustainable Futures,University of Technology, Sydney

As small island states in a vast ocean, Pacific Island Countries (PICs) are highly vulnerable to natural disasters,
including extreme weather events, earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanic eruptions. There is mounting evidence
that climate change is altering the patterns of weather-related disasters globally, including slow onset events
like droughts, sea level rise and rapid onset events like tropical cyclones, flooding and severe storms (IPCC,
2012; IPCC, 2013; Knutson et al., 2010). The direct and indirect impacts of climate change, coupled with
ongoing development challenges, are becoming increasingly visible in particular parts of the Pacific region
today.

LAND AND HUMAN MOBILITY IN THE PACIFIC: THE EFFECTS OF NATURAL DISASTERS
Prof.  Daniel Fitzpatrick, ANU College of Law, Australian National University

This report is a further output of the Pacific Regional Consultation. The consultation outcomes identified land
issues as a key challenge for measures to address disaster-related human mobility in the Pacific.

The outcomes document recommended actions to ensure, in circumstances of displacement or relocation:

• adequate mechanisms and/or safeguards to prevent and solve conflicts over land and resources due to factors
such as cultural diversity or population growth.
• measures such as land audits, demarcation of uncontested boundaries and community land mapping to
facilitate the identification of land.

PACIFIC DIASPORA: MOBILITY, TRANSNATIONALISM, AND IDENTITY OF TUVALU

Mariko Yoshida
Based on diverse dynamics of motivations, a large number of the Pacific Islanders have formed diasporic
communities in metropolitan countries beyond boundaries. Transnational migration is not a new phenomenon
among them as these practices with the continuous flow of remittances have been central to the socioeconomic
development of Pacific microstates since the post-colonial era. This paper explores the questions of the impact
of transnational migration of the Pacific Islanders and their maintenance of cultural values through their
community activities. The findings I present here are based on qualitative analysis of transnational migration
among the several Tuvaluan immigrant communities in Auckland, New Zealand. The Pacific diasporic
islanders maintain their strong links to their homelands in multiple and complex ways, and the forms of
mobility and transnationalism continue to shape their lives.

https://www.nanseninitiative.org/south-east-asia-consultation-intergovernmental/

The Challenge
Every year around the world, millions of people are forcibly displaced by floods, windstorms, earthquakes or
droughts. Many find refuge within their own country but some have to go abroad. In the context of climate
change, such movements are likely to increase. National and international responses to this challenge are
insufficient and protection for affected people remains inadequate.
The Response
In view of this protection gap, there is a need for an intergovernmental process to address the challenges of
cross-border displacement in the context of disasters and climate change. Launched in 2012 by Switzerland
and Norway, the Nansen Initiative is a state-led consultative process to build consensus on a Protection
Agenda addressing the needs of people displaced across borders in the context of disasters and climate change.
The Approach
To feed the Nansen Initiative process with good practices and build a sound knowledge base, regional
consultations already took place in the Pacific, Central America, the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia and South
Asia. The results of the consultations will be consolidated and discussed at a global intergovernmental
consultation in Geneva in October 2015.
Research Handbook on Climate Change, Migration and the Law
Research Handbooks in Climate Law series
Edited by Benoît Mayer and François Crépeau
This comprehensive Research Handbook provides an overview of the debates on
how the law does, and could, relate to migration exacerbated by climate change. It
contains conceptual chapters on the relationship between climate change, migration
and the law, as well as doctrinal and prospective discussions regarding legal
developments in different domestic contexts and in international governance.
Handbook
Published in print: 27 Oct 2017
ISBN: 9781785366581
eISBN: 9781785366598
DOI: https://doi.org/10.4337/9781785366598
Pages: 512

Chapter 19: Towards a global governance system to protect

climate migrants: taking stock
Frank Biermann  and  Ingrid Boas
Handbook Chapter
Published:

27 October 2017

Category:

Handbook Chapter

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4337/9781785366598.00026

Pages:

405–419 (15 total)

Collection: Law 2017
Abstract
Climate change may compel millions of people, largely in Africa and Asia, to leave their homes to
seek refuge in other places over the course of the century. Yet the current institutions, organizations
and funding mechanisms, including new soft law initiatives, are not sufficiently equipped to deal
with this. The situation calls for new governance. Following a review of academic and popular
debates focussed on defining this issue as climate ‘refugees’ or ‘migrants’, we advance in this
chapter a blueprint for a global governance architecture on the protection and voluntary
resettlement of climate migrants. We argue against the extension of the definition of refugees under
the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and discuss the limited use of soft
law mechanisms as these are largely focussed on state responsibility. Key elements of our proposal
are, instead, a new legal instrument that builds on the responsibility of the international community
and is specifically tailored for the needs of climate migrants—a Protocol on Recognition, Protection
and Resettlement of Climate Migrants to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change—as well as a separate funding mechanism, a Climate Migrant Protection and Resettlement
Fund.

https://www.elgaronline.com/view/edcoll/9781785366581/9781785366581.00026.x
ml
https://www.unhcr.org/climate-change-and-disasters.html

Climate change and disaster

displacement
Research indicates that the Earth’s climate is changing at a rate that has
exceeded most scientific forecasts. Some families and communities have
already started to suffer from disasters and the consequences of climate
change, which has forced them to leave their homes in search of a new
beginning.
UNHCR recognizes that the consequences of climate change are extremely
serious, including for refugees and other people of concern. The Global
Compact on Refugees, adopted by an overwhelming majority in the UN General
Assembly in December 2018, directly addresses this growing concern. It
recognizes that ‘climate, environmental degradation and natural disasters
increasingly interact with the drivers of refugee movements.’
The impacts of climate change are numerous. Limited natural resources, such as
drinking water, are likely to become even scarcer in many parts of the world.
Crops and livestock struggle to survive in climate change ‘hotspots’ where
conditions become too hot and dry, or too cold and wet, threatening livelihoods
and exacerbating food insecurity.
People are trying to adapt to the changing environment, but many are being
forcibly displaced from their homes by the effects of climate change and
disasters, or are relocating in order to survive. New displacement patterns, and
competition over depleted natural resources can spark conflict between
communities or compound pre-existing vulnerabilities.
People displaced across borders in the context of climate change and disasters
may in some circumstances be in need of international protection. Refugee law
therefore has an important role to play in this area. UNHCR is providing
protection and assistance for many people forcibly displaced by the effects of
climate change and disasters, among other drivers, and is working to increase
their resilience.
UNHCR’s role in addressing climate change and disaster-
related displacement
UNHCR’s work on climate change and disaster displacement covers four main
areas:
 1. Legal advice, guidance and the development of norms to support the
enhanced protection of the rights of people displaced in the context of
disasters and climate change.
2. Promoting policy coherence to ensure that issues of disaster
displacement are effectively mainstreamed across relevant areas.
3. Research to fill gaps that underpin this operational and policy work.
4. Field-based activities to address internal and cross-border disaster
displacement; to reduce the environmental impact of refugee
settlements and ensure sustainable responses to displacement; risk
reduction activities and others which may contribute to efforts to avert,
minimize and address displacement.
Through its participation in global policy processes, UNHCR has played a
pioneering role in raising awareness about climate change as a driver of
displacement and the need to address protection for people displaced in the
context of disasters.
In 2018, extreme weather events such as severe drought in Afghanistan,
Tropical Cyclone Gita in Samoa, and flooding in the Philippines, resulted in
acute humanitarian needs. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring
Centre, there were 18.8 million new disaster-related internal displacements
recorded in 2017. Most disaster displacement linked to natural hazards and the
impacts of climate change is internal, with those affected remaining within their
national borders. However, displacement across borders also occurs, and may be
interrelated with situations of conflict or violence.
In all cases, people displaced by disasters have needs and vulnerabilities that
must be addressed. People already displaced for reasons other than disasters
linked to natural hazards – including refugees, stateless people, and the
internally displaced – often reside in climate change ‘hotspots’ and may be
exposed to secondary displacement. Moreover, similar impacts on their home
areas can inhibit their ability to safely return.
UNHCR plays a leading role in the Global Protection Cluster for protecting and
assisting people who are forcibly displaced inside their countries and cannot
return safely home. When called upon to intervene, can deploy emergency
teams and provide concrete support in terms of registration, documentation,
family reunification and the provision of shelter, basic hygiene and nutrition.
UNHCR is also a standing invitee to the Steering Group of the Platform on
Disaster Displacement, in follow-up to the Nansen Initiative on cross-border
disaster displacement. The Platform on Disaster Displacement is a State-led
initiative focused on the implementation of the Nansen Initiative’s Protection
Agenda. 
UNHCR has developed planned relocation guidance together with Georgetown
University and other partners for the relocation of at-risk populations to protect
them from disasters and the impacts of climate change while respecting their
human rights.  Furthermore, UNHCR has provided technical support to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change process since 2008,
including through the Advisory Group on Human Mobility and Climate Change,
and in its role as a member of the Task Force on Displacement (TFD) mandated
by the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss
and Damage.
In 2018, in the implementation of the Workplan of the TFD, UNHCR
commissioned a mapping on existing international and regional guidance and
tools on averting, minimizing, addressing and facilitating durable solutions to
displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change and contributed
to the development of recommendations for integrated approaches to avert,
minimize and address displacement linked to the adverse effects of climate
change that were presented at COP24 and adopted by Parties. UNHCR remains
committed to continue providing technical support to Parties in implementing
the Paris Agreement, and to actively participating in the TFD under its renewed
mandate.
‘Climate refugees’?
The term “climate refugee” is often used in the media and other discussions.
However, this phrase can cause confusion, as it does not exist in international
law.  A “refugee” is defined as a person who has crossed an international border
“owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” (1951
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees). In some contexts, the definition
extends to persons fleeing “events seriously disturbing public order” (1969
OAU Convention; 1984 Cartagena Declaration). Climate change affects people
inside their own countries, and typically creates internal displacement before it
reaches a level where it displaces people across borders. There may be
situations where the refugee criteria of the 1951 Convention or broader refugee
criteria of regional refugee law frameworks may apply, for example if drought-
related famine is linked to situations of armed conflict and violence – an area
known as “nexus dynamics.” Regardless, the term “climate refugee” is not
endorsed by UNHCR, and it is more accurate to refer to “persons displaced in
the context of disasters and climate change.”
Nexus Dynamics
Recent history has borne witness to cross border movements in situations where
conflict or violence has interacted with disaster or adverse effects of climate
change. Yet, research on how destination States have used refugee law to
provide international protection in these complex situations has traditionally
been limited.  To address this knowledge gap and to identify policy and
practical solutions to strengthen the implementation of refugee law based
international protection when cross-border movements occur in the context of
nexus dynamics, in 2018 UNHCR undertook the study: In Harm’s Way:
International protection in the context of nexus dynamics between conflict or
violence and disaster or climate change.
It examines the protection provided to people displaced across borders by
countries of destination in specific situations in the Horn of Africa and the
Americas, where conflict or violence interacted with climate change or disaster.
A brief overview of the study, which sets out the scope, key observations and
recommendations, is available in English, French and Spanish. The study’s
findings build on UNHCR’s Legal considerations on refugee protection for
people fleeing conflict and famine affected countries and indicate that refugee
law frameworks can be applicable in situations where nexus dynamics are
present. Nevertheless, there are still data and knowledge gaps in this area that
need to be addressed.