by Jack Miller

The Philippines proudly boasts to be the only Christian nation in Asia. More than 86 percent of the
population is Roman Catholic, 6 percent belong to various nationalized Christian cults, and another 2
percent belong to well over 100 Protestant denominations. In addition to the Christian majority, there is
a vigorous 4 percent Muslim minority, concentrated on the southern islands of Mindanao, Sulu, and
Palawan. Scattered in isolated mountainous regions, the remaining 2 percent follow non-Western,
indigenous beliefs and practices. The Chinese minority, although statistically insignificant, has been
culturally influential in coloring Filipino Catholicism with many of the beliefs and practices of Buddhism,
Taoism, and Confucianism.

The pre-Hispanic belief system of Filipinos consisted of a pantheon of gods, spirits, creatures, and men
that guarded the streams, fields, trees, mountains, forests, and houses. Bathala, who created earth and
man, was superior to these other gods and spirits. Regular sacrifices and prayers were offered to placate
these deities and spirits--some of which were benevolent, some malevolent. Wood and metal images
represented ancestral spirits, and no distinction was made between the spirits and their physical
symbol. Reward or punishment after death was dependent upon behavior in this life.

Anyone who had reputed power over the supernatural and natural was automatically elevated to a
position of prominence. Every village had its share of shamans and priests who competitively plied their
talents and carried on ritual curing. Many gained renown for their ability to develop anting-anting, a
charm guaranteed to make a person invincible in the face of human enemies. Other sorcerers concocted
love potions or produced amulets that made their owners invisible.

Upon this indigenous religious base two foreign religions were introduced -- Islam and Christianity -- and
a process of cultural adaptation and synthesis began that is still evolving. Spain introduced Christianity
to the Philippines in 1565 with the arrival of Miguel Lopez de Legaspi. Earlier, beginning in 1350, Islam
had been spreading northward from Indonesia into the Philippine archipelago. By the time the Spanish
arrived in the 16th century, Islam was firmly established on Mindanao and Sulu and had outposts on
Cebu and Luzon. At the time of the Spanish arrival, the Muslim areas had the highest and most politically
integrated culture on the islands and, given more time, would probably have unified the entire
archipelago. Carrying on their historical tradition of expelling the Jews and Moros [Moors] from Spain (a
commitment to eliminating any non-Christians), Legaspi quickly dispersed the Muslims from Luzon and
the Visayan islands and began the process of Christianization. Dominance over the Muslims on
Mindanao and Sulu, however, was never achieved during three centuries of Spanish rule. During
American rule in the first half of this century the Muslims were never totally pacified during the so-
called "Moro Wars." Since independence, particularly in the last decade, there has been resistance by
large segments of the Muslim population to national integration. Many feel, with just cause, that
integration amounts to cultural and psychological genocide. For over 10 years the Moro National
Liberation Front has been waging a war of secession against the Marcos government.

While Islam was contained in the southern islands, Spain conquered and converted the remainder of the
islands to Hispanic Christianity. The Spanish seldom had to resort to military force to win over converts,
instead the impressive display of pomp and circumstance, clerical garb, images, prayers, and liturgy
attracted the rural populace. To protect the population from Muslim slave raiders, the people were
resettled from isolated dispersed hamlets and brought "debajo de las companas" (under the bells), into
Spanish organized pueblos. This set a pattern that is evident in modern Philippine Christian towns. These
pueblos had both civil and ecclesiastical authority; the dominant power during the Spanish period was in
the hands of the parish priest. The church, situated on a central plaza, became the locus of town life.
Masses, confessions, baptisms, funerals, marriages punctuated the tedium of everyday routines. The
church calendar set the pace and rhythm of daily life according to fiesta and liturgical seasons. Market
places and cockfight pits sprang up near church walls. Gossip and goods were exchanged and villagers
found "both restraint and release under the bells." The results of 400 years of Catholicism were mixed --
ranging from a deep theological understanding by the educated elite to a more superficial
understanding by the rural and urban masses. The latter is commonly referred to as Filipino folk
Christianity, combining a surface veneer of Christian monotheism and dogma with indigenous animism.
It may manifest itself in farmers seeking religious blessings on the irrice seed before planting or in the
placement of a bamboo cross at the comer of a rice field to prevent damage by insects. It may also take
the form of a folk healer using Roman Catholic symbols and liturgy mixed with pre-Hispanic rituals.

When the United States took over the Philippines in the first half of the century, the justifications for
colonizing were to Christianize and democratize. The feeling was that these goals could be achieved only
through mass education (up until then education was reserved for a small elite). Most of the teachers
who went to the Philippines were Protestants, many were even Protestant ministers. There was a strong
prejudice among some of these teachers against Catholics. Since this Protestant group instituted and
controlled the system of public education in the Philippines during the American colonial period, it
exerted a strong influence. Subsequently the balance has shifted to reflect much stronger influence by
the Catholic majority.

During the period of armed rebellion against Spain, a nationalized church was organized under Gregorio
Aglipay, who was made "Spiritualhead of the Nation Under Arms." Spanish bishops were deposed and
arrested, and church property was turned over to the Aglipayans. In the early part of the 20th century
the numbers of Aglipayans peaked at 25 to 33 percent of the population. Today they have declined to
about 5 percent and are associated with the Protestant Episcopal Church of the United States. Another
dynamic nationalized Christian sect is the lglesia ni Kristo, begun around 1914 and founded by Felix
Manolo Ysagun. Along with the Aglipayans and Iglesia ni Kristo, there have been a proliferation of
Rizalist sects, claiming the martyred hero of Philippine nationalism, Jose B. Rizal as the second son of
God and are incarnation of Christ. Leaders of these sects themselves often claim to be reincarnations of
Rizal, Mary, or leaders of the revolution; claim that the apocalypse is at hand for non-believers; and
claim that one can find salvation and heaven by joining the group. These groups range from the
Colorums of the 1920s and 1930s to the sophisticated P.B.M.A. (Philippine Benevolent Missionary
Association, headed by Ruben Ecleo). Most of those who follow these cults are the poor, dispossessed,
and dislocated and feel alienated from the Catholic church.

The current challenge to the supremacy of the Catholic church comes from a variety of small sects --
from the fundamentalist Christian groups, such as Jehovah's Witnesses and Seventh Day Adventists, to
the lglesia ni Kristo and Rizalists. The Roman Catholics suffer from a lack of personnel (the priest to
people ratio is exceedingly low), putting them at a disadvantage in gaining and maintaining popular
support. The Catholic church is seeking to meet this challenge by establishing an increasingly native
clergy and by engaging in programs geared to social action and human rights among the rural and urban
poor. In many cases this activity has led to friction between the church and the Marcos government,
resulting in arrests of priests, nuns, and lay people on charges of subversion. In the "war for souls" this
may be a necessary sacrifice. At present the largest growing religious sector falls within the province of
these smaller, grass roots sects; but only time will tell where the percentages will finally rest.

As we identify the underlying themes of articles in this issue of Religion, State and Society, it may seem a
bit peculiar to invoke the New Testament adage ‘Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and
unto God the things that are God’s’. Yet, although these contributions present quite different cases –
the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON) in India, Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) in the
Philippines and the Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP) in Russia and China – in
one way or another, they all tell the story of how religions’ attempts to make a difference in their
respective societies engage them in power relations that, ultimately, are regulated by the state and its
agencies. These articles thus make valuable contributions to the theme of religious diversity and its
management by the state, which is of paramount importance for understanding changes in
contemporary religions and societies. From this perspective, issues of religious diversity are not simply
about the coexistence of various religious phenomena within given societies but about the whole gamut
of the ways in which people motivated by beliefs, values and affiliations work through social
conventions, regulations and structures to reshape their lives and those of others. Such issues are also
about the indirect and unintended effects that these efforts can yield.

The first two papers, by Samta P. Pandya and Jayeel Serrano Cornelio, follow the trajectories of two
religious movements that play an increasingly prominent role in public services. While motivated by
their devotional callings, their members also become involved in national politics and relationships with
the state that can pose questions about the integrity of their original theologies and the motives of their
leaders. While at their inception, these movements, ISKCON in India and INC in the Philippines, raised
controversies around their beliefs, practices and memberships, their eventual high-profile public service
gained them social acceptability and respect. Yet this newly acquired social capital and respectability
would, ironically, provide new opportunities for their leaderships to engage in mainstream politics in
problematic ways: in the form of new nationalism in the case of ISKCON in India or in a triumphalist
assertiveness in the case of the INC leadership in the Philippines.

These articles can enliven current debates about the place and role of ‘faith-based’ organisations and,
more broadly, about the role of religion in contemporary societies by calling us to look with a more
discerning eye into religious motivations for civic engagement (Dinham 2009Dinham, A. 2009. Faiths,
Public Policy and Civil Society: Policies, Problems and Concepts. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]

; Bretherton 2011Bretherton, L. 2011. Christianity and Contemporary Politics: The Conditions and
Possibilities of Faithful Witness. London: John Wiley & Sons.

[Google Scholar]

) and the ways these motivations are shaped, modified and aligned with political contingencies and
expediencies (Beckford 2012Beckford, J. A. 2012. “Public Religions and the Postsecular: Critical
Reflections.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 51 (1): 1–19. doi:10.1111/j.1468-
5906.2011.01625.x.

[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]

; Hjelm 2014Hjelm, T. 2014. “Religion, Discourse and Power: A Contribution Towards a Critical Sociology
of Religion.” Critical Sociology 40 (6): 855–872. doi:10.1177/0896920513477664.

[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]

). Pandya points out the significance of theological roots and devotional impetuses in the Krishna
devotees’ impressive work for the Food for Life programme in India (and elsewhere in the world, we
might add) while also drawing attention to their elective affinities and political friendships with the
Hindutva nationalism of the country’s current regime. In the context of the Philippines, Jayeel Serrano
Cornelio describes the INC members’ courageous work in disaster relief operations and charitable work
while at the same time posing vexing questions about the movement leadership’s ability and willingness
to be publicly accountable to the extent that befits any prominent public organisation. These cases point
to the need for much more sophisticated approaches to the relationship between theology, religious
practice, politics and society than a straightforward ‘cause–effect’ analysis.
Alexander Agadjanian’s and Alexander Lukin’s papers on the Russian Orthodox Church in the markedly
different contexts of Russia and China also present opportunities to explore how practical theologies
and organisational policies shape and are shaped by political environments, interests and alliances.
Agadjanian draws on the recent official pronouncements by the ROC Moscow Patriarchate leadership to
demonstrate its ambition to reshape the post-Soviet society on the basis of ‘traditional values’ and make
Russia their bulwark and guardian vis-à-vis the presumed moral bankruptcy of the West. Yet, rather than
being rooted exclusively in its ‘authentic’ theology, the Moscow Patriarchate’s stance on, and politics of,
‘traditionalism’ has been shaped by the sociocultural context of imperial and late Soviet Russia.
Agadjanian’s paper suggests that the politics of elective affinity is at work here too, as this new
traditionalism gained momentum alongside the formation of the country’s current political regime with
its official traditionalist ideology and in tune with the rise of the transnational politics of conservatism
elsewhere in the world.

While in Russia the Moscow Patriarchate has been successful in reasserting the Church’s dominance
after decades of Soviet repression, in China it finds itself facing the challenge of defending the right of its
sister church, the Chinese Autonomous Orthodox Church (CAOC) to follow its tradition and enable the
freedom of religious practice for its adherents. Lukin’s study reveals how an intricate politics of
international relations and the restrictive domestic regulation of religion play against each other to
shape Russian Orthodoxy as a minority religion in China. Although the Chinese government has to take
into account the Moscow Patriarchate’s alliance with the Russian State and the respective support it
enjoys in Russia’s foreign policy, the CAOC’s official status is still in limbo, reflecting the general
reluctance of Chinese officials to recognise minority rights. Lukin predicts that an expedient realpolitik
will prevail and the Chinese government will take a creative approach to forging a status for CAOC that is
acceptable to both Russian and Chinese sides.

We round out this issue of Religion, State and Society with a pair of book reviews. Michael Munnik
reviews Sadek Hamid’s Sufis, Salafis and Islamists: The Contested Ground of British Islamic Activism, a
book that gives view into a range of British Muslim theological and political trends. These trends – Sufi
neo-traditionalism, Salafism and two types of Islamism (reformist and radical) – were especially
competitive with each other in the vibrant decade of British Muslim activism following the Rushdie Affair
of 1989. In his review, Munnik reminds us that in times when Muslims can be lazily broad-brushed as a
monolithic group, it is important not only to understand their complex array of orientations but also to
recognise the inwardly contested nature of these orientations themselves.

The other book review is from Joanna Rak, assessing Brent Nelsen and James Guth’s book Religion and
the Struggle for European Union: Confessional Culture and the Limits of Integration. Rak explains the
authors’ notion of ‘confessional cultures’ as being deeply ingrained attitudes and ways being in
European states that have been fostered by centuries of Protestant or Catholic cultural dominance.
Differences between confessional cultures, the book argues, have meant that historically Catholic states
have tended to support greater European integration, while states influenced by Protestantism such as
Britain, the Netherlands and the Nordic countries have been more sceptical. The British referendum
outcome last June to ‘Brexit’ from the European Union makes this analytical discussion all the more
urgent. If this book’s argument is correct and the British public’s EU scepticism has religious roots, then
some readers may be tempted to wish that the decisions of Caesar had simply been left to Caesar.

The Politics of Religion in the Philippines

February 24, 2016

By Maria Isabel T. Buenaobra

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Thirty years ago, on Feb. 22, 1986, then Jaime Cardinal Sin made an urgent call on church-owned Radio
Veritas for Filipinos to take to the streets and support the revolt against President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
For most Filipinos, Jaime Cardinal Sin’s message was what started the People Power Revolution, with
hundreds of thousands of supporters forming a human barricade between Camp Crame and Camp
Aguinaldo (thereby protecting the “rebels” – former President Fidel Ramos and Senator Juan Ponce
Enrile). It was a show of force and a moment of truth for a nation that wanted freedom from the 20-year
Marcos dictatorship. Had people not responded to the Cardinal’s call, Philippine history might have been
very different. As candidates vie for endorsements ahead of May 9 general elections, here’s a look back
at the role organized churches have had in Philippine politics, and a look ahead at how this might play
out in these elections.

Catholic Church Philippines

Historically, organized churches have been involved in electoral politics in the Philippines, including in
the selection of candidates and church members who have run in elections themselves. Photo/Flickr
user Wayne S. Grazio

The notion of a “politics of religion” refers to the increasing role that religion plays in the politics of the
contemporary world and the consequences that a politics of religion has on inclusive nation-building,
democracy, and human rights. The involvement of religious groups in Philippine politics is not new.
During the Spanish colonial era, the “indio priests” advocated for the “secularization” of the Catholic
church to allow “native priests” to head parishes. At that time, it was an act of treason that demanded
the death penalty, for only “Filipinos” (i.e., Spaniards born in the Philippines) were deemed to have the
capacity to govern and thus native priests could not serve as parish priests. The 1872 mutiny which
resulted in the death of the three priests, Gomez, Burgos, and Zamora, became the “seed” of the
Philippine Revolution, inspiring the Filipino heroes Rizal and Bonifacio to “imagine a Filipino nation” and
lead a revolution against Spain to achieve it.

Fast forward to the Marcos years, and discussions on Vatican II, liberation theology, the student
uprisings in the 1960s and 1970s, community organizing, and the impact of Martial Law figured in the
various discussions among the different religious congregations, including the Redemptorist Community
and the Jesuit Mission. Vatican II saw the Catholic Church’s reawakening of the zeal to embark in new
pastoral initiatives such as serving the poor and the marginalized, and to solicit the contributions of the
laity in pastoral care. The human rights violations under President Marcos and the increase in the
number of “desaparecidos” (victims of human rights abuses who have disappeared) resulted in the
collective anger and frustrations that exploded into the People Power movement. According to the
Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility, from July 1973 to October 1984 there were at least 22
military raids on church establishments, four of them on institutions of the Protestant Church.
Seminaries, Catholic schools, and other facilities were ransacked or closed. Priests, nuns, and laypersons
were detained.

While the People Power movement led to the downfall of President Marcos, the Catholic Church has
remained a powerful opposing force on issues such as the Reproductive Health Bill and divorce.
President Aquino signed the Reproductive Health Bill in December 2012, but it wasn’t until 2014 that the
Supreme Court declared it constitutional. The Divorce Bill is still caught up in a contentious battle (the
Philippines is the only country in the world, aside from Vatican City, that lacks divorce laws.)

Historically, organized churches have been involved in electoral politics in the Philippines, including in
the selection of candidates and church members who have run in elections themselves. For instance, the
Iglesia ni Cristo (Church of Christ), with a tradition of bloc voting required from its 1 million voting
members, has allegedly supported presidential candidates throughout history: President Marcos in
1986, Eduardo Cojuangco in 1992, Joseph Estrada in 1998, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in 2004, and Manny
Villar in 2010. The Jesus is Lord movement ran campaigns themselves (Bro. Eddie Villanueva in the 2004
Presidential elections, where he won 3% of the votes), and most recently, the Pilipino Movement for
Transformational Leadership (PMTL), a community composed of Catholics, Protestants, and Born Again
groups, bonded together to elect “God-centered servants.” For the May 2016 elections, the PMTL claims
it can muster up to 10 million voters out of the 54.6 million Filipinos registered to vote.
The Catholic Church, though not endorsing political candidates, exhorts the voters to vote “according to
one’s conscience.” In the launch of the “One Good Vote” campaign against bribery and vote buying, Luis
Antonio Cardinal Tagle recalled the casting of ballots during the papal conclave, and exhorted voters to
pray and have a formulation based on one’s religion.

Just how potent are the political endorsements of religious groups? In the case of Iglesia ni Cristo, whose
members are required to vote as a bloc, previous endorsements have failed: Eduardo Cojuangco came in
3rd, Estrada was ousted in 2001 because of corruption charges, Macapagal-Arroyo had graft charges and
is under hospital arrest, and Manny Villar lost the elections. And yet, despite the failed endorsements,
candidates still trooped to the INC compound to get the “blessing” (and votes) of its executive minister.
A million votes can certainly swing the tide in a hotly-contested election.

Judging by the recent events that involved the INC, its endorsement of a presidential candidate might
not auger well for either the church or for its endorsed candidate. The 101-year-old Church faces its
worst crisis in years – former ministers are accusing top leaders of corruption and illegal detention of
members who dare question the INC. In July, it expelled the sibling and mother of its executive minister,
Eduardo Manalo, for “sowing disunity” in the Church. It also had a previous minister, Menorca, arrested
for alleged illegal possession of a hand grenade. In August, it organized a protest rally against the
Department of Justice’s supposed meddling into its internal affairs but drew flak instead from netizens
and the general public who were stranded or suffered long commutes because protesters rendered
EDSA impassable. Even statements from presidential candidates Grace Poe and Jejomar Binay that INC
members were “just protecting their faith” were criticized for defending a church that is demanding
special privileges and immunity from criminal charges.

Most recently, Senatorial candidate Manny Pacquiao lost the endorsement of Nike (and some voters as
well) when he erred in making a slur against the LGBT community. Invoking Bible verses in his defense,
he failed to realize that a prejudicial remark from any political candidate will not sit well with any group
that still faces discrimination. But then again, his bigoted remark could work both ways: he will clearly
lose the votes of the LGBT community and human rights advocates, but perhaps he will earn the votes
of some ultra-conservatives.

So, 75 days to the May presidential and local elections, candidates will literally move heaven and earth
to get the nod of voters. For some of them, the fastest route may be through organized churches.

Catholicism in the Philippines

Since the colonial period, Catholicism has been the cornerstone of Filipino identity for millions in the
Philippines. Catholicism rapidly spread during the early years of Spanish colonialism, in part due to a lack
of otherwise centralized religious institutions, other than Islam in the south, which might have
challenged it. Its close associations with Filipino identity have placed the Catholic Church at the heart of
nationalism, social justice, and other movements, while at the same time has been associated with
power, elitism, and exploitation at various points in its history.

Catholicism and the Spanish state were inseparable, and the religious played a predominant role in the
administration of the Philippines. As a result, they were deeply implicated in the exploitation of Filipinos;
religious orders including the Augustinians, Dominicans, and Recollects, held the largest tracts of land,
haciendas and encomiendas granted by the Spanish government, renting plots to tenant farmers. They
were also responsible for the religious education and spiritual well-being of their tenants, and some
friars championed the interests of their parishes against the exploitation committed by their orders and
secular leaders.

By the late Spanish colonial period, the Catholic orders and their friars were the wealthiest and most
politically powerful elements within Filipino society. Spanish friars represented the hegemonic power of
the Spanish government and foreign Catholic Church, while native priests pushed forward demands for
greater authority in in Filipino parishes. Both the Spanish government and the orders blocked efforts by
local priests, thereby cultivating a nationalist Filipino priesthood that would support and be supported
by the efforts of the 19th century nationalist movement.

Nationalism and Independence

Catholic priests were among the revolutionary figures that deeply inspired nationalist efforts, especially
José Burgos, Mariano Gomez, and Jacinto Zamora, who were executed by the Spanish army on suspicion
of fomenting the 1872 Cavite Mutiny. The Katipunan code word, GOMBURZA, was an amalgam of all
three names. On the other hand, Spanish friars were vilified in nationalist literature, the most influential
of all being José Rizal’s Noli Me Tangere (1887), which told stories of corruption in the priesthood, and
which was banned in Catholic schools well into the 20th century.

The coupling of the Catholic Church and Philippine state proved a challenge for the incoming Americans,
who promoted a policy of absolute separation between church and state. They also inherited the
problem of the Spanish friars, many of whom had no intention of leaving the Philippines despite hostility
from nationalist Filipinos. The Treaty of Paris ensured the orders’ land ownership, but Filipino politicians
pushed for the confiscation and redistribution of this land.

While initially it appeared that the Americans favored the friars—much to the fear of the Filipinos—
American objectives clearly emphasized the diminution of Catholic power. Americans purchased
Catholic-held land from the Church and made it available for sale, ostensibly to the landless, but most
land was swept up by wealthy Filipino landholders. At the same time, the American government realized
that the Catholic Church held significant power and sought to co-opt it, in part by bringing in American
Catholic priests.

Following decades of marginalization and hostility from the American government and Protestant
missionaries, the power of the Catholic Church reemerged in the 1930s, in part due its control over
Philippine universities, of which the Filipino elite were graduates. As a result, the vast majority of Filipino
politicians were Roman Catholic and Catholicism was an important aspect of political identity. Indeed,
Ferdinand Marcos, an Aglipayan Catholic, emphasized his adherence to Catholicism and claimed that he
had a divine mandate to lead the Philippines.

The Marcos Era

While initially popular, Marcos’ tenure is remembered as a dark period of deep corruption, violence,
chaos, and repression of Filipino society. During this period, the Church played various roles. While most
priests were largely apolitical and many were afraid of being labeled as “subversives,” thus subject to
arrest and abuse, many priests and nuns actively opposed Marcos, some even taking up arms against
the state. Marcos initially attempted to coopt the political power of the Church, but quickly became
suspicious and turned against it.

By his second term in office, Marcos blamed Catholic priests, many of whom were now openly criticizing
him, for fomenting student and leftist protests against his rule. As elsewhere in the world, the Catholic
Church in the Philippines was profoundly impacted by Vatican II and was working more closely with
impoverished Filipinos on basic issues of social justice. Marcos worked to discredit the Catholic Church,
accusing it of sympathizing with Filipino communists. To heighten his own Catholic credentials, he
invited Pope Paul VI to the Philippines, though the Pope himself was unwilling to play the role assigned
to him and both he and the Church made a clear and concerted effort to sideline Marcos and his wife
from official functions.
With the death of his predecessor in 1974, Cardinal Jaime Sin assumed the position of Archbishop and
immediately became an influential opposition figure. Under his leadership, the Church called for an end
to martial law and a full restoration of civil liberties. He also led the Church in fully embracing a mission
of social justice through nonviolent action and the complete liberation of Filipinos from all forms of
socially-mediated repression. The Church reinvigorated the Spanish system whereby the friar or priest
was at the center of public life in impoverished communities, but the active engagement of community
members changed the way that Filipinos related to systems of power and authority. Realizing its
efficacy, Marcos attempted to limit this contact by requiring that Church groups acquire government
approval before working in communities, a move which the Church was able to frame as Marcos
preventing the Church from delivering critical services.

In 1981, 5,000 priests and nuns protested in the streets of Cebu City, outraged by fraudulent elections
that led to another term for Marcos, with similar protests in other cities. Again, Marcos hoped to use a
visit by the Pope (now John Paul II) to improve his image, and a month prior to his visit Marcos ended
the period of martial law as a gesture of goodwill. The lifting of martial law empowered the Church to
take further action, encouraging people to protest against his presidency. Following the assassination of
Benigno Aquino, Marcos’ most powerful political opponent, the Church rallied around Aquino’s wife, the
devoutly Catholic Corazon Aquino. The Catholic radio station, Radio Veritas, was one of few media
outlets that provided coverage of the funeral.

The Church used the pasyon, or Passion of Christ, to frame Benigno’s assassination and Cory’s suffering,
drawing parallels between her and Mary. The powerful metaphors of suffering and resurrection
deployed by the Church served as the catalyst for widespread protests and support for a Cory Aquino
presidency, who took Cardinal Sin as a close adviser. Marcos, believing that he could once again rig
elections, called for an early election in 1986. The Church supported the National Citizens’ Movement
for Free Elections, which sent 500,000 volunteers out to monitor elections, and in sermons emphasized
voting as a Christian duty. Cardinal Sin encouraged those who accepted bribes to vote for Aquino
anyways, absolving them of the sin of taking Marcos’ money. The Catholic Church was instrumental in
the victory of Corazon Aquino, though Marcos himself claimed to have won the presidency.

In response, between February 22nd and 25th, the Church helped to organize massive protests in a
show of People Power, in such large numbers that it became impossible for Marcos to ignore. In 1986,
he and his family were exiled to Hawaii and Corazon Aquino was sworn in as president.

Sources:
Steven Shirley, Guided By God: The Legacy of the Catholic Church in Philippine Politics (Singapore:
Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2004).

The major religion in the Philippines is Roman Catholic Christianity, followed by Islam and other types of
Christianity. In the Philippines, all religions are protected by the law, and no one religious belief is given
priority over any other. Below is an overview of the largest religions in the country, with data from the
CIA World Factbook.

Roman Catholic Christianity - 80.6%

Roman Catholicism is the largest religion in the Philippines. This religion was first introduced through the
Portuguese explorer Ferdinand Magellan in the early 1500s. Magellan, whose original destination was
Spice Island, arrived on Cebu Island in the Philippines due to a missed route. He then proceeded to make
Roman Catholicism a state religion by first converting the Chief of Cebu, and several hundreds of his
followers. Today, a large majority of the population of the Philippines - around 80% - identifies as Roman
Catholic.

Protestant Christianity - 8.2%

Protestant Christianity is the second-largest religious group in the Philippines. Evangelical Protestantism
was introduced into the Philippines by American missionaries after the Spanish-American War between
the late 18th and early 19th Centuries. Some Protestant groups which are affiliated with the Philippine
Council of Evangelical Churches (PCEC), however, were established locally, without any foreign
influence.

Islam - 5.6%

Islam is the third-largest religion in the Philippines after Catholicism and Christianity. The religion existed
in the region for around a century before the spread of Christianity. Islam first spread to Simunul Island
in the Philippines through foreign trade with countries such as India. Specifically, it was the Islamic
cleric-Karim ul' Makhdum who first introduced the religion to the area. Subsequently, he established the
first mosque on the same Island, which is today, the oldest mosque in the country.

What is the Largest Religion in the Philippines?

The major religion in the Philippines is Roman Catholic Christianity.

Other - 1.9%

Other minor religions in the country include Hinduism, Judaism, the Baha'i Faith, Indigenous Beliefs,
Other Christians, and Atheists.

Indigenous traditions predate the colonial religions of Islam and Christianity in the Philippines. The most
predominant views are that of animism, which is the belief that even non-living entities such trees and
plants have spirits. Indigenous religions are characterized by the worship of various deities, as opposed
to the monotheistic religions. With regards to influence, other religions, even the predominant Roman
Catholic, have adopted animism in combination with their own beliefs. This blending is known as
religious syncretism.

Other Christian groups in the country include Jehovah's Witnesses, Latter-Day Saints, Assemblies of God,
Seventh-day Adventists, and numerous others.

When 'secular state' becomes the reason that religion can no longer publicly manifest itself, that is most
assuredly a threat to liberty